SAITO & OTHERS

STATE OF U.P.

April 26, 1979

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J

Utiur Prade.sh Children Act 1952 and approved School!. under it, Sectio11s 2(4), 29, 30, 34, 60, 68, 70, 79 and 79, Scope of-

Three Petitioners between the ages of 10 & 14 .::ame by an eleven year eld girl, tending cattle in a village, near a neglected btick kiln which temptingly offered protective privacy for committing rape.

T!iey ndvanced towards the: victim 11nd tied her up.

They forcibly went through the exercise of rape.

The courls beJO\V have held the three petitioners guilty of an offence under section 376 J.P.C. and sentenced each to two yars' rigo1ous imprisonment.

The offenders being children the dilemmatic issue is to fix the. sentencing guide•lines for juvenile delinquents. It was argued that "Justice and the Child"

is a distinct jurisprudential criminological branch of 3ocioleg<.Jl speciality which i5 still in its infant status in India and many other countries. The children Act is a preliminary exercise, the BO!!tal School is an experiment in reformation and even Section 360 Criminal Procedure Code tends in the same direction.

In the absence of any report from the Reformation Officer nor any consideration of the social milieu, personal oo.fecedents, parental influence, educational status and other material factorn bearing on the three petitioners, the Court while accepting the appeal,

1-IELD : The appellant! should be released on probation of good conduct and com1nitted to the care of their respective pare.nts and if no surviving parents, then their guardian, .executing a bond each without sureties to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful oJfender for n. period of two years from the date of release and for the observance of a condition namely that the child shall he put to school or continue its studies if it is already at school and attend any recrea.tional or meditational centre, if any, of the parents' choice regulnrly. The Reformation Officer enjoying jurisdiction in the locality wilf have supervision over each Of the appellants and shall make a report once every three month! to the Trial Court. The Reformation Officer will explain to the appellants and their parents the import of this order.

[776H, 777A-C]

Pathak, J. (concurring)-On the question \vhether the youthful offender should be proceeded 3gainst under section 29 or Section JO of tbe U.P. Children Act 1951, the court must apply its mind to certain coniJerations like the age of the child, his family background, his general past conduct and antecedents, the circumstances in which he committed the ~!fence ar.d which of the measures provided by section 29 or section 30 would more effectively and yet not hatshly enable the child to develop into a responsible men1ber of society.

The statute is concerned with a person whose personality, judg1nent and discretion

ha;.! not yet attained maturity. A "child" has been defined under Sec. 2(4) of the Act as a person under the age of sixteen years.

T1tcrefore the primary obj'ect must be to place the 'Child in an environment conducive to his reha.bilita-

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SATTO & ORS v. u.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, I.) 7 6 9

tion ai1d providing scope for corrective actiolt which fa the basic c.riteria for A detern1ining the choice between section 29 and section JO o( the Act. \Vhere a child has acted on an impulse in committing an offnc~ and there is nothing to show the 1fresencc of any vicious streak of chara-cler, it would be more approp1 iate to leave him to the care and attention of parental authority under section 30( I) (b) of the Act rather than send him to an approved echool.

On the iarts of the present case, such an order would n1eet the ends of justice and serve the object of the statute.

[779E-H, 780A-BJ B

Willia111 v. /Vcw York, 337 US 241, 249, Sentencing and probation- Nationt.I College of the State Judiciary Reno, Nevada, page 258 relied upon .

.,, CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 239 c of 1979.

, Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3 11-78 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. l 064 and 1065/75.

S. K. SabharwaJ for the Appellants.

0. P. Rana for the Respondent.

; The following Judgments were delivered :

KRISHNA IYER, J. Concurrent convictions by both the courts below have, by a rule of restriction and circumspection which tlu1 Court often adopts under Art. 136, persuaded me to circumscribe the leave to appeal to the critical question of punishment, usually answered by courts untouched by current humane criteria and drowned in the superstition that the gravity of the crime and the tariff prescribed in the Penal Code have a monopolistic hold on the sentencing court.

Quackery in criminology is a deficiency in forensic ju•ticingespecia!ly disastrous is sensitiv~ areas like juvenile sente'ncing when unlettered punishment becomes unwitting crime.

The present case is an illustration of judicial habituation to prescribing sentences conditioned by the offence and its milieu, forgetting G the fundamental fact that the human delinquent, not the criminal deviance, is the cynosure of punitive processing.

The further Gandhia\l axiom follows that crime is like disease, and correction, not cruelty, has dominance in the sentencing calculus. The sadistic appeal to severity of infliction takes on a sublimated form in the judicial process, as has happened in the instan1 case. The court has rightly been 8 horrified by the crime of rape here but wrongly bid farewell to the reform of the vernal criminals.

Thre~ boys. between the ages of ten and fourteen with simmering sex urges amidst societal inhibitions, and infatuating stimulations, came by an eleven year old girl tending cattle in a village, and this, by happen-stance, was near a neglected brick kiln which temptingly offered protective privacy for carnal assault. This lascivious opportullity excited the three juveniles, otherwise engaged in cutting grass, into erotic experimentalism.

They advanced aggressively towards the artless victim, tied up by way of preventive detention a young cowherd who chanced to be near the scene and forcibly went through the adolescent exercise of rape. The courts below have held the three petitioners guilty of an offence under s.376 I.P.C. and we do not feel it right to hibble at probabilities and disturb that conclusion.

Current Indian ethos and standards of punitive deterrence make rape a heinous offence. The offenders, however, are children and the dilemmatic issue is to fix the sentencing guidelines when juvenile delinquents come before the court. 'Justice and the Child' is a distinct jurisprudential-criminological branch of socio-legal speciality which is still in its infant status in India and many other countries. the Children Act is a preliminary exercise, the Borstal School is an experimeht in reformation and even s.360 Cr. P.C. ~nds in the same direction.

Correction informed by compassion, not incarceration leading to degeneration, is the primary im of this field of criminal justice. Juvenile justice has constitutional roots in Articles 15(3) and 39 ( e) :na the pervasive humanism which bespeaks the superparental cohcern of the .State for its child-citizens including juvenile delinquents.

The penal pharmacopoea of India, in tune with the reformatory strategy currently prevalent in civilised criminology, has to approach the child offender not as a target of harsh punishment but of humane nourishment.

This is the central problem of sentencing policy whe'n juveniles are found guilty of delinquency. A scientific approach may insist on a search for fuller material sufficient to individuate . the therapy to suit the criminal malady.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Williams v. New York,(') presente'nce reports :

"have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guess-work and inadequate information.

To deprive sehtencing judges of this kind of information . would undermine .modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation."

tl) .m u. s. 241, 249.

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SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 771

Judge F. Rayan Duffy has written :

"If the judgg has before him a complete and accurate presentence investigation report which sets forth the conditions, circumstances, background, and surroundings of the defendant, and the circumstances underlying the offenoe whicb has been committed, the judge can then impose sentence with greater assurance that he has adopted the proper course. He can do so with much greater peace of mind."

"Regrettably, our juvenile justice system still thinks in terms of terror, not cure, of wounding, not healing, and a sort of blind man's bu.ff is the result.

This negative approach converts even the culture of juvenile homes into junior jails. From the reformatory angle, the detainees are left to drift, there being no constructive programmes for the detainees nor correctional orientation and training for the institutional staff.

I highlight these drawbacks largely because the State's response to punitive issues relating to juveniles has been stricken with 'illiteracy' and must awaken to a new 'enlightenment', at least prompted by the international year of the Child.

Patricia M.

Wald has strengthened this perspective in a recent book on "Pursuing Justice 1or the Child".(').

"Juvenile detention needs a new focus and a new rationale.

The detention period ought to be used to begin to draw togeiher resources necessary for constructive change, whether or not the juvenile is adjudicated. There is abundant evidence that detention has failed as an isolated interlude between those more dramatic parts of the juvenile justice system-arrest and trial or disposition .

The Juvenile judge still has a vital function to fulfil in detention. The judge is charged with the solemn determination whether to deprive juveniles of liberty or whether they cari be released in their parents' custody or to a third party and, ii so, what conditions should apply to the release. In making such a decision the judge should follow dUe proces£ l!earing procedures and the legal presumption should favour release. If the decision is to detain, the judge must make a record to support that decision.

The legality of preventive detention in the juvenile court needs to be tested. If the power is upheld, the procedural safeguards should be a' precise as they are for adults. We should abandon the gotio11 that secure detention is good for the child.

(J) pp.135-136.

Some legal absolutes seem imperative; jail for juveniles should be outlawed; status offenders should not be put into secure detention; finite limits should be set on how long a child can be detained before or after adjudication; minimum standards for physical structure, staff, and program should be enforced by the courts. Even then, we should not cease inquiring whether there are yet better and more ehlightened ways to use the interlude after arrest to help juveniles so that, unless they are innocent, or so blighted that removal from the community before or after trial is an almoot indisputable necessity, there may be no need for the rest of the progress at all."

These general observations of futuristic import apart, we have toconcretise the measures to be taken i'n the present case under thfl available law and the available facilities.

