• •

A.K.A.CT.V.CT. MEENAKSHISUNDARAM CHETTIAR

A.K.A.CT.V.CT. VENKATACHALAM CHETTIAR

February 23, 1979

[R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] B

Courl Fee.J Act, 1870-S. 7(iv) (/)-Suit for accounts--l\recessary for plaintiff to give fair estimate of the amount for which he sues-Court can reject the plaint under Or. Vil r. 11 C.P.C. if plaintiff arbitrarily and deliberately undervalues the relief.

The power of attorney by which the plaintiff constituted the defendant as his agent, authorised the defendant amongst other things to discharge debt! and invest moneys on behalf of the plaintiff. In the suit filed by the plaintiff, the relief claimed was for directing the defendant to render true and correct

ao;.counts of all transactions entered into by him and for amounts received by him on behalf of the plaintiff.

In his written statement the defendant gavo details of amounts invested by him in banks and other relevant details.

An issue whether the suit had been properly valued and proper court-fee D ha<l been paid was answered by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff.

On appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court held that since the plaintiff had quantified the amouni payable, by the defendant, the suit should have been valued on the basis of amount quantified and that not having been done, the :suit had not been properly valued .

Allowin2 the appeal,

HELD: (1) The estittnlte of the relief as given by the plaintiff '"a~ adequate and reasonable and was not an under-estimate.

{392C]

(2) The High Court was in error in holding that thet plaint was clea-r, that apart from the money which the defendant was liable to pay to him as

his agent the plaintifl' had quantified the' amount payable by the defend>nt. The F suit was not only for accounting of the amounts received but also for an account of the transactions of the defendant as power' of attorney agent.

Had the defendant been able to establish that in the course of his management he had invested moneys according to the power of attorney, he would have properly .accounted for his management. The defendant himself had stated that the

Miit was for accounting

0of his management as power of attorney agent.

He pleaded that the moneys had been remitted to the plaintiff by investment or G <>therwise.

[389H-390B]

(3) The. amount of the court-fee payable in suits for accounts as provided for in s. 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is according to the amount at

which relief sought i!ll valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

In a suit for accounts it is not possible for the plaintiff to estimate correctly the amount which he may be entitled to because in a suit in which the plaintiff <\Sb H for accounting regarding the mana.gcmcnt by a power of attorney agent he might not know the state of affairs of the defendant's management and the amount to which he would be entitled to on accounting. [390G-H]

(4) Even where s. 35 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 is applicable, it is necessa.ry that the plaintiff should give a fair estimate of the amount for which he seeks relief.

Order VII H.. 11 CPO casts a duty on the court to reject a plaint when the relief claimed is under-valued.

[391 D-E]

Chillakuru Chenchurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchuran1i Reddy, I.L.R.

B 1969 AP. 1042 (F.B. ), approved.

(5) Before corning to the conclusion that the suit is under-valued the cou:t will have to take into account that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which \Vould result after taking all the account.

If he Cannot estimate th_e' exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for accounts which is adequate and reasonable. The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately under-value the relief.

All that is required is that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate his relief and the estimate should not be a deliberate under-estimation. [391 H- 392 Bl CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 504 of 1979.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-12-1978 of the High Court of Madras at Madras in Appeal No. 408/72.

K. Rajendra Chaudhary for the Appellant.

A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondent.

A. V. Rangam for the Intervener.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KAILASAM, J.-Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1021 of 1979 is filed by the plintiff in the suit O.S. No. 83 of,1969 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, against the two orders passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Appeal No. 408 of 1972 holding that the suit had not been properly valued for court-fee and directing the petitioner to pay court-fee on the valuation of Rs. 9,74,598.35 and requiring that the deficit court-fee both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal be paid within six weeks from the date of the order.

On hearing the petitioner we directed notice to the respondents calling upon them to show carnie why special leave should not be granted and the appeal allowed and remitted to the High Court for disposal of all the issues. On hearing the respondents we granted Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thus heard.

The appellant filed the suit praying for a decree against the respondent/ defendant to render true and correct account of all the transactions of the respondent as the petitioner's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also of all the amounts received by him as the agent of the petitioner including the amount recovered by him from Alagappa Chettiar and pay to the petitioner the amount found dne on such rendition of accounts. In the written statement filed by the defendant it was con-

• ..

MEENAKSHISUNDARAM v. VENKATACHALAM (Kailasam, 1.) 387

tended that the suit is not properly valued and proper court-fee has not A been paid. The trial court framed an issue as to whether the suit had been properly .valued and proper court-fee had been paid. It answered the issue holding that the plaint has been properly valued and proper court-fee has been paid. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved that the defendant is liable to account and that the suit was barred by limitation, On an appeal B by the plaintiff to the High Court, the High Court found that the plaint made it clear that apart from the money which the defendant is liable to pay to the plaintiff as his agent, the plaintiff has quantified the amount at Rs. 9,74,598.35 as payable by the defendant to him which is made clear in allegations in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint and therefore the plaintiff ought to have valued the suit at Rs. 9,74,598.35. As C the appeal was disposed of on the ground that the plaint had not been properly valued we are concerned in this petition in determining whether the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct.

The High Court has passed its conclusion on a reference to paragraph 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint. We will now consider the pleadings D in the case. In paragraph 5 it is stated that on 22nd January, 1965, the plaintiff executed a General Power of Attorney at Karaikudi authorising the defendant to transact all his business, sell his properties, receive the sale price and other monies etc.

This paragraph refers to the General Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on 22nd January, 1965.

The terms of the power of E attorney will be referred to in due course. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint which have been relied on by the High Court may be set out:-

"6. On 27-3-1963, the Plaintiff and the Defendant retired from the said partnership and the other two brothers continued the business under the same name, Alagappa taking on the shares of the plaintiff and Defendant and all their assets in the firm for a consideration or hls paying $ 6,50,000/- equivalent le Rs. 16,12,000/- at the rate ot Rs. 248/- per

100 Dollars to each of them, so that Alagappa became entitled to 314 share and Annamalai to 1/4 share in the continuing firm.

7. As the Plaintiff's agent and on behalf of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, on or about 13-4-1965 received from Alagappa $ 6,50,000/- equivalent to Rs. 16,12,000/- at the rate of 248 rupees per 100 Dollars for the 1/4th share of the Plaintiff in the said firm taken over by Alagappa.

8. The Defendant from Madras has sent to the Plaintiff at Kottaiyer Rs. 25,000/- on 25-10-1965, Rs. 1,30,750/- on

7-2-1966, Rs. 25,311.65 on 7-2-1965 (Rs. 25,000/- plus Rs. 311.65 for interest) and Rs. 4,36,340/- on 11-8-1967.

9. The Defendant as Plaintiff's agent is bound to render true and correct account to the Plaintiff of all the amounts received by him in the course of the agency, to wit, from 22-1-1965 the amounts received from Alagappa.

In paragraphs 6 and 7 the plaint refers to the plaintiff and the defendant retiring from the partnership and Alagappa taking the shares of the plaintiff and the defendant for a consideration of his paying equivalent to Rs. 16,12,000/- to each of the plaintiff and the defendant.

In paragraph 7 it is stated that the defendant as plaintiff's. agent received Rs. 16,12,000/-. Paragraph 8 .refers to certain payments which the plaintiff received from the defendant. Paragraph 9 of the plaint states that the defendant as plaintiff's agent is bound to render true and correct account to the plaintiff of all the amounts received by him in the course of agency, to wit, from 22nd January, 1965 the amounts received from Alagappa. It may be noted that the reliefs sought for is for rendering true and correct account to the plaintiff of ~11 the amounts received by him in the course of the agency. The Power of Attorney was given on 22nd Jannary, 1965 and thus the relief is not confined to the amount payable by Alagappa alone.

In paragraph 10 which is not taken note of by the High Court the plaintiff alleged that on 2nd September, 1967 and 4th October, 1967, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant requiring him to send the accounts of the agency.

These letters were refused. Again on 5th December, 1967, the plaintiff issued a lawyer's notice to render accounts and for payment of the amounts due from him. This notice was also returned.

The defendant did not render any accounts.

At this stage reference may be made to the Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on 22nd January, 1965.

The plaintiff by the Power of Attorney dated 22nd January, 1965, constituted the defendant as his Attorney and authorised the defendant to act for the plaintiff. It is sufficient to state that the power authorises G in general the defendant to manage all the affairs of the plaintiff. Paragraph 3 bf the Power of Attorney empowers the defendant to pay and settle all the debts of the plaintiff and obtain full and effectual receipts and releases for the same.

