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BISHNU DEO SHAW@ BISHNU DAYAL A

STATE OF WEST BENGAL

February 22, 1979

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J B

Demand of death for murder, rationale of section 302 I.P.C. vis-a-vis- Section 354(3) of the Crl. P.C. 1973-"Special Reason:/', meaning of-Section 354(3) 360. 361 of Crl. P.C.-Scope of.

The appellant was convicted by the Additional Session's Judge Alipore for the murder of his son 00.d sentenCed to death. The reason given by the C Sessions Judge was that the murder was "cruel and brutal" and that the facts showed the "grim determination" of the accused to kill the deceased. The Sessions Judge made no reference to the motive of the accused for the commission of the murder. The High Court while confirming the conviction and sentence observed that the accused had previously murdered his wife, suspecting her infidelity that the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him for the

murer of his wife had no sobering effect, that he suspected that the deceased D in the present case was not his own son and so he murdered him without any mercy or remorse, and that he, therefore deserved no mercy.

Allowing the appeal by special leave limited to the question of sentence, the Court

HELD : 1. There were no "special reasons" justifying the imposition of the E death penalty. [3 71 Fl

(a) The Sessions Judge was wrong in imposing the sentence of death without even a reference to the reason v"hy the appellant comn1itted the murder.

[371 CJ

(b) The observation of the High Court that the appellant deserved no mercy because he showed no mercy smacks very much of punishment by way of retribution.

[371 CJ

(c) From the evidence, it is clear that the appellant 'Whs a moody person who had for years been brooding over the suspected infidelity of his wife and the injury of having a son foisted on him. The mere use of adjectives like "cruel and brutal" does not supply the special reasons contemplated by section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. [3.710-E]

Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utrar Pradesh, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 78, applied.

2. "Special reasons 1 ' are reasons which are special with reference to the offender, with reference to constitutional and legislative directives and with reference to the times, that is, with reference to contemporary ideas in the

fields of criminology and connected sciences. Special reasons are those H which lead inevitably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemp tion, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the legislative

policy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made in the methods of treatment etc. Section 354(3) of the 1973 Code has narrowed the discretion of sentence for murder. Death sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be imposed for "Special reasons".

Judges are left with the task of discovering "special reasons".

[368 D-E. 370E-F]

(a) Apart from Section 354(3), there is another prov1s1on in the Code which also uses the significant expression "Special reasons.". It is Section 361, Section 360 of the 1973 Code re-enacts, in substance, Section 562 of ~16 1898 Code and provides for the release on probation of good conduct or after admonition any person not under twenty-one years of age who is COn• victed of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or any person under twentyone years of age or any woman who is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, if no previous offence is proved against the offender, and if it appears to the Court having regard to the age, character or antec-e dents of the offender, and to the circunlStances in which the offellce was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be re1eased on proba tion of good conduct or after admonition. If the Court refrains from den.I ing with an offen<Jer under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Pro bation of Offenders Act, or any other law for the treatment, training, or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where the Court could have done, so, Section 361, which is a new provision in the 1973 Code makes it tnendatory for the Court to record in its judgment the "Special reasons" for not doing so. Section 361 thus casts a duty upon the Court to apply the prov1s1ons of Section wherever it is possible to do so and, to state "special reasons" it it does not do so. [368F-H, 369A-Bl

(b) In the context of Section 360, the "Special reasons" contemplat'd by Section 361 must be such as to compel the Court to hold that it is iin possible to reform and rehabilitate the offenders, after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. This is some indication by the Legislature that reformation and rehabilitation of offenders, and not mere deterrence are now among the foremost objects of the administration of criminal justice in our country. Section 361 and Section 354(3) have both entere_d the Statute Book at the same time and they are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the Indian Parliament of the new trends in criminology. Therefore, the personality of the offender as revealed by his age1 character, antecedents and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender to reform must necessarily play the most prominent role in determin~ ing the sentence to be awarded.

Special reasons must have some relation to. these factors.

(369B-EJ

3. Criminal justice is not a computer machine. It deals with con1plex-. human problems and diverse 1 human beings.

It deals with persons who areotherwise like the rest of us, who work and play, who laugh and mourn, whe> love and hate, who yearn for affection and approval, as all of us do, who think learn and forget. Like the rest of us they too are the creatures of circumstances. Heredity, environment, home neighbourhood, upbringing, school, friends, associates, even casual acquaintences, the books that one reads, newspapers, radio and TV, the economics of the household, the opporr ,

BISHNU DEO V. WEST BENGAL 357

tunities provided by circumstances and the calarnaties resulting therefrom the A success and failure of one's undertakings the affairs of the heart, ambitions and frustrations, the ideas and ideologies of the time, these and several other ordinary and extra-ordinary incidents of life contribute to a person's personality and influence his conduct. Differently shaped and differently circumstanced indivi duals reaoet differently in given situations. A judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the circumstances the situations and the reaction~ and choose the appropriate sentence to be imposed.

A judge must try tO 3.nswcr a myriad question such as was the offence comn1itted without premeditation or was it after due deliberation ? What was the motive for the criwe '! \Va-s it for, gain ? Was it the outcome of a village feud ? Was it the result of a petty drunken, street brawl, or a domestic bickering between a helpless husband and a helpless wife ? Was it due to sexua-1 jealousy ? Was the n1u:·<ler committed under some stress, emotional or otherwise ? What is the background of the offende( ? What is his social and economic status ? What is the level of his education or intelligence ? Do his actions betray a particularly callous indifference towards the welfaire of society, or on the other hand, do they show a great concern for humanity and are in fact inspired by such concern ? Is the offender so perpetually and constitutionally at \Var \Vith society that there is no hope of ever reclaiming him from being a n1enace to society ?

Or is he a person who is patently amenable to reform ? [369 E-H, 370 A-CJ

(a) Judges in India have the discretion to impose or not to in1pose the death penalty.

It is one of the great burdens \Vhich judges in this country have to carry.

In the past, the reasons which \veighed in the matter of awardin:; or not awarding the sentence of death varied widely a-nd there was certainly room for complaint that there was unequal t:lpplication of the law in the matter of imposition of the sentence of death.

{367C-D]

(b) There cannot be any higher basic human right than the right to life and there can not-be anything more offensive to human dignity than a violation of that right by the infliction of the death penalty. It is in the light of the right to life as a basic concf1'.()t of human dignity, in the conb!xt of the unproven efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent and in the background of modern theories of criminology based upon progress in the ·!jeJds of science, medicine, psychiatry and sociology and in the setting of the march of the movement for abolition of Capital Punishment, that Judges in India arc required to decide

\Vhich sentence to impose in a case of murder, death or imprisonn1ent fer life?

[3660, 367B-C]

Furman v. Georgia, 33 Lawyers Edn. 2nd Series 346 1eferred to.

( c) Realising that discretion, even judicial_, 1nust proceed along. perceptive lines, but, conscious, all the same that such discretion cannot be reduced to formulate or put into pigeon-holes, this Court has ben at great pain ever since Ediga-Annamma to point out the path along which to proceed. In the latest pronouncement of this Court in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U11ar Pradesh, several relevant principles have been enunciated to guide the exercise of discretion in making the choice betv.een the penalties of death ~:nd Jife-imprisonment.

[367F-G]

Ediga Annamma v. State of A.P. [1974] S.C.C. 443, Rajendra Prasad v.

State of U.P. [1979] 3 SCR 78 referred to.

