METALWARE & CO. ETC.

BANSILAL SHARMA AND ORS. ETC.

May 4, 1979

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu Building (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960-Sections 14(1)- (b). 14(2)(b). 15 and 16-Scope of.

The appellant, a proprietary concern, has been a tenant of a shop in the C premises in dispute. The respondent had purchased the building in 1975 and filed eviction applications against all the tenants on the ground that ( 1) the building being very old and dilapidated required immediate demolition and reconstruction, (ii) the appellants bona fide required it for their own occupation, (iii) they possessed of sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction and lastly they obtained from the Municipal Corporation sanction for reconstruction. The appellants disputed the above allega- & tions.

The Rent Controller held that the respondent had sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction, (ii) the intention to demolish the e1tisting structure and to reconstruct another building on the same site was honest but did not give a definite finding on the question "whether the building was in a dilapidated condition and required immediate demolition and reconstn1ction. The Rent Controller took the view that it was not always essential to prove that the building was decrepit before an application for possession could be made and that E the respondent had right to demolish his property in order to build a new struc ture on the site with a view to improve his business. He therefore, ordered eviction of the appellant. Their appeal against the decision of the Rent Controller was dismissed. The appellants filed a civil revision in the High Court which

was also dismissed on the ground that the only thing to be looked into in such cases is whether the intention to demolish the building was present, with the future intention to reconstruct and whether the same is bona fide and all thes'e were F' found in favour of the respondent-landlord.

Allowing the appeals,

HEW: I. The phrase used in s. 14(1) (b) of the Act is "the building is bona fide required by the landlord" for the immediate purpose of demoli- G tion and reconstruction and the.· same clearly refers to the bona fide require .. ment of the landlord. The requirement in the terms is not that the building should need immediale demolition and reconstruction. The state or condition of tbe. building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate den1olition and reconstruction in futur'e would not be a totalJy irrelevant factor while determining "the bona fide requirement of the landlord." If the Rent Controller

has to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which must H mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller 'vill have to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the

factor~ of the landlord being possessed of sufficient n1eans or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use <1fter reconstruction. All these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Con1roller oi the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord, under s. 14( 1) (b). Tn a sense if the building happens. to be decrepit or dilapidated it will readily 1nak;? fur the bona fide requirement of th'e landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient.

Conversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition 2.ridl reconstruction by itself 1nay r:ot be sul1lcient to establish his hona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent consti uctiotl it1 a perfectly sound condition and its .situation may prevent ils being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. In any case these latter factors n1ay i.,:; i_.., t a scriou:) doubt on the landlord's. bona fide requirement.

It i'i. th'eref'orc, clear that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a rcle\'ant fa".:tor which will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fidL' requiren1ent of the landlord under s. 14( 1) (b) of the AcL ;1nd the sanh.: cannot be ignored.

[I !14C-H. 1115A-B]

2. The age and existing condition of the building whether it i.;; a recent construction or very old and whether it is in a good and sound condition or has become decrepit or dilapidated-are relevant factors forming pa 1rt of 'all the circumstances' that have to be considered while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act and in the totality of the circumstances these factors may assun1c lesser or greater significance depending upon whether in the scheme of the concerned ena.::tincnt there is or there is not a provision for reinduction of the evicted tenant into the new construction.

Such a view would be in accord \V"ith the main objective of the benign legislation enacted 'vith the avowed intention of giving protection to the tenant. [!l 15E-F]

3. 'The existing condition of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a vital factor which will have to be considered -\vhile pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement or the landlord under that provision which !ms to be done by having regard to "all the circumstances" and since in the instant case all the courts have totally ignored this vital factor their conclusion on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord deserves to be set aside.

The Court accordingly set aside the said Concluion of the Courts 'beJO\V and remanded the matter back to the Rent Controller to di.;; pose of the landlord's application in light of this judgment. f1120 A-B]

Ne&i Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] Suppl, 2 SCR 623; The Pt1tiala and Ea.rt Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, (Section 13) :2006 B. K.

Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Con1pany, G. T. Madras, (1964) 2 !\.f.LJ. 147. affirmed.

Pancha1nal Narayan Shenoy v. Bast/ii Ve11katesha Shenoy, [19701 3 S.C.R. 734, distinguished.

CIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION 78.

Civil Appeal Nos. 2087-2088/

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METAL WARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1109

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated 4-8-1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 1723/78 and 1727 /78.

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1301OF1978

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4-8-1978 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P.No. 1054/78.

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1381OF1978

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated 19-6-1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision No. 1102/78.

AND

WRIT PETITION NO. 4428 OF 1978

Under Article 32 ol the Constitution.

S. K. Dhingra for the Appellant in CA No. 1301 /78 and for the Petitioner in W.P. 4428/78.

A. K. Sen and E. C. Agarwala for the Appellant in CA No. 1381/78 and 2087-2088/78.

K. S. Ramamurthy, P. N. Ramalingam, A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondents in C. A. 2087-2088/78.

Y. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. Bhandari for RR in CA 1381/78 and RR in C.A. 1301/78.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

TuLzAPURKAR, J.-These appeals preferred by tenants by special

eave raise a con1mon question \vhether while considering the bona fult: requirement of the building by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction under s. 14(1) (b) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 (as amended by Act 23 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the condition of the building is wholly irrelevant factor?

Since the facts giving rise to the aforesaid question in all these appeals are almost similar it will suffice if the facts in C.A. Nos. 2087- 2088/78 are stated.

The appellant Metalware & Co., a proprietary concern has been a tenant of the premises in dispute, namely, a shop on the ground floor of door No. 425, Mint Street, George Town, Madras-! since 1953.

The respondents

(landlord) purchased the

building from its erstwhile owner some time in 1975 and filed applications against all the tenants thereof including the appellant for evict ing them under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act alleging that the building being very old and dilapidated required immediate demolition and reconstruction and they bona fide required it for the said purpose for their occupation.

The respondents further alleged that they were possessed of sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction and had applied for and obtained from the Municipal Corporation sanctioned plans in that behalf and after dnly terminating the tenancies had sought vacant possession.

The application was resisted by the appellant on several grounds. Inter alia, the claim of the landlords that the build-' ing was bona fide required by them for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction was seriously disputed; in particular it was emphatically denied that the building was in a dilapidated condition requiring immediate demolition and reconstruction; so also the allegation that the respondents had sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction.