Paragraph 5 empoweys the defendant amongst other things to sign and execute any discharge or release in connection with Charges or Bills of Sale. Paragraph 10 gives the power H to the defendant to charge or mortgage any of the plaintiff's property and paragraph 11 to borrow such sums of money and upon such tenns as the Attorney shall deem expedient. Paragraph 19 confers the power

• •

MllENAKSHISUNDARAM v. VENKATACHALAM (Kailasam, J.) 389

on the defendant to invest moneys upon mortgages or charges of land etc. In short there can be no dispute that complete J?OWer of management is given to the defendant and the defendant could, in exercising; this power, discharge debts, invest moneys on behalf of the plaintiff etc.

When the plaintiff in paragraph 7 of the plaint demanded the agent to render true and correct account to the plaintiff of all tho amount& received by him in the course of agency i.e. by virtue of the power conferred on 22nd January, 1965, the plaintiff is entitled to know as to what amounts the defendant received during tho course of his management and what amounts he had invested or otherwise dealt with.

At the date of the plaint the plaintiff was not aware as to the amount of moneys that were due by the defendant to him. The letters and the lawyer's notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendant were unanswered.

If the defendant had invested or otherwise dealt with moneys according to the power conferred on him nothing would be due to the plaintiff on accounts being taken. The relief claimed for in the plaint in para•

graph 14(a) of the plaint is for directing the defendant to render true and correct acconnt of all transactions made by the defendant as the plaintiff's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also for all the amounts received by the defendant on the plaintiff's behalf as his agent inclnding the amount recovered by him from Alagappa and pay the plaintiff what may be found due to him. This paragraph makes it clear that what was required was not only an account of the amount recovered by the defendant from Alagappa but also an account of all the transactions of the defendant as the plaintiff's agent from 22nd January, 1965.

A reading 0£ the written statement also makes it clear that the plaint was understood by the defendant as a suit for accounting of his management as a power of attorney agent. In paragraph 7 of the written

statement the defendant states that out of 6,50,000 dollars got for the F plaintiff's one-fonrth share, 40,000 dollars were invested in fixed deposit in plaintiff's name with the Indian Overseas Bank, Kuala Lumpnr and 10,000 dollars in plantiff's V. CT. M. Accounts on 10th April, 1965.

On the same day the remaining 6,00,000 dollars were invested with Alagappa Chetttiar himself who had credited the amount in plantiff's name in his accounts. If the defendant was able to prove these con- G tentions the accounts as required by the plaintiff would have been satisfactorily rendered , and very little wonld have been due by the defendant to the plaintiff Qllracconnting. The High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the plaint is clear that apart from the money which the defendant is liable to pay to him as his agent the plaintiff has quantified the amonnt at Rs. 9,74,598.35 as payable by H the defendant to him. In our view, the plaint has been misread.

Though paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 refer to the transactions in which the

plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 16,12,000, paragraphs 10,11 and 14(a) make it clear that the suit was for accounting not only regarding Rs. 16,12,000 but also for the management by the defendant as power of attorney agent. The power, as already noted, confers a right on the defendant to invest moneys. If the defendant has shown in the written statement itself is able to establish that in the course of his management he had invested moneys according to the power conferred on him, he would have properly accounted for his management. In the written statement the defendant himself had pleaded that the moneys which he recieved from Alagappa have been remitted to the plaintiff by investment and otherwise. The conclusion arrived at by th~: High Court is, therefore, unsupportable.

The provision relating to the levy ot court-fee for a suit on accounts is found in section 7(iv) (f) of the Court Fees' Act, 1870 which runs as follows :-

"7. The amount of fee payable nnder this Act in the suits next hereinafter mootioned shall be computed as follows :-

(i) x x x

(ii) x x x

(iii) x x x

(iv) In suits-

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) x x x

(d) x x x

(e) x x x ( f) for accounts- According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

In all such suits the plaintiff shall state th_e amount at which he values the relief sought." Reading this provision by itself the amount of court-fee paya]?le in G suits for accounts is according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. The plaintiff is required to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. In suits for accounts it is not possible for the plain~ to estimate correctly the amount which he may be entitled to for, as in the present case, when the plaintiff asks for accounting regarding the management by a II powe.r of attorney agent, he might not know the state of affairs of the defendant's management and the amount to which he would be entitled to on accounting. But it is necessary that the a1nount at which he

• •

MEENAKSHISUNDARAM v. VENKATACHALAl)I (Kai/asam, J.) 391

values the relief sought for should be a reasonable estimate. Section A 35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, XIV, of 1955, is as follows :-

"In a suit for accounts, fee shall be computed on the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint."

Sub-section (2) of section 35 provides :

"Where the amount payable to the plaintiff as ascertained in the suit is in excess of the amount as estimated in the plaint, no decree directing payment of the amount as so ascertained shall be passed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the amount as ascertained, is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the Court may nx, the decree shall be limited to the account to which the fee paid extends."

While section 35(1) permits the plaintiff to pay the court-fee on the amount estimated by him sub-section (2) safeguards against the loss of revenue for it requires that no decree for any amount in excess of the amount as estimated in the plaint shall be passed unless the difference between the fee actually paid and the fees that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the amount as ascertained, is paid. But here again it is necessary that the plaintiff should give a fair C!ltimate of the amount for which he sues. Order 7, Rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code, requires the co_urt to return the plaint if the relief claimed is undervalued.

Order 7, Rule 11, runs thus :

"11. The phiint shall be rejected in the following cases :-

(a) x x x

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff on beini.; required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;'_'

(c) x x x

(d) x x x

This section casts a duty on the Court to reject the plaint when the relief claimed is undervalued. If on the materials available before it the Court is satisfied that the value of relief as estimated by the plaintiff in a suit for accounts is undervalued the plaint is liable to be rejected.

It is therdore necessary that the plaintiff should take care that the valuation is , adequate and reasonable taking into account the circums- H tances of the case. In comin~ to the conclusion that the suit is undervalued the court will have to take into account that in a suit for

accounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after the taking of the accounts. If he cannot estimate the exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for accounts which is adequate and reasonable.

The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief. A ful! Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a decision in Chillakuru Chenchurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchurami Reddy,(') after elaborate consideration of the case law on the subject bas rightly observed that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate hi, s relief and that the estimate should not be a deliberate under-estimation.

On a consideration of the entire circumstances of the case we are not atisfied that the estimate of the relief as givcm by the plaintiff is inadequate or unreasonable or .a deliberate under-estimation.

In the result, we allow the appeal set aside. the judgment of the Madras High Court and remit it back to the High Court for disposal of all th1~ issues arising in the appeal. The cost will abide by the result.

N.V.K.

Appeal al/awed.

(!) l.L.R. 1969 A.P. 1042 (F.B.)

A.CT.V.CT. MEENAKSHISUNDARAM CHETTIAR

A.CT.V.CT. VENKATACHALAM CHETTIAR

February 23, 1979

R. S. SARKARIA

P. S. KAILASAM

0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.

S. 7(iv)

C.P.C

s. 7(iv)(f)

Court Fees Act, 1870

s. 35

High Court of Madras at Madras

K. Rajendra Chaudhary

A. T. M. Sampath

A. V. Rangam

KAILASAM

22nd January, 1965

Alagappa Chettiar

Karaikudi

Alagappa

Annamalai

Madras

Kottaiyer

22nd Jannary, 1965

2nd September, 1967

5th December, 1967

Alagappa

Indian Overseas Bank, Kuala Lumpnr

10th April, 1965

Alagappa Chetttiar

Qllracconnting

section 7(iv)

Suits Valuation Act

section 35

section 35(1)

Order 7, Rule 11

Order 7, Rule 11

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Madras High Court

N.V.K.


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HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS.

HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA

February 26, 1979

(P. N. BHAGWATI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

Constitution of India 1950-Art. 21-Womtn kept in jail by way of 'protective custody'-Violation of personal liberty .

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973-Ss. 167(5) & 468-Releau of under-trial prisoner 1vlun Magistrate not satisfied with necessity of c, ontinuing i1ivestigation

01A charge-sheel not filed within limitation.

At the further hearing of the case on release of under-trials in the State of Bihar,

HELD : (a) (i) The expression 'protective custody' is an euphemism calculated to disguise what is really and i11 truth nothing but imPrisonmcnt. It is an expression intended to appease the conscience. This so-called 'protective custody' is nothing short of a blatant violation of personal liberty guaranteed

under Art. 21 of the. Constitution, because there is no provision of law under D which a \\'Oman can be kept in jail by way of 'protective custody' or merely because she is required for the purpose of giving evidence. [395C-p]

(ii) The Government in a social welfare state must set up rescue and welfare homes for the purp0&e of taking care of women and children who have nowhere el!!e to go and who are otherwise uncared for by society.