4. Among the several theories of punishment the reformative theory is irrelevant where death is the punishment since life and not death can reform; the preventive theory is unimportant "'here the choice, is between death and life imprisonment las in India; the retributive theory is incongruous in an era of enlightenment and inadequate as a theory since it does not attempt to justify punishment by any beneficial results either to the society or to the person punished. Equally, the denunciatory theory is as inadequate as the retributive theory since it does not justify punishment by its results.

[359H, 360AwB,

36!BJ

5. (a) The very nature Of the penalty of death makes it imperative that at every suitable opportunity life imprisonment should be preferred to the death penalty.

[359E]

Furman v. Georgia, 33 L.ed. 2nd Edn. 346; relied on.

(b) AU studies made on the subject whether capital punishnlent is the most desirable and most effective instrument for protecting the community fr01:.1 violent crime than other penalties say, a sentence of imprisonment for long terms, have led to the conclusion that the death penalty is inconsequential as a deterrent. [361 F]

( c) There is no positive indication that the death penalty has been deterrent.

In other words, the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent is unproven.

[365A]

6. The death penalty, rather than deterring murder, actually deters the proPer administration of criminal justice. [365 A-B]

(a) There is the absolute finality and irrevocability of the dearh penalty.

Human justice1 can never be infallible. The most conscientious judge is no E proof against any mistakes. Cases are unknown where innocent persons haye been hanged in India and elsewhere.

[365B-C]

(b) Some Judges and Jurists have an abhorrence of the death penalty that they would rather find a guilty person not guilty than send even a guilty perscn to the gallows. The refusal of juries to convict persons of murder because of the death penalty is a well known phenomenon throughout the world.

A. perusal of some of the judgments of the Superior Courts in India. dealing with cases where Trial Courts have imposed sentence of death reveals the same reluctance to convict because the result would otherwise be to confirm the sentence of death. Thus a guilty person )s prevented from conviction by a possibility that a death penalty may otherwise be the result.

(365C-D]

(c) Yet a more 'grievious injury' which the death penailty inflicts on the administration of Criminal Justice is that it rejects reformation and rehabilitation G of offenders as among the most important objectives of Criminal Justice, though the conscience of the World Community spelaking through the voices of the Legislature of several countries of the world has accepted reforma•tion ard

rehabilitation as among the basic purposes of Criminal Justice.

Death penalty is the broOOing giant in the part of reform and treatment of Crime and Crimiilals, 'inequitably sabotaging any social or institutional programme tO reformation'.

It is the 'fifth column' in the administration of criminal justic:e.

[365E-GJ

( d) There is also the compelling class complexion of the death penalty.

A tragic by-product of social and economic deprivation is th.Qt the 'have-nots'

in every society always have been 5Ubject to grea¢:er pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more afiluent fellow citizens. So, the burden -0f capital punishment falls more frequently upon the ignorant, the improverished and the underprivilege. [365 G-H]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimihal Appeal No. 70 of 1979.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-2-1978 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1976 and death Reference No. 4/76.

H. C. Mittal (Amicus Curiae) for the Appellaitt.

G. s. Chatterjee for the Respondent.

The following Judgments were delivered :

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-"The murderer has killed. It is wrong to kill. Let us kill the murderer". That was how a Mr. Bonsall of Manchester (quoted by Arthur Koestler in his 'Drinkers of Infinity'), in a letter

to the Press, neatly summed up the paradox and the pathology of the D Death Penalty.

The unsoundness of the rationale of the demand of -Oeath for murder has been discussd and exposed by my brother Krishna Iyer, J., in a recent pronouncement in Rajendra Prasad v ..

State of Uttar Pradesh(').

I would like to add an appendix to what bas been said there.

The dilemma of the Judge i'n every murder case, "Death or life imprisonment for the murderer ?" is the question with which we are faced in this appeal.

The very nature of the penalty of death appears to make it imperative that at every suitable opportunity life imprisonment should be preferred to the death penalty. "The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, uot ih degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpooe of criminal justice.

And, it is unique finally in its absolute re nuhciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity" (per Stewart J., in Furman v. Georgia) (2). "Death is irrevocable, life imprii; onment is not.

Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible, 1ife imprisonment doos not" (per Marshall, J., in Furman v.

Georgia).

I' Theories of punishment, there are many reformative, preventive, retributive, denunciatory and debrre'nt. Let us examine which cap .fits capital punishment.

The reformative theory is irrelevant where H

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A death is the punishment since life and not death can reform.

The preventive theory is unimportant where the choice is between death and life imprisonment as in India.

The retributive theory is incongruous in an era of enlightenment.

It is inadequate as a theory sinoe it does not attempt to justify punishment by any beneficial results either to the society or to the persons punished.

It is, however, hecessary to clear a common misnnderstanding that the retributive theory justifies the death penalty. According to the retributivist society has the right and the duty to vindicate the wrong done to it and it must impose a punishment which fits the crime. It does not mean returning of evil for evii but the righting of a wrong.

It implies the imposition of a just but no more than a jnst penalty and automatically rules out execessive punishment and, therefore, capital punishment.

According to a modern exponent of the v::tributive theory of justice "capital punishmeht . . . . . . is without foundation in a theory of just punishment.

Indeed one could go further and assert that capital punishment is antithetical to the purposes. and principles of punitive sanctions in the law.

Requital, when properly understood in terms of a concept of just law, undoubtedly does have a legitimate roe in punishment.

However, neither requital nor punishment in general is a returning of evil for evil, and, theP::fore, I see no support for the demand that a murder (or an act of treason, or some other serious offence) be paid for with a lifo".

The Biblical injunctioh 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' is often quoted as if it was a command to do retributive justice. It was not.

Jewish history shows that it was meant to be merciful and set limits to harsh punishments which were imposed earlier including the death penalty for blasphamy, Sabbath breaking, adultery, false prophecy, cursing, striking a parent etc. And, as one abolitionist reminds us, who, one "' may ask, remembers the voice of the other Jew : "Whoever shall smite on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also ?".

The d•::nunciatory theory of punishment is only a different shade of the retributive theory but from a sternly moral plain.

Lord Den- G ning advahced the view before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment : "The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the .great majority of citizens for them- It is a mistake to consider the obj•::cts of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. The ultimate justification of a'ny punishment is not that it is a deterrent but that it H is th:: emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime, and from this point of view them are some murders which in the present state of opinion demand the most emphatic denunciation of all, namely the

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death penalty" . . . . . . "The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not".

The implication of this statement is that th•c death penalty is necessary not because the preservation of society requires it but because society demands it.

Despite the high moral tone and phrase, the dennnciatory theory, as propounded, is nothing but an echo of the retributive theory as explained by Stephen who had said earlier : "The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite".

The denunciatory theory is as inade-. quate as the retributive theory since it does not justify punishment by its results.

As Prof.

Hart points out the idea that we may puhish offenders not to prevent harm or suffering or even the reptition of the offence but simply as a means of emphatically expressing our con~ demnation, is uncomfortably close to human sacrifice as an expression of righteousness.

And, the qu•ostio'n remains : "Why should denunciation take the form of punishment".

The deterrent theory may now be considered.

It is important to notice here that the question is not whether the penalty of death, hai;; deterrent effect on potential murderers but whether it deters morecffectively than other. penalties say, a sentence of imprisonment for a long term ? Is Capital Punishment the most desirable and the most effective instrument for protecting the community from violent crime?

What is the evidence that it has a uniquely deterrent force compared with the alternative of protracted imprisonment? If the death penalty really and appreciably decreases murder, if there is equally no effective substitute and if its incidents are not injurious to society, we may well support the death penalty.