Admittedly the building was over 70 years old but as regards the existing condition thereof the landlords were able to produce merely one Notice (Ex. Pl) received from the Municipal Corporation requiring them to carry out repairs specified therein which clearly showed that the building could not be said to be in any dilapidated condition needing demolition.

The Rent Controller (7th Judge Small Causes Court, Madras) on the evidence led before him by the parties came to the conclusion that the responddents had sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction, had got their plans approved by the Municipal Corporation and had an honest intention to demolish the existing structure and to reconstruct another on that site. On the question whether the building was in a dilapidated condition and required immediate demolition and reconstruction no definite finding one way or the other was given but he took the view that it was well settled that it was not always essential to prove that the building was decrepit before an application for possession could be made under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act and that the landlord had a right to demolish his property in order to build a new structure on the site with a view to improve his business or get better returns out of investments and that since in the instant case the respondents had purchased the building for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction and had obtained the municipal sanction in that behalf and were found to be possessed of sufficient means, they satisfied the condition of s. 14 (1 )(b) of the Act. He, therefore, ordered the eviction of the appellant. In the appeal preferred by the appellant under s. 23 of the Act, the appellate authority (2nd Jude of Small Causes Court, Madras) confirmed the view of the Rent Controller that the respondents bad

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METALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1111

.established their bona fide requirement under s. 14(1) (b) and dismisi>ed the appeal. The appellant preferred a Civil Revisional Application to the High Court specifically contending that the decision of the lower authorities on the question of bona fide requirement was wrong inasmuch as the factor whether the building itself required demolition and reconstruction or not had been regarded as irrelevant and completely ignored. The High Court dismissed the Revisional Application by observing that "the only thing to be looked into in such cases is whether the intention to demolish the building is there and

~ • whether such an intention is for the purpose of demolishing the same

•~, with a future intention to reconstruct and whether it is a bona fide intention; all these have been found in favour of the landlord." The appellant has challenged the correctness of the view adopted by the Rent :Controller, the appellate authority and the High Court before us .

It will be desirable to set out the material provisions of s. 14 of the Act

"14. Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction . .. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of sections 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied-

( a) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated; or

(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.

(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed-

( a) on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section ( 1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building shall, on completion of the repairs, be offered to the tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under sub-section (1) for his re-occupation before the expiry of three months from the date of recovery of possession by the landlord, or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded .in writing, allow; or

(b) on the ground specified in clause (b) of sub-section ( 1), unless tbe landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing allow.

It may be stated that under s. 15 provision has been made whereby the tenant has been given the right to reoccupy the premises from which he has been evicted under s. 14 (I) (a) after all the repairs are carried out by the landlord while s. 16 makes a provision enabling the tenant to reoccupy the premises from which he has been evicted under s. 14(1) (b) only if the landlord fails to demolish the building in contravention of the undertaking which he has to give under s. 14(2)

(b) but it will be significant to note that there is no provision in the Act whereby the tenant is entitled to be reinducti; d in the recons•ructed building. The question at issue is what is meant by the phrase "the building is bona (idc required by tho landlord" for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction occurring in s. 14(1) (b)? It is true that the phrase refers to the bona (ide requirement of the landlord and not that the building requires demolition and reconstruction but even so the question is whether while considering the bona fide requirement of the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction the aspect as to what is the existing condition of the building, whether it requires demolition and reconstruction is totally irrelevant or whether the said aspect forms part of the surrounding circumstances and should be taken into account while determi'ning the bona (ide requirement of the landlord ?

Counsel for the appellant contended that the words "bona fide reqwred" occurring in the phrase must be interpreted to have reference to the conditio'n of the building. the demolition of which is sought by the landlord and those words cannot refer to the honest or bona (ide intention entertained by the landlord to demolish the building a'1d to reconstruct the same with a view to putting the property to a more profitable use after reconstruction. He urged that if mere entertaining of a desire or intention on the part of the landlord to demolish the building and reconstruct the same were to satisfy the requirement of s.14(1) (b) then several tenants could be evicted even from building

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METALWARE & co. v. BANSJl.AL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 11 13

which may be in a very good and sound condition simply because the landlord wishes to demolish and reconstruct the same with a view to render his investment more profitable. Counsel emphasized the aspect that unlike other Rent Control enactments, as for instance, the Mysore Rent Control Act (22 of 1961) or the Bombay Rent Act (57 of 1947) there was no provision in the Madras Act entitling the tenant evicted under s. 14(1) (b) to get reinducted into the reconstructed building .

He, therefore, urged that apart from the landlord's honest desire or intention to undertake demolition and reconstruction, the Rent Controller must be satisfied that the building sought to be demolished is in. such a condition that it requires demolition and reconstruction before the application under s.14(1) (b) could be granted by him. In any case, he urged that the aspect whether the building needs demolition or not was most vital and could not be ignored while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(l){b) and since all the Courts below had pronounced upon the landlord's bona fide requirement by totally ignoring the most vital factor their decision was liable to be set aside. In support of his contention strong reliance was placed by him on a decision of this Court in Neta Ram v. I iwan Lal(') and a decision of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai v.

Hale and Company, G. T. Madras(').

On the other hand, counsel for the respondents (landlords) contended that both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority had recorded certain findings which were impliedly confirmed by the High Court, namely, that the building was more than 60 years old, that the landlords had purchased the building with a view to demolish it and reconstruct another at the same site for their own use '\fld occupation, that their intention of demolition and reconstruction was backed by sufficient funds as well as sanctioned plans from the Municipal Corporation and above all ho oblique motive had been found in making the application under s.14(1) (b) and on the basis of these facts it had been held that their bona fide requirement under s.14(1) (b) was established which conclusion should not be disturbed by this Court.

He urged the Iangnage of section 14(1)(b) clearly showed that the existing condition of the building whether it was sound or dilapidated was not a relevant factor for determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord. He pointed out that the Madras High Court has in several decisions consistently taken the view that under s.14(1) (b) a bona fide desire or intention of the landlord was essential but not the requirement that the building

(1) [1962] Suppl. 2 S. C. R. 623.

