{"document_id": "1979_3_518_531_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "GURDIAL SINGH FIJJI v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, J.J\n\nI11dia11 Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulation 1955 -Rcquiren1ent of Integrity Certificate-Resolutions I.1 and 1.2 lVhether ultra vires tlu' Regulations. ~\n\nAdverse report in confidential roll-Not communicated to the person concerned-Whether can be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities.\n\nC The Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 formulates the procedure for selecting persons from the Sta>te Civil Service Cadre for the purpose of bringing them on the select list of the Indian Administrative service. Regulation 5 which deals with the preparation of the list of suitable officers provides by cl. (2) that the selection for inclusion in such list shall be based on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority, \\vhile cl. (5) provides that if it is proposed to supersede D any member of the State Civil Service~ the Selection Committee stall record its reasons for the proposed supersession.\n\nThe \"Government of lndia'_s Decisions\" under the regulations have been •published by the Govt. in the All India Services Manual, Part II.\n\nResolution 1.1 requires the Chief Secretary to the State Government \\vho is the sponsoring authority to record a .certificate in respect of every eligible officer whose case is placed before the Selection Committee, that the State Government certifies the integrity of the officer with reference to the entries in his annual confiden.tial reports.\n\nResolution 1.2 provides that the Selection Committee should specifically record in its proceedings that it is satisfied from the remarks in the confidential reports of the officers selected by it for inclusion in the. Select List that there was nothing against their integrity.\n\nThe appellant and respondents 8 to 15 were members of the Punjab Ovil Service (Executive Branch), the respondentS being junior to the 2ppellant.\n\nTh 1966-67, an adverse entry W36 recorded in the confidential report of the appellant by the District and Sessions Judge.\n\nNo decision was taken by the Government as to whether the adverse entry was justified and whether the contentions G raised by the appellant in his representation to te same were well founded.\n\nAfter 1966-67, the appellant worked in various capocities, earned good reports and was allowed to cross the first and second efficiency bars. However, reipondents 8 to 15 were promoted to the selection grade of the <Jervice prior to the appellant.\n\nHis representation in this regard was rejected ty the Government.\n\nN.espondents 2 to 7 who constituted the committee for selecting persons from the Punjab Civil Service cadre for the purpose of bringing them on the select list of the Indian Administrative Service, selected respondent no. 9. 1lle\n\nG. S, FlJJI V. PUNJAB 519\n\n4.ppellant.'s name was not put on the select list, since respondent no. 2, the A :Chief Secretary to the State Govt. had refused to give an 'integrity certificate' to hin1.\n\nHis representation against the non-inclusion having been rejected, he .approached the High Court.\n\nThe High Court rejected the appellant's contention that resolution 1.1 was ultra vires of regulations 4 and 5; but quashed the order of the State Government granting seniority to. two junior officers over the appellant in the selection B .grade.\n\nIn appeal by the appellant, the High Court held that it is no\\vherre laid _.down that integrity certificate is the requirement for eligibility for promqtion. lntegrity certificate is the requirement of resolution 1.1 which is only an execu .tive instruction. No criteria is mentioned. nor guidelines provided lliS to how the integrity certificate is to be issued.\n\nThe' executive instruction, tberefore, went beyond the scope of the statutory regulation, the provision requiring the production of the integrity certificate, was unguided and was likely to lead to arbitrariness and unreasonableness and that therefore resolution 1.1 was ultra 'Vires of regulations 4 and 5.\n\nThe High Court held further that the records Of the Selection Committee reveal that the decision not to include the appellant's name in the select list was not based solely on the ground of non-availability \"Of the integrity certificate and that the Committee had given another. cogent -reason, that the appellant was noi suitable otherwise also.\n\nAllowing the further appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : 1. (i) The Letters Patent Bench of the High Court was in error in striking down, resolution 1.1 as being ultra vircs of regulation 5.\n\nBoth resolutions 1.1 and 1.2 are within the regulations and are valid. [527 C]\n\n(ii) Under cl. (2) of Regulation 5 selection for inclusion in the select list 'has to be based on merit ood suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority. Neither the 1954 Rules nor the 1951 Act furnish any guideliries for -.as.sessing merit and suitability. The Government would therefore, have, the power to prescribe the criteria for determining whether the requirements of merit and suitability are fulfille.d by any particular candidate. The Executive decision which is contained in resolution 1.1 and 1.2 effectuates the purpose of that prescription. [526 C, F, G]\n\n(iii) The Government in the exercise of its executive authority cannot supersede a statutory rule or regulation but it can certainly effectuate the purpose Of a rule or regulation by supplementing it. These resolutions of the Government of India do not transgress the requirement of the Regulations but are in furthe1:ance thereof. It, therefore, cannot be stated that the Chief Secretary had been conferred with an unguided or unfettered discretion to nssess the integrity of the officers by granting er refusing the integrity certificate at bis sweet will. [526 H, 527 BJ\n\n(iv) Every Executive Authority is charged with the obligation of organising its services so as to ensure maximum efficiency. The idea of maximum efficiency cannot be achieved unless persons who are selected for public offices possess integrity in as high a measure as ability. Integrity is, therefore, the sine qua non of merit MJd suitability. No person can be considered as possessing merit and suitability if he lacks in character and integrity. [526 E]\n\n2. One of the reasons which evidently weighed with the Selection Committeein not putting the appellant's name on the select list was that tht C'hief Secretary had not issued the integrity certificate in his favour.\n\nThe non-inclusion of appellant's name in the select list aru1 the nonissuance of the integrity certificate are thus closely linked, whether or not there' was another reason also for which the Selection Committee kept him out from the select list. [527 G~ HJ\n\n3. An adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunitie~ unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an Opportunity to improve his work a.nd conduct 0r to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an en1pty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior authorities to deidc on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. [528 H-529 BJ\n\nIn the instant case for one reason or another not arising out of any fault on the part of the appellant though the adverse report was communicated to him the Government has not been able to consider his explanation and de<..ide\n\nwhether the report was justified.\n\nIn such circumstances it is difficult to support the non-issuance of the integrity certificate to him. The chain of reaction began with the adverse report and the infirmity in the link of causation is that no one has yet decided whether that report was justified. [529 C]\n\n4. In the absence of a prope:r pleading it cannot be speculated that the appel1ant \\Vas not found suitable for reasons other than those c'1nnected Vlith the non-issuance of an integrity certificate to him. [529 D]\n\n5. The High Court saw the file a•nd discovered that the appellant \\Va.-; not brought on the select list because he was 'not found suitable otherwise'.\n\nRegulation 5(7) provides t:bat the Committee shall record its reasons if it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service. That an officer was \"not found suitable\" is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the decision to supersede him.\n\nIn the absence of any rea6on, this Court cannot agree with the High Court that the Selection Committee had another \"reason'\" for not bringing the appellant on the select list. [529 E, G, 530 AJ\n\nto.\n\n[Directed that the case of the appellant be considered afresh by the Selection Committee indicating the broad frame-work \\Yithin which the Committee should act and the preliminary steps the Govnment should take in order to facilit.ate the Committee's task.J\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nMahal Lal Capoor & Ors., [19741 1 SCR 797; referred\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 503 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-11-1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in LP.A. No. 484/74.\n\nS. K. Mehta, J. S. Chawla, P. N. Puri and P. Balakri3hnan for the Appellant.\n\nBishamber Lal (for State) and Hardev Singh for the RR-1-4 and 6.\n\n-. ) y\n\n• ~\n\n> j\n\n\\ . -\n\nP. N. Lekhi and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 17.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.-The appellant, Gurdial Singh Fijji, was selected for the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) in 1953\n\nand was appointed as an Executive Magistrate on June 8, 1954. Res- B pondents 8 to 15 are also members of the same Service, namely, the P.C.S., but they were selected and appointed to that Service after the appellant.\n\nThey are all governed, in the matter of conditions of their service, by the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules\n\n1930, as amended from time to time by the competent authority.\n\nThe appellant was confirmed in the cadre on May 8, 1958 while C respondents 8 to 15 were confirmed on diverse dates thereafter. In the gradation list irculated by the Government from time to time, respondents 8 to 15 were shown as junior to the appellant.\n\nIn the year 1966, as a result of the reorganisation of the erstwhile State of Punjab, the appellant and respondents 8 to 16 were allocated to the State of Punjab. In 1966-67 an adverse entry was made in the confidential record of the appellant while he was working under one Shri Sewa Singh, District and Sessions Judge, Amritsar.\n\nThat entry was communicated to the appellant whereupon, he made a representation against it but that has still not been disposed of, for one reason or another.\n\nThe State Government forwarded the representation to Shri Sci\"a Singh, who declined to express his views upon it unless asked by the High Court to do so.\n\nNothing further has been done in. the matter and no decision has yet been taken on the question whether the adverse entry was justified and whether the various contentions raised by the appellant in his representation are well-founded.\n\nThe appellant worked in various capacities after 1966-67, earning good reports all along.\n\nHe was permitted to cross the first efficiency bar under an order of the State Government dated June 14, 1966 and the second efficiency bar on July 20, 1971.\n\nBy an order dated July 3, 1971 published in the Punjab Government Gazette on July 23, the Government promoted respondents 8 to 12 to the selection grade of the Punjab Civil Service cadre. Respondent 15 was similarly promoted on December 19, 1970, respondent 16 on January 1, 1971 and respondents 13 and 14 on July 27,\n\n1971. On March 14, 1972, the appellant was also promoted to the selection grade with effect from January 15, 1972. He made a representation to the Government against the orders promoting res-\n\nS!TPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\npondents to the selection grade prior to him but it was rejected by an order dated June 20, 1973.\n\nA Committee consisting of respondents 2 to 7 was constituted under Regulation 3 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955, for selecting persons from the Punjab Civil Service cadre for _the purpose of bringing them on the select list of the Indian Administrative Service. The Committee held its meeting at Chandigarh on May 11, 1973 after which it prepared a list under Regulation 5 selecting respondent 9 for being brought on the select list for the purpose of promotion to the Indian Administrative Service.\n\nIt would appear that the appellant's name was not put on the select list since respondent 2, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, had refused to give an 'integrity certificate' to him.\n\nAppellant made a representation against his non-inclusion in the select list and that representation having been rejected, he filed a Writ Petition (No. 3315 of 1973) in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challenging the promotion of respondent to the selection grade, the refusal of the Chief Secretary to issue an 'integrity certificate' to him and his non-inclusion in the Select Lisi of the Indian Administrative Service.\n\nThe appellant's Writ Petition was allowed partly by a learned single Judge of the High Court by his jud!jffient dated August 19, 1974 whereby the order dated July 27, 1971 of the State Government granting seniority to two junior officers over the appellant in the selection grade was quashed.\n\nThe learned Judge directed the State Government to reconsider the case of the appellant along with that of three other officers regarding the grant of selection grade with effect from June 25, 1971.\n\nThe appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal (No. 484 of 1974) against the decision of the learned Single Judge which was disposed of by the High Court on November 19, 1976. It was held in appeal that the requirement of Resolution No. 1.1 as regards the production of the 'integrity certificate' was in the nature of a mere executive instruction, that it went beyond the scope of the statutory regulations, that the provision requiring the production of the 'integrity certificate' was unguided and was likely to lead to arbitrariness and unreasonableness and that therefore, Resolution No. 1.1 was ultra vires of Regulations 4 and 5. The entire record of the Selection Committee was placed by the State Government before the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal, from a perusal of which the High Court came to the conclusion that the decision of the\n\n) I\n\n\" .\n\nG. s. FJJJI V PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 523\n\nCommtitee not to include the appellant's name in the Select List was not based solely on the ground that he was unable to produce the integrity certificate and that the Committee had given another cogent reason for its decision viz., that the appellant was not suitable for being placed on the Select List otherwise also .\n\nSince inclusion in the select list for the purposes of promotion to the Indian Administrative Service was to be made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority, the Committee, according to the High Court, was justified in not including the name of the appellant in that list if, in its opinion, he was not otherwise suitable.\n\nThe Letters Patent Appeal was accordingly dismissed by the High Court, against which the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.\n\nWt will first deal with the question whether resolution No. 1.1. is ultra vires regulations 4 and 5 of the Indian Administrative Service\n\n(Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955. These regulations are framed by the Central Government in pursuance of sub-rule 1 of rule 8 of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 in consultation with the State Governments and the Union Public Service Commission. Regulations 3 to 7 provide for bringing members of the State Civil Service on the select list for promotion to the Indian Administrative Service. Regulation 3 deals with the constitution of the committe~ for making selections.\n\nRegulation 4 which deals with conditions of eligibility for promotion provides that each committee shall meet at intervals, ordinarily not exceeding one year, and consider the cases of all substantive members of State Civil Service who on the first day of January of that year had completed not Jess than eight years of continuous service, whether officiating or substantive, in a post of Deputy Collector or any other - post or posts declared equivalent thereto by the Government.\n\nBy 'f Clause (2) of regulation 4, the committee shall not ordinarily consider the cases of members of the State CTvil Service who have attained the age of 52 years on the first day of January of the year in which\n\n\\ ,.\n\nthe meeting of the committee is held, provided that a member of the State Civil Service whose name appears in the select list in force immediately before the date of the meeting of the committee shall be considered for inclusion in the fresh list to be prepared by the committee, even if in the meanwhile he has attained the age of 52 years.\n\nRegulation 5 reads thus :\n\n\"5. Preparation of a list of suitable officers -\n\n(1) The committee shall prepare a list of such members\n\nof the State Civil Service as satisfy the condition\n\nspecified in regulation 4 and as are held by the committee to be suitable for promotion to the service.\n\nThe number of members of the State Civil Service included in the list shall not be more than twice the number of substantive vacancies anticipated in the course of the period of twelve months commencing from the date of the preparation of the list, in the posts available for them under rule 9 of the recruitment rules or 10 per cent of the senior duty posts borne on the cadre of the State or group of States whichever is greater :\n\nPovided that in the year ending on the 31st December, 1969, the maximum limit, imposed by this sub-regulation, may be exceeded to such extent as may be determined by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government concerned.\n\n(2) The selection for inclusion in such list shall be based on merit and suitablity in all respects with due regard to seniority. ' ( 3) The names of the officers included in the list shall be arranged in order of seniority in the State Civil Service :\n\nProvided that any junior officer who in the opinion of the committee is of exceptional merit and suitability may be assigned a place in the list higher than that of officers senior to him.\n\n( 4) The list so prepared shall be reviewed and revised every year.\n\n(5) If in the process of selection, review or revision it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service, the Committee shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession.\"\n\nThe All India Services Manual, Part II, which is issued under the authority of the Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, (Dep, art- H ment of Personnel and Administrative Refomts), sets out under\n\n• j\n\nappropriate regulations the \"Government of India's Decisions\" which are, for convenience, referred to by the High Court as \"resolutions\".\n\nI ,\n\n\\ .\n\n; Resolution 1.1. which incorporates a decision taken by the Govern- •ment of India reads thus :\n\n\"1.1. On the basis of the recommendations of the Committee on the Prevention of Corruption, it has been decided that the following certificate should be recorded by the Chief Secretary to the State Government who is the sponsoring authority in respect of all eligible officers whose cases are placed before the Selection Committee for consideration :\n\n\"The State Government certify the integrity of Shri--\n\nwith reference to the entries in his annual confidential reports\".\n\nResolution 1.2. which is on the same subject says :\n\n\"1.2. The Selection Committee should also consider the question of , suitability of the officers for selection with reference to their integrity and should specifically record in their proceedings that they were satisfied from the remarks in the confidential reports of the officers, selected by them for inclusion in the' Select List, that there was nothing against their integrity.\"\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court rejected the appellant's contention that resolution 1.1 is ultra vires of regulations 4 E and 5.\n\nThe Letters Patent Bench of the High Court differed from him and quashed the resolution, observing :\n\n\"Regulations 3 to 7 are self-contained regulations prescribing the whole procedure for the constitution of the selection committee, qualifications for the eligibility, preparation of list of suitable candidates etc. It is evident from the plain reading of .these regulations that integrity certificate is not the requirement for eligibility for promotion.\n\nIntegrity certificate is the requirement of resolution 1.1 which is only an executive instruction. The regulations are quite detailed and the whole mode of selection is given and merit-cum-seniority is the main basis for bringing the persons on the select list. It is nowhere laid down in the regulations that integrity certificate is also required for eligibility for promotion.\n\nHence this requirement under the executive iustmctiou goes counter to the statutory regulations. It has put restrictions and limitations on the. committee in its discretion. Moreover, it is nowhere laid down iis to how the integrity certificate is to be issued.\n\n5:?6 qJP, ZEME COURT REPORTS [I Y79 J 3 s.c.R.\n\ncriteria is mentioned in resolution 1.1.\n\nNo guideline is provided.\n\nHence it can lead to arbitrariness and unreasonableness in certain cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\nI have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that resolution 1.1 contravenes the regulations, which cannot legally be sustained and is struck down as ultra vires of regulations 4 and 5 .\"\n\nWe find it impossible to sustain this conclusion and are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was r ght in upholding the validity of resolution 1.1. on the ground that it is not inconsistent with any of the regulations.\n\nClause (2) of Regula tion 5 provides that selection for inclusion in the Select List shall be based on merit and suitability in all respects, with due regard to semonty.\n\nIn other words, the test for inclusion in the Select Lis: is merit-cum-seniority.\n\nNeither the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 under which the Regulations are framed nor indeed the provisions of the All India Services Act, 61 of 1951, under which the Rules are made, furnish any guidelines for assessing mirit or suitability of a candidate for inclusion in the Select List or provide for the consideration of any particular data before a candidate can be brought on the Select List.\n\nEvery executive authority is charged with the obligation of organising its services so as to ensure maximum efficiency.\n\nThe ideal of maximum efficiency cannot qe achieved unless persons who are selected for public offices possess integrity in as high a measure as ability.\n\nIntegrity is indeed the sine qua non of merit and suitability : no person can be considered as possessing merit and suitability if he lacks in character and integrity. If, as provided by Regulation 5, selection for inclusion in the Select List has to be based on merit . and suitability in all respects, and the Rules and Regulafons do not furnish guidelines for a proper assessment of these requ; rements, the\n\ngoernment would have the power to prescribe the criteria for determining whether the requirements are fulfilled by 'ny particular candidate.\n\nThe prescription of the Regulation for inclusion in the Select List is merit-cum-seniority.\n\nThe executive decision which is contained in resolutions 1.1 and 1.2 effectuates the purpose of that prescripiton.\n\nUndoubtedly the government in t, he exercise of its executive authority cannot supersede a statutory rule or regulation but it can certainly effectuate the purpose of a rule or regualtion by supplementing it.\n\nResolution 1.2 provides that the Selection Committee should consider the question of suitability of officers with reference to their integrity and should specifically record in its proceedings, that it is satisfied from the remarks in the confidential reports of the officers selected by it for inclusion in the Select List,\n\n• • f\n\n\\ ,\n\nthat there was nothing against their integrity.\n\nResolution 1.1 requires the Chief Secretary of the concerned State Government, who is the sponsoring authority, to. record a certificate in respect of all eligible officers, whose cases are placed before the Selection Committee for consideration, that the State Government certifies the integrity of the officers with reference to the entries in their annual confidential reports. These resolutions of the Government of India do not transgress the requirement of the Regulations but are in furtherance thereof.\n\nThe circumstance that the Chief Secretary has to record a certificate does not confer upon him unguided or unfettered discretion to assess the integrity of the officers by granting or refusing the integrity certificate at his sweet will.\n\nThe State Government has to certify the integrity of the eligible candidate \"with reference to the entries in his annual confidential reports''.\n\nWeare, therefore, quite clear that the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court was in error in striking down resolution 1.1 as being ultra vires of Regulation 5.\n\nBoth the resolutions 1.1 and 1.2, are in our opinion within the scope of the Regulations and are valid.\n\nThough the High Court was of the opinion that Resolution 1.1\n\nis ultra vires of Regulation 5, it did not quash the decision of the\n\nSelection Committee because, having perused the record and proceedings of the Selection Committee (which were made available to E it during the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeal), it found that the non-selection of the appellant was not based solely on the ground that the Chief Secretary had not issued an integrity certificate in his favour.\n\nThe proceedings of the Selection Committee, according to the High Court, disclosed that the appellant was not selected for the reason also that he was \"not found suitable otherwise\".\n\nThe course adopted by the High Court has cause to the appellant an amount of injustice which has to be rectified.\n\nIt is clear that the Chief Secretary, Punjab, did not grant integrity certificate in favour of the appellant because of the adverse report in his confidential roll for the year 1966-67.\n\nOne of the reasons which evidently weighed with the Selection Committee in not putting the appellant's name on the Select List was that the Chief Secretary had not issued the integrity certificate in his favour.\n\nThus, the non-inclusion of appellant's name in the Select List and the non-issuance of the integrity certificate are closely linked, whether or not there was another reason also for which the Selection Committee kept him out from the Select List. l4-253SCI/79\n\nIn so far as the non-issuance of the integrity certificate is concern - ed, it is undisputed that its only justification is the adverse report in the confidentia~ roll of the appellant for the year 1966-67. The circumstances surrounding the adverse entry may therefore bear examination for seeing whether such preponderating importance could, on the facts to which we will immediately advert, be given to the particular entry.\n\nThe counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government of Punjab by Shri Phuman Singh, Under Secretary in the services department, shows that after the adverse remarks were communicated to the appellant, he submitted a representation requesting that the remarks be expunged.\n\nThat representation was referred by the Government to Shri Sewa Singh, retired District and Sessions Judge, who had made the particular remarks.\n\nShri Sewa Singh desired that the reference which was made to him by the Government should be routed through the High Court. The Government then made a reference to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana requesting it to obtain the comments of Shri Sewa Singh. The High Court replied that it was not its practice to cal! for comments of District and Sessions Judges on the representation of an officer against whom adverse remarh were made.\n\nThe High Court was once again requested by the Government that the Chief Justice and the Judges may communicate their views to the Government on the representation made by the appellant As the High Court did not express its view, the Government asked the appellant to submit a detailed representation alongwith documentary evidence in order to show that the adverse entry was made ma/a fide as alleged by him.\n\nThe appellant submitted his representation again on December 19, 1971, as desired by the Government.\n\nAfter a detailed examination of that representation, it was decided by the Government that since the comments of the Reporting Officer of the High Court on the representation made by the appellant were not available, which was necessary for the proper disposal of the representation, a suitable note may be placed on the appellant's character roll alongwith the confidential report for the year 1966-67.\n\nAn attested copy of that note is annexed to Shri Phurnan Singh's affidavit as annexure 1.\n\nAfter setting out the facts and circumstances narrated above, that note says that in the absence of necessary comments of the authority concerned, it was not possible for the Government to take any decision on the merits of the representation made by the appellant.\n\nThe principle is well-settled that in accordance with the r11les of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be\n\n' .\n\nacted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstauces leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the pJ:rson concerned, whether the.adverse report is justified. Unfortunately, for one reason or another, not arising out of any fault on the part of the appellant, though the adverse report was communicated to him, the Government has not been able to consider his explanation and decide whether the report was justified.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is difficult to support the non-issuance of the integrity certificate to the appellant.\n\nThe chain of reaction began with the adverse report and the infirmity in the link of causation is that no one has yet decided whether that report was justified.\n\nWe cannot speculate, in the absence of a proper pleading, whether the appellant was not found suitable otherwise, that is to say, for reasons other than those connected with the non-issuance of an integrity certificate to him.\n\nWe may also indicate, since the High Court saw the file and discovered that the appellant was not brought on the Select List because he was \"not found suitable otherwise\", that regulation 5 which deals with the preparation of a list of suitable officers provides by clause 7 that \"if in the process of selection, review or revision it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service, the Committee shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession\".\n\nWhile dealing with an identical provision in clause 5 of regulation 5 of the same Regulations as they stood then, this Court observed in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor & Others(') that \"rubber. stamp\" reasons given for the supersession of each officer to the effect that the record of the officer concerned was not such as to justify his appointment \"at this stage in preference to those selected\", do not amount to \"reasons for the proposed supersession\" within the meaning of clause 5. \"Reas.ms'', according to Beg J. (with whom Mathew J. concurred) \"are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions\".\n\nThe Court accordingly held that the mandatory provisions of regulation 5(5) were not complied with by the Selection Committee. That an officer was \"not found suitable\" is the conclusion and not a\n\nreason in support of the decision to supersede him.\n\nTrue, that it ig not expected that the Selection Committee should give anything approaching the judgment of a Court, but it must at least state, as\n\n(I) [1974] 1 SCR 797\n\nA briefly as it may, why it came to the conclusion that the officer concerned was found \\o be not suitable for inclusion in the Select List.\n\nIn the absence of any such reason, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the Sefoction Committee had another \"reason\" for not bringing the appellant on the Select List.\n\nIn matters of this nature, particularly when the Select Lists have to be , prpared and reviewed from year to year, it becomes difficult to work out the logical consequences of holding that the cae of any particular officer ought to be reconsidered.\n\nBut, inevitably, for reasons mentioned above, the case of the appellant shall have to be C considered afresh by the Selection Committee.\n\nHow best to do it has to be left to its wise discretion in the matter of details, but in order to eliminate, in so far as one may, chance of yet another litigation we ought to indicate the broad frame-work within which the Committee should act and the preliminary steps which the Government must take in order to facilitate the Committee's task.\n\n. In the first place, the State Government shall consider and dispose of within two months from to-day the representations made by the appellant ou January 23, 1969 and December 19, 1971 in regard to the adverse report in his confidential roll, for the year 1966-67.\n\nWe are hopeful that the High Court will co-operate with the Government in the disposal of the representations. The Selection Committee will, within three months thereafter, decide whether the appellant should be included in the Select List as of May 11, 1973. That question ha~ to be decided in accordance with the relevant regulations by applying the test of merit and suitability-cum-seniority.\n\nFor deciding the question of appellant's merit and suitability, the Selection Committee will take into consideration the Government's decision on his representations and his service record up-to-date. If the Committee decides that he is not suitable for inclusion in the Select List and should therefore be superseded, it shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession. If, on the other hand, the Committee G decides to include his name in the Select List, he will be entitled to rank in that list in accordance with his seniority as of May 11, 1973 unless, in the opinion of the Committee, there is a junior officeI of exceptional merit and suitability who may be assigned a higher plaee.\n\nThe Selection Committee will review the list for 1973 in accordance with these directions.\n\nThe Union Public Service Commission will B thereafter be consulted in accordance with the regulations.\n\nThe Select List as finally approved by the Commission will form the Select List. of the members of the State Civil Service.\n\n1 •\n\nWe may indicate that the Writ Petition filed by the appellant and his appeal to !his Court cannot be considered to he ber.ome infructuous on the ground that the Union Public Service Commission has already approved of the Select List.\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court had stayed the final publication of the list by his order dated September 24, 1973 and had directed by his order dated February 11, 1974 in C.M. 994 of 1974 that the publication of the Select List will be subject to the result of the Writ Petition.\n\nWith these modificaticns, the appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs .\n\nN.V.K, Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "GURDIAL SINGH FIJJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURDIAL SINGH FIJJI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GURDIAL SINGH FIJJI v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, J.J\n\nI11dia11 Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulation 1955 -Rcquiren1ent of Integrity Certificate-Resolutions I.1 and 1.2 lVhether ultra vires tlu' Regulations."}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, J.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Ovil Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1930, "end_char": 1949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and respondents 8 to 15 were members of the Punjab Ovil Service (Executive Branch), the respondentS being junior to the 2ppellant."}}, {"text": "4.ppellant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2908, "end_char": 2918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1lle\n\nG. S, FlJJI V. PUNJAB 519\n\n4.ppellant."}}, {"text": "These resolutions of the Government of India do not transgress the requirement of the Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9223, "end_char": 9234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, J. S. Chawla, P. N. Puri and P. Balakri3hnan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. S. Chawla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9236, "end_char": 9248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, J. S. Chawla, P. N. Puri and P. Balakri3hnan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9250, "end_char": 9260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, J. S. Chawla, P. N. Puri and P. Balakri3hnan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Balakri3hnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9265, "end_char": 9280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, J. S. Chawla, P. N. Puri and P. Balakri3hnan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9301, "end_char": 9314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal (for State) and Hardev Singh for the RR-1-4 and 6."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9331, "end_char": 9343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal (for State) and Hardev Singh for the RR-1-4 and 6."}}, {"text": "P. N. Lekhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9392, "end_char": 9403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N. Lekhi and Girish Chandra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9408, "end_char": 9422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N. Lekhi and Girish Chandra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9491, "end_char": 9502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.-The appellant, Gurdial Singh Fijji, was selected for the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) in 1953\n\nand was appointed as an Executive Magistrate on June 8, 1954.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh Fijji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9524, "end_char": 9543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.-The appellant, Gurdial Singh Fijji, was selected for the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) in 1953\n\nand was appointed as an Executive Magistrate on June 8, 1954.", "canonical_name": "GURDIAL SINGH FIJJI"}}, {"text": "June 8, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9663, "end_char": 9675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.-The appellant, Gurdial Singh Fijji, was selected for the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) in 1953\n\nand was appointed as an Executive Magistrate on June 8, 1954."}}, {"text": "P.C.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9751, "end_char": 9757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Res- B pondents 8 to 15 are also members of the same Service, namely, the P.C.S., but they were selected and appointed to that Service after the appellant."}}, {"text": "May 8, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10065, "end_char": 10076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was confirmed in the cadre on May 8, 1958 while C respondents 8 to 15 were confirmed on diverse dates thereafter."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10347, "end_char": 10362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1966, as a result of the reorganisation of the erstwhile State of Punjab, the appellant and respondents 8 to 16 were allocated to the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Sewa Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1966-67 an adverse entry was made in the confidential record of the appellant while he was working under one Shri Sewa Singh, District and Sessions Judge, Amritsar.", "canonical_name": "Sewa Singh"}}, {"text": "Sci\"a Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10829, "end_char": 10840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government forwarded the representation to Shri Sci\"a Singh, who declined to express his views upon it unless asked by the High Court to do so."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11350, "end_char": 11363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was permitted to cross the first efficiency bar under an order of the State Government dated June 14, 1966 and the second efficiency bar on July 20, 1971."}}, {"text": "July 20, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11397, "end_char": 11410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was permitted to cross the first efficiency bar under an order of the State Government dated June 14, 1966 and the second efficiency bar on July 20, 1971."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11431, "end_char": 11443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated July 3, 1971 published in the Punjab Government Gazette on July 23, the Government promoted respondents 8 to 12 to the selection grade of the Punjab Civil Service cadre."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11641, "end_char": 11658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 15 was similarly promoted on December 19, 1970, respondent 16 on January 1, 1971 and respondents 13 and 14 on July 27,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11677, "end_char": 11692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 15 was similarly promoted on December 19, 1970, respondent 16 on January 1, 1971 and respondents 13 and 14 on July 27,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "July 27,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11722, "end_char": 11736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 15 was similarly promoted on December 19, 1970, respondent 16 on January 1, 1971 and respondents 13 and 14 on July 27,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11741, "end_char": 11755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 14, 1972, the appellant was also promoted to the selection grade with effect from January 15, 1972."}}, {"text": "S!TPREME COURT REPORTS [1979]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11925, "end_char": 11954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made a representation to the Government against the orders promoting res-\n\nS!TPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12048, "end_char": 12061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\npondents to the selection grade prior to him but it was rejected by an order dated June 20, 1973."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12409, "end_char": 12419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee held its meeting at Chandigarh on May 11, 1973 after which it prepared a list under Regulation 5 selecting respondent 9 for being brought on the select list for the purpose of promotion to the Indian Administrative Service."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12423, "end_char": 12435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee held its meeting at Chandigarh on May 11, 1973 after which it prepared a list under Regulation 5 selecting respondent 9 for being brought on the select list for the purpose of promotion to the Indian Administrative Service."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12734, "end_char": 12754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear that the appellant's name was not put on the select list since respondent 2, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, had refused to give an 'integrity certificate' to him."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 13018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3315 of 1973) in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challenging the promotion of respondent to the selection grade, the refusal of the Chief Secretary to issue an 'integrity certificate' to him and his non-inclusion in the Select Lisi of the Indian Administrative Service."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13360, "end_char": 13375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's Writ Petition was allowed partly by a learned single Judge of the High Court by his jud!jffient dated August 19, 1974 whereby the order dated July 27, 1971 of the State Government granting seniority to two junior officers over the appellant in the selection grade was quashed."}}, {"text": "July 27, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13400, "end_char": 13413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's Writ Petition was allowed partly by a learned single Judge of the High Court by his jud!jffient dated August 19, 1974 whereby the order dated July 27, 1971 of the State Government granting seniority to two junior officers over the appellant in the selection grade was quashed."}}, {"text": "June 25, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13720, "end_char": 13733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge directed the State Government to reconsider the case of the appellant along with that of three other officers regarding the grant of selection grade with effect from June 25, 1971."}}, {"text": "November 19, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13890, "end_char": 13907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "484 of 1974) against the decision of the learned Single Judge which was disposed of by the High Court on November 19, 1976."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14622, "end_char": 14633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. s. FJJJI V PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 523\n\nCommtitee not to include the appellant's name in the Select List was not based solely on the ground that he was unable to produce the integrity certificate and that the Committee had given another cogent reason for its decision viz.,", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15650, "end_char": 15668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These regulations are framed by the Central Government in pursuance of sub-rule 1 of rule 8 of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 in consultation with the State Governments and the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These regulations are framed by the Central Government in pursuance of sub-rule 1 of rule 8 of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 in consultation with the State Governments and the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17891, "end_char": 17910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The number of members of the State Civil Service included in the list shall not be more than twice the number of substantive vacancies anticipated in the course of the period of twelve months commencing from the date of the preparation of the list, in the posts available for them under rule 9 of the recruitment rules or 10 per cent of the senior duty posts borne on the cadre of the State or group of States whichever is greater :\n\nPovided that in the year ending on the 31st December, 1969, the maximum limit, imposed by this sub-regulation, may be exceeded to such extent as may be determined by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government concerned."}}, {"text": "All India Services Manual", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18806, "end_char": 18831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The All India Services Manual, Part II, which is issued under the authority of the Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, (Dep, art- H ment of Personnel and Administrative Refomts), sets out under\n\n• j\n\nappropriate regulations the \"Government of India's Decisions\" which are, for convenience, referred to by the High Court as \"resolutions\"."}}, {"text": "These resolutions of the Government of India do not transgress the requirement of the Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24770, "end_char": 24867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26370, "end_char": 26376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear that the Chief Secretary, Punjab, did not grant integrity certificate in favour of the appellant because of the adverse report in his confidential roll for the year 1966-67."}}, {"text": "Phuman Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27495, "end_char": 27507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government of Punjab by Shri Phuman Singh, Under Secretary in the services department, shows that after the adverse remarks were communicated to the appellant, he submitted a representation requesting that the remarks be expunged."}}, {"text": "Sewa Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27849, "end_char": 27859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sewa Singh desired that the reference which was made to him by the Government should be routed through the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Sewa Singh"}}, {"text": "December 19, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28746, "end_char": 28763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant submitted his representation again on December 19, 1971, as desired by the Government."}}, {"text": "Phurnan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29250, "end_char": 29263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An attested copy of that note is annexed to Shri Phurnan Singh's affidavit as annexure 1."}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31178, "end_char": 31186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31428, "end_char": 31436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31865, "end_char": 31873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31918, "end_char": 31924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reas.ms'', according to Beg J. (with whom Mathew J. concurred) \"are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions\"."}}, {"text": "[1974] 1 SCR 797", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32448, "end_char": 32464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 23, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33671, "end_char": 33687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, the State Government shall consider and dispose of within two months from to-day the representations made by the appellant ou January 23, 1969 and December 19, 1971 in regard to the adverse report in his confidential roll, for the year 1966-67."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35556, "end_char": 35574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single Judge of the High Court had stayed the final publication of the list by his order dated September 24, 1973 and had directed by his order dated February 11, 1974 in C.M. 994 of 1974 that the publication of the Select List will be subject to the result of the Writ Petition."}}, {"text": "February 11, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35611, "end_char": 35628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single Judge of the High Court had stayed the final publication of the list by his order dated September 24, 1973 and had directed by his order dated February 11, 1974 in C.M. 994 of 1974 that the publication of the Select List will be subject to the result of the Writ Petition."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_532_544_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS.\n\nHOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n(P. N. BHAGWATI & D. A. DESAI, JJ.J\n\nAdn-1inistrc.tion of Justice-Speedy trial-:--Fundamental right of accused- Conslitutional obligation of State.\n\nConstit11tion of India 1950-Arts. 21 and 39A-Free legal services to poor 1 essential efen1ent of 'reasonable fair and just', procedure.\n\nAt the resun1ed hearing of the petition for release of under-tria1s in the State o! Bihar.\n\nHELD : ( 1) The procedure under which a person may be deprived of his life or liberty should be 'reasonable fair and just.' Free legal services to the poor and the needy is an essential element of any 'reasonable fair and just' procedure.\n\nA prisoner who is to seek his liberation through the oourt's process should have legal services available to him. [537 C, DJ\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 1 SCC 248; M. H. Hosko1 v.\n\nS1ate of Maharashtra, (1978] 3 SCC 544; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335; ' L. ed. at 799; John Richard Argersinger v. Raymond Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 : 3' L. ed. 2d 530 at 535-36; referred to.\n\n(2) Article 39A also emphasises that free legal service is an inallew.ible element of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure for without it a person suffer in, g from econL'IDic or other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity for securing justice, The right to free legal service is therefore, clearly an esscnti'RJ ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure for a person accused of, an offence and it must be held in1plicit in the guarantee of Art. 21.\n\nThis is a coustitutional right of every accused person who is unable to en{!age a lawyer and secure legal services, on account of reasons such as poverty, indigence or incomn1unicado situation and the State tS under a mandate to provide a lawyer to an accused person if the circumstances of the case and the needs of justice so require, provided of course the accused person does not object to the provision of such Jawyer. [539 F-540 A]\n\n(3) The poor in their contact with the legal system have always been on the wrong side of the law. They have always come across \"law for the pCIOr\" rother than \"law of the poor\".\n\nThe law is regarded by them as semeU1ing mysterious and forbidding-always taking something away from them and not as a positive and constructive social device for changing the socio ecrinomic order and improving their life conditions by conferring rights and beneftte on them. The result is that the legal system has lost its credibility for the weaker sections of the community.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary to inject ~(Ual ju.-itice into legality and that can be done only by a dynamic and aed\\rist scheme of kgol setvices. [541 E-F]\n\n. I \"~ •\n\n• ,,\n\n4. The urgent necessity of introducing a dpnamic and comprehensive legal services programme impressed upon the Government of India as also the State\n\nGo\\'ernments.\n\nThat is not only a mandate of equal justice implicit in Ait. 14 and right to life and liberty conferred by Art. 21 but also the compulsion of -the constitutional directive embodied in Art. 39A'. {542 DJ\n\nJ, The State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide speedf tria1 to tht ttccused by pleading financial or administrative inability. The State is under a constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial and whatever i~ necessary fer this purpose has to be done by the State. It is also the constitutional obligation of this Court, as the guardian of the fundamental right.1 of the peOp]e, as a sentinel on the qui-vive, to enforce the fundamental right of tJ.e ac::used to speedy trial by issuing the necessary directions to the State which may include taking of positi\\'e action, such as augmenting and strengthening the investigative machinery, setting up new courts, building new court\n\nhouses, appointment of additional judges and other measures calculated to ensure speedy trial. [543 D-E]\n\n(6) The courts in the United States have adopted a dynamic and constructive role in regard to prison reform by utilising the activist magnitude of the Eighth Amendment.\n\nThe courts have ordered substantial improvements to bC made in a variety of archaic prisons and jails through its decisions. [543 Fl\n\nRhem v. Malclm, 377 F. Supp. 995, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. Supp. 2d. 571, Holl v. Sarv,,., 309 F. Supp. 362; Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707;\n\nNewman' v. ,1labama, 349 F. Supp. 278; Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Suppl. 881; referred to.\n\n(7) The powers of this Court in protection of the Constitutional rights arc of the widest ami}litude and this Court should adopt an activist approach and issue to the State, directions which may involve taking of positive action with a view to securing enforcement of the fundamental right to speedy trial.\n\nBut in order to enable the court to discharge this constitutional obligation, it\n\nis necessary that the court should have the requisite information bearing on th' problem. [543 H-544 Al\n\nDirected that :\n\n(a) On th~ next remand dates when the under-trials are produced before the Magistrates or the Sessions Courts the State Government should provide them a la\\l.')'er at its own cost for the purpose of making {l!Il application for bail and opposing remand provided that no objection is raised to such a lawyer en their behalf. [540 Bl\n\n(b) 1'fle .State Government and High Court to fun1ish particulars as to the location of the courts of magistrates and courts of sessions in the State of Bi'1ar togetl1er with the total number of cases pending in each of these courts as on 31st December. 1978 giving year-wise break up of such pending cases\n\nand alllO explaining why it ha~ not been possible to dispose of such of those cot1•• aa hO\\e been pending for more than six month•. [544 DJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 57 of 1979.\n\nK. Hillgorani for the Petitioners.\n\nU. P. Singh for the Respsndent.\n\nA The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This writ petition again comes up for hearing before us pursuant to the directions given by us on 26th February, 1979(') and today three additional counter-affidavits have been filed on behaU\" of the respondents: one by Mrinmaya Choudhri, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons: the other by Bageshwari Prasad Pande, Superin-· tendent of the Patna Central Jail and the third by Pradip Kumar Ganguly, Superintendent of the Muzafferpur Central Jail.· Mrinmaya Choudhri has in his affidavit given particulars of the under-trial prisoners in 48 jails in the State of Bihar in addition to the particulars of: the undertrial prisoners in 17 jails already submitted on 26th February, 1979.\n\nWe directed the State of Bihar by our order dated 26th February, 1979 to file a revised chart showing a year-wise break-u]l of the under-trial prisoners after making a division into two broad categories viz. minor offences and major offences but this direction has not yet been carried out by the State of Bihar. Mrinmaya Choudhri has, however, assured us in his affidavit tllat several steps regarding the different directions given by the Court are being promptly implemented but due to shortage of time it has no! been possible 18 complete the same by 3rd March, 1979.\n\nWe direct that the State of Bihar will file within three weeks from to-day a revised chart in regard to the under-trial prisoners in all the 65 jails in a manner which would clearly show year-wise as to what is the date from which each of them is in jail after making a broad division into two categories of minor offences and major offences.\n\nWe are glad to note that so far as wo'men under 'protective custody' are concerned, the State has assured us in the affidavit of Mrinmaya Choudhri that necessary steps for transferring women under \"protective custody' in jails to the insti- tutions run by the welfare department have been taken and directions to that effect are issued by the Government. We hope and trust that this direction given by us in our earlier order dated 26th February, 1979 will be carried out by Government and compliance report submitted to us within the prescribed time.\n\nThough we directed the State of Bihar by our order dated 26th February, 1979 to intimate .to the court by a proper affidavit to b•~ filed .on or before 3rd March, 1979 whether the under-trial prisoners whose particulars were given in the counter-affidavit filed on 26tl1 February, 1979 were periodically produced before the Magistrates in compliance with the proviso to section 167(2), we find that the only averment made by Bageshwari Prasad Pande in his affidavit in res- ponse to this direction is that petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 17 confined in the Patna Central Jail prior to their release were\n\n(!) S'e PP. 393-198 of this volume.\n\n• I )-\n\n• .;\n\n\\ •\n\n: ·-\n\nH. KHATOON V. HOME SECRETARY 535\n\nregularly produced before the courts \"as aud when required by the 'A courts\", This averment does not at all constitute compliance with the direction given by us.\n\nWe would like to know frcim the State of Bihar in a proper affidavit to be filed within two weeks from today whether t]!e under-trial prisoners who were directed to be released by us <in their personal bond were periodically produced before the\n\nMagistrateii in compliance with requirement of the proviso to section 167(2). We would suggest that the State should furnish to this Court the dates on which these under-trial prisoners were remanded to jUdicial custody from time to time by the Magistrates, so that we can satisfy ourselves that the requirement of the proviso was complied with .\n\nWe also .find an averment in the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar Gariguly that Petitioners Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13. 15, 16 and 18 who were previously confined in the Muzaffarpur Central Jail prior to their release were regularly produced before the Court' \"as and when required by the courts\".\n\nThis avennent, as we have pointed out, is wholly unsatisfactory and it does not inform the Court as to what were the dates on which these under-trial prisoners were remanded from time to time by the Magistrates. It is only if these particulars are furnished to us that we can satisfy ourselves in regard to compliance with the requirement of the proviso to section 167 (2) and we would, therefore, direct the State of Bihar to furnish fhese particulars to us in an affidavif to be filed within two weeks from today.\n\nWe should also like to have the particulars in regard to the dates on which remand orders were made from time to time by the Magiiltrates in regard to under-trial prisoners at items Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 43, 56, 69, 71, 72, 79, 85, 92, 96, 97,\n\n101, 129, 133, 136 to 142, 165 to 167, 170 to 174, 177, 191, 199, 210, and 236 in the list of under-trial prisoners in Ranchi Central Jail submitted on behalf of the respondents. These under-trial prisoners have been in jail for a period of over six to seven years and we would like to satisfy ourselvie that the requirement of the proviso to section 167 (2) was complied with in their case.\n\nThe affidavit giving these particulars should be filed by the State Government within three weeks from today.\n\nThere arc quite a large number of under-trial prisoners who are languishing in jail for long periods of time and it is nbt possible for us to examine the individual cases of these undertrial prisoners for the purpose of satisfying ourselve5 in regard to compliance with the proviso to section 167 (2)' but we would request\n\nthee High Court of Patna to pick out a few names from the lists of under:trlal prisoners which have been filed before us by the State of\n\nBihar on 26th February, 1979 and 5th March, 1979 and satisfy itself\n\nwhether these under-trial prisoners have been periodically remillded from time to time by the 1'4.agistrates as required by the pr<i\\lillo to section 167(2).\n\nWe would direct the State of Bihar to furnish oopies of these lists of under-trial prisoners to the Chief Justice of the Patna\n\nHigh Court within ten days from today.\n\nWe find from the lists of under-trial prisoners filed before us on behalf of the State of Bihar that the under-trial prisoners whose names are set out in the chart filed by Mrs. HinlJ(lrani to-day have been in jail for periods longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced; if convicted. This discloses a shocking state of affairs and betrays complete lack of concern for human yalues. It exposes the callousness of our legal and judical system which can remain unmoved by such enormous misery and suffering resulting from totally unjustified deprivation of personal liberty. It is indeed difficult for us to understand how the S.a'e Government could possibly remain oblivious to the continued incarceration of these under-trial prisoners for years without eve'n their trial having commenced.\n\nThe judiciary in the State of Bihar also cannot escape its share of blame because it could not have been unware of the fact that thousands of under-trial prisoners are languishing in jail awaiting trial which never seems to commence.\n\nWe fail to see how the continued detention of these under-trial prisoners mentioned in the list of Mrs. Hingorani can be justified when we find that they have already been in jail for a period longer than what they would have been sentenced to suffer, if convicted.\n\nThey have in fact some jail term to their credit.\n\nWe, therefore, direct that these under-trial prisoners whose names and particulars are given in the list filed by Mrs. Hingorani should be rekased forthwith as continuance of their detention is clearly illegal and in violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\n' '\n\nThen there are several under-trial prisoners who are charged with • offences which are bailable but who are still in jail presumably because no application for bail has been made on their behalf or G being too poor they are u1iable to furnish bail. It is not uncommon • to find that under-trial prisoners who are produced before the Magistrates are unaware of their right to obtain release on bail and on account of their poverty, they are unable to engage a lawyer who would apprise them of their right to apply for bail and help them to secure release on bail by making a proper application to the Magistrate in Iha!\n\nH behalf.\n\nSometimes the Magistrates also refuse to release the undertrial prisoners produced before them on their personal bond but in- sist on monetary bail with sureties, which by reason of their poverty\n\nthe under-trial prisoners are unable to furnish and which, therefore, effectively shuts out for them any possibility of release from pretrial detention.\n\nThis unfortunate situation cries aloud for introduction of an adequate and comprehensive legal service programme, but so far,\n\nlhesc cries do not seem to have evoked any response.\n\nWe do not think it is possible to reach the benefits of the legal process to the poor, to protect them against injustice and to secure to them their constitutional and statutory rights unless there is a nation wide legal service programme to provide free legal services to them. It is now well settled, as a result of the decisiion of this Court in Maneka Gandhi\n\nv. Unio1t of India(') that when Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law, it is not enough that there should be some semblance of procedure provided by Jaw, but the procedure under which a person may be deprived ot his life or liberty should be 'reasonable, fair and just'.\n\nNow, a procedure which does not make available legal services to an accused person who is too poor to afford a lawyer '!nd who would, therefore, have to go through the trial without legal assistance, cannot possibly be regarded as 'resonable, fair and just'. It is an essential indegredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure to a prisoner who is to seek his liberation through the court's process that he should have legal services available to him.\n\nThis Court pointed out in M. H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra('). '. \"Judicial justice, with procedural intricacies, -legal submissions and critical exainination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under the law is on the cards where such supportive skill is absent for one side.\n\nOur judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our judicial process, engineered by kindred legal technology, compel the collaboration of lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law\".\n\nFree legal services to the poor and the needy is an essential element of any 'reasonable,, fair and just' procedure. It is not necessary to quote authorativc pronouncements by judges and jurists in impport of the view that without the service of a lawyer an accused person would be. denied 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure.\n\nBlack, J., observed in Gideon v. Wainwright(\") :\n\n\"Not only those precedents but also reason and reflecdon require us to recognise that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.\n\nThis seems to us to be an obvit'11s\n\n(1) [1978] 1 s.c.c. 248\n\n(2) {J978] 3 s.c.c. 544\n\n(3) 372 U.S. 335 : 9 L. ed. 2d at 799\n\n538 WPkbME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntruth.\n\nGovernments, both State and Federal quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accnsed of crime.\n\nLawyers to prosecute are every where deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society.\n\nSimilarly, there are few defendants charged with crime who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defences.\n\nThat government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessties, not luxuries.\n\nThe right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamentaJ and essential to fair trials in some countries, but is in ours.\n\nFrom the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.\n\nThis noble idea cannot be realised if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.\"\n\nThe philosophy of free legal service as an essential element of fair procedure is also to be found in the following passage from the judgment of Douglas, J. in Jon Richard Argersinger v.\n\nRaymond Hamlin(')\n\n\"The right to be heard would be, in many cases of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law, if charged with crime, he is incapable, generally of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.\n\nHe is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.\n\nLeft without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge and convicted upon incompetent evidence,. or evidence irr~Iec van! to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.\n\nHe lacks both the skill .and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he has a perfect one.\n\nHe requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.\n\nWithout it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. lf that be true of men of i11tellige11ce,\n\n(l) 407 U.S. 25~35 L. ed. cd 530 t 535-36.\n\n~ -(\n\n\\ -\n\nhow much more true is it of the ignorant and i/li1erate or those of feeble il!!e/lecl.\n\nThe right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries but it is in ours. From the very beginning our state and national constitu!ions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the' poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.\n\nBoth Powell and G; deon involved felonies.\n\nBut their rationale has relevancc to any criminal trial, where an accused\n\nis deprived of his liberty. x x x x x x The court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the probability that a lawyer should be appointed . . . . . The court should consider the indiv:dual factors peculiar to each case.\n\nThese, of course would be the most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be the competency of the individual defendent to pre-\n\n•ent his own case. (emphasis added)\" We may also refer to Article 39A the fundamental constitutional directive which reads as follows:\n\n\"39A. Equal justice and free legal aid:-The State shall , ecure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice,\n\non a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. (emphasis added)\" This Article also emphasises that free legal service is an inalienable clement of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure for without it a per.on suffering from economic or other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity for securing justice.\n\nThe right to free legal services is, therefore, clearly an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just, procedure for a person accnsed of an offence and it must be held implicit in the guarantee of Article 21.\n\nThis is a constitutional right of every accused person who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services n account of reasons such as poverty, indigene or incommunicado situation and the State is under a mandate to provide a lawyer to an accused person if the circumstances of the case and the\n\n540 lli'l<E.ME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nneeds of justice so required, provided of course the accused pcrs.)n does not object to the provision of such Ja\"1yer.\n\nWe would, therefore,. direct that on the next remand dates, when the under-trial prisoners, charged with bailable offences, are produced before the Magistrates, the State Government should provide them a lawyer at its own cost for the purpose of making an application for bail, provided that no objec tion is raised to such lawyer on behalf of such under-trial prisoners and if any application for bail is made, the Magistrates should dispose of the same in accordance with the broad outlines set out by us in our judgment dated 12th February, 1979. The State Government will report to the High Court of Patna its compliance with this direction within a period of six weeks from today.\n\nThere are also various unrkr-trial prisoners who have been in jail for periods exceeding one-half of the maximum punishment that could be awarded to them if convicted, for the offences with which they are charged.\n\nTo take an example, Budhu Mahli, who is at item No. I in the list of undertrial prisoners in Ranchi Central Jail has been in jail since 21st November, 1972 for offences under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act.\n\nThe maximum punishment for the offence under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code is 10 years while that for the offence under Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act is mnch less. Yet Budhu Mahli has been in jail as an under-trial prisoner for over six years. So also Jairam Manjhi, Samra Manjhi, Jugal Munda and Gulam Munda at Item Nos. 2 to 7 in the list of under-trial prisoners confined in Ranchi Central Jail have been in jail as under-trial prisoners from 21st February, 1974 that is, for a period of over five years for the offence under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code which is punishable with a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. There are numerous other instances which can easily be gleaned from the lists of under-trial prisoners filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, where the under-trial prisoners have been in jail for more than half the maximum term of imprisonment for which they could be sentenced, if convicted_. There is no reason why these undertrial prisoners should be allowed to continue to langnish in jail, merely because the State is not in a position to try them within a reasonable period of time. It is possible that some of them, on trial may be acquitted of the offences charged against them and in that event, they would have spent several years in jail for offences which they are ultimately found not to have committed. What faith would these people have in our system of administration of justice? Would they not carry a sense of frustration and bitterness against a society whlch keeps them in jail for so many years for offenoes which they did not commit?\n\nIt is, therefore, absolutely essential that persons accused of offunces\n\nI •\n\nshould be speedily tried, so that in cases where bail, in proper exercise of discretion, is refused, the accused persons have not to remain in jail longer than is absolutely necessary. Since there are several undertrial prisoners who have been in jail for periods longer than half the maximum term of imprisonment for which they could if convicted, be sentenced, we would direct that on the next remand dates when they are produced before the Magistrates or the Sessions Courts, the State Government should prov:de them a lawyer at its own cost for the purpose of making an application for bail and opposing remand provided that no objection is raised to such lawyer on their behalf and if any application for bail is made, the Magistrates or the Sessions Courts, as the case may be should dispose of the same in accordance with the broad guidelines indicated by us in our judgment dated 12th February, 1979.\n\nThe State Government will comply with this direction as far as possible within a period of six weeks from today and submit report of compliance to th'-. High Court of Patna.\n\nWe may also take this opportunity of impressing upon the Government of India as also the State Governments, the urgent necessity of introducing a dynamic and comprehensive legal service programme with a view to reaching justice to the common man.\n\nToday, unfortunately, in our country the poor are priced out of the judicial system with the result that they are losing faith in the capacity of our legal system to bring about changes in their life conditions and to deliver justice to them.\n\nThe poor in their contact with the legal system have always been on the wrong side of the law.\n\nThey have always .come across \"law for the poor\" rather than \"law of the poor\".\n\nThe Jaw is regarded by them as something mysterious and forbidding-always taking something away from them and not as a positive and onstruc tive social device for changing the socio economic order and impnving their life conditions by conferring rights and benefits on them.\n\nThe result is that the legal system has lost its credibility for the weaker sections of the community. It is, therefore, necessary that we 'hould inject equal justice into legality and that can be done only by dyna, nic and activist scheme of legal services.\n\nWe may remind the Government of the famous words of Mr. Justice Brennan\n\n\"Nothing rankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with.\n\nBut injustice makes us want to pull things down. When only the rich can enjoy the law, as a doubtful luxury, and the poor, who need it most, cannot have it because its expense puts it beyond their reach, the threat to the continued existence of free emocracy is not imaginary but very real, because\n\n• 542 SUPREME COURf REPORTS [ l979] 3 s.c.R .\n\ndemocracy's very Efe depends upon making the machinery of\n\njustice so effective that every citizen shall believe in and benefit by its impartiality and fairness.\"\n\nAnd also recall what was said by Leeman Abbot years ago in relation to affluent America.\n\n\"If ever a time shall come when in this city only the rich can enjoy law as a doubtful luxury, when the poor who need it most cannot have it, when only a golden key will unlock the door to the courtroom, the seeds of revolution will be sown, the fire-brand of revolution will be lighted and put into the hands of men and they will almost be justified in the revolution which wilt follow.\"\n\nWe would strongly recommend to the Government of India and the State Governments that it is high time that a comprehensive legal .service programme is introduced in the country.\n\nThat is not only a mandate of equal justice implicit in Article 14 and right lO life and liberty conferred by Article 21, but also the compulsion of the onsti tutional directive embodied in Article 39A.\n\nWe find from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the reiipondents that no reasons have been given by the State Government as to why there has been such enormous delay in bringing the under-trial prisoners to trial. Speedy trial is, as held by us in our earlier judgment dated 26th February, 1979, an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and it is the eoastitutional obligation of the State to device such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial to the accused.\n\nThe State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accued on he ground that the State has no adequate financial resources to incur the necessary expenditure needed for improving the administrative and judicial apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial.\n\nThe State may have its financial constraints and its priorities in expenditure, but, as pointed out by the Court in Rhem v. Ma/elm(') : \"The law does not permit any Government to deprive its citizens _of constitutional ri1thts on a plea of poverty\". It is also interesting to notice wliat Justice, then Judge, Blackmum said in Jackson v. Bishop('):\n\n\"Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured by dollar considera- H tions .... \"\n\n(I) 377 F. Supp. 995\n\n(2) 404 F. Supp. 2d. 571.\n\nSo also in Holt v. Sarver('), affirmed in 442 F. Supp. 362, the Court, dealing with the obligation of the State to maintain a Penitentiary System which did not violate the Eighth Amendment aptly and eloquently said\n\n\"Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the Legislature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed upon what Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the United States.\" The State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide speedy trial to the accused by pleading financial or administrative inabi!tiy. The State is under a constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial and whatever is necessary for this purpose has to be done by the State. It is also the constitutional obligatio!! of this Court as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the people, as a sentinel on the qui vive, to enforce the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial by issuing the necessary directions to the State which may include taking of positive action, such as augmenting and strengthening the investigative machinery, setting up new courts, build ing new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the courts, appointment of additional judges and other measures calculated to ensure speedy trial. We find that in fact the courts in the United States have adopted this dynamic and consructive role so far as the prison reform is concerned by utilising the activist magnitude of the Eighth Amendment. The courts have ordered substantial improve- ' • ments to be made in a variety of archaic prisons and jails through -( - decisions such as Hot v. Sarver (supra), Jones v.\n\nWittenberg('), \"- Newman v. Alabama(') and Gates v. Collier('). The Court in the last mentioned case asserted that it \"has the duty of fashioning a decree that will require defendants to eliminate the conditions and practices at Parchman here-in-above found to be violative of the United •\n\nState's constitution\" and in discharge of this duty gave var\\ons directions for improvement of the conditions of those confined in the State Penitentiary.\n\nThe powers of this Court in protection of the Constitutional rights are of the widest amplitude and we do not see why this\n\n[(I) 309 F. Supp. 362.\n\n(2) 330 F. Supp. 707,\n\n(3) 349 F. Supp. 278.\n\n(4) 349 F. Supp. 881.\n\n15-253SCU79\n\nCourt should not adopt a similar activist approach and issue to the State . directions which may involve taking of positive action woth a view to securing enforcement of the fundamental right to speedy trial.\n\nBut in order to enable the Court to discharge this constitutional obligation, it is necessary that the Court should have the requisite infor- !!lation bearing on the problem.\n\nWe, therefore, direct the State: of Bihar to furnish to us within three weeks from today particulars as to the location of the courts of magistrates and courts of sessions in the State of Bihar together with the total number of cases pending in each of these courts as on 31st December, 1978 giving yearwise br<eakup of such pending cases and also explaining why it has not been possible to dispose of such of those cases as have been pending for more than six months.\n\nWe would appreciate if the High Court of Patna also furnishes the above particulars to us within three weeks from today since the High Court on its administrative side mus:t be having records from which these particulars can be easily gathered.\n\nWe also direct the State of Bihar to furnish to us within three W<eeks from today particulars as to the number of cases where first information report have been lodged and the cases are pending investigntion by the police in each sub-division of the State as on 31st December, 1978 and where such cases have been pending investigation for more than six months, the State of Bihar will furnish broadly the reasons why there has been such delay in the investigative process. The writ petition will now come up for hearing and final disposal on 4th April,\n\n1979. We have already issued notice to the Supreme Court Bar Association to appear and make its submissions on the issue arising in the writ petition since they are of great importance.\n\nWe hope and tru!t that the Supreme Court Bar Association will respond to the notice and appear to assist the Court at the hearing of the writ petition.\n\nN.V.K.\n\n' I ~", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n(P. N. BHAGWATI & D. A. DESAI, JJ.J\n\nAdn-1inistrc.tion of Justice-Speedy trial-:--Fundamental right of accused- Conslitutional obligation of State."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 21 and 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 893, "end_char": 895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1034, "end_char": 1039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1548, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2841, "end_char": 2860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The urgent necessity of introducing a dpnamic and comprehensive legal services programme impressed upon the Government of India as also the State\n\nGo\\'ernments."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3002, "end_char": 3009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3928, "end_char": 3941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "543 D-E]\n\n(6) The courts in the United States have adopted a dynamic and constructive role in regard to prison reform by utilising the activist magnitude of the Eighth Amendment."}}, {"text": "K. Hillgorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Hillgorani for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5835, "end_char": 5846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh for the Respsndent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5911, "end_char": 5919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This writ petition again comes up for hearing before us pursuant to the directions given by us on 26th February, 1979(') and today three additional counter-affidavits have been filed on behaU\" of the respondents: one by Mrinmaya Choudhri, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons: the other by Bageshwari Prasad Pande, Superin-· tendent of the Patna Central Jail and the third by Pradip Kumar Ganguly, Superintendent of the Muzafferpur Central Jail.·"}}, {"text": "Mrinmaya Choudhri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6144, "end_char": 6161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This writ petition again comes up for hearing before us pursuant to the directions given by us on 26th February, 1979(') and today three additional counter-affidavits have been filed on behaU\" of the respondents: one by Mrinmaya Choudhri, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons: the other by Bageshwari Prasad Pande, Superin-· tendent of the Patna Central Jail and the third by Pradip Kumar Ganguly, Superintendent of the Muzafferpur Central Jail.·"}}, {"text": "Bageshwari Prasad Pande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This writ petition again comes up for hearing before us pursuant to the directions given by us on 26th February, 1979(') and today three additional counter-affidavits have been filed on behaU\" of the respondents: one by Mrinmaya Choudhri, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons: the other by Bageshwari Prasad Pande, Superin-· tendent of the Patna Central Jail and the third by Pradip Kumar Ganguly, Superintendent of the Muzafferpur Central Jail.·"}}, {"text": "Pradip Kumar Ganguly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This writ petition again comes up for hearing before us pursuant to the directions given by us on 26th February, 1979(') and today three additional counter-affidavits have been filed on behaU\" of the respondents: one by Mrinmaya Choudhri, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons: the other by Bageshwari Prasad Pande, Superin-· tendent of the Patna Central Jail and the third by Pradip Kumar Ganguly, Superintendent of the Muzafferpur Central Jail.·", "canonical_name": "Pradeep Kumar Gariguly"}}, {"text": "Muzafferpur Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This writ petition again comes up for hearing before us pursuant to the directions given by us on 26th February, 1979(') and today three additional counter-affidavits have been filed on behaU\" of the respondents: one by Mrinmaya Choudhri, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons: the other by Bageshwari Prasad Pande, Superin-· tendent of the Patna Central Jail and the third by Pradip Kumar Ganguly, Superintendent of the Muzafferpur Central Jail.·"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6487, "end_char": 6492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrinmaya Choudhri has in his affidavit given particulars of the under-trial prisoners in 48 jails in the State of Bihar in addition to the particulars of: the undertrial prisoners in 17 jails already submitted on 26th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6624, "end_char": 6638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We directed the State of Bihar by our order dated 26th February, 1979 to file a revised chart showing a year-wise break-u]l of the under-trial prisoners after making a division into two broad categories viz."}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7163, "end_char": 7178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been possible 18 complete the same by 3rd March, 1979."}}, {"text": "26tl1 February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though we directed the State of Bihar by our order dated 26th February, 1979 to intimate .to the court by a proper affidavit to b•~ filed .on or before 3rd March, 1979 whether the under-trial prisoners whose particulars were given in the counter-affidavit filed on 26tl1 February, 1979 were periodically produced before the Magistrates in compliance with the proviso to section 167(2), we find that the only averment made by Bageshwari Prasad Pande in his affidavit in res- ponse to this direction is that petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8448, "end_char": 8462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. KHATOON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8760, "end_char": 8770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ •\n\n: ·-\n\nH. KHATOON V. HOME SECRETARY 535\n\nregularly produced before the courts \"as aud when required by the 'A courts\", This averment does not at all constitute compliance with the direction given by us."}}, {"text": "section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9265, "end_char": 9279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pradeep Kumar Gariguly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9597, "end_char": 9619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also .find an averment in the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar Gariguly that Petitioners Nos.", "canonical_name": "Pradeep Kumar Gariguly"}}, {"text": "Muzaffarpur Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9708, "end_char": 9732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15, 16 and 18 who were previously confined in the Muzaffarpur Central Jail prior to their release were regularly produced before the Court' \"as and when required by the courts\"."}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10194, "end_char": 10205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ranchi Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10744, "end_char": 10763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 43, 56, 69, 71, 72, 79, 85, 92, 96, 97,\n\n101, 129, 133, 136 to 142, 165 to 167, 170 to 174, 177, 191, 199, 210, and 236 in the list of under-trial prisoners in Ranchi Central Jail submitted on behalf of the respondents."