But all studies mad•c on the subject, as I will presently point out, appear to have led to the conclusion that the death penalty is inconsequential as a deterrerrt.

Sir James Fitz James Stephen, a great Victorian Judge and a vigorous expo'nent of the deterrent theory said in his Essay on Capital Punishment : "No other punishment of death.

This is one of those committing crimes as the punishment of death.

Thi; is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof can make them.

It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all.

The who'•' experie'nce of mankind is in the other direction.

The threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute necessity of producing some results ...... No one goes to certain inevitable death except by compulsion.

Put the

matter the other way, was there ever yet a criminal who when sentenced to death and brought out to die would refuse the offer ol' a commutati<in of a sentence for a severest secondary punishment ?

Surely not.

Why is this? It can only be because 'all that a man has will be given for his life''. In any secondary punishment however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly".

Stephen's statement was admittedly a dogmatic assertion since he himself stated that it was a proposition difficult to prove though according to him, self evident.

The great fallacy in the argument of Stephen has been pointed out by several criminologists.

Stephen makes no distinction between a threat of certain and imminent punishment which faces the convicted murderer and the threat of a different problamatic punishment which may or may not influence a potential murderer.

Murder may be unpremeditated, under the stress of some disturbing emotior: or it may be premeditated after planning and deliberation.

Where the murder is premeditated any thought of possibility of punishment. is blurred by emotion and the penalty of death can no more deter than any other penalty.

Where murder is premedit~, ted the offender disregards the risk of punishment because he thinks there is no chance of detection.

What weighs with him is the uncertainty of detection and consequent punishment rather than the nature of the punishment.

The Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders appointed by the Government of Great Britain stated in their report in 1960 "We were impressed by the argument that the greatest deterrent to crime is not the fear of punishment, but the certainty of detection".

Prof. Hart countered Stephen's argument with these observations: 'This (Stephen's) estimate of the paramount place in human motivation of the fear of death reads impressively but surely contaim a suggestio falsi and once this is detected its congency as an argument in favour of the death penalty for murder vanishes for there is really no parallel between the situation of a convicted murderer over the alternative or life imprisonment in the shadow of the gallows and the situation of the murderer contemplating his crime.

The certainty of death is one thing, perhaps for normal people nothing can he compared with it.

But the existence of the death penalty does not mean for the murderer certainty of death now. It means not very high probability of death in the future.

And, futurity and uncertainty, the hope of an escape, rational or irrational lastly diminishes the difference between death and imprisonment as deterrent, and may diminish to vanishing point ....... The way in which the convicted

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murderer may view the immediate prospect of the gallows after he has been caught must be a poor guide to the effect Of this prospect upon him when he is contemplating committing his crime".

A hundred and fifty years ago a study was made by the Joint Selec.t Committee appointed by the General Assembly of Connecticut and they reported "Your Committee do not hesitate to express their firm belief that a well devised system of imprisopment, one which should render the punishment certain and perpetual would be far more effectual to restrain from crime than punishment of death''.

One of the most comprehensive enquiries ever undertaken on the subject was that made by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.

The Commission visited several countries of Europe and the United States, addressed qnestionnaires to many other couutries in search of information and examined celebrated experts and jurists. The Commission's conclusions are of significance.

They said: "There is no clear evidence in any of the figures we have examined that the abolition of Capital Punishment has led to an increase in the homicide rate, or that its reintroduction to a fall ....... prima fade the penalty 0f death is likely to have a stronger effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of punishment and there is some evidence (though no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so.

But its effect does not operate universally or unifonnly and there are many offenders on whom it is limited and may often be negligible. It is accordingly important ta view this question in just perspective and not ta base a penal policy in relation to murder an exaggerated estimates of the uniquely deterrent farce of the death penalty".

Prof. Thorsten Sellin who made a serious and thorough study of the entire subject in the United States on behalf of the American Law In, stitute stated his conclusion: "Any one who carefully examines the above data is bound to arrive at the conclusion that the death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence on the extent or fluctuating rate of capital crime. It has failed as a deterrenf'.

In 1962 statistics were compiled and a report was prepared at the instance Qf the United Nations Economic and Social Council on the question of Capital Punishment, the laws and practices relating thereto and the effects of capital punishment and the abolition thereof on the rate of criminality.

According to the report all the information available appeared to confinn that neither total abolition of the death penalty nor its partial abolition in regard to certain crimes only had

been followed by any notable rise in the incidence of crime which was previously punishable with death.

Late Prime Minister Bhandarnaike of Sri Lanka suspended the death penalty in 1956.

A Commission of Inquiry on Capital Punishment was appointed and it reported "If the experience of the many countries which have suspended or abolished capital punishment is taken into account there is in our view, cogent evidence of the unlikelihood of this 'hidden protection' ...... It is, therefore, our view that the statistics of homicide in Ceylon when related to the social changes since the suspension of the death penalty in Ceylon and when related to the experience of other countries tend to disprove the assumption of the uniquely deterrent effect of the death penalty, and that in deciding on the question of reintroduction or abolition of the capital punishment reintroduction cannot be justified on the argument that it is a more effective deterrent to potential killers than the alternative of protracted imprisonment''. It is a tragic irony that Prime Minister Bhandarnaike who suspended the Capital Punishment in Ceylon was murdered by a fanatic and in the panic that ensued death penalty was reintroduced in Ceylon.

In the United States of America several studies have been made but 'the resnlts simply have been inconclusive'.

The majority Judges of the United States Supreme Court who upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in the State of Georgia in Gregg v. Georgia(') were compelled to observe "Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence supporting or refuting this view".

In the same case the minority Judges Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., were convinced that 'capital punishment was not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society'.

In India no systematic study of the problem whether the death penalty is a greater deterrent to murder than the penalty of life imprisonment has yet been undertaken. A few years ago I made a little research into the matter and studied the statistics relating to capital crime in several districts of Andhra Pradesh from 1935 to 1970.(') The pattern was most eratic but it can be boldly asserted that the fignres do not justify a conclusion that the death penalty has been a deterrent, but, then, the figures do not also lead inevitably to the conclusion that the death penalty has not been deterrent. One of the complicating factors is the discretion given to 1udges to inflict -·-------· (I) 49 L. Edn. 2nd 859.

(2) Article in the Hindu, Madras, published in 1973.

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death penalty or imprisonment for life (about which more later) which A {!estroys the utility of any study based on statistics. The most reasonable conclusion is that there is no positive indication that the death penalty has been deterrent. In other words, the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent ls unproven.

"The death penalty, rather than deterring murder, actually deters the proper administration of criminal justice".(') There is the absolute finality and irrevocability of the death penalty.

Human justice can never be infallible.

The most conscientious judge is no proof against sad mistakes.

Every criminal lawyer of experience will admit that cases are not unknown where innocent persons have been hanged in India and elsewhere.

And, it is not the only way the death penalty strikes at the administration of criminal justice.

Some Judges and Juries have an abhorrence of the death penalty that they would rather find a guilty person not guilty than send even a guilty person to the gallows.

The refusal of Juries to convict persons of murder because of the death penalty is a well known phenomenon throughout the world. A perusal of some of the judgments of the Superior Courts in India dealing with cases where Trial Courts have imposed sentences of death reveals the same reluctance to convict because the result would otherwise be to confirm the sentence of death.

Thus a guilty person is prevented from conviction by a possibility that a death penalty may otherwise be the result.

That is not all.