The mainstream of criminat justice has not been refined by restorative legislations.

We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952 and 'approved schools' of sorts under it.

We l,!ave provision for juvenile courts (s. 60), Reformation Officers (s. 34), and a flexible cluster of factors, social and personal, to be taken into consideration in pa!!i!ing orders when a tender-aged delinquent is to be taken into custodial care E by the court (s. 68). Reports by Reformation Officers have a helpful role in the sentencing process.

The finer focus of sentencing is not furious reaction to the offence but habilitative rescue of the youthful offender from moral-material abandonment and careful reformation by kindling his creative potential. Judicial responsibility is not mechanistic but humanistic, and the ritualistic magistrate is a misfit.

 F Section 70 of the U.P. Childr•m Act highlights it :

70. Principles to be observed by Courts in dealing with children and young persons.-

Every Court in dealing with a child who is brought be- G fore it, either as needing care or as an offender or otherwis<' shall have regard to the welfare of the child and shall

in a proper case take steps for removing him from undesirable surronndings and for securing that proper provision is mad" for his education and training.

H Functionally, a judicial order on a child must be guided by this legislative value judgment.

Non-custodial disposition of the y-0ung offender is permissible under s. 30 of the Act which reads :

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SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 77 3

30. Power to discharge youthful offender or to commit him to suitable custody.-

(1) A court may, if it thinks fit, instead of directing any youthful offeader to be detained in an approved school, order him to be--

(a) discharged after due admonition; or

(b) released on probation of good conduct and committed to the care of his parerrt or guardian or other adult relative or other fit person, on such parent, guardian, relative or person executing a bond, with or without sureties, as the Court may require, to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful offender for any period not exceeding three years and for the observance of suc!J:- other conditions as the Court may impose for securing that the youthful offender may lead an honest and industrious life.

The Court may order that the youthful offender released under this clause may be placed under the supervision of a Reformation Officer or of some other person appointed for the purpose by the Court.

( 2) If it appears to the Court on receiving a report from

the Reformation Officer or otherwise that the offender has E '.llot been of good behaviour during the period of the probation, it may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, order the offender to be detained in an approved school.

Indeed, a conscientious judge may consider it of better service to :society :

"If the criminal's past history gives good reason to be lieve that he is not of the naturally criminal type, that he is capable of real reform and of becoming a useful citizen, there is no doubt that probation, viewed from the selfish ltandpoint of protection to society alone, is the most efficient method that we have. And yet it is the least understood, the least deveioped, the least appreciated of all our efforts to rid eociety of the criminal."

"The basic idea underlying a sentence to probation is very simple.

Sentencing is in large part concerned with 1lVoiding future crimes by helping the defendant learn to live pmductively in the community 1 bich he has offended against.

Pm bation proceeds on the theory that the best way to pursue

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1979 j 3 S.C.ll.

this goal is to orient the criminal sanction toward the community setting in those cases where it is compatible with the other obj•ectives of sentencing. Other things being equal, the odds are that a give'n defendant will learn how to live successfully in the general community if he is dealt with in that community rather than shipped off to the artificial and a typical environment of an institution of confinement.

Banishment from society, in a word, is 'not the way to integrate someone into society.

Yet imprisonment involves just such banishment-albeit for a temporary sojourn in most cases.

This is of course not to say that probation should be used in all cases, or that it will always produce better resulls.

There are many goals of sentencing, some of which in a give'n case may require the imposition of a s•.entence to imprisonment even in the face of a conciusion that probation is more likely to assure the public that the particular defendant will not offend again. And there are defendants as to whom forced removal from the environment which may in some part have co'ntributed to their offence may be the be11t beginning to a constructive and useful life."(')

Appeal and revision provided under s. 79 of the Act involve the higher courts in the process. We are sad that this crucial judicial task E has been discharged with lesser awareness of its seriousness and complexity than necessary. For instance the Sessions Court, oblivious of the offender and obsessed with the offence, in brief confirmation, pent one sentence on sentence.

"Due to seriousness of the crime there is no justification to release the appellants on probation."

The High Court devoted a paragraph but was upset by the Criminal act and closed its mind to salvaging the sentence :

"Lastly, it is urged that the sentence awarded to the revisionists be reduced in view of their ages.

I am reluc- G tant to do so because they committed a crime which repels against moral conscience. They chose a girl of 11 years to satisfy their lust.

They spoiled her life by committing this offence as her father would experience considerable difficulty in arranging her marriage. They were so cruel that all the three committed rape on that minor child. Such an act B deserves to be deprecated. The sentence awarded by the

(1) Sentencing and Probation-National Co1lege of the State Judiciary Reno, Nevada, p, 258.

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SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 77 5

learned lower courts does not at all err on the side of severity.

Moreover, the learned lower courts have already shown sym1pathy by keeping them in an approved school at Etawah."

While the victim needs reparation, failure to pay heed to, which is a blind spot in our criminal justice system, the offender's circumstances are material in sentencing, omission to notice which is a systemic, though traditional failing.

We find no emphasis on the age antecedents, parental and social circumstances and curative possibilities or Reformation Officer's report bearing on the three children punished. The Children Act makes meticulous prov1S1ons which slumber on the statute book and seek no visa into the court room.

We hope this elaborate discussion will activate sentencing wisdom vested in the criminal courts.

At this late stage, without prolonging the process, we can only direct some pragmatic steps.

No report from a Reformation Officer is availble. No consideration of the social milieu, personal antecedents, p.arental influences, educational status and other material factors is apparent i'n the judgments.

Nor, indeed, ii; there any serious advertance to the advantages of community-oriented reformation or the disadvantages of institutional inter-mix and quasi-incarceration.

The juvenile detention system, it must be noted, has not fulfilled itself even i'n countries where it is heavily funded like in the U.S.A. where the young delinquents are

"penned like cattle, demoralized by lack of activities and trained staff, often brutalized.

Over half the facilities in which juveniles are held have no psychiatric or social work staff. A fourth have no school program. The median age of detainees is fourteen; the novice may be sodomized within a matter of houNl.

Many have not been charged with a crime at all. From New York to California, the field reports repeat themselves depressingly.(')

Our 'approved schools' like our adult prisons sometimes remind us of animal farms, if only judges care to visit jails.

These blemishes, in far worse measure, have blighted our Homes and Schools and approved custodial institutions, although our correc-. tional repertory, augmented by meditational, recreational and oriented Gandhian tools, may inexpensively expand and deepen the rehabi-

(1) Patricia M. Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles-Pursuing, Justice for the

Child ed. by Margaret K. Rosenheim, p. 119.

litative potency of our sentencing strategies in this area.

Be that as it may, the U.P. Children Act appears to have been virtually given a go-bye in the courts below, a phenomenon which frequently happens because practising lawyers and judicial officers have not yet given the deeper reflection that welfare-oriented rehabilitative legislations of the mentally and morally retarded in the criminal justice field deserve.

The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, has made provision in s.360 to deal with persons under 21 years of age convicted of offences_, punishable with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less and s. 376 I.P.C., cannot come within its purview . But the U.P. Children Act defines a 'youthful offender' to mean "any child who has been found < to have committed an offence punishable with transportation or im- prisonment".

Thus, life imprisonment for the offence does not take

the delinquent out of the category of youthful offender as defined in s. 2(13) of the said Act. Section 30 authorises the Court, if it thinks fit, instead of directing any youthful offender to be detained in an approved school, order him to be released conditionally, as earliec indicated. We think that the present case deserves action undec s. 30.

Rape is horrific True. The victim is a pathetic child and deserve£ not merely commisseration but also compensation, an aspect which the State will take note of when a proper application is made to it. Our immediate problem is the disposition of the appellants who are nlsB very young.

They have served out some term in an 'approved school' which, making a realistic appraisal, is a 'junior jail'. It is not as if these little lads are incorrigible rapists or violent toughs running amok.

Parental neglect, tempting opportunity, sex perversionslibadences (sic) libidinous environs and a host of other factors where state in-action is contributory to exciting adolescent erotica, count for vulgar, vicious or violent delinquency.

These boys can and should be rehabilitated, and that is done best by obligating the parent to take care of the children concerned and not by institutionalised custody. Section

3C of the Act is attracted by the facts of this case to the extent we are able to glean from the meagre material on record.

We hope that when children are brought before court, the provisions of the Childrea Act will be remembered by the Bench and the Bar and its rehabilitative engineerillg set in motion.

In the present case, we direct the appellants to be released on pro- H bation of good conduct and committed to the care of their respective parents and if no surviving parent then their guardian executing a bond each, without sureties, to be responsible for the good behaviour

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SATTO & ORS V. U.P. STATE (Pathak, J,) 777

of. the youthful offender for a period of two years from the date of release and for the observance of a condition, namely, that the child shall be put to school or continue its studies if it is already at school and attend any recreational or meditational centre if any, of the parent's choice regularly. Many systematic experiments, acknowledged in prison reports and judgments of trial courts have proved the therapentic value of transcendental Meditation viz-a-viz juvenile delinquents.(') The Reformation Officer having jurisdiction over the locality shall have supervision over each of the appellants and shall make a report once in three months to the trial court. If the report shows laps into bad behaviour, the court may direct detention of the deviant appellant or appellants in an approved school. 'The Reformation Officer will explain to the parents of the delinquents and the appellants the import of this order so that they may appreciate the necessity for compliance therewith and cooperate in the rehabiliatory process.