}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10968, "end_char": 10979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11414, "end_char": 11425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11458, "end_char": 11477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There arc quite a large number of under-trial prisoners who are languishing in jail for long periods of time and it is nbt possible for us to examine the individual cases of these undertrial prisoners for the purpose of satisfying ourselve5 in regard to compliance with the proviso to section 167 (2)' but we would request\n\nthee High Court of Patna to pick out a few names from the lists of under:trlal prisoners which have been filed before us by the State of\n\nBihar on 26th February, 1979 and 5th March, 1979 and satisfy itself\n\nwhether these under-trial prisoners have been periodically remillded from time to time by the 1'4.agistrates as required by the pr<i\\lillo to section 167(2)."}}, {"text": "section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11802, "end_char": 11816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna\n\nHigh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11940, "end_char": 11957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct the State of Bihar to furnish oopies of these lists of under-trial prisoners to the Chief Justice of the Patna\n\nHigh Court within ten days from today."}}, {"text": "HinlJ(lrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12165, "end_char": 12176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find from the lists of under-trial prisoners filed before us on behalf of the State of Bihar that the under-trial prisoners whose names are set out in the chart filed by Mrs. HinlJ(lrani to-day have been in jail for periods longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced; if convicted."}}, {"text": "Hingorani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13144, "end_char": 13153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fail to see how the continued detention of these under-trial prisoners mentioned in the list of Mrs. Hingorani can be justified when we find that they have already been in jail for a period longer than what they would have been sentenced to suffer, if convicted."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15215, "end_char": 15225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Black", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16877, "end_char": 16882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Black, J., observed in Gideon v. Wainwright(\") :\n\n\"Not only those precedents but also reason and reflecdon require us to recognise that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.", "canonical_name": "Blackmum"}}, {"text": "S. 335", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17285, "end_char": 17291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Douglas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18638, "end_char": 18645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The philosophy of free legal service as an essential element of fair procedure is also to be found in the following passage from the judgment of Douglas, J. in Jon Richard Argersinger v.\n\nRaymond Hamlin(')\n\n\"The right to be heard would be, in many cases of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law, if charged with crime, he is incapable, generally of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad."}}, {"text": "S. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19645, "end_char": 19650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Powell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20304, "end_char": 20310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Powell and G; deon involved felonies."}}, {"text": "Article 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20941, "end_char": 20952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21878, "end_char": 21888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22891, "end_char": 22910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "direct that on the next remand dates, when the under-trial prisoners, charged with bailable offences, are produced before the Magistrates, the State Government should provide them a lawyer at its own cost for the purpose of making an application for bail, provided that no objec tion is raised to such lawyer on behalf of such under-trial prisoners and if any application for bail is made, the Magistrates should dispose of the same in accordance with the broad outlines set out by us in our judgment dated 12th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "Budhu Mahli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23284, "end_char": 23295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To take an example, Budhu Mahli, who is at item No."}}, {"text": "21st November, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23400, "end_char": 23419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I in the list of undertrial prisoners in Ranchi Central Jail has been in jail since 21st November, 1972 for offences under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act."}}, {"text": "Section 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23439, "end_char": 23450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23458, "end_char": 23475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23480, "end_char": 23490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23505, "end_char": 23513, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23561, "end_char": 23572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23580, "end_char": 23597, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23643, "end_char": 23653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23668, "end_char": 23676, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jairam Manjhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23779, "end_char": 23792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also Jairam Manjhi, Samra Manjhi, Jugal Munda and Gulam Munda at Item Nos."}}, {"text": "Samra Manjhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23794, "end_char": 23806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also Jairam Manjhi, Samra Manjhi, Jugal Munda and Gulam Munda at Item Nos."}}, {"text": "Jugal Munda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23808, "end_char": 23819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also Jairam Manjhi, Samra Manjhi, Jugal Munda and Gulam Munda at Item Nos."}}, {"text": "Gulam Munda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23824, "end_char": 23835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also Jairam Manjhi, Samra Manjhi, Jugal Munda and Gulam Munda at Item Nos."}}, {"text": "21st February, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23973, "end_char": 23992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 7 in the list of under-trial prisoners confined in Ranchi Central Jail have been in jail as under-trial prisoners from 21st February, 1974 that is, for a period of over five years for the offence under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code which is punishable with a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years."}}, {"text": "Section 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24056, "end_char": 24067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24075, "end_char": 24092, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Brennan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27552, "end_char": 27559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may remind the Government of the famous words of Mr. Justice Brennan\n\n\"Nothing rankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice."}}, {"text": "Leeman Abbot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28211, "end_char": 28223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And also recall what was said by Leeman Abbot years ago in relation to affluent America."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28893, "end_char": 28903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28947, "end_char": 28957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29027, "end_char": 29038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29322, "end_char": 29341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speedy trial is, as held by us in our earlier judgment dated 26th February, 1979, an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and it is the eoastitutional obligation of the State to device such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial to the accused."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29422, "end_char": 29432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blackmum", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30163, "end_char": 30171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also interesting to notice wliat Justice, then Judge, Blackmum said in Jackson v. Bishop('):\n\n\"Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured by dollar considera- H tions .... \"\n\n(I) 377 F. Supp.", "canonical_name": "Blackmum"}}, {"text": "Arkansas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30871, "end_char": 30879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the United States.\""}}, {"text": "Parchman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32463, "end_char": 32471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court in the last mentioned case asserted that it \"has the duty of fashioning a decree that will require defendants to eliminate the conditions and practices at Parchman here-in-above found to be violative of the United •\n\nState's constitution\" and in discharge of this duty gave var\\ons directions for improvement of the conditions of those confined in the State Penitentiary."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33569, "end_char": 33588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, direct the State: of Bihar to furnish to us within three weeks from today particulars as to the location of the courts of magistrates and courts of sessions in the State of Bihar together with the total number of cases pending in each of these courts as on 31st December, 1978 giving yearwise br<eakup of such pending cases and also explaining why it has not been possible to dispose of such of those cases as have been pending for more than six months."}}, {"text": "4th April,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34555, "end_char": 34571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition will now come up for hearing and final disposal on 4th April,\n\n1979."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Bar Association", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34610, "end_char": 34639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already issued notice to the Supreme Court Bar Association to appear and make its submissions on the issue arising in the writ petition since they are of great importance."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_545_550_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, MYSORE\n\nHER HIGHNESS VIJAYABA, DOWGER MAHARANI SAfIEB OF\n\nBHAVNAGAR PALACE, BHAVNAGAR & ORS.\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nWealth Tax Act, 1957-S. 2(m)-By a family arrangcnu•nt assessce agreed to pay certain szun to her younger son-The sum agreed to pay-If a debt owed under s. 2(m)-Whether the undertaking to pay the sum an agreement without const.leration.\n\nThi:: respondent's wealth was assessed to Wealth Tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 for three assessment years 1960·61, 1961-62 and 1962-63 the corresponding valuation dates being 31-12-1959, 31-12-1960 and 31-12-1961. On 14th May, 1953 the assessee wrote a letter to her younger son stating that his late father expressed the wish that he (the second son) should be paid Rs. 50 lakhs out of the family properties and that to keep his promise and elso to get peace of mind, if his elder brother did not pay the sum of Ro;;. 50 lakbs, she would pay such balance that remains unpaid. The elder brother\n\npaU Rs. 20 lakhs.\n\nThe balance liability of Rs. 19 lakhs remained due and continued to be due on all the three aforesaid valuation dates. It was finally\n\nwiped off in February, 1962. On the question \"whether, while assessing the net weaHh of the respondent within section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, the sum of Rs. 19 lakhs was to be deducted\" as debt owed by her, the Wealth Tax Tribunal held in favour of the respondent.\n\nThe High Court held that the sum of Rs. 19 lakhs constituted a debt owed by the assessee and was deductible under the Wealth Tax Act from the value of the total assets as on 31-12-1959.\n\n-(' ..\n\nOn appeal to this Court, the appellant argued (i) that the letter dated 14-5-1953 created no debt as the undertaking given by the respondent to her son on his elder brother's failure to pay any portion , Of the sum was an agreement without consideration and hence it was void and therefore it was not cr.fvrceable at law on any of the valuation dates and could not be deducted; (ii) that the undertaking given by the respondent in her letter dated 14-5-1953 was a contingent contract within the meaning of section 31 of the Contrac: Act. \\\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : ( 1) Taking the totality of facts it was a case of family settlement or family arrangement which was binding on the parties. The respondent a.greed to purchase peace for the family and to pay to her younger son the amount which fell •hart of R•. 50 lakh• if her elder son did not pay any portion thereof. _It is well established that such a consideration is good considerafion which brings an enforceable agreement between the parties and is not hit by •ection 25. Even if it be held that the letter dated 14-5-1953 had not the effect of bringing about the family arrangement or any binding arrange~ men bewteen the parties, their ubsequent conduct upto 12th September 1959 brought a concluded hmily arrangement. The respondent paid R•. 11 lakho and reiterated her obligation to pay the balance in the shape of ornaments.\n\nA That was net honoured by reason of which the younger son had a right tA> enforce the family arrangement againt his mother.\n\nThe respondent would. have been bound to pay the balance if a suit had been filed again.st her as he bad refrained from going to the law court against his brother on her bringing about the family arrangement. [548 C--GJ\n\n(2) Assuming that it was a contingent contract within the mOO'lling of B s. 31 of the Contract act, such a contract under section 32 of the Contract Act,. becomes enforceably by law when the future event contemplated in the continf\n\ngent contract had happened.\n\nThe contingency in this case 'vas the liability of 't the mother to pay a ceriain sum of n1oney on the failure by the elder son to pay Rs. 50 lakhs or any part thereof. In that view, the liability of the mother became enforceable by law on the latter date, if not earlier.\n\n[548 G-H, 549] c\n\nKesora1n Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Con1missioner of Wealth 1'ax (Central), Calcutta, 59 J.T.R. 767; Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay, 63 J.T.R., 470; and Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Lt. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay City-I, 93 J.T.R., 603, distinguished and held inapplicable.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil APoeal Nos. 2170-2172 of 1972\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated' 22-7-1971 of the Mysore High Court in T.R.C. Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of 1967.\n\nB. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nE s. T. Desai, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Respondenl~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These are three appeals by special leave filed by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore from the Judgment of the, Mysore\n\n(now Karnataka) High Court.\n\nThe assessee is the Dowger Malmrani of Gondal.\n\nHer husband, His Highness Bhojjrajji Maharaja Saheb of Gonda!, died intestate on 31. 7 .1952 leaving considerable moveable and immoveable properties.\n\nCertain disputes and differences arose after his death between his two ons namely Maharaja Vikramsinghji and his youner brother Shivaraj Singhji in respect of the assets left by the late Maharaja Saheb.\n\nThe younger brother was contemplating legal proceedings against his elder brother. Their mother intervened. The idea of litigation, thereupon, was dropped because the assessee gave a letter dated 14.5.1953 to Shivaraj Singhji stating therein :-\n\n\"Your father had exprelised in the presence of many people that he will give you rupees fifty lakbs.\n\nTo keep up his H words and promise and also that I should get peace of mind I am writing to you that. if your brother Vikramsinghji Maharaj a of Gondal does not give you the full amount, then you\n\n• • ''r\n\nmust get the balance of amount from me.\n\nThat is my sincere desire.\n\nI will also press Vikram that he should give you the amount of Rs. fifty lakhs.\n\nVikram Singhji paid only Rs. 20,00,000/- to Shivaraj Singhji. The latter, therefore, claimed the balance amount of Rs. 30,00,000/- from the assessee on the basis of her Jetter dated 14.5.1953.\n\nOn or about 12.9.1959, pnrsnant to her commitment made in the letter aforesaid, the assessee transferred War Stock valued at Rs. 11,00,000/- to Shivaraj Singhji and also agreed to hand over certain ornaments in full settlement of his claim.\n\nThe ornaments were however not given.\n\nThat led to disputes between the mother and the son but eventually they were also settled on 22.2.1962 which settlement was evidenced by a document setting out all the relevant facts of the history of the dispute.\n\nBy virtue of this settlement a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- was paid by the\n\nassessee to Shivaraj Singhji.\n\nThe assessee's wealth was assessed to wealth-tax under the Wealth- Tax Act, 1957 for the three assessment years in question viz. 1960-61,\n\n1961-62 and 1962-63.\n\nThe corresponding valuation dates of the 'said assessment years are 31.12.1959, 31.12.1960 and 31.12.1961.\n\nIt would be noticed that the assessee, under the arrangement arrived at between the parties, became liable to pay the balance of the amount of Rs. 30,00,000/- to Shivaraj Singhji as Vikramsinghji, out of the sum of Rs. 50,00.,000/- mentioned in the letter dated 14.5.1953, paid only Rs. 20,00,000f-.\n\nThe assessee succeeded in wiping off her liability to the extent of. Rs. 11,00,000/- on 12.9.1959 by transfer of War Stock.\n\nThe balance of the liability, i.e., Rs. 19,00,000/- remained due and continued to be due on all the three valuation dates aforesaid. It --( / could be wiped off by a further settlement only in February, 1962. In\n\n, respect of the three assessment years in question, however, a question arose as to whether while asessing the net wealth of the assessee within the meaning of clause {m) of section 2 of the Wealth-Tax Act the said sum of Rs. 19,00,000/- was to be deducted.\n\nThe Wealth-Tax Tri-\n\n. '\n\nbunal held in favour of the assessee.\n\nAt the instance of the Revenue for all the three years a common question of law was referred to the High Court for its opinion.\n\nThe questions being in identical terms it would suffice to quote the question with respect to the assessment year 1960-61.\n\nIt reads as follows :-\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the\n\nsum of Rs. 19 lakhs could constitute a debt owed by the asses- B see and deductible under the Wealth-Tax Act from the value of the total assets as on 31.12.1959 ?\"\n\nt:I A The High Court has answered the question in the affirmative, in\n\n• B\n\nfavour of the assessee and against the department.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\nMr. Ahuja appearing in support of the appeal contended that by the letter dated 14.5.1953 no debt was created as the undertaking given by the assessee to her son agreeing to pay the deficit in respect of Rs. 50,00,000/- on his elder brother's failure to pay any portion of the sum was an agreement without consideration and hence under section 25 of the Contract Act it was void and was not saved by any of the exceptions mentioned therein. He, therefore, contended that it was not an enforceable liability on any of the valuation dates and could not be deducted from the valuation of the assessee's wealth.\n\nIn our opinion the argument is not sound.\n\nTaking the totality of the facts as found by the Tribunal and mentioned in the impugned judgment of the High Court it was a case of family settlement or family arrangement which iS binding on the parties concerned.\n\nThe asse6see agreed to purchase peace for the family, and to pay to her son the amount which fell short of Rs. 50,00,000/- if her elder son did not pay any portion the:reof. It is well established that such a consideration is a good consideration which brings, about an enforceable agreement between the parties.\n\nSection 25 of the Contract Act does not hit this.\n\nIt may be further pointed out that even if it be held that the letter dated 14.5.1953 had not the effect of bringing about the family arrangement and any binding agreement between the parties, their subsequent conduct upto 12.9.1959 brought about a concluded family arrangement.\n\nVikramsinghji paid Rs. 20,00,000/-.\n\nOut of the balance of Rs. 30,00,000/- the assessee. discharged her liabilities to the • • extent of Rs. 11,00,000/- and reiterated her obligation to pay foe bala- '-,.._ nee of Rs. 19,00,000/- in the shape of ornaments.\n\nThat was not hon- T oured.\n\nShivaraj Singhji had a right to enforce the family arrangement ' against his mother, as arrived at partly in writing and partly orally as evidenced by the conduct of the parties.\n\nThe assessee would have been bound to pay Rs. 19,00,000/- if a suit had been filed against her by Sivaraj Singhji as he had refrained going to the law court from against his brother on her bringing about the family arrangement.\n\nMr. Ahuja then submitted that at best the undertaking given by the assessee in her letter dated 14.5.1953 was a contingent contract within the meaning of section 31 of the Contract Act Even so, under section.\n\nH 32 such a contract becomes enforceable by law when future even' contemplated in the contingent contract has happened. In this case the cotingency was the liability of the mother to pay a certain sum of money\n\non the failure by her elder son to pay Rs. 50,00,000/- or any part thereof.\n\nThis did happen sometime between 14.5.1953 and 12.9.1959.\n\nIn that view of the matter, if not earlier the liability of the mother became enforceable by law on the latter date.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant citod three decisions of this Court to support his argument viz.-Kesaram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax (Central) Calcutta;(') Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Bombay(') and Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.\n\nLt~ v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Bombay City-I('). None of them is quite apposite on the point at issue before us.\n\nIn the case of Kesoram Industries it was held that \"debt owed\" within the• meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealthtax Act, 1957 could be defined as the liability to pay in praesenti or In futuro an ascertainable sum of money. It was held that a liability to pay income-tax was a present liability though the tax became payable after it was quantified in accordance with ascertainable data.\n\nSubba Rao J .; as he then was, delivering the majority opinion said at page 780 :-\n\n\"The said decisions also accept the legal position that a liability depending upon a contingency is not a debt in praesenti or in futuro till the contingency happened. But if there is a debt the fact that the amount is to be a-scertained does not make it any the less a debt if the liability is certain and what remains is only the quantification of the amount.\n\nIn short, a debt owed within the meaning of section 2(~) of the Wealth-tax Act can be defined as a liability to pay in praesenti or in futuro an ascertainable sum of money.\n\nThe other two decisions of this Court were concemod with th~ question as to whether the liability of the assessee to pay gratuity to itil employees on determination of employment was a mere contingent liability which arose only when the employment of the employee was determined by death, incapacity, retirement or resignation and whether it could be deducted :IB a debt in computing the net wealth of the asscssee.\n\nThe answer given was against the assesse'e.\n\nIn the present case we have held that the liability of the assessee was created by the family arrangement arrived at between the parties and even if it was a contingent liability the contingency did bawen and the assesee became liable\n\n(1) S9 I.T.R. 767\n\n(2) 63 I.T.R. 470\n\n(3) 93 I.T.R. 603\n\nA to pay the amount as a debt before 12.9.1959, which is anterior to the relevant valuation dates.\n\nThe sum of Rs. 19,00,000/- was a subsisting debt on the said valuation dates.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal.\n\nIt is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal dismissed .", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, MYSORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HER HIGHNESS VIJAYABA, DOWGER MAHARANI SAfIEB OF\n\nBHAVNAGAR PALACE, BHAVNAGAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HER HIGHNESS VIJAYABA, DOWGER MAHARANI SAHEB OF BHAVNAGAR PALACE, BHAVNAGAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 9, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 456, "end_char": 497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31-12-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi:: respondent's wealth was assessed to Wealth Tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 for three assessment years 1960·61, 1961-62 and 1962-63 the corresponding valuation dates being 31-12-1959, 31-12-1960 and 31-12-1961."}}, {"text": "31-12-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi:: respondent's wealth was assessed to Wealth Tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 for three assessment years 1960·61, 1961-62 and 1962-63 the corresponding valuation dates being 31-12-1959, 31-12-1960 and 31-12-1961."}}, {"text": "14th May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14th May, 1953 the assessee wrote a letter to her younger son stating that his late father expressed the wish that he (the second son) should be paid Rs."}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1279, "end_char": 1291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "31-12-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 lakhs constituted a debt owed by the assessee and was deductible under the Wealth Tax Act from the value of the total assets as on 31-12-1959."}}, {"text": "14-5-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(' ..\n\nOn appeal to this Court, the appellant argued (i) that the letter dated 14-5-1953 created no debt as the undertaking given by the respondent to her son on his elder brother's failure to pay any portion , Of the sum was an agreement without consideration and hence it was void and therefore it was not cr.fvrceable at law on any of the valuation dates and could not be deducted; (ii) that the undertaking given by the respondent in her letter dated 14-5-1953 was a contingent contract within the meaning of section 31 of the Contrac: Act. \\"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2140, "end_char": 2150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th September 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if it be held that the letter dated 14-5-1953 had not the effect of bringing about the family arrangement or any binding arrange~ men bewteen the parties, their ubsequent conduct upto 12th September 1959 brought a concluded hmily arrangement."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4408, "end_char": 4425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2170-2172 of 1972\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated' 22-7-1971 of the Mysore High Court in T.R.C. Nos."}}, {"text": "B. B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "E s. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E s. T. Desai, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Respondenl~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These are three appeals by special leave filed by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore from the Judgment of the, Mysore\n\n(now Karnataka) High Court."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E s. T. Desai, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Respondenl~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These are three appeals by special leave filed by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore from the Judgment of the, Mysore\n\n(now Karnataka) High Court."}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E s. T. Desai, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Respondenl~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These are three appeals by special leave filed by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore from the Judgment of the, Mysore\n\n(now Karnataka) High Court."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E s. T. Desai, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Respondenl~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These are three appeals by special leave filed by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore from the Judgment of the, Mysore\n\n(now Karnataka) High Court."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Vikramsinghji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain disputes and differences arose after his death between his two ons namely Maharaja Vikramsinghji and his youner brother Shivaraj Singhji in respect of the assets left by the late Maharaja Saheb."}}, {"text": "Shivaraj Singhji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain disputes and differences arose after his death between his two ons namely Maharaja Vikramsinghji and his youner brother Shivaraj Singhji in respect of the assets left by the late Maharaja Saheb.", "canonical_name": "Shivaraj Singhji"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain disputes and differences arose after his death between his two ons namely Maharaja Vikramsinghji and his youner brother Shivaraj Singhji in respect of the assets left by the late Maharaja Saheb."}}, {"text": "14.5.1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The idea of litigation, thereupon, was dropped because the assessee gave a letter dated 14.5.1953 to Shivaraj Singhji stating therein :-\n\n\"Your father had exprelised in the presence of many people that he will give you rupees fifty lakbs."}}, {"text": "Vikramsinghji Maharaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if your brother Vikramsinghji Maharaj a of Gondal does not give you the full amount, then you\n\n• • ''r\n\nmust get the balance of amount from me.", "canonical_name": "Vikramsinghji Maharaj"}}, {"text": "Gondal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5689, "end_char": 5695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if your brother Vikramsinghji Maharaj a of Gondal does not give you the full amount, then you\n\n• • ''r\n\nmust get the balance of amount from me."}}, {"text": "Vikram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will also press Vikram that he should give you the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Vikram Singhji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5900, "end_char": 5914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Singhji paid only Rs.", "canonical_name": "Vikramsinghji Maharaj"}}, {"text": "12.9.1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On or about 12.9.1959, pnrsnant to her commitment made in the letter aforesaid, the assessee transferred War Stock valued at Rs."}}, {"text": "22.2.1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6468, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That led to disputes between the mother and the son but eventually they were also settled on 22.2.1962 which settlement was evidenced by a document setting out all the relevant facts of the history of the dispute."}}, {"text": "Wealth- Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7775, "end_char": 7784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7792, "end_char": 7806, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wealth-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8354, "end_char": 8368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ahuja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ahuja appearing in support of the appeal contended that by the letter dated 14.5.1953 no debt was created as the undertaking given by the assessee to her son agreeing to pay the deficit in respect of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9755, "end_char": 9765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vikramsinghji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10086, "end_char": 10099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikramsinghji paid Rs.", "canonical_name": "Vikramsinghji Maharaj"}}, {"text": "Sivaraj Singhji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10650, "end_char": 10665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19,00,000/- if a suit had been filed against her by Sivaraj Singhji as he had refrained going to the law court from against his brother on her bringing about the family arrangement.", "canonical_name": "Shivaraj Singhji"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10935, "end_char": 10945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11718, "end_char": 11753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellant citod three decisions of this Court to support his argument viz.-Kesaram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax (Central) Calcutta;(') Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Bombay(') and Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.\n\nLt~ v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Bombay City-I(')."}}, {"text": "Kesoram Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11888, "end_char": 11906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Kesoram Industries it was held that \"debt owed\" within the• meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealthtax Act, 1957 could be defined as the liability to pay in praesenti or In futuro an ascertainable sum of money."}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11959, "end_char": 11971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealthtax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11979, "end_char": 11998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(~)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12753, "end_char": 12765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealthtax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealthtax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Wealth-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12773, "end_char": 12787, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13585, "end_char": 13587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_551_554_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "BAL KISHAN TIIAPER\n\nl'v!UNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n[S. l\\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KAUSHAL, JJ.]\n\nPrevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954)-S. 2(ix)(a) and (g) Scope of-Outer label described the: contents as \"as slveet as saccharin\"-TV!icther a case of misbranding.\n\nThe appellant was a manufacturer of a preparation called Para Excellent and Para Asli.\n\nThe outer 1abel of the package Jesribed the contents as \"as\n\nsweet as sacc11arin\".\n\nUnder the directions for use it was mentioned on the C lahel that the preparation was para saccharin.\n\nThe appellant was prosecuted under s. 2(ix) (a) and (g) of the Prevention of Fon.-1 l\\(1ulteration Act for misbranding the !JOOd:' and for selling it as saccharin.\n\nWhile the trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment anll a fine on the ground that though a case of misbranding under -;. 2(ix) (a.} and (g) had not been made out, it was 2. case of misbranding contemplated by s. 2(ix) (k), the High Court, in revision, enhanced the sentence and fine under ss_ 7 ::ind 16 read \\1.'ith s. 2(ix){a) and {g) of the Act.\n\nOn behn-lf of the prosecution it was contended in the appellant's appeal to this Court thtlt the use of the word saccharin gave the impression that the\n\nprepnration v.:as saccharin or something akin to it and it was, therefore, a case of mi'lbranding punishable under the Act.\n\nAllowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : 1. There is nothing on the facts of the case to show that the appe11ant in any way tried to give an impression to the Purchasers that either saccharin or ome preparation of the type of saccharin was being so1d so as to amount to misbranding as contemplated by s. 2(iv) (a) and (g) of the Act.\n\nF Nor was there an attempt to sell the preparation as saccharin or some kind of saccharin. When the Jab el described that the preparation was as sweet as saccharin it merely laid emphasis on the sweetness of the preparation when compared. to the S'\\J.'eetness of the saccharin. Similarly when the label described -the preparation was not as bitter as saccharin it was intended to convey that it was neither something like saccharin nor saccharin itself in any form or of any type. [553 C-D] G\n\n2. Nor again was there any evidence of intention on the part of the appellant to sell a preparation which resembles saccharin in any respect. The words \"as sweet as saccarin\" were merely meant to convey one of the qualitie!: of the preparation itself and not the quality of saccharin. That by itself would not attract the provisions of s. 2(ix)(a) of the Act. [554 BJ\n\n3. The use of the word para saccharin appears to be a mistake. In the Hindi portion of the directions contained in the label the words \"para Saccharin\" \"Were not used.\n\nSecondly the word ''para saccharin\" would not indicate that\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe preparation sold was saccharin in any form or of any kind. It was jut a way of describing the contents because the preparation was \"as s'.feet u saccharin.' The manufacturer wanted to convey that the preparation 'iWls alsG much sweeter than sugar and could be Uled for preparing soda water. [554 C-D)\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 105 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 6-8-1974 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 58 of 1973.\n\nFrank Anthony, K. C. Dua and 0. P. Soni for the Appellants.\n\nC Soli. !. Sorabjee, Additiooal Soli. General, B. P. Maheshwari and\n\nSuresh Sethi for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Delhi High Court convicting the appellant under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, read with Section 2(ix) clause (a) & (g) of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisomnent of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. This order was passed by the High Court in a revision filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi against the Order of the Trial Court which convicted the appellant under section 7 /15 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act read with Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act and sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 500/-, a revision against this order to the Sessions Jndge was unsuccessful and hence a further revision was taken by the Delhi Administration before the High Court.\n\nThe facts of the case are detailed in the Judgment of the High Court and the Magistrate and we need not repeat the same all over again.\n\nThe food Inspectors, namely, one Mr. James and Mr. Sinha took samples of a preparation called Para Excellant and Para As!i from the shop of the appellant who according to the Food Inspectors sold these preparations as saccharin, a fact which is not admitted by the appellant.\n\nThe Trial Court after considering the evidence and the report of the Chemical Examiner fonnd that the case of mis-branding under section 2(ix) (a) & (g) was not made out by the Prosecution, but it was certainly mis-branding as contemplated by section 2(ix) (k) of the Act. He, accordingly convicted the appellant as indicated above.\n\nMr. Frank Anthony, Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the High Court was wrong in law in interfering with the Order of the Magistrate, firstly, because the findings of fact by the\n\n., )\n\n• .:\n\nB. K. THAPER v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (Fazal Ali, J.) 5 53\n\nMagrntrate was binding on the High Court in revision and secondly, because the High Court took a legally erroneous view of tbe law on the interpretation of Section 2(ix) (a) & (g) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. , We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the judgment of the High Court and we are of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. We have perused the original label which described the preparation sold to the food inspectors. There is nothing to show that the appellant in any way tried to give an impression to the purchaser that either saccharin or some preparation of the type of saccharin was being sold so as to amount to misbranding as contemplated by Section 2(ix) (a) & (g) of the Act.\n\nAll that the appellant purported to convey under the label was that the preparation sold was as sweet as saccharin but not as bitter as saccharin.\n\nThis was intended merely to lay emphasis on the sweetness of the preparation when it was compared to the sweetness of saccharin. When the label clearly described the fact that the preparation was not as bitter as saccharin it clearly intended to convey that it was neither something like saccharin nor saccharin itself, in any form or of any type.\n\nMr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondent submitted that the use of the word saccharin itself amounts to mis-branding and gives the impression that the preparation sold was saccharin or something akin to saccharin.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this contention. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and the contents of the label and the description of the preparation, we are satisfied that there was no misbtanding, nor was there any attempt on the part of the appellant to sell his preparation as saccharin or some sort of saccharin.\n\nSection 2(ix) (a) runs as follows :\n\n\"Misbranded\"-an article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded-\n\n( a) \"If it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, or\n\nre, embles in a manner likely to deceive, another article of food under the name of which it is sold, and is not plainly and conspicuously labelled so as to indicate its true character.\"\n\nAccording to the Additional Solicitor General of India, the sale, by the appellant, of the preparation clearly falls within (iii) clause ff of sub-section (a), that is to say-the preparation resembles saccharin so as to deceive a person who wanted to purchase the article of food\n\n554 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nknown as saccharin. After having examined the label, its description and the contents of the tin and packets, sold to the food inspectors, we are unable to find any evidence of any intention on the part of the appellant to sell a preparation which resembles saccharin in any respect.\n\nThe words, as sweet as saccharin were merely meant to convey one of the qualities of the preparation itself and not the quality of saccharin at all.\n\nThat, by itself, would not attract the provision of Section 2(ix) (a) of the Act. It was, then submitted that in 0ne of the labels under the directions it was mentioned that the preparation was para saccharin which also shows that the appellant intended to pass on the preparation as some sort of saccharin. In the first place, the use of the word para saccharin appears to be a mistake in the facts of the present case because this word is completely absent from the Hindi portion of the directions contained in the same label. Secondly, the word para saccharin would not indicate that the preparation sold was saccharin in any form or of any kind.\n\nIt was just a way of describing it because according to the manufacturers the preparation was as sweet as saccharin.\n\nThis was mentioned because saccharin being 500 times sweeter than sugar, the manufacturer wanted to convey that the preparation was also much sweeter than sugar and could be used for preparing soda water bottles.\n\nIt is obvious that if any person who purchased the preparation was not conversent with the English language, he would not be misled at all.\n\nHaving regard to these circumstances we are of the opinion that the case of the appellant does not fall within the clauses (a) & (g) of Section 2(ix) of the Act and the High Court erred in law in convicting the appellant for misbranding under these provisions.\n\nFor the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed.\n\nThe order of the High Court is set aside and the sentence of imprisonemnt of six months is also set aside and the fine is reduced to Rs. 500/-. In other words, the order of the Trial Court Magistrate is hereby restored.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nA ppea/ ollowed.\n\nI,.\n\n{ 7", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "BAL KISHAN TIIAPER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAL KISHAN TIIAPER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BAL KISHAN TIIAPER\n\nl'v!UNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI\n\nMarch 9, 1979\n\n[S. l\\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KAUSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. l\\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 2(ix)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 976, "end_char": 984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1084, "end_char": 1092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevelllion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 2(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1684, "end_char": 1692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(ix)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2548, "end_char": 2559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, K. C. Dua and 0.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "K. C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3369, "end_char": 3378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, K. C. Dua and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Soni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3383, "end_char": 3393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, K. C. Dua and 0."}}, {"text": "C Soli. !. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3415, "end_char": 3434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Soli. !."}}, {"text": "Additiooal Soli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3436, "end_char": 3451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabjee, Additiooal Soli."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, B. P. Maheshwari and\n\nSuresh Sethi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3484, "end_char": 3496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, B. P. Maheshwari and\n\nSuresh Sethi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3563, "end_char": 3571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Delhi High Court convicting the appellant under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, read with Section 2(ix) clause (a) & (g) of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisomnent of six months and a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3693, "end_char": 3702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was passed by the High Court in a revision filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi against the Order of the Trial Court which convicted the appellant under section 7 /15 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act read with Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act and sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4053, "end_char": 4062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4120, "end_char": 4133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500/-, a revision against this order to the Sessions Jndge was unsuccessful and hence a further revision was taken by the Delhi Administration before the High Court."}}, {"text": "James", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The food Inspectors, namely, one Mr. James and Mr. Sinha took samples of a preparation called Para Excellant and Para As!i from the shop of the appellant who according to the Food Inspectors sold these preparations as saccharin, a fact which is not admitted by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4585, "end_char": 4590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The food Inspectors, namely, one Mr. James and Mr. Sinha took samples of a preparation called Para Excellant and Para As!i from the shop of the appellant who according to the Food Inspectors sold these preparations as saccharin, a fact which is not admitted by the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4940, "end_char": 4953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5054, "end_char": 5067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5149, "end_char": 5162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Frank Anthony, Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the High Court was wrong in law in interfering with the Order of the Magistrate, firstly, because the findings of fact by the\n\n., )", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5572, "end_char": 5585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6193, "end_char": 6206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondent submitted that the use of the word saccharin itself amounts to mis-branding and gives the impression that the preparation sold was saccharin or something akin to saccharin."}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7277, "end_char": 7290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the Additional Solicitor General of India, the sale, by the appellant, of the preparation clearly falls within (iii) clause ff of sub-section (a), that is to say-the preparation resembles saccharin so as to deceive a person who wanted to purchase the article of food\n\n554 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8440, "end_char": 8453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10084, "end_char": 10090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nA ppea/ ollowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_555_567_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "UNION OF INDIA v.\n\nJARDINE HENDERSON Al'<D ORS.\n\n(AND VICE VERSA)\n\nMarch 16,' 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nBengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, Sections 7 to 10 rea4 with Rule 46{2) under the Act, Scope of-Locus standi of the Purchaser of the\n\npropc1ty of certificate debtor to prefer a claim objecting to the sale of property under the Act.\n\nTaxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964, Section 3(l)(a) & (b) read with sub.section (4) section 35 of the Income Tax Act, 1962-When a fresh notice of demand is necessary, explainied.\n\nIn Income Tax Officer, Kolar Circle and Anr. v. Seghu Buchiah Setty. 52 I.T.R. 538, this Court held that the recovery proceedings initiated against the assessee-respondent' on the basis of the original demand notice were bad as it was of tbc view that the amount of tax assessed when reduced as a result of the appellate orders a fresh demand notice had to be served on the respondent before he could be treated as a defaulter. To get over the difficulties in the collection of income tax and other direct taxes created by the decision in\n\nSeghu Chctty's case, the Taxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964 was passed with retrospective effect by an express provision in. section 5. ,\n\nThe property belonging to two brothers, the certificate debtors in . C.A. 1575(NT) 71 and C.A. 1965 (NT) of 1963 respectively were purchased by M/s Jerdine Henderson (Ltd.) on September 20, 1954, i.e. after service of notices under section 7 of $e Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913.\n\nThe objections raised by the certificate debtors were rejected and the property came to be sold. In both cases the Company received a notice on August 6, 1956 fixing a date for settling the terms of the sale proclamation in respect of the respective one half share of each of the two Certificate-debtors. Imme .. diately thereafter the respondent-company made an application in each of the two cases that it had purchased the property being unaware of the pendency of any Ceritficate case against any of its vendors for realization of incometmc dues and that the Company was the owner of the property and it was not liable to be sold as that of the Certificate-dei>tor. The Certificate Officer\n\nrejected the objection holding that the purchase having been' made after service of notice under section 7 of the Bengal Act on the Certificate-debtor, was void as against any claim enforceable in execution of the Certificate and hence the Company had no right to object to the sale. The Company went up in appeal before the Commissioner and succeeded in both the cases. Two revisions were filed before the Board of Revenue which were allowed. The respondent-company then moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 1575 was allowed .\n\nThe other petition giving rise to C.A. 1965 of 1971 was dismissed by the oame Bench.\n\nA Two questions, namely (a) the locus standi of the purchaser-Company to prefer a claim objecting to the sale of the property and\n\n(b) the effect o! section 3(1 )(a) and (b) of the Validation Act, 1964 read with Section :l5(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 arose for decision in these &ppeals.\n\nAllowing C.A. 1575/71 and dismissing C.A. 1965/71 (both by certificates) the Court. ( B\n\nHELD : I. The Company as a purchaser of the properly of the certificate debtors had locus standi to prefer the claim. The company preferred a claim objecting to the sale of property on the ground that it was not liable to be sold as it had purchased the property from the two certificate debtors. In the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, there is no express provision enabling a person other than the Certificate debtor claiming an interest in the property to he sold to file any objection. He, of course, under section 22 can take recourse to the said provision by filing an application to set aside the sale of immovable property on deposit of the amounts provided therein.\n\nBut the rules in Schedule II under secion 38 have the effect as if enacted in the body of the Act. In Schedule II is to be found rule 39 which is very much like rule 58 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [561 F--G]\n\n(a) It was open to it to show under rule 40 that at the date of the service D of notice under section 7 it had some interest in the property in dispute.\n\nIf the notice served at the beginning of the two Certificate cases under section 7 on the two Certificate-debtors was not a valid notice in the sense that in one case on the reduction of the amount of the Certificate it became necessary to give a fresh notice and in the other without a fresh demand notice under the Income-tax Act for the enhBnced amount, the Certificate case could not proceed, then the Company had validly E purchased the property and its purchase was not void. The property purchased by it could not then be sold for realization of the income-tax dues against the two brothers. If, however, no fresh notice was necessary to be served in either of the two cases then it is plain that the Company's purchase was void es against the claim enforceable in execution of the Certificate. [561 H, 562 A-\n\n(b) It is clear from sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Bengal Public Demands\n\nRecovery Act, 1913, that if the Certificate is modified or varied by the certi ficate officer under Section 10, while disposing of the petition of objection filed by the Certificate-debtor under section 9, then the Certificate case proceeds further without a fresh notice under section 7. [561 D-E]\n\nIn the instant case, the amount was not reduced on the objection of the Certificate-debtor but it wa5 reduced on receipt of the information front the Income Tax Officer. [561 EJ\n\n2. The transfer was void against the Certificate claims in both cases under section S(a) of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. In both the clV!les notices under section 7 of the Bengal Act bad been served upon the Certificate debtor before the property in question was tmnsferred by them to the company. In neither of the two cases did the certificate proceeding became invalid, in one case by reduction of the demand and in the other by an enhancoment, since clause (c) of section 3(1) of the Validation Act clearly and expreasly provides that no proceedings in relation to Government dues\n\nUNION v. J. HENDERSON 557\n\n'fihall be invalid merely because no fresh notice was served upon the assessee, A Jtfter the dues were enhanced or reduced in any appeal or proceeding. [566 E--F]\n\nR.m Swarup Gupta v. Behari Lal Ba/Jeo Prasad and Ors., 95 I.T.R. 339;\n\nDitinguished.\n\n3. (a) On a plain reading of clause (a) of section 3 of the Validation\n\n~.\\ct, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature is not to allow the nullifica~ !ion of the proceedings which were initiated for recovery of the original demand.\n\nOn the basis of another notice of demand for the enhanced amount two .courses are open to the department (i) to initiate another proceedings for the\n\nrecovery of the amount by which the dues arei enhanced treating it 86 a separate demand or (2) to cancel the first proceedings and start a fresh one\n\nfor the recovery of the entire amount including the enhanced one.\n\nIn the latter case, the first proceedings started for the recovery of the original amount will lose it! force and the fresh proceedings will have to proceed de nova.\n\nBut in th(~ former, the proceedings are not affected at all. [564 E-G] c\n\n3. (b) The argument that the effect of sub-section ( 4 of section 35 of the Income Tax Act has not been done away with by clause (a) of section 3 .of the Validation Act, 1964 is not correct. Firstly on a correct interpretation of sub-section ( 4) of section 35 it would be noticed thaot though the expression used i! \"the &um payable\" but in the context it would mean only the \"extra D .enhanced sum payable\" and not the whole of the enhanced amount. The expression \"sum payable\" had to be used in 5ub section ( 4) because that i; ub section was also providing for a contingency where by the rectification order the 001ount of refund was reduced.\n\nIn such a case the expression \"the\n\num payable\" would obviously mean the difference between the amount refunded\n\nand the reduced amount which was liable to be refunded.\n\nSecondly, even -if it were to be held that in the case of enhancement the expression \"the sum E payable\" in sub section ( 4) means the whole of the enhanced amount by a rule of harmonious construction it has got to be held that in view of section 3(1)(a) of the Validation Act even in the case of a rectification a notice of demand i~ to be served now only in respect of the amount by which the Government dues are enhanced.\n\n[565 B-E]\n\n4. Sub clause (i) of clause (b) of sub section (I) of section 3 of the F Validation Act clearly provides that it is not necessary for the Taxing Authority to serve upon the assessee a fresh notice of demand.\n\nThe only thing which he is required to do that he has to give intimation of the fact of such deduction to the assessee and to the Tax Recovery Officer.\n\nThe purpose . of giving intimation to the assessee is to bring it to his pointed knowledge that the demand ag&inst him has been reduced, although by other methods also mch as by service of a copy of the Appellate Order or the revisional order G being served on him hei may be made a.ware of that. The intimation to the Tax Recovery Officer is essential as without that intimation from tbe Taxing Authority he cannot reduce the amount of. the Certificate debt in the proceedings already commenced. [565 E-H]\n\n(a) The view of the High Court that the provunon contained in subclause (ii) of clame (b) of oection 3 (I) of the Validation Act i• mandatory and in abnce of a formal intiD1!.tion to the asse!!ee and to the Tax Recovery Officer as required by the seid provision the proceedings initially started could\n\n110! be continued under •ubclauoe (iii),;, Rot 1u•tainab!e in law. [565 H, 566 A]\n\n(b) On the facts of the case in C.A. 1575(NT)/71, the requirement of sub-clause (ii) stood fulfilled and nothing further had to be done in thematter by the Taxing Authority.\n\nThat being so the proceedings initiated on the basis of the notice of demand served upon the nssessee before the reduction of the amount in appeal could be continued in relation to the amount so reduced from the stage at which such proceedings stocxl immediately bfore such disposal a\" provided for in sub-clause (iii). [566 C-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil <\\ppeal Nos. 1575 and 1965 of 1971.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 12-1-1968 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. 2523 and 2527 of 1960.\n\nC V. S. Desai, S. P. Nayar aud Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, J. Ramamurthi and D. N. Gupta for the Respondents and Vice-Versa.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-These two appeals one by the Union of India and the other by M/s Jardine Henderson Ltd. are by certificate grnnted by the Calcutta High Court. Since the facts in both the cases are very much similar involving the interprptation of the various clauses of section 3(1) of The Taxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964, hereinafter referred to as: the Validation Act, the two appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.\n\nThere were two brothers named Basanta Kumar Daw, respondent no. 2 in CiviJ Appeal No. 1575 of 1971 and Haridhan Daw, respondent no. 2 in Civil Appeal No. 1965 of 1971. The facts of Civil Appeal No. 1575 of 1971 are these : For realization of arrears of income-tax dues the Certificate Officer of 24 Parganas forwarded to the Collector a Certificate in accordance with Section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 specifying the amount of arrears due from respondent no. 2. Thereupon a Certi11cate case was started against him (Basanta Kumar Daw) nnder the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, hereinafter called the Bengal Act, by the Certificate Officer acting as a Collector.\n\nNotice nnder section 7 was served on the Certificate-debtor oo 31-10-1949. Basanta Kumar Daw entered appearance and filed an objection under section 9 of the Bengal Act. This objection was rejected by the Certificate Officer by his Order dated March 8, 1951. On April 2, 1951 the Certificate-debtor made an application for review of the said order dated 8-3-1951 stating therein, inter alia that the appeal preferred by him before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had been alfowed in part and some payments also had\n\n' . (\n\nI I\n\nbeen made since then; the Certificate case, the.refore, could not proceed for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 36,874.10 annas, the original amount mentioned in the Certificate.\n\nThe Certificate Officer declined to review his previous order and rejected the review petition.\n\nBut he made certain enquiries from the Income-tax Officer whether the amount of the Certificate had to be reduced.\n\nThe Incometax Officer informed him that the Tribunal had reduced the demand on appeal on 13-9-1950 and after adjustment of the previous payments made by the Certificate-debtor the revised demand stood at Rs. 19,001.3 annas only. Thereupon the Certificate Officer amended the Certificate on the basis of the information received from the Income-tax Officer and reduced the demand.\n\nOn July 18, 1956 he directed the issue of sale notice under Rule 46(2) framed under the Bengal Act in respect of the half share of Basanta Kumar Daw (the other half belonging to his brother Haridhan Daw) in premises nos. 201 to 205/1, Old China Bazar .Street,, Calcutta.\n\nNow a few facts of the other appeal being Civil Appeal No. 1965 . of 1971 may be stated. The Income-tax Officer &ent a requisition to the Certificate Officer of 24 Parganas for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 59,541.15 annas against Haridhan Daw, respondent no. 2 in this appeal . A Certificate case was started.\n\nA notice under section 7 of the Bengal Act was served on the Certificate-debtor on January 30,\n\n1951. He also filed a petition of objection under section 9. But the Certificate Officer by his order dated January 13, 1954 rejected the objection filed by the Certificate-debtor under the Bengal Act.\n\nA review application was also rejected in this case on January 27, 1954.\n\nOn March 2, 1954, the Income-tax Officer informed the Certificaie Officer that the original demand of Rs. 59,541.15 annas had been enhanced to Rs. 59,604.7 annas under section 35 of the Income-tax Act and requested him to realize the enhanced amount.\n\nThe order under section 35 was passed on March 2, 1953.\n\nThe Certificate Officer thereupon informed the Income-tax Officer that the Bengal Act did not provide for enhancing the demand of the existing Certificate and asked him to file a separate Certificate for the additional amount.\n\nHe how~ ever, continued the Certificate proceedings for the recovery of the original amount.\n\nM/s. Jardine Henderson Ltd., respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1575 of 1971 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1965 of 1971 purchased the whole of the premises in question on .September 20, 1954 for a total sum of Rs. 3,00,100/- purchasing one half of the undivided share from each of the two brothers. l 6-253SCI/79\n\nIn both the cases the Company received a notice on August 6, 1956 fixing a date for settling the terms of the sale proclamations in res-- pect of the respective one half share of each of, the two Certificate-debtors.\n\nImmediately thereafter the respondent-company made an application in each of the two cases that it had purchased the property being unaware of the pendency of any Certificate case against any of its vendors for realization of income-ta)( dues and that the Company was the owner of the property and it was not liable to be sold as that of the Certificate-debtor.\n\nThe Certificate Officer rejected the objection holding that the purchase having been made after service of notice under section 7 of the Bengal Act on the Certificate-debtor, was void as against any claim enforceable in eJCecution of the Certificate and hence 1he Company had no right to object to the sale.\n\nThe Company went up in appeal before the Commissioner and succeetled in both the cases.\n\nTwo revisions were filed before the Board of Revenue which were allowed.\n\nThe respondent-company then moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 1575 was allowed and hence the Union of India has come up in appeal.\n\nThe other petition giving riSe to Civil Appeal No. 1965 of 1971 was dismissed by the same Bench and the Company has, therefore, come up in appeal.\n\nThe Validation Act was not there when the orders were passed either by the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue.\n\nBut in the High Court as also here the main controversy between the' parties was the effect of the Validation Act on the two Certificate proceedings.\n\nMr. V. S. Desai, appearing for the Union of India, in the first in stance submitted that the order reducing the amount of the Certificate in Civil Appeal No. 1575 was an order under section 10 of the Bengal\n\nAct. Hence the notice served under section 7 on the Certificate-debtor continued to have its effect in spite of the reduction of the amount and no fresh notice under section 7 was necessary to be served. In agreement with the High Court we have no difficulty in rejecting this argument.\n\nWe may first read some of the relevant provisions of the Bengal Act.\n\nSection 7 reads as follows :-\n\n\"When a certificate has been filed in the office of a Certificate-officer under section 4 or section 6, he shall cause to be served upon the certificate-debtor, in the prescribed manner, a notice in the prescribed form and a copy of the certificate.\"\n\n• I )\n\n'>'\n\n' •\n\n' .\n\n( ..\n\n\"\"..\n\nThe effect of service of notice of certificate is provided in section 8 which provides :-\n\n\"From and after the service of notice of any certificate under section 7 upon a certificate-debtor-\n\n( a) any private transfer or delivery of any of his immovable property situated in the district in which the certificate is filed, or of any interest in any such property, shall be void against any claim enforceable in execution of the certificate.\"\n\nUnder Section 9 the Certificate-debtor may file a petition of objection denying his liability in whole or in part.\n\nUnder section 10 it is provided :-\n\n\"The Certificate-officer in whose office the original certificate is filed 'shall hear the petition, take evidence (if necessary), and determine whether the certificate-debtor is liable\n\nfor the whole or any part of the amount for which the certi- D ficate was signed; and may set aside, modify or vary the certificate accordingly : \"\n\nOn reading the provisions aforesaid it is clear that if the Certificate is modified or varied by the Certificate Officer under section 10 while disposing of the petition of objection filed by the certificate-debtor under section 9, then the Certificate case proceeds further without a fresh notice under section 7. But in the instant case the amount was not reduced on the objection of the Certificate-debtor but it was reduced on receipt of the information from the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIn the Bengal Act itself there rs no expre5s provision enabling a person other than the Certificate-debtor claiming an interest in the property to be sold to file any objection.\n\nHe, of, course, under section 22 can take recourse to the said provision by filing an application to set aside the sale of i=ovable property on deposit of the amounts provided therein.\n\nBut the rules in Schedule II under section 38 have the effect as if enacted in the, body of the Act.\n\nIn Schedule II is to be found ru'le 39 which is very much like rule 58 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\nThe Company preferred a claim objecting to the safo of property on the ground that it was not liable to sale as it had purchased the property from the two Certificate-debtors. Tt was, therefore, not quite accurate to say that the Company had no locus stdndi to prefer the claim. It was open to it to show under rule 40\n\nthat at the date of the service of notice under section 7 it had some interest in the property in dispute.\n\nIf the notice served at the beginning\n\nA of the two Certificate cases under section 7 on the two Certificatedebtors was not a valid notice in the sense that in one case on the reduction of the amount of the Certificate it became necessary to give a fresh notice and in the other without a fresh demand notice under the Income-tax Act for the enhanced amount, the Certificate case could\n\nnot proceed, then the Company had validly purchased the property and its purchase was not void.\n\nThe property purchased by it could not then be sold for realization of the income-tax dues against the two brothers.\n\nIf,, hower, no fresh notice was necessary to be served in either of the two cases then it is plain that the Company's purchase was void as against the claim enforceable in execution of the Certificate.\n\nThe answer in both the cases has got to be given with reference to the Validation Act and no other point of any consequence was argued or could be pressed with any success in either of the two appeals.\n\nIn Income-tax Officer, Kolar Circle, and another v. Seghu Buchiah Setty(!) best Judgment assessments had been made for the assessment\n\nyrs 1953-54 and 1954-55.\n\nA notice of demand for each of the two yoars was served upon the assessee under section 29 of the Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe asses'see preferred appeals.\n\nIn the meantime for non-payment tax he was treated as a defaulter and a Certificate was for-· warded to the Collector under section 46(2).\n\nThereafter the tro' payable by the assessee was substantially reduced in appeal.\n\nThe In- come-tax Officer infonned the assessee of the reduced tax liability and called upon him to pay the reduced amouut No fresh notice of de-- mand was issued under section 29.\n\nPending further appeals to the Appellate Tribunal the assessee wanted the Certificate proceedings to be stayed and on his request being rejected he moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that the\n\ndepartment was not entitled to treat the respondent as a defaulter in the absence of a fresh notice of demand and quashed the recovery proceedings.\n\nOn appeal to this Court the majority view expressed was that the amount of tax asses'sed being reduced as a result of the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, a fresh demand notice hail to be served on the respondent before he could be treated as a defaulter.\n\nThe recovery proceedings initiated against him on the basis of the orig; inal demand notice were therefore rightly quashed by the High Coun.\n\nThe Statement of Objects and Reasons which led to the introduc:- tion and passing of the Validation Act would show that it was to get over the difficulties in the collection of income-tax and other direct taxts\n\ncreated by the Supreme Court decision in Seghu Buchiah Setty's cae'e\n\n(I) 52 LT.R. 511 -\n\n. \"'\n\nUNION v. J. HENDERSON (Untwalia, !.) 563 '\n\n(supra) that the Validation Act was passed with retrospective effect. The interpretation of this Act falls for our consideration for the first time in this Court.\n\nThis is an Act \"to provide for the continuation and validation of proceedings in relation to Government dues and for matters connected therewith.\" In the Schedule appended to the Act are enumerated various tax statutes including the Income-tax Act. \"Taxing Authority\" has been defined in clause ( d) of section 2 and clause ( e) defines \"Tax Recovery Officer\" to mean an officer to whom a certificate for the recovery of arrears of Government dues may be issued under this Act.\n\nSection 3 without the proviso may be read as a whole :-\n\n\"Continuation and validation of certain proceedings.-\n\n( 1) Where any notice of demand in respect of any Government dues is served upon an assessee by a Taxing Authority under any scheduled Act, and any appeal or other proceeding is filed or taken in respect such Government dues, then,-\n\n( a) where such Government dues are enhanced in such appeal or proceeding, the Taxing Authority shall serve upon the assessee another notice of demand only in respect of the amount by which such Government dues are enhanced and a!ny proceedings in relation to such Government dues a:s are covered by the notice or notices' of demand served upon him before the disposal of such appeal or proceeding may, without the service of any fresh notice of demand, be continued from the 5tage at which such proceedings stood immediately before such disposal;\n\n(b) where inch Government dues are reduced in such appeal or proceeding-\n\n( i) it shall not be necessary for the Taxing Authority to serve upon the assessee a fresh notice of demand;\n\n(ii) the Taxting Authority shall give intimation of the act of such reduction to the assessee, and where\n\na certificate has been issued to the Tax Recovery H Officer for the recovery of such amount, also to that officer;\n\n(iii) any proceedings initiated on the basis of the notice or notices of demand served upon the assessee before the disposal of such appeal or proceeding may be continued in relation to the amount so reduced from the stage at which such proceedings stood immediately be'fore such disposal;\n\n(c) no proceedings in relation to such Government dues (including the imposition of penalty or charging of interest) shall be invalid by reason ofu.y that no fresh notice of demand was served upon the assessee after the disposal of such appeal or proceeding or that such Government dues have been enhanced or reduced in such appeal or proceeding : \"\n\n• Th~ Act was made retrospective by an express provision in section 5.\n\nClause (a) deals with the case of an enhancement of Government dues and provides that the proceedings initiated may be continued from the stage al which such proceedings stood immediately before the dis·\n\nposal of the appeal or proceedings in which the enhancement was made.\n\nAnother notice of demand is required to be served in respect of thf' amount by which the dues are enhanced.\n\nOn a plain reading of clausf'\n\n(a) of section 3 it is clear that the intention of the legislature i's nolt to allow the nullification of the proceedings which were initiated for recovery of the original demand.\n\nOn the basis of another notice o:f demand for the enhanced amount, two courses are open to the department-(!) to initiate another proceeding for the recovery of the amount by which the dues are enhanced treating it as a separate demand or\n\n(2) to cancel !lie first proceedings and start a: fresh one for the recovery of the entire amount including the enhanced one.\n\nIn the latter cas1: the first proceedings started for the recovery of the original amount will lose its force and the fresh proceeding will have to proceed de novo But in the former the first proceedings are not affected at all.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 1965 of 1971 this is exactly the view taken by the High Court and in our opinion rightly.\n\nMr. S. T. Desai appearing for the Company submitted that where the amount was enhanced in appeal or revision there was no express provision in the Income-tax Act for service of a fresh or another notice H of demand for the additional amount.\n\nBut if the amount was enhanced under the power of rectification under section 35 then sub-section\n\n(4) thereof requires :-\n\ni '(\n\n\\ '\n\n\"Where any such rectification has the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund the Income-tax Officer\n\nshall serve on the assessee a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum payable, and suclt notice of demand shall be deemed to be issued under section 29, and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.\"\n\nThe effect of this sub-section, according to the counsel, has not been done away with by clause (a) of section 3 of the Validation Act. We reject this argument as being unsound and for two reasons.\n\nFirstly, on a correct interpretation of sub-section ( 4) of section 35 it would be noticed that though the expression used is \"the sum payable\" but in the context it would mean only the \"extra enhanced sum payable\" and not the whole of the enhanced amount.\n\nThe expression \"sum payable\" had to be used in sub-section ( 4) because' that sub-section was also providing for a contingency where by the. rectification order the amount of refund was reduced.\n\nIn such a case the expression \"the\n\num payable\" would obviously mean the difference between the amount\n\nrefunded and the reduced amount which was liable to be refunded.\n\nThe second reason is that even if it were to be held that in the case of enhancement the expression \"the sum payable\" in sub-section (4) means the whole of the enhanced amonnt by a rule of harmonious construction it has got to be held that in view of section 3 ( 1 )(a) of the Validation Act even in the case of a rectification a notice of demand is to be served now only in respect of the amount by which the Government dues are enhanced.\n\nNow coming to the case of reduction dealt with in clause (ib) of sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Validation Act it would be seen that sub-clause (i) clearly provides that it is not necessary for the Taxing Authority to serve, upon the assessee a fresh notice of demand.\n\nThe only thing which he is required to do is that he has to give intimation of the fact of such deduction to the asse\"ssee and to the Tax Recovery Officer.\n\nThe purpose of giving intimation to the, assessee is to\n\nbring it to his pointed knowledge that the demand against him has been G reduced,, although by other methods also such as by service of a copy of the Appellate Order or the revisional order being served on him he may be made aware of that.\n\nThe intimation to the Tax Recovery Officer is essential as without that intimation from the Taxing Anthority he cannot reduce the amount of the Certificate' debt in the proceedings already commenced.\n\nThe High Court has taken the view that the H provision contained in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of section 3 (1)\n\n'()f the Validation Act is mandatory and in absence of a formal intimation to the assessee and to the Ta!x Recovery Officer al! required by the said provision the proceedings initially started could not be continued under sub-clause (iii).\n\nIn our opinion the view of the High Court is not sustainable in law.\n\nOn the facts of this case the assessee himself in his review application had clearly mentioned that the demand against him stood reduced in appeal.\n\nHe also claimed that he had made certain payments.\n\nAlthough the Tax Recovery Officer rejected his review petition, as, probably, he had no power of review, he took the precautionary measure of making inquiry from the Taxing Authority.\n\nThereupon the Taxing Authority gave him the information and the amount of the Certificate debt was substantially reduced.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that on the facts of this case the requirement of sub-cla'use\n\n(ii) stood fulfilled and nothing further had to be done in the matter by the Taxing Authority.\n\nThat being so the proceedings initiated on the basis of the notice of demand served upon the assessee before the reduction of the amount in appeal could be continued in relation to the amount so reduced from the stage at which such proceedings stood immediately before such disposal as provided for in sub-clause (iii).\n\nClause (c) of section 3(1) of the Validation Act is also important and it clearly and expressly provides that no proceedings in relation to Government dues shall be invalid merely because no fresh notice of E demand was served upon the assessee after the dues were enhanced or rednced in any appeal or proceeding.\n\nIt is, therefore, plain that in neither of the two cases did the Certificate proceeding become invalid, in one case by reduction of the demand and in the other by an enhancement.\n\nIn both the cases notices under section 7 of the Bengal Act had been served upon the Certificate-debtors before the property in F' question was transferred by them to the Company.\n\nThe transfer was, therefore, void against the Certificate claims in both the cases under section 8(a) of the Bengal Act.\n\nMr. S. T. Desai called our attention to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Swarup Gupta v. Behari Lal Baldeo Prasad and G others. ( 1).\n\nThat case is, however, clearly distinguishable as in\n\nthat the property was sold in Cer.tificatc proceedings started for the realization of the original amount even after the amount had been reduced in appeal.\n\nIt is obvious that that sale wai; illegal and invalid as rightly held by the High Court because after reduction the demand had to be reduced on intimation by the Taxing Authority and the property could not be sold for the original amount.\n\n(!) 95 I.T.R. 339\n\n. '\n\nf '\n\nFor the reasons stated above, Civil Appeal No. 1575 of 1971 is allowed with costs payable by the respondent-company, the Judgment and Order of the High Court. are set aside and it is directed that the Certificate case shall proceed to disposal in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1965 of 1971 is dismissed but we make no order as to costs in this appeal.\n\nV. D. K.\n\nC.A. No. 1965/71 dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 1965/71", "total_entities": 136, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JARDINE HENDERSON Al'<D ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JARDINE HENDERSON Al'<D ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. 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PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 7 to 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "statute": "Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Taxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 365, "end_char": 442, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "statute": "Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 492, "end_char": 502, "source": 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"end_char": 1305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1962", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Jerdine Henderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1458, "end_char": 1475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.A. 1575(NT) 71 and C.A. 1965 (NT) of 1963 respectively were purchased by M/s Jerdine Henderson (Ltd.) on September 20, 1954, i.e. after service of notices under section 7 of $e Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1486, "end_char": 1504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.A. 1575(NT) 71 and C.A. 1965 (NT) of 1963 respectively were purchased by M/s Jerdine Henderson (Ltd.) on September 20, 1954, i.e. after service of notices under section 7 of $e Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1542, "end_char": 1551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, 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("}}, {"text": "8-3-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12474, "end_char": 12482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 2, 1951 the Certificate-debtor made an application for review of the said order dated 8-3-1951 stating therein, inter alia that the appeal preferred by him before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had been alfowed in part and some payments also had\n\n' . ("}}, {"text": "13-9-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13129, "end_char": 13138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Incometax Officer informed him that the Tribunal had reduced the demand on appeal on 13-9-1950 and after adjustment of the previous payments made by the Certificate-debtor the revised demand stood at Rs."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13424, "end_char": 13437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 18, 1956 he directed the issue of sale notice under Rule 46(2) framed under the Bengal Act in respect of the half share of Basanta Kumar Daw (the other half belonging to his brother Haridhan Daw) in premises nos."}}, {"text": "Basanta Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13552, "end_char": 13565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 18, 1956 he directed the issue of sale notice under Rule 46(2) framed under the Bengal Act in respect of the half share of Basanta Kumar Daw (the other half belonging to his brother Haridhan Daw) in premises nos.", "canonical_name": "Basanta Kumar Daw"}}, {"text": "Haridhan Daw", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13611, "end_char": 13623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 18, 1956 he directed the issue of sale notice under Rule 46(2) framed under the Bengal Act in respect of the half share of Basanta Kumar Daw (the other half belonging to his brother Haridhan Daw) in premises nos.", "canonical_name": "Haridhan Daw"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "201 to 205/1, Old China Bazar .Street,, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14019, "end_char": 14028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 30,\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14087, "end_char": 14104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notice under section 7 of the Bengal Act was served on the Certificate-debtor on January 30,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14150, "end_char": 14159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14208, "end_char": 14224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Certificate Officer by his order dated January 13, 1954 rejected the objection filed by the Certificate-debtor under the Bengal Act."}}, {"text": "January 27, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14358, "end_char": 14374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A review application was also rejected in this case on January 27, 1954."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14380, "end_char": 14393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2, 1954, the Income-tax Officer informed the Certificaie Officer that the original demand of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14577, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 2, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14670, "end_char": 14683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order under section 35 was passed on March 2, 1953."}}, {"text": "Jardine Henderson Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15013, "end_char": 15035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. 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{"document_id": "1979_3_568_571_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.\n\nDEWAN'S MODERN BREWERIES LTD.\n\nMarch 16, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nPunjab General Sales Tax Act 1948-Sales effected on permits prescribing price, quantity and the person to whom goods should be sold-Sales tax if j' / could be levied-Tax levied retrospectively-Validity of-Concensuality if lacking where dealer did not know that tax was to be paid.\n\nThe sa]es tax authorities levied tax on the sales of liquor effected by the respondent who was a whole saler in that commodity. Impugning the levy, the respondent contended in the High Court that when it sold liquor against permits issued by the authorities there was no volition because the price and 1he quantity of goods to be sold and the person to whom sold were all fixed and therefore there \"'as no sale in the eye of law which would attract tax. The Department, on the other hand, contended that even when goods were sold against a permit there was still an area of volition in that the parties could decide on the quality and brand of liquor, the quantity, whether in bulk or in instalments. the size of the package and so on, all of which showed that thf.re was no restraint on the volition of the parties and therefore there was sale which attracted tax.\n\nA single judge of the High Court, following a decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court in Jagatiit Distilling and Allied Industries Ltd.\n\nv. The State [28 STC 709], quashed the order of assessment. A Division Bench dismissed the appeal in limine.\n\nAllowing the State's appeal\n\nHELD : The transactions were sales exigible to tax. [571 G]\n\n1. The decision of this Court in Vishnu Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, [1978] 2 SCR 433 justifies imposition or sales tax on the sale of liquor on permits. A conspectus of the provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules shows that there is an area of agrement sufficient enough for the parties to bring, by their volition, the impugned transctions within the ambit of sales. [570 G; 571 A]\n\nVishnu Agencies (P) Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.\n\nEtc., [1978] 2 SCR 433; followed.\n\nJagatiit Distilling and Allied Industries Ltd. v. The State, 28 STC 709 overruled.\n\n2 (a) It is well settled that sales tax could be imposed retrospectively.\n\nTI1erefore, even though in this case the tax was levied retrospectively by a validation ordinance, the respondent would be deemed to have entered the trade and carried it on on the basis that it would be, liable to pay sales tax. [571 DJ\n\n• ..