There is yet a more 'grievous injury' which the death penalty inflicts on the administration of Criminal Justice. It rejects reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as among the most important objectives of Criminal Justice, though the conscience of the World Community speaking through the voices of the Legislature of several countries of the world has accepted reformation and rehabilitation as among the basic purposes of Criminal Justice.

Death penalty is the brooding giant in the path of reform and treatment of Crime and Criminals, 'inevitably sabotaging any social or institutional programme to reformation'. It is the 'fifth column' in the administration of criminal justice. • There is also the compelling class complexion of the death penalty.

A tragic by product of social and economic deprivation is that the "have-nots" in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens.

So, the burden of capital punishment falls more frequently upon the ignorant, the impoverished and the underpriviledged. In the words of Marshall, J., "Their impotence leaves them

(1) Frank-cYConnor quoted in 'Ready for the Defence' by Garbus.

victims of a sanction that the welthier, better represented, just-as guilty person can escape.

So long as the capital sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily forgotten members of society, legislators are content to maintain the status-quo because change would draw attention to the problem and concern might develop.

Ignorance is perpetuated and apathy soon becomes its ma.te and we have today's situation''.

As a matter of historical interest it may be mentioned here that when in 1956, in Great Britain, the House of Commons adopted a resolution "That this House believes that the death penalty for murder no longer accords with the needs or the true interests of a civilised society, and calls on Her Majesty's Government to introduce forthwith legislation for its abolition or for its suspension for an experimental period", and the death penalty Abolition Bill was introduced, 'from the hills and forests of darkest Britain they came: the halt, the lame, the deaf, the obscrue, the senile and the forgotten-the here- . ditary peers of England, united in their determination to use their medieval powers to retain a medieval institution",(') and the bill was torpedoed by the House of Lords.

Capital Punishment was however abolished in Great Britain in 1966.

There is finally the question whether the. death penalty conforn1s to the current standards of 'decency'.

Can there be any higher basic human right than the right to life and can anything bt; more offensive to human dignity than a violation of that right by the infliction of the death penalty. Brennan, J., observed in Furman v. Georgia( 2 ) "In comparison to all other punishments today ...... the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity ..... death for whatever crime and under all circumstances is truly an awesome punishment.

The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity ...... as executed person has indeed loot the right to have rights''. Senor Tejera of Uruguay in the debate in the United Nations said "A death penalty is an anachronism iu the twentieth Century and it is significant that no one in the committee has defended it. It is the duty of the United Nations to promote pre~ gress and to protect man from the prejudices and barbarity surviving from the past''.

In a large number of countries in the world where the murder rate is higher than in India, the death penalty has been abolished. In most La'.in American countries, in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Costa

(1) Quotation from the New Statesman.

(2) 22 L. Edn. 2nd 346.

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Rica, Ecuador, Maxico, Panama, Peru and Uruguas, Venezuala, in European countries, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, in Iceland, in Israel, in many Australian States and in many of tbe States in the United

States of America, death sentence has been abolished .

It is in the light of the r\ght to life as a basic concept of human B dignity, in the context of tbe unproven efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent and in tbe background of modern theories of criminology based upon progress in the fields of science, medicine, psychiatry n<l

sociology and in the setting of the march of the movement for abolition of Capital Punishment, that Judges in India are required to decide which sentence to impose in a case of murder, death or imprisonment 0 for life?

Judges in India have the discretion to impose or not to impose the death penalty. It is one of the great burdens which Judges in this country have to carry.

In the past, the reasons which weighed in the matter of '!warding or not awarding the sentence of death varied widely and tbere was certainly room for complaint that there was an unequal application of the Jaw in the matter of imposition of the sentence of death.

The varying outlook on the part of Judges was well brought out a few years ago by two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

In tbe first case, while confirming the conviction of certain "Naxalites" for murder, the judges set aside the sentence of death and awarded life imprisonment instead.

That the mnrder was not for any personal motive but was in p.nrsuit of some mistaken ideology was the reason which weighed with the judges for substituting the sentence of life imprisonment for the sentence of death.

Within a few montbs tbis view was subjected to severe criticism by two other Judges, who, in the second case confirmed the sentence of death.

Realising that discretion, even judicial, must proceed along perceptive lines, but, conscious, all the same, that such discretion cannot be reduced to formulae or put into pigeon-holes, this Court has been at great pains cversince Ediga Annamma to point the path along which to proceed. In the latest pronouncement of this Conrt in Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utlar Pradesh (supra) several relevant principles have been enunciated to guide the exercise of discretion in making the choice between the penalties of death and life-imprisomnent.

I express my agreement witb tbe elucidation of tbe principles in Rajendra Prasad

v. State ofUttar Pradesh. (supra)

Section 302 Indian Penal Code prescribes deatb or life-imprison- H •-r ment as the penalty for mnrder. While so, the Code of Criminal Procedure instructs the Conrt as to its application. The changes which

4-253 SCI /79

the Code ha~ undergone in the last 25 years clearly indicate that Parliament i~ taking note of contemporary criminological thought and movement.

Prior to 1955, Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 insisted upon the Court stating its reasons if the sentence of death was not imposed in a case of murder.

The result was that it was thought that in the absence of extenuating circumstances, which were to be stated by the Court, the ordinary penalty for murder was death.

In 1955, sub-section (5) of Section 367 was deleted and the deletion was interpreted, at any rate by some Courts, to mean that the sentence of life imprisonment was the normal sentence for murder and the sentence of death could be imposed only if there were aggravating circumstances. In the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, there is a further swing towards life imprisonment Section 354(3) cf the new Code now provide8 :

"When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative imprisonment for life or imprison- D mcnt for a t_\lrm of years, the judgment shall tale the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the Special reasons for such sentence."

So, the discretion to impose the sentence of death or life-imprisonment is not so wide, after all.

Section 354(3) has narrowed the E discretion Death Sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be imposed for 'Special reasons', Judges are left with the task of discovering 'Special reasons'.

Let us first examine if the Code of Criminal Procedure gives any clue leading to the discovery of 'Special reasons'.

Apart from Section 354(3) there is another provision in the Code which also uses the significant expression 'special reasons'. It is Section 361.

Section 360 of the 1973 code re-enacts, in substance, Section 562 of the 1898 Code and provides for the release on probation ot good conduct or after admonition any person not under twenty one years ot age who is convicted of an offence punishable with tine only or with imprisonment for a term ot seven years or less, or any person under twenty one years of age or any women who is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment of life, if no previous offence is proved against the offender, and if it appears to the Court, having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct or after admonition. If the Court refrains from dealing

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with an offender nnder Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, or any other law for the treatment, training,

or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where the Court could have done so, Section 361, which is a new provi>ion in the 1973 Code makes it mandatory for the Court to record in its judgment the 'special reasons' for not doing so.

Section 361 thus casts a duty upon the Court to apply the provisions of Section 360 wherever it is possible to BJ do so and, to state "special reasons" if it does not do so. In the context of Section 360, the "special reasons" contemplated by Section 361 mnst be such as to compel the Court to hold that it is impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. This is some indication by the Legislature that reformation and rehabilitation of offenders, and not mere deterrence, are now among the foremost objects of the administration of criminal Justice in our country. Section 361 and Section 354i(3) have both entered the Statute Book at the same tin1e and they are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the Indian Parliament of the new trends in criminology.

We will not, therefore, be wrong in assuming that the persona!ity of the offender a. revealed by his age, character, antecedents and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender to reform !llust necessarily play the most prominent role in determining the sentence to be awarded.

Special reasons must have some relation to thege factors.