I may venture a view in conclusion that the revolutionary contribution Indian culture may make to criminology is apt to be the focus 1 on human consciousness whose mutilation leads to sickness, crime and sorrow and whose restoration, collective and individual, is 1he insurance against psychic stress and its off-shoots-crime and related maladies.

The technology of setencing must release man from distortions and pressures on lines ancient and modern. "This parenthesis, in a sense, argues for the new orientation in juvenile justice.

A copy of this order will be sent to the approved school, Etawah, and to the trial Judge for immediate compliance.

A copy of the order will also be served on the Advocate for the appellants for communication to and compliance by his clients and to the Home Department for correctional actions.

PATHAK, J. The petitioners were convicted by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Aligarh for the offence under s. 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment.

(l) a. fn the Superior court of the State of Arizona dt. March 5, 1976 in Stateo

Arizona V. Jean Coston Preslay-Case 6878.

b. Criminal action 4-81750 in the U. S. Direct court for Eastern District

of Michigan-United States of America V. Robert Charles Rusch, Jr.

c. Kentucky U Vol. 60, 1971 72 No. 2 and University of Mary Land Law Forum Vol. VIII No. 2 Winter 1973-article by David E. Sykes.

d. Hiralal Mallick v. State of Bihar [1978] l"SCR 301.

e. pter 9, Juvenile Delinquency and the T. M. programme, Freedom from

Crime by Roger Glenn Lanphear p-159 (Nellon Publishing Co Ny)

1!-330SCI/79 . . ..

directed their detention for the period of their sentence in an approved school at Etawah. Their appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aligarh.

The High Court dechned to interfere in revision.

From the material on the record it is not possible to say that the finding of the courts below that the petitioners committed the offence is not substantiated by the evidence on the record and, in my opinion, no case has been made out for interfering with the conviction.

But so far as the sentence is concerned, I think that the High Court and the courts below have not sufficiently appreciated the need for a proper order. Special leave granted on the question of sentence only.

Order on the appeal

The appellants are children. At the time of the offence the age of the three appellants ranged between 10 years and 14 years, the youngest, Satto, being 10 and the eldest, Bucha, being 14. They were cutting Rizka in their village fields when Kumari Bismillah, who was then about 12 years old, passed by grazing her cattle. Apparently, the three youngsters were seized with the temptation of having sex with her and borne on that impulse they forced the girl inside a brick kiln and committed rape on her, after securing a bystander, Baboo, who was also grazing his goats at the spot, to a tree.

There can be no doubt that the act cannot possibly be condoned. It calls for severe condemnation by the plainest moral standards. But on the question of sentence, the High Court and the courts below have, almost mechanically, affirmed a sentence of two years imprisonment to be served out by detention in an approved school.

They have failed to apply their mind to considerations which are relevant when a youthful offender is sentenced. The U.P. Children Act, 1951 contains two provisions in that regard. Section 29 provides that where a child is found to have committed an offence punishable with transportation or imprisonment, the court, if satisfied an inquiry that it is expedient so to deal with the child, may order him to be sent to an approved school for a stated period.

Section 30 provides .-

"30. Power to discharge youthful offender ot to Commit him to suitable custody .

(1) A court may, if it think fit, instead of directing any youthful offender to be detained in an approved school, order him to be -

(a) discharged after due admonition; or (b) released on probation of good conduct and committed to the

SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Pathak, J,) 7 79

care of his parent, guardian or other adult relative or other fit person on such parent, guardian, relative or person executing a bond, with or without sureties, as the court may require, to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful offender for any period not exceeding three years and for the observance of such other conditions as the court may impose for securing that the youthful offender may lead an honest and industrious life.

The Court may order that the youthful offender released under this clause may be placed under the supervision of a Reformation Officer or of some other person appointed for the purpose by the Court.

(2) If it appears to the Court on receiving a report from the Reformation Officer or otherwise that the offender has not been of good behavior during the period of the probation,

it may after making such inquiry as it thinks fit order the D offender to be detained in an approved school."

Almost invariably the question will arise whether the youthful offender should be proceeded against under s. 29 or s. 30 The answer to the question lies in the judgment of the Court, which judgment must be made in the sound exercise of its discretion. Among the considerations to which the court must apply its mind are the age of the child his family background, his general past conduct and antecedents, the circumstances in which he committed the offence, and which of the measures provided by the statute, s. 29 or s. 30, will more effectively and yet not harshly enable the child to develop into a responsible member of society. It must be remembered that the U.P. Children Act deals with children, and a "child" is defined by s.2(4) as a person under the age of sixteen years.

The Statute is concerned with a person whose personality, judgment and discretion has not yet attained maturity. The primary object then must be to place the child. in an environment conducive to his rehabilitation and providing scope for corrective action.

That appears to be the basic criterion for determining the choice between s. 29 and s. 30.

In a case where the child has acted on impulse in committing an offence, and there is nothing to show the presence of any vicious streak of character, it would be more appropriate to leave him to the care and

attention of parental , authority rather than to send him to an approved school.

That will depend, however on whethr parental attention is possible and forthcoming and whether it does not suffer from want

A of sufficient effectiveness in moulding the proper moral development -r ... of the child. In my opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case the order contemplated bys. 30(1) (b) of

the Act would more appropriately meet the ends of justice and serve the objcet of the statute.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed on the question of sentence.

The sentence imposed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge and affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court,

is set aside.

The appellants are ordered to be released on probation of ,_.. good conduct and to be committed to the care of their respective """"'"' parents, and if there are no surviving parents then their guardian, on -~ such parents or guardian executing a bond each without sureties, to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful offender for a period of two years from the elate of the release and for the observance of a condition that the child should be put to school or continue his studies if he is already in school, and regularly attend any recreational centre or meditational centre (if any) of the parent's choice.

The Reformation Officer enjoying jurisdiction in the locality will have supervision over each of the appellants and shall make a report once every three months to the trial court.

The Reformation Officer will explain to the appellants and their parents the import of this order.

A copy of this order will be sent to the approved school, Etawah, and to the trial court for immediate compliance.

A copy of the order will also be served on counsel for the appellants for wmmwfication to, and compliance by, the appellants. ----·-

N.K.A.

Appeal allowed.

}--

SAITO & OTHERS

STATE OF U.P

April 26, 1979

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. PATHAK, JJ

Children Act 1952

section 376

India

Section 360

Criminal Procedure Code

Pathak

section 29

Children Act 1951

section 29

section 30

Sec. 2(4)

section 29

section 30( I)

S. K. SabharwaJ

P. Rana

KRISHNA IYER

Art. 136

Penal Code

I.P.C

Articles 15(3) and 39

United States Supreme Court

s. 241, 249

F. Rayan Duffy

Patricia M.

Wald

s. 60

s. 34

s. 68

Section 70

s. 30

Krishna Tyer

Non-custodial disposition of the y-0ung offender is permissible under s. 30 of the Act which reads :
-

SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 77 3

30.

s. 79

Krishna Iyer

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SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.)

U.S.A.

New York

California

Patricia M. Wald

Margaret K. Rosenheim

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

s. 376

I.P.C

s. 2(13)

Section 30

s. 30

Section

3C

Etawah

PATHAK

Aligarh

s. 376

Indian Penal Code

David E. Sykes

Roger Glenn Lanphear

Satto

Bucha

Kumari Bismillah

Baboo

Children Act, 1951

Section 29

Section 30

s. 29

s. 30

s. 29

s. 30

s. 29

s. 30


HARDIP SINGH & ANR.

THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, AMRITSAR & ORS.

April 26, 1979

[!'{, L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

Income Tax Act 1961-S. 179--Scope of-Resolution tor wi11ding up o/ co1np1Ut.y passed before the coming into force of tl1e Act-J.T.O. issued notices to Managing Director & Director topay large tax arrears due fro1n the company -Notice if ralid.

Secticn 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (before it was amended in 1975) provided that when any private company is wound up after the commencement of the , Act and any tax assessed on the company whether before or in the course of or after its liquidation in respect of any income of any previous year cannot be recovered, then, every person who was a director of the ptivate company at any lime during the relevant previous year shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of such tax.

The appellants were the managing director anU director of a private limited company.

On November 13, 1961 a resolution for voluntary liquidation of the private company W2t5 passed. In February and November, 1970 the Income

Tax Officer issued notices to the appellants calling upon them to pay income tax which remained unpaid from the company to the tune o[ Rs. 1.34 Jakhs.