{395E]

(b) Th~ under-trial prisoners against whom charge.-sheets have not been filed by the police within the period of limitation provided for in sub-section

(2) of section 468 cannot be proceeded against at all and they would be entitled to be released forthwith, as their further detention \VOuld be unlawful and in violation of their fundamental right under Art. 21. [397 G]

(c) The provision of •· 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure! 1973 requiring the investigating officer to satisfy the fagistrate on the necessity of continuation of the investigation beyond a period of six months has not been complied with, because there are quite a few cases where the offences charged against the under-trial prisoners are' triable as sumn1ons cases and yet they are languishing in jail for a long number of years far exceeding six months.

[398CJ

And the Court directed that :-

(a) All women and children in thei jails in the State of Bihar under 'protective custcx:Iy' should be released and taken forthwith to '\velfare homes , or rescue homes and should be kept there and properly looked after.

[395F]

__ )c.

(b) The State Government should scrutinise the cases of under-trial prisoners a.nd release uch of them who are not liable to be proceeded against by reason of the period of limitation provided in •· 468 Cr.P.C. having expired. [397H]

(c) The State Govt. should inquire into those cases \vhere the investigation has been going on for a period of more than six months without the satisfaction

A of the Magistrate as envisaged in s. 167(5) and to release the under-trials unless the necessary orders of the Magistrate are obtained within one month. [398D- El

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 57 of 1979.

Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners .

. B Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh and S. N. J ha for the Respondent.

S, V. Gupte, Attorney General, R. N. Sachthey for the Attorney General.

The Order of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, J.-The Government of Bihar has tiled before us a note containing the proposed clarification of paragraph 2(e) of the Government Order dated 9th February, 1979, pursuant to the suggestion made by us in our order dated 19th February, 1979. This clarification states in paragraph one that where the police investigation in a case has been delayed by over two years, the Superintendent of Police will see to it that the investigation is completed expeditidusly

and final report or charge-sheet is submitted by the police as quickly as possible and the responsibility to ensure this has been laid personally on the Superintendent of Police. We are glad to. note that the State Government has responded to our suggestion but we re not at all sure whether it is enough merely to provide that the investigation would be completed expeditiously and the final report or chargesheet submitted as quickly as possible.

We arc of the view that a reasonable time limit should be set by the State Government within which these steps should be taken, so that no further delay is occasioned in the submission of the final report or charge-sheet.

We fail to see how any police investigation can take so Jong as two years and if police investigation cannot be completed within two years, then there must be something radically wrong with the police force in the State of Bihar. It appears that there are a number of cases where police investigation has not been completed for over two years and persons have been in jail as under-trial prisoners for Jong periods. 'Ibis is a shocking state of affairs so far as the administration of law and. order is concerned.

We would, therefore, suggest that in those cases where police investigation has been delayed by over two years, the final report or charge-sheet must be submitted by the police within a further period of three months and if that is not done, the State Government might well withdraw such cases, because if after a period of over two years plus an additional period of three months, the police is not able to file a charge-sheet, one can reasonably assume that there is no case against the arrested persons. ~--

The Government of Bihar has also filed a connter-affidavit made by Mr. Mrinmaya Chaudhry, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons

(1), Bihar setting out the particulars in regard to 18 under-trial who have been ordered to be released by us on their personal bond.

The p:irticulars given in this counter-affidavit make very distressing reading.

It appears from this counter-affidavit tliat there are quite a few women prisoners who are in jail without even being accused of any offence, merely because they happen to be victims of an offence or they are required for (he purpose of giving evidence o.r they are in "protective custody". The expression 'protective custody' is a euphemism calculated to disguise what is really and in truth nothing but imprisonment. It is an expression intended to appease the conscience. It cannot be gainsaid that women who have been kept in jail under the guise of 'protective custody' have sullere<l involuntary deprivation of liberty for long periods without any fault on their part.

We may point out that this so-called 'protective custody' is nothing short of a blatant violation of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, because we are not aware of any provision of law under which a woman can be kept in jail by way of "protective custody" or merely because she is required for the purpose of giving evidence. The Government in a social welfare state must set up rescue and welfare homes for the purpose of

taking care of women and children who have nowhere else to go and who are otherwise uncared for by the society.

It is the duty of government to protect women and children who are homeless or destitute and it is surprising that the Government of Bihar should have come forward with the explanation that they were constrained to keep women in 'protective custody' in jail because a welfare home maintained by the State was shut down.

We direct that all women and children who are in the jails in the State of Bihar under 'protective

ustody' or who are in jail because their presence is required for giving evidence or who are victims of offence should be released and taken forthwith to welfare homes or rescue homes and should be kept there and properly looked after.

We also find from the counter-affidavit that Bhola Mahto was in jail from 23rd November, 1968 until 16th February, 1979 when he was released on his personal bond pursuant to the directions given by us by our order dated 5th February, 1979. He is accused in a case under Section 363 & 368 of the Indian Penal Code and he was committed to the court of Sessions on 13th September, 1972 but his sessions trial has not yet commenced. It is amazing that a sessions

trial of a person committed to the court of sessions as far back as 13th September 1972 should not have been commenced for about seven years.

We direct that the Sessions Judge, Patna should forward to this Court through the High Court of Patna an explanation as to why the sessions trial of Bhola Mahto has not yet commenced.

This is also a matter to which we would invite the attention of the High Court of Patna.

The same may be said also of Ram Sagar Mistry who was admitted in jail on 28th March, 1971 and committed to the Court of Sessions on 28th June, 1972 on a charge un.der section 395 of the Indian Penal Code but whose trial has not yet commenced before the Court of Sessions though a period of more than six years has elapsed since the date of his commitment and a period of eight years since the date of his imprisonment.

The counter-affidavit shows that Babloo Rai who is reported to be a Naxalite is in jail since 15th May, 1975.

He is alleged to be involved . in five cases which are set out in .the counter-affidavit.

So far as he is concerned, it will be open to him to make an application to the Magistrate before whom he is produced, for being released on bail or on his personal bond and the Magistrate will deal with his application in accordance with broad gnidelines laid down by us in our judgment dated 12th February, 1979.

We are not at all sure on reading the counter-affidavit whether the under-trial prisoners whose particulars are given there, are being produced periodically before the Magistrate as required by the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

We should like to know from the Government in a proper affidavit to be filed before us on or before 3rd March, 1979 whether these under-trial prisoners were periodically produced before the Magistrate in compliance with the requirement of the proviso to Section 167(2). The proviso to Section 167(2) says that the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person beyond the period of 15 days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so.

We hope and trust that in these cases the Magistrates concerned did not act mechanically but applied their mind and satisfied themselves that adequate grounds existed for remanding these persons to judicial custody from time to time over a period varying from two to ten years, though we fail to see how the Magistrates could possibly have been satisfied about the existence of adequate grounds for remanding these persons to judicial custody for such long periods of time ranging from two to ten years for the purpose of police investigation.

This is also a matter which we would like the High Court of Patna to consider after making a detailed inquiry.

...

" •

The Government of Bihar has also filed before us a list giving par- A ticulars of the under-trial prisoners who are confined in 17 jails in Bihar for more than 18 months as on 1st February, 1979. The chart shows that there are under-trial prisoners confined in these jails for Joni: periods of time and sometimes even exceeding the maximum punishment which could be awarded to them even if they are found guilty of

the, offences charged against them.

To take an example, we find at Item 30 one Lambodar Gorain has been in Ranchi Jail since 18th June,

1970 for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act for which the maximum punishment is two years, with the result that he has been in jail as an under-trial prisoner for St years for an offence for which even if convicted, he could not have been awarded more than two years' imprisonment.

There are many such cases in the chart, but it is not possible to identify them easily from the chart because the chart rnntains a large number of names of under-trial prisoners.

We would, therefore, direct the Government of Bihar to submit to us on or before 3rd March, 1979 a revised chart showing yearwise break-up of the particulars of the under-trial prisoners in these jails after dividing them broadly into two categories, one of minor offences and the other of major offences.

Our attention has also been drawn to Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which in sub-section ( 1) provides that except ' as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code, no court shall take cogni- E zance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation and under sub-section ( 2) the period of limitation provided is six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only, one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, It would, therefore, be seen that the under-trial prisoners against whom charge-sheets have not been filed by the police within the period of limitation provided in sub-section (2) of Section 468 cannot be proceeded against at all and they would be entitled to be released forthwith, as their further detention would bo unlawful and in violation of their fundamental right under Article 21. We, therefore, direct 'the Government of Bihar to scrutinise the cases of under-trial prisoners charged with offences which are punishable with fine only or punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years and release such of them who are not liable to be proceeded against by reason of the period Of limitation having expired.