Criminal justice is not a computer machine. It deals with omplex human problems and diverse human beings. It deals with persons who are otherwise like the rest of us, who work and play, who laugh and mourn, who love and hate, who yearn for affection and approval, as all of us do, who think, learn and forget.

Like the rest of us they too are the creatures of circumstance. Heredity, environment, home neighbourhOQd; upbringing, school, friends, associates, even caual acquaintenances, the books that one reads, newspapers, radio and TV, the economics of the household, the opportunities provided by circumstances and the calamities r$Jsulting therefrom, the success and failure of one's undertakings, the affairs of the heart, ambitions and frustrations, the ideas and ideologies of the time, these and several other ordinary and extra-ordinary incidents of life contribute to a person's personality and influence his conduct. Differently shaped and differentc

. ly circumstanced individuals react differently in given situations.

A H Judge has to balance the: Pl!tsonality of the offender with the circumstance the situations and the reaction8 and choose the appropriate

sentence to be imposed. A judge must try to answer a myried questions such as was the offence committed without premeditation or was it after due deliberation ? What was the motive for the crime ? Was it for gain? Was it .the outcome of a village feud? Was it the result of a petty, drunken, street brawl, or a domestic bickering between a hapless husband and a helpless wife ? Was it due to sexual jealousy ?

Was the murder committed under some stress, emotional or otherwise ?

What is the background of the offender ? What is his social and economic status ? What is the level of his education or intelligence ?

Do his actions betray a particularly callous indifference towards the welfare of society or, on the other hand, do they show a great concern for humanity and are in fact inspired by such concern ? Is the offender so perpetually and constitutionally at war with society that there is no hope of ever reclaiming him from being a menace to society ? Or is he a person who is patently amenable to reform? Well, may one ex claim with Prof. Vrij "What audacity is involved in these three tasks : to interpret life, explain an act, predict the latest inclination of a human mind."

'Special reasons', we may, therefore say, are reasons which are special with reference to the offender, with reference to constitutional and legislative directives and with reference to the times, that is, with reference to contemporary ideas in the fields of Criminology and connected sciences.

Special reasons are those which lead inevitably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemption, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the legislative policy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made in the methods of treatment etc.

I will not attempt to catalogue any 'Special reasons'.

I have said enough and perhaps more than what I intended, to indi cate what according to me should be the approach to the question.

Whatever I have said is but to supplement what my brother Krishna Iyer has already said in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (')

Coming to the case before us, our brothers J aswant Singh and Kallas am, JJ ., ordered 'notice confined to the question of sentence only.' At the last hearing we granted special leave to appeal on the question of sentence. The appellant was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions' Judge, Alipore, for the murder of his son and sentenced to death. The High Court of Calcutta confirmed the conviction and sentence. The reason given by the learned Sessions Judge for giving the sentence of death was that the murder was 'cruel and

(1) (1979] 3 S.C.R. 18.

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BISHNU DEO v. WEST BENGAL (Krishna Iyer, J.) 371

brutal' and that the facts show the 'grim determination' of the accused to kill the deceased.

The Sessions Judge made no reference to the motive of the accused for the commission of the murder.

The High Court while confirming the sentence observed that the accused had previously murdered his wife, suspecting her infidelity and suspecting that the deceased in the present case was not his own son, that the sentence of imrisomnent imposed on him for the murder of his wife had no soberii)g affect and that he had murdered his own son without any mercy or remorse and that he, therefore, deserved no mercy. We do not think that either the Sessions Judge or the High Court made the right approach to the question.

The Sessions Judge was wrong in imposing the sentence of death without even a reference to the reason why the appellant co=itted the murder.

The observation of the High Court that the appellant deserved no mercy because he showed no mercy smacks very much of punishment by way of retribution.

We have examined the facts of the case. We find some vague evidence to the effect that the appellant suspected that the deceased was not his own son and that he used to get angry with the deceased for not obeyini: him.

There is also vague evidence that he had killed the mother of the deceased and had suffered sentence of imprisonment for that offence. From the vague evidence that is available we gather that the appellant was a moody person who had for years been brood-· ing over the suspected iI\fidelity of his wife and the injustice of having a son foisted on him.

We do not think that the mere use of adjectives like 'cruel and brutal' supplies the special reasons contemplated by

Section 354(3) Criminal Procedure Code. In the light of the principles enunciated in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P.,(') and in the light of what we have said earlier, we do not think that there are anv 'special reasons' justifying the imposition of the death penalty.

W~ accordingly allow the appeal as regards sentence, set aside the sentence of death and impooe in its place the sentence of life imprisonment.

 KRISHNA IYER, J.-I have had the advantage of reading the Judgment of my learned brother, Shri Justice Chinnappa Reddy.

I wholly agree with his reasoning and conclusion.

Indeed, the ratio of Rajendra Prasad ec. v. State of Uttar Prade•h etc.('), if applied to the present case, as 1t must be, leads to the conclusion that death sentence cannot be awarded in the circumstances of the present case.

Coun5el for the State, if I recollect aright, did state that in view of the criteria laid

A down in Rajendra Prasad's case the State did not propose to file any written submissions against commutation to life imprisonment.

I concur with my learned brother and direct that the appeal, confined to sentence, be allowed and the alternative of life imprisonmer.t imposed.

V.D.K.

Appeal allowed

(l) (1979]3 S.C.R. 78.

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BISHNU DEO SHAW@ BISHNU DAYAL

A

STATE OF WEST BENGAL

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ

section 302

I.P.C

Section 354(3)

Section 354(3)

section 354(3)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

[1979] 3 S.C.R. 78

Section 354(3)

Section 354(3)

Section 361

Section 360

Section 562

Section 360

Section 361

Section 361

Section 360

Section 361

Section 361

Section 354(3)

India

Ediga-Annamma

[1979] 3 SCR 78

death penalty

Calcutta High Court

H. C. Mittal

G. s. Chatterjee

CHINNAPPA REDDY

Bonsall

Manchester

Arthur Koestler

Krishna Iyer

Stewart

Marshall

Den- G ning

Stephen

Hart

Royal Commission on Capital Punishment

Europe

United States

Thorsten Sellin

Bhandarnaike

Sri Lanka

Ceylon

United States of America

United States Supreme Court

Georgia

Brennan

Andhra Pradesh

Garbus

Britain

England

Senor Tejera

Uruguay

United Nations

Argentina

Brazil

Columbia

Costa

United

States of America

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Rica, Ecuador, Maxico, Panama, Peru and Uruguas, Venezuala, in European countries, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, in Iceland, in Israel, in many Australian States and in many of tbe States in the United

States of America, death sentence has been abolished .

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Ediga Annamma

Section 302

Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Parliament

Section 367(5)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1898

Section 367

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973

Section 354(3)

Section 354(3)

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 354(3)

Section 361

Section 360

Section 562

Section 360

Probation of Offenders Act

Section 361

Section 361

Section 360

Section 360

Section 361

Section 361

Section 354

Indian Parliament

Vrij

Krishna Iyer

J aswant Singh

Kallas

High Court of Calcutta

(1979] 3 S.C.R. 18

Section 354(3)

Criminal Procedure Code

KRISHNA IYER

Chinnappa Reddy

Rajendra Prasad

V.D.K.


DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS.

DELHI STOCK EXCHANGE ASSN. LTD.

February 23, 1979 [R. S. SARKARIA, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, .fJ.]

Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956-Ss. 4 & 16-Notification is.sued -B

'fl! thereunder-Scope of.

• Interpretation of statutes-Press Note issued by Gorern1ne11t arid letter of

,. .