\n\n'(b) Even assuming that the respondent carried on the trade thinking that it would not be liable to pay sales tax, the area of concensuality still left for the purpose of agreeing to the final terms of the transactions between the res pendent and its retail dealers was quite sufficient for the application of the ntio of Vishnu Agencies. [571 F-G]\n\nC1vn, APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2028 1974.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Order dated 6-9-1975 of the '( Punjab aud Haryana High Court in LP.A. No. 516/73 .\n\n.._..\n\nHardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Appellants.\n\nL. N. Sinha, P. P. Singh and E. C. Agarwala for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-The respondent-company in this appeal by special 1eave has a Distillery and Brewery at Jammu.\n\nIt maintains wholesale depots at various places in the State of Punjab, the main depot being at Ludhiana. As a whole-seller it supplied Indian made foreign liquor to permit holders on the permits issued by the respective Excise and Taxation Officers, the competent authorities under the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder.\n\nSales tax under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 was imposed in respect of the sales aforesaid by an order of assessment dated the 30th November, 1972.\n\nThe respondent, thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court for the quashing of the said order and to restrain the appellants from recovering the amount of Rs. 46,396.22 paise from the petitioner.\n\nThe main ground of attack on the imposition of sales tax was that the -alleged sales were not sales in the eye of law as the respondent had no volition in the distribution of liquor which was received from the manufacturing concern at Jammu.\n\nThe prices were fixed by the Competent authorities and the respondent had to charge the fixed price from its retailers holding L-2, L-4, L-5 and L-10 licences.\n\nThe respondent company holds L-.1 licence which is meant for whole-sale dealers.\n\nThe State contested the application and in its counter asserted that the excise trade like many other trades, or even more, had to be regulated and controlled by various Rules and Regulations and inspite of all the restrictions placed thereby an area was still left where the whole-seller and the retail purchaser had to arrive at an agreement by their volition. According to the case of the appellants \"the\n\nuahty a.nd bra?d .of Foreign Liquor, lifting of the specified quantity m blk liter or m mstalments, the size of packages (i.e. Bottles, pints,\n\n<Or Nips) and mode of payment (cash or credit or part payment) and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthe prices, are the matters which are decided by the petitioner and' his purchasers and there is no law or rule restricting the volition• or liberty of the petitioner in this respect.\"\n\nFollowing a Division Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jagatjit Distilling and Allied Industries Ltd. v. The State(')\n\na learned single Judge of that Court allowed the writ application and quashed the assessment order.\n\nA Letters Patent appeal from tl:1<i .srud order was dismissed in !imine. Hence this appeal.\n\nThis case, in our opinion, is squarely covered by a recent decision of this Court delivered by a Bench of seven Judges in Mjs Vishnu Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Officer and others ei'c.(2) The High Court in the case of Jagatjit Distilling and Allied Indu.stries\n\nLtd. (supra) had mainly relied upon two decision's of this Court to hold that the transactions in that case were not sales.\n\nThe said decisions are Mis New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar(3) and Chittar Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P.('). In the case of Vishnu Agencies (supra) the former case was considered in paragraph 36 to 39 of A.I.R. volume at pages 463-464 and it was held that the view expressed in the majority judgment was not good law and the one contained in the minority judgment was approved.\n\nChittar Mal's case was also considered in paragraph 44-45 at page 467 and it was distinguished on the ground that the said decision \"can he justified only on the view that clause 3 of the Wheat Procurement Order\n\nenvisages compulsory acquisition of wheat by the State Government from the licensed dealer.\" But then the criticism in that case of the Full Berich decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commr. Sales-tax, U.P. v. Ram Bi/as Ram Gopal(') \"which held while construing cl'. 3 that so Ion!( as there was freedom to bargain in some areas the transaction could amount to a sale though effected under compulsion of a Statute\" wa~ not endorsed.\n\nIt is, therefore, plain that to that extent Chittar Mal's case is also not good law.\n\nThe decision of the High Court in Jagatjit's case is no longer goog law.\n\nWe liave examined the various relevant provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder.\n\nWe find that an area of agreement sufficient enough for the parties to cover by their volition to bring the transactions in question within the ambit of sales was left in the field.\n\nBroadly speaking the stand taken on behalf of the\n\n(I) 28 S.T.C. 709\n\n(2) [1978! 2 S.C.R.\n\n433~A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 449.\n\n(3) 14 S.T.C. 316~[1963] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 459.\n\n(4) 26 S.T.C. 344~[1971] 1 S.C.R. 671.\n\n(5) A.LR. 1970 All. 518.\n\n. , \\\n\n' j\n\n.appellants in their counter. was correct, except that in regard to the\n\nfixation of price we assume in favour of the respondent-companJ that the price had been fixed, as usually it is so in the excise trade.\n\nEven so the decision of this Court in Vishnu Agencies (supra) and the various other previous decisions reviewed therein justifies in law :the imposition of sales tax by the impugned order in question.\n\nMr. Lal Narayan Sinha tried to distinguish the decision in Vishnu Agencies (supra) by pointing out that sales-tax for the period in question was imposed by the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1972 which was promulgated on the 15th November, 1972 with retrospective effect.\n\nThe respondent-company, counsel submitted, cannot be said to have entered into the trade and carried it on during this period by a volition as it did not know that sales-tax would be chargeable for this period and, therefore, it had not realised sales-tax from its customers.\n\nHe drew our attention to paragraph 33 of the judment of this Court in Vishnu Agencies at page 461. In our opinion t11e argument of the learned counsel is not sound and for two reasons.\n\nFirstly, it is well settled and it was not disputed that sales-tax could\n\nbe impoied retrospectively.\n\nThat being so the respondent-company will be deemed to have entered the trade and carri¢ it on the basis that it would be liable to pay sales-tax. Secoudly, even assuming it was not so, what has been pointed out in the begining of paragraph\n\n'33 as a primary fact of willingness to trade in the commodity strictly On the terms of Control Orders is-only ohe of the reasons which led to the decision that an area of agre0ment between the parties was left to their consensus. In our opmion such a part of the area as the one hinted at is not very important and does not form the whole and sole basis of the conclusions arrived at in the case of Vishnu Agencies.\n\nEven assuming in favour of the respondent-company that it did not carry on the trade thinking that it would be liable to pay sales-tax, the area of consensuality still left in the field for the purpose of agreeing to the final terms of the transactions between the company and its retail dealers was quite sufficient for the application of the ratio of Vishnu Agencies. Having considered all that was submitted on behalf of the respoudent-company we find that there is no escape from the conclusion in this case that the iransactions in question were sales exigible to sales-tax.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal with costs in this Court only.\n\nThe judgment and order of the High Court are set ·~~ H\n\n'P.B.R.\n\nAppea~ allowed.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEWAN'S MODERN BREWERIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEWANS MODERN BREWERIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nPunjab General Sales Tax Act 1948-Sales effected on permits prescribing price, quantity and the person to whom goods should be sold-Sales tax if j' / could be levied-Tax levied retrospectively-Validity of-Concensuality if lacking where dealer did not know that tax was to be paid."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab General Sales Tax Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 433", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1699, "end_char": 1715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 433", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2095, "end_char": 2111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".._..\n\nHardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".._..\n\nHardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3112, "end_char": 3123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, P. P. Singh and E. C. Agarwala for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, P. P. Singh and E. C. Agarwala for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, P. P. Singh and E. C. Agarwala for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-The respondent-company in this appeal by special 1eave has a Distillery and Brewery at Jammu."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3320, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-The respondent-company in this appeal by special 1eave has a Distillery and Brewery at Jammu."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3392, "end_char": 3398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It maintains wholesale depots at various places in the State of Punjab, the main depot being at Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3424, "end_char": 3432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It maintains wholesale depots at various places in the State of Punjab, the main depot being at Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Sales tax under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th November, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3804, "end_char": 3823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sales tax under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 was imposed in respect of the sales aforesaid by an order of assessment dated the 30th November, 1972."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the case of the appellants \"the\n\nuahty a.nd bra?d .of Foreign Liquor, lifting of the specified quantity m blk liter or m mstalments, the size of packages (i.e. Bottles, pints,\n\n<Or Nips) and mode of payment (cash or credit or part payment) and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5405, "end_char": 5432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following a Division Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jagatjit Distilling and Allied Industries Ltd. v. The State(')\n\na learned single Judge of that Court allowed the writ application and quashed the assessment order."}}, {"text": "Vishnu Agencies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6271, "end_char": 6286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Vishnu Agencies (supra) the former case was considered in paragraph 36 to 39 of A.I.R. volume at pages 463-464 and it was held that the view expressed in the majority judgment was not good law and the one contained in the minority judgment was approved."}}, {"text": "Chittar Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chittar Mal's case was also considered in paragraph 44-45 at page 467 and it was distinguished on the ground that the said decision \"can he justified only on the view that clause 3 of the Wheat Procurement Order\n\nenvisages compulsory acquisition of wheat by the State Government from the licensed dealer.\""}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6698, "end_char": 6706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But then the criticism in that case of the Full Berich decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commr."}}, {"text": "Jagatjit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7297, "end_char": 7305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the High Court in Jagatjit's case is no longer goog law."}}, {"text": "liave examined the various relevant provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7340, "end_char": 7425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 1 S.C.R. 671", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7812, "end_char": 7831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lal Narayan Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8288, "end_char": 8305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha tried to distinguish the decision in Vishnu Agencies (supra) by pointing out that sales-tax for the period in question was imposed by the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1972 which was promulgated on the 15th November, 1972 with retrospective effect."}}, {"text": "15th November, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8541, "end_char": 8560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha tried to distinguish the decision in Vishnu Agencies (supra) by pointing out that sales-tax for the period in question was imposed by the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1972 which was promulgated on the 15th November, 1972 with retrospective effect."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_572_583_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "VITHAL DATTATRAYA KULKARNI & ORS.\n\nSHAMRAO TUKARAM POWER & ORS.\n\nMarch 21, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nBombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948-S. 40-Scope of- Whether heirs of a protected tenant who died before the commencement of the 1956 Amendn1ent Act are entitl:ed to recover possession from the landlord.\n\nSection 3 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 classified a tenant as a pro .. tected tenant in respect of any land if he 'had held such land continuously for a period of six years immediately preceding 1st January, 1938 to 1st January,_ 1945 and had cultivated such land personally during that period. Tenancy held by a protected tenant could be terminated only in the circumstances stated in s. 5 as for example, failure to pay arrears of rent subletting and so on. Section 7 provided that the landlord could recover possession of the land from the protected tenant on the ground that he bonafide required such and for the purpose of cultivating it personally or for a nonagricultu.ral purpose.\n\nIf after taking possession of the land he ceased to use it for that purpose at any time within 12 years from the date on which he took posses~ sion the landlord was required to restore possession of the land under s. 7(2) to the protected tenant. The Act also defined that a protected tenant shall include his heirs by an explanation to this section.\n\nThe 1939 Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. This Act also empowered the landlord to terminate the tenancy of a protected te:ant by giving the tenant one year's. notice in writing if he bonafide required the land for any of the purposes mentioned in the Act and the grounds on which a tenancy could be tern1i 4 nated were also enumerated in the Act. A provision similar to s. 7(i) of the 1939 Act was contained in s. 34(i) of this Act.\n\nThe 1948 Act did not contain prov1s1ons corresponding to Explanation (ii) to s. 7 of the 1939 Act declaring that a tenant shall include his heirs. Section 40 provided that if a protected tenant died the landlord shall offer to continue the tenancy on the same terms on which such tenant was. holding it at the tin1e of his death, to the heir or heirs of the deceru.ed tenant. The Explanation to s. 40 declared that a heir meant the lineal de5 .. cendant of a tenant or his adopted son and failing both, his widow.\n\nThe 1948 Act underwent substantial changes in 1956. Section 40 as amended in 1956 provided that on the dath of the tenant the landlord shall\n\nbe deemed to have continued the tenancy on the same terms and conditions \"-..., on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death to such heir or heirs of the deceased tenant as may be willing to continue the tenancy.\n\nThe land in dispute belonging to the appellants was held by the respondent's father who was a protected tenant within the meaning of that term\n\nin the 1939 Act.\n\nIn June, 1950 the appellants recovered possession of thee\n\n' i\n\ny. D. KULKARNI V. S. T. POWER 573\n\nland allenging that they needed it for their personal cultivation. In 1951 the potected tenant died. In 1962 the landlords sold a part of the land, whereupon the respondents who were the heirs of the late protected tenant filed a petition alleging that the landlords had ceased to cultivate the land personally within 12 years from the date of dispossession of the protected tenant and, therefore, they were entitled to recover possession of the land. While the Aval Karkun and the Deputy Collector held in favour of the heirs of the tenant, the Revenue Tribunal allowing the revision application of the landlords dismissed the application of the tenant/respondents.\n\nThe High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constituton reversed the order of the Revenue Tribunal.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the right of a protected tenant whose tenancy had been determined and \\\\'ho had been dispossessed of the land under s. 39 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was a right which was personal to the tenant himself and, which could not for that reason be exercised by the tenant's heirs.\n\nAllowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : The contrast betvveen s. 40 before and after its amendment in 19 56 was that while after the amendment, the heirs of the tenant were automatically deemed to succeed to the tenancy there was no such deeming before the 1956 amendment. The landlord was merely required to make an offer and it was not stipulated what would happen if he did not make the offer. Where the landlord had obtained possession of the land for cultivating it personally there could be no question of making an offer to continue the tenancy.\n\nThe 1948 Act before its amendment in 1956 contained no provision corresponding to Explanation (ii) to s. 7 of the 1939 Act.\n\nTherefore under the provisions of 1948 Act as it stood before the 1956 amendment the right of a tenant to recoVer possession of the land from the landlord who had obtained possession of such land on the ground that he required it to cultivate it perso~ nally was not a heritable right. [581 B-E]\n\nExplanation (ii) to s. 7 of the 1939 Act expressly provided that for the purpose of that section a tenant included his heirs. The position under the 1948 Act after its amendment in 1956 as could be seen from ss. 4B and 40 was that the tenancy under the Act was heritable. When it is found that the tenancy was heritable the right given to the tenant may be exercised by the heirs of the tenant also. In the instant case death of the protected tenant occurred in 1951 i.e. before the 1956 Act came into force.\n\nHis heirs had therefore no right to recover possession from the landlords. [579 G-H, 581 BJ\n\nVasant Hariba Londhe v. Jagannath Rarnchandra Kulkarni 71 B.L.R.\n\n~.... 12; Bai Jarnna v. Bai Dhani, 61 Born. L.R. 419; Thakorelal v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, A.I.R. 1964 Guj. 183; Damadi/al & Ors. v.\n\nPareshrarn & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2229 @ 2234; referred to.\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1296 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Le, ave from the Judgment and Order dated H 11-11-1968 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1080/65.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, B. Datta and K. K. Manchanda for the Appellant.\n\nA. N. Karkhanis for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgement of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-In respect of an extent of ten acres and 23 guntas of land in Survey No. 215 of Village Nathare, Haranax, one Tukaram Patla Power was a protected tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, as amended by Act 26 of 1946.\n\nThe landlords, Vithal Kulkarni, Vasudeo Kulkarni and Krishnaji Kulkarni gave a: notice to Tukaram on 8th March, 1948 under Section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, alleging that they required the land for their personal cultivation.\n\nIn December, 19~!8, the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (57 of 1948). Thereafter, on 25th April, 1949, the Kulkarni brothers filed Tenancy Case No. 102 of 1949, before the Aval Karkun, to recover possession of the land from Tukariim.\n\nThe application was dismissed by the AYal Karkuu on 29th August, 1949, but in Tenancy Appeal No. 20 of 1950 filed by the landlords, the Collector of South Satara, Sangli, by his order dated 9th May, 1950, directed that possession of the land should be given to the Kulkarni brothers. The landlords accordingly recovered possession of the land on 18th June, 1950.\n\nTukaram died on 31st August, 1951. On 18th April, 1961, Vasudeo Kulkarni executed a deed of conditional sale in favour of Sopan Power in respect of a joint 1/9th share in the land. It was recited in the deed that possession was delivered to Sopan but that was disputed.\n\nHowever, on 27th June, 1962, Sopan executed a deed of recoriveyance in favour of Vasudeo Kulkarni. On 16th April, 1962, Vithal Kulka.mi executed a deed of sale in respect of his 1/3rd share in the land in favour of Bapu Bhan More and Vilas Ganpatl More. On 7th July, 1962, Tukaram's heirs filed Tenancy Case No. 87 of 1962 against the Kulkarni brothers arid their alienees, under Section 3 7 and Sectioh 39 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act alleging that the landlords had ceased to cultivate the lands personally within twelve years from the date of dispossession of the tenant (Tukaram) and, therefore, they were entitled to recover possession of the land.\n\nThe Aval Karkun made an order in favour of Tukaram's heirs on 26th November, 1963. The order was confirmed by the Special Deputy Collector on 31st March 1964. The landlords and their alienees preferred Revision Applications before the Maharashtrll\n\nRevenue Tribunal.\n\nThe Revenue Tribunal allowed the Revision Applications on 27th October, 1964, and dismissed the application\n\nof Tukare.m's heirs filed under Sections 37 and 39 of the Bombay\n\nI • . '\n\nTenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.\n\nTukaram's heirs invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay by its judgmeut dated 11th November, 1968 allowed the Writ Petition, quashed the order of the Tribunal anj restored the order of the Aval Karkun as affirmed by the Special Deputy Collector.\n\nThe three Kulkarni brother~, Bapu Bhau More and Vilas Ganapati More, have preferred this appeal by special leave.\n\nShri M. C. Bhandare, learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the right of a protected tenant whose tenancy had been determined and who had been dispossessed of the land under Section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was a right which was personal to the tenant himself and, which could not for that reason be exercised by the tenant's heirs.\n\nHe argued that whatever may be the right of the heirs of a protected tenant dying subsequent to the Amending Act of 1956, the heirs of a protected tenant who died before the commencement of the 1956 Amending Act had no right to recover possession from the landlords.\n\nHe urged that there was a substantial difference between Section 40 of the Bombay Tenanc)\n\nand Agricultural Lands Act as it stood before and after the 1956 amendment. He submitted that the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Vasant Hariba Londhe v.\n\nJagannath Ramclzandra Kulkarni, U) applied to cases where the tenant died\n\nafter the Amending Act of 1956 and not before. Some other conten tions were also raised to which it is unnecessary to refer.\n\nShri A. N. Karkhanis, learned Counsel for the respondents, who presented the case of the respondents exteremely well, drew our attention to the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act and the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act before and after it was amended in 1956.\n\nHe submitted that a comprehensive view of the provisions of the Act showed that the right given to the protected tenant was heritable and, therefore, the heirs of Tukaram were entitled to exercise the right given to the tenant under Section 37 of the Act.\n\nHe submitted that the position was not different even under Section 40 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act as it stoud before the 1956 amendment.\n\nHe also advanced some other minor contentions which we do not consider necessary to mention here.\n\nThe Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 preceded the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.\n\nChapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 (Section 13A to Section 26) dealt with tenants generally, while Chapter II (Sections 3 to 13) of the Act dealt with a special class of tenants described in the Act as protected tenants. Section 3\n\n(I) 71 B.L.R. 12\n\n17-253SC1/79\n\nclassified a tenant as a protected tenant in respect of any land if he had held such land continuously for a period of six years immediately preceding 1st January 1938 to 1st January, 1945 and had cultivated such land personally during the aforesaid period. Section 3A was\n\nintroduced by way of amendment in 1946 and it provided that every tenant shall be deemed to be a pro\\ected tenant for the purpose of the Act, on the expiry of one year from the date of coming into force of the amending Act.\n\nSection 5 enumerated the rights and liabilities of a protected tenant and it was expressly provided that the tenancy of land held by a protected tenant shall not be terminated unless the tenant failed to pay the arrears of rent for a specified period or before the specified date or had done any Act which was destructive or partly injurious to the land or had sub-divided or sub-let the land or failed to cultivate personally or had used the land for a purpose other than agricultural.\n\nSection 7 ( 1) invested the landlord with a special right to determine protected tenancy by giving the protected tenant one year's notice in writing on the ground that he bonafide required the land for the purpose of cultivating the land personally or for a nonagricultural purpose.\n\nSection 7 (2) provided that if after taking possession of the land after the termination of the tenancy the landlord faikd to use it for the purpose for which he had obtained possesshm within one year from the date on which he took possession or ceased to use it for that purpose at any time within twelve years from the date on which he took possession, the landlord shall restore possession of the land to the tenant whose tenancy was terminated: by him unless the tenant had refused iri writing to accept the tenancy on the same terms and conditions as before or that the tenant, on an offer being made to him in writing, had failed to accept the offer within three months of the receipt thereof. Explanation II to Section 7 provided\n\n\"For the purposes of this Section a tenant shall include his heir as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 9''.\n\nSection 9(3) specified that the lineal male descendants of a protected tenant or his adopted son, or, in absence of any lineal male descendant or an adopted son, his widow shall be deemed to be his heirs for the purposes of this section.\n\nSection 9 (1) provided that if a protected tenant died, the landlord should continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which the protected tenant was holding it at the time of his death to such one of his heirs who, within four months of the death of such tena:t,,\n\ngave notice in writing to the landlord that he is willing to hold the land on such terms and conditions.\n\nThe Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Chapter II\n\n. \" \"\n\nF • ;_ ..\n\n~ ,.\n\n• t\n\n' .\n\nof the Act (Section 3 to Section 30) contained 'General provisions regarding Tenancies' while Chapter III (Section 31 to Section 43) dealt with 'Protected tenants, their special rights and privileges'. 'Tenant' was defined to mean an Agriculturist who held the land on lease and to include a person who was deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of the Act. 'Protected tenant' was defined to mean a protected tnant under Section 31 of the Act.\n\nSection 5 prescribed that no tenancy of any land shall be for a period of less than ten years and further provided that at the end of the said period and thereafter at the end of ten years, in succession, the tenancy shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and (3), be deemed to be renewed for a further period of ten years on the same terms and conditions, notwithstand: ing any agreement to the contrary. Section 5(3) provided that a tenancy was liable to be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 14. Section 5(2) further empowered the landlord to terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant one year's notice in writing if he bonafide required the land for any of the purposes specified in Section 34(1 ). Section 14 enumerated certain general grounds which entitled a landlord to terminate the tenancy, such as non payment of rent within the prescribed period, doing of an act which was destructive or permanently injurious to the land, division of the land in contravention of Section 27, sub-letting, failure to cultivate personally and use of land for a pnrpose other than agricu_Iture.\n\nSection 31 declared as protceted tenants persons who were deemed to be protected tenants under Sections 3, 3A or 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. Section 3 2 clothed the protected tenant with the right to purchase from the landlord the land held by him as a protected tenant.\n\nSection 34(1) gave to the landlord a special right to terminate the tenancy of a protected tenant by giving him one year's notice in writing that he required the land for cultivating personally or for any non agricultural use for his own purpose. Section 34(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, corresponded to section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. Section 37 of the 1948 Act provided that if after taking possession of the land after terminating the tenancy under Section 34 ( 1) , the landlord failed to use it for the purpose for which he had obtained possession within one year from the date on which he took possession or ceased to use it for that purpose at any time within twelve years from the date on which he took possession the landlord shall restore possession to the tenant whose tenancy was terminated by him unless he obtained from the tenant his refusal in:\n\nwriting to accept the tenancy on the same terms and conditions or the tenant had failed to accept the offer made by him in writing to give possession of the land on the same terms and conditions.\n\nSection\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.Et.\n\n37(1) of the 1948 Act corresponded to Section 7(2) of the 1939 Act.\n\nOne noticeable feature in the 1948 Act was that there was no provision corresponding to Explanation II to Section 7 of the 1939 Act which: declared that for the purposes of Section 7 a tenant shall include his heir as specified in Section 9 (3) of that Act.\n\nThis was a significartt omission.\n\nSection 39 of the 1948 Act enabled the tenant to make an application where th(l landlord failed to comply with the provisions of Section 37. Section 40 provided that if a protected tenant died the landlord shall offer to continue the tenancy on the same terms on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death to the heir or heirs cf the deceased tenant. The Explanation to Section 40 de1:- Jared that for the purposes of the Section, an heir meant the line:il male descendants of a tenant or his adopted son and failing ooth, his widow.\n\nSection 40 of the 1948 Act replaced Section 9 of the 1939 Act though not in the same terms.\n\nThe 1948 Act underwent some substantial amendments in 1956. 'Tenant' under the Amended Act was defined to include a protected tenant and the provisions relating to the special rights and privileg1is. of the protected tenants contained in Chapter III of the Act were extended to all tenants.\n\nInstead of providing as Section 5 of the unamended Act did, that no tenancy shall be for a period of less th2n ten years, and for renewal of the tenancy for ten year periods thereafter, Section 4B of the amended Act provided that no tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed\n\nby the agreement or usage had expired. Section 31 of the 1948 Act as it stood originally was repealed and replaced by a new Section 31 which substantially enacted the provisions of Section 34 of the Act as it stood before the amendment.\n\nWhat was Section 37 of the Act before amendment continued to be Section 37 after the amendment.\n\nSection 40 was amended and it was declared that on the death of a tenant, the landlord shall be deemed to have continued the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death to such heir or heirs of the deceased tenant as may be willing to continue the tenancy.\n\nIn this appeal we are concerned with Section 40 as it stood before it was amended in 19 5 6.\n\nIn order to understand the real controversy between ihe parties it is necessary to extract here Section 40 both as it stood before and after the 1956 amendment. Before the 1956 amendment Section 40 was\n\nas follows:\n\n\"If a protected tenant dies, the landlord shall offer to continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on\n\nwhich such tenant was holding it at the time of his death to the heir or heirs of the deceased tenant : Provided that the offer required to be made by the landlord under this section shall be made in writing :\n\n,,,\n\nProvided further that if any heirs of the deceased tenant do not agree to continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which the deceased protected tenant was holding the land, the Collector may select an heir or heirs who is or are willing to continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions.\n\nThe decision of the Collector shall be final.\n\n• Explanation :-For the purposes of this section, an heir means the lineal male descendants of a tenant or his adopted son and failing both his widow who has not remarried\".\n\nSection 40 as it stood after the 1956 amendment is as follows :\n\n\" ( 1) Where a tenant (other than a permanent tenant) dies, the landlord shall be deemed to have continued the\n\ntemincy on the same terms and conditions on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death, to such heir or heirs of the deceased tenant as may be willing to continue the tenancy.\n\n(2) Where the tenancy is inherited by heirs other than the widow of the deceased tenant, such widow shall have a charge for maintenance on the profits of such land\".\n\nThe question for consideration is whether the heirs of a tenant whose tenancy was terminated by the landlord on the ground that he required the land for his personal cultivation were entitled to exercise the right which the tenant would have, if alive, to obtain possession ( \"\" of the land if the landlord ceased to cultivate the land at any time within twelve years after he obtained possession, in other words, whether the right of the tenant to have the possession of the land restored on the failure of the landlord to cultivate the land personally at any time during the twelve years subsequent to his obtaining possession was a heritable right. The position was clear under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. Explanation II to Section 7 of that Act expressly provided that for the purposes of the Section a tenant included his heirs, as specified in Section 9(3). The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, after it was amended in 1956 is also quite clear.\n\nSection 4B and Section 40 show that the tenancy under the Act is heritable.\n\nAs already mentioned, while Section 4B provides for the continuation of the tenancy even after the expiry of the period fixed by the agreement or usage, Section 40\n\nexpressly provides for the continuation of the tenancy on the death of. the tenant, the heirs of the tenant stepping into the position of the\n\ntenant.\n\nOnce it is round that the tenancy is heritable it follows that the right given to the tenant under Section 37(1) may be exercised by the heirs of the tenant also.\n\nA Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Vasant Hariba Londhe v. Jagannath Ramchandra Ku/c\n\nkarni(') came to the same conclusion, Kotwal, C.J. observed:\n\n\"Section 40(1) provides that where a tenant other than a permanent tenant dies, the landlord shall be deemed to have continued the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death, to such heir or heirs o! the deceased tenant as may be willing to continue the tenancy. It will be noticed that prior to the amendment of the Tenancy Act by the Bombay Act XIII of 1956 this section was worded thus \"If a pro- . tected tenant dies, the landlord shall offer to continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death to the heir or heirs of the deceased tenant .... \" The expression used in the old S.40 was \"offer to continue the tenancy\" and there was no indication whatever as to what was to happen if the offer was not made but by the amendment made by the Amending Act XIII of 1956, sub-s. (!) was wholly re-cast and now there is no question of the landlord merely making an offer to the tenant to continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions, but on the other hand, the section provides that \"the landlord shall be deemed to have continued the tenancy on the same terms and conditions\". The amendment, therefore, meets precisely the argument that is here advanced that the heir succeeding to the erstwhile tenant does not continue as a tenant on the same terms and conditions.\n\nBesides, the new section introduced a fiction by the use of the words \"deemed to have continued the tenancy\" and therefore, whatever may have been the position prior to the amendment, s.40 as it now stads after the Amending Act XIII of 1956 automatically confers on the heir a tenancy on the same terms and conditions as were applicable to the deceased tenant\". ..,\n\nThe learned Chief Justice then referred to the decisions in Bai Jamna\n\nv. Bai Dhani(') and Thakorelal v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal(•) andt\n\n(1) 71 B.L.R. 12.\n\n(2) 61 Born. LR. 419\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1964 Gujarat 183\n\n-4'\n\ndistinguished the two cases on the ground that on the date on which the death of the tenant took place in thos'e cases Section 40 as amended in 1956 had not come into force, whereas, in the case before the Full Bench the tenant had died after Section 40 was amended in 1956. In the case now before us, however, the death of the tenant took place before the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was amended in 1956.\n\nWe have already extracted Section 40 before and after it was amended in 1956.\n\nThe contrast is apparent.\n\nWhile under the amended Section 40 the heirs of the tenant were automatically deemed to succeed to the tenancy there was no such \"deeming\" before the 1956 amendment. The landlord was merely required to make an offer and it was not stipulated what would happen if he did not make the offer. Where the landlord had obtained possession of the land under Section 34 for cultivating the land presonally, there could be no question of making an offer to continue the tenancy since such an offer would be an exercise in futility.\n\nThere was also the significant circum stance that the 1948 Act (before it was amended in 1956) contained no provision corresponding to Explanation II to Section 7 of the 1939 Act.\n\nThe only reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that under the provisions of th!! Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land's Act, 1948, as it stood before it was amended in 1956, the right of a tenant to recover possession of land from a landlord who had obtained posses sion of such land on the ground 'that he required it to cultivate it personally was not a heritable right.\n\nShri Karkhanis, learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision of this Court in Damadilal & Ors. v. Parashram & Ors. ( ')\n\nand argued that a statutory tenancy was heritable like a contractual tenancy.\n\nThis Court did not lay down the wide proposition that every statutory tenancy was heritable but the Court did quite definitely lay F down that it would be wrong to import the notions of English law relating to \"statutory tenancy\" and on that basis to hold that it was not transferable or heritable. It was observed by A. C. Gupta, J., as follows :\n\n\"We find it difficult to appreciate how in this country we can proceed on the basis that a tenant whose contractual tenancy has determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute, has no right of property but only a personal right to remain in occupation, without ascertaining what hi~ rights are under the statute.\n\nThe concept of a statutory tenant having no estate or property in the premises which he occupies is derived from the provisions of the English Rent\n\n(l l AIR 1976 S.C. 2229 at 2234\n\nActs. But it is not clear how it can be assumed that the position is the same in this country without any reference to tht:\n\nprovisions of the relevant statute.\n\nTenancy has its origin in contract.\n\nThere is no dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subject-matter of the tenancy, and heritability is an incident of the tenancy. It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determination of the tenancy the estate mnst necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation. It is not possible to claim that the \"sanctity\" of contract cannot be touched by legislation.\n\nIt is therefore necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 to find ant whether the respondents' predecessors in interest retained a heritable interest in the disputed premises even after the termination of their tenancy.\"\n\nThe learned Judge thereafter referred to the definition of tenant in the Madhya Pradesh Act and held that the definition made a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant, unless a decree or order for eviction had been made against him, thus putting him at par with. a person whose contractual tenancy still subsisted. It was observed that the incidents of such tenancy and the contractual tenancy had to be the same in the absence of a contrary intention conveyed by any provision of the Act. It was further observed that the so called statutory tenant had, under Section 14 of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the right to sublet in common with the contractual tenant and, therefore, he must be said to have an interest in the premies occupied by him.\n\nThus the question whether a tenancy other than a contractual tenancy has any or all the incidents of a contractual tenancy has to be decided with reference to the provisions of the particular statute.\n\nThough Section 5 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act as it stood before it was amended in 1956, did indicate by providing that notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary the minimum period of a tenancy shall be ten years renewable thereafter for successive periods of ten years, that the tenancy was heritable, the indication was definitely to the contrary when it came to the right of a protected tenant to have the land restored to him on the failure of the landlord to cultivate the land personally.\n\nOur conclusion regarding the non-heritability of this right rests solely on our understanding of Section 40 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act as it\n\nstood before it was amended in 1956, in relation to the right under Section 37. Nothing that we have said should be understood as indicating that any other right of a tenant or this very right after the 1956 amendment is not heritable.\n\nShri Karkhanis argued that having regard to the position that obtained both under the Bombay Tenancy Act and under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act after the 1956 amendment, we 'should so interpret Section 40 as to make the right under Section 37 heritable. We are unable to do so in view of the language of Section 40 before it was amended in 1956. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order regarding costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 173, "entities": [{"text": "VITHAL DATTATRAYA KULKARNI & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VITHAL DATTATRAYA KULKARNI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAMRAO TUKARAM POWER & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAMRAO TUKARAM POWER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 21, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1266, "end_char": 1273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1413, "end_char": 1497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1827, "end_char": 1834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 34(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1868, "end_char": 1876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2038, "end_char": 2048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2286, "end_char": 2291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2458, "end_char": 2468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed and replaced by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Aval Karkun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the Aval Karkun and the Deputy Collector held in favour of the heirs of the tenant, the Revenue Tribunal allowing the revision application of the landlords dismissed the application of the tenant/respondents."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3742, "end_char": 3750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4B and 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5360, "end_char": 5373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1976 SC 2229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6016, "end_char": 6044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6220, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, B. Datta and K. K. Manchanda for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, B. Datta and K. K. Manchanda for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6249, "end_char": 6264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, B. Datta and K. K. Manchanda for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Karkhanis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Tukaram Patla Power was a protected tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6497, "end_char": 6592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vithal Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords, Vithal Kulkarni, Vasudeo Kulkarni and Krishnaji Kulkarni gave a: notice to Tukaram on 8th March, 1948 under Section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, alleging that they required the land for their personal cultivation.", "canonical_name": "Vithal Kulkarni"}}, {"text": "Vasudeo Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6657, "end_char": 6673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords, Vithal Kulkarni, Vasudeo Kulkarni and Krishnaji Kulkarni gave a: notice to Tukaram on 8th March, 1948 under Section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, alleging that they required the land for their personal cultivation."}}, {"text": "Krishnaji Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6678, "end_char": 6696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords, Vithal Kulkarni, Vasudeo Kulkarni and Krishnaji Kulkarni gave a: notice to Tukaram on 8th March, 1948 under Section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, alleging that they required the land for their personal cultivation."}}, {"text": "Tukaram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6715, "end_char": 6722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords, Vithal Kulkarni, Vasudeo Kulkarni and Krishnaji Kulkarni gave a: notice to Tukaram on 8th March, 1948 under Section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, alleging that they required the land for their personal cultivation.", "canonical_name": "Tukariim"}}, {"text": "8th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6726, "end_char": 6741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords, Vithal Kulkarni, Vasudeo Kulkarni and Krishnaji Kulkarni gave a: notice to Tukaram on 8th March, 1948 under Section 7(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, alleging that they required the land for their personal cultivation."}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6748, "end_char": 6760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tukaram Patla Power was a protected tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tukaram Patla Power was a protected tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6768, "end_char": 6792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7017, "end_char": 7033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on 25th April, 1949, the Kulkarni brothers filed Tenancy Case No."}}, {"text": "Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7039, "end_char": 7047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on 25th April, 1949, the Kulkarni brothers filed Tenancy Case No."}}, {"text": "Tukariim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7156, "end_char": 7164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "102 of 1949, before the Aval Karkun, to recover possession of the land from Tukariim.", "canonical_name": "Tukariim"}}, {"text": "AYal Karkuu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7204, "end_char": 7215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed by the AYal Karkuu on 29th August, 1949, but in Tenancy Appeal No."}}, {"text": "29th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed by the AYal Karkuu on 29th August, 1949, but in Tenancy Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Satara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1950 filed by the landlords, the Collector of South Satara, Sangli, by his order dated 9th May, 1950, directed that possession of the land should be given to the Kulkarni brothers."}}, {"text": "Sangli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7330, "end_char": 7336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1950 filed by the landlords, the Collector of South Satara, Sangli, by his order dated 9th May, 1950, directed that possession of the land should be given to the Kulkarni brothers."}}, {"text": "9th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7357, "end_char": 7370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1950 filed by the landlords, the Collector of South Satara, Sangli, by his order dated 9th May, 1950, directed that possession of the land should be given to the Kulkarni brothers."}}, {"text": "18th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7513, "end_char": 7528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords accordingly recovered possession of the land on 18th June, 1950."}}, {"text": "31st August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7547, "end_char": 7564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tukaram died on 31st August, 1951."}}, {"text": "18th April, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th April, 1961, Vasudeo Kulkarni executed a deed of conditional sale in favour of Sopan Power in respect of a joint 1/9th share in the land."}}, {"text": "Sopan Power", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th April, 1961, Vasudeo Kulkarni executed a deed of conditional sale in favour of Sopan Power in respect of a joint 1/9th share in the land."}}, {"text": "Sopan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7772, "end_char": 7777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was recited in the deed that possession was delivered to Sopan but that was disputed."}}, {"text": "27th June, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on 27th June, 1962, Sopan executed a deed of recoriveyance in favour of Vasudeo Kulkarni."}}, {"text": "16th April, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7904, "end_char": 7920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th April, 1962, Vithal Kulka.mi executed a deed of sale in respect of his 1/3rd share in the land in favour of Bapu Bhan More and Vilas Ganpatl More."}}, {"text": "Vithal Kulka.mi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7922, "end_char": 7937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th April, 1962, Vithal Kulka.mi executed a deed of sale in respect of his 1/3rd share in the land in favour of Bapu Bhan More and Vilas Ganpatl More.", "canonical_name": "Vithal Kulkarni"}}, {"text": "Bapu Bhan More", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8017, "end_char": 8031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th April, 1962, Vithal Kulka.mi executed a deed of sale in respect of his 1/3rd share in the land in favour of Bapu Bhan More and Vilas Ganpatl More.", "canonical_name": "Bapu Bhan More"}}, {"text": "Vilas Ganpatl More", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th April, 1962, Vithal Kulka.mi executed a deed of sale in respect of his 1/3rd share in the land in favour of Bapu Bhan More and Vilas Ganpatl More.", "canonical_name": "Vilas Ganapati More"}}, {"text": "7th July, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th July, 1962, Tukaram's heirs filed Tenancy Case No."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8182, "end_char": 8191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtrll\n\nRevenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8712, "end_char": 8742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlords and their alienees preferred Revision Applications before the Maharashtrll\n\nRevenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Sections 37 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8886, "end_char": 8904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8929, "end_char": 8963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tukaram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8966, "end_char": 8973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tukaram's heirs invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Tukariim"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9031, "end_char": 9042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act", "statute": "Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay by its judgmeut dated 11th November, 1968 allowed the Writ Petition, quashed the order of the Tribunal anj restored the order of the Aval Karkun as affirmed by the Special Deputy Collector."}}, {"text": "Bapu Bhau More", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The three Kulkarni brother~, Bapu Bhau More and Vilas Ganapati More, have preferred this appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "Bapu Bhan More"}}, {"text": "Vilas Ganapati More", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9329, "end_char": 9348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The three Kulkarni brother~, Bapu Bhau More and Vilas Ganapati More, have preferred this appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "Vilas Ganapati More"}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9401, "end_char": 9415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri M. C. Bhandare, learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the right of a protected tenant whose tenancy had been determined and who had been dispossessed of the land under Section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was a right which was personal to the tenant himself and, which could not for that reason be exercised by the tenant's heirs.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9578, "end_char": 9588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act", "statute": "Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10090, "end_char": 10100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He argued that whatever may be the right of the heirs of a protected tenant dying subsequent to the Amending Act", "statute": "He argued that whatever may be the right of the heirs of a protected tenant dying subsequent to the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Agricultural Lands Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10128, "end_char": 10150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11096, "end_char": 11106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11299, "end_char": 11323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11354, "end_char": 11382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11385, "end_char": 11428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11430, "end_char": 11441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Sections 3 to 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11615, "end_char": 11624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "1st January, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11829, "end_char": 11846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3\n\n(I) 71 B.L.R. 12\n\n17-253SC1/79\n\nclassified a tenant as a protected tenant in respect of any land if he had held such land continuously for a period of six years immediately preceding 1st January 1938 to 1st January, 1945 and had cultivated such land personally during the aforesaid period."}}, {"text": "Section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11916, "end_char": 11926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12157, "end_char": 12166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12645, "end_char": 12654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12929, "end_char": 12938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13647, "end_char": 13656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13768, "end_char": 13777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13782, "end_char": 13794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14021, "end_char": 14030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14411, "end_char": 14435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14470, "end_char": 14517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14577, "end_char": 14586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14590, "end_char": 14600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14672, "end_char": 14682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14686, "end_char": 14696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14990, "end_char": 15000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15014, "end_char": 15023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15433, "end_char": 15445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15533, "end_char": 15543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15545, "end_char": 15557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15734, "end_char": 15748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15750, "end_char": 15760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16023, "end_char": 16033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16136, "end_char": 16146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 3, 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16231, "end_char": 16245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16258, "end_char": 16282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16284, "end_char": 16293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16415, "end_char": 16428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16683, "end_char": 16730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16748, "end_char": 16760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16768, "end_char": 16792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16794, "end_char": 16804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16910, "end_char": 16920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17604, "end_char": 17616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17741, "end_char": 17750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17808, "end_char": 17817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17866, "end_char": 17875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17929, "end_char": 17939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18058, "end_char": 18068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18314, "end_char": 18324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18479, "end_char": 18489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18515, "end_char": 18524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18810, "end_char": 18832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18888, "end_char": 18897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19050, "end_char": 19060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19220, "end_char": 19230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19305, "end_char": 19315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19362, "end_char": 19372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19428, "end_char": 19438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19483, "end_char": 19493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19516, "end_char": 19526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19869, "end_char": 19879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20022, "end_char": 20032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20113, "end_char": 20123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21007, "end_char": 21017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "position was clear under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22199, "end_char": 22252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22272, "end_char": 22281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position was clear under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "The position was clear under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22395, "end_char": 22407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position was clear under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "The position was clear under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22413, "end_char": 22479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22532, "end_char": 22542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22547, "end_char": 22557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 4B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22637, "end_char": 22647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22762, "end_char": 22772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 37(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23025, "end_char": 23038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Kotwal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23223, "end_char": 23229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Vasant Hariba Londhe v. Jagannath Ramchandra Ku/c\n\nkarni(') came to the same conclusion, Kotwal, C.J. observed:\n\n\"Section 40(1) provides that where a tenant other than a permanent tenant dies, the landlord shall be deemed to have continued the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which such tenant was holding it at the time of his death, to such heir or heirs o!"}}, {"text": "Section 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23248, "end_char": 23261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "The position under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23642, "end_char": 23665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23953, "end_char": 23957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24115, "end_char": 24140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24831, "end_char": 24835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Amending Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24862, "end_char": 24887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25347, "end_char": 25357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Amending Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25471, "end_char": 25481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Amending Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25675, "end_char": 25685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Amending Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25779, "end_char": 25789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Amending Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26106, "end_char": 26116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26432, "end_char": 26441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karkhanis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26838, "end_char": 26847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Karkhanis, learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision of this Court in Damadilal & Ors."}}, {"text": "A. C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27365, "end_char": 27376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed by A. C. Gupta, J., as follows :\n\n\"We find it difficult to appreciate how in this country we can proceed on the basis that a tenant whose contractual tenancy has determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute, has no right of property but only a personal right to remain in occupation, without ascertaining what hi~ rights are under the statute."}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29468, "end_char": 29478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is therefore necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "statute": "It is therefore necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29858, "end_char": 29867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30468, "end_char": 30478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30603, "end_char": 30613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30983, "end_char": 30993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31021, "end_char": 31031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31093, "end_char": 31103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31243, "end_char": 31271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31347, "end_char": 31353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_584_598_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "PARAMJIT SINGH SANDHU AND ORS. ETC.\n\nRAM RAKHA AND ORS. ETC.\n\nMarch 22, 1979\n\n[P. N. SH!NGl!AL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Police Rule, s, 1959, Ru{, e3 3, 6, 8 and 10 Construction of-U'hen appointnients to a post are from t1ro different sources, one by promotion\n\nand another by direct recruitn1ent according to quota rule, whether the quota rule would operate at both the stages of recruitn1ent and confinnation or at the stage of initial recruitn1ent only.\n\nDeemed confirmation after the expiry of the period of probation and cases when an express order of confirmation is necessary, pointed out.\n\nUnder the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959, recruitment to Punjah Police Service (Deputy Superintendent of Police) is made from tv10 sources, namely 80% by promotion and 20% through direct recruitment. lfnder R.u1e\n\n10, seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Pplice is reckoned accofding to the date of confirmation.\n\nConsideration for nomination to Indian Police Service is done according to seniority-cum-merit.\n\nRespondent~ 1 and 2 in C.A. 2903/78 who were promotees to the cadre of Deputy Superintendents of Police in February, 1961 and January, 1961 respectively v.ere not confirmed even though appellan~ and resp:>ndents 5 to 8 who were recruited to the sa1ne cadre by direct appointment con1m1!ncing from May, 1961 to May, 1965 were confirmed.\n\nThey, theref.::>re, filed a Writ Pe!ition praying for a direction to con.firm them in the Pun, iab Police Service, adhering to the quota rule at the time of confirmation as wdl. Ttey alleged that a~ eniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police is reckoned under rule 10, according to date of confirmation failure to confirm in the post-available to them in breach of the relevant rules, had resulted' in the denial of equality of opportunity in public service enshrined in Art. 15 of the Constitution at the time of consideration of their cases for non1ination to the Indian Police Service which i~ done according to seniority-cutnmerit.\n\nAllov.'ing the Writ Petition and directing the State to confirm them, the learned single judge held that the quota rule would operate not only at the time of initial recruitment but also at the time of confirmatioll, as he was of the opinion that the quota-rule i~ linked with the seniority rule.\n\nTwo Letter~ Patent Appeals, one filed by appellant No. 1 and another by the State, were heard along with another Writ Petition filed by one Ram Rakha urging identical contentions.\n\nThe Writ Petition was allowed and the appeals were dismissed by a common judgment modifying the directioa given by the learned single judge to the extent that the State should consider B the case of the Writ petitioners for confirmation afresh according to quota rule and then refix their inter-se seniority.\n\nDismissing the appeals, by special leave the Court\n\nP. S. SANDHU V. RAM RAKHA 585\n\nHELD : 1. When a first appointment or promotion i! made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only in the absence of any communication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the Service Rules.\n\nIn such a case, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post.\n\nFrom the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specific period of probation he should not be deemed to have been confirmed.\n\nThis is so, when the relevant rules permitted extension of the Probationary period for an indefinite time. [592 A-CJ\n\nSukhbans Singh v. State of Puniab, [1963] 1 SCR 416, G. S. Ramaswamy\n\nv. The Inspector General of Police, Mysore State Bangalore, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 278; State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali, [1966] 3 SCR 821; referred to.\n\n2. Where the rules provide for a fixed period of probation with a power in the' Government to extend it up to a specific period and not any unlimited period, either by express provision or by necessary implication, at the end of such specified period beyond which the Government had no power to extend the probation, the probationer, if he continues beyond that period, 'lhould be deemed to have been confirmed in the post. [592 C-E]\n\nState of Punjab v. Dharam Singh. [1968) 3 SCR I explained.\n\n3. Rule 8 of the Punjab Service Rules, 1959 prescribe!. a period of probation of two years and the proviso confers power to extend the period of probation by not beyond one year meaning thereby that in any case the E Government would not have the power to extend the period of probation beyond a• period of three years.\n\n[593 A-BI\n\nIn this situation, (a) the ratio of Dharani Singh's case would muratis 1nurandis apply and the direct recruits who completed the period of probation of tw'O years and in the absence of an extension of probationary period would be deemed to be confirmed by necessary implication. [593 B-C]\n\n(b) If seniority is to be reckoned from the date of confirmation and if promotees are not confirmed for years together in some cases, while direct recruits who came much later got confirmed and .i'pso facto became senior to the pron1otees, if quota rule is only applied at the time of initial rei.:.ruit ment, this undesirable result i!. wholly unavoidable. [593 C-D]\n\n4. Where recruitment to a cadre is from two sources and the Service Rules precribe quota for recruitment for both sources, a question would\n\nalwas anse, whether the quota rule would apply at the initial stage of\n\nrecru1rnent or als~ at the stage of confirmation. Ordinarily, if quota is prescnbed for recruitment to a cadre, the quota rule \\vill have to be observed at the recruitment stage. The quota would then be c0--related to vacancies to be filled in by recruitment but after recruitment is made from two different .sources they will have to be integrated into a cow.man cadre and while so doing the question of their inter se seniority would surface. [593 F-G]\n\nT '\n\nSeniority is ordinarily determined from the date of entry into cadre on the principle of continuous officiation. Confirmation in a post would ordinari~ ly depend upon such circumstances as satisfactory completion of probationary period, efficiency in the discharge of duty, capacity to discharge functions of the post, availability of permanent vacancy etc. Now, if seniority is to be determined according to the date of confirmation and the quota rule '.s not made relatable to confirmation in various posts falling vacant in the cadre it would directly impinge upon the seniority of members of the service. [593 G- H. 594 Al\n\nS. B. Patwardhan and Ors. etc. v. State of 'A1aharashtra, [1977] 3 SCR 77 5 @ 797; referred to.\n\n5. A harmonious reading of rules 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10 makes it clear that the qllota rule is operative both at the time of initial recruitment and .ot the time of confirmation. The recruitment to Punjab Police Service is from two sources.\n\nRecruits from both the sources have to be on probation.\n\nAdcpting the construction that the proviso to Rule 8(b) permitting a maximum period of probation of three years at the end of which the direct recruit\n\nv;1ould automatically be confirmed unless his services are dispensed with simultaneously enjoying seniority from the date of such automatic confirmation without applying quota rule at the time of confirmation, would put the promotee to an unintended disadvantage who may be continued in an officiating capacity without confirming him and consequently denying or relegating him do\\vn in seniority for years as has happened in the case of respondeets 1 and 2.\n\nSuch an approach would be wholly unreasonable more so ¥.'hen 1 here was not the slightest suggestion that their services were not satisfactory and that the confirmation was denied on , any such ground, thereby directly affecting their places in the seniority list. [594 C-F, H]\n\nIf the other view that the quota rule would apply both at the tim1! of recruitment and at the time of confirmation, is adopted rule 10 which provides for seniority according to the date of confirmation would certainly be saved from the vice of unreasonableness. [594 G]\n\nThe quota rule is linked up with the seniority rule.\n\nQuota rule is linked up with seniority rule because, not the date of entry in service determines the seniority but the date of confirmation determines seniority. Quota rule being inextricably intertwined with the seniority rule any delinking \\vould render the seniority rule wholly unreasonable. After recduitment, members of the service, though drawn from two different sources-direct recruits and promotees-constitute a single integrated cadre.\n\nThey discharge identical functions, bear similar responsibilities and, acquire an equal amount of experience in the respective assignments.\n\nIf quota rule were to be applied at the stage of initial recruitment and wholly ignored at the time of confirmation the rule would suffer from the vice of unreasonableness and would offend Art. 16, because, in that event, while direct recruits would get confirmation automatically, the promotees would hang out for years as has happened , in the case of respondents 1 and 2 and if they are not confirmed they would never get seniority and their chances of being considered for promotion to the higher post would be wholly jeopardised. [595 A-B. C, D-E]\n\n• S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors. [1967] 2 SCR 703 @ 717 and 718; S. B. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 3 SCR 775 @ 797; followed.\n\n.. t\n\nP. s. SANDHU v. RAM RAKllA (Desai, /.) 587\n\n6. \\Vhere recruitment is from two sources and the seniority in the cadre i8 determined according to the date of confirmation to accord utmost fair treatment a rotational system bas to be followed while giving confirmation.\n\nThe quota rule would apply to vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. If the quota rule is strictly adhered to there will be no difficulty ln giving confirmation keeping in view the quota rule even at the time of confirmation.\n\nA roster is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every time which post has fallen vacant and the recruit from that source has to be confirmed in the post available to the source. This system would breakdown the moment recruitment from either source in excess of the quota is made. In fact a strict adherance to the quota rule at the time of recruitment would introduce no difficulty in applying the rule at the time of confirmation because vacancies would be available for confirmation to persons belonging to different sources of recruitment. The difficulty would arise when recruitment in excess of the quota is made and it would further Le accentuated when recruits from one source viz. direct recruits get auton1atic confirn1ation on completion of the probationary period, while the promotees hang out for years together before being confirmed. [596 F-H, 597 A-BJ\n\nMrvyn Couthzdo and Ors. v.\n\nCollector of Custonis, Bombay and Ors., [1966] 2 SCR 600; A .. K. Subraman and Ors. v. Union of Indian and Ors., D [1975] 2 SCR 979; explained and distinguished .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2902-2903 of 1977.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated E 3-11-1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6781/74.\n\nY. S. Chitale, M. N. Phadke and P. C. Bhartari (In CA 2903 /77) for the Appellants .\n\nG. L. Sanghvi, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for RR 1-2.\n\nR. S. Sodhi for the State of Punjab.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-These two appeals by special leave arise from a common judgment rendered by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 560 and 564 of 1974 and Civil Writ No. 6781/74. The controversy raised in these appeals turns upon the construction of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959 ('Service Rules' for short).\n\nA few relevant facts as alleged by respondents 1 and 2 in Civil Appeal No. 2903/78 who moved Civil Writ No. 825 of 1972 in the High Court would highlight the problem posed in these appeals.\n\nRespondents 1 and 2, Gurdip Singh and Dalip Singh, filed a writ petition nnder Article 226 of the Constitution against lhe State of Punjab, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, and six others including the present appellants, praying for a direction to confirm them in Punjab Police Service. Respondents 1 and 2 alleged that they were promotees to !he cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police of Februaiy, 1961 and January, 1961 respectively having been brought on 'G' List by an order dated 23rd February 1961 of the State of Punjab and the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, respondents 3 and 4 herein.\n\nAppellants and respondents 5 to 8 were recruited to tile same cadre by direct appointment commencing from May, 1961 to May, 1965.\n\nThe grievance of respondents 1 and 2 in the petition filed by them\n\nwas that recruitment to Punjab Police Service is made from two sources, namely, 80% by promotion and 20% by direct appointment but this quota rule is not adhered to at the time of confirmation in the 'service and, therefore, even though they were members of the service since a period earlier to appellants and respondents 5 to 8, they were not confirmed though the latter were confirmed and as seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police is reckoned under rule 10 according to date of confirmation, the failure to confirm them in the post available to them, in breach of the relevant rules, has denied to them equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution to be considered for nomination to Indian Police Service which E is done according to seniority-cum-merit.\n\nThe State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, on the one hand and the direct recruits on the other contested the writ petition, inter alia, contending that the quota applies at the stag<' of initial recruitment and not at the time of confirmation and there is no allegation that the quota rule was violated at the time of initial recruitment.\n\nIt was further contended that no one can claim to be confirmed as a matter of right and, therefore, the writ petition is misconceived.\n\nDirect recruits to the post of Dy. Superintendent of Police, appellants and respondents 5 to 8 further contended that the petitioners were promoted on officiating basis against temporary posts and as there were no permanent posts available, they could not be confirmed till substantive vacancies in the permanent strength of the cadre were available and till confirmation their seniority having t) be reckoned from the date of confirmation, they cannot claim to be senior to the direct recruits on the principle of continuous officiation.\n\nThe writ petition came up before a learned single Judge of the High Court who was of the opinion that the quota rule is linked with the seniority rule and in order to give a reasonable interoretation and\n\n.., I\n\n( \\\n\nin order not to make the seniority rule unreasonable, upon a proper\n\ncontruction it must be held .1hat the quota rule would operate not only at the time of initial recruitment but also at the time of confirmation.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion the learned single Judge relied upon two decisions of this Court in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India &\n\nOrs.,(') and Mervyn Coutindo & Ors. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay & Ors., (2 ) and some other decisions of other High Courts. The learned single Judge accordingly gave a direction that the writ petitioners, respondents 1 and 2 herein, should be confirmed.\n\nTwo appeals being Letters Patent Appeal No. 560/74 by the present apgellant 1 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 564/74 by the State of Punjab and the Inspector General of Police, Punjab,, were preferred.\n\nOne Rakha Ram filed Civil Writ No. 6781/74 raising identical contentions and\n\nthiS writ petition was referred to the Division Bench before which the aforementioned two Letters Patent Appeals came up for hearing The Court by a common judgment disposed of all the three matters.\n\nBoth the Letters Patent Appeals were dismissed and Civil Writ No. 6781/74 by Ram Rakha was allowed, but the direction given by the learned single Judge was modified to the extent that the State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, should consider the cases of writ petitioners 1 and 2 for confirmation and to fix their seniority afresh according to the quota rule.\n\nThe present two appeals arise from this common judgment preferred by the direct recrnits. It may be mentioned that neither the State of Punjab nor the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, have questioned the decision of the High Court though at the hearing of these appeals Mr. R. S. Sodhi appeared for the State of Punjab and supported the contentions canvassed on behalf of the appellants .\n\nAs the main controversy turns upon the construction of rules 3, 6, 8 and 10 of the Service Rules it would be advantageous to get a clear picture of the relevant rules. The Service Rules provide for constitution, recruitment, qualifications for being members of the service, probation, pay, seniority and discipline of the members of the Service.\n\nRule 3 provides that the Service shall comprise of the posts specified in Appendix 'A' to the Service Rules.\n\nDesignation of the Post in Appendix 'A' is shown to be Deputy Superintendent of Police and the strength of the cadre is shown as 66. The State Government, under rule 5, is the appointing authority to the Service. Rule 6 provides for method of recruitment from two different sources, viz., 80% by promotion from the rank of Inspectors and 20% by direct recruitment. It also prescribes eligibility qualification for promotees.\n\nSub-\n\n(!) [1967] 2 SCR 703.\n\n~2) [1966] 2 SCR 600.\n\nrule (2) of rule 6 provides that appointment by promotion shall bi' made by he Government from Inspectors brought on List 'G' and the\n\nmethod of drawing up of List 'G'. Sub-rule (3) provides that direct appointment to the Service shall be made upon the result of a competitive examination conducted by .the Punjab Public Service Commission ('Commission' for short) and further confers power on the Government in consultation with the Commission to frame necessary rules relating to examination. Rule 7 prescribes qualifications of physical fitness.\n\nRule 8 provides that members of the Service shall be on probation for two years which shall include the period of training at the Police Training School, Phillaur, and in the districts and in the case of members recruited by promotion the Government may by a\n\nspecial order in each case permit periods of officiating appointment to the Service to count towards the period of probation. There is a provisoto the rule which enables the Government to extend the period of probation by not more than one year. Rnle 9 provides for pay of members of the Service. Rule I 0 provides for seniority of members to be reckoned by the date of confirmation in the Service.\n\nDr. Chitaley followed by Mr. Phadke, urged that the vires, validity or reasonableness of rule 10 having not been challenged, it was not open to the High Court to put upon rules, 6, 8 and 10 a construction on the supposed unreasonableness of rule 10 if it is interpreted by giving the language therein used its ordinary grammatical meaning.\n\nThe High Court applied the quota rule even at the stage of confirmation to avoid the vice of unreasonableness which, in the opinion of the High Court, would be implicit in rule 10 if any other view were taken.\n\nThe rules provide for constitution of Service and the Service shall comprise of the posts specified in Appendix 'A' to the rules.\n\nAt the relevant time the sanctioned strength of the Service was 66 posts.\n\nThere is a proviso to rule 3 which enables the Government to make additions to or reductions in the number of such posts whether permanently or temporarily.\n\nRule 6 which provides for method of recruitment in terms says that recruitment to the Service shall be made : (i) 80% by promotion from the rank of Inspectors; and (ii) 20% by direct appointment. Thus there is recruitment to the Service from two independent sources, viz., promotion and direct recruitment.\n\nOnce recruitment to any given cadre is from two sources oliviouilly after recruitment is ma:de from two sonrces they have to be integrated into one cadre which also necessitates providing for their inter se seniority.\n\nRule 10 provides that the seniority of the\n\n• • 1/\n\n• ~\n\n'.\\' f' i\n\n\\~ ' ..\n\nmembers of the Service shall be determined by the date of confirmation in the Service.\n\nThere is a proviso to rule 10 which is not material for the present discussion.\n\nOn behalf of the promotees it was contended that if seniority is to be reckoned from the date of confirmation in the Service, confirmation must be made available to recruits from both the sources, viz., promotees and direct recruits. It was further contended that if on satisfactory completion of probation a direct recruit is confirmed or is deemed to be confirmed and a promotee who can be continued in an officiating capacity for any length of time without considering his case for confirmation, promotees would be put at a serious disadvantage because for further promotion or what is styled as nomination to Indian Police Service, seniority-cum-merit being the criterian and the basic £adre being the cadre 'of Deputy Superintendent of Police from which nomination is to be made, their case would not come up for consideration as they are not confirmed. They pointed out that in 1971 their names were reconunended by Deparmental Committee set up for the purpo'se but the State Government turned down their names on\n\nthe only ground that they were not confirmed. It is clear from Rule 8 that both promotees and direct recruits would be on probation for two ye!lfs and in case of promotees the Government may by special order in each case permit periods of officiating appointments to the Service to count towards the period of probation.\n\nClause (b) of rule 8 provides that the services of _a member recruited by direct appointment may be dispensed with by the Government on his failing to pass the final examination at the end of bis period of training or on bis being reported on, during or at the end of his period of probation, as unfit for appointment.\n\nThere is a proviso at the end of sub-rule (b) which reads as under :\n\n\"Provided that the Government may, if it deems fit, extend the period of probation by not more than one year.\"\n\nThere is some controversy between the parties whether the proviso is to operate as proviso to rule S(a) and 8(b) both or only to rule\n\nS(b).\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the direct recruits that once a ,,. specific period of probation is fixed and a fetter is put on the power of the Government to extend probation only by a specific period, at the end of such extended period either the service of the direct recruit is to be dispensed with on thr ground that he was unfit for appoint- H • ment or if he is continued thereafter he must be deemed to have been confirmed and the date next after the day of expiry of his ordinary or 18-253SCI j79 _ ·\n\nextended period of probation would be the date of his confirmation.\n\nThis Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only in' the absence of any communication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the Service Rules.\n\nIn such a case an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee & substantive right to the post and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specific period of probation it is not possible to hold that he 'should be deemed to have been confirmed.\n\nThis view was taken in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Pun; ab('1); G. S.\n\nRamaswamy v. The Inspector General of Police, Mysore State, Bangalore(2); and State of U. P. v. Akbar Ali( 3). This view was founded upon the relevant rules which permitted extension of the probationary period for an indefinite time.\n\nIn fact there was no negative rule in tl1ese cases prohibiting the Government from extending the probationary period beyond a certain maximum period. However, where the rules provide for a fixed period of probation with a power in the Government to extend it up to a specific period and not any unlimited period, either by express provision or by necessary implication, at the end of such specified period beyond which the Government had no power to extend the probation, the probationer if he continues beyond that period, should be deemed to have been confirmed in the post.\n\nThis Court in State of Punjab v.\n\nDharam Singh( 4); after taking into consideration rule 6(3) of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961, which provided for either dispensing with the services of the person appointed to the post on probation if his work was found to be unsatisfactory or to extend the period of probation for such period as may be deemed fit or revert him to his former post if he was promoted from some lower post, provided that the total period of probation including the extensions if any, shall not exceed three years, held that the Service\n\nRules fixed a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended and if an employee appointed or promoted to a post is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication.\n\nIn such a case the Court held it is permissible to\n\n(1) [1963] I SCR 416.\n\n(2) [1964] 6 SCR 278.\n\n(3) [19661 3 SCR 821.\n\n(4) [1968] 3 SCR !.\n\ndraw an inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of pr<'bation has been confirmed in the post by implication.\n\nRule 8 of the Service Rules presciibes the period of probation of two years and the proviso confers power to extend the period of probation by not beyoDd one year meaning thereby that fn any case the Government wor Id not have the power to extend the period of probation beyond a period of three years.