(2) (1964) 2 M. L. J. 147

IS-409 SCI/79

should be old and decrepit and that in any case the age and dilapidated condition of the building was not a sine qua non for eviction of the tenant under the said provision. Reference in this behalf was made to two decisions of the Madras High Court, one in Mahboob Badsha v. M. Manga Devi and Anr.(') and the other in R. P. David & Anr. v. N. Daniel & Ors.(') and it was pointed out that the view of the learned Single Judge in Mehsin Bhai's case (supra) had not been approved in subsequent decisions of that Court. Reliance was also placed upon a decision of this Court in 1'anchamal Narayan Shenoy v.

Bast hi Venkatesha Shenoy( 3) and certain observations made by this Court in S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty v. Ganeshan & Ors(').

As stated earlier it cannot be disputed that the phrase used in s.14(1) (b) of the Act is "the building is bona fide required by the landlord" for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the same clearly refers to the bona fide requirement of the landlord; it is also true that the requirement in terms is not that the building should need i=ediate demolition and reconstruction. But we fail to appreciate how the state or condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction in future would be a totally irrelevant factor while determining "the bona fitk requirement of the landlord". If the Rent Controller has to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which must mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller will have to take • into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the factors of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and sitnation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction.

All these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Controller on the question of the bona fide require ment of the landlord under s.14(1)(b). In a sense if the building happens to be decrepit or dilapidated it will readily make for the bona fide requirement of the l_andlord, though that by itself in the G absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient.

Conversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition and reconstruction by itself may not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent construction in a perfectly sound condition

(1) 1965 (2) M. L. J. 209 ..

(2) 1967 (!) M. L. J. 110.

(3) (1970] 3 S. C. R. 734.

(4) (19761 1 S. C. R. 273.

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.. _

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METALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1115

and ils situation may prevent its being put to a more profitable use

A."· after reconstruction. In any case these latter factors may cast a serious doubt on the landlord's bona fide requirement. It is, therefore, clear to us .that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a. relevant factor which Will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s.14(1)(b) of the Act and the same ca'nnot be ignored~ D;

. We would like to observe that each side has adopted an extreme stand on the question at issue which is obviously incorrect.

On the one hand counsel for the appellant urged that the words "bona fide required" refor to the condition of. the building and not to the honest or bona fide i'ntention entertained by the landlord to undertake demolition and reconstruction, suggesting thereby thai the condition of the building should be a decisive factor while counsel for the .respondent on the other hand contended that that aspect was totally irrelevant and ' the bona fide requiremel:! t of the landlord should be determined on the basis of factors such as the financial capacity of the landlord to undertake the project and whether he had taken any steps in that behalf etc.

We do not agree that old age and dilapidated condition of the building is a sine qua non or a decisive factor for eviction under s. 14(1) (b) 'nor is it possible to accept the view that the said circumstance is totally irrelevant in pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the land- \ lord. We are clearly of the view that the age and existing condition of the building-whether it is a recent construction or very old and. whether it fa in a good a'nd sound condition or has become decrepit or dilapidated-are relevant factors forming part of 'all the circumstances' that have to be considered while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act and in the. totality of the circumstances these factors may assume lesser or greater significance depending'upon whether in the scheme of the concerned enactment there is or there is not a provision for reinduction of the evicted tenant into the new cpnstruction. Such a view would be in accord with the main objective of (he benign legislation enacted with the avowed intention of giving protection to the tenant.

Turning to the decided cases cited by counsel on either side w;: might mention that our aforesaid view receives support from them., In Neta Ram's case (supra) the landlord had sought eviction of his te'nants from a building owned by him, inter alia,_ on the ground that the shops occupied by ti>~ tenants were in a state of great disrepair and were dilapidated and he wishes to rebuild the same after dismantling the structures. Section 13 of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union UrbanRent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 B.K. provided that a land,

lord may apply for eviction "in the case .of any building if he (landlord) requires it for re-erection of that building or for its replacement

by another building or for the erection of other building." It also

p(OVided that the Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.

Oil the question Of the construction of the provisions of the Ordinance this Court observed that according to the provisions it should be established that a claim of the landlord that he required the building for reconstruction and re-erection, must be bona fide, that is to say, "honest in the circumstances" t.. "'' At pp. 629-630 of the report the relevant observations run thus : _.,_ •

.. The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on.

It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that be entertains a particular intention, however, strongly, said to be entertained by him. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . The very purpose of the Rent Restriction Acts would be defeated, if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they want to reconstruct the houses, without first establishing that the plea is bona fide with regard to all the circumstances, viz., that the houses need reconstruction or that they have the means to reconstruct them, etc." (Emphasis iUpplied).

It is true that in the last sentence of the above observations this Court has used the disjunctive "or" whe11 referring to the condition of the building and the means of the landlord to reconstruct the houses but that does not mean that this Court wanted to suggest that if the landlord established that he had means to reconstruct the houses the existing state of the building becomes irrelevant.

This is clear from the fact that this Court has emphasized at two places in the above observations that the landlord's plea of bona fide claim is rejquired to. be established by having regard to "all the surrounding cir H l<:umstances".

The observations quoted above clearly suggest that amongst the several circumstances which would go to establish the bona fide requirement of the landlord the existing condition of the ' ~

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METALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapur/;; ar, I.) [ 117

building and its situation play an important part. Incidentally, it may be stated that there was no provision entitling the evicted tenant to get reinducted in the reconstructed building in the concerned Ordinance.

In Mehsin Bhai's case (supra) Mr. Justice M. Ananthanarayanan of the Madras High Court has taken the view that in order to decide the

bona fide of the landlord in an application under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act, the Courts have to apply several criteria and judge upon the totality of the Acts and that even though a building may be old stil its present condition may be such as to involve no danger whatsoever , of any breaking up so as to necessitate a decision by the landlord that • -""" it is in his interest to demolish it immediately; the condition of the building and extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition anrl reconstruction in future are all relevant considerations in assessing the bona {ides of the landlord.

His observations, which meet with our approval, have been put in negative language. 1bis is what he has observed :

"What the section really requires is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that the building was bona filie required by him, for the immediate purpose of demolition. I am totally unable to see how the present state of the building, and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction, in the future, are not relevant considerations in assessing the bona {ides of the landlord."