This direction shall be carried out by the Government of Bihar within a

A period of six weeks from today and compliance reports containing particnlars shall be submitted to this Court, first at the end of four weeks and then at the end of the next two weeks.

We also find from section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that if in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence, unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary.

We are not at all C sure whether this provision has been complied with, because there are

quite a few cases where the offences charged agaiust the under-trial prisoners are triable as summons cau1 and yet they are languishing in jail for a long number of years far exceeding six months.

We, therefore, direct the Government of Bihar to inquire into these cases and

where it is found that the investigation has been going on for a period of more than six months without satisfying the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary, the Government of Bihar will release the under-trial prisoners, unless the necessary orders .of the Magistrate are obtained within a period of one month from today.

We would also request th.e High. Court to look into this matter and satisfy itself whether the Magistrates in Bihar have been complying with the provisions of section 167 (5).

We adjourn tge hearing of the Writ Petition to 5th March, 1979 and on that date, we shall proceed to hear and dispose of the W.rit Petition on merits on the vanous question11 arising for determination.

N.V.K.

• •

HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS

HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA

P. N. BHAGWATI

A. P. SEN, JJ.

Constitution of India

Art. 21

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

Ss. 167(5) & 468

Art. 21

section 468

Art. 21

Code of Criminal Procedure

Bihar

Cr.P.C

s. 167(5)

K. Hingorani

B Lal Narain Sinha

U. P. Singh

S. N. J ha

V. Gupte

R. N. Sachthey

BHAGWATI

Government of Bihar

Mrinmaya Chaudhry

Article 21

Bhola Mahto

23rd November, 1968

16th February, 1979

5th February, 1979

Section 363 & 368

Indian Penal Code

13th September, 1972

13th September 1972

High Court of Patna

Ram Sagar Mistry

28th March, 1971

28th June, 1972

section 395

Indian Penal Code

Babloo Rai

15th May, 1975

12th February, 1979

Section 167(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

3rd March, 1979

Section 167(2)

Section 167(2)

1st February, 1979

Lambodar Gorain

Ranchi Jail

Section 25

Arms Act

Section 468

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

Section 468

Article 21

section 167(5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

section 167

5th March, 1979


" " t •

HOSHNAK SINGH v.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

February 27, 1979

[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]

Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-Ss. 10' & 12-Scope of.

Res judicata-Principles analogous to res judicata when could be invoked.

A part of the land allotted to the appellant on quasi-permanent basis as a displaced person from West Pakistan was acquired by the Government.

Wben C the question of payment of compensation in respect of the land acquired w:.1s pending, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 was passed which enabled holders of quasi-pe.rmanency rights to obtain perntanent settlement pursuant to which permanent settlement in respect of acquired land was made in favour of the appellant.

AJJeging that the land allotted to the appellant was not allottable on a pcrrna- D nent basis, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated 17th March, 1961, cance11ed the allotment. The appellant's petition questioning the correctness of this decision was dismissed by the High Court in limine.

Thereupon the appellant preferred a petition under s. 33 of the Act to the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Rehabilitation Department, challenging the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

By his order dated 29th September, 1964 the Joint Secretary rejected the petition pointing out that the cancellation of the appellant's permanent settlement rights in the land was in accordance with law and that no interference was called for.

lbe appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court.

In rejecting the appellant's writ petition impugning the order dated 29th September, 1964 the High Court was of the view that it was barred by princinfes

analogous to res judicata because if that petition were aI1owed, it would in F effect, amount to cancellation of the order dated the 17th March, 1961 which beclame final as against the appellant on dismissal of his first petition.

Allowing the appeal,

HEID : l(a) Where a petition under Art. 226 is dismissed in limine without a speaking order, such a dismissal would not constitute a bar of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action.

When a petition is G dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision under a statute and on failure to get relief after pursuing the remedy by way of appeal or revision, he moved the High Court, it would be incorrect to dismiss the petition on the ground that the order made by the re\'isional authority had the effect of merging the orieinal order with the order of the revisional authority, and that the challenge on the fresh cause of actifln to the order of the revisional authority would of necesitv be a cha11enge to the H original order also and that therefore the petition would be barred bv nrinciples analogous to res judicata as the first order had become final.

[407C-E]

6-253SCI/79

Daryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 574; Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Govt. of Madras, [1968] 2 SCR 740; Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H. B. Munshi & Anr., [1969] 2 SCR 824; referred to.

In the instant case in the first wTit petition the appellant questioned the cor rcctness of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 17th March, 1961 without claiming therein any compensation for the land a1:quired.

That having been dismissed in linline he invoked the revisional jurisdiction under s. 33 of the Act.

When that petition was dismissed by the revisional authority he preferred the second writ petition. What he prayed in the second petition was a direction quashing the order dated 29th September, 1964 of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The High Court was, therefore, in error in rejecting the second petition on the sole ground that the order of 17th March, 1961 merged into the order of 29th September, 1964 and in substance: the challenge was to the order dated 17th March, 1961 which had become final. [40d A-Bl

(b) Secondly, if the claim for compensation was not raised in the first petition but was specifically raised in the second, it would not be dismissed on the ground that it \Vas barred by principles analogous to res judicata. f408 D]

2 (a) It has been well established by a long line of decisions of this Court that after July 22, 1952 the Custodian had no authority to cancel or modify quasi-permanent allotment, that the allottees of these rights could not "be dispossessed at the whim or caprice of the Custodian, that the quasi-permanent rights were heritable and that the holders were entitled to permanent settlement by issuance of sanad. Added to this was the fact that r. 14(6) of the Adminii;;- tration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 as amended 1Ero1n July 22, 1952 restricted the power of the Custodian to resume or cancel quasi-permanent rights of the allottees except in the circumstances 'mentiont:d in the subrule and no material is placed on record to show that the Custodian had exercised hi• power under r. 14(6) of the Rules.

[41! D-E]

P. D. Sharma v. State Bank of India, [1968] 3 SCR 91; Amar Singh v.

Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab, [1957] SCR 801; State of Punjab v.

Suraj Prakash Kapur, etc., [1962] 2 SCR 711; Joginder Singh & Ors. v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property, [1962] 2 SCR 738 at 740; referred to.

(b) Nor again is there any material to show that the Custodian had the power to cancel the allotment under the State Rules. It was not shown that the State Government had framed any re-settlement scheme and that the allot ment was cancelled for that purpose.

[412 HJ

'3(a) Under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 property which was declared ns evacuee property vested in the Custodian and was aliotted to displaced persons on a quasi-permanent basis. To obviate difficulties caused by continued unextinguislied title of the evacuee, the 1954 Act was passed, under s. 12(2) of which the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in the notification issued under the section stood extinguished and the

evncuee property would vest absolutely in the Central Government.

Evacuee property acquired in this manner. formed part of the compensation pool. Therefore, the appellant's property which was acquired in 1953, much before the coming into force of th, e 1954 Act, could not have become part of the compensation pool. [413 G-H]

" l' _.__ ..

l!OSHNAK SINGH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 4 01

(b) Even assuming that though the property was taken over by the Central A Government in 1953 evacuee interest in it bad not been extinguished till a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act had been issued and that on the issue of the notification it became part of the compensation pool, the consequence envisaged by s. 10 of the 1954 Act must ensue. It is that so long as the property remained vested in the Central Government it shall continue in possession of the person to whom it was allotted on the same conditions on v.'hich he held th'e property immediately before the date of acquisition. [914 C-Dl In the present case if the property had been taken over by the Central Government much before the 1954 Act came into force neither s. 12 of tht:

1954 Act nor r. 49 would be attracted. If on the other hand the evacuee interest in the property came to be extinguished on the issue of a notification under s. 12, s. 10 would be attracted and the appellant would be entitled to hold the property till it continued to vest in the Central Government under s. 12.

In other \vords in either event he would be entitled to +c:ompensation. [415

C-D]

(c) Nor again is it correct to say that it was a fresh n.Uotment under s. 10 of the 1954 Act. The land was allotted in 1949 and s_ 10 does not purport to make a fresh a!lotment. [415 Al 4(a) The whole of chapter VIII of the 1955 Rul'es (which indudes rr. 49 to 69) Would not apply because the land allotted was agricultural land and the allotment was made under the notification of the Goven1ment of Punjab dated 8th July, 1949_ [416 CJ

(b) Once chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules and especially r. 49 v:hich provides for payment of compensation in the form of land is out of the way, there is nothing in the Act which would debar a quasi-permanent allottee asking for compensation in cash and the Government paying it. Moreover on the former occasion the appellant was paid compensation in cash for a part of the land acquired from him_

[417 D-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2082 of 1969.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-2-1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A.