\n\nIn ttJs situation the ratio in Dharam Singh's case (supra) would mutatis mutandis apply and it will have to be held that the direct recruit who completed the period of probation of two years and in the absence of an extension of probationary period, would be deemed to be confirmed by necessary implication.\n\nRespondents 5 to 8 direct recruits have accordingly been confirmed on expiry of the period of probation of two years.\n\nNow if seniority is to be reckoned from the date of confirmation and if promotees are not confirmed for years together in some cases, to wit, respondents 1 and 2 who were promotees of February and January, 1961 respectively, were not confirmed till they filed the writ petition in 1972 while direct recruits who came much later got confirmed and ipso facto became senior to the promotees, if q11'1ta rule is only applied, as is contended on behalf of the appellants and the State of Punjab, at the time of initial recruitment, this undesirable result is wholly unavoidable.\n\nMr. G. L. Sanghi learned counsel for the interveners and the pro- E motees contended that the framers of the rule could not have intended to accord such a discriminatory treatment to the promotees in whose favour the quota is as big as 80 % of the total strength.\n\nWhere recruitment to a cadre is from two sources and the Service Rules prescribe quota for recruitment for both sources a question would always arise whether the quota rule would apply at the initial stage of recruitment or also at the stage of confirmation.\n\nOrdinarily, if quota is prescribed for recruitment to a cadre, the quota rule will have to be observed at the recruitment stage.\n\nThe quota would then be co-related to vacancies to be filled in by recruitment but after recruitment is made from two different sources they will have to be integrated into a common cadre and while so doing, the question of their inter se seniority would surface.\n\nSeniority is ordinarily determined from the date of entry into cadre on the principle of continuous officiation.\n\nConfirmation in a post would ordinarily depend upon such circumstances as satisfactory completion of probationary period, efficiency in the discharge of duty, capacity to discharge functions of the pos', availability of pel1llanent vacancy, etc.\n\nNow, if seniority is to be determined ccording to the date of confirmation and the quota rule\n\nis not made relatable to confirmation in various posts falling vacant in the cadre it would directly impinge upon the seniority of members of the service. In a slightly different form this question came before this Court in S. B. Patwardhan & Ors. etc. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,,(') in which vires of rule 8(iii) of 1960 Rules were questioned.\n\nRule 8 (iii) of the 1960 Rules provided that probationers recruited directly to the Bombay Service of Engineers Class II Cadre m any year shall, in a bunch, be placed senior to promotees confirmed during ihat year.\n\nStriking down this rule as violative of Article 16 this Court held that the rule leaves the valuable right of seniority to depend upon the mere accident of confirmation.\n\nThe recruitment to Punjab Police Service is from two sources.\n\nRecruits from both the sources have to be on probation.\n\nAdopting the construction as canvassed for and on behalf of direct recruits that the proviso to rule 8 (b) permitting a maximnm period of probation of three years at the end of which the direct recruit automalically be confirmed unless his services are dispensed with simultaneously enjoying seniority from the date of such automatic confirmation without applying quota rule at the time of confirmation, would put the promotee\n\nto an unintended disadvantage who may be continued in an officiating capacity without confirming him and consequently denying or relegating him down in seniority for years as has happened in the case of respondents 1 and 2.\n\nAppellants who were recruited to the Service after respondents 1 and 2, came to be confirmed at the end of two years' period of probation while respondents 1 and 2 were not confirmed after more than 11 years of officiating service and there it not the slightest suggestion that the services of respondents 1 and 2 were not satisfactory and that the confirmation was denied on any snch ground thereby directly affecting their place in the seniority list. Such an approach would be wholly unreasonable.\n\nNow, if the other view is taken that the quota rule would apply both at the time of recruitment and at the time of confirmation, rule to which provides for seniority according to the date of confirmation would certainly be save from the vice of unreasonableness.\n\nIs such a construction possible? One need not stretch the language to bring about the desired result but in this case upon a harmonious reading of rules 3, 6, 8 and 10, the conclusion is inescapable that quota rule is operative both at the time of initial recruilinent and at the time of confirmlltion. If the rule of seniority were one otherwise than according to date of confirmation it would not have become necessary to\n\n\n- ' t\n\nap, rly the quota rule at the stage of confirmation but in this ca5c the quota rule is linked up with the seniority rule and unless the quota rule is strictly observed in practice it will be difficult to hold that the seniority rule is not unreasonable and does not offend Article 16 (see S. G. Jaisinghani's case (supra) at pp. 7.17 and 718).\n\nQuota rule is linked up with seniority rule because, not the date of entry in service determines the seniority but the date of confirmation determines seniority and, therefore, quota rule is inextricably intertwined with the seniority rule and any delinking would render the seniority rule wholly unreasonable.\n\nAny other view would lead to the most_ undesirable result wholly unintended by the framers of the rule.\n\nIt must be re membered. that after recruitment, members of the service, though drawn from two different sources-direct recruits and promotees-constitute a single integrated cadre.\n\nThey discharge identical functions, bear similar responsibilities and acquire an equal amount of experience in the respective assignments. In this background in S. B. Patwardhan's case (supra) tliis Court held that if the promotees are treated with an evil eye and an unequal hand in the matter of seniority as was done under rule 8(iii), the rule would suffer from the vice of unreasonable.. ness and would offend Article 16 and it was actually struck down. Ari exactly identical situation would follow here if quota rule is applied at the stage of initial recruitment and wholly ignored at the time of confirmation because in that event while direct recruits will get confirmation antomatically, the promotees would hang out for years as has happened in the case of respondents 1 and 2 and if they are not confirmed they would never get seniority and their chances of being considered for promotion to the higher post would be wholly jeopardised. To avoid this utterly unconsciounable outcome the construction we have put on rule 8 would be in consonance with justice and reason.\n\nIt may be pointed out that where recruitment is from two sources and the seniority in the cadre is determined according to the date of confirmation, to accord utmost fair treatment a rotational system has to be followed while giving confirmation.\n\nThe quota rule would apply to vacancies and recruitment ha' to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. If the quota rule is strictly adhered to there will be no difficulty in giving confirmation keeping in view the quota rule even at the time of confirmation.\n\nA roster is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every time which post has fallen vacant and the recrnit from that source has to be confirmed in the post available to the source.\n\nThis system would breakdown the moment recrnitment from either source in excess of the quota is made. In fact a strict adherence to the quota\n\nrule at the time of recruitment would introduce no difficulty in applying the rule at. the time of confirmation because vacancies would be available for confirmation to persons belonging to different sources of recruitment.\n\nThe difficulty arises when recruitment in excess of the quota is made and it is further accentuated when recruits from one source, to wit, in this case direct recruits get automatic confirmation on completion of the probationary period while the promotees hang out for years together before being confirmed.\n\nIn Mervyn Coutindo's case (supra) this Court in terms said that rotational system of fixing seniority meaning thereby confirmation followed by seniority does not\n\noffend equality of opportunity in Government service and recruitment not following the fixed quota rule need not be a ground for doing away with rotational system.\n\nIt was, however, contended that in A. K. Subral'nan & Ors. etc. v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors.,.(') this Court in terms has held that when recruitment is from two sources and the quota rule is enforced, the same will have. to be enforced at the time of initial recruitment in officiating capacity and not at the time of confirmation. It was, therefore, said that it would be contrary to settled law to hold that quota rule will also operate at the time of confirmation. Now, the observation of the Court is in the context of Central Engineering Service (Class I) Recruitment Rules, 1954, which came up for interpretation before the Court in that case.\n\nThe recruitment was from three different sources, viz., by competitive examination, by promotion and .by transfer.\n\nRule 4 provided that 75 % of the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer Class I shall be filled by promotion of Assistant Executive Engineers Cla.ss I, the rest of the vacancies being filled by promotion and/ or by transfer in accordance with Parts IV and V of the Rules respfctively.\n\nThe general seniority rule which was held applicable in that case was that seniority should be determined on the basis of length of service in that grade or a service in an equivalent grade irrespective of whether the latter was under Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan. It is in the context of these rules the question whether the quota rule should be applied at the stage of initial recruitment or confirmation came up for consideration. Unlike the rule in the present case seniority was not dependent on confirmation but seniority was dependent upon continuous officiation in the cadre.\n\nIn this background this Court held that the quota has to be enforced at the time of initial recruitment in officiating capacity and not at the time of confirmation. The situation in the case nnder discussion is materially different.\n\nTherefore, it cannot be said that ignoring the\n\n(!) [1975) 2 S.C.R. 1975.\n\n• cl (\n\nrule a proposition of universal application has been laid down that whenever there is a quota prescribed for recruitment to a cadre it can only apply at the time of initial recruitment and not at the time of confirmation.\n\nEverything will depend upon the whole body of rules and harmonious construction has to be put upon the rules so as to avoid the possibility of a ru)e becoming unreasonable.\n\nThis Court while saying in Subraman's case (supra) that quota rule has to be adhered to and enforced at the time of initial recruitment re-affirmed the observation in Mervyn Coutindo's case (supra) that there is no inherent invalidity in introduction of quota system and to work it out by rule of rotation.\n\nWhen it is said that the confirmation shall follow the quota rule it is in terms being stated that the rotational system should be followed at the time of confirmation so as to make quota rule effective and seniority rule reasonable because all the three are interlinked.\n\nUndoubtedly, the decision in Subraman's case was in terms affirmed in Patwardhan's case (supra) but the scheme of rules in Patwardhan's case (supra) was more or less similar to the one that was examined by this Court in Subraman' s case. ~\n\nMr. Sanghi also urged that the language of Rule 8(a) would unmistakably show that members of Service recruited from eitlier source would be on probation for a period of two years and this would imply that promotees would also be on probation for a period of two years.\n\nApproaching the matter from this angle he further urged that proviso to rule 8 (b) which permits extension of probation only by one year without expressly referring to direct recruits would govern both promotees and direct recruits and in that view of the matter promotees would also be deemed to be confirmed on the expiry of period of probation.\n\nThis contention overlooks the latter Part of rule 8(a) which provides that in case of promotees the Government may by special order in each case permit periods of officiating appointments to the Service to count towards the period of probation. It appears that both promotees and direct recruits to Service would be on probation.\n\nBut the latter part of rule 8-(a) comprehends Inspectors being promoted on officiating basis.\n\nUnless there is a temporary addition to the strength of the cadre such officiating appointment by promotion would not make the promotee a member of the service in view of Rule 3.\n\nIn order to avoid any injustice to such promotees the Government may make an order to treat officiating service to count towards probation.\n\nIn the absence of such order the officiating service would not count towards probation and such appointment would not make the promotcc\n\na member of the service.\n\nIn that event his case would not be covered\n\nA by the proviso to rule 8(a). Therefore, the contention cannot be accepted.\n\nThe High Court was, therefore, right in concluding that the quota rule would operate at both the stages.\n\nAccordingly both these appea:'s fail and are dismissed but in the circumstances of the case with no B order as to costs.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n. \\. - ' \\", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "PARAMJIT SINGH SANDHU AND ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PARAMJIT SINGH SANDHU AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM RAKHA AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM RAKHA AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 22, 1979\n\n[P. N. SH!NGl!AL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 613, "end_char": 646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjah Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959, recruitment to Punjah Police Service (Deputy Superintendent of Police) is made from tv10 sources, namely 80% by promotion and 20% through direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Rakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and another by the State, were heard along with another Writ Petition filed by one Ram Rakha urging identical contentions.", "canonical_name": "RAM RAKHA"}}, {"text": "P. S. SANDHU V. RAM RAKHA 585", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the appeals, by special leave the Court\n\nP. S. SANDHU V. RAM RAKHA 585\n\nHELD : 1."}}, {"text": "[1963] 1 SCR 416", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3733, "end_char": 3749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. S. Ramaswamy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3751, "end_char": 3766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "592 A-CJ\n\nSukhbans Singh v. State of Puniab, [1963] 1 SCR 416, G. S. Ramaswamy\n\nv. The Inspector General of Police, Mysore State Bangalore, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 278; State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali, [1966] 3 SCR 821; referred to."}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R. 278", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 821", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3877, "end_char": 3893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Service Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4421, "end_char": 4447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dharani Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4772, "end_char": 4785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[593 A-BI\n\nIn this situation, (a) the ratio of Dharani Singh's case would muratis 1nurandis apply and the direct recruits who completed the period of probation of tw'O years and in the absence of an extension of probationary period would be deemed to be confirmed by necessary implication. [", "canonical_name": "Dharani Singh"}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 SCR 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 7009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The recruitment to Punjab Police Service is from two sources."}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9082, "end_char": 9089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 703", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9494, "end_char": 9510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 SCR 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9568, "end_char": 9584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 SCR 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11139, "end_char": 11155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 979", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11214, "end_char": 11230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11478, "end_char": 11491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, M. N. Phadke and P. C. Bhartari (In CA 2903 /77) for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11493, "end_char": 11505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, M. N. Phadke and P. C. Bhartari (In CA 2903 /77) for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11510, "end_char": 11524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, M. N. Phadke and P. C. Bhartari (In CA 2903 /77) for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11564, "end_char": 11577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghvi, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for RR 1-2.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Sanghvi"}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghvi, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for RR 1-2.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghvi, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for RR 1-2.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11622, "end_char": 11633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Sodhi for the State of Punjab.", "canonical_name": "R. S. Sodhi"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11704, "end_char": 11709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-These two appeals by special leave arise from a common judgment rendered by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Gurdip Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 1 and 2, Gurdip Singh and Dalip Singh, filed a writ petition nnder Article 226 of the Constitution against lhe State of Punjab, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, and six others including the present appellants, praying for a direction to confirm them in Punjab Police Service."}}, {"text": "Dalip Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12286, "end_char": 12297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 1 and 2, Gurdip Singh and Dalip Singh, filed a writ petition nnder Article 226 of the Constitution against lhe State of Punjab, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, and six others including the present appellants, praying for a direction to confirm them in Punjab Police Service."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12327, "end_char": 12338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The controversy raised in these appeals turns upon the construction of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959", "statute": "The controversy raised in these appeals turns upon the construction of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12371, "end_char": 12386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 1 and 2, Gurdip Singh and Dalip Singh, filed a writ petition nnder Article 226 of the Constitution against lhe State of Punjab, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, and six others including the present appellants, praying for a direction to confirm them in Punjab Police Service."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12766, "end_char": 12781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police of Februaiy, 1961 and January, 1961 respectively having been brought on 'G' List by an order dated 23rd February 1961 of the State of Punjab and the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, respondents 3 and 4 herein."}}, {"text": "Inspector General of Police, Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12790, "end_char": 12825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police of Februaiy, 1961 and January, 1961 respectively having been brought on 'G' List by an order dated 23rd February 1961 of the State of Punjab and the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, respondents 3 and 4 herein."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13717, "end_char": 13727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grievance of respondents 1 and 2 in the petition filed by them\n\nwas that recruitment to Punjab Police Service is made from two sources, namely, 80% by promotion and 20% by direct appointment but this quota rule is not adhered to at the time of confirmation in the 'service and, therefore, even though they were members of the service since a period earlier to appellants and respondents 5 to 8, they were not confirmed though the latter were confirmed and as seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police is reckoned under rule 10 according to date of confirmation, the failure to confirm them in the post available to them, in breach of the relevant rules, has denied to them equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution to be considered for nomination to Indian Police Service which E is done according to seniority-cum-merit."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13909, "end_char": 13915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, on the one hand and the direct recruits on the other contested the writ petition, inter alia, contending that the quota applies at the stag<' of initial recruitment and not at the time of confirmation and there is no allegation that the quota rule was violated at the time of initial recruitment."}}, {"text": "Rakha Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15922, "end_char": 15931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Rakha Ram filed Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16854, "end_char": 16865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that neither the State of Punjab nor the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, have questioned the decision of the High Court though at the hearing of these appeals Mr. R. S. Sodhi appeared for the State of Punjab and supported the contentions canvassed on behalf of the appellants .", "canonical_name": "R. S. Sodhi"}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 703", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17863, "end_char": 17879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 SCR 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17886, "end_char": 17902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18212, "end_char": 18244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-rule (3) provides that direct appointment to the Service shall be made upon the result of a competitive examination conducted by .the Punjab Public Service Commission ('Commission' for short) and further confers power on the Government in consultation with the Commission to frame necessary rules relating to examination."}}, {"text": "Phillaur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18609, "end_char": 18617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 8 provides that members of the Service shall be on probation for two years which shall include the period of training at the Police Training School, Phillaur, and in the districts and in the case of members recruited by promotion the Government may by a\n\nspecial order in each case permit periods of officiating appointment to the Service to count towards the period of probation."}}, {"text": "Chitaley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19119, "end_char": 19127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitaley followed by Mr. Phadke, urged that the vires, validity or reasonableness of rule 10 having not been challenged, it was not open to the High Court to put upon rules, 6, 8 and 10 a construction on the supposed unreasonableness of rule 10 if it is interpreted by giving the language therein used its ordinary grammatical meaning."}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19144, "end_char": 19150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitaley followed by Mr. Phadke, urged that the vires, validity or reasonableness of rule 10 having not been challenged, it was not open to the High Court to put upon rules, 6, 8 and 10 a construction on the supposed unreasonableness of rule 10 if it is interpreted by giving the language therein used its ordinary grammatical meaning."}}, {"text": "Class III Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25152, "end_char": 25173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 SCR 278", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26031, "end_char": 26047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dharam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26595, "end_char": 26607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In ttJs situation the ratio in Dharam Singh's case (supra) would mutatis mutandis apply and it will have to be held that the direct recruit who completed the period of probation of two years and in the absence of an extension of probationary period, would be deemed to be confirmed by necessary implication.", "canonical_name": "Dharani Singh"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27571, "end_char": 27583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. L. Sanghi learned counsel for the interveners and the pro- E motees contended that the framers of the rule could not have intended to accord such a discriminatory treatment to the promotees in whose favour the quota is as big as 80 % of the total strength.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Sanghvi"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29550, "end_char": 29560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31926, "end_char": 31936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. G. Jaisinghani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31942, "end_char": 31959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the rule of seniority were one otherwise than according to date of confirmation it would not have become necessary to\n' t\n\nap, rly the quota rule at the stage of confirmation but in this ca5c the quota rule is linked up with the seniority rule and unless the quota rule is strictly observed in practice it will be difficult to hold that the seniority rule is not unreasonable and does not offend Article 16 (see S. G. Jaisinghani's case (supra) at pp."}}, {"text": "S. B. Patwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32757, "end_char": 32773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this background in S. B. Patwardhan's case (supra) tliis Court held that if the promotees are treated with an evil eye and an unequal hand in the matter of seniority as was done under rule 8(iii), the rule would suffer from the vice of unreasonable.. ness and would offend Article 16 and it was actually struck down."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33011, "end_char": 33021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mervyn Coutindo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35112, "end_char": 35127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mervyn Coutindo's case (supra) this Court in terms said that rotational system of fixing seniority meaning thereby confirmation followed by seniority does not\n\noffend equality of opportunity in Government service and recruitment not following the fixed quota rule need not be a ground for doing away with rotational system."}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35995, "end_char": 36018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parts IV and V of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36450, "end_char": 36477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36764, "end_char": 36769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The general seniority rule which was held applicable in that case was that seniority should be determined on the basis of length of service in that grade or a service in an equivalent grade irrespective of whether the latter was under Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36773, "end_char": 36781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The general seniority rule which was held applicable in that case was that seniority should be determined on the basis of length of service in that grade or a service in an equivalent grade irrespective of whether the latter was under Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "[1975) 2 S.C.R. 1975", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37389, "end_char": 37409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37844, "end_char": 37852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court while saying in Subraman's case (supra) that quota rule has to be adhered to and enforced at the time of initial recruitment re-affirmed the observation in Mervyn Coutindo's case (supra) that there is no inherent invalidity in introduction of quota system and to work it out by rule of rotation."}}, {"text": "Patwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38468, "end_char": 38478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly, the decision in Subraman's case was in terms affirmed in Patwardhan's case (supra) but the scheme of rules in Patwardhan's case (supra) was more or less similar to the one that was examined by this Court in Subraman' s case."}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38643, "end_char": 38649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nMr. Sanghi also urged that the language of Rule 8(a) would unmistakably show that members of Service recruited from eitlier source would be on probation for a period of two years and this would imply that promotees would also be on probation for a period of two years."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_58_77_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "L. KOCHIVAREED v.\n\nP. MERIAPPA GOUNDER AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 7, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nMesne Profits-Liability for mesnt profits, principle of-Section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (A.ct V of 1908).\n\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908, Order XX Rule 12-Construction of decree explained-Nature of the decree of the Court dated April 22, 1958 clarified.\n\nWords and Phrases-\"Whichever event first occurs\" in Rule 12(1)(c)(iii} of order XX C.P.C.-Meaning of.\n\nCivil Procedure Codt~. S. 144-Scope of.\n\nMeriappa Gounder respondent No. 1 in C.A. 466 /69 and appellant I in C.A. 2375/69 filed e suit on August 23, 1950 in the District Court, Trichur, for specific performance of an agreement dated May 22, 1950 made by one Soliappa Chettiar. The said Soliappa Chettiar pleaded inability to perform the contract in view of the refusal of one Neelakanta Iy'er a lessee of the factory to give up possession.\n\nPending the suit Late Kochiyareed, husband of the appellant in C.A. 466 /69 obtained an assignment of the lease from Neelakanta Iyer on March 5, 1951. On March 8, 1951 Soliappa Chettiar executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of one George Thatil, a nephew of Kochivareed.\n\nIn the course of the proceedings the trial court appointed a Receiver to manage the suit property. On March 21, 1951, Late Kochivarced obtaffied a lease of the suit property at a rent of Rs. 15,000/- for a period of one year which was renewed for anqtber year fron1 the Receiver and a sum of Rs. 30,000 /- so collected as rent for t\\VO years was deposited in the Court by the Receiver.\n\nThe District Court on August 28, 1952 decreed the suit for specific performance and mesne profits at a reduced rate of Rs. 15,000/- per annum, instead of at Rs. 30,000/- per annum as claimed. Against the decree two appeals were filed in the High Court by Kochivareed and George Thatil. The High Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit by its judgment dated March 21,\n\n1953. The appeal filed by Meriappa Gounder (CA 129 /56) was allowed by this Court as per its judgment and decree dated April 22, 1958.\n\nOn tlte question of the liability of the mesne profits, the present appeals aro6e out of interpretation of the direction ( e) of this Court's decree dated April 22, 1958.\n\nAllowing the appeals by certificate in part the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. Mesne profits being in the nature of damages. no invari&tte role governing their award and assessment in every case can be laid do\\vn and the \"Court may mould it according to the jutice of the case''.\n\nEven so one broad basic principle 2oveming the liability for mesne profits is discernible\n\n\\..\n\n' .... ,.\n\n~ ....\n\nt• Ii\n\n...\n\n\" ... \\\n\nL. KOCHIVAREED V. P. M. GOUNDER 59\n\nfrom section 2 ( 12) of the Code of Civil Procedure which defines 'mesne A profits' to mean 'those profi~ which the person in wrongful pos.Jes:Jion of property (lctually received or might with ordinary deligence havo received therefrom together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession.\" [680-H, 69A]\n\nWrongful pos.session of the defendant is the very essence of a claim for n1esne profits and the very foundation of the defandant's liability therefor, Generally, the person in wrongful possession and enjoyment of the immovable property is liable for mesne profits.\n\nBut, where the plaintiff'~ dispOiiesaion, or his being kept out of possession can be regarded as a joint or concreted act of several persons, each of them who participates in the Commission of that act would be liable for mesne profits even though he was not in actual possession and the profits were received not by him but by some of hii confederates. Possession through another, such as a tenant may be sufficient to create liability for mesne profits, if such possession is wrongful. [69A-C and GJ\n\n2. In such a case, where the claim for mesne profits is against several trespassers 'vho hnd combined to keep the plaintiff out of possession, it IS\n\nopen to th~ Court to adopt either of the two courses. It may by itli decree hold all such trespas!l!ers jointly and severally liable for mesne profits leaving them to have the.ir respective rights adjusted in n separate suit for contribution; or it may, if there is proper material before it ascertain and apportion the liability of each of them on a proper application made by the defendant _during the same proceedings. [69C-Dl\n\n3. A decree under Order XX Rule 12 of C.P.C., directing enquiry into mesne profit~, howsoever expressed must be construed to be a decree directing the enquiry in conformity with the requirements of Rule 12(1)(c), eo that the decree holder is not entit1ed to mesne profits for a period (commencing from the date of the institution of the suit) extending beyond three years from the date of the preliminary decree.\n\n[69E-F]\n\nChitturi Sub.hanna v. Kudappa Subbanna, [1965] 2 SCR 661; referred to.\n\n4. The words \"whichever event first occurs\" in sub clause (c)(iii) of clause 1 of Rule 12 of Order XX Civil Procedure Code imply th•t the maximum period for which future mesne profits can be awarded is three ye\\\\rs from the date of the decree for posl!Cssion and mesne profits, finally passed.\n\nThe period of three years is to be computed from the date of decree of this Court i.e. from April 22, 1958 and it wiiJ expire on the date on which possession 1\"B! delivered or relinquished by the defendant in favour of the decreeholder punn1ant to that decree. In other words, the decree mentioned in sub clause (iii) of clause (c) would be the appellate decree dated April 22, 1958 of this Court. The period of three years mentioned in the said 11ubclause is, therefore, to be reckoned from April 22, 1958. [73G-H, 74A-B]\n\n5. Section 144 of tI:e C.ode of Civil Procedure, in termc;, says that for the purpose of the restitution, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the payment of interes-t, damages compensation and mesne profits which are JYOperly consequential on variation or reversal of the decree.\n\n[77A-B]\n\nThere is nothing in the decree, dated April 22, 1958 of this Court which expresSly or by implication, prohibits the payment of interest on the sum of\n\nA Rs. 30,000/- withdrawn by defendant 3 by way of restitution. l\"he trial court had rightly allowed interest.\n\n[77B-C]\n\n6. The decree dated April 22, 1958 of this Court was a compoiite decree, partly fin&l, and partly preliminary. It was final in so far as it granted tho\n\nreliefs of specific performance and possession on deposit of the price by the Plaintiff.\n\nIt was preliminary in as much as it directed an inquiry with regard to the assessment of mesne profits and as to who out of the defendants ViiU6 / were liable for payment of thos~ mesne profits.\n\nBut, it laid down in no uncertain terms that only such of the defendants would be liable for mesne profits \"as may have been in possession of the property\"'.\n\nThis direction in the decree n1eans that only the defendant or defendants found in actual posession and enjoyment of the property would be liable for mesne profits.\n\n{70A-CJ ~\n\nc In the instant case : --4\n\n(a) The third defendant \\Vas in sole, actual possession and control of the suit property from March 3, 1951, when he obtained the alleged assignment of lease in his favour from Neclakanta Iyer.\n\nIn tern1s of the decree of thi~ Court, therefore defendant 3 alone is liable for mesne profits in respect of the period he was in possession (excepting the peroid during which the property wa<; under the management of the Court Receiver).\n\n[71E-F]\n\n(b) The contention that the possession of defendant 2 was the legal possession of an owner while that of defendant 3 V.'as derivative possession of a lessee or licensee under the former is not correct, since at no stage, in the Courts below defendant 3 took up the position that he was in derivative possession of the property under defendant 2.\n\nNor was there even a whisper in the pleadings that defendant 2 and defendant 3 v.1ere joint-tortfeasors and therefore jointly and severally lia-ble for mesne profits.\n\n[69H, 70C, GJ\n\n(c) There is nothing in the decree of this Court dated April 22, 1958, indicating that the amount deposited by the plaintiff to\\.vards the price should have been set off against the liability of defendant 3 for mesne profits.\n\nOn the contrary. it a1lowed deduction of the an1ounts found due against defendant 1 and defendant 2 from the deposit of Rs. 85,000/~ to be made by the plaintiff t0\\1/ards the price, and further directed that after such deduction, the balance of such deposit made by the plaintiff, if any, shall be paid to the third respondent (defendant 2) who is the assignee of the second respondent (defendant I) pendente lite.\n\n[71F-H]\n\n(d) The plaintiff was not bound to suffer a set off in favour of defendant 3, merely because defendant 2 or his assignee withdrew the price deposited by the plaintiff without furnishing any security for its refund or adjustment G towards the liability of defendant 3, there being no evidence whatever, on record to show that such withdrawal was the result of any collusion or conspiracy between the plaintiff and defendant 2 and defendant 3.\n\nEven assuming that both defendants 2 and 3 were liable for mesne profits jointly and\n\n'--< '\"\n\n....\n\nseverally, then also, the plaintiff could, at his option, recover the whole of the f \" amount of mesne profits from either of them; and how such inter se liability of the defendants was. to be adjusted or apportioned was a matter between the 11 defendanls only.\n\n[72A-C]\n\n(e) Defendant 3 entered into possession of suit property under an assianment of sham lease from NeelkantQ Iyer on March 5, 1951 during the\n\nL. KOCllIVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 61\n\npendency of the plaintiffs suit, which was instituted on August 25, 1950. The plaintiff had deposited Rs. 50,000/- sometimes after the presmtation of th<\n\nplaint. Under the agreement of salei dated May 22, 195() made by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff, the total sale considerations was fixed @ Rs. 90,003/-.\n\nOut of it Rs. 5,003/- had been paid to defendant I on the very date of the agreement. It was further stipulated that out of the balance, Rs. 50,000/- would be paid by the plaintiff-purchaser at the time of the reJ:istration of the sale deed which wa~ to be executed l\\nd registered on or before July 15, 1950.\n\nIt was further stipulated that on :i:byment of the further sum of Rs. 50,000/- the plaintiff would be entitled to be put in possession of the suit property. ,.\n\nThus when defendant 3 entered into possession, first under the garb of an t\\. assignee of sham lease from Neelkanta Iyer, and then further purchased the fproperty with his own funds in fa.vour of defendant 2 pe11dente lite, he v, ras f - fully conscious that he was purchasing a litigation. His posSessioll was, therefore V.Tongful qua the plaintiff from its. inception. [72E-ll]\n\n(f) Disallowance of the claim for deduction for interest on the depo1it of Rs. 50,000 which the plaintiff had withdrawn on August 19, 1953 and had redeposited on 9-2-1959 is incorrect. The defendant is entitled to interest @ 6% per tinnum for the said period, after deducting the interest for the period during which the property was under the management of the Receiver.\n\n[740-E]\n\n(g) The plaintiff's claim for rnesne profits @ the rate of Rs. 25,000/- has correctly been negatived. Since .the plaintiff did not object to the lease granted by the Receiver to defendant 3 on an annual rental of Rs. 15,000/- and since he di<l not produce any other reliable evidence, the High Court 'Ml• not wrong in holding that the mesne profits should be on the basis of this rental value of Rs. 15,000/- [76A-C]\n\n(h) The plaintiff, in view of the long drawn out litigation is entitled to interest @ 6% per annum upto March 29, 1959.\n\n[76E-F]\n\nCrv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 466 and 2375 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 6-8-78 of the Kerala High y'Court in Appeal Suit Nos. 27 /63 and 245/63. \"\"' K. S. Ramamurthy, Miss Pushpd[Nambiar and A. S. Nambiar for the\n\n- ..\n\nAppellant in C.A. 466/69 and R. 1 in C.A. 2375/69.\n\nP. Govindan Nair, S. Balakrishnan and K. L. Rathi for R. 1 in C.A. 466/69 and Appellant in CA 2375/69.\n\nN. Sudhakaran, S. L. Aneja and K. L. Aneja for RR 2-3, in C.A. 466/69 and For RR 3-4-in C.A. 2375/69.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARTA, J.-These two appeals on certificate arise out of execu- ·\n\ntion petition No. 118 of 1962 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tri- H chur, filed by P. Meriappa Gounder (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) to execute the decree of the Supreme Court in C.A. 129/56\n\nA passed on April 22, 1958.\n\nThe common facts, out of. which these appeals arise, are as follows\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit on August 23, 1950 in the District Court, Trichur, for :Specific. performance of an acement, dated May 22, 1950, made by Soliappa Che.ttiar (hereinafter referred to as defendant 1) to sell a factory known as \"Sivakami Tiles Works\", for a consideration of Rs. 90,003/-.\n\nThe plaintiff made an advance payment on that very date of a sum.of Rs. 5,003/- to defendant!.\n\nIt was stipulated in the agreement that the sale deed must be executed and registered on or before July ~5, 1950.\n\nIt was further provided that out of the balance of sale consideration, Rs. 50,000/- would be paid by the plaintiff at the time of the registration and for the'remaining Rs. 35,000/-, the plaintiff was to execute a mortgage of the suit property to be redeemed on or before May 31,, 1951.\n\nIt was further agreed that on payment of Rs. 50,000/- at the time of registration, the plaintiff would be put i; i possession of the suit property.\n\nThe plaintiff pleaded that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, but came to know that defendant 1 was trying to evade his obligation under the agreement. AccordinJ:ly, the plaintiff sent a registered notice, dated July 7, 1950, through his lawyer to defendant I, to which the latter replied the. same day, that the factory was in possession of one NeeAakanta Iyer as lessee, who had refused to give up possession and therefore, it had become impossib'e to give effect to the agreement to sell the factory, as giving possession to the plaintiff was a condition precedent to the execution of the sale deed. _ The plaintiff further pleaded that the suit property was really in possession of defendant 1 and the alleged lease in fav, our of Neelakanta Iyer was a sham transaction and a device to evade payment of income tax. and hence defendant 1 was bound to carry out the terms of the agreement to sell.\n\n- -f\n\nThe suit was contested by defendant 1 (who originally was the sole defendant).\n\nHis case was that, aQthough there was an agreement to sell the suit property, it had been made clear at the time when negotiation for sale was going on, that the factory was in the possession of Neelakanta Iyer as lessee and that it was a condition precedent to the sale that Neelakanta Iyer would 'surrender his right under the lease and give up possession and that if he refused to do so, the agreement to sell would not be given effect to.\n\nThe defendant urged Neelakanta Iyer to surrender the possession, but he refused to do so.\n\nIn the circumstances,, tho contract for sale had become incapable of performance.\n\nHe denied that the lease in favour of Neelakanta was a sham transaction.\n\n~ ---- •\n\n• •\n\nL. J(OCHIVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 63\n\nPending the suit, T. V. Kochivareed (the deceased husband of the appellant, Lucy Kochivareed in C.A. 466/69) obtained an assignment of the lease (Ex. D-3) from Neelakanta Iyer on March 5, 1951. Since Kochivareed was later on, when the suit was pending in the Supreme Court impleaded as defendant 3, for the sake of convenience the appellant in C.A. 466/69, will hereinafter be referred to as defendant 3.\n\nOn March 8, 1951, defendant 1 executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of George Thatil, who is the nephew of defendant 3, and will hereinafter be referred to as defendant 2. Like defendant 3, he also joined as defendant 2 at his own reqnest, when the appeal was pending in this Court.\n\n' On December 23,. 1950, the Court appointed a Receiver to manage\n\n. - ..\n\n• ..\n\n• •\n\n•.A\n\nthe suit property.\n\nOn March 21, 1951, defendant 3 obtained a lease of the suit property at a rent or Rs. 15,000/- for a period of one year from the Receiver.\n\nThe term of the lease was extended for one more year and two years' rent, amounting to Rs. 30,000/- was collected and deposited in the Court by the Receiver.\n\nThe District Court, Trichur, on August 28, 1952, decreed the suit for specific performance and mcsne profits at a reduced rate of Rs. 15,000/- per annum, instead of Rs. 30,000/- per annum claimed by the plaintiff.\n\nAgainst the decree of the, Trial Court, two appeals were filed in the High Court-one by defendant 3 and the other by defendant 2.\n\nThe High Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the plaintiff's suit by a judgment dated March 31, 1953.\n\nAggrieved, the plaintiff filed C.A. 129/56 in this Court.\n\nThe plaintiff's appeal was allowed by this Court as per its judgment and decree, dated April 22, 1958.\n\nSince a good deal of argument centers round the construction of this Court's decree, dated April 22, 1958, it will be pertinent to extract ' here the material part of that decree .\n\n\"(a) That the appellant herein do deposit within thirty days of the receipt in the decree of this Court the sum of Rs. 85,000/- in the District Court of Trichur and that on the aforesaid amount being deposited the said District Court of Trichur do forthwith give notice, thereof to the respondents abovenamed and that on the aforesaid amount of Rs. 85,000/- being deposited respondents Nos. 2 and 3 herein,, namely S. M. R. Solaiyappa Chettiar and George Thatil do within 30\n\nSUPREMI! COURT REPORTS\n\n[1919J 3 S.C.R.\n\ndays frbm the date of receipt of the notice of the said deposit e<Kecute and register a sale deed iri favo1lr of the plaintiff (Appellant) in respect of the suit property. ·\n\n(b) ................... .\n\n( c)) That the respondents above-named do pay to the appellant the cost incurred by him in the Court of the District Judge, Trichur, in Suit No. 183 of 1950 and the costs incurred by him in the former High Court of ............. .\n\n(Kl) . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . • . . •\n\n(e) .... AND 1HIS COURT DOTH FURTHER DE- CLARE that appellant shall be entitled to :\n\n(a) mesne profits against such of the respondents 11~ may have been in possession of the rproperty except during the period that the property was in the custody and management of the receiver appointed by the tri~I court;\n\n(b) the net sum collected by the Receiver during his\n\n' management; and\n\n(c) credit for all such sums as he may have advanced to the receiver under the direction of the Court for the management of property;\n\nAND THIS COURT DOTH ACCORDINGLY DIRECT that the trial Court do bold an enquiry about the mesne profits and such snms as may be found to be due on inquiry against the second and third respondents in respect of the mesne profits be deducted from the amount to be deposited in cash in the Court by the appellant aforesaid in accordance with clause (a) supra, and do direct the payment of the remaining amount, if any, to the third respondent (defendant\n\n2) who is the assignee of the second respondent (defendant\n\n1) pendente lite;\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nOn September 12, 1958, the plaintiff filed an application in the District Court for execution of the said decree, dated April 22, 1958,, in respect of all the reliefs allowed thereunder. After the decree-holder had deposited a sum of Rs. 85,000/-, as directed in the decree, the execution application was eventually made over to the Subordinate Judge, Trichur.\n\nAs per the decree, the sale deed was executed on March 16,. 1959, by the Court on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 in favour of\n\n\\.. •\n\nL. KOCHIVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkatia, J.) 6 s\n\nthe plaintiff and the possession of the property in consequence, thereof, was de1iveted to him oh March 29, 1959.\n\nThereafter, the plaintiff filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 229 /60 in the Trial Court.\n\nBefore the Court, defendant 3 on November 11, 1958, filed objections that he was not >liable for mesne profits, as he was never in possession and occupation of the suit property.\n\nHe further :a\n\ncontended that his liability for mesne profits. if any, was limited to the period commencing from the date of notice of the deposit in Court of the amount of Rs. 85,000/- till the date of dellivery of possession and that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest on mesne profits, or on costs by way of restitution.\n\nDefendant 2-contended that he was not liable for mesne profits as he had never been in possession and management of the suit property, and that the entire liability, if at all any, for mesne profits was that of defendant 3, who had been in exclusive po%ession of the property.\n\nOn December 22, 1962, the court of first instance passed orders in respect of mesne profifs, costs etc.\n\nIt found that defendants 1, 2 and 3 were jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 10, 162.67 on account of costs of the Trial Court and the Supreme Court. The Court further found that defendant 2 was separately liable to pay to the plaintiff, a sum of Rs. 11,941.63 consisting of three items, namely, Rs. 1, 239.02 on account of costs recovered by defendant 2 from decree-holder and payable by former with interest by way of re'stitution, Rs. 2,577.01 on account of costs in the High Court, and Rs. 81251on account of mesne profits from the factory from the date of suit till date of Ex. D-3.\n\nThe aggregatti amaunt under these two heads came to Rs. 23,103.70, which was allowed to be set off against Rs. 85,000/- deposited in Court by the plaintiff and the balance was directed to be paid to the second defendant's mother, his assignee.\n\nApart from the sum of Rs. 10,162.67 jointly and severally payable by the third and second respondents, the District Court found that the third defendant was separately liable to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1,57,086.81 consisting of these items :\n\nla) Rs. 7,298.10, by way of restitution on account of costs reco- • ' vered from the decree-holder including interest thereon;\n\n(b) Rs. 39,975.00-Rent deposited and withdrawn by him together with interest thereon;\n\n(c) Rs. 1,177.00, costs payable by him for the appeal in the High Court; a11d\n\n(d) Rs. 1,08,636.71 net mesne profits payable by him from April 1, 1963 to the date of delivery of possession, during which period, he was found to be in possession and management.\n\nAfter giving credit of a sum of Rs. 48,321 deposited by the third defendant in Court on March 9, 1959, a net sum of Rs. 1,08,765.81 was directed to be realised by the plaintiff from the estate of defendant 3 in the hands of his legal repre•entative (appellant in C.A. 466/69). By the same order, the Court dismissed Misc. Petition No. 229/60 that had been filed by the plaintiff for determination of the extent of waste committed upon the property by defendant 3.\n\nAggrieved by that Judgment and Order, Lucy Kochivareed, wife of defendant 3, a• well as the plaintiff and the second defendant, preferred\n\nappeafa in the High Court of Kerala.\n\nBy a common judgment, dated August 6, 1968, the High Court partly allowed the appeals filed respectively, by the plaintiff and the legal representatives of defendant 3; but dismissed the appeal (AS. 248/63) file'd by defendant 2.\n\nThe High Court,, inter alia, affirmed the finding of the Trial Court that the\n\nthird defendant was in sole and exclusive possession of the suit propeny during the period in question.\n\nThe Trir1l Court's findings with regard to the quantum of rnesne profits per year, were not found satisfactory.\n\nThe High Court assessed the mesne profifs at a flat rate of Rs. 15,000/- per year and determined the obligations of the parties accordingly.\n\nThe High Court further found that the second and third defendants were jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 10,200/- by way of costs, and the second defendant alone was liable to pay Rs. 11,000/- by way of restitution, costs in the High Court and mesne profits to the plaintiff, and that the aggregate of Rs. 21,200/- be set off against the sum of R~. 85,0001deposited by the plaintiff and the balance be paid to the mother of defendant 2.\n\nAggrieved by the judgment, dated August 8, 1968, of the High Court, Lucy Kochivareed, wife of the deceased defendant 3, has filed Civil Appeal 466 of 1969; while the plaintiff has preferred Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1969.\n\nBoth the appeals will be disposed of by this common judgment.\n\n' , l\n\n---- •\n\nWe will first take up CM! Appeal 466 of 1969 filed by the widow of r • defendant 3.\n\nff The main contention of Mr. K. S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the appellant (\\Luci Kochivareed), is that if the' decree, dated April 22, 1958, passed by this Court in C.A. 129/56 is properly construed in the\n\n_..,\n\n- --.\n\n. _,\n\nL. KOCHJVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 67\n\nlight of the material on record and the law on the subject, then three comequences inevitably follow :\n\n(i) Both defendant 2 and defendant 3 would be deemed to be in pos5ession of the suit property during the period in question, The posgession of defendant 2 was juridical or legal possession of an owner, he being the purchaser of the property from defendant 1; while that of B defendant 3 was on actual permissive possession with the consent of defendant 2. Defendant 2 and defendant 3 being in the position of joint-tort-feasors would he jointly and severally liable for mesne profits or compensation.\n\nThis being the case, the plaintiff was bound to suffer a set off to the c purchase price (Rs. 85,000/-) deposited by him, against his claim fot mesne profits against defendant 3.\n\nBut after the decree ol this Court, the plaintiff in pursuance of a collusion between him and defendant 2, allowed the High Court to cancel the security given by defendant 2 for withdrawal of Rs. 62,900/- out of the purchase price deposited by the plaintiff.\n\nThe plaintiff was thus precluded by his conduct from cl aim- D ing tbat much amount from defendant 3.\n\nAfter setting off the entire deposit of Rs. 85,000/-, defendant 3 will be liable only, for the balance of the mesne profit, jointly with defendant 2.\n\n(ii) The plaintiff's right to possession of the property under the decree accrued when he deposited the price in Court and thereafter ob- E tained the conveyance in his favour on March 16, 1959.\n\nThe possession of defendants 2 and 3 as against the phintiff became wrongful only from the date on which the conveyance was executed in his favour, at any rate on the date (September 12, 1958) on which he fully deposited the price in Court.\n\n(iii) The period for which the mesne. profits have been awarded., is to be restricted to the one permissible nuder Order XX Rule 12( 1) ( c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nSuch period in the light of this provision would be the one commencing from the date the institution ol the suit and ending on the expiration of three years from the date of the decree of the Trial Court.\n\nThe expression \"the decree,\", occurring in the aforesaid clause (according to the counsel) means the decree of the Trial Court.\n\nIn other words, the maximum period for which mcsne profits can be awarded-and would be deemed to have been awarded-is three years from the date of the decree of the Trial Court; and the Courts below were wrong in awarding mesne profits for a period of more than six years, commencing from the date of the institution of the suit till the delivery of possession in accordance with the decree of this Court to the plaintiff.\n\nUpon the above premises, Mr. Ramamurthy maintains that the plaintiff will not be entitled to any mesne profits because his right to possession did not accrue within three years of the date of the decree of the Trial Court.\n\nSuch a right, according to the counsel, accrued to the plaintiff only on April 22, 1958 when his amended suit for specific performance and possession and future mesne profits was decreed.\n\nIn the alternative, as already noticed, counsel submits that mesne profits could not be awarded for any period prior to the date (September 12, 1958) on which the plaintiff deposited the price, because his right to possession accrued on that date and not earlier.\n\nIn support of his contentions, Shri Ramamurthy has cited a decis'on of this Court in Chitturi Subbanna v. Kudapa Subbanna & Ors.(') He has also referred to some other rulings, wherein some general principles have been enunciated as to who can be made liable for mesne profits.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submits that the decree,, dated April 22, 1958 of this Court is crystal-clear.\n\nThere is no ambiguity in it.\n\nRead in the light of this Court's judgment, it unmistakably shows that whosoever, out of the de- • fendants was/were in actual possession, would be liable for the mesne profits from the date of the suit tlll the delivery of possession.\n\nIt is pointed out that in the courts below, the positive stand taken by defendant 3 was that he was never in possession of the suit property and therefore, was not liable for mesne profits. It was never the case of defendant 3 that he was in derivative possession under defendant 2.\n\nCounsel submits that defendant 3 should not be allowed to take a stand diametrically opposed to the one taken by him in the courts below.\n\nIt is further submitted that the decree of this Court was final decree so far as it laid down that the liability for the mesne profits shall be fixed on the basis of the defendant found in actual possession of the suit property.\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions canvassed on both sides, it wi11 be profitable to notice the general principles relating to the liability for mesne profits.\n\nMesne profits being in the nature of damages, no invariable rule governing their award and assessment in every case, can be laid down and \"the Court may monld it according to the justice of the case\". Even so, one broad basic principle governing the liability for mesne profits is discernible from Section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure which defines 'mesne profits' to mean \"those profits which the person in wrongful possession of property actually Jeeceived or might with ordinary\n\n(I) [196512 S.C.R. 661.\n\n--{.\n\n\\ l\n\n.- \"\n\n• ' • t\n\nL. KOCHJVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, !.) 6 9\n\ndiligence have received therefrom together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession\".\n\nFrom a plain reading of this definition, it is dear that wrongful possession of the defendant is the very essence of a claim for mesne profits and the, very foundation of the defendant\"'s liability therefor.\n\nAs a rule, therefore, liability to, pay mesne profits , goes with actual possession of the land.\n\nThat is to 'say, generally, the person in wrongful possession am] enjoyment of the immovable property is liable for mesne profits, But, where the plaintiff's disposscsion, or his being kept out of possession can be regarded as a joint or .concerted act of several persons, each of them who participates in the , commission of that act would be liable for mesne profits even though he was , not in actual pos'scssion and the profits were received not by him but by some of his confederate, s,\n\nIn such a case where the claim for mesne profits is against several trespassers who combined tn keep the plaintiff out of possession; it is\n\nOpen to the Court to adopt either of the two courses.\n\nIt may by its , decree hold all such trespassers jointly and severally liable for mesne vrofits, leaving them to have their respective rights adjusted in a separate suit for contribution; or, it may, if there is proper material before 'it, ascertain and apportion the liability of each of them on a proper , application made by the defendant during the same proceedings.\n\nAnother principle, recognised by this Court in Chitturi Subba11na v.\n\nKudapa Subbanna (ibid) is that a decree under Order XX Rule 12 .of the Code, directing enquiry intn mesne profits, howsoever expressed, must be construed to be a decree directing the enquiry in conformity with the requirements of Rule 12(1) ( c), so that the decree-holder is not entitled to mesnc profits for a period (commencing from the date .of the institution of the suit) extending beyond three years from the date of the preliminary decree.\n\nAgain, possession through another, such as a tenant, may be suffi- , cient to create liability for mcsne profits if 'such possession is wrongful.\n\nWe will now deal with the contentions advanced by Mr. Rama- :murthy, in the light of these principles.\n\nThe first argument, as already noticed, is that both defendants 2 and 3 were in possession of the suit property during the period in ques\"\n\ntion. It is contended that the possession of defendant 2 was the !gal H possession of an owner while that of defendant 3 derivative possession .of a lessee or licensee under the former.\n\nA perusal of the decree dated April 22, 1958, of this Court, extracted in a foregoing part of this judgment, show's that it was a composi'e decree, partly final, partly preliminary.\n\nIt was final in so far as it granted the reliefs of specific performance and possession on deposit of the price by the plaintiff. It wa' preliminary inasmuch it directed an inquiry with regard to the assessment of mesne profits, and as to who out of the defendants was/were liable for payment of those mesne profi's.\n\nBut, it laid down in no uncertain terms that only such of the defendants would be liable for mesne profits \"as may have been in possession of the property\". Construed in conformity with the legal principles enun\n\nciated above, this direction in the decree, means that only the defendant or defendants found in actual possession and enjoyment of the property would be liable for mesne profits.\n\nIn the courts below, at no stage, defendant 3 took up the position that he was in derivative possession of the property under defendant 2.\n\nOn the contrary, in his objection-petition filed before the District Court on November 11, 1958, defendant 3 emphatically asserted that he \"is not liable for mesne profits for the suit property as he was never in possession and occupation of the same\".\n\nDefendant 3 further vehemently pleaded that it was. never intended at any •ime that he (defendant 3) \"should be a lessee of the property nor was he a lessee at any time\". In para 3 of his petition, defendant 3 further pleaded that the purchase of the factory was made. in favour of defendant 2, with money advanced by him (defendant 3), and the intention then was that the snit property should be worked by defendant .2 with funds advanced by defendant 3 who should be \"recouped from the profits accrued from the proper•y or otherwise in respect of the purchase money advanced by him as also the advances for the working expenses''.\n\nIn paragraph 5, he further pleaded that \"in any event he cannot be held liable for any amount more than what is stipulated in the lease deed (Ex. I) in favour of Neelakantha Iyer\".\n\nThere is not even a whisper in the pleadings that defendant 2 and defendant 3 were joint-tort-feasors and therefore, jointly and severally liable for mesne• profits.\n\nThe plea now pressed into argument by Mr. Ramamurthy is thus a complete somersault of the position that had been taken in the courts below.\n\nH The Court of first instance after an exhaustive. consideration of the overwhelming evidence, oral and documentary, on record reached the finding that ever since March 5, 1951, defendant 3 was, while defendant\n\n•• •\n\n• • • '\n\n--d.\n\nL. KOCH!VAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 71\n\n2 was not,, in actual control, management and possession of ihe suit property, and therefore, in terms of the decree dated April 22, 1958 of this Court, defendant 3 alone would be liable for mesne profits of the property.\n\nIn appeal, the High Court found that \"the Court below was perfectly right in holding that the 3rd defendant was in sole and exclusive possession during the period in question and it i's idle for him to pretend otherwise\".\n\nIndeed, the third defendant himself had re- • peatedly admitted in various documents that he was in possession.\n\nIn , his application, Ex. D-77(a), made in the Court of first instance, on l.\n\nMarch 7, 1951, the defendant admitted that he was in possession in pur\n\n\\..~- suance of assignment of lease made, in his favour by Neelakantha Iyer on IF March 5, 1951.\n\nThis lease has been found by this Court to be a sham\n\n1 transaction.\n\nFurther, defendant 3 on March 21, 1951, executed a lease in favour of the Receiver appointed by the Court.\n\nIn this Qease also, he admitted tpat he had been in posses'sion of the property since March 5, 1951.\n\nThe lease executed by defendant 3 in favour of the Receiver ensured for a period of two years on a yearly rental of Rs. 15,000/- and he deposited Rs. 30,000/- therefor as rental in Court.\n\nThen, the Bank accounts of the factory (except for a short period from March 25, 1953 to November 11, 1954) were throughout in the name of the third defendant as lessee thereof.\n\n. ..;,\n\n• ' - • -.\n\nWe have absolutely no reason to differ from this concurrent finding of the courts below that the third defendant was in sole, actual po•scssion and control of the suit property from March 3, 1951, when he ob. tained the alleged assignment of the lease in his favour from Neelakantha Iyer.\n\nIn terms of the aforesaid decree of this Court, therefore, defendant 3 alone is liable for mesne profits in respect of the period he was in pMsession (excepting the period during which the property was under the management of the Court Receiver).\n\nAs regards the appellant's contention that the amount deposited by the plaintiff towards the price should have been set off against the liability of defendant 3 for mesne profits, it may be observed that, there is nothing in the decree, dated April 22, 1'958, of this Court which say's that such a set off should be allowed.\n\nOn the contrary, it allowed deduction of the amouuts found due against defendant 1 and defendant 2 from the deposit of Rs. 85,000/- to be made by the plaintiff towards the price, and further directed that after such deduction, the balance of such deposit made by the plaintiff\" if any, shall be paid \"to the third respondent (defendant 2) who is the assignee of the second respondent (defendant l) pendente lite.\"\n\nSUpREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nAssuming arguendo, that both defendants 2 and 3 wern liable for mesne profits jointly and severally, then also, the plaintiff could, at his option, recover the whole of the amount of mesne profits from either of them; and how such inter se liability of the defendants was to be adjusted or apportioned, was a matter between the defendants only.\n\nThe plaintiff was not bound to suffer a set off in favour of defendant 3, merely because defendant 2 or his assignee withdrew the price deposited by the plaintiff without furnishing any security for its refund or adjustment towards the liability of defendant 3, there being no evidence, whatever, on record to show that such withdrawal was the result of any collusion or conspiracy between the plaintiff and defendant 2 against defendant 3.\n\nAssuming further, for the sake of argument, that defendant 2 and defendant 3 were both acting in concert to keep the plaintiff out of possession, it was not necessary for the courts below to decide the i'ssue with regard to apportionment of liability and its adjustment between defendants 2 and 3.\n\nIndeed, the adoption of such a course would have militated against the finding that defendant 3 alone was in exclusive possession and control of the suit property ever since March 5, 1951.\n\nWe therefore, negative the first contention of the appellant.\n\nThis takes us to the second and third points pressed into argument by Mr. Ramamurthy.\n\nIt is to be noted that defendant 3 entered into possession of the suit property under an as'signment of sham lease from Neelakantha Iyer on March 5, 1951 during the pendency of the plaintiff's suit which was instituted on August 25, 1950.\n\nThe plaintiff had deposited Rs. 50,,000/- sometime after the presentation of the plaint.\n\nUnder the agreement for sa!le, dated May 22, 1950, made by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff, the total sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 90,003 /-. Out of it, Rs. 5 ,003 /- had been paid to defendants on the very date of the agreement. It was further stipulated that out of the balance, Rs. 50,000/C would be paid by the plaintiff-purchaser at the time of the registration of the sale deed which was to be executed and registered on or before July 15, 1950.\n\nIt was further stipulated that on payment of the further sum of Rs. 50,000/-, the plaintiff would be entitled to be put in possession of the suit property. Thus, when defendant 3 entere<l into possession, first, under the garb of an assignee of a sham lease from Neelakantha Iyer, and then further purchased the property with his own fu.nds in favour of defendant 2, pendente lite, he was fully conscious that he was purchasing a litigation.\n\nHis possession was,. therefore, wrongful qua the plaintiff from its very inception.\n\n...\n\nI t\n\n.. •\n\n~ . ., •\n\n--j .r~\n\n• ,,\n\n' ~ -I\n\n~ \\.\n\nL. KOCHIVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, !.) 73\n\nThei material part of Rule 12(1) of Order XX of the Code of Civil P; ocedure, provides : .\n\n\"Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immoveable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree-\n\n(a) for the possession of the property;\n\n(b) ........................... .\n\n(ba) ....................... .\n\n< c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institntion of the suit until-\n\n(i) the delive.ry of possession to the decree-holder,\n\n(ii) the relinqui'shment of possession by the jndgmentdebtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Ccinrt, or\n\n(iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, whichever event firstoccnrs.\" Mr. Ramamurthy argned, if we may say so with respect, somewhat inconsistently, that the word \"decree\" in snb-clanse {iii) of clause (c) of the aforesaid rnle 12 ( 1), means the decree for possession and mesne profits which the trial conrt ought to have passed, and that in this view of the matter, the period of three yearn mentioned in sub-· clause (iii) will be connted from Augnst 28, 1952, tl1e date of the trial conrt's decree, whereby mesne profits at the reduced rate of Rs. 15,000/- instead of Rs. 30,000/- per annum claimed by the plaintiff, were awarded.\n\nIn that view of the matter; acc; o'rding to the coun- :sel, the plaintiff was not entitled under the law to ger a decree for mesne profits beyond August 27, 1955. It is pointed out that since the paintiff had, as a result of the acceptance of the defendants' appeal and dismissal of his suit by the High Court, withdrawn the deposit of Rs. 50,000/- on Augnst 19, 1953 and he had not redeposited the amount until February 9, 1959, he was not then entitled to possession and, i.n consequence, to any. mesne profits during this period.\n\nThe argnme11t is certainly ingenious, but untenable, being found- -ed on fallacious premises.\n\nThe period of three years mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of Rule 12(1) is to be computed from the date of the decre~ of this Court, i.e. from April 22, 1958 and it will expire on the date on which possession was delivered or reline -quished by .the defendant in favour of the decree-holder pursuant to ·\n\nthat decree. In other words, the decree mentioned in sub-clause 6-196SCij79\n\n(iii) of the aforesaid clause ( c), would be the appellate decree, dated April 22, 1958, of this Court.\n\nThe period of three years mentioned in the said sub-clause is, therefore, to be reckoned from April 22,\n\n1958. The words \"whichever event first occurs\" in sub-clause (iii) imply that the maximum period for which future mesne profits can be awarded, is three years from the date of the decree for possession and mesne profits, finally passed.\n\nT!Je courts below, therefore, whil• holding that defendant 3 was liable to pay mesne , profits for a period of about 6 years commencing from Match 5, 1951/March 21, 1951 till the delivery of possession in September, 1958 (less the period during which the property was under the management of the Receiver), were acting in conformity with the law and the terms ol the decree, dated April 22, 1958, of this Court.\n\nWe, therefore, reject these contentions, ao.\n\nAnother contention canvassed by Mr. Ramanii.trthy was thal the courts below have wrongly disallowed deduction for interest on tb D deposit of Rs. 50,000/-, which the plaintiff had withdrawn on August 19, 1953 and had redeposited on February 9, 1959. It appears to us that in all fairness, the defendant is entitled to deduction for interest for the period from August 19, 1953 to February 9, 1959 on the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, which, at 6 per cent per annum, after deducting the interest for the period during which the property was under the manage- E ment of the Receiver. (According to the agreed calculations mad• by the counsel for the parties it works out to Rs. 14,000/- approxi- , mately.\n\nWe see no reason why deduction of this amount be not allowed from the mesne profits assessed againsi defendant 3.\n\nWe will now take up Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1969 filed by di• F plaintiff.\n\nMr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, has , ' contended-\n\n(i) that mesne profits ought to have been awllrded at the xate of Rs. 25,000/- per annum.\n\nThe High Court was in error in awardinr the ame at the rate of Rs. 15,000/-;\n\n(ii) that the High Cpurt was not justified in reduc; ing th• rate of interest from 6 per cent per annum awarded by the Trial Court to 4 per cent per annum;\n\n(iii) that interest at 6 per cent per annum was rightly awarded by the court of first instance on the sum of Rs. 30,000/-, which was two years rental paid by defendant 3, under the lease taken from the Receiver for the period from August 19, 1953 to March 9, 1959, and\n\nthe High Court was in error in disallowing that interest; and\n\n-i-..\n\n.. , .....\n\nJI.\n\n...\n\n'L. JCOCHIVAREED v, P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, !.) 75\n\n(iv) that the Courts below were not justified in denying costs to A the plaintiff in the inquiry as to mesne profits or in appeal arising therefrom_\n\nWe will deal with these contentions ad seriatim .\n\nComention (i) : In this connection, Mr. Nair drew p'lrr attention to Exhibits D-8 to D-15, which are Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts of the Sivakami Tile Works, relating to the period from March 31, 1953 to November 5, 1958. These documents were prepared at the instance of the third defendant for the purposes of his Income-tax returns.\n\nThe High qaurt found that these Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts prepared for Income-tax puropses were suspicious documents and by themselves were not proof of the profits derived.\n\nMr. Nair has no quarrel with this finding.\n\nHe, however, contended that the High Court ought to have worked Pl!t the real profits by taking into account the quantity of clay purchased according to these documents. In this connection, it is submitted that according to the evidence produced on the side of the plaintiff about five candies of clay are reqnired (o'r producing 1000 small tiles and even according to the evidence of the second defenc, Jant as C.P.W. 2, St to 6 candies are required for 1000 small tiles .\n\nWe are not. impressed by this argument. The High Court has fully considered the evidence produced on the side of the plaintiff.\n\nIt noted that the plaintiff, also, had not produced any cogent evidence to show what were the profits earned by him by working the factory in dispute for the period of one year preceding the date of his examination. By the time plaintiff appeared in the witness-box, he had been working this factory for about one year.\n\nIn the alternative, Mr. Nair submitted that even during the period of two years when the Receiver was there and d, efendant 3 worked the factory as a lessee under the former, he had made a profit of Rs. 22,000/-. Our attention has, also been drawn to the document (Ex.\n\nD-8), that the income for the first year ending 1952 was Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nThe point pressed into argument is that the highest profit made by him according to these Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts . during any year by defendant 3, should be taken as the rate for calculating the mesne profits.\n\nThe contention does not appear to tenable.\n\nOnce it was found that these Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts were not reliable, nor the evidence produced by the plaintiff,, the only reliohle evidence left on the file W!ll the rate at' which the factory was leased out\n\nby the Receiver to defendant S. When the lease for the seeond year was granted to defendant 2 by the Receiver on a rental of Rs. 15,000/-, the plaintiff should have objected that the rent was less or Jte could himself take the lease on paying higher rent. The High Court was, therefore, not wrong in holding that this rent fixed under the lease granted by the Receiver represented the real rental value of the factory during the year in question and in the absence of any other reliable evidence for assessing the profits actnally earned or which, with due diligence, could have been earned the mesne pro'fits may reasonably be fixed at Rs. 15,000/- per annum.\n\nWe, therefore, negative the first contention of Mr. Nair.\n\nContention (ii) :\n\nThe . Trial Court had awarded interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the mesne profits assessed by it. The High Court reduced that rate to 4 per cent, with the observation that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including that the plaintiff had D the use of the sum of Rs. 85,000/- which he was to pay towards the price of the property a rate of 4 per cent per annum would be reasonable d just.\n\nEven Mr. Ramamurthy has not been able to support this reduction in the rate of interest. It was after a long drawn out litigation that the plaintiff got possession of the property. The Trial Court, therefore rightly awarded the intere§t at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.\n\nWe, therefore, accept this contention and direct that interest as part of the mesne profits assessed in this case, shall be payable at the rate of 6 per cent per annum upto March 29, 1959 when possession was delivered in pursuance of the decree of this Court, to the plain- F tiff and further interest at 6 per cent per annum oo the outstanding amount shall be payable till the date of payment.\n\nCo, ntention (iii) : A sum of Rs. 30,000/-, being the rent collected \\>y the Receiver from the third defendant, was deposited in Court. This amount was G withdrawn by the third defendant on August 19, 1953 following the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit, by the High Court. When the plaintiff's appeal succeeded in this Court and a decree was passed in his favour by this Court, then defendant 3 redeposited the sum of Rs. 30,000/-, only on March 9, 1959. The Trial Court had awarded in-· terest at 6 per cent per annum on this arnO'Ullt of Rs. 30,000/- for II the period from August 19, 1953, the date on which the defendant withdrew that deposit, until March 9, 1959, the date when he redeposited the sum.\n\nThe Hiiih Court has disallowed interest on this account\n\n-i-.....\n\nL. KOCHNAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 77\n\nfor the aforesaid period on. the ground .\"that the Supreme Court does A not award that\".\n\nWe are unable to agree wijh this reasoning.\n\nIt overlooked the fact that interest on the sum of Rs. 30,000/- was. being claimed under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by way of restitution.\n\nSection 144 in terms says that for the purpose of the restitution, the B Court may make any orders, including orders for the payment of interest, tlamages, compensation and mesne profits which are properly consequential on variation or reversal of the decree. There is nothing in the decree, dated April 22, 1958, Qf this Court which expressly or by inlplication prohibited the payment of interest on this sum, by way of restitution.\n\nThe Trial Court had rightly allowed interest on amount C for this period at 6 per ce_nt per annum, and we restore the same directfoc..\n\nContention (iv) :\n\nThe argument is that costs have been unfairly denied to the plain-\n\n~··) '\n\ntiff by the Courts below.\n\nWe do not agree.\n\nThe Courts below could D not have been oblivious of the fact that defendant 3 has since dietl and the respondent is his widow.\n\nWe, therefore, d(> not want to interfere with the discretion of the Courts below in the matter of costs.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we partly allow the plaintiff's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1969) to the extent indkated above, with proportionate costs. We will dismiss the defedant's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 466 of 1969) except to the extent that the defendant shall be allowed a set off in the sum of Rs. 14,000/-, being the interest , on the sum of Rs. 50,000/- for the period frarn August 19, 1953 (the 'date of the withdrawal of the deposit by the plaintiff) to the date when he redeposited it.\n\nInterest on the outstanding amount at 6 per cent per annum shall be payable till the date of payment. In Civil Appeal 466 of 1969, however, the parties will bear their own costs in this Court .\n\nS.R.\n\nCA 2375/69 allowed in part. CA 466/69 dismissed with modifications.", "total_entities": 103, "entities": [{"text": "L. KOCHIVAREED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "L. KOCHIVAREED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. MERIAPPA GOUNDER AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. MERIAPPA GOUNDER AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 7, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order XX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 276, "end_char": 289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 519, "end_char": 525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Soliappa Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in C.A. 466 /69 and appellant I in C.A. 2375/69 filed e suit on August 23, 1950 in the District Court, Trichur, for specific performance of an agreement dated May 22, 1950 made by one Soliappa Chettiar.", "canonical_name": "Soliappa Che.ttiar"}}, {"text": "Neelakanta Iy'er", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Soliappa Chettiar pleaded inability to perform the contract in view of the refusal of one Neelakanta Iy'er a lessee of the factory to give up possession.", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "Kochiyareed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending the suit Late Kochiyareed, husband of the appellant in C.A. 466 /69 obtained an assignment of the lease from Neelakanta Iyer on March 5, 1951.", "canonical_name": "L. KOCHIVAREED"}}, {"text": "Neelakanta Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending the suit Late Kochiyareed, husband of the appellant in C.A. 466 /69 obtained an assignment of the lease from Neelakanta Iyer on March 5, 1951.", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "March 8, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1092, "end_char": 1105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 8, 1951 Soliappa Chettiar executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of one George Thatil, a nephew of Kochivareed."}}, {"text": "George Thatil", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 8, 1951 Soliappa Chettiar executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of one George Thatil, a nephew of Kochivareed.", "canonical_name": "George Thatil"}}, {"text": "Kochivareed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1210, "end_char": 1221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 8, 1951 Soliappa Chettiar executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of one George Thatil, a nephew of Kochivareed.", "canonical_name": "L. KOCHIVAREED"}}, {"text": "March 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1326, "end_char": 1340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 21, 1951, Late Kochivarced obtaffied a lease of the suit property at a rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1633, "end_char": 1648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Court on August 28, 1952 decreed the suit for specific performance and mesne profits at a reduced rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 21,\n\n1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1977, "end_char": 1992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit by its judgment dated March 21,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "Meriappa Gounder", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by Meriappa Gounder (CA 129 /56) was allowed by this Court as per its judgment and decree dated April 22, 1958."}}, {"text": "L. KOCHIVAREED", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ ....\n\nt• Ii\n\n...\n\n\" ... \\\n\nL. KOCHIVAREED V. P. M. GOUNDER 59\n\nfrom section 2 ( 12) of the Code of Civil Procedure which defines 'mesne A profits' to mean 'those profi~ which the person in wrongful pos.", "canonical_name": "L. KOCHIVAREED"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2787, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order XX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1965] 2 SCR 661", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4933, "end_char": 4949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5035, "end_char": 5043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Order XX Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5058, "end_char": 5087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 22, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of three years mentioned in the said 11ubclause is, therefore, to be reckoned from April 22, 1958. ["}}, {"text": "Section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5787, "end_char": 5798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XX Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Order XX Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Neclakanta Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7342, "end_char": 7357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{70A-CJ ~\n\nc In the instant case : --4\n\n(a) The third defendant \\Vas in sole, actual possession and control of the suit property from March 3, 1951, when he obtained the alleged assignment of lease in his favour from Neclakanta Iyer.", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "May 22, 195", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9997, "end_char": 10008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the agreement of salei dated May 22, 195() made by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff, the total sale considerations was fixed @ Rs."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10411, "end_char": 10424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000/- would be paid by the plaintiff-purchaser at the time of the reJ:istration of the sale deed which wa~ to be executed l\\nd registered on or before July 15, 1950."}}, {"text": "Neelkanta Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10694, "end_char": 10708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus when defendant 3 entered into possession, first under the garb of an t\\. assignee of sham lease from Neelkanta Iyer, and then further purchased the fproperty with his own funds in fa.vour of defendant 2 pe11dente lite, he v, ras f - fully conscious that he was purchasing a litigation.", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "9-2-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11131, "end_char": 11139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 which the plaintiff had withdrawn on August 19, 1953 and had redeposited on 9-2-1959 is incorrect."}}, {"text": "6-8-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12005, "end_char": 12011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 6-8-78 of the Kerala High y'Court in Appeal Suit Nos."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ramamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12082, "end_char": 12098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy, Miss Pushpd[Nambiar and A. S. Nambiar for the\n..\n\nAppellant in C.A. 466/69 and R. 1 in C.A. 2375/69."}}, {"text": "Pushpd[Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12105, "end_char": 12119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy, Miss Pushpd[Nambiar and A. S. Nambiar for the\n..\n\nAppellant in C.A. 466/69 and R. 1 in C.A. 2375/69."}}, {"text": "A. S. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12124, "end_char": 12137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy, Miss Pushpd[Nambiar and A. S. Nambiar for the\n..\n\nAppellant in C.A. 466/69 and R. 1 in C.A. 2375/69."