The contention of the appellants that the company had gone into liquidation before the Act came into force on 1st April, 1962 and, tl:erefore, s. 179 bad no appiiction to this case was rejected by the Income-tax Officer. The appellants' revision petition was rejected by the Commissioner; the High Court dismissed tbeir writ petition in lin1ine.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : The appellants could not escape from their liability to pay the tax dues.

Section 179 was meant to cover cases of this nature also. [784A]

There are three stages when a company goes into liquiJation, nmely : ( 1) the con1mencement of the winding up of the company; (2) continuation of the proceedings or the steps for winding up and (3) final winding up and dissolution of the company. Section 179 will be attracted if any on'e or more of the three

stages occurred after the commencement of the Act even though the first or the first and second events had happened eairlier. The directors were made liable to pay the tax dues because on its liquidation it becon1es difficult for the department to realise the tax dues from the assets of the company.

[783D-E]

.Jn the instant case, although the commencement of the winding Up of the c-0mpany had begun on a date prior to the date of commencement of the Act, a.t the time when the Income-tax Officer issued notice, proceedings for its

windins up were pending.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2390 of 1972.

From the Judgment and Order d-ated 7-3-72 of the Punjab and

A Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 773/72. r ~

Bhagirath Das, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellants. _,..,, ':--. ' P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

UNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellants' writ application in limine.

Sandhu Transport Company (Private) Lin1ited is a private limited company.

The two appellants were its directors.

One of them was a Managing Director.

A resolution ' -- was passed ou the 13th November, 1961 for a voluntary liquidation of the company at the instance of its creditors.

In respect of some years ending with the assessment year 1964-65 a huge arnont of income tax to the tune of Rs. 1,34,319/- remained due from the company. The Income Tax Officer issued a notice on 7th of February,

1970 against appellant No. 2 under Section 179 of the Income Tax Act 1961, hereinafter called the Act, to show cause why action should not be taken against the directors of the company for realisation of the arrears of income-tax due from the company.

A similar notice was issued to appellant No. 1 on the 1 W1 of Novembr, 1970.

Both the appellants filed their show cause before the Income Tax Officer mainly taking the stand that since the company had gone into liquidation before the Act had come into force, action under Section 179 could not be taken against them.

Some other points were also taken in the show cause filed by the appellants but it is not necessary to state them as the only point pressed in this Court fa in relation to the jurisdiccion of the Income Tax Officer under Section 179 of the Act. •

The Income Tax Officer rejectcJ the appellant'' pleas by his ·}· order dated the 31st December, 1970.

The appellants went in revi _ sion before the Commissioner of Income Tax. It was rejected on 31st January, 1972.

Thereafter, when proceedings were taken for realisation of the income-tax arrears aforesaid against the appellants they mowcl the High Court for the quashing of the proceedings and the orders under Section 179 of the Act.

As already stated the High Court rejected their application in limine, but certificate to appea'l to tijs Court was granted only because of the rule of valuation then prevalent.

Section 179 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time read as follows:-

179. Liability of directors of private company in liquidation-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Com-

. """'

HARDIP SINGH v. I.T.O. (Untwalia, J.) 783

panies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) when any private. company is wound up after the commencement of this Act, and any tax assessed on the company, whether before or in the course of or after its liquidation, in respect of any income of any previous year cannot be recovered, then, every person who was a director of the private company at any time during the relevant previous year shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of such tax unless he proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company".

The Section was amended in 1975 making it more stringent against the directors of a private company, but we are not concerned with the said amendment in this case .

There are three stages when a company goes into liquidation, namely :-(1) the commencement of the winding up of the company, (2) the continuation of the proceeding or the steps for winding up and (3) the final winding up and dissolution o~ the company.

If all the three stages were complete before the Act came into force on and from the 1st April, 1962, obviously Section 179 will not be attracted. If all of the three stages happened after the commencement of the Act, it is manifest that Section 179 would undoubtedly be attracted. But the difficulty presented before us by learned counsel for the appellants was because of some speciality of the facts of this case, the commencement of the winding np of the company began on a date which was prior to the date of commencement of the Act.

As it appears from the orders of the Income Tax Officer and the Commissioner the company had not even till then been finally wound up and dissolved. The proceedings for its winding up were pending.

The submission, therefore, is that in such a case Section 179 will not be attracted.

We have no difficulty in rejecting this argument. In our opinion the Section will be attracted if any one or more of the three events occurred after the commencement of the Act even though the first or the first and second events had happened earlier.

The Section was meant also to net a case like the instant one where it was resolved that the private company should be sent to liquidation and nobody cared to pay the huge arrear~ of incometax due from it. The Directors were sought to be caught exactly for

this purpo; e. When the company goes into liquidation it becomes difficult for the department to realise its dues from the assets of the H company and more so when the company has been finally wou Id up and dissolved.

The directors, therefore, have been made liable to

' ...

A pay such dues.

Section 179 is meant to squarely cover such a case also and the appellants cannot escape their liability for the dues.

The proceedings were rightly initiated against them for realisation of the dues.

The High Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the appellants' writ petition in llmlne.

B We find DO) merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.

P.B.R.

Appeal dismissed. 1 ...- )

HARDIP SINGH & ANR

THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, AMRITSAR & ORS

April 26, 1979

L. UNTWALIA

R. S. PATHAK

E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.

Income Tax Act 1961

S. 179

Income-tax Act, 1961

November 13, 1961

1st April, 1962

s. 179

Section 179

Section 179

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Bhagirath Das

B. P. Maheshwari

Suresh Sethi

P.A. Francis

A. Subhashini

UNTWALIA

High Court of Punjab and Haryana

7th of February,

Section 179

Income Tax Act 1961

Section 179

Section 179

31st January, 1972

Section 179

Section 179

Section 179

Section 179

Section 179

Section 179


NIMEON SANGMA & ORS.

HOME SECRETARY, GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA & ORS

April 30, 1979 rv. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. s. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J

A"11thtistration of Justice-Pre-trial detention-Expeditious disposal of case1 , Jnclwli11g i1tvestigations and tri.a/s-Sections 167, 209 & 309 of Criminal Procedure Ce. 1973.

la their petition for the issue of a \Vrit of hab'eas corpus, the pctitionecs alleged -illegal detention of a large number of persongi under guise of the judicial

process.

lJEW : 1. Criminal Justice breaks down at a point 1, vhen expeditious trial is not '8.ttempted while the affected parties are languishing in jail. The Criminal Procedure Code in Sections 167, 209 and 309 has emphasised the importance of .expeditions disposal of tases including investigations and trials..

[786E]

2. The State Government to take a policy decision \•iith a vie\V to ensure that accused persons, too indigent to set in motion th.:: judicbt prucess, do not suffer incarceration silently.

[787B]

3. The Government will do \vell to comply with the sy1irit of the Code of Criminal Procedure especially in the matter of pcr:"; Oil"i :;.ought to be bound over for good behaviour, persons against whom sumrnon::. caes are pending and persoas who have been in custody for more than six months..

This will involve a mass releas'e from j'ai!s, but Governn1ent has to pay homage in sub~ stance a1.d reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. [787C)

1 he Court directed that :-

(a) The State do consent to r'elease all persons who have been in custody for over six months and whose trials have not commenced or against whom. charge sheets have not been laid excepting in those cases under Se:clions 302 and 395 J.P.C.

[786G]

(b) The Stare shall complete investigation within t\vo months in cases where ckarge.,, heets have not been laid.

[786H]

(C) The Sessions Court concerned should dispose of the cases where charge~ sheet$ have been laid and commitment has been made \Vithin six monthi,

[786HJ

C!uMIN, AL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 211 of 1979.

K. Hingorani for the Petitioners.

D. N. Mukherjee for the Respondents.

The Order of the Court was delivered by

KRirnNA IYER, J.-This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of H habeas corpus in view of alleged illegal detention of a large number of persons under guise of the judicial proce'ss.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1979] 3 S.C.R.

A Even \\ithout going into details, we are satisfied that petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 should be released on their own bonds to the satisfaction of the trial ro:; rt subject to their reporting to the nearest poliee stati0n once every fortnight nd appearing in court whenever called upon to do so to take their trial.

We direct accordingly. n So far as petitioner No. 1 is concerned, the State in its affidavit swenr that there is no such person in custody in connection with any case. This matter will be scrutinised further by the State so that it may satisfy itelf th~! no one is in custody except under due process of law.

------ This Court in its earlkr order dated March 5, 1979 has directed the C State to file a statement containing particulars of the under-trial prisoners who have been confined in Jail for a period of over six months without their trials having commenced. Further details as to the ages of such under-trials, the dates from which they were confined and the offences with which they were 9harged were also called for.

In the reply statement put in by the respondent, we find a larg~ number of cases where D detention for considerable periods, without the trial having even commenced, is being su!Iered by various persons.

Criminal justice breaks dawn, at a point when expeditious frial is not attempted while the affected parties are languishing in jail.

The Criminal Procedure Code in sections l67, 209 and 309 hns emphasised the importance o[ expedi- E tious disposal of cases includ; ng investigation.s and trials.

It is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have bcn such considerable delay in investigations by the police in.utter disregard of the fact th:it a citizen Jias been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an ofience.