The decisions on which reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents, in our view, do not go to the extent of saying that the existing condition of the building is a totally irrelevant factor. In PanchamaJ Narayan Shenoy's case (supra), a case arising under r s.21(1)(j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, an extreme contentiOD.

' was urged on behalf of the tenant that unless the landlord was able to establish that the condition of the building was such that it immediately required demolition and reconstruction no tenant could be ordered to be evicted under the provision, in other words, the contention was that the words "reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord" occurring in cl. (j) of s. 21 (1) of that Act must be interpreted to have reference to the condition of the building, the demolition of which was sought to be made, and that those words had no reference to any intention entertained by the landlord. Such an extreme contention was negatived by this Court. And this Court went on to observe; "no doubt, whether the landlord's requirement is

easoab!1~ and bona fide has to be judged in the light of the 5urroundmg crrcumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of

the building, and other steps taken by him in that regard''. It is true that this Court also observed as follows :

"In our opinion, it is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition."

This observation, in our view, was made by this Court because of two

• •

aspects which emerged from the two other specific provisions con- ..,; tai:ned in the Mysore Act. First, that in cl. (k) of s. 21 (1) another ~, r ground of eviction had been provided to a landlord to obtain eviction of his tenant, namely, that the condition of the property was such as required immediate demolition and secondly, that under s. 27 of the Act the tenant had been given the right to occupy the new building on its reconstruction provided he satisfied the provision contained in that section. In other words, it was in light of the such scheme of the Act, which contained cl. (k) of s. 21(1) and s. 27 that this Court made that particular observation.

That particular observation on which strong reliance was placed by counsel for the respondent

will have to be read in the context of scheme of the Mysore Rent Control Act.

Counsel for the respondent attempted to argue that purely on question of construction the identical words occurring in the two Acts should receive the same construction and it must be held that under s. 14(1)(b) of the Act it is not necessary for the landlord to establish that the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. It is not possible to accept his contention for the simple reason that though the words employed in two enactments may be the same or identical their construction may not be the same and would vary depending upon other cognate provisions of and the scheme of each enactment. ~

The next decision relied upon by counsel for the respondents is S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty's case (supra), the ratio of which is clearly different and does not touch the issue arising before us in these appeals.

The question which arose for determination in that case was whether a landlord who had life interest in the property in question could seek eviction of his tenant for bona fide requirement of demolition and reconstruction and this Court took the view that the definition of the word "landlord" under s. 2 ( 6) was wide enough to include the appellant who had a life-interest in the premises. Counsel however, relied upon the general observation made by this Court in that case to the effect "A landlord has every right to demolish his property in order to build the new structure on the site with

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METALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1119

a view to improve his business or to get better return on his investment. Such a step per se cannot be characterised as ma/a fide on the part of the landlord. In the first place these observations were made in the context of the contention that was strongly urged before the Court that a person (landlord) having merely a life interest could not be allowed to demolish the property in order to reconstruct it as that action would per se be not bona fide for the purposes cl s . 14(1)(b). It was while rejecting this contention that the aforesaid observation was made by this Court.

Secondly, all that the said observation indicates is that in the view of this Court if a landlord were to exercise his right to demolish his property in order to build a new strncturc at the site with a view to improve his business or to get better return on his investment such a step per se could not be regarded as ma/a fide on the part of the landlord. This has nothing to do with the question whether while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act, the condition of the building is or is not a relevant factor.

The Madras decision in Mahboob Badsha's case (supra) merely takes the view that the age and the dilapidated condition of the building is not a sine qua non

for eviction under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act. That is far from saying that it is a totally irrelevant factor. In fact, in that case the relevancy of this factor has in one sense been accepted, for, the Court has observed that a decrepit building may call for immediate demolition and without anything more the landlord could be said to have satisfied the condition of his bona fide requiring the building for immediate demolition but according to the Court the terms of s. 14(1 )(b) are wide enough to cover cases where landlord bona fide requires a building for the expanse of his own business or for legitimate purpose.

Irt David v. Denial (supra) also the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has proceeded on the basis that under s. 14 ( 1) (b) of the Act bona fide desire or intention on the part of the landlord was essential and that it was not essential requirement of the provision that the building should be old and decrepit.

But it is the alternative con./ tention of the counsel for the appellant which we have accepted, namely i that the age and decrepit condition of the building is a relevant facto ! amongst several others which will have to be considered while ad judicating upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under that provision and might receive greater emphasis in a case where the enactment, as is the case here, contains no provision for reinductin the evicted tenant into the new building than where the concerned enactment has such a provision.

Having regard to the above discussion, on the construction of s. 14 (1) (b) of the Act, particularly in the light of its scheme, we are

1120 SUPREMl! COURT REPORTS 119 79] 3 s.c.R.

clearly of the view that the existing condition of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a vital factor which will have to be considered while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under that provision which has to be done by having regard to

"all the circumstances" and since in the instant case all the Courts have totally ignored this vital factor to feel that their conclusion on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord deserves to be set aside. We accordingly set aside the said conclusion of the Courts below and remand the matter back to the Rent Controller to dispose of the landlord's application in light of our judgment.

In Civil Appeal No. 1301 of 1978 and Civil Appeal No. 1381 of 1978 which are by two tenants against the same landlord and attempt was made by counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord to show that the tenants in their written statements had made an admissicm that the building which was sought to be demolished was not merely old but in a dilapidated condition. After going through the written statements of the tenants in these appeals we are not satisfied that any such clear admission has been made by the tenants in their written statements. Further, in these matters also the Rent Controllex, the Appellate Authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the footing that even if it were assumed that the building was not old nor dilapidated even then the landlord was entitled to an order of eviction as his honest intention to demolish the building and to reconstruct the same was backed by sufficient funds and the stepi; which he took by applying for sanction of plan for demolition and reconstruction and, therefore, the applications of the landlord "ill have to go back to the Renf Controller and we accordingly set aside the orders of the High Court and remand the applications to the Relllt Controller for disposal according to law in the light of our judgment.

There will be no order as to costs in all these appeals.

In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 2087-2088, 1301 and 1381 of 1978 the writ petition is allowed to be withdrawn since the same is not pressed.

N.K.A. 4 ppeals allowed.

• •

METALWARE & CO. ETC

BANSILAL SHARMA AND ORS. ETC

May 4, 1979

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.