}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12205, "end_char": 12221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair, S. Balakrishnan and K. L. Rathi for R. 1 in C.A. 466/69 and Appellant in CA 2375/69."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair, S. Balakrishnan and K. L. Rathi for R. 1 in C.A. 466/69 and Appellant in CA 2375/69."}}, {"text": "K. L. Rathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12243, "end_char": 12254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair, S. Balakrishnan and K. L. Rathi for R. 1 in C.A. 466/69 and Appellant in CA 2375/69."}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12309, "end_char": 12322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sudhakaran, S. L. Aneja and K. L. Aneja for RR 2-3, in C.A. 466/69 and For RR 3-4-in C.A. 2375/69."}}, {"text": "S. L. Aneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12324, "end_char": 12335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sudhakaran, S. L. Aneja and K. L. Aneja for RR 2-3, in C.A. 466/69 and For RR 3-4-in C.A. 2375/69.", "canonical_name": "S. L. Aneja"}}, {"text": "K. L. Aneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12340, "end_char": 12351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sudhakaran, S. L. Aneja and K. L. Aneja for RR 2-3, in C.A. 466/69 and For RR 3-4-in C.A. 2375/69.", "canonical_name": "S. L. Aneja"}}, {"text": "SARKARTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12456, "end_char": 12464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARTA, J.-These two appeals on certificate arise out of execu- ·\n\ntion petition No."}}, {"text": "P. Meriappa Gounder", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12615, "end_char": 12634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "118 of 1962 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tri- H chur, filed by P. Meriappa Gounder (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) to execute the decree of the Supreme Court in C.A. 129/56\n\nA passed on April 22, 1958.", "canonical_name": "P. MERIAPPA GOUNDER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12707, "end_char": 12720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "118 of 1962 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tri- H chur, filed by P. Meriappa Gounder (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) to execute the decree of the Supreme Court in C.A. 129/56\n\nA passed on April 22, 1958."}}, {"text": "August 23, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12865, "end_char": 12880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which these appeals arise, are as follows\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit on August 23, 1950 in the District Court, Trichur, for :Specific."}}, {"text": "District Court, Trichur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12888, "end_char": 12911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which these appeals arise, are as follows\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit on August 23, 1950 in the District Court, Trichur, for :Specific."}}, {"text": "Soliappa Che.ttiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12983, "end_char": 13001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "performance of an acement, dated May 22, 1950, made by Soliappa Che.ttiar (hereinafter referred to as defendant 1) to sell a factory known as \"Sivakami Tiles Works\", for a consideration of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Soliappa Che.ttiar"}}, {"text": "Sivakami Tiles Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13071, "end_char": 13091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "performance of an acement, dated May 22, 1950, made by Soliappa Che.ttiar (hereinafter referred to as defendant 1) to sell a factory known as \"Sivakami Tiles Works\", for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 31,, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13615, "end_char": 13628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35,000/-, the plaintiff was to execute a mortgage of the suit property to be redeemed on or before May 31,, 1951."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14020, "end_char": 14032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AccordinJ:ly, the plaintiff sent a registered notice, dated July 7, 1950, through his lawyer to defendant I, to which the latter replied the."}}, {"text": "NeeAakanta Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14154, "end_char": 14169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "same day, that the factory was in possession of one NeeAakanta Iyer as lessee, who had refused to give up possession and therefore, it had become impossib'e to give effect to the agreement to sell the factory, as giving possession to the plaintiff was a condition precedent to the execution of the sale deed. _", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "Neelakanta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15451, "end_char": 15461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He denied that the lease in favour of Neelakanta was a sham transaction.", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "T. V. Kochivareed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ ---- •\n\n• •\n\nL. J(OCHIVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 63\n\nPending the suit, T. V. Kochivareed (the deceased husband of the appellant, Lucy Kochivareed in C.A. 466/69) obtained an assignment of the lease (Ex."}}, {"text": "Lucy Kochivareed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15630, "end_char": 15646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ ---- •\n\n• •\n\nL. J(OCHIVAREED v. P. M. GOUNDER (Sarkaria, J.) 63\n\nPending the suit, T. V. Kochivareed (the deceased husband of the appellant, Lucy Kochivareed in C.A. 466/69) obtained an assignment of the lease (Ex."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15733, "end_char": 15746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-3) from Neelakanta Iyer on March 5, 1951."}}, {"text": "December 23,. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16263, "end_char": 16281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' On December 23,."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17104, "end_char": 17118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the plaintiff's suit by a judgment dated March 31, 1953."}}, {"text": "S. M. R. Solaiyappa Chettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17881, "end_char": 17909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 herein,, namely S. M. R. Solaiyappa Chettiar and George Thatil do within 30\n\nSUPREMI!"}}, {"text": "George Thatil", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17914, "end_char": 17927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 herein,, namely S. M. R. Solaiyappa Chettiar and George Thatil do within 30\n\nSUPREMI!", "canonical_name": "George Thatil"}}, {"text": "September 12, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19539, "end_char": 19557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(e) .... AND 1HIS COURT DOTH FURTHER DE- CLARE that appellant shall be entitled to :\n\n(a) mesne profits against such of the respondents 11~ may have been in possession of the rproperty except during the period that the property was in the custody and management of the receiver appointed by the tri~I court;\n\n(b) the net sum collected by the Receiver during his\n\n' management; and\n\n(c) credit for all such sums as he may have advanced to the receiver under the direction of the Court for the management of property;\n\nAND THIS COURT DOTH ACCORDINGLY DIRECT that the trial Court do bold an enquiry about the mesne profits and such snms as may be found to be due on inquiry against the second and third respondents in respect of the mesne profits be deducted from the amount to be deposited in cash in the Court by the appellant aforesaid in accordance with clause (a) supra, and do direct the payment of the remaining amount, if any, to the third respondent (defendant\n\n2) who is the assignee of the second respondent (defendant\n\n1) pendente lite;\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nOn September 12, 1958, the plaintiff filed an application in the District Court for execution of the said decree, dated April 22, 1958,, in respect of all the reliefs allowed thereunder."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Trichur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19869, "end_char": 19895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85,000/-, as directed in the decree, the execution application was eventually made over to the Subordinate Judge, Trichur."}}, {"text": "March 16,. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19947, "end_char": 19962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As per the decree, the sale deed was executed on March 16,."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21079, "end_char": 21096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 22, 1962, the court of first instance passed orders in respect of mesne profifs, costs etc."}}, {"text": "March 9, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22856, "end_char": 22869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48,321 deposited by the third defendant in Court on March 9, 1959, a net sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23387, "end_char": 23407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by that Judgment and Order, Lucy Kochivareed, wife of defendant 3, a• well as the plaintiff and the second defendant, preferred\n\nappeafa in the High Court of Kerala."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23438, "end_char": 23452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a common judgment, dated August 6, 1968, the High Court partly allowed the appeals filed respectively, by the plaintiff and the legal representatives of defendant 3; but dismissed the appeal (AS."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24557, "end_char": 24571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by the judgment, dated August 8, 1968, of the High Court, Lucy Kochivareed, wife of the deceased defendant 3, has filed Civil Appeal 466 of 1969; while the plaintiff has preferred Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "\\Luci Kochivareed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24992, "end_char": 25009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff The main contention of Mr. K. S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the appellant (\\Luci Kochivareed), is that if the' decree, dated April 22, 1958, passed by this Court in C.A. 129/56 is properly construed in the\n\n_..,\n--."}}, {"text": "March 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26673, "end_char": 26687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) The plaintiff's right to possession of the property under the decree accrued when he deposited the price in Court and thereafter ob- E tained the conveyance in his favour on March 16, 1959."}}, {"text": "Order XX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27047, "end_char": 27060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27076, "end_char": 27103, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27894, "end_char": 27904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the above premises, Mr. Ramamurthy maintains that the plaintiff will not be entitled to any mesne profits because his right to possession did not accrue within three years of the date of the decree of the Trial Court.", "canonical_name": "Rama- :murthy"}}, {"text": "Govindan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28844, "end_char": 28857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submits that the decree,, dated April 22, 1958 of this Court is crystal-clear."}}, {"text": "Section 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30354, "end_char": 30367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30371, "end_char": 30398, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order XX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32303, "end_char": 32316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rama- :murthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32907, "end_char": 32920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We will now deal with the contentions advanced by Mr. Rama- :murthy, in the light of these principles.", "canonical_name": "Rama- :murthy"}}, {"text": "November 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34397, "end_char": 34414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, in his objection-petition filed before the District Court on November 11, 1958, defendant 3 emphatically asserted that he \"is not liable for mesne profits for the suit property as he was never in possession and occupation of the same\"."}}, {"text": "Neelakantha Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35369, "end_char": 35385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) in favour of Neelakantha Iyer\".", "canonical_name": "Neelakanta Iy'er"}}, {"text": "March 25, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37329, "end_char": 37343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, the Bank accounts of the factory (except for a short period from March 25, 1953 to November 11, 1954) were throughout in the name of the third defendant as lessee thereof."}}, {"text": "April 22, 1'958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38238, "end_char": 38253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the appellant's contention that the amount deposited by the plaintiff towards the price should have been set off against the liability of defendant 3 for mesne profits, it may be observed that, there is nothing in the decree, dated April 22, 1'958, of this Court which say's that such a set off should be allowed."}}, {"text": "Order XX of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41669, "end_char": 41689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Augnst 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42705, "end_char": 42720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramamurthy argned, if we may say so with respect, somewhat inconsistently, that the word \"decree\" in snb-clanse {iii) of clause (c) of the aforesaid rnle 12 ( 1), means the decree for possession and mesne profits which the trial conrt ought to have passed, and that in this view of the matter, the period of three yearn mentioned in sub-· clause (iii) will be connted from Augnst 28, 1952, tl1e date of the trial conrt's decree, whereby mesne profits at the reduced rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43040, "end_char": 43055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that view of the matter; acc; o'rding to the coun- :sel, the plaintiff was not entitled under the law to ger a decree for mesne profits beyond August 27, 1955."}}, {"text": "Augnst 19, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43246, "end_char": 43261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000/- on Augnst 19, 1953 and he had not redeposited the amount until February 9, 1959, he was not then entitled to possession and, i.n consequence, to any."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43306, "end_char": 43322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000/- on Augnst 19, 1953 and he had not redeposited the amount until February 9, 1959, he was not then entitled to possession and, i.n consequence, to any."}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43898, "end_char": 43906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramanii.trthy was thal the courts below have wrongly disallowed deduction for interest on tb D deposit of Rs. 50,000/-, which the plaintiff had withdrawn on August 19, 1953 and had redeposited on February 9, 1959. It appears to us that in all fairness, the defendant is entitled to deduction for interest for the period from August 19, 1953 to February 9, 1959 on the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, which, at 6 per cent per annum, after deducting the interest for the period during which the property was under the manage- E ment of the Receiver. (According to the agreed calculations mad• by the counsel for the parties it works out to Rs. 14,000/- approxi- , mately.\n\nWe see no reason why deduction of this amount be not allowed from the mesne profits assessed againsi defendant 3.\n\nWe will now take up Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1969", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44861, "end_char": 45685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another contention canvassed by Mr. Ramanii.trthy was thal the courts below have wrongly disallowed deduction for interest on tb D deposit of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46354, "end_char": 46369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30,000/-, which was two years rental paid by defendant 3, under the lease taken from the Receiver for the period from August 19, 1953 to March 9, 1959, and\n\nthe High Court was in error in disallowing that interest; and\ni-..\n\n.. , .....\n\nJI."}}, {"text": "Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46779, "end_char": 46783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comention (i) : In this connection, Mr. Nair drew p'lrr attention to Exhibits D-8 to D-15, which are Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts of the Sivakami Tile Works, relating to the period from March 31, 1953 to November 5, 1958."}}, {"text": "Sivakami Tile Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46889, "end_char": 46908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comention (i) : In this connection, Mr. Nair drew p'lrr attention to Exhibits D-8 to D-15, which are Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts of the Sivakami Tile Works, relating to the period from March 31, 1953 to November 5, 1958."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46956, "end_char": 46972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comention (i) : In this connection, Mr. Nair drew p'lrr attention to Exhibits D-8 to D-15, which are Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Accounts of the Sivakami Tile Works, relating to the period from March 31, 1953 to November 5, 1958."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50705, "end_char": 50719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, accept this contention and direct that interest as part of the mesne profits assessed in this case, shall be payable at the rate of 6 per cent per annum upto March 29, 1959 when possession was delivered in pursuance of the decree of this Court, to the plain- F tiff and further interest at 6 per cent per annum oo the outstanding amount shall be payable till the date of payment."}}, {"text": "Section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51978, "end_char": 51989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51993, "end_char": 52020, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52046, "end_char": 52057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_599_624_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "JAYARAMA REDDY & ANR.\n\nREVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & LAND ACQUISITION\n\nOFFICER, KURNOOL\n\nMarch 23, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nCode of Civil Procedure; 1908-0rder XXII r. 4-Scopc of-Cross appeals -Legal representatives of deceased appellant brought on record-Appellan~ in crossappeal fatled to bring them on record of cross appeal-CroJs appeal-If abates-, Vo objection raised before the High Court-.ff could be raised in further appeal.\n\nOrder XXII Rule 4(1) CPC provides that where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or d.efendants alone, the court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made\n\na party and shall proceed with th~ suit. Sub-rule (3) of the Rule provides D that \\vhere, within the time limited by law, no application is made under sub rule (1) the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.\n\nThe Ia-nd in dispute, which belonged to three persons, was acquired by the State Government for a public purpose and the market value was fixed at Rs. 2/· per square yard, On appeal by the claimants, it was raised to Rs. 12/- per square yard.\n\nAgainst the order of Subordinate Judge, both the State and the claimants filed appeals before the High Court.\n\n\\Vhile the aippeals were pending before the High Court, one of the claimant~ died. Tbe legal representatives of the deceased claimant were brought on record in the claimant's appeal, but the Government took no steps to bring the legal representatives of the deceased claimant on record in the appeal filed by it.\n\nDismissing the claimant's appeal and allowing the Government appeal the High Court reduced the price of the acquired land to Rs. 4 jper square yard.\n\nIn appeal befor'e this Court the claimants contended that since the legal representatives of the deceased claimant were not brought on record within the period of limitation, the Government appeal abated and stood disrnissed,\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: (per Shinghal, J.) I. It is not correct to say that the Gi:>vernmeot appeal stood dismissed against the surviving respondents because th'e Govern ment failed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased claimant on record within the specified time limit. The question whether the right to sue survived agaM1st the surviving respondents alone, was a matter for the appellate court to examine and decide after hearing the parties \\vith regard to the question of jointness or otherwise of the de:ree and the further question whether there was any possibility of two contradic:ory decrees. [605 F-G]\n\n2. There is no justification for the arguro'ent that the High Court's decree wa.s a nullity because it was passed against a dead pernn. A decree against a dead person is a nullity because it cannot be allowed to operate against his legal representatives when they were never b:-ought on the record to defend the case.\n\nIt is held a nullity because it cannot be executed against his legal representatives who had not ha.d the full opportuuity o.f being heard in respect of it.\n\nIf the respondent to an appeal dies and the appellate1 court loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will still be permissible for the court hearing the appeal to bring his legal rcpresentati->es on the r€X:ord on an r'•)plication to that efi'iect and to consider any application for condonation of delay. It is permi:sisible for the appellate court to remand the case for disposal according to law to the court in which it was pending at the time of the death of the deceased party. [606 B-D]\n\n3. \\Vhile the law treats such decree as a nullity qua the legal representative of th~ deceased defendant or respond'ent, there is nothing to prevent him from decidil:'!g that he wou!d not treat the decree as a nullity but would abide by it as it stood or as it rn&y be modified on appeal. If a legal repr'csentative adopts that alternative, it cannot be sa'.d that his option to b-~ governed by the decree is against the l<tVi' or any concept of public policy or public n1ora1ily.\n\nIt is a matter entirely <1t th'e discretion of the legal representative to decide whether he would raise the question that the decree had beoome a nullity, at the appropriate time, or to abando•.1 that obviously technic<!l obj'ection and fight th'e appeal on the mrrits. [606 F-H]\n\n4 .. Nor ran it be said that the appellate .:ourt is denuded of its jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which one of the respondents had died and th'e right to sue did not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone merely because uo applk:ation had been mad'e to bring his legal representative on the\n\nrecord when no objection to the effect was raised by any one of them. [607 B]\n\n5. At the same time, an inference as to the abandonment of such plea of abafement canont be drawn unless there is clear, sufficient and satisfactory evidence to prove that the legal representative of the deceased respondent was aware of it and abandoned it wilfully. [607 DJ\n\nIn the instant case, on th'c deah of one of the three cla:n1ants the other two surviving claimants brought the legal repre3en+atives of the deceased on the record.\n\nThey knew that the legal repres'entatives o? the de-;::eased claimant had not been brought 01.1 the . record of the Government appeal within the iime prescribed by la\\v and th21t, ther'efore, the appeal ~:tood abated. E\\'en so, they mad?· no applicat'.on to th.:: High Court seeking. dismissal of the Government appeal.\n\nThis position continued for as long as five years.\n\nTwo courses were open tlo the claim::ints : (i) to move th'~ High Court for the diEmissal_ of the Government appeal, or fii) to allow that appea.1 to be heard and decided on merits.\n\nThe claimants chose the second course.\n\nWhen the appeals came up for hearing before the Higl] Court, the appeal was argued on merits \\vithout raising an objection on this point.\n\nAfter the High Court had pronounc'ed its judgment, the c1aimants had asked for a certificate for leave to appeal without asking for a review of its judgment on the ground that the legal representatives were not brought on the record of the Government appeal.\n\nSo a point of defence which was wilfully an<l deliberately abandoned by a pBrty in a civil\n\n\\ , ..\n\n( . '\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY V. REVENUE OFFICER 601\n\n-case at 21 crucial stage, cannot be allowed to be taken up later at the will of the ; party which had abandoned ihe point _or as a la&t resort, or as an after thought.\n\nGaekwar Baroda State Railway v. Hafiz HabibulHaq & Ors., 65 InJian Appeals 182: Thakore Saheb Khanji Kas.hari Khanji v. Gulam Rosul Chandbhai, AIR 1955 Bon1. 449; Punjflb State v. Sardar Attna Singh, AIR 1963 Pub. 113, State of Rajast/Uln & Ors. v.\n\nRaghuraj Singh, AIR 1968 Raj. 14; held inapplicable.\n\n6. The High Court had rightly taken into consideration all factors necessary for coming to the right conclusion for fixing the rate of compensaition payable to 1be cl.:U1nants namely that a few months before the date of at:l[uisition the claimants them5elvespurchased the land at Rs. 2/- per square yard, that they did not make any improvements after its pun; h2,5e and that the previous owners had not sold the land for any compelling reason. [611 B-D]\n\nDesai, J. (concurring) 1. The basic principle underlying O. XXII rr. 3 and '4 CPC is ::1 facet of natural justice.\n\nIt is a fundam;!ntal rule of natural justice thait a man has a right to be heard where a decision affecting him or his interesit is to be recorded. As a corollary to the rule of audi altrem partem it is provided in the Code of Civil Procedure that where a party to a proceeding dies pending the proceeding and the cause of action survives, the l'cgal represenatives of the D deceased party should be brought on record, which n1eans, that such legal represent.a.tive must be afforded an opportunity of b'eing heard before any liability is fastened on them.\n\nAlthough the legal representatives LJf a deceased plaintiff or defendant must b'e substituted on the pain of the action abating, \\Vith utmost diligence, from a multitude someone n1ay escap.: notice and the consequent hardship in abatement of action led this Court to assrt the principle that where some legal representatives were brought on record permitting an E inference that the estate was adequately represented, the action would not abate though it 'vould be the duty of the other side to bring on record even at a later , date those legal representatives who were overlooked or missed. [614 E-H]\n\n2. The principle deducible from decisions of this Court is that if the deceased had, as a party, a right to put forth his case. those likely to be affected by the decision, o•J death of the deceased, had the same opportunity to put forth their\n\ncase and even if from a large number having identical interest some are not brought on record those \\Vho arc brought on record would adequately take care of their inte:est and the cause, in the ribscnce of some such, would not a-bate .\n\n1615 F-GJ\n\nDtIYa Ram & Ors. v. Silyam Sundari, [1965] 1 SCR 231; N. K.\n\nMohan1mad Sulain1an v. N. C. Moha1nmad Ismail & Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 937; HarN1ar Prasad Singh & Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Singh & Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 932; referred to.\n\n3. Yet a1J.other principle is th<>·~ if the legal representatives of the deceased party were before the court in the sam'e action even if in another capacity, failure to bring them on record in a specific legal position would not result in abatement of the action. [615 HJ n\n\nMahabir Prasad v. }age Ram & Drs. [1971] 3 SCR 301; referred to.\n\n4. Where a. d'ecree partly satisfies each of the two parties in a suit, both parties may prefer an appeal cha11enging only that part of the decree by \\Vhich each party is dissatisfied. But where one of the two parties appeals and a ootic~ of app(:al is served on the other, the respondents receiving the notice may pr'l:!fer\n\ncros&-objections under O. XLI, r. 22 CPC. In such a case, though the respondent may not have appeal'ed from any part of the decree, he may take crossobjections to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal. The parameters of cross-objections are limited to the contention which could prop'erly be taken in an appeal against a decree or part of a decree. [617 B-D]\n\n5. When legal repres'entatives of a deceased appellant are substituted and those very legal representatives as legal representatives of the same person occupying the position of respondent in cross-appeal are not substituted, its out come would be that they were on record in the connected proceeding before the same court hearing both the matters, in one capacity though they Yiere not described as such in their other capacity, namely, as legal representatives of the deceased respond'ent. To ignore this obvious position would be giving undue importance to form rather than substance. The anxiety of the court should be whether those likely to be affected by the d'ecision in the proceeding were before the court having full opportunity to canvass their case.\n\nOnce that is satisfied' it can be said that the provisions contained in rr. 3 and 4 of 0. XXII are satisfied in a given case. To taik'e another view would be to give an opportunity to the legal representatives of a deceased party in an appeal having had the fullest opportunity to canvass their case through the advocate of t'ieir choice appearing in cross-2•pp'eals for them and having canvassed their case and Jost, to turn round and contend that they were not before the court as legal representatives of the same person in his other ..:apacity, namely, respondent in the crosti-app'eal.\n\nIn other words, those legal representatives were before, the court all throughout the\n\nharing of the appeal as parties to the a.ppeal and canvassed their case and were heard through their advocates and they had the full opportunity to put forth whatever contentions were open to them in the appeals and to contest the con tentions advanced aga.inst th'em by the opposite side and yet if the other view is taken that as they were not formally impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased respondent in the cross-appeal that appeal has abated, it >, vould be wholly ujust. It is very difficult to distinguis-h on principle the approach of\n\nthecourt in appeals and cross-objections and in cross-appeals in this behalf. The cases which have ta.ken the vi'ew that in cross-appeals the position is different from the one in appeal and cros, g-objections do not proceed on any discernible legal principle.\n\nNor can they be explained by any de1nonstrable legal principle but in fact they run counter to the established legal principle. [623 G-H; 624\n\nA-CJ\n\nBrtj 111der Singh v. Lala Kanshi Ram & Ors .. AIR 1917 PC 156; Rangubai Korn Shanker Jagtap v. Sunderabai Bhra'i/ar Sakharam /edhe & Ors., [1965] 3 SCR 211 at 216·217; app!i'ed.\n\nSankaranaraina Sara[aya v. Laxmi Hengsu & Ors., AIR 1931 Mad. 277; State of Raiasthan & Ors. v. Raghurai Singh, AIR 1968 Raj. 14; not approved.\n\nH In the instant case the legal representatives of the deceased claimant were brought on the record of the \"Claimant's app'eal.\n\nBoth the appeals were hea.rd together. Their counsel argued their case in both appeals. Therefore, they were\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Shinghal, ],} 603\n\n' l:>efore the court all through. Th'e fact that they had not been described as legal A\n\nrepresntatives of the deeeased in the Government appeal could not make any .difference and their appeal has not abated.\n\n_On the question of compensatio•.:i no case had been made out for interfering with the view of the High Court.\n\n')VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2314 of 1969. 1 ' From the Judgment and Decree dated 4-2-1969 of the Andhra\n\n-..,.(--Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 180/64.\n\nA. K. Sen and A. Subba Rao for the Appellant. •, c\n\nT. V. S. N. Chari for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSHINGHAL, J.-This appeal is by a certificate of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the valuation of the subject matter and is directed against its judgment dated February 4, 1969.\n\nThe State Government acquired 2 acres and 79 cents of the land of the appellants in Kurnool town, for locating a bus depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation. It was arable land within the municipal liniits of the town, with two trees and an old compound wall.\n\nIts possession was taken by the State Government on May 25,\n\n1962. The market value of the land 'was fixed at Rs. 27,042.53 at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard.\n\nThe compound wall and the trees were valued at Rs. 930/- and after allowing a solatium of 15 per cent and interest at 4 per cent per annum, the total compensation was\n\n \"worked out to Rs. 33,069.12.\n\nN. Jayarama Reddy, Y. Prabhakar r\"\n\n,,..\n\nReddy and C. Manikya Reddy, who were the three owners of the land, accepted that compensation under protest and applied for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nAfter recording evidence and inspecting the site, the Subordinate Judge held that the claimants were entitled to payment at the rate of Rs. 12/- per square yard for the value of land, a solatium of 15 per cent and interest at 4 per cent. Both parties felt aggrieved against that order dated Jnly\n\n30, 1963.\n\nWhile appeal No. AS 180 of 1964, hereinafter referred to as the government appeal, was filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer, Knrnool, appeal No. AS 296 of 1964, hereinafter referred to as the claimants' appeal, was filed by the claimants. There were thus cross-appeals in the High Court against a common order of the Subordinate Jndge.\n\nThe memorandum of the government appeal was filed on December 7, 1963. I do not\n\nhave the date of the claimants' appeal on the record, but it is not disputed that it was filed before April 3, 1964.\n\nWhile the two appeals were pending in the High Court, Y. Prabhakar Reddy, one of the three claimants of the compensation for the acquired land, died on April 3, 1964.\n\nAn application was. made in the claimants' appeal to bring his legal representatives on the record, and the High Conrt passed an order on July 14, 1964 (in C.M.P. No. 7284 of 1964) bringing appellants 4 to 9 on record as the legal representatives of Y. Prahhakar Reddy.\n\nIt is admitted before me that was done before the abatement of that appeal. It seems that no application was made in the . government appeal to bring the legal representatives of the deceased respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on the record of that appeal.\n\nBoth the appeals were, however, taken up for hearing together and were disposed of by a common judgment of the High Court dated February 4, 1969.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the claimants' appeal, but allowed the government appeal and reduced the price of the acquired land from Rs. 12/- to Rs. 4/- per square yard \"with the usual solatium and interest at 4 per cent as allowed by the lower court.\" While the government felt satisfied with that judgment, the claimants applied for a certificate which was granted on the ground that the value of the subject matter of the suit in the court of first instance was upwards of Rs. 20,000/- and the value of the subject matter in dispute on appeal to this Court was also upwards of that amount and the decree appealed from did not affirm the dedsion of the lower court.\n\nOn the strength of that certificate the appellants have come up to this Court in appeal.\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellants that as Y. Prabhakar Reddy, respondent No. 2 in the government appeal died on April 3, 1964, and his legal representatives were not brought on the record within the period of 90 days provided by law, that appeal abated thereafter and stood dismissed automatically and could not be resurrected and beard by the High Court as a cross-appeal to the claimants' appeal.\n\nThe learned counsel bas placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in The State of Punjab v.\n\nNathu Ram,(')\n\nameshwar Prasad and others v. Mis Shyam Beharilal Jagannath and others,(2) Ramagyd; Prasad Gupta and others v. Murli Prasad(') and Harihar Prasad Singh and others v. Balmiki Prasad Singh ana others.(') to support his argument.\n\nIn particular, be bas placed\n\n(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 636\n\n\n...\n\n( .. ( -·\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Shinghal, /.) 605\n\nreliance on Nathu Ram's case(') to fortify his argument that the specification of the shares or of the interest of the deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy did not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree holders to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere w; tb the joint right decreed in their favour.\n\nIn particular, he bas relied on that portion of that decision where it has been stated that as the subject matter for which the compensation is to be calculated in such cases is one and the same, there cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same parcel of land.\n\nSo, as the appeal before the High Court was directed against the joint decree and the appellate court could not take a decision on the basis of the separate sl!ares of th~ claimants, it has been argued that the whole of the government ap!Jeal should have been dismised because of its abatemem against the deceased respondent.\n\nNow what Order XXII r. 4 (I) C.P.C. provides is that where one of two or more defendan!s dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.\n\nSub-rule (3) prov; des further that where w; thin the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), \"the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.\" So as Y. Prabhakar Reddy, respondent No. 2 in the government appeal, died on April 3, 1964, and an application was not made to bring his legal representatives on the record within the specified time limit, the appeal automatically abated as against the deceased respondent, and it is not correct to say that the appeal automatically stood dismissed against the surviving respondents because of that default.\n\nThe question whether the \"right to sue\" survived against the surviving respondents alone, was a matter for the appellate court to examine and decide after hearing the parties, with due regard to the question of jointness or otherwise of the decree and the further question whether there was any possibility of two contradictory decrees etc.\n\nAs that was not done by the High Court where the government appeal was pending, there is no justification for the argument that the appeal automatically stood dismissed after the expiry of the period of 90 days from the death of respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on April 3, 1964 because of the abatement of the appeal against him.\n\nBut even if it were assumed that the government appeal deserved to be dismissed as a whole because of its abatement against the\n\n\ndeceased respondent, there is no justification for Mr.\n\nSen's further argument that the High Court's decree dated February 4, 1969, was a nullity merely because it was passed against a dead person, namely, Y. Prabhakar Reddy. It has to be appreciated that a decree against a dead person is not necessarily a nullity for all purposes. It will be sufficient to say that such a decree has been held to be a nullity because it cannot be executed against his legal representative for the simple reason that he did not have a full opportunity of being heard in respect of it, and the legal representative can not be condemned unheard.\n\nSo if a respondent to an appeal dies, and the appeal abates because of the failure to bring his legal representative on the record within the time limited by law, and the appellate court loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will still be permissible for the court hearing the appeal to bring his legal representative on the record on an application to that effect and to examine any application that may be made for condonation of the delay.\n\nIt is also permissible, and is in fact the common practice, to remand the case for disposal according to law to the court in which it was pending at the time of the death of the deceased party. The Jaw has therefore provided, and accepted, modes for reopening and hearing the appeal in such cases.\n\nThe basic fact remains that a decree against a dead person is treated as a nullity because it cannot be allowed to operate against his legal representative when he was never brought on the record to defend the case.\n\nAny other view would not be possible or permissible for it would fasten on him a liability for which he did not have any hearing.\n\nSo while the Jaw treat~ such a decree as a nullity qua the legal representative of the deceased defendant or respondent, there is nothing to prevent him from deciding that he will not treat the decree as a nullity, but will abide by it as it stands, or as it may be modified thereafter on appeal. If a legal representative adopts that alternative or course of action, it cannot possibly be said that bis option to be governed by the decree is against the law or any concept of public policy or purpose, or the public morality. It is thus a matter entirely at the discretion of the leg'1_l represeI!!aJive of a deceased respondent against whom a decree has been passed after his death to decide whether he will raise the question that the decree has become a nullity, at tho. appropriate time, namely, during the course of the hearing of any appeal may be filed by the other party, or to abandon that obvious technical objection and fight the appeal on the merits.\n\nHe may do so, either because of his faith in the strength of his case on the meriti, or because of incorrect legal advice, or for the reason that he may not like to rely on a mere technical plea, or because in the case of\n\n- . '\n\nI ..\n\n' >-\n\nit~·\n\nl '(-\n\n, T ./ '-.\n\n( ' '\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFF!Cllil (Shinghal, J.) 607\n\ncross-appeals, he may have the impression that bringing the legal representative of the dece_ased respondent on record in an appeal by a coappellant will enure for the benefit of or be sufficient for purposes of the cross-appeal.\n\nAn abandonment of a technical plea of abatement and the consequential dismissal of the appeal, is therefore a matter at the discretion of the legal representative of the deceased respondent and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary.\n\nIt is equally futile to argue that an appellate court is denuded of its jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which otfe of the respondents has died and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone me!ely because no application has been made to bring his legal representative on the record when no objection to that effect is raised by any one.\n\nBut, as is equally obvious, it will not be fair to draw an infernce as to the abandonment of such a plea of abatement unless there is clear, sufficient and satisfactory evidence to prove that the legal representative of the deceased respondent was aware of it and abandoned it wilfully.\n\nThe following facts have been well established in this respect in the present case.\n\nIt will be recalled that the Subordinate Judge made his order in the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act on July 30,\n\n1963, and the memorandum of the government appeal was filed in the High Court on December 7, 1963.\n\nThe claimants filed their crossappeal No. AS 296 of 1964 soon after and, at any rate, before April 3,\n\n1964. It will also be re-called that Y. Prabhakar Reddy died on April 3, 1964. While he was respondent No. 2 in the government appeal, he wa_f! a co-appellant in the claimanis' appeal.\n\nAs has been stated, the claimants brought Y. Prabhakar Reddy's legal representatives on the record in their appeal under an order of the High Court dated July 14, 1964, and they were arrayed as appellants Nos. 4 to 9.\n\nIt is admitted that that appeal therefore never abated and the array of the parties was full and complete.\n\nAs has been pointed out, the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy were not brought on record in the government appeal.\n\nIt cannot be denied, however, that they knew of Y. Prabhakar Reddy's death on April 3, 1964, for he was their ancestor.\n\nThey also knew that they had been brought on record as his .legal representatives in the claimants' appeal because of the High Court's specific order to that effect dated July 14, 1964 in C.M.P. No. 7282 of 1964 where they were represented by counsel.\n\nThey thus knew that Y. Prabhakar Reddy's legal representatives were not brought on record in the government appeal, and that it stood abated against them because of the expiry of the time limited by law\n\n19-253SCI/79\n\nSU!>REME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nin that respect.\n\nEven so, they did not make an application to the High Court for the dismial of the appeal on the ground that it could\n\nnot survive against the surviving respondents because of that. basic defect, in the facts and circumstances of that case.\n\nThat in fact continued to be the position for a long period of some five years. It is not disputed that the appeals came up for hearing in the High Court on or about February 4, 1969, but, even then, no objection was taken to the hearing of the government appeal in spite of the fatal defect in its constitution. On the other hail'tl; when the two appeals were taken up for hearing, the High Court heard, without any objection, not only the counsel for the appellants in the government appeal, but also C. Padmanabha Reddy, who was counsel for the respondents in that appeal and for the reconstituted array of appellants in the claimants' appeal.\n\nThe legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy and their counsel were thus aware of the fact that the government appeal had abated against respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy, and it will not be unfair to assume that they, or, at any rate, their counsel knew that it was open for them to contend that the appeal was liable to dismissal for that reason.\n\nTwo courses of action were therefore open to them :\n\n(i) to move the High Court for the dismissal of the government appeal, or (ii) to allow that appeal to be heard and decided on the merits and to abide by any decree which the High Court might pass in the two E appeals.\n\nThe legal representatives and their counsel did not choose to adopt the first course of action, and it will be fair and reasonable to hold that they wilfully chose the second course of action.\n\nThat was why their counsel C. Padmanabha Reddy, who was counsel for all the respondents in the government appeal, and for all the appellants in the claimants' appeal, argued both the appeals on the merits.\n\nThe High Court heard and decided the cross-appeals by its impugned judgment dated February 4, 1969, and it will be a proper conclusion for me to reach that the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy wilfully abandoned any plea that might have been available to them on the basis of the abatement of the government appeal against the deceased respondent.\n\nIt was only after the judgment of the High Court went aaginst them, that the legal representatives of Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy decided to take np the question of abatement, for the first time, in the petition which they and the other claimants' filed under section 104-110 and order 45 rules 2 and 3 C.P.C. It is significant that they did not even then ask the High Court to review its judgment and grant them relief on the ground that Y. Prabhakar Reddy had died and the decree against him was a nullity in so far as they were concerned. The High Court was\n\n~ I\n\n.. _.\n\nti t\n\n-,)~\n\n/ ' '\n\n~ I\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Shinghal, J.) 609\n\nsimply asked to allow the application for the certification of the appeal A on the ground that the value of the subject matter was upwards of Rs. 20,000/- and it made an order to that effect.\n\nIn all these facts and circumstances, I have no doubt that any plea that may have been available to the legal representatives of the deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy in the government appeal because of its abatement, was wilfully abandoned by them.\n\nAny other view of the matter will be unfair to the present respondents, because if any such objection had been taken in the High Court, they would have made an application for the setting as; de of the abatement and condoning the delay, for whatever it was worth. It has to be appreciated that a point of defence which has been wilfully or deliberately abandoned by a party in a civil case, at a crucial stage when it was most relevant or material, cannot be allowed to be taken up later, at the sweet will of the party which had abandoned the point, or as a last resort, or as an after thought.\n\nIn fact in a case where a point has been wilfully abandoned by a party, even if, in a given case, such a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of his conduct, it will not be permissible to allow that party to revoke the abandonment if that will be disadvantageous to the other party .\n\nMr. Sen has however made a reference to Gaekwar Baroda State Railwriy v. Hafiz Habib-ul-haq and others( 1) and Thakore Saheb Khanji Kashari Khanji v. Gu lam Rasul Chandbhai (2 ) for the purpose of showing that the government appeal was not at all maintainable in the High Court because of its abatement against respondent Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy as that was a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court which could not have been abandoned.\n\nThe provisions of section 86 C.P.C. came up for consideration in both those cases and it was held that as the section was based upon public policy or purpose, it was not open to a ruling chief to waive its provisions.\n\nThose were therefore different observations which have no bearing on the present controversy for, as has been stated, the decision of the legal representative of a deceased respondent to be bound by a decree in spite of its abatement does not involve any question of public\n\npolicy.\n\nMr. Sen's reference to Maharana Shri Davlatsinghji Thakore Saheb of l.imdi v. Khachar Hamir Mon,(') Town 1Wu11icipal Council, Athani\n\n(!) 65 Indian Appeals 182\n\n(2) AJ.R. 1955 Bombay 449\n\n(3) I.L.R. 34 Bombay 171.\n\n610 SUPRl!Mll COUl.T REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nT. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others,(') Simpson and\n\nflll(}ther v. Crowle and 0th.rs(•) Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and tmother v. L. V. A. Dikshitula and others(3 ) and P. Dasa Muni ReaiJy\n\nY. P. Appa Rao(') is equally futile because they were cases of inherent lad of jurisdiction in the co.i:t cottcerncd or raised the question of the bar of limitation .\n\nMr. Sen has placed reliance OD. Punjab State v. Sardar A.tm\" Singh(\") and State of Rajasthan and others v. Raghuraj Singh(') to show that where an application is not mad• to bring the legal repreientative of the deceased respondent on the record of a cross-appeal, that appeal will abate, and it wiU not be permissible for the appellant to claim the benefit of the fact that the legal repr-ntative of the deceased respondent had been brought on the record in the crcJ£s-appeal filed by him. I have gone\n\ntlrrough the cases, but they are clearly distinguishable. The respondent in both cases died durin:; the pendency of the first appeal, and an objection as to abatement was takea during the course of the hearing, so that there was no questiGn of abandoning the objection in either of !hese cases and it was permissible to apply to the court for th~ usual consequences which follow for non<oapliance with the provision's of Order XXII rules 3 and 4 C.P.C.\n\nThose decisions cannot threfore be of any help in a case like this.\n\nIt would thus follow that a.s the plea of abatement of the government appeal against respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy and its dismissal as a whole for that reason, was wilfully abandoned by the present respondents in the High Court, it will not be fair and reasonable to allow them to take it up the facts and circumstances of this case merely because the decision of the High Court has gone against them.\n\nThat leaves for consideration the question whether the finding of --' \\,' fact of the High Court that the pre6ent appellants were entitled to compenation at Rs. 4/- per square yard suffers from any such e1Tor as to \\\n\nrequire interference by this court.\n\nMr. Sen has argued that the High Court went wrong in interfering with the finding of the Subordinate Judge and in excluding the sale deeds Exs. A 1 and A 2 altogether from consideration when they were important and were by themselves sufficient to uphold the finding of the Subordinate Jude that the market value of the land was Rs. 12/- pe< quare yard.\n\n(!) [1970] 1 S.C.:R. 51.\n\n(2) [19211 3 K.B. 243,\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1979 S.C. 193 .\n\n\n(5) A.l.R. 1963 Punjab 113.\n\n(6) A.I.R. 1968 Rajasthan 14.\n\n' ,.\n\n' ... ,\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY V REVENUE OFFICER (Desai, !.) ti I I\n\nI find from the impugned judwent that the High Court st took into consideration all tboe factor~ which were in favour of the claimants, namely, the fact that the li!_nd was situated within the municipal limits of Kurnool town, it was within easy reach of the government hospitals, the railway station, the Medical College and the State Bank etc., it was suitable as a building site etc. The High Court also took due notice of the fact that although Kurnool was not made the capital of Andhra Pradesh, it was a growing town and had an importance of its own. It then examined those facts which persuaded it to reduce the market value. In doing so, it took note of the fact that the land under acquisition had been bought by the Claimnnts themselves for Rs. 26,000/- on October 30, 1961, just eigljt months before the issue of the notification for its acquisition. That rate worked out to Rs. 2 /- per square yard. Then the High Court took into consideration the other facts that the claimants did not ell'ect any improvement in the land after its purchase, it was not their case that the previous owner had\n\nold it for any compelling reason, the claimants were not even responsible for preparing the lay out plan for the locality (which bad been accepted by the municipality even before they had ])urchased the land) and that they merely obtained the sanction of the Town Planning department to the lay out which had already been sanctioned. The High Court carefully examined the various sale agreements En. A3, AS, A7, AlO, Al2 and Al4, and rejected them on the ground that they did not appear to be genuine and had mostly been executed on the same date.\n\nThat left th~ two registered sale deeds Exs.\n\nA 1 and A2 for consideration on which Mr. Sen has placed considerable reliance.\n\nThe High Court notked that they were for the sale of very small portions of land, namely, 3 cents and S cents, and did not think it proper to make them the basis for determining the value of a far larger piece of land.\n\nIt cannot therefore be said that the High Court ig11ored or misread any important piece of e; vidence in arriving at its finding. As has been stated, the appellanfs bought the land for Rs. 26,000/-, which worked out to Rs. 2/- per square yard, and the High Court doubled that rate, and raised it to Rs. 4 /- per quare yard even though the acquisition took place within a matter of the next eight months and the appellants did nothing to improve its value.\n\nTo say the least, such a finding cannot be said to have been vitiated for any reason whatsoever so as to require reconsideration here.\n\nAs I find no merit in the appeal, it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nDESAI, J.-1 have carefully gone through the judgment prepared by H my learned brother Shinghal, J. and I am in bill agreement with him that the appeal be dismissed.\n\nThis separate opinion become~ necessary because in my opinion in the facts and circumstances of this case the Government appeal had nol abated at all.\n\nAll the relevant facts have been extensively set out by my learned brother and it is not necessary to repeat them here.\n\nEven the nomenclature in re, pect of the two appeals as given by him may be adopted for\n\nJ 1 facility o[ appreciating the point under discussion.\n\nAfter the award by the Subordinate Judge, two appeals came to be preferred, one by the Revenue Divisional Officer styled as 'Government appeal', !Ind another by the claimants styled as 'claimants appeal'. Both .J ' these appeals were cross-appeals arising from the Award of the Subordinate Jude.\n\nDuring the pendency of the. appeals in the High Court, Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy, one of the three claimants, being an appellant in the claimants' appeal and respondent in Government appeal, died on April 3, 1964 and upon an application made' to the Court in the claimants' appeal bis legal representatives appellants 4-9 were brought on record.\n\nAdmittedly, the legal representatives of deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy one of the respondents in Government appeal were not brought on record till both the appeals were disposed of by a common judgment rendered on February 4,. 1969.\n\nThe High Court by its judgment dismissed the claimants' appeal and partly allowed the Government appeal reducing the compensation payable in respect of the acquired land from Rs. 12/- to Rs. 4/- per sq. yd.\n\nOriginal two claimants and heirs of deceased claimant Y. Prabhakar Reddy preferred the present appeal to this Court by certificate granted by the High Court under Article 133 of the Constitution.\n\nMr. A. K. Sen contended that as heirs of one of the claimants Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy, respondent in Government appeal, were not brought on record within the prescribed period of !imitation after his death pend- . ing the appeal, not only the Govermnent appeal abated against Y. Pra _ _, \\.' bhakar Reddy but in view of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab \\\n\nv. Nathu Ram,(') the appeal abated as a whole and, therefore, the judgment of the High Court partly allowing the Government appeal- -' ,. and reducing the compensation from Rs. 12/- to Rs. 4/- per sq. yd of the acquired land must be set aside on this short ground alone.\n\nIn view of the decision in Nathu Ram's case, if Government appeal had abated in the facts and circumstances of the case, indisputably the appeal would abate as a whole. The substance of the matter is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case and keeping in view the relevant provisions of law the Government appeal had at all abated.\n\nThere were cross appeals arising tram the same Award before the High Court.\n\nThe record does not show that any order was made for\n\n\n, L\n\n\"( •\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Desai, !.) 613\n\nconsolidating these appeals as is usually done when both the partie\"s to a decree prefer appeals and which are styled as cross-appeals.\n\nBoth the parties to the original proceeding adopt rival positions in cross appeals. The claimants in their appeal moved the High Court to enhance the compensation from Rs. 12/- per sq. yd. awarded by the Subordioote Judge to a higher amount as claimed by them.\n\nThe Government in its appeal against the same Award moved the High Court to reduce the compensation from Rs. 12/- to Rs. 2/- per sq. yd.\n\nThe contest between the parties wonld be, what in the circumstances of the case should be adequate compensation being the market value of the land acquired by the Government on the relevant date. (ee Nathuram's case) .\n\nUndoubtedly, one of the original claimants Y. Prabhakar Reddy being one of the appellants in the claimants' appeal died and specifically his legal reprc>entatives were brought on record within the prescribed period of limitation and that was done much prior to the date of hearing of the appeals by the High Court.\n\nAs is notorious, the inadvertence, if not down right indifference, of those incharge of the Government appeal is demonstrably established because the counsel incharge of the Government appeal must have received the notice moved on behalf of the appeUants-- claimants seeking to bring the k:gal representatives of deceased Y. Parbhakar Reddy on record and Jmending the cause :it!e of the claimants' appeal accordingly.\n\nThis was sufficient notice to the counsel incliarge of the Govrenment appeal that the same gentleman was one of the respondents in Government appeal and his death having been notified, as a necessary corollary his heirs will have to be brought on record in Government appeal. Nothing more was required to be .j _ done by lhe counsel incharge of Government appeal except to bodily\n\nr 1 adopt those who applied to come on record in place of decea!ed Y. ( Prabhakar Reddy as his leal repreoentatives in claimants' appeal to be \\ substituted as legal representatives of deceased respondent Y. Prabhakar °' 1 Reddy in Government appeal.\n\nThis was not done. It may aho be\n\nmentioned that both the appeals were heard together and were di1posed\n\nof by a common judgment. As has been pointed out by Shinghal, J., no contention was taken on behalf of the respcndents in Government appeal thJt on account of the failure of Government to bring the heirs of deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy on record within the time prescribed, the appeal has abated but on the contrary Government appeal was allowed to be proceeded in the presence of all parties including legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy who were appellant! in claimants' appeal and ended in a judgment adverse to them. What is the consequence of failure to raise this contention has been examined by my learned brother in detail and I am in agreement with his conclusion.\n\n614 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS (1979] 3 s.C.R:.\n\nNow, Order 22, Rule 4 read with Order 22,, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure require that the appellant in Government appeal should have brought the legal representatives of respondent deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy, on record.\n\nThere is no controversy that rule' 4 of Order 22 read with rule 11 would be attracted in this case, and as, admittedly the legal representatives of deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy, the respondent in Government appeal, were not brought on record till the appeal was disposed of, ordinarily tbe aPPeal would abate.\n\nThe, ubstantial question is : where cross appeals are preferred against a common decree or an Award and in the cross appeals 1he parties are arrayed in rival positions and where one party as appeflant dies and his legal representatives are brought on record though those very legal representatives are not substituted in his place which he adopted as respondent in the cross appeal, would the cross appeal abate ?\n\nThis question may be examined first on principle.\n\nThe basic principle underlying order 22, rules 3 and 4 which on account of the provision contained in order 22, rule 11 apply to appeals, is indisputably a facet of natural justice or a limb of audi altrem partem rule.\n\nIt is a fundameutal rule of natural justice that a man has a right to be hard audi altrem partem-where a decision affecting him or his interest is to be recorded.\n\nIt hurts one's sense of, justice, fairness and reason that a decisiou one way or the other is recorded affecting a party without giving that party an opportunity of being heard.\n\nThis rule embraces the whole notion of fair procedure and the rule requiring a hearing is of almost universal validity.\n\nIt has made a serious inroad in administrative decisions.\n\nIt should enjoy a top place in a judicial proceeding.\n\nThe first limb of this rule audi altrem partem is that a person must be given an opportunity of being heard before a decision one way or the other affecting him is recorded.\n\nAs a corollary to this rule it is provided in the Code of Civil Procedur~ that where a party to the proceeding dies pending the proceeding a'nd the cause of action survives, the legal representatives of the deceased party should be brought on record which only means that such legal representatives must be afforded an opportunity of bei'!g heard fore any liability is fastened upon them.\n\nIt may be that the legal representatives in a given situation may be pe, rsonally liable or the estate of the deceased in their hands would be Jiablct and in either case a decision one way or the other, adverse or favourable to them, cannot be recorded unles they are given a:n opportunity of being heard. Order 22, rules 3 and 4 codify these procedural safeguards translating into statutory requirement one of the principles of natural justice.\n\n' .\n\n~ \\ ..\n\n-·- \\ ,-\n\nJ L\n\nJAYAUMA REDDY v. l!.EVENU! OFFICER (Desai, ].) Gli\n\nIf this is th~ discernible principle underlying order 22, rules 3 and .i it bas been dell'.lonstrably established by interpretation put on !belle two rules.\n\nOriginal view was that all lepi representatives of a deceased plaintiff or dekndant must be substituted on the pain of the action abating.\n\nWith utmoit diligence, from a multitude some one may <*:ape notice and the consequent hardship in abatement of action led this Court to assert the principl]e that where some legal representatives are brought on record permitting an inference that the estate is adequately represented, the action would not abate though it would be the duty of tho other side to bring those legal representatives on record who are overlooked or missed even at a later date.\n\nWhen the aforementioned two provisions speak of legal representatives it only 111eans that if after diligent and bona fide enquiry tho party liable to bring the legal representatives oa record ascertains who are the legal representatives of a decea'sed party and brio~ them on record within the time limited by 'law, there• is no abatement of the suit or appeal on the ound that some other legal representatives have not been brought on record,, because the impleaded legal representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and the decision would bind not only those impleaded but the entire estate including the interest o! those not brought on record.\n\nThis view has been consistently adopted by this Court in Daya Ram & Ors. v. Shyam Sundari(') N. lC. Mohammad Sulaiman v. N. C. Mohammad Ismail & Ors.;(2) and Harihar Prasad Singh & Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Singh & Ors.(') The principle deducible from these decisions is that not only the interest of the deceased was adequately taken care of by those who were on record but they had the opportunity to put forth their case within permissible limits. Neither the case of the deceased nor of his successors in-interest has gone by default.\n\nIn other words, the principle is that if the deceased had as a party a right toput forth hio case, those likely to be affected by the decision on death of the deceased had the saime\n\nopportunity to put forth their case and even if from a large number hning identical interest some are not brou!Jht on record those who are brought on record would adequately take care of their interest and the cause in the obsence of some such would not abate. In legal parlance this procedure affords an opportunity of being heard in all its ramification before a decision on the pending list is taken.\n\nAnother principle in this behal! which has found recognition of the Courts is that if the legal representatives of the decea5ed party are before the Court ia the same action even it in another capacity, failure to\n\n(I) (1965] I SCR !31.\n\n(2) [1966] I SCR ~37.\n\n(3) (1975] 2 SC!t '32.\n\n' \\.\n\n~UPUM& COUIT llEPOllTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA - bring them on record iii. a specific legal ition would not result in\n\nabatement of the action. In Mahabir Prasad v. Jag~ Ram & Ors.,( 1) this Court was caUed upon to consider whether where a legal representative of a deceased party is on record in another capacity, failure to implead him ~~ legal representative of the dece~ed party woul.fl result in abatement of the action ?\n\nIn that case Mahabir Prasad, his wife Saroj Devi and his mother Gunwanti Devi filed a suit against Jage Ram and-two others for recovering rent then due in the aggregate amount of Rs. 61,750/-.\n\nThe suit ended in a decree.\n\nThe execution of the decree was resisted by the defendants on the plea inter alid that the decree was ine.xecutable because of the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.\n\nThis contention found favour with -the executing court and the application for execution was dismissed. Mahabir Prasad, one of the decree holders alone appealed against that order and impleaded Gunwati Devi and Saroj Devi as party respondents along wit'>. the original judgment-debtors.\n\nSaroj Devi died in November 1962 and Mahabir Prasad applied that the name of Saroj Devi be \"struck of from the array_pf respondents.\n\nThe High Court made an order granting the application \"subject to all just exceptions\".\n\nSubsequently the\n\nHigh Court dismissed the appeal holding that because the heirs and legal representatives of Saroj Devi were not brought on record within the period of limitation, the appeal abated in its entirety. This Court, while setting a!ide the order made by the High Court holding that the appeal abated, observed as under :\n\n\"Even on the alternative ground that Mahabir Prasad being one of the heirs of Saroj Devi there can be no abatement merely because no formal application for showing Mahabir Prasad\n\nas an heir and legal representative of Saroj Devi was made.\n\nWhere in a proceeding a party dies and one cf the legal representatives i! already on the record in another capacity, it is\n\n- ',_only necessary that he should be described by an appropriate\n\n. application made in that behalf that he is also on record. as an heir and legal representative.\n\nEven if there are other heirs -and legal representatives and no application for impleading\n\n- them isl made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the proceeding will not abate\".\n\nThe principle deducible from this decision of the Court i's that where one of the legal representatives of the deceased party is before the Court at tl\\e time when the proceeding is heard but in another capacity, it i• immaterial whether he i• described as such or not and even if there are other legal representative!, the cause will not abate.\n\n(I) 11971) 3 SCR 301.\n\nJ L\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY V REVENUE OFFICER (Desai, !.) 617\n\n'\\ow, when a proceeding such as a suit ends in a decree it may be that decree may partly satisfy both the parties with the result that with regard to that part of decree by which each party is dissa1isfied that pariy may prefer an appeal challenging only that part of the decree by which\n\nit is dissatisfied.\n\nWhen one such party to the decree appeals and a notice of the appeal is served on the o'her side the respondent receiving the notice may prefer cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22, but what is important to note is that such respondent though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may take any cross-objections to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal. In other words, the respondent could have as well filed an appeal against that part of the decree by which he is dissatisfied but if he has not filed an appeal he can as well put forth cross-objections as contemplated by Order 41, rule 22.\n\nParameters of cross-objections by the language of OrJ\"1 . .\\J, rule 22, are limited to the contentions which could appropriately be taken in an appeal against a decree or a part of a deqee. For all practi.:al purposes cross-objections and cross-appeals have the same purpose to achieve and cover the same ground. Would they stand on a different footing in respect of death of a party either in cross-appeals or in cross-objections ?\n\nThere is a conflict of judicial opinion on the effect of substitution of\n\nleg~! representatives of a deceased party in cross-objections and in crossappeals.\n\nMuUa has noted this cleavage of opinion in his Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition, Volume II, P. 1237, as under:\n\n\"Where both the parties to a suit file independent appeals against the decree passed therein, and one of them dies pending the appeal, the substitution of his legal represen tatives in one appeal does not enure for the benefit of the other appeal which consequently abates.\n\nBut where one party to a suit prefers an appeal against the decree passed therein and the other files a memorandum of crpss-objections under 0. 41, r. 22, what is the effect of the legal representatives of a deceased party to the proceedings being substituted in the memorandum of cross-objections, and not in the appeal ? There is a conflict of judicial opinion on this question.\n\nWhere the respondent died and his legal representative was brought on record on his own application in the cross-objections and the appeUant had not applied to\n\nbrin~ him on record, it was held that the substitution of the legal representative in the cross-objection enured for the benefit of the appeal also as both the appeal and the crossappeal (sic) were part of tho same proceedins. And where\n\n618 SUPl\\l!MI! COUl\\T l\\l!POR.TS [197~] 3 s.c.I\\.\n\nA the appellant died, and hi~ legal representatives were brought on record in the cross-objection but not in the appeal, it\n\n'll'a8 held thst the substitution in the cross-appeal (sic) did not enure for the benefit of the appeal and that the latter abated\".\n\nB Decisions on whlch the commentary is based may now be examinc\n\ned in depth to sort out principle, if any, to which the cleavage or opinion is referable.\n\nIn a very early decision in Brij lndar Singh v. Lala Kanshi Ram & Ors.,( 1) the Judicial Committee held that s:ibstitution of a deceased party's legal representatives in an interlocutory appeal arising from an order made in a suit would enure for the benefit of the suit a11d no separate application for substitution in the suit need be made.\n\nIt was in terms held that the introduction of a plaintiff or a defendant at on• stage of the suit is an introduction for all stages, and that though it was done in the course of an interlocutory application as to the production of books the same would enure for the benefit of the suit. Whil• a!lirming the ratio of this decision this Court in Rangubai Kom Shankar Jagtap v. Sunderabai Bharatar Sakharanz ledhe & Ors.,( 2 }\n\nanalysed !)1e principle underlying Order 22, rules 3, 4 and 11 as under :\n\n\"Let us now consider the question on prin.ciple.\n\nA combined reading of Order XXII, rr. 3, 4 and 11, ot the Code of Civil Procedure shows that the doctrine of abatement >applies equally to a suit M well as to an appeal.\n\nIn the application of the said rr. 3 and 4 to an appeal instead of\n\n\"plaintiff'' and \"defendant\", \"appellant\" and \"respondent\" have to be read in those rules.\n\nPrima facie, therefore, if a F respondem dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record within the prescribed time, the appeal abates as against the respondent under r. 4, read with r. 11, of 0.\n\nXXII of the Code ot Civil Procedure.\n\nBut there is another principle recognised by the Judicial Committee in the aforesaid decision which softens the rigour of this rule.\n\nThe said G principle is that if the legal representativ~ are brought on record within the prescribed time at one stage of the suit, it will ennre for the benefit of all the subsequent stages of the suit.\n\nThe application of this principle to different situations will help to answer the problem presented in the present case. (1) A filed a suit agaimt B for the recovery of posses- H sion and mesne profits.\n\nAfter the issue~ were framed, B\n\n(1) AIR 19171PC 156.\n\n(2) [1965! 3 S.C.R. 211 at 216-217.\n\nJ ' y\n\n....\n\n' I.\n\n• !.\n\nJAYAMMA llEDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Desai, J.) 61 g\n\ndied.\n\nAt the stage of an interlocutory application for production of documents, the legal representatives o! B were brought on record within the time prCicribed.\n\nThe order bringinc them on record would enure for the benefit of the entire uit.\n\n(2) The suit was decreed and an appeal was filed in the High Court and was pending: therein.\n\nThe defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record.\n\nThe suit was subsequently remanded to the 11rial Court.\n\nThe order bringing the legal representatives on record in the appeal would enure for the further stages ol the suit.\n\n(3) An appeal was filed against an interlocutory order made in a suit.\n\nPending the appeal the delendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record.\n\nThe appeal was dismissed.\n\nThe appeal being a continuation or a sl'age of the suit, the order bringing the legal representatives on record would enure for the subsequent stages of the suit.\n\nThis would be so whether in the appeal the trial Court's order was confirmed, modified or reversed.\n\nIn the above 3 illustrations one fact is common, •amely, the order bringing on record the legal representalives was made at one stage of the rnit, be it in the suit or in an appeal against the interlocutory order or final order made in the suit, for an appeal is only a continuation of the suit.\n\nWhether the appellate order confirms that of the first Court, modifies or reverses it, it replaces or substitutes the order appealed against. It takes its place in the suit and becomes a part of it. It is, as it were, the suit was brought to the appellate Court at one stage and the orders made therein were made in the suit itself.\n\nTherefore, that order enures for the subsequent stages of the suit.\n\nBut the same legal position cannot be invoked in the reverse or converse situation.\n\nA suit is not a continuation ol an appeal. An order made in a suit subsequent to the filing of an appeal at an earlier stage will move forward\n\nlith the subsequent stages of the suit or appeals taken therefrom; hut it cannot be projected backwards into the appeal that has already been filed.\n\nIt cannot possibly become an order in the appeal.\n\nTherefore, the order bringing the legal representatives of the 7th respondent on record in the final decree proceedings cannot enure for tlie benefit of the appeal filed against the preliminary decree.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the appeal abated so fur as the 7th respondent was concerned.\"\n\n])'\n\nIn Sankaranaraina Saralaya v. Laxmi Hengsu & Ors.,(') two independent appeals were filed against the decree of the trial court in the suit, one appeal being by the plaintiff and the other appeal by defendant 2.\n\nIn the appeal filed by defendant 2 the legal representatives of the respondent, viz., the plaintiff not having been brought on record within the time prescribed by law, the appeal abated, and when that abatement was sought to be set aside, the Court found that there was no ground for allowing the application. It was then contended that because the legal representatives of the appellant in other appeal (who was undoubtedly the plaintiff in the suit) have been added within the time allowed, it should be taken that those legal representatives have also been added in place of the deceased respondent by defendant 2.\n\nNegativing this contention a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court held that there is no interdependence between the two appeals and the analogy of an appeal and a memorandum of cross-objection in the same appeal does not hold good in case of two independent appeals where the Conrt has to deal with two separate and independent appeals though arising from the same suit and the parties adopt rival positions.\n\nThe Court distinguished the decision in Brij lndar Singh's case (supra,) by posing a question to itself : 'Can it be said in the present case that what was done in one appeal could ennre for the benefit of another appeal unless the latter appeal can be deemed to be a continuation or a further stage of the appeal in which the legal representatives were brought on record' and answered it in the negative oliserving that it is not possible to extend the principle laid down by J udici•al Committee in Brij lndar Singh's case (supra) In Dasondha Singh v.\n\nShadi Ram Sardha Ram & Ors.(') there were cross appeals arising from the same decree before the Court and the plaintiff Shadi Ram was an appellant in the appeal preferred by him and when he died his legal representatives were impleaded within the prescribed time.\n\nIn the appeal preferred by the defendant the application for impleading Shadi Ram's legal representatives which was made beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the Court having declined to condone the delay, the appeal abated. It was contended that as the legal representatives of Shadi Ram were impleaded in his appeal and as both these appeals arose out of the same judgment, the legal representatives of Shadi Ram being before the Court it is a mere formality to make necessary endorsement on record and, therefore. the appeal preferred by defendant 2 wonld not abate.\n\nThe Court negatived Jhe argument relying upon a Division Bench decision in Punjab State v. Atma Singh.(•). -n1 Alll-i931 Mad. 277\n\n(2) AIR 1964 Punjab 336\n\n(3) A.LR. 1963 Punj. 113.\n\n.I '\n\nl •\n\n-...\n\nI L\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Desai, J.)\n\n62 I\n\nIn State of Rajasthan & Ors. v.\n\nRaghuraj Singh,(') two crossappeals came to be filed against the decision of the trial court to the Rajasthan High Court.\n\nDuring the pendency of these appeals the plaintiff who was appellant in his appeal died and his legal representatives were impleaded within time.\n\nIt appears that the legal representatives of the plaintiff who was respondent in ciefendant's appeal were not substituted and a preliminary objection was taken that the defendant's appeal abates or has abated.\n\nThe defendant countered this submission by saying that as plaintiff's legal representatives were before the Court as brought on record and substituted in the plaintiff's appeal, it would be permitting a technicality to hold that the defendant's appeal has abated.\n\nThe Court examined two separate limbs of the submission : ( 1) what is the eITect of ubstitution of de- ~. .. ceased party's legal representatives in cross-objections though no l:~, such substitution was made in the main appeal; and (2) would the '-'~\"effect be different if instead of cross-objections there were cross-\n\n, appeals.\n\nA Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held tha.t cross-objections being part of the same proceedings and form pmt of the same record, substitution of legal representatives in the crossobjections would enure for the benefit of the main appeal.\n\nBut in the case of cross-appeals, after referring to Sankaranaraina Saralaya's case, (supra) the High Court held that substitution of legal representati<es of a deceased party in one appeal cannot enure for the benefit of the cro:; s-appeal and, therefore, defendant's appeal was held to have abated.\n\n\\ -·-·-\n\nAn analysis of the aforementioned decisions in search of a common thread or a deducible principle has not proved helpful.\n\nThe following conclusions emerge from these decisions : (!) If all legal representatives are not impleaded after diligent search and some are brought on record and if the Court is satisfied that the estate is adequately represented meaning thereby that the interests of the deceased party are properly represented before the Court, an action would not abate.\n\n(2) If the legal representative is on record in a different capacity, the failure to describe him also in his other capacity as legal representative of the deceased party would not abate the proceeding.\n\n(3) If an appeal and cross-objections in the appeal arising from a decree arc eforc the appellate court and the respondent dies, substitution of his legal representatives in the cross.-objctions being part of the same record, would enure for the benefit of the appe•al and the failure of the appellant to implead the legal representatives of the\n\n(I) AIR 1968 Raj. 14.\n\nA deceased respondent would not have the effect of abating the appeal but not vice versa.\n\n. ( 4) A .substitution of legal representatives of the deceased party m an appeal or revision even against an interlocutory order would\n\nnure for the subsequent stages of the suit on the footing that appeal _ 1s a continuation, of a suit and introduction of a party at one stage of B a suit. would enure for all subsequent stages of the suit.\n\n(5) In -cross-appeals arising from the same decree where parties to a suit adopt rival positions, on the death of a party if his legal re-- presentatives -are impkaded in one appeal it will not enure for the benefit of cross-appeal and the same would abate.\n\nIs it possible to ratiocinate these decisions? Appmcntly the task is difficult.\n\nNow, if the object and purpose behind enacting Order 22, rules 3 and 4 are kept in forefront conclusions Nos. 1 to 4 would ' more or less fall in line with the object and purpose, namely; no decision can be recorded in a. judicial proceeding concerning the interests of a party to a proceeding without giving such party or his legal representatives an opportunity of putting forth its/their case.\n\nTo translate this principle into action denuding it .of its ultra technical or harsh application, the Courts held that if some legal representatives are before the Court, or they are before the Court in another, capacity or are brought on record at some stage of the suit, the action will not abate even if there is no strict compliance with the requirements of rules 3 and 4. The distinction in the process drawn between the substitution of legal representatives in cross-objections and cross-appeal defies ratiocination. Cross-appeal and cross-objections provide two different remedies for the same purpose and that is why under Order 41, rule 22, cross-objections can be preferred in respect of such points on which that party could have preferred an\n\nppeal. If such be the pcsition of cross-objections and cross-appeal . a differentiation in the matter of their treatment under rules 3 and 4 cannot be justified merely on the ground that in case of cross-objections-they form part of the same record while cross-appeals are two independent proceedings.\n\nNow, if the discernible principle underlying rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 is that the legal representatives of the deceased .likely to be affected . one way or the other by the decision in appeal must be before the Court and must be heard before a decision affecting their interests is recorded it would stand fully vindicated when in cross-appeals a p'arly occupying the positi.on of an appellant in one appeal and respcndent in the - other appeal dies and his legal representatives are brought on record in the appeal in which he i! the appellant and not in the other appeal wherein he is a respondent because the subject-matter of both the\n\nJAYARAMAltECCY V. REVl!NUE OFFICER 623\n\n11ppeals being the deaee under attack, they have an opportunity to\n\n'upport the decree in their favour and question the correctness of the .tiecree adverse to them.\n\nEven if they were brought on record as l•gal representatives of the deceased in his capacity as respondent in liloe cross-appeal, they could not have further advanced their case nor , oould they have done anything more than what they would do in their\n\nOi.pacity as legal representatives of the deceased appellant unless they were precluded from contendint that they being not on record cannot rnpport or controvert the decree.\n\nThey have thus the fullest opportunity of putting forth their grievance against and in support of the liecree.\n\nTheir position was not the least likely to be affected one way or the other even if they were not formally impleaded as !eta! representatives of the decrnsed in hi' capacity as respondent.\n\nTo say that cro•s-appeals are independent of each other is to overlook the ebvious position which parties adopt in cross-appeals.\n\nInterdepentlence of cross-appeals is the same •s interdependence of appeal and \"oss-objections because as in the case of appeal and cross-objections a decision with regard to appeal would directly impinge upon the decioion in cross-objections and _vice v\"sa.\n\nIndu_bita]:i)y the decision in one of the cross-appeals would directly impinge upon the decision in tlte other because both nltimately ari•e from the same decree.\n\nThis k really the interdependence of cro\"-appeals and it is impossible to distinguish cross-appeals from appeal and cross-objections.\n\nUnfortuutely this interdependence was overlooked by the Madras High Court when the scope of cross-appeals arisin: from the same decree and appeal and cross-objections in respect of the iame decree were not examined in depth in Sankaranaraina Sara/aya's case (supra).\n\nThis approach is merely an extension of the principle well recognised by Courts that if legal representatives are before the Court in the given proceeding in one capacity it is immaterial and irrelevant if they are not formally impleaded as legal representatives of the dceased party in another capacity. Sham of embellishment, when legal representatives of a\n\ndeceased appellant are substituted and those very legal representatives as legal representatives ot the same person occupying the position of respondent in cross-appeal are not 'ubstituted, the indisputable outcome would be that they were on record in the connected proceeding\n\nbefore the same Court hearing both the matters, in one capacity though they were not described as such in their other capacity, namely, as le¢ representatives of the deceased reapondent.\n\nTo ignore this obvious position woud he giving undue importance to torrn rather than substance. The anxiety of the Court should be whether those likely to be 1tffected by the decision in the proceedint; were before the Court having 'full opportunity to canvass tlteir case.\n\nOnce that is satisfied it can be\n\nsafely said that the provisions contained in rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 are satisfied in a given case.\n\nTo take another view would be to give an opportunity to the legal representatives of a deceased party in an appeal having had the fullest opportunity to canvass their case through the advocate of their choice appearing in cross-appeals for them and having canvassed their case and lost, to turn round and contend that they were not before the Court as legal representatives of the same person in his other capacity, namely, respondent in the crossappeal.\n\nIn other words, those legal representatives were before the Comt all throughout the hearing of the appeal as parties to the appeal and canvassed their ca>e and were heard through their advocate and they had the fuli opportunity to put forth whatever contc1ttions w. re open to them in the appeals and to contest the contentions advanced against them by the opposite side and yet if the other view is taken that as they were not formally impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased respondent in the cross-appeal that appeal has abated, it would be wholly unjust.\n\nIt is very ditlicult to distinguish on principle the approach of the Court in appeals and cross-objections and in crossappeals in this behalf.