We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state F of a!Iairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under ·, .. e Cons.titution especially under Article 21 as interpreted by

0this Court.

Even so we do not wish to pass any orders at the moment until more p"!ficulars are brought to our notice.

It will suffice for the presentand counsel for the State assures us that any direction given by this Court will be promptly complied with-that' we direct the State to consent to release all persons who have been in custody for over six months and whose trials have not commenced or against whom charge sheets have not been laid., But make one exception in cases" where sections 302 and 395, IPC are involved. We direct that the State shall complete the investigation within two months from today where charge sheets have not been laid and further direct the Sessions Court concerned to dispose of the cases where charge sheets have been laid and commitment has been made, within six months from today.

A report will be made to

~. /

,.._

N. SANGMA v. HOME SECRETARY (Krishna Iyer, !.) 7 87

this Court at the end of six months from today by the State.

We must emphatically record our view that there has been a self-condemnation in the statement put in by the State Govermnent in that in quite a number of cases which are not of a serious character and even in those which involve serious offences, investigations have been pending for nearly two years.

There are cases where persons have been in custody for five years-a situation too ghastly for a civilised country like ours.

We therefore draw lhe attention of the State Government to take a policy decision with a view to ensnre that accnsed persons, too indigent to set in motion the judicial process, do not suffer incarceration silently. The Govermnent will do well to comply wi1h the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure especially in the matter of persons sought to be bound over for good behaviour, persons against whom summons cases are pending and persons who have been in custody for more than six months.

Maybe this will involve a mass release from Jails, but Government has to pay homage in substance and reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. With these observations, and directions, we dispose of this petition.

N.V.K.

Petition disposed

NIMEON SANGMA & ORS

1979 rv. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. s. PATHAK

A. D. KOSHAL, JJ

Sections 167, 209 & 309

Sections 167, 209 and 309

Code of Criminal Procedure

K. Hingorani

D. N. Mukherjee

KRirnNA IYER

March 5, 1979

Jias

Article 21

sections 302 and 395

IPC

Code of Criminal Procedure

N.V.K.


STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ETC. ETC.

PATEL RANJIBHAI DHANBHAI & ORS. ETC. El'C.

May 1, 1979

(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.,

R. S. SARKARIA,

N. L. UNTWALIA,

P. S. KAILASAM AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

Bombay Soiro Tax Act 1959-Ss. 33(b) a11d 35(1)~Bombay Sale>' Tax Act, 1953-S. 14(b) validity of-lf offend Art. 14 of the Co11.rt1tufiun- Procedure under s. 33(b) if more onerous than the procedure under 1. 35,.

Section 33(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1959 provides that if the CP1nmissioner of Sales Tax has reason to believe that a dealer i.~ liable to pay tnx bul has failed to apply for registration within the time as rcquited by s. 22, the Con1mhsioner shall assess to the best of his judgrnnt the au1ount Of tax due from the dealer in respect of such period and any period subsequent

thereto.

Section 35(1) provides that if the C'ornmission,:r has reason to believe that any turnover chargeabl'e to tax has esaped assessment he may proceed to assess or re-assess the amount of tax due, as the case nw.y be.

Section 14(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 provides that if the Collector is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay the tax in respect of any period he shall assess to th'e best of his judgment the amount of tax from the dealer.

Section 15 of the 1953 Act provides that if the Collector is satisfied that any turnover has escaped assess1ncnt he may proceed to assess or re-assess the an1ount of tax.

In C.A. 287/72 the Sales Tax Officer after isuing notice.; under s. 14(6) of 1953 Act to the erstwhile partners of the asses'iee firlll af(er its dissolution to show cause why they should not be assessed to tax and \vhy a penalty should not be imposed on them for not getting themselves registered under the Act made a best judgment assessment under s. 33(6) of the 1959 Act and imposed a penalty. In C.A. Nos. 289/72 am! 290/72 the Sales Tax Officer made a best judgment ass'ess.ment and imposed penalty under s. 36(2) on account of the assessees' failure to get their respective firms regstered as dealers under the Act.

Relying mainly on the judgment of this Court in Anandji llari Das & Co.

v. S. P. Kasture & Ors. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 565) and Ghanshyan1das \. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 766), the High Court held that the provisions of ss. 33(6) and 35 of the 1959 Act overlap each other and that s. 33(6) offends Art. 14 of the Constitution and as such

is void because all cases of escapement of assessment by a dealer can be dealt with at the sweet will of the assessing authority under either of these provisions, that the procedure provided ins, 33(6) was more onerous than the one provided in s. 35 inasmuch as, unlike the latter section, no perio<l of limitation had been provided for taking action under s. 33(6), that no guidelines had been provided and that the choice of one procedure in preference to the other is left to the arbitrary whim of the' assessing authority.

,,.. .

....

r \

GUJARAT V. P. R. DHANBHAI 789

Jn the second batch of cases the assessees were unregistered dealers who A were assessed under s. 14(6) of the, 1953 Act. Following the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which held that s. 14(6) of the 1933 Act was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and therefore void, the Sales tax Tribunal directed the orders passed by the aflsessing authorities be set a!ld.e.

It w.u contended on behalf of the State Governments that s. 33(6) is a B special provision confined to an unregistered dealer, who is guilty of committing a two-fold violation of the: law enacted in that provisio11, that the special provisi"n excludes the application of the general provision ins. 35(1) and the case of unregistered dealer who escapes assessment on account of his failure to get himself registered, that the case of Anandii Hari Das C;:. Co. was distinguishable because that was a case of a registered dealer whil~ the cases on hand were cases of unregistered dealers and that the procedure provided in C s. 33(6) is not more onerous than the one prescribed undr s. 35.

AUo\\ing the appeaols,

HELD: I. Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act and s. 14(6) of the 1953 Act do not violate ArL 14 of the Constitution and are valid.

[801C]

2. Section 33(6) is, in terms, restricted in its application to the case of an D unregistered dealer whose modus operandi to evade tax involves ab .initio dis- • regard of the law. It does not apply to a registered dealer who has escaped 38.!essment or has bee~1 under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate or has been wrongly allowed any deductions or has concealed any material particulars relating to sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns. The case of such a registered dealer will fall under s. 35 and not under CJ. 33(6).

Section 33(6) is a special provision confined to a pa.rticular ciass of tax-evaders, E namely, unregistered dealers; while s. 35 is a general provision to deal with cases of escapEd assessment or under-assessment.

Generalia special!buv nor. dt:rogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It mean'3 that the genera] provisions must always yield to the special provisions. Construed in accordance with this fundamental principle the special class of unregistered dealers covered by s. 33(6) must be, taken to have been excluded from the purview of the general proYisions in s. 35. Thus considered, it is clear that in the ce of an F unregistered dealer who evades tax by committing the double default qpecified ins. 33(6), action can be taken only under that section and not under s. 35.

l799D-FJ

3. Putting the umegistered dealer v;:ho, though liable to pay tax, fails to get himself registered and does not pay any tax in a separate class to be dealt with under s. 33 (6) differently from other dealers falling under s. 35. rests on inteJligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of p1'Cventing tax G evasion. Though no limitation has been prescribed for taking action under s. 33(6) against an unregistered dealer fa.Hing thereunder there i'3 rational basis for not putting any restriction as to the length of tima ~..-itb.in \Vhich action can be taken under s. 33 (6). The reason is that tax evasion by the unregitered dealers in this class because of the clandestine modus operandi adopted by them, and wholesale disregard of the law, is more contumacious in character, more sinister in its effect both on the Iawabiding tax-payers anil the collection

II of public revenue, and more difficult to detect than tax-evasion by a. registered dealer. When a dealer applies for and obtains a registration certificate under

the Act, he thereby admits his liability to pay tax.

In his case the Sales-tax Authorities have basic information in pursuance of which thef can, by the exercise 0f due vigilance, check and detect any tax-evasion by him within reasonable time. This reasonable time is the period of limitation fixed by the Legislature in s. 35. But the case of a tax-evading unregistered dealer is different. In his case, the Authorities have on their record no basic information such as the registration record which would supply them a 'lead' to work upon.

For lack of information and the secrative nature of the modus operandi, tax .. evading activities of an unregistered dealer may go on undetected for years on end. That is why for taking action under s. 33 (6) against a tax-evadina unregistered dealer, the Legislature has not fixed any period uf limitation.

[SOOD; 799 G-Hl

4. The procedure provided in s. 33(6) cannot be said to be more onerous than the one specified in s. 35. The requirement as to issue of a notice to the defaulter and giving an opportunity of being heard, is a CQmtn'Jn feature of both the sections. Although under s. 33(6) the assessment is made on best judgn1c:nt basis, it cannot be made arbitrarily or capriciously. It bas to be made after taking into account all relevant material gathered by the Taxation

Officer or produced before him by the assessee in response to the notice. If an assessment under s. 33(6) is made upon inadequate materials, but on honest and fair guess-work, then it will be but due to the deliberate default of the assessee in supplying the necessary information, 'The differrential mode of assessment under s. 33 (6) is thus founded upon rational criteria.