No_ 103/68.

R. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant.

Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 1.

Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents 2-5.

The Judgment of lhe Court was delivered by

DESAI, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from the dismissal of the Civil Writ Petition filed by the present appellant by a learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court as also dismissal in fimine of the Letters Patent appeal preferred by him.

Appellant is a displaced person from West Pakistan.

Ou his migrntion to India he was allotted on quasi-permanent basis land admeasuring 32t standard acres in village Daulatpur, Tehsil Pathankot,

District Gurdaspur.

First respondent Union of India acquired land admeasuring 1243 canals, 5 marlas which included 15 acres of !and allotted to the appellant, for constructing a railway line.

According to the appellant he was paid cash compensation for the same. First respondent further acquired in 1950 some land for construction National Highway from Jammu to Jullundur and the acquis; tion included a portion of the land allotted to the appellant and along with other allottees he was paid cash compensation for the same.

First respondent wanted an open plot of land for setting up a housing colony for rehabilitating some refugees from Mirpur (Kashmir) and in all it took possession of land comprising 7.88 acres of non-evacuee land and 6.64 acres ot evacuee land.

This acquisition included land admeasuring 1 standard acre and 15! uuits of land allotted to the appellant.

Possession of the land including the land of the appellant was admittedly taken over in July 1953. Since then the appellant has been requesting the first respondent and other competent authorities for payment of compensation for the same.

In the mean time after the introduction of the Dispfaced Persons ·(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, ('1954 Act' for short), allotment of land to appellant which was till then on quasi permanent basis was converted into permanent basis.

As the appellant was clamouring for compensation for the land taken from him, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, made an order on 17th March 1961, Annexure 'C', whereby a reference made from the Evacuee Property Department was accepted and the permanent settlement rights conferred on the appellant in respect of 1 standard acre and

15:!- units of land were cancelled on the ground that there already existed houses over that portion of the land and the land was described as ghair mumkin abadi and was not allottable on permanent settlement, as agricultural land against the verified claim of the appellant.

The appellant questioned the correctness of this order in Writ Petition No. 559/61 in the High Court which was dismissed in limine on 22nd March 1961 and which has led to a contention on behalf of the respondents that the subsequent writ petition from which the present appeal arises is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.

After the dismissal of the aforementioned writ petition the appellant approached the Financial Commissioner (Rehabilitation Department), Chandigarh, as per his representation Annexure 'D' dated 15th March 1963 requesting him to pay cash compensation for the land taken over by the first respondent which till such taking over was held by the appellant on quasi permanent allotment.

On receipt of this representation the appellant was directed as per Annexure 'E' dated 25th April 1963 to appear before the Financial Commissioner (Taxation) on 16th March 1963 at Chandigarh. The appellant accordingly appeared before the

...

• •

HOSH~AK SINGH \'. UNION (Desai, J.) 403

Financial Commissioner (Taxation) and represented his case lo1 cash compensation. Subsequent thereto, Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, wrote to his counterpart in the Central Government requesting the first respondent to concur with the decision of the Punjab Government for payment of cash compensation to the appellant adding that the land held by the appellant on quasi permanent basis was taken over for the purpose of the first respondent um! that as the area involved was less than 2 acres, the decisioa to pay cash compensation in respect of such area, arrived at in the meeting held between the officers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation on 27th August, 1957 would govern the case. Presumably in response to this communication from the Punjab Government the then Horne Minister wrote a demi official letter to the then Chief Minister of Punjab in which it was admitted that the land allotted to the appellant was in rural areas and a part of it was required later on for public purpose and that in view df the decision arrived at the meeting on 27'h August. 1957 the appellant would be entitled to cash compensation and requested the Chief Minister to process the case accordingly.

Thus, even though both the Govcrmnents agreed in their inter-departmental communications that the appellant would be entitled to cash compensation, nothing tcngihle

came out with tl1e result that the appellant preferred a petition under s. 33 of the 1954 Act challenging the order datcu 17th March 1961 of the then Settlement Commissioner cancelling the permanent settlement rights conferred upon the appellant.

This appliation was rejected by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India observing that the cancellation of the permanent settlement right, was in accordance with law and no interference was called for.

Thereafter the appellant filed the writ petition from which the present appeal arises.

After the writ petition was filed and rule nisi was issued, a return was filed as per the affidavit of one R. C. Aggarwal, Under Secretary to Goverrnnent of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, presumably on behalf of all the respondents which undoubtedly amongst others, include the Union of India, the first respondent, and the State of Punjb. the second respondent. It must be specifically mentioned that tl; e Union of India did not file any separate return and accepted the return filed by and on behalf of the State of Punjab and other officers of the Punjab

Government. There are certain averments in this return which must be noticed.

Appellant is a displaced person and he was allotted 32t standard acres of land on quasi permanent basis is in fact admitkd. It

is equally admitted that the land which was taken over for setting up a colony for rehabilitation o[ some families from Kashmir included one

standard acre and 15! units of land which was till then held by the appellant and that the land was taken over in July 1953.

It was contended that when land is allotted on quasi permanent basis, the allotment can be cancelled and the land can be resumed and that when such a resumption takes place the allottee is only entitled to compensation in the form of land and not in cash. It was also contended that the cancellation of the permanent settlement rights was just and legal because the conferment was the result of a fraud between the appellant and some officers of the Punjab Government and proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the land was used as agricultural land though in fact it can be appropriately described as ghair mumkin abadi. The manner in which the preliminary objection was raised at the hearing of the writ petition that in view of the dismissal of the earlier petition bearing on the same subject the present petition is barred by the principles of res judicata was not in terms taken up in the return filed on behalf of the respondents. The High Court, however, appears to have permitted the respondents to raise that contention.

The learned single Judge held that the effect of dismissal of the earlier petition filed by the present appellant was that the order dated 17th March, 1961 by which permanent settlement rights conferred or the appellant were cancelled became final and if the present petition is allowed the only thing the court would have to do would be to cancel the order dated 17th March, 1961 which has become final against the appellant and, therefore, the petition is barred by the principles a'nalogous to res judicata.

Mr. Girish Chandra for the first respondent and Mr. Hardev Singh for the remaining respondents urged that the appeal must fail for the same reason for which the earlier petition of the appellant was dismissed inasmuch as the cause of action for both the petitions being the same, the subsequent petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.

In the earlier petition the appellant questioned the correctness of the decision dared 17th March 1961 by which permanent settlement 6 rights conferred on the appellant for the land held by him on quasi permanent basis, including the land admeasnring 1 standard acre and

!St units taken over by the first respondent in July 1953, and the appellant in the earlier petition did not claim any cash compensation for the land taken over by the first respondent. In the present ptition the appellant seeks a direction for quashing the order H of the Joint Secretary, Rehabilitation Department, Government of India dated 29th September, 1964 rejecting the representation made to the Central Government presumably nuder s. 33 of the 1954 Act question-

...

..,

ing the correctness of the order dated 17th March 1961. Under s. 33 the Central Government has power to call for the rocord of any proceeding under the Act and to pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisio'm; contained in the Act or the rules made thereunder.

Broadly stated the powe.r of revision is conferred on the Central Go\'ornment under s. 33. Appellant invoked this revisional jurisdiction under s. 33 against the order dated 17th March 1961 which he challenged in the first petitio'n.

After the dismissal of the first petition he preferred revision application under s. 33 and when this revision petition was dismissed he preferred the second petition. 'The High Court was of the view that the ordr dated 17th___March 1961 merged into the order dated 29th September 1964 passed by the Central Government while dismissing the revision applicatio'n of the appellant and, therefore, if now the petition is allowed it would have the effect of setting aside the order dated 17th March 1961 which in view of the dismissal of th~ earlier petition of the appellant had become final. The High Court is clearly in error in reaching this conclusion.

The earlier petition was dismissed by a 'non-speaking, one word, order 'dismissed'. The High Court may as well dismiss the petition

in limine on the ground of delay or !aches or on the ground of alternative remedy. The second petition after pursuing the alternative remedy would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.

More often a petition under Article 226 is dismissed on the ground that bfore invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, if the potitioner has an alternative remedy under a statute under which the right is claimed by the petitioner, the Court expects the pditioner to exhaust the remedy and in such a situation the petition is dismissed in limine.