\n\nNo principle of law can distinguish thisdevigational approach.\n\nThe cases which have taken the view that in cross-appeals the position is different than the one in appeal and crossobjeetions do not proceed on any discernible legal principle.\n\nNor can they be explained by any demonstrable legal principle but in fact they run counter to the established legal principle.\n\nIn the present case the legal representatives of deceased Y. Prabrakar Reddy were brought on record in the claimants' appeal. Through their advocate they were contending before the High Court that not only the compensation should be enhanced but in reply to the submissions of the counsel for the State in their appeal they contended that no case was made out for reducing the compensation.\n\nBoth the appeals were heard together and not one after the other.\n\nTherefore, the legal representatives of the deceased Y. Prakhakar Reddy were all throughout before the Court, of course in one capacity, viz., as legal representatives of deceased appellant, but not so described as legal representatives of the deceased respondent.\n\nThat cannot make any difference.\n\nTherefore, the appeal has not abated.\n\nOn merits, I agree with my learned brother Shinghal, J. that the compensation as awarded by the High Court represents the market value of the land on the date of the Notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and no case is made out for interfering with the same.\n\nAccordingly, I agree with the final order that the appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nM GIPF-253 SCI/79-16-11-79-2,500\n\nI ..", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "JAYARAMA REDDY & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAYARAMA REDDY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & LAND ACQUISITION\n\nOFFICER, KURNOOL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,KURNOOL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & LAND ACQUISITION\n\nOFFICER, KURNOOL\n\nMarch 23, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order XXII Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 475, "end_char": 478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shinghal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2053, "end_char": 2061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal befor'e this Court the claimants contended that since the legal representatives of the deceased claimant were not brought on record within the period of limitation, the Government appeal abated and stood disrnissed,\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: (per Shinghal, J.) I. It is not correct to say that the Gi:>vernmeot appeal stood dismissed against the surviving respondents because th'e Govern ment failed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased claimant on record within the specified time limit.", "canonical_name": "Shinghal"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7304, "end_char": 7309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "611 B-D]\n\nDesai, J. (concurring) 1.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7382, "end_char": 7385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7635, "end_char": 7662, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1965] 1 SCR 231", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9110, "end_char": 9126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 SCR 937", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9189, "end_char": 9205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 932", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9267, "end_char": 9283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 3 SCR 301", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10004, "end_char": 10007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1965] 3 SCR 211", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12893, "end_char": 12909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13695, "end_char": 13721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "')VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13868, "end_char": 13877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and A. Subba Rao for the Appellant. •,", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13882, "end_char": 13894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and A. Subba Rao for the Appellant. •,"}}, {"text": "T. V. S. N. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13920, "end_char": 13937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nT. V. S. N. Chari for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SHINGHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14001, "end_char": 14009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSHINGHAL, J.-This appeal is by a certificate of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the valuation of the subject matter and is directed against its judgment dated February 4, 1969.", "canonical_name": "Shinghal"}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14053, "end_char": 14081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSHINGHAL, J.-This appeal is by a certificate of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the valuation of the subject matter and is directed against its judgment dated February 4, 1969."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14164, "end_char": 14180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSHINGHAL, J.-This appeal is by a certificate of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the valuation of the subject matter and is directed against its judgment dated February 4, 1969."}}, {"text": "Kurnool town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14267, "end_char": 14279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government acquired 2 acres and 79 cents of the land of the appellants in Kurnool town, for locating a bus depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14313, "end_char": 14355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government acquired 2 acres and 79 cents of the land of the appellants in Kurnool town, for locating a bus depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation."}}, {"text": "May 25,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14512, "end_char": 14525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its possession was taken by the State Government on May 25,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "N. Jayarama Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14825, "end_char": 14842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Jayarama Reddy, Y. Prabhakar r\"\n\n,,..\n\nReddy and C. Manikya Reddy, who were the three owners of the land, accepted that compensation under protest and applied for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act."}}, {"text": "Y. Prabhakar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14844, "end_char": 14856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Jayarama Reddy, Y. Prabhakar r\"\n\n,,..\n\nReddy and C. Manikya Reddy, who were the three owners of the land, accepted that compensation under protest and applied for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "C. Manikya Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14877, "end_char": 14893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Jayarama Reddy, Y. Prabhakar r\"\n\n,,..\n\nReddy and C. Manikya Reddy, who were the three owners of the land, accepted that compensation under protest and applied for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15009, "end_char": 15019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Knrnool", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15519, "end_char": 15526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AS 180 of 1964, hereinafter referred to as the government appeal, was filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer, Knrnool, appeal No."}}, {"text": "December 7, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15784, "end_char": 15800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum of the government appeal was filed on December 7, 1963."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15914, "end_char": 15927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not\n\nhave the date of the claimants' appeal on the record, but it is not disputed that it was filed before April 3, 1964."}}, {"text": "Y. Prabhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15984, "end_char": 16002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the two appeals were pending in the High Court, Y. Prabhakar Reddy, one of the three claimants of the compensation for the acquired land, died on April 3, 1964.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "July 14, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16236, "end_char": 16249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "made in the claimants' appeal to bring his legal representatives on the record, and the High Conrt passed an order on July 14, 1964 (in C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "Y. Prahhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16348, "end_char": 16366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7284 of 1964) bringing appellants 4 to 9 on record as the legal representatives of Y. Prahhakar Reddy.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "Y. Prabhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16572, "end_char": 16590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "government appeal to bring the legal representatives of the deceased respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on the record of that appeal.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17551, "end_char": 17554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argued by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellants that as Y. Prabhakar Reddy, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Prasad Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18146, "end_char": 18158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel bas placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in The State of Punjab v.\n\nNathu Ram,(')\n\nameshwar Prasad and others v. Mis Shyam Beharilal Jagannath and others,(2) Ramagyd; Prasad Gupta and others v. Murli Prasad(') and Harihar Prasad Singh and others v. Balmiki Prasad Singh ana others.(')"}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 636", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18324, "end_char": 18343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nathu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18428, "end_char": 18437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In particular, be bas placed\n\n(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 636\n\n...\n\n( .. ( -·\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY v. REVENUE OFFICER (Shinghal, /.) 605\n\nreliance on Nathu Ram's case(') to fortify his argument that the specification of the shares or of the interest of the deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy did not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree holders to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere w; tb the joint right decreed in their favour.", "canonical_name": "Nathu Ram"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19433, "end_char": 19438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25495, "end_char": 25505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 30,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25537, "end_char": 25551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that the Subordinate Judge made his order in the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act on July 30,\n\n1963, and the memorandum of the government appeal was filed in the High Court on December 7, 1963."}}, {"text": "April 3,\n\n1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25740, "end_char": 25754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AS 296 of 1964 soon after and, at any rate, before April 3,\n\n1964."}}, {"text": "C. Padmanabha Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27785, "end_char": 27804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hail'tl; when the two appeals were taken up for hearing, the High Court heard, without any objection, not only the counsel for the appellants in the government appeal, but also C. Padmanabha Reddy, who was counsel for the respondents in that appeal and for the reconstituted array of appellants in the claimants' appeal."}}, {"text": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29415, "end_char": 29434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only after the judgment of the High Court went aaginst them, that the legal representatives of Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy decided to take np the question of abatement, for the first time, in the petition which they and the other claimants' filed under section 104-110 and order 45 rules 2 and 3 C.P.C. It is significant that they did not even then ask the High Court to review its judgment and grant them relief on the ground that Y. Prabhakar Reddy had died and the decree against him was a nullity in so far as they were concerned.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29565, "end_char": 29576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 45 rules 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29585, "end_char": 29601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29608, "end_char": 29613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31600, "end_char": 31619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen has however made a reference to Gaekwar Baroda State Railwriy v. Hafiz Habib-ul-haq and others( 1) and Thakore Saheb Khanji Kashari Khanji v. Gu lam Rasul Chandbhai (2 ) for the purpose of showing that the government appeal was not at all maintainable in the High Court because of its abatement against respondent Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy as that was a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court which could not have been abandoned.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31744, "end_char": 31754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31755, "end_char": 31760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "P. Dasa Muni ReaiJy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32681, "end_char": 32700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nT. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others,(') Simpson and\n\nflll(}ther v. Crowle and 0th.rs(•) Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and tmother v. L. V. A. Dikshitula and others(3 ) and P. Dasa Muni ReaiJy\n\nY. P. Appa Rao(') is equally futile because they were cases of inherent lad of jurisdiction in the co.i:t cottcerncd or raised the question of the bar of limitation ."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33820, "end_char": 33825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A.I.R. 1968 Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35023, "end_char": 35044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) A.I.R. 1968 Rajasthan 14."}}, {"text": "JAYARAMA REDDY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35065, "end_char": 35079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ... ,\n\nJAYARAMA REDDY V REVENUE OFFICER (Desai, !.)", "canonical_name": "JAYARAMA REDDY & ANR"}}, {"text": "Kurnool", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35567, "end_char": 35574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also took due notice of the fact that although Kurnool was not made the capital of Andhra Pradesh, it was a growing town and had an importance of its own."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35603, "end_char": 35617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also took due notice of the fact that although Kurnool was not made the capital of Andhra Pradesh, it was a growing town and had an importance of its own."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35885, "end_char": 35901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,000/- on October 30, 1961, just eigljt months before the issue of the notification for its acquisition."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37798, "end_char": 37803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DESAI, J.-1 have carefully gone through the judgment prepared by H my learned brother Shinghal, J. and I am in bill agreement with him that the appeal be dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38736, "end_char": 38755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeals in the High Court, Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy, one of the three claimants, being an appellant in the claimants' appeal and respondent in Government appeal, died on April 3, 1964 and upon an application made' to the Court in the claimants' appeal bis legal representatives appellants 4-9 were brought on record.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "February 4,. 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39234, "end_char": 39251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the legal representatives of deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy one of the respondents in Government appeal were not brought on record till both the appeals were disposed of by a common judgment rendered on February 4,."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39625, "end_char": 39636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39663, "end_char": 39672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. K. Sen contended that as heirs of one of the claimants Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy, respondent in Government appeal, were not brought on record within the prescribed period of !", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Prabhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39725, "end_char": 39740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. K. Sen contended that as heirs of one of the claimants Y.\n\nPrabhakar Reddy, respondent in Government appeal, were not brought on record within the prescribed period of !", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "bhakar Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39947, "end_char": 39959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ing the appeal, not only the Govermnent appeal abated against Y. Pra  , \\.' bhakar Reddy but in view of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab \\\n\nv. Nathu Ram,(') the appeal abated as a whole and, therefore, the judgment of the High Court partly allowing the Government appeal- -' ,."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40005, "end_char": 40020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ing the appeal, not only the Govermnent appeal abated against Y. Pra  , \\.' bhakar Reddy but in view of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab \\\n\nv. Nathu Ram,(') the appeal abated as a whole and, therefore, the judgment of the High Court partly allowing the Government appeal- -' ,."}}, {"text": "Nathuram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41572, "end_char": 41580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ee Nathuram's case) .", "canonical_name": "Nathu Ram"}}, {"text": "Y. Prabhakar Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41635, "end_char": 41653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly, one of the original claimants Y. Prabhakar Reddy being one of the appellants in the claimants' appeal died and specifically his legal reprc>entatives were brought on record within the prescribed period of limitation and that was done much prior to the date of hearing of the appeals by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "Y. Parbhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42230, "end_char": 42248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is notorious, the inadvertence, if not down right indifference, of those incharge of the Government appeal is demonstrably established because the counsel incharge of the Government appeal must have received the notice moved on behalf of the appeUants-- claimants seeking to bring the k:gal representatives of deceased Y. Parbhakar Reddy on record and Jmending the cause :it!e of the claimants' appeal accordingly.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "Order 22, Rule 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43797, "end_char": 43813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43846, "end_char": 43873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "order 22, rules 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44830, "end_char": 44847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 22, rule 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44901, "end_char": 44918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 22, rules 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46468, "end_char": 46485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 22, rules 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46737, "end_char": 46754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49967, "end_char": 49981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Mahabir Prasad, his wife Saroj Devi and his mother Gunwanti Devi filed a suit against Jage Ram and-two others for recovering rent then due in the aggregate amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Saroj Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49992, "end_char": 50002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Mahabir Prasad, his wife Saroj Devi and his mother Gunwanti Devi filed a suit against Jage Ram and-two others for recovering rent then due in the aggregate amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Gunwanti Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50018, "end_char": 50031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Mahabir Prasad, his wife Saroj Devi and his mother Gunwanti Devi filed a suit against Jage Ram and-two others for recovering rent then due in the aggregate amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Gunwanti Devi"}}, {"text": "Jage Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50053, "end_char": 50061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Mahabir Prasad, his wife Saroj Devi and his mother Gunwanti Devi filed a suit against Jage Ram and-two others for recovering rent then due in the aggregate amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50322, "end_char": 50350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gunwati Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50547, "end_char": 50559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, one of the decree holders alone appealed against that order and impleaded Gunwati Devi and Saroj Devi as party respondents along wit'>.", "canonical_name": "Gunwanti Devi"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51888, "end_char": 51902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1971) 3 SCR 301", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 52288, "end_char": 52303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order 41, Rule 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52838, "end_char": 52855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 41, rule 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53281, "end_char": 53298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MuUa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53893, "end_char": 53897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuUa has noted this cleavage of opinion in his Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition, Volume II, P. 1237, as under:\n\n\"Where both the parties to a suit file independent appeals against the decree passed therein, and one of them dies pending the appeal, the substitution of his legal represen tatives in one appeal does not enure for the benefit of the other appeal which consequently abates."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53940, "end_char": 53963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order 22, rules 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56336, "end_char": 56353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56480, "end_char": 56507, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 61079, "end_char": 61096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Negativing this contention a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court held that there is no interdependence between the two appeals and the analogy of an appeal and a memorandum of cross-objection in the same appeal does not hold good in case of two independent appeals where the Conrt has to deal with two separate and independent appeals though arising from the same suit and the parties adopt rival positions."}}, {"text": "Brij lndar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61481, "end_char": 61497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court distinguished the decision in Brij lndar Singh's case (supra,) by posing a question to itself : 'Can it be said in the present case that what was done in one appeal could ennre for the benefit of another appeal unless the latter appeal can be deemed to be a continuation or a further stage of the appeal in which the legal representatives were brought on record' and answered it in the negative oliserving that it is not possible to extend the principle laid down by J udici•al Committee in Brij lndar Singh's case (supra) In Dasondha Singh v.\n\nShadi Ram Sardha Ram & Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Shadi Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 62116, "end_char": 62125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there were cross appeals arising from the same decree before the Court and the plaintiff Shadi Ram was an appellant in the appeal preferred by him and when he died his legal representatives were impleaded within the prescribed time.", "canonical_name": "Shadi Ram"}}, {"text": "Shadi Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 62333, "end_char": 62342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeal preferred by the defendant the application for impleading Shadi Ram's legal representatives which was made beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the Court having declined to condone the delay, the appeal abated.", "canonical_name": "Shadi Ram"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 64237, "end_char": 64257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held tha.t cross-objections being part of the same proceedings and form pmt of the same record, substitution of legal representatives in the crossobjections would enure for the benefit of the main appeal."}}, {"text": "Sankaranaraina Saralaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64517, "end_char": 64540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in the case of cross-appeals, after referring to Sankaranaraina Saralaya's case, (supra) the High Court held that substitution of legal representati<es of a deceased party in one appeal cannot enure for the benefit of the cro:; s-appeal and, therefore, defendant's appeal was held to have abated.", "canonical_name": "Sankaranaraina Saralaya"}}, {"text": "Order 22, rules 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66654, "end_char": 66671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 41, rule 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67636, "end_char": 67653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sankaranaraina Sara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70558, "end_char": 70577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unfortuutely this interdependence was overlooked by the Madras High Court when the scope of cross-appeals arisin: from the same decree and appeal and cross-objections in respect of the iame decree were not examined in depth in Sankaranaraina Sara/aya's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Sankaranaraina Saralaya"}}, {"text": "Y. Prabrakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73438, "end_char": 73456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the legal representatives of deceased Y. Prabrakar Reddy were brought on record in the claimants' appeal.", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "Y. Prakhakar Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73892, "end_char": 73910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the legal representatives of the deceased Y. Prakhakar Reddy were all throughout before the Court, of course in one capacity, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Y. Prabhaka_r Reddy"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74363, "end_char": 74367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_625_629_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v.\n\nR. SAHARI, GENL.MANAGER, DAURALA\n\nSUGAR MILLS, DAURALA & ORS ETC.\n\nMarch 23, 1979 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nPrevention of Food Adulteration Act-Sections 20 & 20-A-Scope of\n\nToffees sold by a vendor to a Focxl Inspector having been found to b_e adulterated, prosecution was launched against him. The vendor produced a warranty in the Trial Court as a result of which he was acquitted by the 11agistrate.\n\nTh~ Magistrate however directed notice to the respondents under\n\nsection 20-A for being impleaded and prosecuted on the grounds that the articles C manufactured and distributed by them were adulterated.\n\nOn revision, the Session Judge dismissed the same but on further revision to the High Court, it allowed the revision and set aside the order of the Magistrate.\n\nIn the other two Criminal Appeals Nos. 166 & 167 of 1972, the appellants were i.mpleaded under section 20A before the acquittal of the last seller and that Order was upheld by the High Court. On the question whether the magistrate was entitled to implead the distributors or manufacturers under s. 20A even after acquitting the seller on the ground that he was protected by n warranty.\n\nDisn1i.ssing the appeals\n\nHELD : 1be opening lines of section 20A clearly contemplate a contingency where the discretionary jurisdiction under this Act can be exercised only during the trial 1Jf any offence, i.e. the stage at which the magistrate can exercise his jurisdiction under this section must be before the trial has concluded and ended in acquittal or conviction.\n\nA combined reading of section 20A and 20 is that where a distributor or manufacturer or any other person is implee.ded in the course of a trial, the obligation to get a fresh sanction for such a person\n\nis dispensed with and the sanction obtained for the last seller in the trial, will -ensure for the benefit of the prosecution of the other person impl'eaded. There\n\nfore protectiC'n of section 20 is not available if the parties conCemed are im~ plead'ed aftr the trial was over.\n\nThe special statutory concessioo is given to the prosecution only if the conditions mentioned in s. 20A are fulfilled and not otherwise.\n\n[627B-C, F-HJ\n\nV. N. Kamdar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1974]\n\nS.C.R. 157 followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 152- 153 of 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 28-10-1970 of Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 426/68 and 5/70.\n\nAND\n\nCRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 166-167 OF 1972\n\nFrom the Judglitent and Order dated 28-10-1970 of Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 72-73/68.\n\nSoli J. Sorabji, Addi. Sol. Genl. of India, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!. A. Nos. 152-153/72.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, S. C. Malik and B. R. Agarwal<i for RR 4 in Cr!.\n\nA. 152/72.\n\nB H. K. Pun for RR. 3 in Cr!. A.153 /72.\n\nMrs. Urmila Sirur for RR. 3 in Cr!. A. No. 152/72.\n\nB. K. Jaggi for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 166-167/72.\n\nH. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for RR. in Cr!. A. Nos. 166-167 / 72.\n\nC B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nF AZAL Au, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate arise out of a common Judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi and will be disposed of by ns by one judgment. In Appeals Nos. 152-153/72, one Gian Singh sold toffees to the Food Inspector and as the toffees were found to be adulterated, a prosecution was launched against him under S. 7 /16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration AC!. Gian Singh, however, productd in course of the trial a warranty given by the distributons and manufacturers as a result of which the Magistrate acquitted accused Gian Singh. After having acquitted Gian Singh, t!Je Magistrate issned notice under S. 20A against the Respondents for being iropleaded and prosecution on the gound that the articles manufactured by the distributors were adulterated. The respondents went up in revision to the Sessions Judge which was dismissed. But on further revision to the High Court the High Court allowed the petition and set aside the order of the Magistrate impleading the respondei; its.\n\nIn the other two appeals i.e. Cr!. Appeals Nos. 166 and 167/1972, the manufadurers were impleaded under S. 20A before the acquittal' of the last sller and that order was upheld by the High Court and, hence these appeals before us by the appellants.\n\nThe common question of law that arises for consideration in all these appeals is : whether or not the Mag:strate is entitled to implead the distributors or manufacturers under S. 20A even after acquitting the last seller on the gronnd that he is protected by a warranty. In other words, the question for decision in these appeals turns upon the interpretation of S. 20A and S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. S. ~OA runs thus :-\n\n\"Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act, alleged to have been committed by any person, nut\n\n,..\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. DAURALA SUGAR MILLS 627 (Fazal Ali, J.) being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence, then the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(l) of S. 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under S. 20\".\n\nThe opening lines of S. 20A clearly contemplate a contingency where the discretionary jurisdiction under this Act can be exercised only during the trial of any offence, that is to say, the stage at which the Magistrate can exercise his discretion under this Section must be before the trial has concluded and ended in acquittal or conviction.\n\nS. 20 which precedes S. 20-A runs thus :-\n\n\"S. 20 ( 1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not bemg an offence under S. 14 or section 14A, shall be instituted except by or with written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government;\n\nProvided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst alongwith the complaint.\n\n(2) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act. \\\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code o[ Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under subsection (IAA) of Section 16 shall be cognizable and nonbailable''.\n\nA combined reading of S. 20A and S. 20 is that where a distributor or manufacturer or any other person is impleaded in the course of a trial, the obligation to get a fresh sanction for such person is dispensed with and the sanction obtained for the last seller in the trial will ensure for the benefit of the prosecution of the other person iropleaded also and no further sanction is necessary. It is manifest that this special statutory concession is given to the prosecution only if the conditions mentioned in S. 20A are fulfilled and not otherwise.\n\nIn other words, the protection of S. 20 is not available to the proscution if the parties concerned are impleaded after the trial is over. [n such a cnse, a fresh trial will have to be started by obtaining sanction under\n\nS. 20. This matter is no longer .res integra as it has been fully considered by this Court in V. N. Kamdar v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi(') where this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\" .... In order that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer may be impleaded under S. 20A, it is necessary that there should be a trial for an offence committed under :he Act by a person and that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer must be concerned in the offence. When once the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is impleaded, the mal proceeds as if he is also an accused in the case. That is made clear by the closing words of the setcion. As already indicated, no prosecution for an offence under the Act can be instituted by a Food Inspector without the sanction specified in S. 20 .... The real purpose of enacting S. 20A is to avoid. as far as possible, conflicting findings. If, in the prosecution instituted against the vendor, it is found that the vendor has sold the article of food in the same state as he purchased it and that while it was in his possession it was properly stored, and the vendor is acquitted, it would look rather ridiculous if in the prosecution against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, it is found on the evidence _that he did not give a false warranty, but that the article was not stored properly while it was in the possession of the vendor or that h~ did not sell the article in the same stage as he purchaed it.\n\nThis being so, the object of the legislature in enacting the section will be frustrated if a Magistrate were to exercise his discretion improperly by failing to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer under S. 20A in a case where he should be impleaded. But that is no reason to hold that a separate prosecution against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer would be barred, if he is not impleaded under s. 20A, and tried along with the person who is alleged to have committed an offence under the Act. In order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflict of findings, it is imperative that the Magistrate should implead these persons under S. 20A whenever the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied. As I said, it is a far cry from this to say that if this is not done, the manufacturer, distributor or dealer would get an immunity from a separate prosecution.\"\n\nH For these reasons, therefore, and in the facts and circumstances of the case so far asCr. Appeals No. 152-153/1972 are concerned, the\n\n(1) [1974] I S.C.R. 157.\n\n, '\n\n•~ .. ' + . •\n\n.~ •\n\n~ . - ~\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. DAURALA SUGAR MILLS 629 (Fazal Ali, J.) Magistrate had no jurisdiction to implead the respondents after havill.g concluded the trial by the acquittal of the last seller. Similarly, the Magistrate was fully justified in CrJ. Appeals No. 166 and 167 /72 in impleading the appellants during the course of the trial as the trial was still continuing and the case would, therefore, squarely fall under S. 20A of the Act and no further sanction would be necessary. For these reasons, therefore, all the appeals are dismissed.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAHARI, GENL.MANAGER, DAURALA\n\nSUGAR MILLS, DAURALA & ORS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. SAHARI,GENL.MANAGER, DAURALA SUGAR MILLS, DAURALA & ORS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 23, 1979 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 20 & 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "section 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 918, "end_char": 929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "section 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20A and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1606, "end_char": 1624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2164, "end_char": 2170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2627, "end_char": 2642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabji, Addi."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2671, "end_char": 2687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "C B. P. Maheshwari"}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2692, "end_char": 2704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2752, "end_char": 2766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S. C. Malik and B. R. Agarwal<i for RR 4 in Cr!."}}, {"text": "S. C. Malik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2768, "end_char": 2779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S. C. Malik and B. R. Agarwal<i for RR 4 in Cr!."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2784, "end_char": 2797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S. C. Malik and B. R. Agarwal<i for RR 4 in Cr!."}}, {"text": "B H. K. Pun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B H. K. Pun for RR."}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2877, "end_char": 2889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Urmila Sirur for RR."}}, {"text": "B. K. Jaggi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Jaggi for the Appellant in Crl."}}, {"text": "H. S. Marwah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2982, "end_char": 2994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for RR."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2999, "end_char": 3011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for RR."}}, {"text": "C B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3051, "end_char": 3069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Intervener.", "canonical_name": "C B. P. Maheshwari"}}, {"text": "F AZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nF AZAL Au, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate arise out of a common Judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi and will be disposed of by ns by one judgment."}}, {"text": "Gian Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "152-153/72, one Gian Singh sold toffees to the Food Inspector and as the toffees were found to be adulterated, a prosecution was launched against him under S. 7 /16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration AC!."}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3483, "end_char": 3487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3781, "end_char": 3787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4588, "end_char": 4594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4786, "end_char": 4791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5030, "end_char": 5039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. ~OA runs thus :-\n\n\"Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act, alleged to have been committed by any person, nut\n\n,..\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. DAURALA SUGAR MILLS 627 (Fazal Ali, J.) being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence, then the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(l) of S. 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under S. 20\"."}}, {"text": "S. 351", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5324, "end_char": 5330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5378, "end_char": 5388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5471, "end_char": 5476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5501, "end_char": 5507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5824, "end_char": 5829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5868, "end_char": 5873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5951, "end_char": 5956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5960, "end_char": 5971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6034, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 20 which precedes S. 20-A runs thus :-\n\n\"S. 20 ( 1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not bemg an offence under S. 14 or section 14A, shall be instituted except by or with written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government;\n\nProvided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst alongwith the complaint."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6303, "end_char": 6313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act", "statute": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act"}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act", "statute": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6764, "end_char": 6769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act", "statute": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act"}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7244, "end_char": 7250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act", "statute": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act", "statute": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act"}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act", "statute": "No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act"}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8277, "end_char": 8282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8317, "end_char": 8323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9170, "end_char": 9176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9369, "end_char": 9375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9612, "end_char": 9618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. DAURALA SUGAR MILLS 629 (Fazal Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10044, "end_char": 10103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. DAURALA SUGAR MILLS 629 (Fazal Ali, J.) Magistrate had no jurisdiction to implead the respondents after havill.g concluded the trial by the acquittal of the last seller."}}, {"text": "S. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10466, "end_char": 10472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_630_635_EN", "year": 1979, "text": ".STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nLAXMISHANKAR MISHRA AND ORS. ETC.\n\nMarch 29, 1979\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.)\n\nMadhya Pradesh Local Authorities School Teachers (Absorption in Government Service) Rules, 1963, Rule 3(b)-lnterpretation of the words \"should have worked on the post for a minin1um period of 7 years''.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Local Authorities School Teachers (Absorption in Government Service) Act provided for absorbing teachers serving in Middle ·\n\nSchools and Primary Schools managed by local authorities in Government service.\n\nThe relevant rule for absorption enacted under the Act in rule 3 and rule 3 (b) reod \"\" follows :\n\n\"3(b) For absorption on the post of Head Master/Principal of a High/\n\nHigher Secondary School, the person concerned should possess the poet graduate degree and should have worked on the post for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution and should have\n\n10 years' teaching experience in any recognised institution of Madhya Pradesh\".\n\nOn the question of interpretation of the words \"should have worked on the post for a minimum period of seven years\" the High Court was of the view that the period during which a Head Master fPrincipal worked as inobarge Principal ought to be taken into account for computing the period of 7 years.\n\nDismissing the special leave petitions by the State the Court,\n\nHELD : 1, While computing the period of 7 years for the purpose of rule 3 (b) what is determinative is performing duties and discharging functions of the post of Head Master /Principal irrespective of the c..apacity in whick the\n\np~.at was hold. [635. CJ\n\n2. The absorption of a person as Principal under rnle 3 (b) does not depend on rank but on the nature of functions and duties that is incumbent disch&rges for a particular number of years (i.e.) the duties of a Principal for a period of seven years. The language, in the instant case, indicates emphasis 011 work\n\nbeing done while on the post irrespective of capacity. [635 B~CJ\n\nRamrattan v. State of M.P. and Ors., I.L.R. 1964 M.P. 242; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ookul Prasad, [1971] M.P.LJ. 609; Giria Shanker v. S.D.0. Barda and Or.•., A.I.R. 1973 M.P. 104; distinguished.\n\n3. On a pure grammatical construction of the expression. \"should have worked on the post for a minimum period of seven years in the same institution\",\n\nit is clear that the person claiming to be absorbed must have worked on the post of Head Master/Principal Of a HighjHigher Secondary School i0r a minim11m period of 7 years, the emphasis being on the experience gained by working on the said post. A person in charge of the post also worb and\n\n~·.\n\ndi,.licharges the duties and functions of the post of which he has taken charge.\n\nA Even an officiating incumbent of the post does discharge the functions and duties of the post. If the rule expressly did not make any differentiation between the persons working as a confirmed holder of substantive post and an incharge or officiating holder of the post, there is nothing in the expression itself which by necessary implication excludes service in any other capacity except as a confirmed Hea<i Master/Principal in a substantive post.\n\n(633 D-E, G-HJ B\n\nQonfirmation in a post being one of the glorious uncertainties of service as observed by this Court in S. B. Patwardhan's case, it is rational to believe that the framers of the rule did not want to attach any importance to the capacity\n\nin which the post is held but the emphasis was on working on the post meaning 'thereby discharging 'the duties and performing the functions assigned to the ' post. [634 C-D] C\n\nS. B. Patwardhan and Ors. etc. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1977] 3 SCR 775; applied .\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 4062-4066 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Orders dated 11-1-1978 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. Nos. 390, 391, 393, 395 and 397 /75.\n\nAND\n\nSPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 4069 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Order dated 5-1-78 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court E in M.P. No. 580/75.\n\nS. K. Gambhir for the Petitioners in all the S. L. Ps.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered b_y\n\nDESAI, J. Mr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner infonr_ed us that a number of petitions are pending in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in which the question raised in the present group of petitions is involved and as we are not inclined to grant leave, we would rather indicate our reasons by a speaking ordr.\n\nAt the commencement of the British Raj both in the Raj ruled area of India and the princely States institutions of higher education were set up and manned under Government aegis. As the demand for institutions of higher education increased with the proliferation of State activity and need of white collar employees., these institutions speedily mu\\t1plied and they were generally set up and manned by educational societies or local authorities.\n\nThe turmoil since independence and especially in the last one and H a ha'f decade in the world of academicians led to the reversal of the policy of Gc.ernment directly setting up educational institutions and\n\nin fact whatever they had set up, being slowly handed over to educational sociellc5 and/or local authorities, and it has turned a full circle.\n\nThe grievar.ce of the teachers in such school manifested in the demand . for taking over of such institutions by the State and all over the country the transition has begun.\n\nIn MaJhya Pradesh the State regulated the functioning and standards of academic instruction in 'Higher Secondary Schools under Madhya Praaesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyem, 1965. This supervisory role of the State hardly improved the situation with the Tesnlt that tensions increased and the demand became louder that these institutions should be taken over by the Government for its direct management and the teachers should be accorded the status of Government servants.\n\nThe State Government responded to this demand by enactin~ the Madhya Pradesh Local Authorities School Teachers (Abso'iption in Government Service) Act, 1963 ('the Act' for short). The Act provided for absorbing teachers serving in Middle Schools and Primary Schools managed by local authorities in Government service.\n\nThe rckvant rule for absorption is rule 3 of the Rules enacted under the Act. In these petitions we are concerned with rule 3(b) which reads as under :\n\n\"3 (b). For absorption on the pog of Head Master/ Principal of a High/Higher Secondary School, the person concerned should possess the post graduate degree and should have worked on the pest for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution and should have 10 years teaching experience in any recognised institution of Madhya Pradesh''.\n\nWhile implementing the aforementioned rule there arose a cleavage on the interpretation of the rule, the concerned teacher. contending that what is relevant is that working on the post for . a .minimum period of 7 years would for the purpose of computation of 7 years include service even as incharge Head Master/Principal or officiating service in the post whereas 'the State contended that the (eacber claiming to be absorbed as Head Master/Principal should have worktd as a confirmed Head Master /Principal in a substantive pest for the full period of 7 years. The State in accordance with its interpretation declined absorption to a number of Head Masters/ Principals \\\\h1ch led to the filing of a number of writ petitions in the Madhya Pradesh High Court.\n\nIt appears that this question was first examined by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Satyendra Prasanna Singh Yadav v.\n\nState of\n\n)ii\n\nI • •••\n\n' , •\n\n,•.\n\nI •\n\nMadhya Pradesh & 3 Ors.('), in whlch the ijigh Court took the view that the period during which a Head Master/Principal worked as incharge Principal ought to be taken into account for computing the period of 7 years. Following this decision the present group of petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and an application for leave to appeal to this Court under Article 133 of the Constitution was rejected. Hence the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed this group of petitions for special leave to appeal. It may be mentioned that the earlier decision which the High Court seeks to follow appears to have been accepted by the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the expression : \"should have worked on the post for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution\" would, in the context of the rule and the consequences flowing from it, mean only a substantive post on which the Head Master/Principal was confirmed and the confirmed holder of t!1e substantive post for a period of 7 years would be entitled to absorption as envisaged by rule 3 (b). On a pure grammatical construction of the expression it would indisputably appear that the person claiming to be absorbed must have worked on the post of Head Master/ Principal of a High/Higher Secondary School for a minimum period of 7 years. Emphasis is on the experience gained by working on the post of Head Master/Principal. A person incharge of the post also works and discharges the duties and functions of the post of which he has taken cl1arge. Even an officiating incumbent of the post does discharge the functions and duties of the post.\n\nWhile examining the relative positions of confirmed Deputy Engineers and Officiating Deputy Engineers in .S. B. Patwardhan & Ors. etc. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2) this Court observed that the officiating Deputy Engineers discharge identical functions, bear similar responsibilities and acquire an equal amount of experience in the respective assignments. Viewed from this angie, the confirmed holder of a substantive post would be discharging the functions attached to the post and when some one is placed in ilmt very post in an officiating capacity or directed to hold charge of tbe post, he would be required to perform the duties and discharge the functions of the post rendering identical service. If the rule expressly did not make any differentiation between the persons working as a confirmed holder of substantive post and an incharge or officiating holder of the post, is there anything in the expression itself which by nettssary inlplication excludes service in any other capacity except as a confirmed H_ead Master/Principal in a substantive post? A\n\n(!) Misc. Petition No. 368 of 1973, decided on 144-1976\n\n(2) [1977] 3 S.C.R. 775.\n\n2-330SCI/79\n\nconfirmed holder of a substantive post may look tautologous because one can only be confirmed in the substantive post.\n\nNow, every High School or Higher Secondary School must of necessity have the post of Head Master/Principal and it was nowhere suggested that there would not be a post of Head Master/Principal.\n\nB If that would mean that there was always a substantive post of Head Master/Principal it may be that the confirmed holder of the post may be away and not in a position to discharge the duties and some one may be appomted in an officiating capacity or may be directed to hold charge but none-the-less such holder of the post will have to paform duties and discharge functions attached to the post. c Further, the emphasis in the expression is on working on the post meaning thereby performing the duties and discharging the functions assigned to the post and not the capacity in which the post is held.\n\nConfirmation in a post being one of the glorious uncertainties of \"ervice as observed by this Court in S. B. Patwardhan's case, (supra) it is D rational to believe that the framers of the rule did not want to attach any importance to the capacity in which the post is held but the emphasis was on working on the post meaning thereby discharging the duties and performing the functions assigned to the post.\n\nOur attention was drawn to State of Assam & Ors. v. Shri Kanak Chandra Dutta('). We fail to see bow this decision can assist in deciding the question one way or the other. The question that came for consideration of this Court was : whether the holder of a post designated as Moujadar in the Assam valley was holding a civil post in the context of Article 311 of the Constitution ? After examining the duties and functions attached to the post of Moujadar, this Court held that a post can exist apart from the b9lder of the post and that Moujadar is the holder of a civil post under the State and that it makes no difference that he is remunerated by way of a commission on the collection of Government dues and does not draw a salary. In fact, if at all this decision helps, it would fortify the view which we are taking that the post is independent of the holder thereof and the requirement of the rule is that the person claiming to be absorbed must have worked in the post of Head Master/Principal.\n\nPerhaps there would have been some merit in the submission on behalf of the petitioner if in rule 3 (b) the words used were \"who held the post\" but the language in rule 3 (b) is so materially different and it speaks that a person should have worked on the post. The State was apparently wrong in introducing the element of rank for the purpose\n\n(I) [1967] l S.C.R. 679.\n\n.,.\n\n<lf rule 3 (b). The controversy that surfaced in Ramrattan v. Siate of\n\nMadhya Prad<sh & Ors.,( 1) and the subsequent decision in State of Madhya Prc1desh v. Gokul Prasad, (2) which led to a reference to a Full Bench in Girja Shankar v. S.D.O., Harda & Ors.,(8) on account <lf the use of the expressions such as \"person appointed to be incharge of the current duties of the office\" which indicated that such person did not hold the rank and, therefore, could not discharge statutory functions assigned to the post should not detain us.\n\nThe language here indicates emphasis on work being done while on the post irrespective of •he capacity. The absorption of a person as Principal under rule 3 (b) does not depend on rank but on the nature of functions and duties that an incumbent discharges for a particular number of years, i.e. the duties of a Principal for a period of 7 years .\n\nIt thus dearly transpires that while computing the period of 7 years for the purpose of rule 3 (b) what is determinative is performing duties and discharging functions of the post of Head Master/Prmcipal irrespective of the capacity in which the post was held. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the period during which the petitioners (respondents in these petitions) worked as in charge Head Masters/Principals ought to be taken into account by the State Government for computing the period of 7 years.\n\nThese petitions are accordingly dismissed.\n\nV.D.K.\n\n{1) J.L.R. 1964 MP 242\n\n(2) 1971 MPLJ 609\n\n(3) AIR 1973 MP 104.\n\nPetitions disrniscd.\n\n---~", "total_entities": 23, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LAXMISHANKAR MISHRA AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMISHANKAR MISHRA AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 29, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 29, 1979\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 967, "end_char": 981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant rule for absorption enacted under the Act in rule 3 and rule 3 (b) reod \"\" follows :\n\n\"3(b) For absorption on the post of Head Master/Principal of a High/\n\nHigher Secondary School, the person concerned should possess the poet graduate degree and should have worked on the post for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution and should have\n\n10 years' teaching experience in any recognised institution of Madhya Pradesh\"."}}, {"text": "S. B. Patwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3290, "end_char": 3306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(633 D-E, G-HJ B\n\nQonfirmation in a post being one of the glorious uncertainties of service as observed by this Court in S. B. Patwardhan's case, it is rational to believe that the framers of the rule did not want to attach any importance to the capacity\n\nin which the post is held but the emphasis was on working on the post meaning 'thereby discharging 'the duties and performing the functions assigned to the ' post. ["}}, {"text": "(1977] 3 SCR 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir for the Petitioners in all the S. L. Ps."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4129, "end_char": 4134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered b_y\n\nDESAI, J. Mr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner infonr_ed us that a number of petitions are pending in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in which the question raised in the present group of petitions is involved and as we are not inclined to grant leave, we would rather indicate our reasons by a speaking ordr."}}, {"text": "Gambhir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered b_y\n\nDESAI, J. Mr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner infonr_ed us that a number of petitions are pending in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in which the question raised in the present group of petitions is involved and as we are not inclined to grant leave, we would rather indicate our reasons by a speaking ordr.", "canonical_name": "Gambhir"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered b_y\n\nDESAI, J. Mr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner infonr_ed us that a number of petitions are pending in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in which the question raised in the present group of petitions is involved and as we are not inclined to grant leave, we would rather indicate our reasons by a speaking ordr."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the commencement of the British Raj both in the Raj ruled area of India and the princely States institutions of higher education were set up and manned under Government aegis."}}, {"text": "MaJhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In MaJhya Pradesh the State regulated the functioning and standards of academic instruction in 'Higher Secondary Schools under Madhya Praaesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyem, 1965."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7949, "end_char": 7974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following this decision the present group of petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and an application for leave to appeal to this Court under Article 133 of the Constitution was rejected."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8034, "end_char": 8045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8090, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed this group of petitions for special leave to appeal."}}, {"text": "Gambhir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8327, "end_char": 8334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the expression : \"should have worked on the post for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution\" would, in the context of the rule and the consequences flowing from it, mean only a substantive post on which the Head Master/Principal was confirmed and the confirmed holder of t!1e substantive post for a period of 7 years would be entitled to absorption as envisaged by rule 3 (b).", "canonical_name": "Gambhir"}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 S.C.R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12164, "end_char": 12175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Moujadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12263, "end_char": 12271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examining the duties and functions attached to the post of Moujadar, this Court held that a post can exist apart from the b9lder of the post and that Moujadar is the holder of a civil post under the State and that it makes no difference that he is remunerated by way of a commission on the collection of Government dues and does not draw a salary."}}, {"text": "AIR 1973 MP 104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14704, "end_char": 14719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_636_638_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "PUSHPABEN & ANR.\n\nNARANDAS V. BADIANI & ANR.\n\nMarch 29, 1979\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nContempt of Courts Act-Section 12(3)-Scope of-Sentence of inipri.ronment-When should be awarded in civil contempt.\n\nRespondent No. 1 filed a complaint under s. 420 IPC against the appellants alleging that a loan taken by them from him had not been repaid. \\Vhile the complaint was pending before a Magistrate the parties entered into a compromise under which the appellants undertook to repay the loan before a stipulated date. The Magistrate accordingly allowed the parties to compound the case.\n\nWhen the appellants failed to repay the loan in accordance with the undertaking given before the Magistrate the respondent moved the High Court for taking action against the appell&nts for contempt of court. On the view that the appellants had committed a wilful disobedience Of the undertaking the High Court held that they were guilty of civil contempt and sentenced them to one month's simple imprisonment.\n\nAllowing the appeal in part,\n\nHELD : I. The appellants had committed wilful disobedience of the court\n\nE of the Magistrate by committing serious breach of the undertaking given to it on the basis of which alone they had been acquitted. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the appellants were guilty of civil contempt under s. 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act. [638 Al\n\n2. Having regard to the circumstances of the case the present case falls .J within the first part of s. 12(3) of the Act and a sentence of fine alone should have been awarded by the High Court. By enacting the section the legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances.\n\nSpecial power is, however, conferred on the court to pass a sentence ')':~ of imprisonment if it thought that ends of justice so required. Therefore,\n\nfore a court passed a sentence of imprisonment it must give special reasorui\n\nfor passing such a sentence. [638 G]\n\nIn the present case there are no special reasons why the appe11ants should be sent to jail.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 1975.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 9-1-1973 of the Bombay High\n\nH Court in Criminal Application No. 681/72.\n\nV. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants.\n\nPUSHPABEN v. NARANDAS (Fazal Ali, J.) 637\n\nM. N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by F AZAL Au, J .-This is an appeal under s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter called the Act) against an order of the High Court of Bombay convicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing th(m to one month's simple imprisonment. The facts of the case have been fully detailed by the High Court and it is not necessary for us to reprnt the same all over again. It appears that Respondent No. 1 had gicn a loan of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellants on certain conditions. Somehow or other, the loan could not be paid by the appellants as a result of which Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint under S. 420 I.P.C. against the appellants. While the complaint was pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the parties entered into a compromise on 22-7-1971 under which the appellants undertook to pay the loan of Rs. 50,000/- with simple interest@ 12% per annum on or hefore 21-7-1972. An application was filed before the Court for allowing the parties to compound the case and acquit the accused. The Court after hearing the parties, passed the following order :-\n\n\"The accused given an undertaking to the court that he shall repay the sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the complainant\n\n.1 on or before 21-7-1972 with interest as mentioned on the reverse. In view of the undertaking, I permit the compromise and acquit the accused\".\n\nIt is obvious, therefore, that the Court permitted the parties to compound the case only because of the undertaking given by the appellants.\n\nThereal'tcr, it apears, that the undertaking was violated and the amount of loan was not paid to the Respondent No. 1 at all. The res- • ,~ pendent, therefore, moved the High Court for taking action for con- _., tempt of Court against the appellants as a result of which the present proceedings were taken against them.\n\nThe High Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had co=itted a wilful disobedience of the undertaking given to the Court and were, therefore, guilty of civil contempt as defined in S. 2(b) of the Act. Hence, this appeal before\n\nus.\n\nMr. V. S. Desai appearing in support of the appeal has raised two short points before us. He has submitted that there is no doubt that the\n\nappellants had violated the undertaking but in the circumstances it cannot be said that the appellants had committed a wilful disobedience\n\nof the orders of the Court. So far as this point is concerned, we fully H agree with the High Court. In the circumstances, the appellants undoubtedly committed wilful disobedience of the order of the court\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nby committing a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court on the basis of which alone, the appellants had been acquitted. For these reasons, the first contention put forward by Mr. Desai, is overruled.\n\nIt is, then, contended that under S. 12(3), normally the sentence that shonld be, given to an offender who is found guilty of ci; il contempt, is fine and not imprisonment, which should be given only where the Court is satisfied that ends of justice require the imposition of such a sentence. In our opinion, this contention of learned counsel for the appellants is well-founded and must prevail. Sub-section 3 of S. 12 reads thus :--\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained 111 this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit\".\n\nA close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it think that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule.\n\nHaving regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any special reason why the appellants should be sent to jail by sentrncing them to imprisonment.\n\nFurthermore, respondent No. 1 before us despite service, has not appeared to support the sentence given by the High Court. Having regard to these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the present case, squarely falls in the first part of S. 12(3) and a sentence of fine alone should have been given by the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal to this extent that the sentence of imprisonment passed by the High Court is set aside and instead the appellants are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each.\n\nIn case of default, 15 days simple imprisonment.\n\nFour weeks time to pay the fine.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed m part.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "PUSHPABEN & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUSHPABEN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NARANDAS V. BADIANI & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARANDAS V. BADIANI & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 29, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 29, 1979\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1372, "end_char": 1394, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. S. DeJaz", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2257, "end_char": 2268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "V. S. DeJaz"}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2270, "end_char": 2282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "C. B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M. Mudgol", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2297, "end_char": 2306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "B. L. Ve111ia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2308, "end_char": 2321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "J. C. Rajani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2326, "end_char": 2338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. DeJaz, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. L. Ve111ia and J. C. Rajani, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2384, "end_char": 2393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUSHPABEN v. NARANDAS (Fazal Ali, J.) 637\n\nM. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2404, "end_char": 2416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUSHPABEN v. NARANDAS (Fazal Ali, J.) 637\n\nM. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "F AZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2482, "end_char": 2491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F AZAL Au, J .-This is an appeal under s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter called the Act) against an order of the High Court of Bombay convicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing th(m to one month's simple imprisonment."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2534, "end_char": 2556, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F AZAL Au, J .-This is an appeal under s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter called the Act) against an order of the High Court of Bombay convicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing th(m to one month's simple imprisonment."}}, {"text": "S. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3096, "end_char": 3102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3103, "end_char": 3108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "22-7-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3243, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the complaint was pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the parties entered into a compromise on 22-7-1971 under which the appellants undertook to pay the loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "21-7-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000/- with simple interest@ 12% per annum on or hefore 21-7-1972."}}, {"text": "S. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V. S. Desai appearing in support of the appeal has raised two short points before us.", "canonical_name": "V. S. DeJaz"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, the first contention put forward by Mr. Desai, is overruled."}}, {"text": "S. 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5301, "end_char": 5309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7150, "end_char": 7158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_639_643_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY\n\nKAUSHAL YA SAWHNEY\n\n,4pril 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA lYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]\n\nProc1?dt1re-Dury of Subordinate Court:1 in dealing with farnily dispute3.\n\nThe purpose of la\\V and justice (Dharma) is promotion of cohesion and\n\nno~ production of fission.\n\nA judgment often possesses a sublime essence and a humdrum component. The sublime e1ement consists in the optimitic endea vour to bring parties together so that the litigation may not cut them a-s under, especiaJJy when they are blood relations like sisters. The -present appeal in its happy conclusion, holds out the higher lesson that hate and fight are dis.solved by basic human fellnwsbip, even after bitter litigative struggle, if the Bench and the Bair pursue consensual justice and bring into play conciliatory processes and successfully persuade the parties to see reason and right beyond bare law. If the effort succeeds, the court and counsel derive spiritual fulfilment and get satisfactiori. The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously v.'hen parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or union. !640 Dl\n\nThe present case is not merely a just adjustment of a bitter litigation but\n\n._ J. a path-finder for the subordinate courts in dealing with family or like disputes. [643 Bl\n\nThe text and tlie context and the app]ication of traditional rules of statutory E inttrpretation, in a given case, might leave the position in an un~, atisfactory dilemma of dual import. Even an equitable approach n1ay not necessu-rily help reach a just solution because equity shifts as the situation varies. Contradictory positions taken by different High Courts add to the difficulty and result in the deleterious uncertainty of the law. The Supreme Court may resolve the conflict by exercising its preference guided by the language and the milieu and follo\\ving the customary canons of statutory interpretation. While its decision \\vill be F binding on account of Art. 141 of the Constitution it may still be fallib1e becanse the intendment of Parliament is best brought out by legislative clarification in some cases. [640 H]\n\nThe appe1lant and the respondent were step-sisters-daughters of a common father but of different mothers. The father who owned _vast propertie~ had diea before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. The G respondent's mother who inherited her husband's estate died after the comiiig into force of the 1956 Act. The High Court dismissed the appellant'~ claim for a. half share in the propertie~ under~. 15(1)(a) of the Act. The pecific\n\npoint of claim, whether a son and daughter in the setting of s. 15(1)(a) of the Act, includes stepMson and step-daughter or embraces only the son and daughter of the deceased female propositus, has escaped thei Parliament's attention while passing the legislation.\n\n{A.t the Court's suggestion the parties came to a compromise assisted by counsel on both sides.]\n\n640 S\"iJPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA Tulzapurkar, J.\n\nParliament should clarify its intention regarding s. B(l)(a) of the Act.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 348 of 1977.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1976 oi the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 89/76.\n\nW. C. Chopra for the appellant.\n\nM. L. Varma for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A judgment often possesses a sublim~ essence and a humdrum component. The appeal before us, in its happy conclusion, bolds out the higher lesson that bate and fight are dissolved by basic human fellowship, even after bitter litigative struggle, if the Bench and 1he Bar pursue consensual justice, and bring into play conciliatory processes, and successfully persuade the parties to see reason\n\nand right beyond bare law. If the effort succeeds, as it has in this case, court and counsel derive spiritual fulfilment and get satisfaction.\n\nTwo sisters, apparently of the affluent bracket, with a common father but different mothers, became estranged when one (the appellant) claimed a half share in the estate of the father, on whose death before 1956, the respondent's mother inherited her husband's estate but died after 1956, possessed of her husband's assets and her own.\n\nWhen intestate succession to her opened the plaintiff-appellant claimed a half share therein, founded on s. lS(l)(a) of the Hindu Succesoion Act (the Act, for hort). The High Court negatived the right to a share as an heir, and, in doing so, preferred the interpretation of the provision adopted by the then Mysore High Court (AIR 1962 Mysore\n\n160) as against the meaning attached to the provision by the Allahabad High Court ( 1968 Allahabad Law Journal 488). In fact, a plurality of decisions has been brought to our notice indicating a plain conflict.\n\nInterpretation is sometimes a projection of judicial inclination to do justice.\n\nThe question of law canvassed before us turns on the meaning of \"son\" and \"daughter\" in the setting of s. lS(l)(a) of the Act. Do the expressmns include step-son and step-daughter or embrace only the son and daughter of the deceased female propositus ? The text and the context and the application of traditional rules of statutory interpretation leave the position in an unsatisfactory dilemma of dual\n\nimport.\n\nEven an equitable approach may not necessarily help reach a just solution, because equity shifts as the situation varies, as illustra-\n\n• I\n\nSHAKUNTALA v. KAUSHALYA (Krishna lyer, J.) 641\n\ntions presentd to us convinced us. Thus, the problem is a little tricky and may wdl arise frequently. Contradictory positions already taken by different High Courts add to the difficulty and result in the deleterious uncenainty of the law which may well incite, as it has done here, close relations to quarrel over property. Blood may be thicker than water, but wealth breaks all relations on a word of material value sets.\n\nThe Supreme Court may, when the High Courts disagree, resolve the logomachic conflict by exercising its preference guided by the language and the milieu and following the customary canons of statutory interpretation. While its decision will be binding on accounf of Article 141 of the Comtitution, it may still be fallible because the intendment of Parliament is best brought out by legislative clarification. In the present instance, we have a hunch that the specific point of claim by stepsons and step-daughters to inherit to the estate of a deceased female has escaped Parliament's attention while fashioning the legislation. This is not surprising when we appreciate the push and pressure, hurry and worry of Jaw-making modalities. In such a situation, when a sharp conflict has shown up in the rulings of courts, the matter should not be left in doubt or to forensic-linguistic exercises but must be settled by legislative action on the part of Parliament, making explicit its policy on this branch of the Hindu Succession Act. Inaction leads to more litigation, speculation and compulsion for judicial legislation by the Supreme Court. Drafting lapses are understandable but when differencei of interpretation come into the open, delay in correctional parliamentary performance is fraught with negative litigative potential .. We are hopeful that the Indian draftsmen will disprove the old English jingle :\n\nl'am the parliamentary draftsman I compose the country's laws\n\nAnd of half the litigation I'am undoubtedly the cause.\n\nTue sublime element which we adverted to in the bgil:lning consists\n\nin the optimistic endeavour to bring parties together so that the litiga- G tion may not cut them asunder, especially whn they are sisters. The purpose of law and justice ( dharma) is promotion of cohesion and not\n\nproduction of fission.\n\nFrom this angle, as the arguments proceeded and the legal tempers ftared up, we suggested that instead of escalating estrangement the parties may as well compose themselves and their quarrels and re-establish their sisterly relations making a some\\\\ hat H amicable adjustment of the !is before us. Viewing the case from this perspective of tranquillity verms turbulence, but making it perfectly\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.1t.\n\nplain that suggestions from the court towards this end will uot affect its unbiased adjudicatory duty iu case it became necessary, we ventured tentative solutions. Counsel took up the suggestion in the proper spirit and we mut record our admiration for the strenuous effort made by the young lawyer Shri M. L. Varma who did his best and successfully persuaded his client who had won in the High Court to come down to a compromise. We need hardly say that such a seasoned and senior counsel like Shri Lal Narain Sinha could be counted upon to aid in the process, and he did. The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave ~\n\nsense of fellowship or reunion. In the present case, counsel today put in a joint statement(') signed by the parties setting down the terms on which they have agreed. We consider it a snccess of the finer human spirit over its baser tendency for conflict.\n\nNow we come to the hundrum part of the case. According to the compromise some landed properties are to be made over to the appellant. Some cash is also to be paid to the appellant by the respondent.\n\nThe discretion to fix the sum has been left by the parties to us.\n\nWe direct that the respondent shall pay a sum of Rs. 75,000/- to the appellant within two weeks of the attachment of the moneys by the trial court being withdrawn.\n\nThe plaintiff/appellant undertakes that she will get the attachment withdrawn and we direct her to do so. We make it further clear that this withdrawal of the attachment is to facilitate the making of the payment of Rs. 75,000/- from out of the sum now lying in bank deposit.\n\nWe also direct that landed property worth Rs. 25 ,000 /- will in addition be made over to the appellant from out of the suit prnperty. The further direction must justly follow-and we make-that all the rents due from the properties allotted to the appellant under the joint statement prior to this date and subsequent to tbi& date shall be collectible by the appellant. If they have already been deposited in court, they will be withdrawn by the appellant. The actual allocation of the lands under the joint statement will be made by Mr.\n\nPrem Nath Randa within two months from today. Both sides agree on Shri Handa being impartial and competent to make the said allotment. His allotment once made will not be challengeable. Shri Randa pursuant to this direction will make the allocation and put in a statement to that effect in the trial court and that statement will be deemed to be part of this decree.\n\n(1) On 2-4-79 an incohate compromise purporting to be a full-fledged compromise had been put into court by counsel signed by both sides, but the joint\n\nst,.._tement of settlement put in today is in complete sllpersession of the\n\n earlier one.\n\nSHAKUNTALA v. KAUSHALYA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 643\n\nWe need hardly mention-it is so obvions-that the land that remains will belong entirely to the respondent and there will be no more\n\nclajms from the appellant on the respondent in regard to the estate of her step-mother, or in respect of its income or otherwise.\n\nBefore we part with the case we should like to emphasise that having regard to the merits of the claim, this is not merely a just adjustment of a bitter litigation but a path-finder for the subordinate courts in dealing with family or like disputes. Indeed, we have had to take the lead in giving shape to the settlement as it has finally emerged.\n\nCounsel on both sides have also, statesman-like, assisted in producing the settlement. We command this exampb to the judiciary and to the Bar and reinforce it with what Gandhiji has recorded in his autobiography:\n\n\"I have learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I realised that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties driven asunder.\n\nThe lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases.\n\nI lost nothing, thereby-not even money, certainly not my soul.\"\n\nWe allow the appeal in part but entirely in terms of the compromise which we consider clearly reasonable and just. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.-Dccree in terms of compromise without costs.\n\n~ Parliament should clarify its intention regarding s. 15(1)(a).\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed in part .", "total_entities": 26, "entities": [{"text": "SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAUSHAL YA SAWHNEY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAUSHALYA SAWHNEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "4pril 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY\n\nKAUSHAL YA SAWHNEY\n\n,4pril 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA lYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1757, "end_char": 1770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court may resolve the conflict by exercising its preference guided by the language and the milieu and follo\\ving the customary canons of statutory interpretation."}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1980, "end_char": 1988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2060, "end_char": 2070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141 of the Constitution it may still be fallib1e becanse the intendment of Parliament is best brought out by legislative clarification in some cases. ["}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2333, "end_char": 2358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956"}}, {"text": "A Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3006, "end_char": 3019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA Tulzapurkar, J.\n\nParliament should clarify its intention regarding s. B(l)(a) of the Act."}}, {"text": "W. C. Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. C. Chopra for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. L. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3331, "end_char": 3342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. L. Varma for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. L. Varma"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3410, "end_char": 3422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A judgment often possesses a sublim~ essence and a humdrum component."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court negatived the right to a share as an heir, and, in doing so, preferred the interpretation of the provision adopted by the then Mysore High Court (AIR 1962 Mysore\n\n160) as against the meaning attached to the provision by the Allahabad High Court ( 1968 Allahabad Law Journal 488)."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4707, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court negatived the right to a share as an heir, and, in doing so, preferred the interpretation of the provision adopted by the then Mysore High Court (AIR 1962 Mysore\n\n160) as against the meaning attached to the provision by the Allahabad High Court ( 1968 Allahabad Law Journal 488)."}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 6998, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. L. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8548, "end_char": 8559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel took up the suggestion in the proper spirit and we mut record our admiration for the strenuous effort made by the young lawyer Shri M. L. Varma who did his best and successfully persuaded his client who had won in the High Court to come down to a compromise.", "canonical_name": "M. L. Varma"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8744, "end_char": 8760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We need hardly say that such a seasoned and senior counsel like Shri Lal Narain Sinha could be counted upon to aid in the process, and he did."