[SOOE-0]

5. The ratio of Anandji Haridas is not applicable to the facts of the present cases. 'fhe former was dealing with a registered dealer whereas the instant case is concerned with unregistered dealers. Upon a proper construction of the two provisions, such unregistered dealers can be proceeded again.;; t under s. 33(6) of the 1959 Act or s. 14(6) of the 1953 Act and not under s. 35 or s. 15 of the respective Acts. There is no over-lapping between these two because s. 35 cannot be applied to the case of an unrgistered dealer falling within the purview of the special provisions in s. 33(6). Thilj w&~ clear from s. 35(2) as it stood at the time material to tliese cases.

[SOOH]

Anandii Hari Das & Co. v. S. P. Kasture & Ors.

A.I.R.

1968 S.C. 565 and Ghansh)amdas v. Ret?ional Assistant Commissioner of Salts Tax, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1964 S.C, 766 distinguished.

Civn, APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil APPeal Nos. 287-290 of 1972.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8-7-70 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 191168, 1378/68, 1643/69 and 8/70.

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2450-2451/72 H (Appeals by Special Leave from the Order/Judgment dated 19-4-72 of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal in Revision Application Noli. 111 and 112/65.

,... .

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2529 OF 1972

From the Judgment and Order dated 13-3-1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1959/71.

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 303 OF 1974

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4-7-1973 of the Gujarat High Court in Sales Tax Reference No. 10/71.

R. M. Mehta (287-90, 2529 and 303), M. C. Bhandare (2450-51) V. S. Desai (2450-51) and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in all tho matters.

I. N. Shroff for the Respondents in C.A. 287-90/72 .

R. P. Bhatt and B. R. Agarwala for the Respondents 2450-51/72.

J. Ramamurthi and Miss R. Vaigai for Re'spondent No. 1 in C.A.

D 2529(72.

M. N. Shroff for the Intervener in C.A. 2450-51172.

The, Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SARKARIA, J .-This judgment will dispose of two batches of appeals.

The first batch includes Civil Appeals 287 to 290 and 2529 of 1972 and Civil Appeal 303 of 1974 preferred by the State of Gujarat/Sales Tax Officer on the basis of a certificate granted by the High Court. Of this batch,, Civil Appeals 287 to 290 of 1972 are directed against a common judgment, dated July 8, 1970, of the High Court of Gujarat : while Civil Appeal 303 of 1974 i's preferred against a judgment, dated July 4, 1973, of the Gujarat High Court, which follows its earlier decision in Patel Ranjibhai Dh1111bhai & Ors. v. A. S. Tambe, Sales Tax

Officer, Anand.

The Second batch comprises of Civil Appeals 2450 and 2451 of 1972 and {, Jvil Appeals 1260 and 1213 of 1975.

They have been preferred by the State of Maharashtra after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. Of these, the first two are directed against an Order dated April 19, 1972, of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal wl11ch, in turn, is based on a judgment, dated October 11/12, 1971, of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 444 of 1968 (B. M.

Jain v. State of Maharashtra), and the other two are directed against a judgment dated October 11/12, 1971 of the High Court of Bombay.

The common question posed for our decision in all these appeals is, whether any of the provisions in Sections 33(6) and 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 1959 Act) which are in pari materia with Sections 14(6) and 15, respectively, of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the 1953 Act), offend Article 14 of the Constitution and, as snch, are void.

The High Courts[I'ribunal in the concerned appeals have answered this question in affirmative, so far as Section 33(6) of 1959 Act/14(6) of 1953 Act is concerned.

FIRST BATCH

Facts in C.A. 287 /72 The facts in the Writ Petition (S.C.A. No. 191 of 1968), from which C.A. 287 /72 has arisen, are that writ petitioners 1, 4 and 6 (respondents herein) were running business in partnership under the name of 'The Laxmi Vijay Saw Mill' from November 2, 1955 to October 31, 1959.

From November 1, 1959, writ petitioners 1 to 7 together with one Patel Muljibhai Bemjibhai, formed another partnership and executed a deed to that effect on February l, 1960.

This partnership was dissolved on November 10, 1964.

On November 13,. 1964, the Sales Tax Officer, Anand, was informed about this dissolution.

On November 11, 1965, the Sales Tax Officer issued notices in Form No. 13 under Section 14 of the 1953 Act, requiring the erstwhile partner's to show-cause why they should not be assessed under sub-section

(6) of Section 14 of the said Act, and why a penalty on account of their failure to get their firm registered, when they were liable to pay tax, be not imposed.

These notices covered the period from April 1, 1955 to December 31, 1959.

In reply to the notices, the respondents contended that since !lie old partnership formed in 1955 and the new partnership formed on November 1, 1959, had both been dissolved, the proposed action was illegal, there being no machinery under the 1953 Act to oassess a dissolved firm. A further objection was raised that the assessment proposed was time-barred.

At this stage, the respondents moved the High Court by a petition (S.C.A. 191/68) under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging that the turn-over of the business during the relevant period, never exceeded the limit of Rs. 900/- in the past and, therefore, the question of their incurring liability to get the firm registered as a dealer and to file salestax returns under the 1959 Act, did not arise.

During the pendency of this writ petition, on September 9, 1968, the Sales Tax Officer assessed the writ-petitioners under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act on 'best judgment' basis, and an amount of R's. 9,771.45

,...

• . .

'( .........

l .:

was determined as tax arrears and a further amount of Rs. 10,000/- was A imposed as penalty.

A notice making demand of both these amounts was also issued on September 12, 1959.

Facts of C.A. 289 /72.

The writ petitioner, respondent herein, i's carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling wooden boxes, bamboos, timber etc. under the name of M/s. Manila! Ranchoddas at Kaloi. On Ju!te 1, 1965, he was served with a notice under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act, by the Sales Tax Officer to show cause why he should not be assessed on best- Judgment basis for the period from January 1,, 1960 to June 31, 1964 and further with penalty on account of his failure to get himself registered.

Thereafter, on August 7, 1965, the Sales Tax Officer completed the 'best-Judgment' assessment.

He further imposed a penalty nuder Section 36(2) on the assessee on account of his failure to get the firm registered as a dealer.

The assessee,'s appeal was partly allowed by the Assessment Commissi<; mer of Sales Tax on November 10, 1967, only so far as the question of penalty was concerned.

The assessee's second appeal was dismissed by the Sales Tax Tribunal ou April 28, 1969.

Facts of C.A. 290/72.

The facts in writ petition (S.C.A. 8/70) giving rise to Civil Appeal 290 of 1972, are that the petitioner did not get itself registered as a dealer under the 1959 Act. The business of the petitioner consisted of taki'ng catering contracts from the Railway Administration. The Sales

Tax Officer served a notice in Form No. 27 under Section 33 on March 25, 1969, requiring the writ petitioner to show cause why action be not taken against him under Section 33(~) of the 1959 Act, as applicable in the State of Gujarat, for assessing the petitioner oti 'best-Judgment' basis for the period from March 1, 1960 to February 28, 1969.

The respondent herein sent a reply to this notice denying his liability

to get himself registered as a dealer.

While the matter was still pend- G ing before the Sales Tax Officer, the respondent moved the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, impugning the action proposed to be taken or actually taken against him under the provisions of Sections 33(6) and 36(2) of the 1959 Act.

By a common judgment, dated July 8, 1970, the Gujarat High H Court held that the provisions of Sections 33 ( 6) and 35 overlap each other" because all cases of escapement of assessment by a dealer can

12-JJOSCI/79

be dealt with at the sweetwill of the as'sessing authority under either of these provisions; that a dealer who is subjected to the procedure provided in Section 33 ( 6) will find it more onerous than the ooo in Section 35 inasmuch as unlike the latter Section, no period of limitation has been provided for taking action under Section 33 ( 6). No guidelines

have been provided and the choice of one procedure in preference to the other, is left to the arbitrary whim of the assessing authority. On this reasoning, the High Court held that Section 33(6) offends Article 14 of the Constitution and as such is void.

In reaching this conclusion, the High Court relied mainly upon this Court's decision in Anandji Hari

Das & Co. v. S. P. Kasture & Ors.( 1) It also drew support from this ,_... c Court's decision in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner-~ of Sales Tax, Nagpur( 2).

Facts in C.A. 2529 of 1972.

This appeal is directed against a judgment, dated March 13, 1972, of th~ Gujarat High Court, whereby it, following its earlier decision, dated D July 8, 1970, in writ petition 1378 of 1968, quashed the assessment of the respondents herein, for the period, January 1, 1960 to April 5, 1964 on the ground that Section 33(6) under which it was made, was wiolative of the equality clau5e contained in Article 14 of the Omstitution, and as such, void.

SECOND BATCH :

Facts in C. As. 2450-2451 of 1972.

In these two cases, the respondent was assessed as an unregistered dealer under Section 14(6) of the Bombay Sales Ta-.: Act, 1953, for F the period from 1.11.52 to 31.3.54 and from 1.4.54 to 24.4.56.