Sections 14(1)

s. 14(1)

s. 14( 1)

s. 14( 1)

s. 14(1)

Section 13

CIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION 78

Article 32

S. K. Dhingra

A. K. Sen

E. C. Agarwala

K. S. Ramamurthy

P. N. Ramalingam

A. T. M. Sampath

Y. S. Chitale

L. N. Singhvi

J. S. Sinha

K. J. John

B. Bhandari

TuLzAPURKAR

s. 14(1)

Metalware & Co.

Madras-

s. 14(1)

s. 14(1)

s. 14

s. 23

s. 14(1)

s. 14

sections 12 and 13

s. 15

s. 14

s. 16

s. 14(1)

s. 14(2)

s. 14(1)

s. 14(1)

s. 14(l)

Madras High Court

section 14(1)(b)

Mehsin Bhai

(1970] 3 S. C. R. 734

s. 14(1)

s. 14(1)

Neta Ram

Section 13

M. Ananthanarayanan

s. 14(1)

PanchamaJ Narayan Shenoy

s. 21

s. 21

s. 27

s. 21(1)

s. 27

s. 14(1)(b)

S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty

s. 2

s. 14(1)

Madras

Mahboob Badsha

s. 14(1)

s. 14(1 )(b)

s. 14

s. 14


• •

THE AUTIIORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR & ANR.

S. NAGANATHA AYYAR

May 4, 1979

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

The Tamll Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961- Ss. 7 and 22-Scope of-Sale, gift, transfer etc. of land made between certain

dates void-Bona fide transfers if exempt by s. 22.

Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961, provides that on and from the date of commencement of the Act no

person shall, except as otherwise provided in the Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIlI, be entitled to hold land in 'excess of the ceiling area.

Section 22 provides that where on or after the date of commencement of the Act (6th April, 1960) but before the notified date (2nd October, 1962) any

person has transferred any l•nd held by him by sale, gift etc. the Authorued D Officer within whose Jurisdiction such land holding of the major part thereof is situated may, after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer or partition and after such inquiry as he thinks fit to make, declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition, as the case may be, defeats any of the provisions of the Act.

The alienations in all the cases took many forms ranging from 3tridl1ana to bona fide !ale and they were executed between the date of commencemnt ot. the Act and notified date.

The Land Tribunal held that the alienations were void because but for the alienations the holders would have had the lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act.

On the interpretation of s. 22 of the Act, the ){igh Court was of tile view thn.t the section covered only those sham, nominal and bogus transfers which are intended to defeat the provisions of the Act and which are inconsistent with the object provid'ed in s. 7. It was also held that transactions entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act would not be hit by the provisions prevent ing such transfers except where they were mala fide or colourable; and that the word "defeat" in s. 22 should be taken as having been used to import a sinister motive. It was therefore held that under s. 22 the Authorised Officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are skam and nominal entered into with the avowed object of defeating the provisions of the Act without any bona fide intention to transfer title.

HELD: (I) If any transfer defeats the'provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such transaction, bona fide or not, is void in the matter of computation of the permissible area and the surplus area.

The Authorised Officer is within hia p:ower if he ignores it as void for purposes of s. 22, s. 7 and other ceiling related provioions. [l132C]

{2) Looking at the words of s. 22 in the light of the scheme of prohibition of transfers to preserve the surplus land for distribution there is no justification for importing into s. 22 more than its words convey. The section says what it means.

A simple scan of the provision reveals that any transfer, gift, surrender, settlement or other alienations may be declared void by the Authorized Officer, if he finds that the transfer or the partition defeats any of the provisions of this Act. fhe trichotomy is obvious : There must be a transfer or other alienation; it must have taken place during 1he period mentioned in the section; it must have the effect of defeating any of the provisions of the Act. If these three elements are present, the Authoris'ed Officer must void the transfer. There is no rule for importing a fourth principle that the transfer should be sham, nominal or bogus nor is there any additional consideration that if the transfer is bona fide for family necessity or other urgency then it is good even though

it' defeats the provisions of the Act.

The provision seeks to provide social justice for the landless and it defeats the purpose if, by the interpretative process, soft justice to large !andholder. is brought bout. [I 130B-D]

(3) The literal meaning of the section is that any transfer or other alienation mentiOilfd in it which reduces or impairs the otherwise available extent of surplus land beyond the ceiling defeats the provisions of the Act. This is the plain meaning of the section which gives no room for doubt or justification for D importation of any further condition like sham, bogus etc.

(4) The High Court was wrong in its view that the Act being a confiscatory one, the public authority "invested with the power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act reasonably, and that such a power should bo construed beneficially in favour of the subject who is affected by the statute." The approach of the High Court is inept and inapplicable when one considers agrarian reform legislation whose avowed purpose is to take away as much extent of land as policy dictates so that distribution thereof among the landless may be achieved.

When a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property, rules which have frowned upon confiscatory legislation cannot apply at all.

The jurisprudential principles in such a situation cannot be the same as have be'en inherd from a culture which postulates the State v. the subject.

[1126E-0]

(5) While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental a character as agrarian reform, the.Court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgI'image to destination socir.J justice should be helped, not hampered, by judicial interpretation.

It is true that Judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters; but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution. The judiciary, in its sphere, shares the revolutionary pur pose of the constitutional order and when called upon to decode social legisla• tion it must be animated by the goal-oriented approach.

[1123E-H]

OVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal 2544 of 1972.

Nos. 2542

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 11-12-1970 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1824 and 1825/65.

V. P. Raman, Adv. Genl. and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant.

' ..

A. T. M. Sampath tor Respondent in C.A. 2542172.

K. S. Ramilmurthi, Mrs. Saroja Gopalkrishnan for Respondent in

C.A. 2542172.

K. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar for R. 1 in CA 2544172.

K. Rajendra Chaudhry for R. 2 in C.A. 2544172.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J. The short point of Jaw. decided in the Jong judgment under appeal may justly be given short shrift. But the batch of Civil Revision Petitions allowed by the High Court involves a legal issue of deep import from the angle of agrarian reform and surplus land available for distribution under its scheme that we deem it proper to discuss the core question at some length. If the statutory construction which found favour with the High Court be correct the risk of reform legislation being condemned to functional futility is great, and so the State has come up in appeal by Special Leave challenging the High Court's interpretation of s. 22 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms

(Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act, 1961 (for short, the Ceiling Act).