If after preforring an appeal or revision under the statute under which the right is claimed by the petitioner a petition under Article 226 is filed irrespoctive of the fact that the revision or appeal was dismissed and th~ original order which was challenged in the first petition had merged into the appellate or revisional order, nonetheless tho second petition in the circumstances would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata b<canse the cause of action is entirely different and the merger of the order cannot stand in the way of the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

In the leading case of Daryao & Ors. v. State df U.P. & Ors.(') this Court in venns said that if the petition filed in the High Court under

(!) [1962] I SCR 574.

Article 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applyihg for the writ or becaus•.; it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it th>"n the dismissal of the writ

petition would not constitute a bar to the subsequent. petition under Art. 32 exc.opt in cases where the facts found by the High Court may th•.omselves be relevant even under Art. 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would ho a bar; if the order says that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was

guily of !aches or that he had an alternativ•e remedy it would not lx• a bar except in cases indicated ii; i the judgment. Then comes an obserrntion which may better be quoted :

"It the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the• view that there was no substance in the petition at all, but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and uhsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Art. 32".

In Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Government of Madras,( 1) rejecting the contention that if the petition under Art. 226 is dismissed without issuing a notice to the other side though by a speaking order such a dismissal would not bar the subsequent petition for same cause of action or for the same relief, it was observed that this Court in Daryao's case(') did not mean to lay down that if the petition is dismissed in limine without notice to the opposite side it would not bar a subsequent petition. This Court only ruled that if the petition is dismissed. in limine but with a speaking order which order itself indicates that the petition was dismissed on merits, the absence of notice to other side by itself would not be sufficient to negative the plea of res judicata in 2 subsequent petition in respect of the same cause of action.

However, while negativing the contention on the facts of the case this Court reaffirmed that if the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order than such a dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. Similarly in Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H. B.

(I) [1968] 2 SCR 740.

(2) [1962] 1.S.C.R. 574.

• , r

.> •

____ ,,,_

Munshi & Anr.,(') a majority of the Judges affirmed the ratio in Daryao's case (supra) that if a petition under Art. 226 is dismissed not on merits but because an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner or that the petition was dismissed in limine without a speaking -0rder such dismissal is not a bar to the subsequent petition under Art.

32. It must follow as a necessary corollary that a subsequent petition under Art. 226 would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata. Roraffirming the view taken on this point in Daryao'.1 oase, in P. D. Sharma v. State Bank of India(') the preliminary objection about bar of res judicata was negatived. lt is, therefore, incontrovertible tha\ whe.re 1 petition under Art .. 226 is dismissed "' limine without a ; peaking order ; ach a dismissal would not constitute a _bar" of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, more so, when on the facts in this case it appears that the petition was dismissed presumably because the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of a revision petition under s. 33 of the 1954 Act which remedy he availed of and after failure to get the relief he moved the High Court again for the relief. It would be incorrect in such a situation to dismiss the petition on the ground that the order made by the revisional authority dismissing the revision petition had the effect of merging the original order against which the revision was preferred with the order made by the revisional authority and, therefore, the challenge on the first cause e>[

action to the order made by the revisional authority would of necessity _be a challenge to the original cider also and the petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata as the rest order had become final.

The High Court was clearly in error in dismissing the petition on this short ground.

There is yet another fallacy in the approach of the High Court while dismissing the petition as being barred by the principles analogous to res judicata because the second relief claimed by the appellant in the second petition was never claimed in the first petition and is an independent '\nd separate relief which the High Court was invited to grant if the appellant was otherwise entitled to it.

The appellant, by prayer (b) of the petition, sought a direction that the respondents be ordered to pay cash compensation to the appellant for the area of land which had been takeu over by the respondents. It is nobody's case that such a prayer was ever made in the first petition. In the first petition the grievance of the appellant was that the order dated 17th March, 1961 made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner cancelling the permanent settlement rights conferred on the appellant in respect of his land was illegal and invalid.

There was no claim for

(I) [1969] 2 SCR 824.

(2) (1%8] 3 SCR 91.

compensation. A claim for compensation was being separately pursued by the apellant and he did not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court praying for a direction to pay him compensation. In. the second petition from which this appeal arises there is a specific prayer for compen.i; ation and Mr. Narula, learned counsel for the appellant, stated that the appellant is not interested in the first prayer questioning the validity of the order made by the Joint Secretary to Government of India dated 29th September 1964 affirming the order dated 17th March, 1961 which was the subject-matter of the first petition. Now, if claim for compensation was not raised in the first petition and if it is specifically raised in the second petition on the allegation that as the land of the appellant has been taken over by the Government for its own use, if compensation is not paid it would be deprivation of property without compensation and would be denial of fundamenta I right to hold property, it is unthinkable that the present petition for this particular relief can ever be dismissed in the facts of this case on the ground that it is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.

For this additional reason the order of the High Court is unsustain· able.

And now to the facts of the case.

The appellant is admittedly a displaced person to whom 32t standard acres of land was allotted and the allotment admittedly was on quasi permanent basis. It is again an admitted position that in July 1953 the first respondent, Union of India, took possession of 1 standard acre and 15t units of land from the land allotted to the appellant on quasi permanent basis for its use,. viz., for setting up a colony.

Appellant contends that he must be paid compensation in cash for the land taken over from him. Respondents en the other hand contend that an allotment of land on quasi permanent basis could be resumed by the first respondent when the land was. required for its own use and on such resumption the appellant would only be entitled to allotment of an equivalent area of land but in no case the appellant would be entitled to compensation in cash.

This necessitates examination as to what is the interest of the appellant in the land allotted to him on quasi permanent basis and when and in what circumstances and for what purpose .it can be resumed or allotment cancelled and if so resumed, to what relief the appellant is entitled to.

There has been a flood of enactments on the taking over and administration of evacuee property as also compensation payable to displaced persons.

This Court in Amar Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee

I ..

Property, Punjab,(') exhaustively and stage by stage examined the measures taken by the Central and State Governments first for rehabilitating displaced persons, taking over of properties left by those who migrated to Pakistan, its distribution and allotment to displaced persons who came over to India on partition, and ultimately extinguisbment of the evacuee interest in such properties.

To recapitulate them here would be merely adding to the length of this judgment.

We would, therefore, only take note of the conclusion reached in Amar Singh's case (supra) with regard to the interest of the displaced persons to whom agricultural land was allotted on quasi permanent basis up to July 22, 1952. Says the Court at page 823 :

" ( 1) The allottee is entitled to right of use and occupation of property until such time as the property remains vested in the Custodian;

( 2) The benefit of s.uch right will enurc to bis heirs and successors;

( 3) His enjoyment of the property is on the basis of paying land revenue thereupon and cesses for the time being.

Additional rent may be fixed thereupon by the Custodian. If and when he does so, the allottee is bound to pay the same;

( 4) He is entitled to quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of the property during that period;

(5) He is entitled to make improvements on the land with the assent of the Custodian and is entitled to compensation in the manner provided m the Punjab Tenancy Act;

( 6) He is entitled to exchange the whole or any part of the land for other evacuee land with the consent of the Custodian;

(7) He is e.ntitled to lease the land for a period not exceeding three years without the permission of the Custodian and for longer period with bis consent.

But he is not entitled to transfer his rights by way of sale, gift, will, mortgage or other private contract;

(8) His rights in the allotment are subject to the fairly extensive powers of cancellation under the Act and rules as then in force prior to July 22, 1952. on

(1) [1957] SCR 801.

varied ad1ninistrative considerations and actions such as the following : .................. "

Undoubtedly this Court held that these quasi permanent rights in land would not be property within the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitution and, therefore, if deprivation of property is complained of a petition under Art. 32 would not lie.

However, after concluding in this manner this Court summed up the position with regard to the interest of quasi permanent holder in his holding as under :

"In holding that quasi-permanent allotment does not carry with it a fundamental right to property under the Constitution we are not to be supposed as denying or weakening the scope of the rights of the allottee.

Tliese rights as recognised in the statutory rules arc important and constitute the essential basis of a sat ; sfactory rehabilitation and settlement of displaced land-holders.

Until such time as these land-holders obtain sanads to the lands, these rights are entitled to the zealous protection of the constituted authorities according to administrative rules and instructions binding on them, and of the courts by appropriate proceedings where there is usurpation of jurisdiction or abuse of exercise of statutory powers".

After re-affirming the position of the quasi permanent allottees as herein quoted, this Court in State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash Kapur, etc., ( 1) held that after July 22, 1952, the Custodian ceases to have any authority to cancel or modify quasi permanent allotment.