In Revision, the Maharashtra Sale5 Tax Tribunal, following the decision, dated October 12, 1971, of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A.

No. 444 of 1968 (Bhikamchand Moolchand Jain v. A. G. Saudagar &

Anr.) held that Section 14(6) is ultra vires the Constitution, and directed that the orders passed by the assessing authorities be set aside and if the applicant had paid anything in compliance with those orders, the 'same may be refunded.

In Balmokand Jain's case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, feeling itself bound by the ratio of this Court's decision in Anandii's case (ibid), held that Section 14(6) of the Bombay Act of 1953 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore void.

(I) A.J.R. 1968 SC 565.

(2\ A.I.R. 1%4 SC 766.

Facts in C. As. 1206 and 1213 of 1975.

These appeals by special leave arise out of a writ petition S.C.A. 444 of 1968 and Misc. Petition 330 of 1971, filed in the High Court of Bombay, which were disposed of by that Court by its judgments, dated 11/12 October, 1971 and October 12, 1971, respectively.

The writ petitioner/respond•ent herein was not at any time material to the case,

-.- registered as a dealer either under the 1953 Act or under the 1959 Act.

The relevant periods of assessment are, April 1, 1956 to December 31, 1959, the period being covered by the 1953 Act, and January 1, __ 1960 to September 30, 1967, being the period covered by the 1959 " Act.

On September 19, 1967, a notice under Section 14(6) of the t'1.953 Act was served on the respondent.

On November 22, 1967, ano, ther notice under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act was served on him.

Thereafter on November 22, 1967,, an order was made against him in • respect of the first period, levying a tax in the sum of Rs. 13,696.65 and a penalty under Section 14('7) in the sum of Rs. 4,500/-.

On January 30, 1968,, another assessment order was made which was in respect o~ the second period levying tax in the sum of RS. 17,887/- and a penalty under Section 36(2) (a) in the sum of Rs. 3001and under Section

3f;(2)(c) in the sum of Rs. 500/-.

In his writ pe•ition, the respondent challenged the validity of these two as'sessment orders, on the ground that Section 14(6) and Section 33(6) of the aforesaid Acts of 1953 and 1959 be.ing violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, were void.

Following the ratio of th.is Court's decision in Anandji's case, the High Court, accepted the respondent's contention and quashed the impugned assessments.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Gujarat High Court was in error in holding that the provisions of Sections 33 ( 6) {and 35 of the Act of 1959 overlap each other; that it overlooked the

met that upon its very language, Section 33 ( 6) is a special provision confined to an unregistered dealer who is guilty of committing the two-fold violation of law indicated in that provision; that the special provision by inevitable implication excludes the application of the general provision in Section 35 ( l) to the case of an unregistered dealer who escapes assessment on account of his failure to get himself registered and failure to file a return.

Counsel has further • submitted that Anandji Haridas is distinguishable inasmuch as that was a case of a registered dealer. While all the instant cases out of which these ppeals have arisen, are of unregistered dealers of the category specified in Section 33 ( 6).

It is submitted that putting unregistered dealers who escape assessment by the modus operandi ...

mentioned in Section 33(6), in a separate class to be dealt with, under that provision, rests on rational criteria having a direct nexus . with the object of preventing tax evasion.

According to Mr. Bhandare, the procedure provided in Section 33(6} is not more onerous than the one prescribed for taking action under Section 35.

Tax-evasion, proceeds the argument, by the modus operandi of the kind stated in Section 33(6), is of a more sinister kind and may go on for years an end without detection.

That is why, says the counsel, no limitation is provided for taking action under Section 33(6). ,,- On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents haw- C substantially reiterated the same reasons in support of the judgments ~· under appeal, which have been given by the High Courts.

Before dealing with these contentions, it is necessary to notice the material provisions of the 1959 Act and the 1953 Act.

Subsection (5) of Section 2 of 1959 Act defines an 'unauthorised dealer' to mean "a registered dealer who holds an Authorisation." 'Authorisation' means an "authorisation granted under Section 24." 'Dealer' under sub-section ( 6) of the same Section is defined to mean "any person who carries on the business of selling or buying goods in the pre-Reorganisation State of Bombay, excluding the transferred territories, whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and inclndes a State Government which carries on snch business and any society, club or association which sells goods to or buys goods from its members".

Then, there is an 'Exception' appended to this definition which excludes an agriculturist who sells exclusively agricultural produce grown on land cultivated by him personally, from the definition.

The definition of 'Dealer' in Section 2(6) of the 1953 Act is".,_ substantially the same. /

Sub-section (i) of Section 22 of the 1959 Act requires that no dealer shall, while. being liable to pay tax, carry on business as a G dealer unless he possesses a valid certificate of registration under this Act.

Sub-sectiort (2) obligates every dealer who is liable to pay tax to apply for a certificate of registration in the prescribed manner to the pr68cribe<l nuthority within the prescribed time.

Sections 33(6) and 35 of the 1959 Act read as follows:

H "S. 33(6). If the Commissioner has reason to believe that a dealer is liable to pay tax in respect of any period, but has failed to apply for registration within time as re-

-{_

quired by Section 22, the Commissioner shall, after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess, to the best of his judgment the amount of tax, if any, due from the dealer in respect of such period; and any period subsequent thereto."

"S. 35 (I). If the Commissioner has reason to believe that , any turnover of sales or turnover of purchases of any goods chargeable to tax under this Act has in respect of any year escaped assessment, or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate, or that any deductions have been wrongly made, then the Commissioner may,

(a) where such turnover has escaped assessment or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate by reason of the fact that the provisions of sub-section ( 1) 0f section 2 of the Bombay Sales Tax (Validating Provision;;) Act, 1957 were not then enacted, at any time within eight years,

(b) where be bas reason to believe that the dealer bas concealed such sales or purchases or any material particular

relating thereto, or bas knowingly furnished incorrect re-- ' turns, at any time within eight years, and ( c) in any other case, at any time within five years of the end of the year, serve on the dealer liable to pay tax in respect of such turnover, a notice containing all or any of the requisitions which may be included in a notice under sub-section (3) of section 33 and may proceed to assess or re-assess the amount of the tax due from such dealer; and accordingly, the other provision of this Act shall apply as if the notice were a notice served under that sub-section:

Provided that the amount of tax shall be assessed at the rates at which it would have been assessed bad there been no under-assessment or escapement, but after making

deductions, if any, pennitted from time to time by or under this Act :

Provided further that, where in respect of such turnover an order has already been passed in appeal or revision under this Act, the Commissioner shall make a report to the appropriate appellate or revising authority under this Act, which shall thereupon after giving the dealer concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such order as it deems fit.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall apply to any proceeding (including any notice issued) under section 33 or 57 or 6;!.

(3) Nothing in section 57 or 62 shall affect a proceeding under this section."

The corresponding provisions of the Act of 1953 run as under:-

"S. 14(6). If upon information which has come into his possssion, the Collector is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay the tax in respect of any period, but has failed to apply for registration, the Collector shall, after giving the dealer reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess to the best of his judgment the amount of tax, if any. due from the dealer in respect of such period and all subsequent periods."

"S. 15. If in consequence of any information which has come into his possession the Collector is satisfied that any turnover in respect of sales or purchase of any goods chargeable to the tax has escaped assessment in any year or has been under assessed or assessed at a lower rate or any deductions have been wrongly made therefrom, the Collector may, in any case where he has reason to believe that the dealer has concealed the particulars of such sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns, at any time within five years, and in any other case, at any time within three years, of the end of that year, serve on the dealer liable to pay the tax in respect of such turnover a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (3) of section 14 and may proceed to assess or re-assess the amount of the tax due from such dealer and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice served under that sub-section :

Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, the Bombay Sales Tax (No. 2) Ordinance, 1952, and this Act, as the case may be, at the rates at which it would have been as&essed had the turnover n.ot escaped assessment or full B assessment, as the case may be :

Provided further that where in respect of such turnover or deduction, as the case may be, an order has already been

passed under section 30 or section 31, the Collector shall make a report to the appropriate appellate or revising authority, as the case may be, which shall thereupon after giving the dealer concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such order as it deems fit."

An' analysis of Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act (corresponding to Section 14(6) of the 1953 Act) will show that it applies to that particular class of dealers, liable to pay tax, who -

(i) fail to apply for registration as required by Jaw (vide Section 22); and

(ii) who fail to pay the tax in respect of any period. c

Thus, Section 33(6) is, in terms, restricted in its application to the case of an unregistered dealer whose modus operandi to evade tax involves ab initio disregard of the Jaw. It does not apply to i: registered: dealer who has escaped assessment or has been underassessed or assessed at a lower rate or has been wrongly allowed any deduction or has concealed any material particulars relating to sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns. The case of such a registered dealer will fall under Section 35 and not under Section 33(6). Section 33(6) is a special provision confined to a particular class of tax-evaders, namely, unregistered dealers; while 'Section 35 is a general provision to deal with cases of escaped assessment or under assessment.