}}, {"text": "Prem Nath Randa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10437, "end_char": 10452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual allocation of the lands under the joint statement will be made by Mr.\n\nPrem Nath Randa within two months from today."}}, {"text": "Handa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10508, "end_char": 10513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both sides agree on Shri Handa being impartial and competent to make the said allotment."}}, {"text": "Randa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10628, "end_char": 10633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Randa pursuant to this direction will make the allocation and put in a statement to that effect in the trial court and that statement will be deemed to be part of this decree."}}, {"text": "2-4-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) On 2-4-79 an incohate compromise purporting to be a full-fledged compromise had been put into court by counsel signed by both sides, but the joint\n\nst,.._tement of settlement put in today is in complete sllpersession of the\n\n earlier one."}}, {"text": "Gandhiji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11879, "end_char": 11887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We command this exampb to the judiciary and to the Bar and reinforce it with what Gandhiji has recorded in his autobiography:\n\n\"I have learnt the true practice of law."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12546, "end_char": 12557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TULZAPURKAR, J.-Dccree in terms of compromise without costs."}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12660, "end_char": 12671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_644_650_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HUKUM CHAND JUTE MILLS LTD.\n\nSECOND INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, WEST BENGAL & ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, V. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nPayment of BonuJ A.ct, 1965-Customary and contractual bonus-If excluded by the Act>-A.mending A.ct 23 of 1976-Efject of.\n\nThe appellant mills had been paying customary bonus to its employees for a number of years.\n\nConsequent to the amendment of the Bonus Act, 1965 in 1976 by Act 23 of 1976 the moo.agement denied the customary bonus claimed by the workmen, whereupon the dispute regarding \"customary bonus for the year 1976\" was referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nThe Management's plea that customary bonus was no longer payable, in view of tho provisions of the 1976 Amendment, WM negatived by the Tribunal.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant D that the Bonus Act as amended by Act 23 of 1976, annihilate! all epecies of bonu! including customary and contractual bonu?i.\n\nDismissing. the appeal,\n\nHEID: 1. The Bonus Act (1965) though a complete code was confined to profit-oriented bonw only.\n\nThe other kinds of bonu! that have flourished in Indian industrial law have been left uncovered by the Bonus Act.\n\nThe legislative universe spanned by the said statute cannot therefore, affect the rights\n\nand obligations belonging to a different world or claims and conditions. [647-E]\n\n2. The amending Act, 23 of 1976 amended the long title of the Bonuo Act to provide for the payment of bonus\n\n11on the bMi! of profits Ol\" on tbs basis of production or productivity, and for maA.te~ connected therewith.\" The inference that flows therefrom i! that customary or contractual bonus goes F beyond the pale of the amending Act which modifi°' the previous one by bringing within its range bonu?i on the basis of production or produttivity also.\n\n!648G-649B].\n\n3. Section 17 of the Bonus Act in express terw rerfers to puja bonus nd other customary bonus as available for deduction from thC: bonus payable under the Act, thus making a clear distinction between the bonus payable under the Act\n\nand \"puja bonus or other customary bonus\". This section has been left intact.\n\nSo long as this section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act, as amended, do not deal with cuaton1ary\n\nbonm. (649-C]\n\n-4. Section 31A relates to bonus linked with production or productivity in lieu of bonus based on profits. It speaks nothing of the other kindlil of bonus.\n\n[649-GJ\n\n5. The Bonus Act (1965) doe. not deal with cu•tomary bonus and i1 confiaed to profit-based or productivitybased bonm. The provi?iion! of the Act have no say, on customary bonus and cannot, therefore, be inconsistent therewith.\n\n• )!'. ..\n\nHUKAM CHAND JUTE MILLS V. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL 6 4 5 (Krishna Iyer, I.) Conceptually, statutory bonus and customary bonus operate in two fields arid do not cash with each other. [649H-650AJ\n\nIn the instant case, both parties have agreed that throughout they have been dealing with customary bonus only and whenever there has been a settlement or agreement it has been not the source of the right but the quantification thereof. The claim was rooted in custom but quantified by contract.\n\nIt did not originate in any agreement, but was organised by it.\n\nThe customary bonus as claimed is neither impaired nor eliminated by the 1976 Amendment Act.\n\n[650 C, Bl\n\nMumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. M/S. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai & Or.. [1976] 3 SCR 591 at 608-609 & 612; Sanghi Jeevarai Gh'e'war Chand & Ors. v.\n\nSecrtary Madras Chillies, Grains Kirana Merchants Workers' Union and Anr. [1969] I SCR 366; referred to.\n\nCIYIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1118 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Order dated 12-5-1978 of the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. VIII-169 /77 G.O. No. 3000 IR dated 26-7-77.\n\nG. B. Pai, R. C. Shah, S. R. Agarwal, 0. P. Khaitan and Praveen D Kumar for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, D. T. Sen Gupta, S. R. Gupta and P. K.\n\nChakravorti for Respondent No. 3.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, and Ramesh C. Pathak for the Intervener (The Bank of Tokyo Staff Association).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Industrial jurisprudence, based on the values of social justice which is integral to our Constitution, bas been built around se¥ral legislations enacted by Parliament, one of which is the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, (the Bonus Act, for short). The bonus branch of labour law, however, is not exhausted by this enactment and has been replenished by judge-made law, drawing sustenance frem practice and precedent, custom and contract. Against this back\n\ndrop, we have to state and assess the single issue strenuously canvassed before us by the appellant-management challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal and urging that the Bonus Act, as amended by Act 23 of 1976, annihilates all species of bonus including customary and contractual bonus.\n\nThe claim of the Union of Workmen is for customary bonus, the reference to industrial adjudication relates to custorr.ary bonus, and the special leave to appeal granted by this Court is confined to customary bonus as the common basis and focuses on the sole legal issue of negation of that kind of bonus by virtue of the provisions of the amel)ding Act 23 of 1976.\n\nThe matrix of minimal facts necessary to highlight the limited controversy may lay bare the crucial issue we have to decide.\n\nThe appellant is a jute mill in Bengal employing several thousand workers but we are directly concerned here with a dispute between the Managemnt and the employees in its head office.\n\nCertain indisputable facts, fundamental to the case, make a useful beginning.\n\nCustomary bonus has been claimed, conceded and settled between the parties for long years since the early sixties at least.\n\nFrom time to time, this demand has been the subject of dispute and, fortunately, of agreed solution right down to 1975.\n\nBut in 1976--the year in which Art. 43A making participation of workers in Management of industries was made a Directive Principle in our Constitution-the Bonus Act was, paradoxically, amended restricting workers claim to Bonus by Act 23 of 1976 although much of the curtailment has been cancelled by the next Amending Act, 1977.\n\nAnyway, the changes wrought by the 1976 amendment emboldened the Management to deny the legality of Customary bonus claimed by the workmen. This conflict led to a reference by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal of the following dispute :\n\n\"CUSTOMARY BONUS FOR THE YEAR, 1976\"\n\nWhat is material to notice is that the demand and the denial, the reference and the adjudication and, finally, the special leave itself revolved round customary bonus.\n\nThe specific case of the Management was that customary bonus could no longer be payable, in view of the provisions of the 1976 amendment.\n\nA statutory fatality was sought to be spelt out of its provisions before the Tribunal and before us.\n\nWe emphasize this to exclude a hazy, though half-hearted plea mentioned by Shri G. B. Pai for the appellant that here the bonus was based on agreement and no agreement as such could avail in view of s. 34, read with s. 31A, (as amended by the 1976 Act).\n\nApart from the Jaw relied on, it is somewhat startling that bonus paid by settlement between the parties qua customary bonus at least since 1962-63 (see page 4 of the Paper Book) should be anathematized as untenable. in 1976, suggesting that labour law, viewed from the social justice angle, is making headway steadily backwards.\n\nEven so, we will examine the law as the statute speaks.\n\nThe payments over the years have been of customary bonus. The demand for 1976, which alone directly concerns us, is also for customary bonus.\n\nThe dispute referred is of customary bonus.\n\nThe legal objection urged is to customary bonus.\n\nThe award has upheld the tenability of customary bonus.\n\nThe special leave. petition complained about the legality of customary bonus and\n\n'\".\n\nill .-\n\nHUKAM CHAND JUTE MILLS V. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL 647 (Krishna Iyer, !.) the order granting leave clinched the issue by treating the dispute as one for customary bonus.\n\nLikewise, throughout, the only defence of the management was the lethal impact on customary or other bonus, save profit or productivity-based bonus of Act 23 of 1976.\n\nSo the sole question is the soundness of the legicidal impact of the l 976 amendment on the customary bonus claim which otherwise was valid and, indeed, was honoured by the appellant by progressively escalating rates by agreement.\n\nThis part of the narration may be concluded by excerpting the order granting leave :\n\n\"Mr. Pai states on behalf of the petitioner-Management that if they fail on the legal issue, namely, because of the amendment in the Bonus Act customary bonus is not payable, then they will not ask for the trial of that issue on merits and straightway they will pay the customary bonus they have been paying as per the agreement dated 20-3-1975.\n\nIn view of this undertaking we grant special leave to app::al and even if the appellants succeed in this appeal, they will not ask for costs against the workmen concerned.''\n\nThe Bonus Act (1965) was a complete code but was confined to profit-oriented bonus only.\n\nOther kinds of bonus have flourished in Indian Industrial law and have been left uncovered by the Bonus Act.\n\nThe legislative universe spanned by the said statute cannot therefore affect the rights and obligations belonging to a different world or claims and conditions.\n\nThis has, in the Mumbai Kamgar's case(') exhaustively dealt with the anatomy of the Bonus Act, its functional scope its modalities and its operational frontiers to reach the following conclusion :\n\n\"It is clear further from the long title of the. Bonus Act of 1965 that it seeks to provide for bonns to p::rsons employed 'in certain establishments' -not in all establishments .\n\nMoreover, customary bonus does not require calculation of profits, allocable surplus, because it is a payment founded on long usage and justified often by spending Qn festivals and the Act gives no guidance to fix the quantum of festival bonus; nor does it expressly wish away such a usage.\n\nThe conclusion seems to be fairly clear, unless we strain judicial sympathy countrarywise, that the Bonus Act dealt with only profit bonus and matters connected therewith and did not govern customary, traditional or contractual bonus.\n\n(I) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 591, 608-609.\n\nThe end product of our study of the anatomy and other related factors is that the Bonus Act spreads the canvas wide to exhaust profit-based bonus but beyond its frontiers is not void other cousin claims bearing the caste name 'bonus' flourish-miniatures of other colours ! The Act is neither proscriptive nor predicative of other existences.\"\n\nAfter dealing with Ghewar Chand's case('), the Court arrived at the final view that\n\n\"A discrning and concrete analysis of the scheme of the Act and the reasoning of the Court leaves us in no doubt that it leaves untouched customary bonus.\"(')\n\nThis ruling has our concurrence and, indeed, the principal plea of Shri Pai, counsel for the appellant, is that the effect of the 1976 amending Act has been left open in that decision a'nd that is precisely the justification for his submission that the new provisions nullify all kinds of claims of bonus except pmfit-or-productivity-based bonuses, having regard to ss. 31 A and 34A brought into the statute Act.\n\nCounsel made his goal-oriented submissions by taking us through the new provisions.\n\nAs we have stated earlier many of the statutory modifications brought about in 1976 in the then wisdom of Parliament have been repealed and the original position restored in 1977 by the later wisdom of the new Parliament.\n\nHowever, we are concerned only with the import and effect of the few provisions incorporated by Act 23 of 1976. . The fundamental fact which we must reiterate is that the Bonus Act before the 197 6 amendment bad nothing to say on bonu~ not oriented on profit.\n\nWhat then was the departure made ?\n\nDid it travel beyond the broad territory of the original statute and invade other forms of bonus ? Apart from the clauses which we will presently deal with, a key to the understanding of the changes is the long title. The long title of the Bonus Act was also amended in 1976 and the substituted one runs thus :\n\n\"An Act to provide for the payment of bonus to persons employed in certain establishments on the basis of profits or on the basis of production or productivity and for matters connected therewith.\"\n\nThe clear light that we glean from the new long title is contrary to the intent of Shri Pai's argument.\n\nSpecifically, the new\n\n(I) [1969] I S.C.R. 366.\n\n(2) [1976] > S.C.R. 591, 612.\n\nI •\n\n~· .\n\n• ' I\n\nHUKAM CHAND JUTE MILLS V. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL 6 4 9 (Krishna Iyer, !.) long title purports to provide for the payment of bonus \"on the basis of profits or on the basis of production or productivity and for matters connected therewith\". The emphatic inference flows therefrom that customary or contractual bonus goes beyond the pale of the amending Act which modifies the previous one by bringing within its range bonus on the basis of production or productivity also.\n\nNothing more-unless the text expressly states to the contrary. It Is important to remember that s. 17 of the Bonus Act has been left intact.\n\nThat Section in express terms refers to puja bonus and other customary bonus as available for deduction from the bonus payable under the. Act, thus making a clear distinction between the bonus payable under the Act and \"pujd' bonus or other customary bonus. So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act, as amended, did not deal with customary bonus\n\nStrong reliance was placed by counsel for the appellant on new s. 31A read with substituted s. 34. It is proper to reads. 34 at this stage :\n\n\"34. Subject to the provisions of section 31A, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the terms of any award, agreement, settlement or contract of service.\"\n\nThe only changes that we notice as between this Section and its predecessor are (i) that agreements, settlements and contracts of service inconsistent with the provisions of the Act regardless of whether they\n\nwere made before 29th May, 1965 or after would now stand superseded; and (ii) s. 24 shall be subject to the provisions of s. 3 lA newly inserted.\n\nF We may straightway dispose of the argument based on s. 3 JA.\n\nThat relates to bonus linked with production or productivity in lieu of bonus based on profits. We are not concerned with such a situation and we agree that in regard to productivity bonus s. 31 A sha1! have operation but it speaks nothing about the other kinds of bonus G and cannot, therefore, be said to hve the sp, in-off benefits claimed by the appellant.\n\nSimilarly, the submission that an agreements inconsistent with the Bonus Act shall become inoperative also has no substance vis-a-vis customary bonus.\n\nThe fallacy is simple.\n\nOnce we agree-and this is incontestible now-that the Bonus Act ( 1965) does not deal with customary bonus and is confined to profit-based H or productivity-based bonus, the provisions of the Act have no say\n\n3-330SCI/79\n\nA on customary bonns and cannot, therefore, be inconsistent therewith.\n\nConceptually, statutory bonus and customary bonus operate in two fields and do not clash with each other.\n\nWe have reached the end of journey because the focal point of the debate is as to whether customary bonus, as claimed in this case, is impaired or eliminated by the 1976 amendment Act. Moreover, both parties have agreed that throughout they have been daling with customary bonus only and whenever there has been a settlement or agreement it has been not the source of the right but the quantification thereof.\n\nThe claim was rooted in custom but quantified by contract.\n\nIt did not originate in any agreerp.ent, but was organised by it. We are, therefore, satisfied that the appeal must fail.\n\nWe should have unhesitatingly directed costs to be paid by the management-appellant to the respondent-workmen; but during the course of the hearing we were far from impressed with the attitude taken up by the respondent.\n\nWhile the merits df the matter have D to be decided indifferent to such factors, costs are discretionary and we are constrained to dismiss the appeal, directing both the parties to bear their respective costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "HUKUM CHAND JUTE MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUKUM CHAND JUTE MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SECOND INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, WEST BENGAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SECOND INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, WEST BENGAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. 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Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4097, "end_char": 4113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, and Ramesh C. Pathak for the Intervener (The Bank of Tokyo Staff Association)."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4217, "end_char": 4229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Industrial jurisprudence, based on the values of social justice which is integral to our Constitution, bas been built around se¥ral legislations enacted by Parliament, one of which is the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, (the Bonus Act, for short).", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Union of Workmen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim of the Union of Workmen is for customary bonus, the reference to industrial adjudication relates to custorr.ary bonus, and the special leave to appeal granted by this Court is confined to customary bonus as the common basis and focuses on the sole legal issue of negation of that kind of bonus by virtue of the provisions of the amel)ding Act 23 of 1976."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5508, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a jute mill in Bengal employing several thousand workers but we are directly concerned here with a dispute between the Managemnt and the employees in its head office."}}, {"text": "Managemnt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5612, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a jute mill in Bengal employing several thousand workers but we are directly concerned here with a dispute between the Managemnt and the employees in its head office."}}, {"text": "Art. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6017, "end_char": 6025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Management of industries was made a Directive Principle in our Constitution-the Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amending Act, 1977", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6296, "end_char": 6314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7216, "end_char": 7221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act, 1977", "statute": "Amending Act, 1977"}}, {"text": "s. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7233, "end_char": 7239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act, 1977", "statute": "Amending Act, 1977"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ill .-\n\nHUKAM CHAND JUTE MILLS V. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL 647 (Krishna Iyer, !.)", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8707, "end_char": 8710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the narration may be concluded by excerpting the order granting leave :\n\n\"Mr. Pai states on behalf of the petitioner-Management that if they fail on the legal issue, namely, because of the amendment in the Bonus Act customary bonus is not payable, then they will not ask for the trial of that issue on merits and straightway they will pay the customary bonus they have been paying as per the agreement dated 20-3-1975."}}, {"text": "20-3-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9037, "end_char": 9046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the narration may be concluded by excerpting the order granting leave :\n\n\"Mr. Pai states on behalf of the petitioner-Management that if they fail on the legal issue, namely, because of the amendment in the Bonus Act customary bonus is not payable, then they will not ask for the trial of that issue on merits and straightway they will pay the customary bonus they have been paying as per the agreement dated 20-3-1975."}}, {"text": "Mumbai Kamgar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9603, "end_char": 9616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has, in the Mumbai Kamgar's case(') exhaustively dealt with the anatomy of the Bonus Act, its functional scope its modalities and its operational frontiers to reach the following conclusion :\n\n\"It is clear further from the long title of the."}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 S.C.R. 591", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10497, "end_char": 10516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ghewar Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10891, "end_char": 10903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After dealing with Ghewar Chand's case('), the Court arrived at the final view that\n\n\"A discrning and concrete analysis of the scheme of the Act and the reasoning of the Court leaves us in no doubt that it leaves untouched customary bonus.\"(')"}}, {"text": "ss. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11483, "end_char": 11489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13415, "end_char": 13420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13942, "end_char": 13948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act", "statute": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13971, "end_char": 13976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act", "statute": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act"}}, {"text": "section 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14055, "end_char": 14066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act", "statute": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act"}}, {"text": "29th May, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14521, "end_char": 14535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only changes that we notice as between this Section and its predecessor are (i) that agreements, settlements and contracts of service inconsistent with the provisions of the Act regardless of whether they\n\nwere made before 29th May, 1965 or after would now stand superseded; and (ii) s. 24 shall be subject to the provisions of s. 3 lA newly inserted."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14582, "end_char": 14587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act", "statute": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14626, "end_char": 14630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act", "statute": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14705, "end_char": 14709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act", "statute": "So long as this Section remains without amendment the inference is clear that the categories covered by the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14904, "end_char": 14909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Once we agree-and this is incontestible now-that the Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15253, "end_char": 15315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16680, "end_char": 16686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_651_670_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SATPAL & CO. ETC.\n\nl'.\n\nLT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI AND ORS.\n\nApril 12, 1979\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND A P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Excise (Delhi 'A1nei1dn1eizt) Ordinance, 1979 ctnpowering tile Governnumt under the Punjab Excise Act, to levy \"special duty\" on the iniport of coun ..\n\ntry liquor. into Delhi and the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979 levying \"special\n\nduty'\"-Validity of,\n\nPowers o'~ Parliament to /egislat~ exclusively for Union Territory of Delhi,\n\na part of the Territory of India not included in a State-Constitution of India C Articles 246 to 248 and Entry 97 of t/ie Union List.\n\nRight to trade in intoxicants-Whether a fundanientrd right-Constitution of India Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 301.\n\nRetrospective Legislation is valid in case of intoxicants-Constitution of India Art. 47.\n\nD While implementing the provisions of the Punjat, Excise Act, 1914 as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi, the concerned authority used to hold auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at one such auction held on 29th March 1978, the petitioners' bids were accepted and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978 to 31st Mairch 1979. The licence included a condition to sell a bottle of 750 ml. of country liquor at Rs. 15/- which was inter alia made up at excise duty E (<tyled as still-head duty) at the rate of Rs. 10.23 and profit of licensee at the rate of Rs. 2/-· In W.P. 716/78, validity of the levy of 'still head duty' was challenged by certain petitioners inter alia on the ground tha-t it was nothing but countervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi, countervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be constitutionally levied.\n\nThis contention found favour with a learned single judge of the Delhi High Court and a number of Letters Patent Appea.ls were filed against that Judgn1ent.\n\nDuring the pendency of these appeals President of India pron1ulgated an Ordinance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, styled as Punjab\n\nExcise (Delht Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 with retrospective effect, conferring power on the Government under the provisions of the Act to levy 'special duty' on the import of country liquor in Delhi at rates not exceeding that set out in Schedule I~A which was introduced in the Act by the Ordinance.\n\nPursuant to the Ordinance amending the Principal Act, the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979 was issued levying special duty at the rates set out in the order on import of country liquor into Delhi.\n\nSome of the petitioners questioned the validity 'generally of the Ordinance and specifically of the impost of special duty in Civil Writ No. 16/79. A Division Bench of the Delhi High\n\nCourt heard the Letters Patent Appeals and the Writ Petition No. 116/79 and by a common judgment held the ordinance as well as the impost of the special duty thereunder valid, dismissed the \\Vrit Petition and a11owed the Letters Patent\n\nAppeals.\n\n:-- 1\n\nDismissing the special leave petitions, the Court\n\nHELD ; 1. Scheme underlying distribution of Legislative power in Part XI Chapter I and especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except the matters spe<:ifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule, Parliament's plenary po\\Ver to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes \\Vhen Parliament legislates for part of the territory of India not included in a State. The three dimensional picture becomes complete, viz. (i) to select topic for legislation\n\n(ii) enactment of legislation on the topic and (iii) to impose tax in respect of such subject matter of legislation by reference to Art. 248 which confers power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in Lists JI and III including the po\\ver to impose tax not mentioned in either of those lists. Under Art 246 ( 4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India, not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. Power of Parliament thus to legislate with respect to any matter for Delhi, territory not included in a\n\nState is unabridged or unfettered by the entries in the State List.\n\nFurther residuary power of legislation including the power to levy tax is conferred on Parliament by the combined operation of Articles 246(4), 248(1l and (2) and_ Entry 97 in the Union List. That power is untrammelled by the limitations prescribed by Article 246(2) and (3) and Entry 51 of State List and is plenary and absolute subject only to such restrictions as imposed by the Constitution. [659 G-H, 660 A-Cl\n\nMithan Lal v. State of Delhi, [1959] SCR 445 @ 451; referred to.\n\n2. While legislating for the Union Territories the Parliament unhampered by Articles 246(2) and (3) but enriched by Article 248(1) and (2) could legislate on any of the topics either in the List I and III or in List TI or in exercise of the residuary power under Entry 97. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent Parliament from combining its powers under one or other Entry with its power under Entry 97. Parliament can rely on the powers under specified Entries 1 to 96 List I and supplement them with the powers under Entry 97 List I and Article 24 or even the powers under Entries in the concurrent list. There is no dearth of legislative competence of Parliament to enact legislation for a territory not included in a State because the power to legislate takes within its sweep matters included in all the three lists and added to it is the residuary power on matters not specifically included in any entry in any of the three..lists. [661 D-G]\n\nIf exercise or countervailing duty could be levied on country liquor JOOnufactured or imported into Delhi, Parliament \\VOuld not lack competence to levy the same only because levy of such duty on alcoholic liquors for human consumption is within the competence of a State. As country liquor is not manufactured in Delhi, the Parliament could not under Entry 51 of the State List levy either excise or countervailing duty on it. Merely because Parliament could not levy countervailing duty on country liquor imported into Delhi because country liquor is not manufactured in Delhi it does not exhaust the power of Parliament to levy some other duty on the import of liquor if it is otherwise constitutiona11y permissible. [660 D-Fl\n\nUnion of India v. H. S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33; followed.\n\nSATPAL & CO. V. LT. GOVERNOR 653\n\n3. With:· the advancement of society, expanding horizons of scientific and technical knowledge, probe into the mystery of creation, it is impossible to conceive that every imaginable, head of legislation within human comprehension and within the foreseeable future could have been within the contemplation of the founding fathers and was, therefore, specifically enumerated in one or the other of the th, ree Lists, meaning thereby that three Lists were exhaustive of Government2.l action and activity. D'emands of welfare State, hopes and aspirations and expectations in a developing society and the complex \\VOrld situation \\Vith inter-dependence and hostility amongst nations may necessitate legislation on some such topics that even for visionaxy they could not have been within the contemplation of the founding fathers. Con1plex modem governmental administration in a federal set up providing distribution of legislative power coupled with po\\•, rer of judicial review may raise such situations that a subject of legisla tion may not squarely fall in ony specific entry in List I or II. Simultaneou<; ly on correct appraisal it may not be covered by any entry in List II though apparently or on a superficial view it may be covered by an entry in List IL In such a situation Parliiln1ent would have po\\ver to legislate on the subject in exercise of residuary power under Entry 97, List I and it \\vou1d not be proper to unduly circumscribe, corrode or w;;.ittle down this power by a process of interpretation by saying that subject cf legislation \\Vas present to the ntind of the framers of the Constitution because apparently it falls in one of the entries in List II and thereby deny power to legislate under Entry 97.\n\nThe history of freedo1n struggle demonstrates in unequivocal ternlS the in1portane of residuary power of legislation beitig conferred on Parliament.\n\nAccordingly, once the power of Parliament to legislate on a topic is not expressly taken a\\vay by any constitutional provision, it remains intact under Entry 97 of l.ist I.\n\n[662 G-H, 663 A-DJ\n\nUndoubtedly e:x<:ise and countervailing duties on alcoholic. liquors for human coHsumption \\\\'ere within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution.\n\nThat is a specific topic of legislation in List lT. It does not exhaust a conceivable levy that can be legitimately imposed on such items if otherwise they could be legally imposed on such items by reference to constitutional power to levy the same. And Entry 97 is a complete answer to the contention. [663 D-E]\n\nI/is HoUness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, [1973] F Suppl. S.C.R. I; explained and discussed.\n\nl. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, [1967] 2 SCR 672; referred to.\n\nUnion of India v. H. S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33, affirmed .\n\n4. Terminal tax is entirely different from the special duty sought to be imposed by the impugned Ordinance. The impost is on entry of country liquor into Delhi to be recovered by the Delhi Administration for its own use. Delhi Administration and Delhi Municipal Administration are entirely different, and, therefore, it cannot be said that Entry 52 excludes the power of the Parliament to levy tax on in1port of country liquor in Delhi. [663 F-G]\n\n5. If on the same subject the legislature choosesi to levy tax hvice over there is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure.\n\nMore so when Special Duty levied by Parliament and the terminal tax imposed by the Municipal Administra- H tion on the import of liquor in Delhi can be traced to independent source of power. [664 A-Bl\n\nr' I\n\nA Avinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [1979)\n\n1 SCR 845;\n\nfollowed.\n\n6. The idea conveyed by the expression \"colourable legislation\" j3 that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to be within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and i~ reality it transgressed those powers,\n\nthe transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. Applying this test it is difficult to say that the impugned impost is either a camouflage or a colourable legislation. [664 G-H]\n\nMerely because a statute was found to be invalid on the ground of lepjative competence that does not permanently inhibit the legislature from re-enacting the statute if the power to enact the same is properly traced and establhed.\n\nIn such a situation it would not be correct t('; say that the subsequent legift!ation would be merely a colourable legislation or a camouflage to re-enact the invalidated previous legislation. [665 E-F]\n\nK. C. Gajapati Narayan Dea v. State of Orissa, [1954] SCH. 1, MahariUUl Sri layvant Singhji Ramnal Singhli etc. v. State of Gujarat, [1962) Suppl. 2 SCR 411 @ 440, Patel Gordhandas Rargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Alimedabad, [1964] 2 SCR 608, Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Broach Borough\n\nMunicipality and Ors., [1970) 1 SCR 388; referred to.\n\n7. The expression 'excisable article' which alone can be the subject matter of levy special duty is merely descriptive of the goods subject to charge. It is <mly an identifying mark, a tag, whlch would attract special duty. If liquor was manufactured in Delhi it v.:uuld be an excisable article.\n\nIt is that article on which, if manufactured in Delhi excise duty could be levied which when imported would provide the taxing event for the levy of special duty because in the absence of manufacture in Delhi countervailing duty cannot be imposed Upon it. The expreiSEiion is used for identifying the subject-matter of impost and nothing more need be r'ead into it.\n\n[666DE]\n\n8. There is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicaBis. The State under its regulatory powers, has right: to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants its manufacture, storage, export import, ale and possession.\n\nIn all their manifestations these 1ights are vested in the State F and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicnnf5, [666 l-1. 667 Al\n\nIf there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor, there is no question of its abridgement by any restriction \\vhich can be styled as unreasonable. Ther State under its regulatory power has a right to control or even to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants apart from G anything else, its import too. This power of control is question of gociety's right to self-protection and it rests upon the right of the State to act for the health, moral and \\vclfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism and crime. Such an impost, therefore, is one in the public interest for preserving public health and public moral and is not one as infringing the inter!tate freedom of trade and commerce. All taxes are imposed in public intert.\n\nr667 F-R 668 A-BJ ff In the instant case the Preamble to the impugned Ordinance clearly recites that the special duty on the importation of country liquor into Delhi an endeavour towards bringing about prohibition of consumption of alcoholic drinks, and,\n\n• )(\n\n_)/\n\nSATPAL & CO. V. LT. GOVERNOR 655\n\ntherefore, it is a step in th, e. direction of safeguarding public health and with a view to rlising the goal fixed in Article 47 of the Constitution. It is a fiscal n1easure and the one safeguarding public health and even public morals became\n\nit is well recognised that liquor tre is instinct with injury to individual and community and has serious side-effects recognized everywhere in every age. Not to control alcohol business is to abdicate the right to rule for the good of the people. [669 B, G-H, 670 A]\n\nHar Shanker and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Con11niss1011er and Ors. [1975] 3 SCR 254, State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaug/iwala, [1957]\n\nSCR\n\n0874; P. N. Kaushal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1978] 3 SCC 558; applied.\n\nCrowlty v. Christafisen, 54 Law Ed. 620; quoted \\Vith approval.\n\nP. N. Kaushal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 122; referred to.\n\n9. There is no substance in the contention that the retrospectivity of the Ordinance is illegal, and invalid. The argument overlooks the twin objects sought to be achieved by the measure namely, validating an import which was found to bo inY8lid on the ground that it was countervailing duty which could not have been legitimately imposed and also tho object to •afeguard public health •ud public mor.l [670 B-D] ·\n\nPrith11i COtton MUls Ltd. and Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality and OrJ., [1,70] I SCR 388; applied.\n\n10. _The altruistic grievance of the petitioner by proxy for consumers strikes E as hollow because even with the impost the petitioners' profit of Rs. 21~ per bottle is guaranteed and they are in no way adversely affected by the impt\n\nbecause the levy is passed on to consumers, except for t1'e detention of their money for a day or two when they pay in advance while taking the bottles from the Warehouse and recovers it when they sell the bottle and this detention of their money for a period of two days is a trivality and is a part of <1ny busines. ~~ F\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petitions (Civil)\n\n• Nos. 2585-2594/79 .\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 9-3-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 116-122 and 135-137/79.\n\nV. S. Desai (In SLP 2585), L. N. Sinha (In SLP. 2586), L. M.\n\nSinghvi (In SLP 2587), P.P. Rao (In SLP 2588), R. C.\n\nVerma, Y. K. Sabharwal, D. P. Mukherjee, (In SLP 2589-94) and A. K.\n\nGanguli (In all the S.L.Ps.) for the Petitioners.\n\nSoli !. Sorabiee, ddl. Sol. Genl. R. K. Bhatt and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.\n\nII'\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by D11sA1, J.\n\nLaw touching manufacture, import, use or ,.consumption of liquor (as understood in common parlance) is recently vigorously assailed with almost afllicted sentimentalism that even though we have dhmissed this batch of Special Leave Petitions on 23rd March, 1979, in fairness to petitioners on whose behalf all possible contentions that can be formulated by research and dialectics were advanced with eloquence and devoid of inebriation likely to be caused by the subject-matter of dispute, we propose shortly to. state our reasons for dismissal of the petitions.\n\nTo illuniine the contours of controversy events preceding the promulgation of the Ordinance amending the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 ('Act' for short), as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi ('Delhi' for short) styled as Punjab Excise (Delhi Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 ('Ordinance' for short) may be stated. Punjab Excise Act, 1914 has been extended to Delhi. While implementing the provisions of the Act, the concerned authority used to hold auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at one such auction held on 29th March 1978 the petitioners' bids were accepted and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978 to 31st March 1979. The licence included a condition to sell a bottle of 750 ml. of country liquor at Rs. 15/- which was, inter alia, made up of excise duly at the rate of Rs. 10.23 and profit of licensee at the rate of Rs. 2/-. This excise duty was styled as 'still head duly' for obvious reasons. In Writ Petition No. 716/78 filed in the High Court of Delhi by certain petitioners, validity of the levy of 'still head duty' was challenged inter alia on the ground that it was nothing but countervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi, countervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be constitutionally levied. This contention found favour with a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court and a number of Letters Patent Appeals were filed against that judgment which were pending in the High Court. In the mean time on 20th January 1979 the President of India, promulgated the Ordianance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act with retrospective effect and conferring power on the Government under the provisions of the Act to levy special duty on the import of country liquor in Delhi at rates not exceeding that set out in Schedule I-A which was introduced in the Act by the Ordinance Pursuant to the Ordinance amending the principal Act, the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979, was issued levying special duty at the rates set out in the order on import of country liquor into Delhi. Some of the petitioners questioned the validity generally of the Ordinance and specifically of the import of special duty in Civil Writ No. 116/79. A Division Bench of the Delhi\n\n~-...\n\nHigh Court heard the Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court as wen as the aforementioned writ petition and by a common judgment held the Ordinance\n\nas wen as th~ impost thereunder valid mid dismissed the writ petition and allowed the Letters Patent Appeals setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge. This bunch of petitions is filed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 116/79 and allied writ petitions and the Letters Patent Appeals.\n\nThe cardinal question around which the various facts of controversy rotates turns upon the competence of Parliament to enact legislation under challenge which would directly impinge upon the competence of the President to issue the impugned Ordinance. Article 123 of thr Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance in the circumstances thereunder mentioned and the power to issn0 Ordinance is co-extensive with the legislative power of Parliament vide Article 123 (3). The question, therefore, is whether Parliament had the power to impose special duty on the import of country liquor in Delhi.\n\nJn order to avoid the slightest confusion it must be reiterated that the power of Parliament to legislate for Delhi is in question . .l\\rticle 246(1) confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule. Sub-article (3) confers similar powor on the Legislature of any State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II.\n\nSub-article (2) confers power both on Parliament and the State Legislature to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List). Sub-article ( 4) reads as under :-\n\n\"Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the Territory of India not included m a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List\".\n\nArticle 248(1) provides that Parfament has exclusive power to make\n\nay law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. In other words, residuary power of legislation is conferred on Parliament Sub-article (2) of Article 248 is material and may be extracted :\n\n\"(2). Such power shall include the power of making any Jaw imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists\".\n\nEntry 84 in the Union List reads as under :\n\n\"84. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except :-\n\n(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;\n\n(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics,\n\nbut including medicinal and toilen preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) nf\n\nthis entry\".\n\nEntry 97 of the Union List reads as under :\n\n\"97. Any other matter not enumerated in List )( or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those\n\nLists\".\n\nEntry 51 in the State Lis~ reads as under:\n\n\"51. Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the State and countervailing duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India :\n\n(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;\n\n(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics;\n\nbut not including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) F of this entry\".\n\nEntry 52 is as under :\n\n\"52. Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein\".\n\nThe relevant provisions of the impugned Ordinance may also be extracted for convenience of reference. The Ordinance in its Preamble states that by reason of certain excisable articles not being manufactured or produced in Delhi, one snch being con'ntry liquor, countervailing duty is not leviable on such articles which are imported into Delhi, and proceeds to define duty in clause S(a) of s. 3 as under:\n\n\"(Sa). \"duty\" means the excise duty or countervailing duty or, as the case may be, special duty;\"\n\nClause (c) was add, cd to clause (6) of s. 3 specifying the words \"any spirit\".\n\nClause (18a) was added specifying thereunder the definition of 'special duty' which reads as under :\n\n\"(18A). \"Special duty\" means a tax on the imporr of any excisable article being an article on which countervailihg duty as is mentioned in entry 51 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is not imposable on the ground merely that such article is not being manufactured or produced in the territory to which this Act extends\".\n\nSection 31 was amended enabling the Government to levy over and above excise duty a countervailing duty or special duty at such rate or rates not exceeding the rates set forth in Schedule IA which was\n\nalo added by the Ordinance.\n\nThe contention is that Entry 51 in the State List enables the State Legislature to levy duty of excise or countervailing duty on alcoholic liquors for human consumption and that the almost corresponding Entry 84 of the Union List denies power to Parliament to levy duty of excise on alcoholic liquors for human consumption. Proceeding further it was said that initially countervailing duty was levied on the country liquor imported in Delhi and when it was found that as country liquor was not manufactured in Delhi countervailing duty. could not be levied upon it, an attempt was made to levy the same duty by a camouflage of changing the name and that in pith and substance the Ordinance levies countervailing duty which Parliament had no power to levy particularly because country liquor on which duty is levied is not manufactured in Delhi.\n\nIt is an admitted position that country liquor, the subject-matter\n\nof impost, is not manufactured in Delhi. It is again an admitted posi- F lion that as country liquor is not manufactured in Delhi, countervailing duty as is commonly understood could not be levied upon its import in Delhi. The question is : does that exhaust the power of Parliament to levy a duty on the import of country liquor into Delhi ?\n\nScheme underlying distribution of legislative powers in t'art XI, Chapter I ailci especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except the matters specifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh . Schedule, Parliament's plenary power to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes when Parliament legislates for part of the territory of India not included in a State. The three dimensional picture D becomes complete, viz., (i) to select topic for legislation; (ii) enactment of legislation on the topic; and (iii) to impose tax in respect\n\nSUPRE11E COURT REPORTS\n\n(1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA of such subject-matter. of legislation, by reference to Art. 248 which confers powtr to make any law with respect to any matter not enume-, -· rated in Lists II and III including the power to impose tax not men- X tioned in either of those Lists. Under Article 246 ( 4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the B territory. of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. Power of Parfoment thus to legislate with respect to any matter for Delhi, territory not\n\n- - - included in a State, is unabridged or unfettered by the entries in the\n\nState List. Further, residuary power of legislation including. the power\n\nto levy tax is conferred on Parliament by the combined operation of\n\n• c Articles 246(4), 248(1) & (2) and Entry 97 in the Union List. That power is nntramelled by the limitations prescribed by.Articles 2~6(2) k\n\nand (3) and Entry 51 of State List and is plenary and absolute subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitu!i:Jn and ·! we find none such which is material to the present question (vide Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi)(').\n\nAccordingly, if excise or countervailing duty could be leviod on country liquor manufactured or imported into Delhi, albeit other conditions for the levy of such duty being fulfilled, Parliament would not lack competence to levy the same only because levy of such duty on alcoholic liquors for human consumption is within the competence of a Sta!e. But it must be confessed that as country liquor is not manufactured in Delhi, the Parliament could 1101 under Entry 51 of the State List levy either excise or countervailing duty on it. Merely because Parliament could not levy countervailing duty on country liquor imported into Delhi because country liquor is not manufactured in Delhi, it does not exhaust the power of Parliament to levy some other duty on the import of Uquor if it is otherwise constitutiPnally permissible\n\n. It was, however, said that Entry 51 in State List being a specific entry providing for levy of duty either on manufacture or import of country liquor and there being. no other specific entry enabling to levy • special duty it is inconceivable that the framers of the Constitution should have ldt some such levy on the import of country liquor in respect of Delhi under residuary entry. In other words, it was said that\n\n,. J 1\n\nwhere there is a specific entry the kgislation must squarely ftill within _,.,..- .the entry and correspondingly is must be assum'd that it would not\n\nb~ covered by the residuary entry. In fact the argument went so far that before resort could be had to the residuary Entry 97 the Court in\n\nC1)[t95ll S.C.R. 445 to 451\n\nits exploration to ascertain under which Entry the legislation falls, must proceed from the beginning and in its journey till Entry 97 if it falls somewhere, removing the camouflage under which the legislation is sought to be taken out from the specific entry, it would not be proper to say that the legislation is covered by the residuary entry. Whenever\n\nlegislative competence is in question attempt of the Courts is to find out whether the legislation squarely falls in one or the other entry. If\n\na particular legislation is covered by any specific entry well and good.\n\nIf it does not, the second question would be : is it beyond the legislative competence of Parliament? In undertaking this exercise it is quite often known that a legislation may be covered by more than one entry because an analysis bas shown that the entries are overlapping. 1f the legislation may fall in one entry partly and part of it may be covered by the residuary entry, the legislation would none-the-less be immune from the attack on the ground of legislative competence.\n\nThis was the approach adopted by a 7 Judges Bench of this Ciurt in\n\nUnior. of India v. H. S.\n\nDhillon(') wherein while examining the constitutio11al validity of the amended Wealth Tax Act which included the capital value of agricultural land for the purpose of computing net wealth, the controversy was whether the impugned Act was a Jaw with respect to entry, including Entry 49 in the List II or was it one under Entry 86 read with Entry 97 or Entry 97 itself of the List I.\n\nRepelling the contention of legislative incompetence this Com t held that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent Parliament from combining its powers under one or other Entry with its power under Entry 97. The terse observation is that this Court knows no principle which debars Parliament from relying on the powers uuder the specified entries 1 to 96, List I and supplement them with the powers under Entry 97, List I and Article 248 or even the powers under entries in the Concurrent List. This authoritative pronouncement would answer the conten~10n that while legislating for the Union Territories the Parliament unhampered by Articles 246(2) and (3) but enriched by Article 248(1) and (2) could legislate on any of the topics either in the List I or in List II or in exercise of the residuary power under Entry 97. There is thus no dearth of legislative competence of Parliament to enact legislation for a territory not included in a State because the power to legislate takes within its sweep matters included in all the three Lists and added to it is the residuary power on matters not specifically included in any entry in any of the three Lists.\n\nIt was, however, said that the observations in Dhillon's case (supra) are no more good law in view of the opinion of Judges constituting\n\n(I) [19721 2 S.C.R. 33.\n\nmajority in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.\n\nState of Kera/a('). The controversy in Kesavananda Bharat i's case was about the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and a contention being the spill over from J.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab(\") was that apart from Article 368, Entry 97 of List I would\n\nconfrr power on Parliament to amend the Constitution. After pointing out that when all the three Lists were exhaustively drawn up it is difficult to believe that an important power would be kept hidden in Entry 97 of the Union List leaving to the off chance of the courts locating that power in that entry, it was said that if a subject of legislation was present to the minds of the framers of the Constitution, it could not Lave been left to be found by the Courts in the residuary powers. Mr. Scervai's commentary at p. 1264 on Constitutional Law of India, 2nd Edn., was pressed into service wherein it is ob>erved that a forteori if a subject of legislative power was promill'ntly present to the minds of the framers of our Constitution, they would not have left it to be found by Courts in the residuary power. Proceeding ahead it was submitted that while enacting Entry 51 in List II the subicct of levying duty on import of alcoholic liquor was present to the minds of the framers of the Constitution and, therefore, it is futile to search that power in the residuary Entry. The observations in Kesavancmda's case (supra) have to be kept in focus in the context of the controversy whether Article 368 confers specific power of amendment of the Constitution and it was sought to be brushed aside by saying that it merely provided procedure for amendment of the Constitution and, therefore, the power for amendment must be located in the residuary Entry 97 01 the Union List. The position here is materially different.\n\nWith the advancement of society, expanding horizons of scinti fi.c and technical knowledge, probe into the mystery of creation, it is impossible to conceive that every imaginable head of legislation within human comprehension and within the foreseeable future could have been within the contemplation of the founding fathers and was, therefore, specifically enumerated in one or the other of three Lists, meaning the; cby that thre;, Lists were exhaustive of Governmental action and activity. Demands of welfare State, hopes and aspirations and expectations in a developing society and the complex '.\"orld situation with intEI-dependence and hostility amongst nations may necessitate legislation on some such topics that even for visionary they could not have lxcn within the contemplation of the founding fathers.\n\nComplex modern governmental administration in a federal set up pro-\n\n(ll [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. I.\n\n(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 672.\n\nviding distribution of legislative powers coupled with power of judicial review may raise such situations that a subject of legislation may not squarely fall in any specific entry in List I or III. Simultaneously on correct appraisal it may not be covered by any entry in List II though apparently or on a superficial view it may be covered by an entry in List II. In such a situation Parliament would have power to legislate on the subject in exercise of residuary power under Entry 97, List I and it would not be proper to unduly circumscribe, corrode or whittle down this power by saying that subject of legislation was present to the mind of the framers of the Constitution because apparently it falls in one of the entries in List II and thereby deny power to legislate under Entry 97. The history of freedom struggle demonstrates in unequivocal terms the importance of residuary power of legislation being co'nferred on Parliament. Therefore, the scope and .ambit of Entry 97 need not be whittled down or circumscribed by a\n\nproce£S of interpretation. In any case majority decision in Dhillon's case (supra) is neither overruled not cicpartcd from in Kesavananda's case (supra). Accordingly, once the power of Parliament to legislate on a topic is not expressly taken away by any constitutional provision, it remains intact under Entry 97 of List I.\n\nUndoubtedly, excise and countervailing duties on alcoholic liquors for human consumption were within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution. That is a specific topic of legislation in List IL It <loes not exhaust all conceivable levy that can be legitimately imposed on snch items if otherwise they could be legally levied by reference to constitutional power to levy the same. And Entry 97 is a complete answer to the contention.\n\nIt was incidentally urged that Entry 52 in the State List which enables the levying of taxes on entry of goods in local area for consumption, use or sale therein was also within the contemplation uf the founding fathers and that power under Entry 52 having been exercised by the Delhi Municipal Administration in the form of terminal tax the same cannot be arrogated by Parliament to itself. Terminal tax is entirely dillerent from the special duty sought to be imposed by the impugned Ordinance. The impost is on entry of country liquor into Dell1i to be recovered by the Delhi Administration for its own use.\n\nDelhi Administration and Delhi Municipal Administration are entirely different, and therefore, it cannot be said that Entry 52 excludes the power of the Parliament to levy tax on import of country liquor in Delhi.\n\nIncidentally, the argument is that the taxing event being th~ import\n\n~ of liquor in Delhi it is exposed to double taxation, namely, the special\n\nduty levied by Parliament and the terminal tax imposed by the .Municipal Administration and that is impermissible. Titis has merely to be mentioned to be rejected in view of the decision of this Court in Avinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.,(') wherein it was observea that if on the same subject the legislature chooses to levy tax twice over there is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure save wherever prohibitions exist.\n\nIt was next contended that what is sought to be done by the impugned Ordinance is to circumvent the decision of the learned single Judge of the High Court which invalidated the levy of countervailing duty and that at best it is a colourable legislation and that in pith and substance it is re-introduction of countervailing duty under a different nomenclature and hence unsustainabk If by a legislation tax is sought to be imposed in exercise of certain legislative power which under judicial review is found to be wanting, it does not prohibit the legislature from exercising the same power if it can be traced to provisions of tl1e Constitution. Merely because an incorrect exercise of legislative power under a misconception of power itself is once invalidated that very legislative power if it is traceable to provisions in the Constitution cannot be struck down on the ground that it is a colourable legislation or a mere camouflage. Undoubtedly initially countervailing duty was levied but it was found that as country liquor was not manufactured in Delhi legally it was impermissible to levy countervailing duty. This is admitted in the Preamblo;; of the Ordinance itself.\n\nIt was a constitutional error to have levied such a duty and the same was pomted out.\n\nNow, if the very duty could be levied under . the power which is available it can never be said that it is a colcurable exercise of power or that the new impost is a camouflage for the old one. What is colourable legislation was explained by this Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Dea v. State of Onissa, (2) and it was re-aflirmed in Maharana Shri Jayvant Singhji Ranmal Singhji etc. v. State cf Gujarat.(') This Court said that the idea conveyed by the expreMion\n\n\"colourable legislation\" is that although apparently a legislature in passing a •tatute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a more pretence or disguise.\n\nApplying this test it is difficult to say that the impugned impost is either a camouflage or a colourable legislation.\n\nConditions for levy of countervailing duty may not be satisfied. That\n\n(I) [1979! I S.C.C. 137. (2) [19541 S.C.R. I.\n\nIJ) [1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 411 at 440.\n\n_, •\n\n'.· ....•. •••••• / . ..\n\ndoes not debar the Parliament from levying tax on import of country liquor if it has otherwise power to do so. It would be too trik a saying that if countervailing duty cannot be imposed there would be no power to impose duty in any form on the import of country liquor into ' a territory where that country liquor is not manufactured.\n\nIn fact, where particular pre-requisites for levying a tax are not satisfied and it is so pointed out by a Court of law, the legislature would not lack power to levy that tax if it could be traced to the provisions of the Constitution. In such a situation Legislature has power to set at naught the judgment of the court by resort to appropriate power. 'This is well settled by the decision of this Court in Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad,(1) where the word 'rate' as used in Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, came l'tp for inrerpretation and it was held that it can be imposed on the annual letting value of the property but not on the capital value of the property. The legislature stepped in by enacting Gujarat Imposition of Tax by Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963, providing in s. 3 thereof assessment and collection of rate on lands and buildings on the basis of capital valne or a percentage of the capital value and declaring the past levy to be valid by further providing that tax on lands and buildings may be imposed ei:her on the basis of annual letting value or on the basis of capital value. When the amending and validating Act was questioned m Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v.\n\nBroach Borough Municipality & Ors.,(2) this Court observed that the legislature exercised its undoubted powers of redefining 'rate' so as to equate it to a tax on capital value and convert the tax purported to be collected as a 'rate' into a tax on lands and buildings, and thus got rid of the judgment in Patei Gordhandas's case, (supra). It would thus folluw that merely because a statute was found to be invalid on the ground of legislative compdence that does not permanently inhibit the Legislature from re-enacting the statute if the power to enact the same is properly traced and stablished. In such a situation it would not be correct to\n\nr say that the subsequent legislation would be merely a colourable legis-\n\n• lation or a c.amonflage to re-enact the invalidated previous legislation .\n\nJn passing it was mentioned that there is inherent evidence to show that the fresh impost wos nothing but the invalidated countervailing duty under a guise of different nomenclature. It was said that special duty can be levied under the Act amended by the Ordinance only on the impnrt cf any 'excisable article' being an article on which countervailing duty as is mentioned in Entry 51 of List, 2, Seventh Scheclule to the Cons; i1ution is not imposable on the ground merely that such -(lj [1964]TS.C.R. 608.\n\n(2\\ [1970] I S.C.R. 388.\n\n4-3JOSCI/79\n\n' \"\n\narticle is not being manufactured or produced in the territory to which the Act is extended. Reference was then made to the definition of 'excisable article' in s. 3 of the Act. Excisable article has been defined to mean (a) an alcoholic liquor for human consumption, or (b) any intoxicating drug, or ( c) spirit, the last being added by the impugned Ordinance. Apart from the definition, it was urged that excisable article in common parlance o.r by judicial interpretation has been understood to mean article on which excise is levied, or leviable.\n\nProceeding further it was said that as country liquor was not manufactured h1 Delhi, excise could not be levied on it nor countervailing duty could be imposed on its import though that very liquor where J~ manufactured may be an excisable article in that area. It was, there- ,-.! • fore, said that subject-matter of impost being an excisable article, ' .._ meaning if ruanufactured in Delhi excise could be levied on it, the special duty is nothing but invalidated countervailing duty on excisable article. There is no merit in this submission because the expression 'excisable article' which alone can be the subject-matter of levy of special duty is merely descriptive of the goods subject to charge. It is only an identifying mark, a tag, which would attract special duty. If liquor was manufactured in Delhi it would be an excisable article. It is that article on which, if manufactnred in Delhi, excise could be levied which when imported would provide the taxing event for the levy of special duty because in the absence of manufacture in Delhi countervailing duty cannot be imposed upon it. The expression is used for identifymg the subject-matter of impost and nothing more need be read into it.\n\nThe next important contention was that this impost imposed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Article 301 or the freedom to carry on trade or business in liquor is a fundamental right under Article 19(1) being not m public interest, the enactment is constitutionally invalid. 'That raises the oft repeated vexc :I question whether right to carry on trade or business in liquor is a fun< lamental right under Article 19 (I) {g) and tl\\\\lt same considerations would apply for acting under Article 301.\n\nThis quostion has cropped up before the Court at regular intervals but it would be sufficient to take note of two decisions to dispose of the contention. In Har Shankar & Ors. etc. v. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commis.1ior.e1 & Ors.(1) after referring to Crowley v. Christan<en,(\") and several cases of this Court it was in terms stataj that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State ---- --·\n\n(I) (19751 3 S.C.R. 254.\n\n(2) 54 Law. Ed. 620.\n\n...,.\n\nuuder its regulatory powers, has right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants--its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion the Court took note of an important observation made in the State of Bombay v. R. M. D.\n\nChamarbaugwala,(') which may be extracted as under:\n\n\"We find it difficult to persuade ourselves that gambling was ever intended to form any part of this ancient country's trade, rnmmerce or intercourse to be declared as free under Art. 301. It !s not our purpose nor is it necessary for us in deciding this case to attempt an exhaustive definition of the word 'lrade', 'business', or 'intercourse'.\n\nWe are, however, clearly oi opinion that whatever else may or may not be regarded as falling within the meaning of these words, gambling cannot certainly be taken as one of them. We are convinced and satisfied that the real purpose of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 301 could not possibly have been to guarantee or declare the freedom of gambling.\n\nGambling activities from their very nature and in essence are extra-commercium although the external forms, formalities and instruments of trade may be employed and they are not protected either by Art. 19(1) (g) or Art. 301 of our Constitution\".\n\nAfter extracting these observations this Court observed in Har Shwkar's case (supra) that the reasons mentioned by Das, C. J. for holding that there can be no fundamental right to do trade or business in an activity like gambling apply with equal force to the alleged right to trade in liquor and those reasons may not be brushed aside by restricting them to gambling operations.\n\nRecently, in P. N. Kaushal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,(2) after an exJ; austive review of all previous decisions, this conclusion was affirmed that there is no fundamental right to trade or business in nauseous drinks which includes liquor. If there is no fundamental right to carr; on trade or business in liquor, there is no question of its abridgement by any restriction which can be styled as unreasonable. In fact, as stated in Har Shankar's case, (supra) the State under its regulatory power has a right to control or even to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants apart from anything else, its import\n\n(I) [1957] S.C.R. 874.\n\n(2) [1978] 3 s.c.c. 558.\n\n668 SUPll.EME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\ntoo.\n\nThis power of control is question of society's right to selfprotection and it rests upon the right of the State to act for the health, moral and welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is' a source of pauperism and crime. In this background <it is now too late in the day to entertain an argument that imposition of tax on the import of liquor which serves the double purpose of restraining its use by making it costly and • prohibiting its use on the grorn:id that it trenches upon the manufacturers slowly and gradually to restrict its manufacture directly impinging upon its unrestricted consumption. Such an impost, therefore, can be said to be one in the public interest for preserving public health and _ .,. public morals and cannot be said to be one as infringing the mter-State ; J.. freedom of trade and commerce. Mr. Rao, who appeared for some of the petitioners specifically submitted that this question is no more\n\nres-mtegra in view of the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kalyani Stores v. The State of Orissa & Ors.( 1) In that case the validity of a Notification enhancing the duty on the import of foreign liquors from Rs. 40/- to Rs. 70/- per L.P. Gallon was questioned on the ground that it interferes with freedom of inter-State trade and commerce guaranteed by Article 301. This challenge was upheld by the majority decision observing that-\n\n\"the notification levying duty at the enhanced rate is purely a fiscal measure and cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction on the freedom of trade in the public interest. ..\n\nWithout entering upon an exhaustive categorisation of what may be deemed \"required in the public interest\", it may be said that restrictions which may validly be imposed under Art. 304(b) are those which seek to protect public health, safety, morals and property within the territory\".\n\nSince Kalyam Stores case (supra) judicial opinion on the vexed question of right to carry on trade or business in intoxicating drinks has undergone a sea change culminating into Har Shankar's case (supra) which again is a decision of 5 Judges Constitution Bench of this Court.\n\nUnfortunately the judgment in Kalyani Stores case is not referred to in Har Shankar's case. However, th•e undisputed position that now emerges is that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intocants. Once that latter pronounoment is u'nambiguous and incontrovertible a regulatory measure imposing a tax cannot be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness or want to public interest because one must not lose sight of the well accepted legal proposition !bat all taxes are imposed in public interest. Even apart from this, the majority judgment in Kalyani Stores case (supra) clearly recognises the test of\n\n(I) [1966] ! [S.C.R. 865.\n\nreasonable restrictions to be judged in the light of the purpose for which the restrictiou is imposed, i.e. as may be required in the public interest and restrictions that may validly be imposed under Article\n\n304(b) are those which seek to protect public health, safety, morals and property withiu the territory.\n\nThe Preamble to the impugned Ordinance clearly recites that the special duty on the importa•ion of country liquor into Delhi is an endeavour towards bringing about prohibition of consumptiou of alcoholic driuks, and, therefore, it is a step in the direction of safeguarding public health.\n\nIncidentally, however, it was stated that when the Minister piloted the Bill replacing the Ordinance it was in terms said that the Act replacing the Ordinance was purely a fiscal measure and had nothing to do with the prohibition. lrt the same breath it was stated that the Government was committed to total prohibition and would ; incerely try to achieve this objective. Opinion of the Minister would be hardly relevant in examining the object and purpose behind enacting a certain legislation.\n\nProvision in Punjab Excise Act, 1914, conferring power on the State to direct closure of liquor shops on certain days in a week, month or year was challenged as one not of a regulatory character but introduced with the avowed object of enforcing prohibition and a contention was raised that way back in 1914 the then rulers could not have thought of enforcing prohibition through the provisions of the Punjab Act which was specifically enacted for the purpose of collecting revenue from liquor vendors and indirectly from liquor consumers. This Court in P. N. Kaushal's case (supra) while repelling this contention observed as under :-\n\n\"In short, while the imperial masters were concerned about the revenues they could make from the liquor trade they were not indifferent to the social control of this business which, if left unbridled, was fraught with danger to health, morals, public order and the flow of life without stress or distress.\n\nIndeed, even collection of revenue was intertwined with orderly milieu; and these twin objects are reflected in the scheme and provisions of the Act\".\n\nThe present levy under the amended provisions of the Act in 1t3 application to Delhi could certainly be said to be one enacted both with the object of regulating the trade or business in intoxicants and with a view to realising the goal fixed in Article 47 of the Constitution Therefore, one can look upon this measure both as a fiscal measure and the one safeguarding public health and even public morals because it is .\n\nA well recognised that liquor trade is instinct with injury to individual and community and has serious side-effects recognised everywhere in every age. [Not to control alcohol business is to abdicate the right to rule for the good of the people] [see P. N. Kaushafs case (supra)]. •\n\nIn this very breath it was, however, contended that if this Ordinance was promulgated with a view to advancing the policy of prohibition enunciated in Art. 4 7 it could only be prospective and not retrospective because one cannot introduce prohibition retrospectively.\n\nThis argument overiovks the twin objects sought to be achieved by the measure, namely, validating an import which was found to be invalid on the ground that it was countervailing duty which could not have been legitimately imposed, and also a measure to safeguard public health and public morals. These twin objects underlying the measure would clearly permit its being retrospective because retrospective validation of impost bas been recognised in a number of decisions (see Prithvi Cotton Mills case) (supra). Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the retrospectivity of the Ordinance is illegal and invalid.\n\nHaving given the matter our anxious cohsideration not sw•yed in any manner by moral, religious, ethical or extraneous preachers' considerations the altruistic grievance of the petitioners by proxy for consumers strikes as hollow, because even with the impost the petitioners' profit of Rs. 2/- per bottle is guaranteed ahd they are in no way adversely affected by the impost because the levy is passed on to consumers.\n\nFor years the impugned levy was paid. as countervailing duty. Then a loophole appeared which is sought to be plugged by a valid legislaticn.\n\nAnd even with this turmoil the licen&ee in L-10 Form having rountry liquor vend is assured of this profit of Rs. 2/- per bottle. The entire impost is passed on to the shoulder of consumers except for the detention of his money for a day or two when he pays in advance while taking the botiles from the Warehouse and recovers it when he sells the bottle and this detention of his money for a period of two days is a triviality which need not detain any one. It is a part of any business.\n\nTherefore, we see no substance in these petitions.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "SATPAL & CO. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SATPAL & CO. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 831, "end_char": 847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th March 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D While implementing the provisions of the Punjat, Excise Act, 1914 as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi, the concerned authority used to hold auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at one such auction held on 29th March 1978, the petitioners' bids were accepted and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978 to 31st Mairch 1979."}}, {"text": "1st April 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1143, "end_char": 1157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D While implementing the provisions of the Punjat, Excise Act, 1914 as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi, the concerned authority used to hold auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at one such auction held on 29th March 1978, the petitioners' bids were accepted and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978 to 31st Mairch 1979."}}, {"text": "31st Mairch 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D While implementing the provisions of the Punjat, Excise Act, 1914 as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi, the concerned authority used to hold auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at one such auction held on 29th March 1978, the petitioners' bids were accepted and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978 to 31st Mairch 1979."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1629, "end_char": 1634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2/-· In W.P. 716/78, validity of the levy of 'still head duty' was challenged by certain petitioners inter alia on the ground tha-t it was nothing but countervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi, countervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be constitutionally levied."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1780, "end_char": 1796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention found favour with a learned single judge of the Delhi High Court and a number of Letters Patent Appea.ls were filed against that Judgn1ent."}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1910, "end_char": 1928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of these appeals President of India pron1ulgated an Ordinance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, styled as Punjab\n\nExcise (Delht Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 with retrospective effect, conferring power on the 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Scheme underlying distribution of Legislative power in Part XI Chapter I and especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except the matters spe<:ifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule, Parliament's plenary po\\Ver to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes \\Vhen Parliament legislates for part of the territory of India not included in a State."}}, {"text": "Art. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3884, "end_char": 3891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 246(4), 248(1l and (2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 246(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4523, "end_char": 4537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 246(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4829, "end_char": 4844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 248(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4869, "end_char": 4883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5302, "end_char": 5312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 SCR 33", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 672", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 SCR 33", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9305, "end_char": 9320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9517, "end_char": 9537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The impost is on entry of country liquor into Delhi to be recovered by the Delhi Administration for its own use."}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9580, "end_char": 9610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi Administration and Delhi Municipal Administration are entirely different, and, therefore, it cannot be said that Entry 52 excludes the power of the Parliament to levy tax on in1port of country liquor in Delhi. ["}}, {"text": "[1979)\n\n1 SCR 845", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10175, "end_char": 10192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 SCR 608", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11349, "end_char": 11365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970) 1 SCR 388", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11444, "end_char": 11460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BJ ff In the instant case the Preamble to the impugned Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13432, "end_char": 13496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13837, "end_char": 13847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BJ ff In the instant case the Preamble to the impugned Ordinance", "statute": "BJ ff In the instant case the Preamble to the impugned Ordinance"}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14310, "end_char": 14326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1979] 1 SCR 122", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai (In SLP 2585), L. N. Sinha (In SLP."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15929, "end_char": 15940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai (In SLP 2585), L. N. Sinha (In SLP."}}, {"text": "L. M.\n\nSinghvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15957, "end_char": 15971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2586), L. M.\n\nSinghvi (In SLP 2587), P.P. Rao (In SLP 2588), R. C.\n\nVerma, Y. K. Sabharwal, D. P. Mukherjee, (In SLP 2589-94) and A. K.\n\nGanguli (In all the S.L.Ps.)"}}, {"text": "P.P. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15987, "end_char": 15995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2586), L. M.\n\nSinghvi (In SLP 2587), P.P. Rao (In SLP 2588), R. C.\n\nVerma, Y. K. Sabharwal, D. P. Mukherjee, (In SLP 2589-94) and A. K.\n\nGanguli (In all the S.L.Ps.)"}}, {"text": "R. 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"start_char": 19905, "end_char": 19916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19924, "end_char": 19980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20118, "end_char": 20129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance", "statute": "Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20526, "end_char": 20542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance", "statute": "Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Article 248(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21075, "end_char": 21089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21323, "end_char": 21334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23031, "end_char": 23035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23186, "end_char": 23190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23495, "end_char": 23511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23672, "end_char": 23682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23851, "end_char": 23861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 246 and 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25254, "end_char": 25274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25893, "end_char": 25901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26090, "end_char": 26101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 246(4), 248(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26624, "end_char": 26647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26745, "end_char": 26755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of 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"start_char": 30799, "end_char": 30813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Dhillon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31331, "end_char": 31338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, said that the observations in Dhillon's case (supra) are no more good law in view of the opinion of Judges constituting\n\n(I) [19721 2 S.C.R. 33."}}, {"text": "Kesavananda Bharat i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31551, "end_char": 31571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy in Kesavananda Bharat i's case was about the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and a contention being the spill over from J.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab(\") was that apart from Article 368, Entry 97 of List I would\n\nconfrr power on Parliament to amend the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharat i"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31743, "end_char": 31754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Scervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32278, "end_char": 32285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Scervai's commentary at p. 1264 on Constitutional Law of India, 2nd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Kesavancmda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32884, "end_char": 32895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations in Kesavancmda's case (supra) have to be kept in focus in the context of the controversy whether Article 368 confers specific power of amendment of the Constitution and it was sought to be brushed aside by saying that it merely provided procedure for amendment of the Constitution and, therefore, the power for amendment must be located in the residuary Entry 97 01 the Union List.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharat i"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32978, "end_char": 32989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 672", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34225, "end_char": 34244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kesavananda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35404, "end_char": 35415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any case majority decision in Dhillon's case (supra) is neither overruled not cicpartcd from in Kesavananda's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharat i"}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40665, "end_char": 40700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40980, "end_char": 40984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Patei Gordhandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41700, "end_char": 41716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(2) this Court observed that the legislature exercised its undoubted powers of redefining 'rate' so as to equate it to a tax on capital value and convert the tax purported to be collected as a 'rate' into a tax on lands and buildings, and thus got rid of the judgment in Patei Gordhandas's case, (supra)."