Presently, we will set out the skeletal facts relating to the civil appeals and the scheme of the Act designed for distributive. justice in the field of agricultural land ownership, sufficient to disclose the purpose of the legislation, the mischief it intends to suppress, the reverse effect of the construction put on the key section (s. 22) in the judgment under appeal and the consequeut stultification of the objective of the Ceiling Act. While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental a character as agrarian reform, t.he court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgrimage to 'destination social justice' should be helped, and not hampered, by judicial interpretation. For, the story of agrarian re-distribution in Tamil Nadu, as elsewhere, has been tardy and zigzag, what with legislative delays, judicial stays and invalidations, followed by fresh constitutional amendments and new constitutional challenges and statutory constructions, holding up, for decades, urgent measures of rural economic justice which was part of the pledges of the Freedom struggle. It is true that judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters; but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution being one of the trinity of the nation's appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio-economic order.

The judiciary in its sphere, shares the revolutionary purpose of the Constitutional order, and when called upon to decode social legislation must be animated by a goal-oriented approach. This is part of the dynamics of statutory intretation in the developing countries so that courts are not converted into rescue shelters for those who seek to defeat agrarian justice by cute transac-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 S.C.ll.

A lions of many manifestations now so similar in the country and illustrated by the several cases under appeal.

This caveat has become necessary because the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme.

The Ceiling Act, in its structure and process, follows the common pattern.

The object is equitable distribution of land to the land!~ by relieving those who hold more than the optimum extent fixed by the law.

The success of the scheme depends on maximisation of' surplus land to be taken over by the State from large landholders. The strategy of fixing a severe ceiling on land holdings was expected to be paralysed by anticipatory strategems by landholders and so legislature sought to outwit them and clamped down pre-emptive restrictions on transfer whereby the surplus takeover would be sabotaged, Chapter II prescribes the ceiling on land holdings and Chapter III proscribes certain types of deleterious transfers and future acquisitions.

One such provision is s. 22 which falls for immediate dissection. The machinery for working out the scheme includes 'authorised officers'

aS defined in s. 3 (5) of the Ceiling Act.

The rest of the infra structure for implementation of the statutory scheme is not material foc our case nor the other chapters relating to compensation, exemptions and the like Chapter XI provides for appeals and revisions and the High Court, by virtue of s. 83 read with s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has jurisdiction to entertain revisions against orders of Land Tribunals which enjoy appellate powers over orders of authorised officers in the manner provided.

The present appeals are against a common order of the High Court allowing several revision petitions under s. 115 C.P.C.

N0w, the respondents before us in the several appeals are persons whose transfers have been held void by the authorised officer and the land Tribunal but upheld by the High Court on a narrow construction of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act. The alienations took many fonns ranging from stridhana tu bona fide sale but shared one common attribute that they were executed during the suspect spell, if one may say so, between the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date.

The legislature, in its realistic anxiety and pragmatic wisdom, demarcated a lethal zone viz., the period between the two dates stated above when all landholders with lands in excess of the ceiling would desperately salvage their surplus by resort to devices, some bona fide, some not, but all having the effect of frustrating the legislative objective of freezing holdings as on the date of commencement of the Act and seizing the surplus in terms of the Act for eventual equitable distribulion, after payment of statutory compensation.

Before embarking on any further discussion of the project of inter- A dieting transfers, as spelt out in s. 22, we may read the provision :

"Where on or after the date of commencement of this Act, but before the notified date, any person has transferred any land held by him by sale, gift (other than gift made in contemplation of death), exchange, surrender, settlement or in any other manner except by request or, has effected a partition of his holding or part thereof, the Authorised

Officer within whose jurisdiction such land, holding of the major part thereof is situated may, after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer on partition and after such enquiry as he thinks fit to make declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition as the case may be, defeats any of the provisions of this Act."

Three semantic alternatives compete for judicial acceptance. The first, which appealed to the Land Tribunal is that all alienations during the dubious period specificated in s. 22, if executed by a holder who, but for such shedding operation or alienation, would have had lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act, are void because they are sure to defeat the 'surplus' provisions of the Act. The second alternative, which swings to the other extreme but has met with the High Court's approval, virtually salvages all such transfers save sham and mala fide ones, for only if they are obnoxious in that sense

can they be caught in the coils of s. 22. The third possible construction, which is in between the two extremes and has been forcefully pressed before us by Shri K. S. Ramamurthy, validates bona fide transfers even during the offending period, the reason being that regardless of thdr impact on the scheme of the Act or its provisions, the primary object is bona fide fulfilment of the alienor's purposes such as discharge of pressing debts or borrowing to perform necessitous obligations and not to defeat or thwart the purposes or provisions of the Act.

The judicial choice from among these triple possibles depends on the rules of statutory interpretation. In the present case the basic facts are beyond dispute. The legislature had a defined plan of providing for a ceiling on land holding, taking over the balance and distributing it among the landless according to priorities.

In this perspective it defined the "date of the commencement of this Act in s. 3(11) Its meaning the 15th day of February, 1970. It also defined in s. 3(31) the notified date. As stated earlier, the Ceiling Act had

a chequered caree.r in court and, indeed, at one stage the whole Act was struck down as unconstitutional.

However, now it is immune to attack having been included in the Ninth Schedule and there is no challenge to its vires before us.

On account of extensive mischief done by alienations on a co!'siderble scale calculated to undo the public policy behind agrarian reform the legislature felt the necessity to provide in s. 22 that transfers made between 6-4-1960 and 2-10-1962 would be void if they defeated the provisions of the Act.

In all the cases before us the transfers which have been ignored by the Authorised Officer fall within this interregnum. That being admitted, the only question is whether the lethal effect of s. 22. operates only in the case of transfers which are sham and specifically intended to defeat the Act or does not affect transfers which are otherwise bona fide or is so pervasive that if the effect of the transfer is to defeat the provisions of the Act, whatever the intent of the parties, the transfer is void and can be ignored vis-a-vis the Ceiling Act and the Authorised Officer may legitimately proceed to compute the surplus D a'rea on this basis.