Ministry of Finance-I/ could be used for interpreting the notifil:ation.

By a notification issued on the 27th June, 1969, under ' 16( I) of the .)ecurities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 the Central Govcrnme•t banned with immediate effect all forward trading in hares on recognised tock exchanges in the country.

The proviso to the notification, "Which dealt with bow all existing contracts remaining outstanding as on the date of the notification should be closed or liquidated, contained a direction to the effect that "a contract other than a spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery may be entered into between it~ members or th1ough or with any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing tontrac~ ren1aining to bei performed after that date." It further provided that "such contracts !hall be subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the recognised stock exchange" that con1e into force when further new deall.n~ arei prohibited and subject also to such term~ and conditions as the Cential Government may impose.

In tel'l!ns of the notification the re!pondent called upon all its rr1cmbers , o subntit a list of outstanding transa-ctions in all securitie~ on the cleared list and to deposit along with it, interim margins in cash or approved shares

.; alcUlated on the basi& of differences between the rates of the last clearing and certain average specified r1'.te! fixed by it.

Appellant no. 2 'vho was a partner flf appellant no. 1, contended that the demand for interim margins was by 'vay r)f "carry over" of the forward transactions which, in view of the ban contained in the notification, was illegal. Instead of submitting a list of his outstanding transactions on the basis of the rates fixed by the respondent, he enclosed n statement of his outstanding transactions adjusted at the last official closing rates which \'\'ere higher than the rates fixed by the respondent. t1uggesting thereby that he WM not liable to pay anything. The respondent rejected the appellant'& contention and again called upon him to comply with its earlier notice. Eventually since the appellant did JiOt comply with the notice the respondent by a resolution declared him a defaulter \Vbich exposed him under the bye la\'\'S to a rigorous enquiry into hi! financial condition and entailed other disabilitie! including termination of membership.

By another resolution the appellant was called upon to deposit additional security of Rs. 20,000 / •·

In his writ petition before the High Court, challenging the resolutions, the appellant contended that all his transoction! which remained outstanding on June 27, 1969 were forward contracts pertaining to cleared securities and aiJ such were affected by the notification which banned all for¥.'ard contracts, that these had to be adjusted at the last official closing rates, and thererore, the respondent's action in calling upon him to deposit interim margins calculated

A on the basis of certain ave; rage specified rates fixed by it was not warranted by the proviso of the notification and was illegal. The I-ligh Court <lis1nissed the petition.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD The directions issued by the respondent were proper and legal. [383 Hl

The proviso clearly permitted the closing out or liquidation of all out~ standing transactions in the normal manner by entering into a forward contract (which would include "carry over") in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent.

There was no warrant for the stand taken by appellant no. 2 that all outstanding transactions had to be or coilld be adjusted on the basis of "previous official closing." {381F]

1. For the purpose of closing or liquidating existing outstanding transactions a forward contract was permitted to be entered into. rhe expression "such contracts" occurring in the last part of the notification meant those as were referred to in the first part of the notification, the making of which was banned after June 27, 1969. The expression "such contracts" was not referable to the existing outstanding "contracts nor to 'a contract' that could be entered into for closing or liquidating the existing outstanding contracts. The last part of the notifica-tion has nothing to do with the existing outstanding contracts, the closing or liquidating of which was independently provided for by the proviso.

[381C-DJ

2. Moreover the letter of the Joint Director Ministry of Finance addressed to the President of the respondent and the Press Note, issued by the Ministry of Finance clearly brought out that as per the notification itself all outslanding contracts. were permitted to be liquidated in accordance with the relevar; rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange and secondly no :; pecific period was mentioned in the notification for liquidation of outstanding business but that the members operating on a recognised stock exchange \Vere expected to clear the outsta-ndings in a smooth and orderly manner within a rea'ionable period.

[382G-H]

3. The two documents which came into existence a-lmost simultaueously with the issue of the notification, could be looked at for finding out the true intention of the Government in issuing the notification. The principle of conten1poranea expositio can be invoked, though the same will not al"'ays be decisive on the question of construction.

In construing a statute courts will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at the time of its enactment and by th~ whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it. C-ontem-.. poraoncous construction placed by administrative or eixecutive officers charged with executing a statute, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable \\'eight; it is highly persuasive.

[383A-B]

Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass, ILR 35 Cal. 701 at 713; .'\fathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha, ILR 43 Cal. 790; approved.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2458 of 1969.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14-10-1969 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 520/69.

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Desh Bandhu Gupta (for Appe)lant No. 2 for self and on behalf of appellants 1 and 3.)

F. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

TULZAPURKAR, J.~This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order dted October 14, 1969 of the Delhi High Court dismissing the appellants' Civil Writ Petition (520 of 1969) whereby the appellants sought to quash certain directions issued on June 28, 1969 and two resolutiqns passed on July 2 and 3, 1969, by the Delhi Stock Exchange, which adversely affected them.

The Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., New Delhi (the Respondent herein) is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act,

1913. It has received recognition from the Centrl Government under s. 4 of the Securi ties Contracts Regulation) Act (XLII) of 1956 for the purpose of the said Act.

One Desh Bandhu Gupta (Appellant No. 2) carried on business as a share-broker in the firm name and style of Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. (Appellant No. 1) and as such was a member of the Respondent.

By a notification No. S.0. 2561 dated June 27, 1969 issued under s. 16(1) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 the Central Government banned with immediate effect all forward trading in shares at all the Stock Exchanges in the country by declaring that "no person, in the territory to which the said Act extends, shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of recongnised Stock Exchange", but as regards the forward contracts which remained outstanding as on that date it was directed under the proviso that these could be closed or liquidated in the normal manner.

On June 28, 1969 at an emergent meeting held at I 0.30 a.m. the Board of Directors of the Respondent considered the abnormal situation arising from the ban imposed under the notification and decided to issue notice to all its

membrs directing them to submit their lists of outstanding transactions in all the securities on the cleared list and to deposit alongwith it interim margins in cash or approved shares calculated on the basis of differences between the rates of the last clearing and certain average specified rates fixed by it: Upon receipt of such notice dated June 28, 1969 from the Respondent the appellant No. 2 addressed a letter of

even date to the Board of Directors contending that the demand for interim margins was by way of "carry over" of the forward transactions which in view of the ban contained in the notification was illegal and instead of submitting a list of his outstanding transactions on the basis of the rates which had been fixed by the Respondent he enclosed a statement of his outstanding transactions adjusted at the last official closing rates which were higher than the rates fixed by the Respondent, thus suggesting that he was not liable to pay any thing but was entitled to receive some amount at the foot of closing out or liquidating his outstanding transactions.

By a rejoinder of the same date the Board of Directors of the Respondent reiterated that its action in fixing the interim clearing rates in the concenied securities and demanding interim margins was in order and that the adjustment of outstanding business claimed by appellant No. 2 wa~ utterly wrong and as snch appellant No. 2 was called upon to comply with its notice by submitting an amended list in accordance with the directions together with the differences, if any, immediately.