This enunciation of the interest of the quasi permanent allottees in the land allotted to them should dispel any doubt about their entrenched interest in the land.

Nor could it be said that those allottees were at ':lie mercy of the Custodian and can be dispossessed at his whim or caprice.

These were heritable rights and the holders were entitled in due course. to permanent settlement by issuance of sanads.

But even before this situation was reached a fundamental change occurred in the posit ion of the Custodian vis-a-vis the quasi permanent :)llottces about 'he right of the former to cancel allotment and resume land. In exercise of the_ powers conferred by s. 56 of the Administration o[ Evacuee Property Act, 1950, the Central Government enacted what aro styled as Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950. Rule 14 recites the power of the Custodian to vary or cancel the lease or allotment under certain circumstances mentioned therein.

Initially sub-rule ,(6) was added to this rule and later on it was modified where-

(!} [1962] 2 SCR 7tl.

...

.. ,.

by the power to cancel any allotment or resume evacuee property allotted on quasi permanent basis was circumscribed and was available in the circumstances mentioned in amended sub-rule (6). The amendment effective from 22nd July 1952 had undoubtedly the effect of modifying and thereby restricting the power of resumption or cancellation vested in the Custodian in respect of quasi permanent allottees and the power was confined within very narrow limits. Therefore, subsequent to July 22, 1952, the Custodian of Evacuee Property would have the power to cancel an allotment only upon a ground which falls within the exceptions enumerated in sub-rule (6) (vide Joginder Sillgh

& Ors. v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property).(') We need not examine the circumstances in which resumption or cancellation can be ordered under the amended sub-rule (6) of rule 14 because it is not the case of the respondents that the land was resumed in exercise of the power conferred by rule 14 and in one or other of the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule (6) thereof.

Suffice it to say that after July 22, 1952, the Custodian had no authority to cancel quasi permanent allotment and resume land except in the circumstances and contingencies mentioned in sub-rule (6) of rule 14 and that having not been done, it cannot be contended on behalf of the respondents that the land in this case allotted on quasi permanent basis to appellant was resumed by the Custodian.

Two fact situations material and necessary for raising this contention are absent in this case. There is no material placed on record, including the counter-affidavit, which would show that the Custodian resumed the land of the appellant in exercise of the power conferred by rule 14 and in one of the circumstances mentioned in rnb-rule ( 6). And secondly, no such order of Custodian 1s forth-coming even after time was given to produce the file.

Mr. Hardev Singh, however, contended that even though sub-rule • (") of rule 14 as amended up to July 22, 1952 would not "enable the Custodian to resume land or cancel allotment granted on quasi pennanent basis except in the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule ( 6), yet

the State Government had the requisite power under a rule made by the G Punjab State Government on 29th August, 1951. It was contended that in exercise of the powers delegated by the Central Government under sub-s. (1) of s. 55 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to make rules under clause (i) of sub-section (2) of s. 56, the Punjab Government made the rule, the relevant portion of which reads as under : H

(l) (1962] 2 SCR 738 at 740.

"The Custodian shall be competent to cancel or terminate any lease or allotment or vary the terms of any lease, allotment or agreement and evict the lessee allottee in any one of the following circumstances;

(h) that it is necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of a lease/allotment for the implementation of resettlement schemes-and/or-rules framed by the State Government or for such distribution amongst displaced persons as appears to the Custodian to be equitable and proper".

Mr. Hardev Singh contended that presumably the Custodian at the State level cancelled the allotment in respect of the land taken over for resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees from Kashmir and ci1at this cancellation and resumption must be for implementation of resettlement scheme or under the rules framed for such resettlement D schemes by the State Government and, therefore, the resumption was one under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and it was not a case of either acquisition or taking over of the land of the petitioner.

There is no material placed before us to support this submission.

In the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents not one word has E been stated that the Custodian at State level cancelled the allotment and resumed the land.

The stand taken in the return filed m the High Court is that evacuee area measuring 7.88 acres was taker. over by the Government for construction and development of a colony for rehabilitation of 300 Kashmiri displaced persons and that such land

included an area of 1 standard acre and 15! units of the land allot:ed to the petitioner. It was further stated that this land of the appellant stood acquired under s. 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.

There is not the slightest suggestion that the Custodian in exercise of the power under the aforementioned rule cancelled the allotment in favour of the appellant and resumed the land. If snch is not the case, the power claimed under the rule can.not help the respondents.

Assuming that there was power to cancel aJlotment and resume land under the State Rules, it must be shown that the State Government had framed a resettlement scheme and for the purpose of the scheme the allotment was cancelled and land was resumed.

The fact pleaded is to the contrary that the Union of India took possession of the land for setting up a colony.

This also becomes clear frm the letter written by the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Annexure 'F wherein it was in terms stated that

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the land in question was not acquired by the State Government but stood acquired by the Central Government in terms of the general notification issued in 1955 and, therefore, the Government should concur in payment of compensation out of the funds allotted for setting up ol

the colony.

From the contents of the letter which have remained uncontroverted the situation that emerges is that the land was acquired by the Central Government for its own use.

The Central Government could exercise powers under the Central Rules.

It had not asked the State Government to acquire the land.

Therefore, the power conferred

c>n the State Custodian under the State Rules would not help the respondents as contended by Mr. Hardev Singh.

c It was next contended that on the introduction of the 1954 Act and the issuance of Notification under s. 12, all evacuee property was acquired by th.e Central Government and under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 12 such aCCiJUired evacuee property formed part of the compensation pool.

It was further said that if acquisition was under s. 12 of the 1954 Act, the allottee of land on quasi permanent basis would. be entitled to compensation as provided by rule 49 of Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, and in that event he would be entitled to compensation by allotment of agricultural land but not cash compensation. To understand the full import of the submission it is necessary to state that when there was migration of large number <if persons both the ways from India to Pakistan and vice versa, initially such property left by migrants from India to Pakistan was taken over for the purpose of administration under the1provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. This Act broadly provided for appointment of Custodian General of Evacuee Property and other authorities subordinate to him.

The authorities set up under the Act were empowered to declare certain properties to be evacuee property and any property so declared as evacuee property would, under s. 8, vest in the Custodian for the State. The Custodian was empowered to administer the property and the powers and duties of the Custodian were enumerated in s. 10. In exercise of this power the Custodian allotted lands on quasi permanent basis to displaced persons. But this was an unsatisfactory situation because the interest of the evacuee in the evacuee property remained intact and till such evacuee interest was extinguished, the evacuee property could not be settled on permanent basis. In order to obviate this difficulty the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was enacted by Parliament.

Section 12 provided for issuance of a notification as hereinabove mentioned and sub-s. (2) of s. 12 amongst others provided that the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in

the notification shall, on and from the beginning of the date on which the notification is so pnblished, be extinguished and the evacuee prc- perty shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.

Evacuee properties acquired in this manner would form part of the compensation pool.

If the scheme of the 1954 Act is as hereinbefore mentioned, we f; ril to see how the property which was admittedly allotted to the appellant on quasi permanent basis and which was taken over by the Central Government in July 1953, i.e. much before the introducticn of the 1954 Act, became property of the compensation pool.

Assuming that even though it was taken over by the Central Government n July 1953, the evacuee interest therein having not been extinguished till the issue of a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act and, ther~ fore, on the issue of a notification the property became part of the compensation pool, the consequences provided in 1954 Act must ensue, viz., that so long as the property remained vested in the Central Government it shall continue in possession of the person to whom it was allotted on the same conditions on which he held the property immediately before the date of acquisition.

In this connection reference to s. 10 of the 1954 Act would be advantageous..

The relevant portion reads as under :

"10. Where any immovable property has been leased or allotted to a displaced person by the Custodian under the conditions published :-

(a) by the notification of the Govermnent of Punjab in the Department of Rehabilitation No.

4891-S or 4892-S, dated the 8th July 1949; or

(b) by the notification of the Govermnent of Patiala and East Punjab States Union in the Department of Rehabilitation No. SR or 9R, dated the 23rd July, 1949, and published in the Official Gazette of that State, dated the 7th August 1949, and such property is acquired under the provisions of this Act and forms part of the compensation pool, the displaced person shall, so long as the property remains vested in the Central Government, cont; nue in possession of such property on the same conditions on which he held the property immediately before the date of the acquisition, and the Central Government may, for tho purpose of payment of compensation to such displaced person, transfer to h; m mch property on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed."