The learned judge adverted to an argument that the Act being a confiscatory one, the public authority "invested with the power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act reaspnably, and that such a power should be construed beneficiently in favour of the subject who is affected by the statute (emphasis added). This approach, sanctified by tradition and vintage jurisprudence, is inept and inapplicable when we consider agrarian reform legislation whose avowed purpose is to take away as much extent of land as policy dictates so that distribution thereof among the landless may be achieved.

When a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property, subject to payment of compensation, rules which have frowned upon confiscatory legislation cannot apply at all. We are concerned with a Republic created by the people of India, with a social transformation where the State is 'not antagonistic to the cti7, en but harmonises individual interest with community good. The jurisprudential principles in such a situation cannot be the same as have been inherited from a culture which postulates the State versus the subject.

We do not explore the aspect df the law further as we are satisfied that the answer to the specific question raised before us flows directly from a reading of the Section in the light of we11-established rules of interpretation.

Section 7 is a key provision and runs as follows :

"On and from the date of commencement of this Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act but

' ,) .. r

subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII be entitled to hold laud in excess of the ceiling area;

Provided that in calculating the total of land held by any person, any extent in excess of the ceiling area and not exceeding half an acre in the case of wet land and one acre in the case of dry land shall, irrespective of the assessment of such land, be excluded."

\, Section 8 directs every person who holds land in excess of 30 , _ , i(_ standard acres to submit a return with specified particulars. Section 18

' is the culmination and provides for the publication of a notification to the effect that the surplus land with each landholder is required for a public purpose. Thereupon such land shall be deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and shall vest in the Government.

Chapter III is a protective armour created by the statute with prohibitions and proscriptions. In particular, s. 22, which we have quoted earlier, contains an interdict.

If any transfer, contrary to its tenor, is createtl it can be voided by the Authorised Officer.

The whole purpose is to make available land with Government for its equitable dispensation according to the statutory plan. Section 94 is relevant in this context.

6-4-1960 is the date of commencem"nt of the Act. 2-10-62 is the notified date. Transfers in between these two dates have been executed by the respondents in the various appeals before us.

The concrete question is whether s. 22 has the effect of rendering such transfers invalid ipso facto or whether there is need for further proof that such transfers are "sham, nominal and bogus''.

The view taken by the High Court is that :

" ... Section 22 seems to cover only those sham,· nominal and bogus transfers which are only inte'nded to defeat the provisions of the Act. If the Legislative intention is also to invalidate all bona fide transactions during the relevant period, it would have made certain consequentia1 pravisions as to what arc the rights of the transferor and the transferee in relation to the property conveyed, and how the resultant equities between th~ transferee and the transferor have to be worked out.

This view that section 22 will cover only transactions of sham, nominal and bogus character which are intended only to defeat the provisions of the Act will not be inconsistent with the object provided in section

7."

A The learned judge seems to take a liberal view that transactions

entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act will not be hit by the provisions preventing such transfers except where they are 1JID/a fide or colourable.

The reason partly turns on semantics and the conrt argues with lexical support:

"The word "defeat" normally means overcome, thwart, evade, frustrate, circumvent, bypass, disappoint, prevent, the accomplishment of the word "defeat" in Section 22 is one to be taken as having been used to import sinister, motive.

Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes, twelfth edition, after stating that the Courts will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to escape its net, that the statute has to be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions thus defeating any shifts and contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope of falling outside the Act."

D The conclusion categorically reached by the High Court virtually

emasculates s. 22 as we understand its object and import.

The learned judge winds up with these words:

"On a due consideration of the matter, I hold that under section 22 of the Act the authorised officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are sham and nominal entered into with the avowed object of defeating the provisions of the Act, without any bona fide intention to transfer title. So in the light of the view expressed above the facts of each case have to be considered.''

Section 22, literally read leads only to one conclusion, that any transfer, bona fide executed or not, is liable to be declared void by the Authorised Officer "if he finds that the transfer defeats any of the provisions of this Act." There is not the slightest doubt that severally and cumulatively the provisions of the Act seek to make available the maximum extent of land, in excess of the ceiling, to be vested in Government for fulfilment of its purposes.

Chapter II contain\; a fasciculus of provisions in this behalf and if any transfer carves out of the surplus area some land, pro tanto, the provisions of the Act are defeated.

Indeed, it is not seriously disputed that such will be the conclusion if we do not read into the provisions either the condition that it does not apply to bona fide transfers, as Shri Ramamurthy would have it, or does not apply to any transfers other than sham, nominal or bogus transfers, as the High Court would have it.

A policy-oriented interpretation tallies with the literal construction in the

~··· ...

present case. The mischief rule in Heydon's case and the grammati- A cal construction which is the Golden Rule converge to the same conclusion in the present case.

The policy of the law of land reform with drastic limit on holdings often drives large holders to evade by manouvres. They make gifts, execute sales or settlements, enter into other dealings to save their properties from being taken by the State.

May be in a few cases, the ow'ner has real necessity.

Bnt why sell only on !he eve of land legislation? Why execute deeds, !hongh for good purposes, only where the bill fixing ceilings is round the corner?

By a'nd large, the strategies of extrication of holdin!11' from the arm of the law is the reason that prompts sudden affection for making gifts, sudden realisation of debts due and sudden awareness of family necessity.

The legislature, astute enough not to be outwitted in its objective, puts a blanket ban on transfers wbich, in effect, Cbfeat its provisions.

This may cause hardship to some but every cause claims martyrs.

Individual trauma is inevitable while ushering in a new economic order.

This is the rationale of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act. To alloy the sense of the text and to mix alien concepts is to debase the statutory metal.

Likewise, laws are not value-free and so he reads the symbols of words best who projects i'n the process the values of the legislation as distinguished from his own.

Reading other valuos into the legislators' words may judicially demonetize the statute and break the comity between constitutional instrumentalities.

The current and correct view of the interpretative process is that words must be given their 'literal' or 'ordinary' meaning unless there are compelli'ng reasons, recognised by canons of construction, to the contrary. It must be remembered that the jndicial rule of law for interpreting statutes applies the grammatical approach, thereby to bring out the value judgment incorporated in the statute itself. Some times it is called the 'equity of the statute'. As Prof. R. B. Stevens

of the Yale University bas pointed out:

"Whenever the judges support to depart from the literal or ordihary meaning, and apply the mischief rue or the golden rule, there is danger that in place of those irrelevant criteria, the canons of construction, they have more obviously substituted their own (perhaps more harmful) impressions views, prejudices or predispositions.