By a telegram dated June 30, 1969, which was confirmed by a letter of even date the appellant No. 2 was again called upon to submit his list alongwith the amount of differences, if any, by July 1, 1969 failing which he was informed that necessary action would be taken against him. As the appellant No. 2 stuck to his stand, the Respondent by its letter dated July 1, 1969 once again stressed that the action of the Board in calling for the list and margin money was in order and in accordance with the rules, byelaws, regulations, practices usages and previous resolutions of the Board and gave further opportunity to him to comply with the directions by July 2, 1969 upto 11.00 a.m. failing which further action was threatened. At the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Respondent held on July 2, 1969 at 4.00 P.M. the Board noticed that all !'1embers, except appellant No. 2, had complied with its directions and on a consideration of the entire matter came to the conclusion that appellant No. 2 was intentionally evading to comply with its direction and to pay the required amount of margins and, therefore, resolved that appellant No. 2 trading in the name and style of Desh Bandhu G Gupta & Co. be declared a defaulter for such failure and a notice in • that behalf be pasted on the Notice Board and appellant No. 2 was informed about it by a telegram and a letter. The resolution passed on July 2, 1969 declaring appellant No. 2 as a defaulter exposed him under the bye-Jaws to a rigorous inquiry by the Respondent into his financial condition and entailed other disabilities including termination H of his membership of the Respondent under Bye-law 308 read with Article 43 (iv) of the Articles of Association. Appellant No. 2 thereupon filed a writ petition (Civil Writ No. 520 of 1969) in Delhi High

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Court challenging the directions of the Respondent demanding payment of interim margins as also its resolution declaring him to be a defaulter. It appears that after the filing of the petition the Board of Directors of the Respondent at its meeting held on July 3, 1969 passed another resolution calling upon the appellant No. 2 under Article 29 of the Articles of Association to deposit additional security of Rs. 20,000/- failing which further action was thereatened. The writ petition was amended and a prayer seeking to quash the second resolution was added. The main contention of the appellant No. 2 was that all his transactions which remained outstanding as on June 27, 1969 were forward contracts pertaining to cleared securities and as such were affected by the Notification which banned all forward contracts, that these had to be adjusted at the last official closing rates, that the action of the Respondent in calling upon him to deposit interim margins calculated on the basis of certain average specified rates fixed by it was not warranted by the proviso therein but in fact amounted to carry over of those transactions which had been prohibited and, therefore, illegal and that both the resolutions, one dated July 2, 1969 whereby he was declared to be a defaulter and the other dated July 3, 1969 whereby he was called upon to deposit Rs. 20,000/- as additional security were contrary to law and unjust and, therefore, the said action as well as the resolutions were liable to be quashed.

The appellant No. 2 further contended that by passing the two resolutions, particularly the first one dated July 2, 1969 in contravention or breach of statutory Bye-laws and Regnlations his fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19 (1 )(f) of the Constitution had been infringed and, therefore, issuance of appropriate writ quashing the directions issued on June 28, 1969 and the two resolutions dated July 2 and 3, 1969 was sought.

By its reply filed on July 15, 1969 the Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition. It was contended that the relationship between appellant No. 2 and the Respondent was contractual resulting from the Memorandum & Articles of G Association and the Rules, Bye-laws and Regnlations made under the powers given by the Articles of Association, and since the grievance made in the writ petition related to contractual rights and obligations between the parties and no question of enforcement of any statutory right or obligation arose the remedy under writ jurisdictin was not available.

On merits it was contended that the enstruetion H sought to be placed by the appellants on the proviso contained iu the Central Government Notification, which dealt with closing out or liqui

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dating the transactions outstanding as on June 27, 1969 was not correct, that under the said proviso such transactions were permitted to be closed or liquidated in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Respondent and, therefore, the directions issued by

its Board of Directors on June 28, 1969 to all its members including appellant No. 2 to submit their lists of outstanding transactions and.to pay interim margins on the basis of the average specified rates fixed by it were proper and lawful and both the resolutions were legal and justified.

The respondent, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

On .i consideration of the rival submissions made before it by counsel for the parties, the High Court upheld both the contentions of the Respondent and dismissed the petition with costs.

The High Court's view on both the points is challenged by the appellant before us in this appeal.

In the view which we are taking on the merits of the case after giving our anxious consideration to the rival submissions thereon, we feel lhat it would be unnecessary to go into and decide the preliminary objection raised by the respondent to the maintainability of the writ petition.

We, therefore, propose to dispose of the appeal on merits.

On merits the question that arises for our determination is what on proper construction is the scope and ambit of the proviso contained in the notification ? Whether, after the imposition of the ban on all forward trading in shares with effect from the close of June 27, 1969, the outstanding contracts that had remained to be performed as on that date were permitted to be closed or liquidated under the proviso in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Respondent or not? On the one hand counsel for the appellants contended that by reason of the ban imposed on all forward trading in shares with effect from the close of June 27, 1969 the action of the respondent in making the demand for interim margins calculated on the basis of the difference between the rates of the last clearing and certain average rates fixed by it in respect of their forward outstanding transactions, which amounted to "carry over" of those transactions, was illegal; in other words the proviso did not permit the closing out or liquidation of the existing outstanding transactions by way of "carry over".

On the other hand, counsel for the respondent contended that notwithstanding the ban imposed, which prohibited all future forward trading in shares, the existing forward transactions that remained outstanding on that date were permitted to be closed or liquidaied in the

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D. B. GUPTA & co. v. EX¢HANGE ASSOCIATION (Tulzapurkar, !.) 379

normal manner under its rules, bye-laws and regulations and, therefore, the directions issued, by the respondent on June 28, 1969 were in accordance with the ntification. It was pointed out that at the close of June 27, 1969, the appellant No. 2 had certain outstanding contracts in Cleared Securities for the then current clearing of July 8, 1969 which had to be completed and performed for the said clearing in the manner laid down '.in Regulation 8 and Bye-law 52 ( e) which meant that he could either.make cross contracts to close his outstanding purchases or sales for that clearing or to make carry over contracts so as to close the contracts of the current clearing and to make contracts for the ensuing clearing and such contracts could be made upto the last business day prescribed for that clearing by the Respondent; and so much was permitted by the proviso contained in the notification.

Moreover, in vie\v of the crisis created by the Notification the Board of Directors of the Respondent issued the directions on June 28, 1969 having regard to Bye-law 73, which were in order and the further action taken by the respondent against the appellant No. 2 consequent upon his failure to comply with the directions was proper and justified under Bye-law 308 read with Article 43 (iv) of the Articles of Association o( the respondent. Since the question depends upon proper construction of the notification dated June 27, 1969, it will be desirable to set out the said notification in extenso which ran thus :-

"New Delhi, the 27th June 1969.

NOTIFlCATION

S.O. 2561. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection ( 1) of section 16 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 ( 42 of 1956) the Central Government, being of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable speculation in securities in the whole of India, hereby declares that no person, in the territory to which the said Act exterids, shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contracts for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange:

Provided that a contract other than a spot delivery conact or cont; cts for cash or hand delivery cir special delivery m any secunties on the Qeared Securities List of a recognised stock exchange may be entered into between: its members

or through or wit)l any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing contracts entered into upto the date of this notification and remaining to be performed after the said date, but such contracts shall be subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the recognised stock exchange that come into force when further new dealings are prohibited in any securities on the Cleared Securities List and subject also to such terms and conditions, if any, as the Central Government may from time to time impose."