Generalia specialibus non derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that the general provisions must always yield to the special provisions.

Construed in accordance with this fundaniental principle the special class of unregistered dealers covered by Section 3 3 ( 6) must be taken to have been excluded from the purview of the general provisions in Section 35. Thus considered, it is clear that the case of an unregistered dealer who evades tax by committing the double default specified in Section 33(6), action can be taken only under that Section and not under Section 35.

It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for taking G action under Section 33 ( 6) against an unregistered dealer falling thereunder. But, there is rational basis for not putting any restriction as to the length of time within which action can be taken nnder Section 33 (6). The reason is that tax evasion by the unregistered dealers in thi§ class because of the clandestine modus operandi adopted by them, and wholesale disregard of the law, is more contu- B macious in character, more sinister in its effect both on the lawabiding tax-payers and the collection of public revenue,· and more

difficult to de, tect than tax-evasion by a registered dealer.

When a dealer appliei\_ for and obtains a registration certificate under the Act, he thereby admits his liability to pay tax.

In his case, the Sales-tax Authorities, have basic information, in pursuance of which, they can, by the exercise of due vigilence, check and detect any tax-evasion by him within a reasonable time.

This reasonable time is the period of limitation fixed by the Legislature, in its wisdom, in Section 3S. But the case of a tax-evading unregistered dealer is different. Jn his case, the Authorities have on their record no such basic information such as the registration record which would supply them a 'lead' to work upon.

For lack of information, or want of adequate staff, resources and time at the disposal of the Department, and the secretive nature of the modus operandi, tax-evading activities of an unregistered dealer may go on undetected for years on end. That is why for taking action under Section 33 ( 6) against a tax-evading unregistered dealer, the Legislature has not fixed any period of limil'ation. Thus, puling the unregistered dealer who, though liable to pay tax, fails to get himself registered and does not pay any tax, in a separate class, to be dealt with under :-ection 33 ( 6), differently from other dealers falling under

Sectic; m 35, rests on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of preventing tax-evasion.

The question of limitation apart, it cannot be said that the procedure provided in Section 33 (6) is more onerous than the one specified in Section 35.

The requirement as to issue of a notice to the defaulter and giving of an opportunity of being heard, is a common feature of both the sections. It is true that under Section 33 ( 6), the assessment is made on 'best-judgment basis'.

Nevertheless, it cannot be made arbitrarily or capriciously. It has to be made after taking into account all relevant material gathered by the Taxation Officer or pro-

_ L... duced before him by the assessee in response to the notice.

If an /

assessment under Section 33(6) is made upon inadequate materials, but on honest and fair guess-work, then it will be but due to the deliber- -<' ate default of the assessee in supplying the necessary information. The differential mode of assessment under Section 33 ( 6) is thus founded G upon rational criteria.

The ratio of Anandji Haridas is not applicable to the facts of the present cases.

Therein, this Court was dealing with the case of a registered dealer under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act 194 7. It was in that context that this Court, by a majority of 3 to 2, held that H Section 11(4) (a) of that Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act.

In our opinion, upo'n a proper construction,

of the two provisions, in juxtaposition to each other, such unregistered dealers can be proceeded against under Section 33(6) of the Bombay Act of 1959 or Section 14(6) of the Bombay Act of 1953, as the case may be, and not under Section 35 / Section 15 of the said Acts.

There is no overlapping between. these two, because Section 35 cannot be applied to the case of an unregistered dealer falling within the purview of the special provision in Section 33(6).

This was clear from sub-section (2) of Section 35, as it stood at the time material to these cases.

For the foregoing reasons, we. are of opinion that Section 33(6) o[ the 1959 Act and Section 14(6) of the 1953 Act do not violate Article 14 of the Constitution, and are valid.

We may mention in passing that the question raised with regard to the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions has become largely academic because mostly the impugned notices or assessments were within the period of limitation prescribed for taking action under Section 35 of the 1959 Act. In such cases, the question of subjecting the respondents to a more onerous procedure than the one envisaged in Section 35 in the matter of limitation, docs not arise.

In the result, we allow these appeal~, set aside the judgment of the High Courts/Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal and send the cases back

to the High Court or the Tribunal concerned, with these directions : E

In matters in which assessment orders have been passed, it will be open to the respondents to file or refile appeals against the assessment orders or if the respondents have withdrawn any :ippeal filed by them, they will be at liberty to file fresh app_eals.

Jn that case, if there is delay in filing or refiling the appeals, the delay will hopefully be con- F1 do'ncd as it is attributed to tbese proceedings.

The matters remitted to the High Court will be further remitted to the Sales-tax Officer, for disposal.

Civil Appeals Nos. 2450-2451/72 (Maharashtra appeals) will go back to tlte Sales Tax Tribunal, for decision or merits.

As already stated above, Civil Appeals Nos. 1213, 1206175, 1023- 1031/73, 2529172 and 303/74 will also be governed by this judgment in Civil Appeals 287-290 of 1972. In all these cases, the parties arc left to pay and bear their own costs in this Court.

P.B.R.

Appeals allowed.

STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ETC. ETC

PATEL RANJIBHAI DHANBHAI & ORS. ETC

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.

R. S. SARKARIA

N. L. UNTWALIA

P. S. KAILASAM

E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.

Bombay Soiro Tax Act 1959

Ss. 33(b)

Tax Act, 1953

S. 14(b)

Art. 14

s. 33(b)

Section 33(6)

Bombay Sales Tax Act 1959

s. 22

Section 35(1)

Section 14(6)

Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953

Section 15

s. 14(6)

s. 33(6)

s. 36(2)

ss. 33(6) and 35

s. 33(6)

Art. 14

s. 35

s. 33(6)

s. 14(6)

Bombay High Court

s. 14(6)

Art. 14

s. 33(6)

Anandii Hari Das

s. 33(6)

s. 35

Section 33(6)

s. 14(6)

Section 33(6)

s. 35

Section 33(6)

s. 35

s. 33(6)

s. 35

s. 35

s. 33

s. 35

s. 33(6)

s. 33

s. 35

s. 33

s. 33(6)

s. 35

s. 33(6)

s. 33(6)

s. 33

Anandji Haridas

s. 33(6)

s. 14(6)

s. 35

s. 15

s. 35

s. 33(6)

s. 35(2)

R. M. Mehta

M. C. Bhandare

V. S. Desai

M. N. Shroff

I. N. Shroff

R. P. Bhatt

B. R. Agarwala

J. Ramamurthi

R. Vaigai

M. N. Shroff

SARKARIA

State of Gujarat

July 8, 1970

High Court of Gujarat

July 4, 1973

Gujarat High Court

State of Maharashtra

Article 136

Sections 33(6) and 35

Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959

Sections 14(6) and 15

Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953

Article 14

Section 33(6)

Laxmi Vijay Saw Mill

November 2, 1955

October 31, 1959

November 1, 1959

Patel Muljibhai Bemjibhai

February l, 1960

November 10, 1964

November 13,. 1964

Anand

November 11, 1965

Section 14

Section 14

April 1, 1955

December 31, 1959

Article 226

Section 33(6)

s. 9

Section 33(6)

August 7, 1965

Section 36(2)

November 10, 1967

Sales Tax Tribunal

April 28, 1969

Section 33

Section 33(~)

Article 226

Sections 33(6) and 36(2)

Gujarat High H Court

Sections 33

Section 33

Section 35

Section 33

Section 33(6)

Article 14

Section 33(6)

Article 14

Section 14(6)

Maharashtra Sale5 Tax Tribunal

October 12, 1971

Section 14(6)

Balmokand Jain

Anandii

Section 14(6)

Article 14

High Court of Bombay

September 30, 1967

The relevant periods of assessment are, April 1, 1956 to December 31, 1959, the period being covered by the 1953 Act, and January 1,  1960 to September 30, 1967, being the period covered by the 1959 " Act.

September 19, 1967

Section 14(6)

November 22, 1967

Section 33(6)

Section 14('7)

January 30, 1968

Section 36(2)

Section

3

Section 14(6)

Section 33(6)

Article 14

Anandji

Sections 33

Section 33

Section 35

Anandji Haridas

Section 33

Section 33(6)

Bhandare

Section 33(6)

Section 2

Section 24

Bombay

Section 2(6)

Section 22

Sections 33(6) and 35

S. 33(6)

Section 22

S. 35

section 2

section 33

section 33

section 57

S. 14(6)

S. 15

section 14

section 30

section 31

Section 33(6)

Section 14(6)

Section 22

Section 33(6)

Section 35

Section 33(6)

Section 33(6)

Section 35

Section 3

Section 35

Section 33(6)

Section 35

Section 33

Section 33

Section 3S

Section 33

Section 33

Section 35

Section 33

Section 33(6)

Section 33

Berar Sales Tax Act

Section 11(4)

Article 14

Section 33(6)

Section 14(6)

Section 35

Section 15

Section 35

Section 33(6)

Section 35

Section 33(6)

Section 14(6)

Article 14

Section 35

Section 35