Such conflicts betwee~ what Parliament intended and what the judges asi; umed Parliament to have intended have long bt"Clll appreciated."(')

(l) Modern Law Review, Vol. 28, 1%5, p. 525.

16--409 SCI/79

Those who have reflected on the meaning of meaning have said that words. . . . "mean" nothing by themselves .. (').

They convey policy and the judge who interprets must seek the intent of the legis lature by gaining an insight ihto this policy and making it manifest through the process of construction.

Looking at the words of s. 22 in the light of the scheme of prohibition of transfers to preserve the surplus lands for distribution, we find no justification for importing into s. 22 more than its words convey.

The Section says what it means, nothing more, nothing else.

A simple scan of the provision reveals that any transfer, gift, surrender, settlement or other alienation referred to in the Section may be declared void by the Authorised Officer "if he finds that the transfer or the partition .... defeats any of the provisions of this Act.".

The trichotomy is obvious.

There must be a transfer or other alienation.

It must have taken place during the period mentioned in the Section.

It must have the effect of defeating any of the provisions of the Act.

If these three elements are present, the Authorised Officer must void the transfer.

There is no room for importing a fourth principle that the transfer should be 'sham, nominal or bogus'.

Nor indeed is there any additional consideration that if the transfer is bona fide for family necessity or othr urgency then it is good, even though it defeats the provisions of the Act.

We cannot amend the Section or dilute its imperatives, scared by the consequences or moved by extraneous sympathies. Sub-conscious forces and individual prepossessions have a subtle way of entering the interpretative verdict of the judge. We have to be constantly careful to exclude such intrusions. Moreover, when the whole purpose of the Section is to prevent any alienation which defeats any of the provisions of the Act, it is impermissible to introduce any requirement, other than is mentioned in the Section, as a condition for its operation.

Obviously, the provision seeks to provide social justice for the landless and it defeats the purpose if, by the interpretative process, soft justice to large landholders is brought about.

We consider the 'literal' meaning of the Section to be that any transfer or other alienation mentioned in the Section which reduces or impairs the otherwise available extent of surplus land beyond the ceiling "defeats ...... the provisions of this Act." This is the plain meaning of the Section which gives no room for doubt or justiftcation for importation of any further condition like sham, bogus elc.

H A return to the rules of strict construction, when the purpose of

(I) C. Ogden and I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 9 (10th Edn. 1956)

the statute needs it, is desirable, especially with a view to give effect to the intention of the legislature. We are reminded of Lord Denning's interesting remarks in his recent book "The Discipline of Law" under heading "I am a Portia Man".

In justification of his view Russe]] Ll quoted a passage from Shakespearo. It is worth recording becausv there are lessons to be drawn from it-as there often are from Shakespeare.

'I may perhaps be forgiven for saying that it appears to me that Lord Denning MR has acceded to the appeal of Bessanio in the Merchant of Venice.

Bessanio

"And, I beseech you,

Wrest once the law to your authority:

To do a great right, do a little wrong."

But Portia retorted :

"It must not be; there is no power in Venice

Can alter a decree established : It will be recorded for a precedent,

And many an error, by the same example,

Will rush into the State : it cannot be." Then said Russell LJ.

'I am a Portia man'.

I cannot believe that Russell Ll wonld be a 'Portia man' if it meant aligning himself with Shylock-in support of a strict law of penalties which could not be relieved by equity.

To be truly a 'Portia man' the lawyer should follow the way in which Portia avoided an unjust decree.

Not to let the words of the deed be the masters: but so construe them--<ldapt them as the occasion demands-so as to do wha.t iustice and equity require.

This is how she turned the tables on Shylock:

It is in this denouement that I would follow the example of Portia-I too am a Portia man.

In the interpretation of s. 22 we too are Portia men.

For this H reason we reverse the view of the High Court that s. 22 will not apply to nullify any transaction of transfer or partition unless it is further

shown that it is sham, nominal or bogus.

Nor do we' agree with Shri Ramamurthy that even if a transaction defeats the ceiling provisions, it may still be valid if the transfer is, from an individual point of view, bona fide. The short reply is that from the cormnnnity's angle, especially the landless community's angle hungering for allotment, the alienation, however necessary for the individual, is not bona fide visa-vis the cormnunity.

Therefore, we allow the appeal in the light of the interpretation we have adopted, restore the tribunal's holding and rule that if any '

transfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of sur- ,/ plus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such trans- __.M._. r action bona fide or not, is void in the matter of computaticm of the ·

permissible aea and the surplus area.

May be, that the transaction may be good for other purposes or may ilot be.

The Authorised Officer is within his power if be ignores it as void for purposes of s. 22, s. 7 and other ceiling-related provisions.

D The detailed discussion of the High Court on many other aspects of the Act do not affect the core of the matter and cannot deflect us from the conclusion we have arrived at.

The appeals are allowed but in the light of the earlier direction of the Court. the State. will pay the costs of the respondent.

P.B.R.

Appeal allowed.

S. NAGANATHA AYYAR

May 4, 1979

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

A. P. SEN, JJ.

Ss. 7 and 22

s. 22

Section 7

Section 22

s. 22

s. 7

s. 22

s. 22

s. 22

s. 7

s. 22

s. 22

V. P. Raman

A. V. Rangam

A. T. M. Sampath

K. S. Ramilmurthi

Saroja Gopalkrishnan

K. Jayaram

K. Ram Kumar

K. Rajendra Chaudhry

KRISHNA IYER

s. 22

s. 22

Tamil Nadu

s. 22

s. 3

s. 83

s. 115

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 115

C.P.C

s. 22

s. 22

s. 22

s. 22

K. S. Ramamurthy

s. 3(11)

s. 3(31)

Ninth Schedule

s. 22

s. 22

India

Section 7

Section 8

Section 18

s. 22

Section 94

s. 22

Section 22

section 22

section

7

Section 22

Maxwell

s. 22

section 22

Section 22

Ramamurthy

Heydon

s. 22

R. B. Stevens

s. 22

s. 22

C. Ogden

I. Richards

Denning

Shakespearo

Shakespeare

Bessanio

Venice

Portia

Russell LJ

Shylock

s. 22

s. 22

s. 22

s. 7