Counsel for the appellants did not dispute that the proviso in the aforesaid notification dealt with the topic of closing out or liquidating all existing forward contracts entered into up to the date of the notification and which remained to be performed or outstanding as on that date but contended that it did not permit the closing or liquidating all such outstanding transactions in the normal manner under the rules, bye4aw or regulations of the respondent, but such outstanding transactions were declared to be "subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the rcc0gnised Stock Exchange that come irto force when further new dealings are prohibited in any securities on the Cleared Securities List and subject also to such tenns and conditions, if any as the Central Government may from time to time impose." In other words, according to counsel, the words "but such contracts" occurring in the last part of the notification referred to the outstanding contracts that remained to be performed at the close of June 27, 1969 and it is this last portion of the notification which indicated the manner in which such outstanding transactions were required to be closed or liquidated. The Respondent's counsel disputed this and urged that the last portion had nothing to do with such outstanding transactions, the closing or liquidating of which was fully dealt with by the proviso. It cannot be disputed that the drafting of the notification in question has been far from happy but even so on a fair reading of the notification it is difficult to accept the construction sought to be placed thereon by counsel for the appellants. In our view, the notification was in three parts. By the first part the Central Government put a ban on all forward trading in shares through the Stock Exchanges in the country by declaring that "no person ...... shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange." The second part consisted of the proviso and it dealt fully with how all existing contracts remaining outstanding as on the date of tho notification should be closed or liquidated, and the direction

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-contained therein in that behalf was to the effect that "a contract other than a spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery (meaning thereby a forward contract) ...... may be entered into between its members or through or with any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing contracts .... remaining to be performed after that date." In other words, for the purpose of closing or liquidating existing outstanding transactions a forward contract (which would include a carry over) was permitted to be entered into. Then follows the third or the last part of the notification which commences with the words "but such contracts shall .be subject to ....... " The expression "such contracts" occurring in this last. part of the notification meant those as were referred to in the first part of the notification the making of which was banned after June 27, 1969 and the last portion provided that such forward contracts that had been banned "shall be subject to the rules, bye-laws or regulations of the recognised Stock Exchange that come into force (i.e. become applicable) when further new dealings are prohibited ...... and subject also to such terms and conditions as the Central Government may from time to time impose.'' In our view the expression "such contracts" occurring in the last part of the notification were not referable to the existing outstanding contracts nor to 'a contract' that could be entered into for closing or liquidating the existing outstanding contracts.

In other words, the third part of the notification on which reliance has been placed by the counsel for the appellants, in our view, has nothing to do with the existing outstanding contracts, the closing or liquidating of which was independently provided for by the proviso. It will thus appear clear that on a proper construction of the notification in question the proviso clearly permitted the closing or liquidating of the existing outstanding transactions in the normal manner by entering into a forward contract (which would include a "carry over") in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Respondent. There was no warrant for the stand taken by th~ appellant No. 2 that all outstanding transactions had to be or could be adjusted on the basis of "previous official closing''.

On the construction of the proviso counsel for the Respondent rightly invited our attention to two documents on record which had come into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification explaining the manner in which outstanding transactions were intended to be closed or liquidated. In a Press Statement or Press Note issued by the Finance Ministry immediately upon the issuance of the notification it was stated thus :

"The existing contracts entered into upto the date of the notification and remaining to be performed are, however, permilted by the same notification to be liquidated in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Stock Exchange concerned."

Further it appears that in response to a query made by the President. of the respondent, Shri Maitra, Joint Director (S.E.) Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, addressed a communication dated June 28, 1969 to the President in which he stated thus :

"As stated in the notification itself, all outstanding contracts which were not liquidated till the date of notification, will have to be liquidated in accordance with the relevant rules, bye-laws and regulations of your exchange in that regard. No fresh forward transactions in any cleared security, however, is permissible.

A statement of outstanding position in each of the cleared securities on your Exchange, as on the date of the notification may please be forwarded to us as early as possible and thereafter at each settlement so as to enable Government to know the reduction in the outstanding business effected from time to time. As will be seen, no specific period has been mentioned in the notification for liquidation of the outstandings. It is, however, hoped that you will issue suitable instruction to your members to ensure that the outstandings are cleared in a smooth and orderly manner within a reasonable period."

(Emphasis supplied}

It may be stated that in one of his earlier conununications appellant No. 2 himself had requested the respondent to seek clarification from the Government on the points raised by him in regard to the outstanding transactions. The letter dated June 28, 1969 addressed by the Joint Director to the President of the Respondent clearly brings out two aspects : first, that as per the notification itself all outstanding contracts were permitted to be liquidated in accordance with the relevant rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent and secondly, no specific period was mentioned in the notification for liquidation of the outstanding business but the members operating on a recognised Stock Exchange were expected to clear the outstandings in a smooth and orderly manner within a reasonable period and, in fact, the Government desired the respondent to forward to it a statement at each settlement indicating the reduction in outstanding business effected from time to time. The exposition in these two documents, therefore, conforms. to our interpretation of the provi'So.

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D. B. GUPTA & co. v. EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION (T11lzap11rkar, 1.) 383

It may be stated that it was not disputed before us that these two dccuments which came into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification could be looked at for finding out the true . intention of the Government in issuing the notification in question, particularly in regard to the manner in which outstanding transactions were to be closed or liquidated. •The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction. (Maxwell 12th Edn. p. 268). In Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edn.) in para 219 (at pp. 393-395) it has been stated that <1dministrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a constructioo, commonly referred to as practical construction, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive. In Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass(') the principle, which was reiterated in Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha(') hM been stated by Mukerje<> J. thus :

"It is a well-settled principle of construction that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply

it. I do not suggest for a moment that such interpretatioo E has by any means a controlling effect upon the Courts; such interpretation may, if occasion arises, have to be disreg; irded for cogent and persuasive reasons, and in a clear case of error, a Court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction." •

Of course, even without the aid of these two documents which contain a contemporaneous exposition of the Government's intention, we have come to the conclusion that on a plain construction of the Notification the proviso permitted the closing out or liquidation of al! outstanding transactions by entering into a forward contract in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent.

Having regard to the above construction which appears to us to be the true and proper construction of the notification in question it will be clear that the directions issued by the respondent to all its members including appellant No. 2 on June 28, 1969 in regard to their outstanding transactious as at the close of June 27, 1969 were proper and

(I) I.L.R. 35 Cal. 701 al 713. (2l I.LR. 43 Cat 790.

S-2S3SCI/19

384 StJP!U!ME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.

legal and the appellants' stand was clearly erroneous. It cannot be disputed that ample opportunity was given to appellant No. 2 to comply with the directions but the appellant persisted in his erroneous contention, and failed to comply with those directions with the result that the respondent had no alternative but to declare him a defaulter. In our view, the directions dated June 28, 1969 as well as the two resolutions passed by the respondent on July 2 and July 3, 1969 were proper and justified and the appellants' case on merits was rightly rejected by the High Court. This conclusion of ours, 11s stated at the commencement of the judgment, renders unneceiiary the determination of the preliminary objection.

In th= result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

P.B.R.

A'ppeal dismissed.

DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS

DELHI STOCK EXCHANGE ASSN. LTD

February 23, 1979

R. S. SARKARIA

V. D. TULZAPURKAR

A. P. SEN

Ss. 4 & 16

vho

June 27, 1969

I-ligh Court

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Desh Bandhu Gupta

S. Nariman

Bihamber Lal

Manoj Swarup

LaUta Kohli

Manish Gupta

TULZAPURKAR

Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd.

New Delhi

Indian Companies Act

s. 4

Desh Bandhu Gupta

Desh Bandhu Gupta

s. 16(1)

Central Government

June 28, 1969

June 30, 1969

July 1, 1969

July 2, 1969

Desh Bandhu G Gupta & Co.

Article 43

Article 29

July 3, 1969

Article 19

July 2 and 3, 1969

Articles of G Association and the Rules

Article 43

27th June 1969

section 16

Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act

India

Maitra

Mukerje

July 2 and July 3, 1969