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Now, indisputably the appellant was allotted the property on quasi permanent basis under the conditions published by the notification of the Government of Punjab in the Department of Rehabilitation, dated 8th July 1949. If he had continued to hold the property on the date on which the notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act was issued, by the operation of s. 10 he would be entitled to hold the property till the property remained vested in the Central Government and v, ould be entitled to payment of compensation by transfer to him of sue~ property on terms and conditions that may be prescribed.

Therefore,\'. if 1954 Act is not attracted because the property in questio!l was ·. already taken over by the Central Government in July 1953 much before the 1954 Act came into force neither s. 12 nor Rule 49 would be attracted. If on the other hand the evacuee interest in the property came to be extinguished on the issue of a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act, its consequences would be as provided in s. 10 and the appelfant would be entitled to hold the property till it continues to vest in the Central Government under s. 12.

In either event he would be entitled to compensation.

Mr. Hardev Singh, however, urged that assuming that the appellant is entitled to compensation for taking over of his land, the land having formed part of the compensation pool on the issue of a notification under s. 12 and the allotment in this case being one not under the notification of the Government of Punjab dated 8th July 1949 but o fresh allotment under s. 10, the compensation would only be payable ; n the form of land under rule 49: There is a two-fold fallacy in this subm1ss1on.

Indisputably the land was allotted to the appellant under the conditions published by the notification of the Government of Punjah dated 8th July 1949 ands. 10 does not purport to make a fresh allotment.

It merely tkes note of the earlier allotment and assures that if the displaced person has continued to be in possession of the land allotted, on the issue of a notification under s. 12 and the land becoming part of the compensation pool, such allottee would be entitled to continue in possession of such property on the same conditions on which he held the property immediately before the date of acquisition by issue of notification under s. 12 till the property continues to vest in the Central Government and further he would be entitled to the transfer of su.ch property to him presumably on permanent se!tlement basis as and by way of _compensation. Section 10 does not permit a .,. construction as canvassed for by Mr. Hardev Singh that a fresh allotment could be made under s. 10.

7-253SC!i79

Further, rule 49 which proYides that compensation shall be in the form of land will have to be read with r. 69 which reads as under

''69. Saving-Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to agricultural land allotted in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union under section 10 of the Act."

It will immediately appear that where allotment was made under .. the conditions published by the notification of the GoverllDK'nt of ' Punjab dated 8th July 1949, the whole of Chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules which includes Rules 49 to 69 would not apply. In this case };. appellant was allotted agricultural land and th~ allotment was under -- C th0 notification hereinbefore mentioned which has been set out in rule

lO(a) and in that situation provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the Rules would not be attracted. Therefore, rule 49 cannot be c:alled in aid by the respondents.

The last contention, however, is that if the appellant is a displaced person and he was being allotted land against a verified claim in respect of agricultural land held by him in Pakistan, ordinarily compemation for land taken over must be in the form of land and not in form of cash.

Ordinarily it should be so.

But in this connection the e~:peri ence gained by the Government in disposing of the claims cannot be overlooked.

There were allottees of small plots of land.

Once allotc ment is mad~ and thereafter the land is taken over by the Govcrrment a fresh allotment cannot be in a compact area and if a small plot of land is allotted at a distant place the allottee would be put to a serious disadvantage.

Realising this position, at a meeting between th~ olficers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation of the Central Government held on 27th August 1957, a decision was taken which was notifi.cd by the Press Note Annexure 'A' of the very date.

It provides that there are largo number of displaced land allottees whose whole or part of the land were acquired by the Government for various public purposes and their claim for cash compensation is pending.

Such of the allottees who have acquired permanent rights and others who arc quasi permanent allottees and small pieces of their land are acquired by th~ Government, should send their applications to the Doputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur, giving various details therein.

The decision further provided that quasi permanent land allottes whose land exceeding two standard acres have been acquired should apply for alternative allotment to the. Land Claims Officer, and those whose land admrnsuring less than two standard acres is acquired should apply for payment of compensation in cash.

The decision was the deci!>ion of the O::ntral

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Government and the Punjab State Government that displaced persons to whom lands were allotted on quasi permanent basis, part of which was taken over for public purposes by the Government and where the land acquired was less than two standard acres in area, payment of compensation would be in cash and applications were accordingly invit"d.

This decision was affirmed in the letter of the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, addressed to his counterpart in the Central Government wherein after referring to the meeting dated 27th August, 1957 and the decision arrived at it, he r"quested the Central Government that the appellant would be entitled to cash compensation because the land taken over from him was vo>S than two standard acres and was covered by the decision arrived at, at the meeting and that the Central Government should concur in

paym"nt of compensation out of the funds allotted for setting up the colony for which the land was acquired.

In the face of this position it is difficult to entertain the contentian that comp.; nsation in cash was never payable for agricultural land taken over from a quasi permanent allottee. It was said that such a decision which runs counter to th;, statute cannot be given effect to by the Court.

Once Chapter Vil! of 1955 Rules and especially rule 49 which provides for payment of <0ompensatian in the form of land is out of the way, we sec nothing in the statute which would debar a quasi-p.; rmanent allottec asking for compensation in cash and the Government paying the same.

In fact the appellant has averred in his petition and in his affidavit that on former occasion he was paid compensation in cash and the denial is on the ground of want of information which can frankly be styled as a vague one.

Now it is indisputable that the appellant was a quasi permanent F allottee and that his land admeasuring 1 standard acre and 15} uni.ts had been taken over by the, Central Government in July 1953. In view of the decision n:corded in the Press Note referred to above he would be e'ntitled to compensation in cash which has not been paid to him.

The appellant would be entitled to compensation in cash for the intere1; t that he had in th~ land because land was taken awa v G from him.

What is the quantum of compensation will have to b~ worked out according to law and the modalities of determining the compensation.

This appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed.

The respondents H are directed to pay the compensation in cash to the appellant for the fand admeasuring 1 standard acre and 15} units taken over in July

A 1953.

As there is a delay of nearly 25 years, the respondents should pay the compensation as directed herein within a period of six months from today.

Respondents should also pay the costs of the appellant and bear their own costs.

P.B.R.

Appeal allow<'d.

...

HOSHNAK SINGH

UNION OF INDIA & ORS

February 27, 1979

D. A. DESAI, JJ.

Ss. 10

17th March, 1961

s. 33

Government of India

Art. 226

[1962] 1 SCR 574

[1968] 2 SCR 740

[1969] 2 SCR 824

s. 33

July 22, 1952

[1968] 3 SCR 91

[1962] 2 SCR 711

[1962] 2 SCR 738

Evacuee Property Act, 1950

s. 12(2)

Central Government

Central A Government

s. 12

s. 10

s. 12

s. 12

s. 10

s. 12

s. 10

8th July, 1949

49 to 69) Would not apply because the land allotted was agricultural land and the allotment was made under the notification of the Goven1ment of Punjab dated 8th July, 1949 [416 CJ

(b) Once chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules and especially r. 49 v:hich provides for payment of compensation in the form of land is out of the way, there is nothing in the Act which would debar a quasi-permanent allottee asking for compensation in cash and the Government paying it.

R. S. Narula

S. K. Mehta

T. S. Doabia

P. N. Puri

K. R_ Nagaraja

Girish Chandra

Hardev Singh

R. S. Sodhi

DESAI

Punjab & Haryana High Court

Union of India

Jammu

Jullundur

Mirpur

Kashmir

Punjab

17th March 1961

22nd March 1961

Chandigarh

HOSH~AK SINGH

Desai

Punjab Government

Ministry of Rehabilitation

27th August, 1957

27'h August.

s. 33

R. C. Aggarwal

State of Punjb

Union of India

State of Punjab

Girish Chandra

Hardev Singh

29th September, 1964

s. 33

s. 33

s. 33

s. 33

s. 33

Article 226

Article 226

Article 226

Article 226

Art. 32

Art. 32

Art. 32

Art. 226

Daryao

[1968] 2 SCR 740

Munshi

Art. 226

Art.

32

Art. 226

s. 33

[1969] 2 SCR 824

Narula

India

29th September 1964

Pakistan

Amar Singh

Article 31

Art. 32

s. 56

Evacuee Property Act, 1950

[1962] 2 SCR 7

22nd July 1952

29th August, 1951

s. 55

s. 56

(1962] 2 SCR 738

s. 12

Government of Punjab

s. 12

s. 12

s. 12

s. 8

s. 10

Parliament

Section 12

s. 12

s. 12

s. 10

s. 12

s. 10

s. 12

s. 12

s. 10

s. 12

s. 12

s. 10

s. 12

s. 12

Section 10

s. 10

Patiala

section 10

8th July 1949

Chapter VIII of the Rules

27th August 1957

Punjab State Government