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42909, "end_char": 42913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44667, "end_char": 44678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44763, "end_char": 44776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44981, "end_char": 44991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45060, "end_char": 45071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46276, "end_char": 46284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46680, "end_char": 46691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46981, "end_char": 46991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46999, "end_char": 47007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Har Shwkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47090, "end_char": 47100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After extracting these observations this Court observed in Har Shwkar's case (supra) that the reasons mentioned by Das, C. J. for holding that there can be no fundamental right to do trade or business in an activity like gambling apply with equal force to the alleged right to trade in liquor and those reasons may not be brushed aside by restricting them to gambling operations.", "canonical_name": "Har Shankar"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47146, "end_char": 47149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After extracting these observations this Court observed in Har Shwkar's case (supra) that the reasons mentioned by Das, C. J. for holding that there can be no fundamental right to do trade or business in an activity like gambling apply with equal force to the alleged right to trade in liquor and those reasons may not be brushed aside by restricting them to gambling operations."}}, {"text": "Har Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47850, "end_char": 47861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, as stated in Har Shankar's case, (supra) the State under its regulatory power has a right to control or even to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants apart from anything else, its import\n\n(I) [1957] S.C.R. 874.", "canonical_name": "Har Shankar"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48984, "end_char": 48987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rao, who appeared for some of the petitioners specifically submitted that this question is no more\n\nres-mtegra in view of the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kalyani Stores v. The State of Orissa & Ors.("}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49456, "end_char": 49467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 304(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49894, "end_char": 49905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kalyam Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50011, "end_char": 50024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since Kalyam Stores case (supra) judicial opinion on the vexed question of right to carry on trade or business in intoxicating drinks has undergone a sea change culminating into Har Shankar's case (supra) which again is a decision of 5 Judges Constitution Bench of this Court."}}, {"text": "Kalyani Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50313, "end_char": 50327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unfortunately the judgment in Kalyani Stores case is not referred to in Har Shankar's case."}}, {"text": "Article\n\n304(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51140, "end_char": 51155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Provision in Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52041, "end_char": 52077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. N. Kaushal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52595, "end_char": 52608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in P. N. Kaushal's case (supra) while repelling this contention observed as under :-\n\n\"In short, while the imperial masters were concerned about the revenues they could make from the liquor trade they were not indifferent to the social control of this business which, if left unbridled, was fraught with danger to health, morals, public order and the flow of life without stress or distress.", "canonical_name": "P. N. Kaushafs"}}, {"text": "Article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53383, "end_char": 53393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. N. Kaushafs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53812, "end_char": 53826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not to control alcohol business is to abdicate the right to rule for the good of the people] [see P. N. Kaushafs case (supra)]. •", "canonical_name": "P. N. Kaushafs"}}, {"text": "Art. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53996, "end_char": 54002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_671_678_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SUKHRANI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS.\n\nHAR! SHANKER & OTIIERS\n\nApril 12, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.)\n\nPartition of ance5tral property and business-One of the partie! a rnino1 11t the time of partition-Partition-If could be re-opened when minor became a major.\n\nThe plaintiff's father and the fifth defendant were brothers. During his minority. the plaintiff filed a suit aileging that the business which his father and uncle were doing was ancestral in that it was being carried on with the capital v•en by his grandfather, that on the death of 11is grandfather his uncle proposed to his father for a nominal partition of the business and other family aMets to avoid income tax, that in so doing he took two-thirds share in the business as well as in other assets but gave only one-third to his father and that 188tly the partition, even if true, was ''unequal, unfair and unconscionable.'• He further alleged that the partition did not bind the interest of the minor plaintiff and his minor brotherl'I.\n\nDuring the pendency of the suit a reference was made to arbitration. Tue\n\n\"-'-- arbitrators gave an award.\n\nBut that award was impugned by the defendants alleging that it was given without any enquiry and without giving the parti~ a chance to adduce evidence and that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to reopen the parthion. The trial court set aside the award. The plaintiff's appeal against;\n\n1his decision of the trial court was dismissed by the High Court holding that E there was an error of law on the face of the award because the artitrators had found that there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation and that unequal shares had been accepted voluntarily and yet had reopened the partition.\n\nAfter remand the trial judge found that the business WM not ancestral bul 1'• only a joint business and that there was a complete partition of the joi:.tlt family property, and that there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation in F bringing about the partition. The trial court however observed that though the ]tlaintiff's father voluntarily agreed to llCCCp! one-third share, the partition of the business WM \"unequal and unconscionable.\" It, however, dismissed tbie suit on the ground that the business was not ancestral and therefore the plaintiff had •o right to reopen the partition.\n\nOn appeal by the plaintiff the High Court found that the business being an- G ce&tral the sons of the two brothers acquired interest by birth and that so far as the partition WM concerned there was no fraud or undue influence vitiating the partition. It, however, affirmed the trial court's view that one-third share given to the plaintiff's father was unfair and prejudicial to the interests of the minors.\n\nIn appeal to this Court the defendants contended that tire partition could, not be reopened by the plaintiff because he and his brothers were represented in the. partition by their father and there was no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation.\n\nA Dismissing the appeal,.t, he Court, ',. . ,- ' HELD.: 1. It\" is not the practice of this Court to interfere v.ith findings .of fact arrived at by the High Court except to prevent gross miscarriage of jwtic'e.. y\n\n. [676 BJ . . . , , ' . ill -\n\nIn the instant case there is no justifiable ground to go behind the findings of fact. [676 CJ .. ' • ' ·\" · . '\n\n2. It is well established that simply because a matter has been: decided at an earlier stage. by interl0C1:1tory order and no appeal has been taken therefrom or \\ • Ii'' • • · ' • I \\ >I 1 • ' • • ' . _. ' '• •\n\n.~?. 1~.J?~~, , di, d 1 ~e, .a 1 ~.igher_ ~?u~ . p.Jot p~~_cl,1:1.ded i fr~_iµ _ ~~-i~_en.g, fe , t-r again at a latei stage of the same litigation. 'Th.el correctness. of an order 01' remand passed by the High Court which was not questioned at that time by filing an appeal .in. the Supreme .Court can nevertlleless, be challenge~ Jater ill\n\n, C the .supreme Court in. the appeal arising. out of the .final. judgment pr()Ilounced ' iri, the action. [676&FJ · ·\n\n Saty<U/han G.hosal .&. Qrs. v. Smt. Ilea _Ra; an , Debi ,{nr., 119.§0J..3 .590, J.asraj lllfl.uinglz. v. Jlemraj f'r!.ultqn. Cha~<!. l1972] _2 ~GR,,!173, ]l.fargaret , IAiit_a .v. , Jnfl.o,_Co\"!mt; r_cial Bank , Ltd., , AIR ; i?7~~S.c.-.1Q2, Arjan Sin$h y. __ J1of!i!!fla J(umpr .P<. O.rs. :{l~.64] 5 ~R 19,16: .rrf.rief! .to. ·\n\nWhere an application: under Order IX, r. 7 was dismissed and an appeal was filed against the decree in the suit in which the appliCatlOn .... ·as .. made, '\"tile\n\n-. v.op~!ety. <?f, lh:e ~!4r . i.:j~<rting the -q~~-g <?fl-the pr~!Jlg ght, ~!OO•t\n\n.ou, bt, , e \"'1IlV~)<jl in , tll_e ~~Jl<al .P.Pfl , 49tt J<ith 1py te ·, aJ?P<ll~!; e :~ ; l6\\6, GJ . .\n\nIn the present case the same principle applies and the parties could challenge in tihis1 c0\\iit in -the' a~'at g<iiiiSt 1he fin.at JudgIDCD.t m:-the suifany Illldiilg\n\n iiivenby the Hlgfl'cllrt ai the·alie;_ .... sgein''tliesuit-fien ihiwid m3de by .the 'aibitrcitOis was-sef aste ilnCf tliC sUlt .. th]owii OPeii rottriaf. (676H;-677A1 ,.,,,.--\" \"\"\" f., ), .. •'-~\" t ~·-··• '·• ,...-.1tn.,· ,._.. ...• !.- ·-·· t .. ; .1 • ._ t:. '-·• o• '• •·\" • •• ,.\n\n3. Even.though.there ; vas p.o, fraµd, _misrepresentaP'pn, or _undµe iq.flen~ .a\n\nption could be ieopened at the instancC of \"a minor coparce-ner, despite tho fact ihat .lii.S. bniiich. w.S representai' bi b)g filiher at the partitiOn, if the partition I? ~Was Unfair\" Or PejUdiCiai io die fnte'rCsfOf.ihC ffiifioi~ Th\"e eiitlre partition need (\" llot bd're0penoo\"if'ihe partitl0n:-w35Wifrur fu regard to a distinct'and sepcirabie : part 0( the' SCheirie~ Of Partifi'oii. ; Iii Such-ari eVCD.t the. reopenhig of the partiiioll ' :eoulif' be\" suiiably cireumscrilied. [67TG-H, '678. A] ... \" \" . ' • ' .. . . • • •+ \"\":, •\n\n~ \\ .,. •··-'I; .,.~···••••• -' ,,;\n\n•, I ... ,. • • • ,. 1 ,. •\n\natnam .Gfzet(iar Qrs. S. M. f:uppuswa'!'i , Chet!iar Qr,3. ir _1976 ·- S.C. 1 applied.\n\n, G CIVIL , APPEI, LATE JURisDiqION: Civil .(\\.ppeal_No. 168 of 1969. ,,. •·· l•: ~···!l ,,., ~~ ... .,, t .,. ... ..... - , ...•. ·-~ ... ·- Appeal .by .Special .Leave from the Judgment and Decree .dated 31-1-1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High\" Court in First Appeal N'o'. 80/64.·. \"' .. \" - . . - ·· . -· .\n\nI. P. Naik, S. L. lain, Miss M. Gupta and M. S. Gupta for the '- • -,·~ , 1 !t·, ·•·n••'< 1\"' ,. • 1,.,~ .,.,,. ' A; ipellat . .\n\nB. D. Sharma for the Resndents.\n\n....,;.:>.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The legal representatives of the fifth defendants 6 to 15 in Civil Snit No. 17-A of 1957 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Narsinghpur are the appellants in this appeal by special leave. Mannulal (5th defendant) and Rajaram (!st defendant), both of whom died during the pendency of the suit, were brothers. They were the sons of Pusau. The plaintiff, a son of Rajaram and a minor on the date of the institution o~ the suit, filed the suit for partition and separate possession of a one eighth share in the properties mentioned in schedule 'A' of the plaint and also for an account from defendants 5 to 8 of the assets and income of the business, \"Mannulal Lakhanlal\".\n\nIt was alleged in the plaint that with the capital given to them by their father, Pusau, Mannulal and Rajaram started the business of manufacturing Bidis. After the death of Pusau in 1936 the business was continued by the two brothers. In 1948 Mannula! represented to Rajaram that in order to avoid income tax it was necessary that there should be a nominal partition and that the joint family business should be converted into a partnership business. Accordingly the firm \"Mannu- Jal Lakhanlal\" was registered under the Partnership Act.\n\nMannulal's share was shown as 10 Ans. 8 ps. in a rupee while Rajaram's share was shown as 5 Ans. 4 ps. In 1953 Babula! and Sunderlal, sons of Mannulal were also shown as partners. The share of Mannulal was reduced to 5 Ans. 4 ps. and the share of Babula! and Sunderlal was shown as 5 Ans. 4 ps. All this, was done nominally with a view to avoid incometax. The houses belonging to the family were also divided. Rajaram was given one-third share and Mannula! took two-thirds share. The partition of ancestral property and business between the two brothers Rajaram and Mannulal, even if true, was \"unequal, unfair and unconscionable\". The partition and the formation and dissolution of the firm did not bind the interest of the minor plaintiff and all his brothers. It was further alleged in the plaint that Mannulal promised Rajaram at the time of the ficticious partition that he would be given his half share when a real partition was made. It was on those allegations that the plaintiff, a minor, represented by his next friend Harchand filed the suit, out of which the appeal arises, for the reliefs already mentioned. The suit was contested by Mannufal and his sons who pleaded that the business was not joint family business and that it was a purely partnership business. The, allegations that the partition was nominal and that the formation and dissolution of the partnership were nominal, were denied. It was pleaded that there was a complete disruption of the family on 31st March, 1948. The partition was not unfair. After the partition the two brothers decided to run the Bidi manufacturing business in partnership, with Rajaram taking a share of 5 Ans. 4 ps. and\n\nSUP~ME COURT REPORTS [19791 3 s.c.R.\n\nMannulal taking a share of 10 Ans. 8 ps.\n\nDuring the pendency of the suit a reference was made to arbitration and the Arbitrators gave an award under which it was directed that a sum of Rs. 12,000/- was to be paid to each of the 2 minor sons of Rajaram to equalize the shares of the two branches. The contesting defendants filed an application to set aside the award claiming that the Arbitrators had given their award without any enquiry and without giving the parties a chance to adduce evidence. It was also claimed that the Arbitrat-Ors had found that the earlier partition was not fraudulent and that it was also not the result of any misrepresentation and on that finding the Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to reopen the partition. The Trial Court set aside the award on the ground that the Arbitrators had made the award without any enquiry and without giving the parties a\n\nchance to adduce evidence. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court. The appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 10th January, 1962. The High Court upheld the finding of the Trial Court that the award was vitiated as it was made without enquiry and without opportunity being afforded to the parties to adduce evidence. The High Court also found that there was an error of law on the face of the award inasmuch as the Arbitrators had found that there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation and that unequal shares had been accepted voluntarily and yet had reopened the partition. It was observed that this was contrary to law as the plaintiff and his other minor brother E were duly represented by their father Rajaram.\n\nThereafter, consequent to the setting aside of the award, the 'uit proceeded to trial. The plaintiff attained majority during the pendency of the suit and elected to continue the suit. Among the witnes examined on behalf of the plaintifl' was Rajaram. Mannulal, the 5th defendant, did not step into the witness box and he also objected to answer the interrogatories which were sought to be served on him. The learned Trial Judge found that the business was not ancestral buiness but only a joint business and that there was a complete partition of the joint family property and the Bidi business on 31st March, 1948. There was neither fraud nor misrepresentation practised on Rajaram to bring about the said partition. The learned Trial Judge, however, observed that though Rajaram voluntarily agreed to accept one third share. only, the partition of the joint business appeared to be 'unequal, unfaIT and unconscionable'.\n\nThe suit was, however, dismissed in view of the finding that the business was not ancestral business, and the plaintiff, therefore had no right to reopen the partition on the ground that the partition f the joint business was 'unequal, unfair and unconscionable'.\n\nThe plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court. The !ligh Cort\n\nfound that the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the plamt1ff which\n\nwas practically unrebutted by the defendants and the documentary evidence including the deed of partition and the deed of partnership clearly established that the busiuess of \"Mannulal Lakhanlal\" was ancestral business in which the sons of Mannulal and Rajaram acquired interest by birth. The High Court also found that there was no fraud or undue influence vitiating the partition. The High Court, however, llffirmed the finding of the Trial Court that the partition of the joint family busiuess resulting in the formation of a partnership in which Mannulal took 10 Ans. 8 ps. share and Rajaram took 5 Ans 4 ps.\n\nihare was unfair and prejudicial to the interests of the minor sons of Rajaram. On those findings the High Court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for an account of his one eighth share of the Bidi business, upto 30th. November, 1955, on which date the partnership business of which Rajaram was a partner was dissolved. It was also directe~ that a sum of Rs. 5,000/- representing one eighth of the amount which had already been: received by Rajaram should be adjusted when account3 were taken to determine the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled.\n\nThe contesting defendants have preferred this appeal by special leave\n\n-0{ this Court.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the finding of the High Court in the proceeding to set aside the award to the effect that the partition could not be reopened since there was no fraud or misrepresentation and since unequal shares had been voluntarily accepted was binding on the parties at all subsequent stages of the suit.\n\nHe pointed out that, in any event, on the facts of the present case, the plaintiff and his brothers were effectively represented in the partition by their father Rajaram and in that situation the partition could not be reopened by the plaintiff on the mere ground of equality of shares, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. He further questioned the findings of the High Court that the business was ancestral and that the partition was unfair. In supp6rt of his contentions the learned couniel relied upon a passage from N. R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law (5th Edn. p. 428). He also drew our attention to Balkishan Das & Ors. v.\n\nRam Narain Sahu & Ors.(') On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent urged that an erstwhile minor coparcener could always seek to reopen a partition on attaining majority if he could show that it was unfair or prejudicial to his interest. He also contended that the decision of the High Court in the proceeding to set aside award would not be binding on this Court at a later stage of the same suit and that it was open to him: to challenge in this Court the earlier finding -0f the High Court. The learned counsel placed reliance on Ratnam\n\n(1) 30 I. A. 139.\n\nChettiar & Ors. v. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar & Ors(') and Jas Raf lndu Singh v. Hem Raj Multan Chand.(')\n\nThe findings of fact arrived at by the High Court are: ( 1) the business was ancestral, (2) the partition was not vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation and (3) the partition was unfair and prejudicial to interests of the minor sons of Rajaram in so far as it related to the definition of shares in the partnership business.\n\nNow, it is not the practice of this Court to interfere with fi'ndings of fact arrived at by the High Courts except to prevent gross miscarriages of justice.\n\nWe find no justifiable ground to go behind these findings of fact and we, therefore, proceed to consider the questions raised in the appeal on those basic findings.\n\nIt is true that at an earlier stage of the suit, in the proceeding to set aside the award, the High Court recorded a finding that the plain- . tiff was not entitled to seek reopening of the partition on the ground of unfairness when there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation. It is true that the plaintiff did not further pursue the matter at that stage by taking it in appeal to the Supreme Court but preferred to proceed to the trial of his suit.\n\nIt is also true that a decision given at an earlier stage of a suit will bind the parties at later stages c:if the same suit.\n\nBut it is equally well settled that because a matter has been decided at an earlier stage by an interlocutory order and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher Court is not precluded from considering the matter again at a later stage of the same litigation (vide Satyadhan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajan Devi & Anr.( 3 ) ). So, it has been held that the correctness of an order of remand passed by the High Court which was not questioned at that time by filing an appeal in the Supreme Court could nevertheless be challenged latr in the Supreme Court in the appeal arising out of the final judgment pronounced in the action (vid•o Jasraj Indu :Singh v. Hem Raj Multan Chand (supra) and Margaret Lalita v. Inda Commercial Bank Ltd.( 4 ) In Arjun Singh v. Mahindra Kumar & Ors.(5 ) it was held that where an application under Order IX, Rule 7 was dismissed and an appeal was filed against the decree in the suit in which the application was made, the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding might without doubt, be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate Court.\n\nIn our view the same principle applies in the\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1. [2) (1977] 2 S.C.R. 973 at 981.\n\n(3) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 590.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1979 S.C. 102.\n\n\n----\"'-\n\nSUKHRANI v. HARi SHANKER (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 677\n\np:esent case and the parties can challenge in this Court in the appeal against the final judgment in the suit any finding given by the High Court at the earlier stage in the suit when the award made by the . arbitrators was set aside and the suit thrown open for trial.\n\nThe only question therefore, reqrnnng our consideration is whether the partition in so far as it rela!d to the business could be reopened on the sole ground that it was unfair and prejudicial to the interest of the minor, when there was no fraud or misrepresentation. In N. R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law (5th Edn.), the learned anthor has said at page 428:\n\n\"Ordinarily where a partition bas been entered into by adult members of a joint family, each of them having minor sons, the minors are represented by their respective fathers in the partition, and it is not open to any of them to challenge the validity of the partition arrangement except where i.t is alleged and provided that there has been fraud vitiating the transaction and resulting in inequity and obviously smaller share having been allotted to a particular adult member who represented his minor son. The mere fact that outwardly or apparently the shares appear to be unequal is no ground for reopening the same at the instance of the minor sons of an adult member who was a party to the partition, because. in a partition arrangement so many factors enter into the reckoning with reference to the proper shares to be allotted and unless it can be distinctly shown that there had been an element of overreaching or fraud taking advantage of the ignorance or incapacity or other disqualification of a particular member, the partition should rarely be reopened\".\n\nAll that we need say is that the learned anthor has not referred\n\nto any decided case in support of what he has said, but the matter is G now no longer res integra. In Ratnam Chettiar & Ors.\n\nv. S. M.\n\nKuppuswami Chettiar & Ors. (supra) an identical question arose and it was held that even though there was no fraud misrepre&:!ntation or undue influence, a partition could be reopened at the instance of a minor coparcener, despite the fact that the branch was represented by his father at the partition, if the partition was unfair or prejudicial H to the interest of the minor.\n\nIt was also held that the entire partition need not be reopened if the partition was unfair in regard to a distinct\n\nA and separable part of the scheme of partition. In such an event the reopening of the partition could be suitably circumscribed.\n\nIn the light 9f the principles laid down in Ratnam Chettiar & Ors. v. S. M.\n\nKuppuswami Chettiar & Ors. (supra) this appeal is dismissed with costs .\n\n• N.K.A.\n\nAppeal dismissed. •", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "SUKHRANI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUKHRANI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HAR! SHANKER & OTIIERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARI SHANKER & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHANKER & OTIIERS\n\nApril 12, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme .Court can nevertlleless,", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Supreme .Court can nevertlleless, be challenge~ Jater ill\n\n, C the .supreme Court in."}}, {"text": "Arjan Sin$h", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jnfl.o,Co\"!mt; rcial Bank , Ltd., , AIR ; i?7~~S.c.-.1Q2, Arjan Sin$h y.  J1of!i!!fla J(umpr .P<."}}, {"text": "I. P. Naik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6234, "end_char": 6244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. P. Naik, S. L. lain, Miss M. Gupta and M. S. Gupta for the '- • -,·~ , 1 !"}}, {"text": "S. L. lain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6246, "end_char": 6256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. P. Naik, S. L. lain, Miss M. Gupta and M. S. Gupta for the '- • -,·~ , 1 !"}}, {"text": "M. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6263, "end_char": 6271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. P. Naik, S. L. lain, Miss M. Gupta and M. S. Gupta for the '- • -,·~ , 1 !", "canonical_name": "M. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": "M. S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. P. Naik, S. L. lain, Miss M. Gupta and M. S. Gupta for the '- • -,·~ , 1 !", "canonical_name": "M. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6364, "end_char": 6376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma for the Resndents."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6453, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The legal representatives of the fifth defendants 6 to 15 in Civil Snit No."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Narsinghpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6578, "end_char": 6616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17-A of 1957 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Narsinghpur are the appellants in this appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "Mannulal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6669, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mannulal (5th defendant) and Rajaram (!", "canonical_name": "Mannulal"}}, {"text": "Rajaram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6698, "end_char": 6705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mannulal (5th defendant) and Rajaram (!", "canonical_name": "Rajaram"}}, {"text": "Pusau", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6811, "end_char": 6816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were the sons of Pusau."}}, {"text": "Rajaram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6842, "end_char": 6849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, a son of Rajaram and a minor on the date of the institution o~ the suit, filed the suit for partition and separate possession of a one eighth share in the properties mentioned in schedule 'A' of the plaint and also for an account from defendants 5 to 8 of the assets and income of the business, \"Mannulal Lakhanlal\".", "canonical_name": "Rajaram"}}, {"text": "Mannulal Lakhanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7129, "end_char": 7147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, a son of Rajaram and a minor on the date of the institution o~ the suit, filed the suit for partition and separate possession of a one eighth share in the properties mentioned in schedule 'A' of the plaint and also for an account from defendants 5 to 8 of the assets and income of the business, \"Mannulal Lakhanlal\"."}}, {"text": "Mannulal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7240, "end_char": 7248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged in the plaint that with the capital given to them by their father, Pusau, Mannulal and Rajaram started the business of manufacturing Bidis.", "canonical_name": "Mannulal"}}, {"text": "Mannula", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7395, "end_char": 7402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1948 Mannula!", "canonical_name": "Mannulal"}}, {"text": "Mannu- Jal Lakhanlal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7625, "end_char": 7645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the firm \"Mannu- Jal Lakhanlal\" was registered under the Partnership Act."}}, {"text": "Babula", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7801, "end_char": 7807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1953 Babula!"}}, {"text": "Sunderlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7813, "end_char": 7822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Sunderlal, sons of Mannulal were also shown as partners."}}, {"text": "Harchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8719, "end_char": 8727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on those allegations that the plaintiff, a minor, represented by his next friend Harchand filed the suit, out of which the appeal arises, for the reliefs already mentioned."}}, {"text": "Mannufal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8837, "end_char": 8845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested by Mannufal and his sons who pleaded that the business was not joint family business and that it was a purely partnership business.", "canonical_name": "Mannulal"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9168, "end_char": 9184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pleaded that there was a complete disruption of the family on 31st March, 1948."}}, {"text": "10th January, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10412, "end_char": 10430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 10th January, 1962."}}, {"text": "Mannulal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11272, "end_char": 11280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mannulal, the 5th defendant, did not step into the witness box and he also objected to answer the interrogatories which were sought to be served on him."}}, {"text": "30th. November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13185, "end_char": 13205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On those findings the High Court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for an account of his one eighth share of the Bidi business, upto 30th."}}, {"text": "N. R. Raghavachariar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14492, "end_char": 14512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In supp6rt of his contentions the learned couniel relied upon a passage from N. R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law (5th Edn."}}, {"text": "Ratnam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15148, "end_char": 15154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel placed reliance on Ratnam\n\n(1) 30 I. A. 139."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16319, "end_char": 16332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the plaintiff did not further pursue the matter at that stage by taking it in appeal to the Supreme Court but preferred to proceed to the trial of his suit."}}, {"text": "(1977] 2 S.C.R. 973", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17708, "end_char": 17727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 590", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17741, "end_char": 17760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_679_684_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "S. N. BANERJEE\n\nBABU LAL GUPTA (DHANUKA) & ORS.\n\nApril 12, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KoSHAL, JJ.J\n\nSection 181.A Sea Customs Act and s. 196A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898-Scope of.\n\nSection 187A of the Sea Customs Act provides that no court shall take cognizaace of any offence relating to smuggling of goods punishable under Item\n\n81 of the Schedule to s. 167 except upon a complaint in writing made by the C C.'hief Customs Officer or any other officer of Customs not lower in rank than an Assistant Collector of Customs authorised by the Chief Customs Officer.\n\nSection 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, so far as relevant, _prOTidcs that no court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under s. 120B of the IPC unless a Chief Presidency Magistrate hu, by order in writing consented to the initiation of the proceeding.\n\nThe appellant, ~'ho was Assistant Collector of Customs, sought the consent of the Chief Presidency Magistrate under s, 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of the respondents under s. 120B IPC a.! ttey were guilty of a conspiracy to Commit offences under Item 81 of the Schedule to s. 167 of the Cutorns Act and s. 5 of Import and Exports (Control) Act.\n\nThis was accorded.\n\nThe appellant was authorised by the E Chief Customs Officer to prosecute the respondents. A complaint was accord.\n\ningly filed against them.\n\nJn the course of proceedings before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, one of the respondents moved the High Court alleging that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no power to give his consent because tiit the date of their\n\nproecution the appellant \\Vas not an officer holding the authorisation envi- F sagcd in s. 187-A of the Act and that the Magistrate could not act under s. 196A of the Code unless an application was made to him by a person holdina such authorisation.\n\nThe High Court upheld the respondent's contention.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appeliant that the Higb_ Court erred in interpreting s. 196A so as to incorporate therein the provisions regarding authorisation enacted by s. 187 A of the Act.\n\nAllowing the appeal.\n\nHELD: The authorisation contempJated by s. 187A of the Act, which could be given only in respect of complaints embracing offences under Item 81\n\nof the •chedule to s. 167 of the Act. was actually obtained by the appellant H from the competent authority before the complaint was filed.\n\nThe complaint cannot be said to be hit by the provisions of s. 187A of the Act. [683 A-BJ\n\nSection 196-A of the Code does not envisage any application whatsoever and, therefore, no application at all is necessary for action under that section.\n\nAssuming that such an application was necessary it \\Yould not follow that the same had to be made by a person holding the type of authorisation envisaged by s. 187-A of the Act. Under s. 196-A, there is no bar at all against the power of the Chief Presidency Magistrate to consent to the initiation ot proceedings being exercised on an application made by any person, whether or not he is connected with the official n1achinery normally burdened with the duty of initiation o.f prosecutions.\n\nThe status of the person •0/ho supplies facts is not relevant. [683 D-EJ\n\nIn the instant case the requirements of both the sections viz .. s. 196A of the Code and s. 187-A of the Act were fulfilled before the complaint was filed and, therefore, there is no infirmity in the impugned proceeding.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 6-5-1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Cr!. Revision No. 739/68.\n\nD K. K. Venugopal, Addi. So!i. Genl., S. Markandey and S. P. Nayar\n\nfor the Appellant.\n\nN. C. Talukdar and Sukumar Ghosh for Respondent 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was de!iveJ'ed by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave which is directed against a judgment dated May 6, 1970 of the High Court of Calcutta has arisen in the following circumstances.\n\nOn March 2, 1963, Shri S. N.\n\nBanerjee, Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta, made an application to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, praying that consent be given under section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter called the Code) to the prosecution of 14 persons in respect of an offence under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code as they were guilty of a conspiracy to commit offences under item 81 of the Schedule to section 167 of the Sea Customs Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act (the Control Act, for short).\n\nThe application was granted on Ma.rch 5, 1963 when the Chief Presidency Magistrate accorded the consent asked for.\n\nFour days later, i.e., on March 9,\n\n1963. Shri Banerjee was authorised by the Chief Customs Officer, Calcutta, to prosecute the said persons for the commission of offences under item 81 and section 5 above mentioned. On the same date, i.e., March 9, 1963, Shri Banerjee actually filed a complaint against the said 14 persons accusing them of the commission of offences under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and item 81 as well as section 5 aforesaid.\n\ns. N. llANERJEE v. B. L. GUPTA (Koshal, !.) 68 1\n\nAfter the Presidency Magistrate, who was seized of the case, had examined 43 witnesses, one of the accused challenged his jurisdiction to entertain the. complaint through a petition made to the High Court under sections 439' and 561A of the Code on the ground that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no power to give the consent which he did on March 5, 1963, because, till that date, Shri Banerjee was not an officer holding the anthorisation envisaged in section 187 A of the Act.\n\nThe petition stated that the Chief Presidency Magistrate could not act under the provisions of section 196A of the Code unless an application was made to him in that behalf by a person holding such\n\n- • l.. an authorisation. .. l The High Court accepted the contention of the petitioner before it with the following observations :\n\n\" ..... The requirement of authorisation under section 187A Sea Customs Act ............ to enable a Court to take cognizance attaches to sanction under section 196A Cr. P.C., as the allegations made or the charge framed is in respect of one offence and sanction granted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate' at the instance of S. N. Banerjee, who was not authorised to initiate proceeding is therefore bad in law, as the officer had no authority to apply for sanction.\"\n\n\" ..... Obviously, for an offence of the nature charged, there can be only one cognizance and therefore the sanction under section 120B must also be obtained by an Officer\n\nmentioned in section 187 A Sea Customs Act, ..... \"\n\nAn argument put forward on behalf of Shri Banerjee that section 196A of the Code did not speak of any authorisation was repelled by the High Court in the following terms :\n\n\"Mr. Mitra has also submitted that not only section i96A does not speak of any authority but that even after sanction, prosecution may not be initiated.\n\nThis, in our view is oversimplification of the matter. Prosecution has been initiated and therefore this Court has to decide whether the magistrate is authorised under the law to take cognizance, without sanction under section 196A being obtained by person c0mpetent to initiate proceeding.\"\n\n2. On behalf of Shri Banerjee, who is the appellant before us, it has .been urged that the High Court has erred in interpreting section 196A of the COOe so as to incorporate therein the provision regarding authorisation enacted by section 187 A of the Act, and, after hearing\n\n5-330SCI/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 S.C.It.\n\nA learned counsel for the parties, we find ourselves in complete agreement with him for the reasons which follow.\n\n3. The two sections requiring inteq)retation by us are reproduced below:\n\nSection 196A of the Code\n\n\"No Court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code,\n\n(1) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit either an illegal act other than an offence, or a legal act by illegal means, or an offence to which the provisions of section 196 apply, unless upon complaint made by order or under authority from the State Government or some officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf, or\n\n(2) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, or a cognizable offence not punishabl~ with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for _a term of two years or upwards, unless the State Government or a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the State Government has. by order in writing, consented to the initiation of the proceedings :\n\nProvided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 195 apply no such consent shall be necessary.\"\n\nSection 187 A of the Act\n\n\"Cognizance of offences : No Court shall take cognizance of any offence relating to smuggling of goods punishable under item 81 of the Schedule to section 167, except upon complaint in writing, made by the Chief Customs Officer or any other officer of Customs not lower in rank than an Assistant Collector of Customs authorised in this behalf by the Chief Customs Officer.\"\n\nThere is a corresponding section in the Control Act which, according to the High Court, provides for a similar bar against the taking c:A. cognmmce of complaints by Courts but to which we shall no longer advert a9 arguments were not addressed to us in relation thereto by learned counsel for either party. -- ,\n\nI\"'\n\n• • •\n\n/ ...\n\n. ·~\n\n• •\n\ns. N. BANERJEE v. B. L. GUPTA (Kasha/, !.) 683\n\n4. Now, section 187A above extracted contemplates authorisation by the Chief Customs Officer only in respect of complaints embracing\n\noffences unde.r item 81 aforesaid.\n\nAs stated above, such an authorisation was actually obtained by Shri Banerjee in his favour from the competent authority, viz., the Chief Customs Officer, before the complaint was filed, so that the complaint cannot be said to hit by the provisions of sectioh 187 A of the Act. The argument raised on\n\nbeltalf uf the accused respondents and accepted by the High Court, however, was that, as the conspiracy forming the subject-matter of the offence under section l 20B of the Indian Penal Code was a conspiracy to commit offences under the Act, ll.n application by a person holding the authorisation above mentioned was a sine qua non for the accord of consent under sub-section (2) of section 196A of the Code. This argument, in our opinion, has no substance.\n\nFor one thing, section 196A of the Code does not envisage any application whatsoever and, therefore, no application at all is necessary for action under that section.\n\nEven if it be held that such an application was inherent in the scheme of the section, it would not follow that the same had to be made by a person holding the type of authorisation envisaged by section 187 A of the Act.\n\nAs the language of section l 96A of the .:::ode stands, there is no bar at all against the power of the Chief Presidency Magistrate to consent to the initiation of proceedings being exercised on an application made by any person whosoever, whether or not he is connected with the official machinery normally burdened with the duty of initiating prosecutions. It is no doubt true that the consent to be given has to follow a consideration of a.II the material facts of the case, but then the status of the person who supplies such facts is not relevant.\n\nIf the legislatme had intended to restrict the accord of consent under section 19.6A of the Code to cases in which applications had been made by persons authorised in a particular manner, the exercise of the power would surely have been made subject to such a condition in specific terms.\n\nHolding that no application was at all needed for the accord of consent provided for in the section, <md that, in any case, such an application need not have been made by a person authorised in the manner spoken of by section 187A of the Act, we repel the argument raised to the contrary on behalf of the accusedrespondents.\n\nIt follows that in the instant case the requirements of both the sections, namely, section 196A of the Code and ·; cction 187A of the Act were fulfilled before the complaint was filed so that, as found by the High Court, there is no infirmity in the impugned proceedings.\n\n5. Learoed counsel fo.r the accused-respondents also contended\n\n->. that the consent given by the Chief Presidency Magistrate was not valid\n\n....\n\nI •\n\nIt.. in law as it had been accorded without proper application ai the mind to the material facts of the ca&e.\n\nThis contention we do not allow to be raised as it was not put forward before the High Court and embraces questions of fact.\n\n6. For the reasons stated, the appeal succeeds and is accepted.· The B impugned order is set aside and the trial court is directed to proceed with the case from the stage at which it was interrupted by reason of the impugned judgment.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed. ~' . \\~", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "S. N. BANERJEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. 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"metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 369, "end_char": 375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580, "end_char": 592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1014, "end_char": 1040, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1086, "end_char": 1093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1187, "end_char": 1193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1217, "end_char": 1221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1462, "end_char": 1489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the course of proceedings before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, one of the respondents moved the High Court alleging that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no power to give his consent because tiit the date of their\n\nproecution the appellant \\Vas not an officer holding the authorisation envi- F sagcd in s. 187-A of the Act and that the Magistrate could not act under s. 196A of the Code unless an application was made to him by a person holdina such authorisation."}}, {"text": "s. 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1798, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2123, "end_char": 2129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 187A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2331, "end_char": 2337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 187A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 196", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2855, "end_char": 2861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 196", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2882, "end_char": 2888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D K. K. Venugopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3679, "end_char": 3696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D K. K. Venugopal, Addi."}}, {"text": "S. Markandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3717, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markandey and S. P. Nayar\n\nfor the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markandey and S. P. Nayar\n\nfor the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Talukdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar and Sukumar Ghosh for Respondent 3."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3786, "end_char": 3799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar and Sukumar Ghosh for Respondent 3."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was de!iveJ'ed by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave which is directed against a judgment dated May 6, 1970 of the High Court of Calcutta has arisen in the following circumstances."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was de!iveJ'ed by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave which is directed against a judgment dated May 6, 1970 of the High Court of Calcutta has arisen in the following circumstances."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4036, "end_char": 4049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2, 1963, Shri S. N.\n\nBanerjee, Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta, made an application to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, praying that consent be given under section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter called the Code) to the prosecution of 14 persons in respect of an offence under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code as they were guilty of a conspiracy to commit offences under item 81 of the Schedule to section 167 of the Sea Customs Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act (the Control Act, for short)."}}, {"text": "S. N.\n\nBanerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4056, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2, 1963, Shri S. N.\n\nBanerjee, Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta, made an application to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, praying that consent be given under section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter called the Code) to the prosecution of 14 persons in respect of an offence under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code as they were guilty of a conspiracy to commit offences under item 81 of the Schedule to section 167 of the Sea Customs Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act (the Control Act, for short).", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nBanerjee"}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2, 1963, Shri S. N.\n\nBanerjee, Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta, made an application to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, praying that consent be given under section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter called the Code) to the prosecution of 14 persons in respect of an offence under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code as they were guilty of a conspiracy to commit offences under item 81 of the Schedule to section 167 of the Sea Customs Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act (the Control Act, for short)."}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4217, "end_char": 4229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4364, "end_char": 4376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4384, "end_char": 4401, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4513, "end_char": 4524, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "March 9,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four days later, i.e., on March 9,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4811, "end_char": 4819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Banerjee was authorised by the Chief Customs Officer, Calcutta, to prosecute the said persons for the commission of offences under item 81 and section 5 above mentioned."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4865, "end_char": 4873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Banerjee was authorised by the Chief Customs Officer, Calcutta, to prosecute the said persons for the commission of offences under item 81 and section 5 above mentioned."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4954, "end_char": 4963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "March 9, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5005, "end_char": 5018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same date, i.e., March 9, 1963, Shri Banerjee actually filed a complaint against the said 14 persons accusing them of the commission of offences under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and item 81 as well as section 5 aforesaid."}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5159, "end_char": 5176, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5282, "end_char": 5303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 1\n\nAfter the Presidency Magistrate, who was seized of the case, had examined 43 witnesses, one of the accused challenged his jurisdiction to entertain the."}}, {"text": "sections 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5483, "end_char": 5495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "complaint through a petition made to the High Court under sections 439' and 561A of the Code on the ground that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no power to give the consent which he did on March 5, 1963, because, till that date, Shri Banerjee was not an officer holding the anthorisation envisaged in section 187 A of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 187A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "S. N. Banerjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6415, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C., as the allegations made or the charge framed is in respect of one offence and sanction granted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate' at the instance of S. N. Banerjee, who was not authorised to initiate proceeding is therefore bad in law, as the officer had no authority to apply for sanction.\"", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nBanerjee"}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6682, "end_char": 6694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "section 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6745, "end_char": 6756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6759, "end_char": 6774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6841, "end_char": 6853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" ..... Obviously, for an offence of the nature charged, there can be only one cognizance and therefore the sanction under section 120B must also be obtained by an Officer\n\nmentioned in section 187 A Sea Customs Act, ..... \"\n\nAn argument put forward on behalf of Shri Banerjee that section 196A of the Code did not speak of any authorisation was repelled by the High Court in the following terms :\n\n\"Mr. Mitra has also submitted that not only section i96A does not speak of any authority but that even after sanction, prosecution may not be initiated."}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7331, "end_char": 7343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "section 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7636, "end_char": 7647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 S.C.It", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7695, "end_char": 7732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of Shri Banerjee, who is the appellant before us, it has .been urged that the High Court has erred in interpreting section 196A of the COOe so as to incorporate therein the provision regarding authorisation enacted by section 187 A of the Act, and, after hearing\n\n5-330SCI/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 S.C.It."}}, {"text": "Section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7924, "end_char": 7936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8037, "end_char": 8049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 196", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8959, "end_char": 8970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9015, "end_char": 9026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9188, "end_char": 9199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is a corresponding section in the Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9422, "end_char": 9467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 187A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9814, "end_char": 9826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is a corresponding section in the Control Act", "statute": "There is a corresponding section in the Control Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10451, "end_char": 10468, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10661, "end_char": 10673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10752, "end_char": 10764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11100, "end_char": 11111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11752, "end_char": 11762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 187A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12189, "end_char": 12201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12380, "end_char": 12392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_685_693_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• i\n\nBABU RAM GUPTA\n\nv • •\n\nSUDHIR BHASIN & ANR.\n\nApril 12, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL JJ.J\n\nConten1pt of Courts Act 1971-S. 2(b)-Consent order passed at the instance of 1he parties and undertaking given' by one of the parties-El]tct of breacll-DiJtincti.on between-When a1nounts to contempt of Court .\n\nPending the decision of a dispute between the -parties referred to an arbi~ C trator, the High Court passed \\Vith the agreement of the parties a consent order appointing a receiver.\n\nThe Court'~ order directed that the receiver should te.ke charge of the property forthwith from the appellant and submit periodical reports to the Court regarding the running of the business.\n\nWithout making an express direction to the appellant that the property in his possession should be handed over to the receiver, the High Court directed the appellant not to interfere with the receiver in the running of the business D and that the appellant should 2:ive to the Teceiver all cooperation that the receiver might require .\n\nIn a petition filed before the High Court , the respondent alleged that by failing to hand over possession of the property to the receiver, in terms of the consent order the appellant had committed breach of the undertaking given to the court and thereby committed an offence punishable under E S. 2 (b) o[ the Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nThe High Court held the appellant to be guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to undergo civil imprisonment.\n\nIn appeal to this Court the appellant contended that there was no breach o:f the undertaking on his part because he had given no express or implied F undert-aking to. handover possession of the disputed property to the receiver.\n\nAllowing the appeal\n\nHEID : 1. The act of the appellant in not complying with the terms of the consent order did not amount to an offence under S. 2(b), however im proper or reprehensible his conduct might be. [693 G]\n\n2. When a persOn appearing before a court file5 an 'application or affidavit giving an undertaking to the court or when he clearly and expressly gives an oral undertaking v..hich is incorporated by the court in its order and fails to honour that undertaking then a wilful breach of the undertaking would amount to an offence punishable under the Act. An undertaking given by one of the parties should be carefully construed by the Court to find out the nature and extent of the undertaking given by the pen1on concerned, It is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertakingwhen there is none on the record. f69QC-D. 691 GJ\n\n686 SUPRl!MI! COURT REP OR TS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3. While it is the duty of the court to punish a person who tries to obstruct\n\nthe course of justice or brings into disrepute the institution of judiciary this power has to be exercist.d not casually or lightly, but with great care and circumspection.\n\nContempt proceedings serve a dual , purpose of vindication of the public interest by punishment of the contumacious conduct and coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him. [691 H, 692 C]\n\n4.r The reason why a breach of clear undertaking amounts to contempt of court is that the contemner by making false representation would obtain the benefit and if he failed to honour that undertaking he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings the judicial institution into disrepute.\n\nThe same cannot, be said of a consent order or a compromise decree \\vhere the fraud is played not on the court but on one of the partie1. The offence committed is qua a party and not qua the court and therefore the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absent ia •uch ca.es. [693 D-E[\n\n5. If it is held tat non-compliance of a compromise decree or consent order would amount to contempt of court the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees may not be resorted to at all by the parties. [693 CJ\n\n6. In the in!tant case no application or affidavit or undertaking was given by the appellant that he '\\\\\"OUld cooperate with the receiver or that he would hand over possession of the property to the receiver. The consent order did not incorporate expressly that any such undertaking had been given either by the appellant or by his lawyer before the Court. In the absence of such an u~1dertaking it cannot b'e said that he wilfully disobeyed or committed E breach of such an undertaking.\n\nThe High Court assumed that the appellant had given an undertaking to carry out its directions. [692 E-G]\n\nBhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, [1957] SCR. 701, The Aligar/1 Municipal Board & Ors. v. Ekka Tanga Mazdoor Union & Ors. [1970] 3 SCR.\n\n98; referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 501 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 27-10-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Original No. 61 /77.\n\nK. B. Asthana, Salish Chandra, Sarai Chandra and P. D. Sharma G for the Appellant.\n\nMiss Seita Vaidialingam for respondent I.\n\nNemo for respondent 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This is an appeal by the contemner under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court dated 27th October, 1978 convicting\n\nthe appellant under section 2(b) ot the Contempt o~ Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentencing him to detention in civil prison for a period of fom months.\n\nA detailed narrative of the facts culminating in the order impugned ill to be found in the judgment of the High Court and it is not uecessary for us to repeat the same all over again except giving a brief resume of the important facts in order to appreciate the points of law that arise in the appeal. It appears that there was a_partnersl1ip between\n\n- - Sudhir Bhasin and Jagatri Lal Bhasin as a result of which a firm • '.11//11 under the style of Sitapur Theatres with its !lead Office at Delhi was\n\n.llllf constituted. The partnership deed was executed as far back as 19-11-1965 and clause 25 of that deed contained the usual arbitration\n\n• ..\n\nclause.\n\nDisputes arose between the partners as a result of which an application uuder section 20 of the Arbitration Act was made before the High Court and the High Court on hearing the application referred the dispute to the sole arbitration of a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court. Along with the aforesaid application, the respondent Sudhir Bhasin had filed an application for appointment of a Nceiver as he apprehended that the appellant would misappropriate the fund~ of the partnership property. The application for appointment of a receiver was allowed and the respondent Sudhir Bhasin himself was appointed as a receiver of Laxmi Talkies, Sitapur.\n\nThereafter the appellant being aggrieved by this order filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. In the appeal it appears that a consent order was passed with the agreement of the parties by which Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary, Bar Association of Sitapur was appointed as a receiver of the Laxmi Talkies pending the decision of the arbitrator and was directed to run the said cinema after taking possession from the appellant.\n\nThis order passed by the High Court may be quoted in extenso as it forms the solid basis for the proceedings for contempt taken against the appellant by the High Conrt:\n\n\"After hearing !J:\\e learned counsel for sometime on previous hearings, a suggestion has been mooted that if the receiver is changed, the applicant would not prosecute the present appeal except to the extent of getting the Receiver changed.\n\nWe accordingly di.reeled the Registrar to address letters to the District Judges, Sitapur and Luckllow to send names of three Advocates each from whom we could pick out one name for appointment as a Receiver in place of Sudhir Bhasin, who had been appointed Receiver by the learned Single Judge.\n\nThree names have been received from\n\nthe District Judge, Sitapur. Shri S. C. Bhat\\acharya, President of the Bar Association, is not acceptable because he had been connected with the Cinema in question in the capacity of a Receiver previously.\n\nWith the consent of the learned counsel of the parties, we therefore, appoint Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary of the Bar Association, Sitapur, to be the Receiver of Laxmi Talkies pending decision of the disputes between the parties which have been referred to arbitration.\n\nThe Receiver so appointed, will take charge of the Laxmi Talkies forthwith from the appellant, who is at present running the said Cinema. Shri Mahabir Prasad will run the Cinema himself through such Managers as he may appoint.\n\nHe will be-responsible to keep account, make disbursements and deposit the net proceeds in a Bank account to be opened by him in the name of Laxmi Talkies.\n\nThe Receiver will submit quarterly reports to this Court regarding the running of the business of the said Cinema. The first report should be submitted to this Court on or before 14th August,\n\n1977. Each subsequent report should be submitted by the middle of the month in which the quarter gets completed.\n\nThe appellant is directed not to interfere with the Receiver appointed or with the business of the running of the Laxmi E Talkies. He will, however, give to the Receiver appointed, all cooperation that the Receiver may require.\n\nThe licence for running the Cinema will be taken out by the Receiver in the name of Laxmi Talkies. He will approach the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur for issue of this licence accordance with the above direction of this Court ...... \".\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nA perusal of the order extracted above clearly shows that there was no express direction to the appellant to hand over possession to the G receiver although certain directions were given by the Court to the receiver for filing quarterly reports etc. The only direction given to the appellant was that he would not interfere with the receiver appointed or with the. business of running of the Laxmi Talkies. The appellant was also directed to give all cooperation that the receiver may require.\n\nThere was thus no specific direction to the appellant to hand over B possession of the property to the receiver although impliedly this was meant to be done because the order was passed with the conSCflt of the parties. ·\n\n..,;-.\n\nIn the instant case the gravamen of the charge against the appellant was that he had committed a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court to hand over possession to the receiver and having failed to honour the undertaking, he was liable to be hauled up for an offence under the Act.\n\nThe High Court held that the conduct of the appellant was unrelenting and inexorable and he had wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court passed with his consent.\n\nMr. Asthana, learned counsel for the appellant raised two important cont•entions before us.\n\nIn the first place, he submitted that taking the order ex facie there is no express or implied undertaking given by the appellant to hand over possession to the receiver and hence the question of breach of the undertaking on the part of the appellant does not arise, and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant was not legally sustainable.\n\nSecondly, it was argued that eve'n assuming that an undertaking was given to the Court, as the appeal before the Division Bench was wholly incompetent, the proceedings before the Division Bench were non est and the order passed by the High Court being a nullity a disobedience of such an order would not attract the provisions of the Act.\n\nMiss Seita Vaidialingam who argued this case before us with great ingenuity and persuasiveness submitted that even if the order of the High Court was void, it was not open to the appellant as a litigant to assume the role of a Judge and unilaterally decide that the order of the High Court being non est he was not bound to obey the same.\n\nIn other words, It was contended that he having himself filed an appeal before the Division Bench and thereby having invited the Court to pass a consent order which was agreed to by the appellant he could not by virtue of the rule of estoppel by judgment be heard to say that the appeal filed by the appellant himself being incompetent, the judgment was void, hence the appellant could disobey the same with impunity.\n\nIn support of her submission, the learned counsel cited the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ratan Shukla('), Umrao Singh v.\n\nMan Singh & Ors. (2), Joseph F. Maggio v. Raymond Zeitz(\") and\n\nUnited States of America v. United Mine Workers of America.(•) While we do find co'nsiderable force in the argument of Miss Seita Vaidyalingam, counsel for the respondent we are of the opinion that the point is not free from difficulty and in the view that we have decid- ------\n\n0) A.LR. 1956 AH 258.\n\n(2) I. L. R. (1971) 2 Delhi 44.\n\n(3) 92 L. Ed : 476, 487.\n\n(4) 91 L. Ed. 884, 911.\n\nA. ed to take on the first point raised by counsel for the appellant, the second point does not fall for determination. We, therefore, refraia from going into this point and leave the matter to be decided in a more proper and suitable case.\n\nComing to the first point, the contention of Mr. Astha'na was that there was no undertaking give'n by the appellant to the court at all.\n\nOur attention has not been drawn by counsel for the respondent to any application or affidavit filed by the appellant which contains an undertaking given by the appellant to hand over possession to the re- • ceiver appointed by the High Conrt by virtue of the impugned order.\n\nIt is manifest that any person appearing before the Court can give an undertaking in two way: ( 1) that he files an application or an affidavit clearly setting out the undertaking given by him to Court, or (2) by a clear and express oral undertaking given by the contemner and incorporated by the court in its order. If any of these conditions are satisfied then a wilful breach of the undertaking would doubtless amount to an offence under the Act.\n\nAlthough the High Court observed that the consent order extracted above had been passed on the basis of various undertakings given by the contemner, we are unable to find any material on record which contains such undertakings.\n\nIt seems to us that the High Court has construed the consent order itself and the directions contained therein as an implied undertaking given by the appellant.\n\nHere the High Court has undoubtedly committed ?n error of law.\n\nThere is a clear cut distinction between a compromise arrived at between the parties or a consent order passed by the court at the instance of t]!e parties and a clear and categorical undertaking given by any of the parties.\n\nIn the former, if there is violation of the compromise or the order no question of contempt of court arises, but the party has a right to enforce the order or the compromise by either executing the order or getting an injunction from the court.\n\nIn the case of Bhatnagars & Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India(') although an undertaking appears to haye been given by learned counsel on behalf of his client that certain goods confiscated by the Customs authorities wonld be sold within a certain period of time, it was interpreted by the petitioner as an undertaking to decide the revision petition within the period fixed, and as this was not done it was argued before this Court that the customs authorities had committed a serious B contempt of this Court. Repelling the argument of the petiioner, his\n\n(l) [1957] S.C.R. 701.\n\n• ,!\n\n<Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"The order passed by this Court would show that the\n\n}arned Solicitor General of India made a statement to the Court indicating that the goods which had been confiscated by the Customs Authorities would not be sold or otherwise dealt with for a month from the date of the communication to the petitioner of the final order that the Central Government may pass in the revisional petition preferred by him bfore them.\n\nActing on this undertaking, this Court allowed the petitioner a period of one month from the date of the communication to him of the final order which the Central Government might pass on his revisional petition to enable him to file a petition for Special Leave to Appeal if he was so advised.\n\nThen the order recorded the undertak ing given by the Solicitor-General ......•......•..•••\n\nIndeed the petition seeks to suggest that the undertaking was that the revisional petition would be disposed immediately in a day or two, and, since the revisional petition was not disposed of within the time mentioned by the So!icitor- General, the petitioner says that all the respondents are gnilty of contempt.\n\nIt is clear that the petitio'ner's grievance and the prayer for a writ are entirely misconceived. The petitioner is entirely in error in assuming that, on behalf of the Union of India, any undertaking was given that his revisional petition would be disposed of within a day or two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The petitioner presumably thinks that the Court's order required that his revisional petition should be disposed of by the Central Government within a month.\n\nThis assumption is entirely unwarranted\".\n\nThis decision, therefore, clearly shows that even if them was an >nndertaki'ng given by the counsel on behalf of his client the undertaking should be carefully construed to find out the extent and nature of ·!he undertaking actually given by the person concerned. It is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertaking when !her~ is :none on the record. It was on this ground that this Court negatived the plea of contempt of court. It is well settled that while it is the duty of the court to punish a person who tries to obstruct the course <Jf justice or brings into disrepute the institution of judiciary, this ; power has to be exercised not casually or lightly but with great care .and circumspection and only in such cases where it is neeessary to\n\nJ>unish the conternner in order to uphold the majesty of law and the .dignity of the courts.\n\nIn the case of The Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors. v. Ekka T•ng/ll Mazdoor Union & Ors.(') this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It may also be pointed out that in order to justify action for contempt of court for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been officially served on the party against whom it is grankd if it is proved that he has notice of the order aliunde and he knew that it was intended to be enforced.\n\nContempt proceeding against a person '\\\\'.ho has failed to comply with the Court's order serves a dual purpose: ( 1) vindication of the public interest by puuishment of contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him.\n\nThe sentence imposed should effectuate both these purposes.\n\nIt must also be clearly understood in this connection that to employ a subterfuge to avoid compliance of a Court's order about which there could be no reasonable doubt n; iay in certain circumstances aggravate the contempt\".\n\nThese are the tests laid down by this Court in order to determinec whether a contempt of court has been committed in the case of vio-· lation of a prohibitive order.\n\nIn the instant case, however, as indicated above, there is no application nor any affidavit nor any written• undertaking given by the appellant that he would cctoperate with thee receiver or that he would hand over possession of the Cinema to the receiver.\n\nApart from this, even the consent order does '.not incorporate expressly or clearly that any such undertaking had been given• either by the appellant or by his lawyer before the Court that he would hand over possession of the property to the receiver. In the absence of any express undertaking given by the appellant or any undertaking: incorporated in the order impugned, it will be difficult to hold that the appellant wilfully disobeyed or committed breach of such an under-· taking.\n\nWhat the High Court appears to have done is that it took the consent order passed which was agreed to by the parties and by whiclr a receiver was appointed, to include ah undertaking given by the con-· telllner to carry out the directions contained in the order.\n\nWith due respects, we are unable to agree with this view taken by the Higlr Court. A few examples would show how unsustainable in law the view taken by the High Court is.\n\nTake the instance of a suit where the defendant agrees that a decree for Rs. 10,000 may be pasi; ed>. against him and the court accordingly passes the decree.\n\nThe defendant does not pay the decree.\n\nCan it be said in these circumstances that merely because the defendant has failed to pay the decretal amount he is guilty of contempt of court? The answer muit neces- ------·-\n\n(1)[1970] 35.C.R 98.\n\n• •\n\nB. R. GUPTA v. SUDHIR BHASJN (Fazal Ali, J.) 6 93\n\n'.Sarily be in the negative.\n\nTake another instance where a compromise is arrived at between the parties a'nd a particular property having been .allotted to A, he has to be put in possession thereof by B.\n\nB does not give possession of this property to A Can it be said th[ft because the compromise decree has not been implemented by B, he commits the -0ffence of contempt of conrt?\n\nHere also the answer must . be in the negative and the remedy of B would be not to pray for drawing up proce-\"dings for contempt of court agai'nst B but to approach the executing court for directing a warrant of delivery of possession under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nIndeed, if we were to hold that non compliance of a compromise d•<cree or consent order amount to contempt of court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees may not be resorted to at all.\n\nIn fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the conrt amounts to contempt of court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himsel! and if he fails to hononr the undertaki'ng, he plays a &<rious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice a.nd Q.rings foto disrepute the judicial institution. The same cannot, however, be said of a consent order or a compromise decree where the fraud, if any, is practised by the person concerned not on the court but on one of the parties.\n\nThus, the offence committed by the person concerned is qua the party not qutz the court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of conrt is completely absent in such cases.\n\nIn these circumstances, we are satisfied that unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the court by the contemner or incorporared by the court in its order, there can be no question of wilful disobedience of such an undertaking.\n\nIn the insta'nt case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed 'by the app; o:llarrt nor was any such undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in the order impugned.\n\nThus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are of the opinion that however improper or reprehensible the conduct of the appellant may be yet the act of the appellant in not complying with the terms of the consent order does not amount to an offence under section 2 (b) of the .i\\ct and his conviction and order of detention in civil prison for four months is wholly unwarranted by law.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order passed by the High Court directing the appellant to be detained in civil prison for four months is hereby quashed and the appellant is acquitted of the offence lll100r section 2 (b) of the Act.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nApptal allowed.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "i\n\nBABU RAM GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABU RAM GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUDHIR BHASIN & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHIR BHASIN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 12, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL JJ.J\n\nConten1pt of Courts Act 1971-S. 2(b)-Consent order passed at the instance of 1he parties and undertaking given' by one of the parties-El]tct of breacll-DiJtincti.on between-When a1nounts to contempt of Court ."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Courts Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act 1971", "statute": "Courts Act 1971"}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1330, "end_char": 1334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1346, "end_char": 1368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3869, "end_char": 3896, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR.\n\n98", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4917, "end_char": 4930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana, Salish Chandra, Sarai Chandra and P. D. Sharma G for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Salish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana, Salish Chandra, Sarai Chandra and P. D. Sharma G for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sarai Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana, Salish Chandra, Sarai Chandra and P. D. Sharma G for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana, Salish Chandra, Sarai Chandra and P. D. Sharma G for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Seita Vaidialingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5006, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Seita Vaidialingam for respondent I.\n\nNemo for respondent 2.", "canonical_name": "Seita Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5112, "end_char": 5121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This is an appeal by the contemner under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court dated 27th October, 1978 convicting\n\nthe appellant under section 2(b) ot the Contempt o~ Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentencing him to detention in civil prison for a period of fom months."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5167, "end_char": 5177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5329, "end_char": 5341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "statute": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5361, "end_char": 5377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sudhir Bhasin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that there was a_partnersl1ip between\n- Sudhir Bhasin and Jagatri Lal Bhasin as a result of which a firm • '.11//11 under the style of Sitapur Theatres with its !", "canonical_name": "SUDHIR BHASIN & ANR"}}, {"text": "Jagatri Lal Bhasin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5866, "end_char": 5884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that there was a_partnersl1ip between\n- Sudhir Bhasin and Jagatri Lal Bhasin as a result of which a firm • '.11//11 under the style of Sitapur Theatres with its !"}}, {"text": "Sitapur Theatres", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5943, "end_char": 5959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that there was a_partnersl1ip between\n- Sudhir Bhasin and Jagatri Lal Bhasin as a result of which a firm • '.11//11 under the style of Sitapur Theatres with its !"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 5990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lead Office at Delhi was\n\n.llllf constituted."}}, {"text": "19-11-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The partnership deed was executed as far back as 19-11-1965 and clause 25 of that deed contained the usual arbitration\n\n• ..\n\nclause."}}, {"text": "clause 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1971", "statute": "Courts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6229, "end_char": 6239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1971", "statute": "Courts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disputes arose between the partners as a result of which an application uuder section 20 of the Arbitration Act was made before the High Court and the High Court on hearing the application referred the dispute to the sole arbitration of a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Sudhir Bhasin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6486, "end_char": 6499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Along with the aforesaid application, the respondent Sudhir Bhasin had filed an application for appointment of a Nceiver as he apprehended that the appellant would misappropriate the fund~ of the partnership property.", "canonical_name": "SUDHIR BHASIN & ANR"}}, {"text": "Sitapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6796, "end_char": 6803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for appointment of a receiver was allowed and the respondent Sudhir Bhasin himself was appointed as a receiver of Laxmi Talkies, Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the appellant being aggrieved by this order filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7033, "end_char": 7047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeal it appears that a consent order was passed with the agreement of the parties by which Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary, Bar Association of Sitapur was appointed as a receiver of the Laxmi Talkies pending the decision of the arbitrator and was directed to run the said cinema after taking possession from the appellant."}}, {"text": "Bar Association of Sitapur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7073, "end_char": 7099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeal it appears that a consent order was passed with the agreement of the parties by which Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary, Bar Association of Sitapur was appointed as a receiver of the Laxmi Talkies pending the decision of the arbitrator and was directed to run the said cinema after taking possession from the appellant."}}, {"text": "Luckllow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7779, "end_char": 7787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly di.reeled the Registrar to address letters to the District Judges, Sitapur and Luckllow to send names of three Advocates each from whom we could pick out one name for appointment as a Receiver in place of Sudhir Bhasin, who had been appointed Receiver by the learned Single Judge."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Sitapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8023, "end_char": 8046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three names have been received from\n\nthe District Judge, Sitapur."}}, {"text": "S. C. Bhat\\acharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8053, "end_char": 8071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S. C. Bhat\\acharya, President of the Bar Association, is not acceptable because he had been connected with the Cinema in question in the capacity of a Receiver previously."}}, {"text": "Bar Association, Sitapur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8355, "end_char": 8379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the consent of the learned counsel of the parties, we therefore, appoint Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary of the Bar Association, Sitapur, to be the Receiver of Laxmi Talkies pending decision of the disputes between the parties which have been referred to arbitration."}}, {"text": "14th August,\n\n1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9076, "end_char": 9094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first report should be submitted to this Court on or before 14th August,\n\n1977."}}, {"text": "Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10876, "end_char": 10883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Asthana, learned counsel for the appellant raised two important cont•entions before us.", "canonical_name": "Astha'na"}}, {"text": "Seita Vaidialingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11655, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Seita Vaidialingam who argued this case before us with great ingenuity and persuasiveness submitted that even if the order of the High Court was void, it was not open to the appellant as a litigant to assume the role of a Judge and unilaterally decide that the order of the High Court being non est he was not bound to obey the same.", "canonical_name": "Seita Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "Seita Vaidyalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12725, "end_char": 12743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), Joseph F. Maggio v. Raymond Zeitz(\") and\n\nUnited States of America v. United Mine Workers of America.(•) While we do find co'nsiderable force in the argument of Miss Seita Vaidyalingam, counsel for the respondent we are of the opinion that the point is not free from difficulty and in the view that we have decid- ------\n\n0) A.LR.", "canonical_name": "Seita Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "Astha'na", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13279, "end_char": 13287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming to the first point, the contention of Mr. Astha'na was that there was no undertaking give'n by the appellant to the court at all.", "canonical_name": "Astha'na"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15719, "end_char": 15724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"The order passed by this Court would show that the\n\n}arned Solicitor General of India made a statement to the Court indicating that the goods which had been confiscated by the Customs Authorities would not be sold or otherwise dealt with for a month from the date of the communication to the petitioner of the final order that the Central Government may pass in the revisional petition preferred by him bfore them."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15970, "end_char": 15988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"The order passed by this Court would show that the\n\n}arned Solicitor General of India made a statement to the Court indicating that the goods which had been confiscated by the Customs Authorities would not be sold or otherwise dealt with for a month from the date of the communication to the petitioner of the final order that the Central Government may pass in the revisional petition preferred by him bfore them."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is entirely in error in assuming that, on behalf of the Union of India, any undertaking was given that his revisional petition would be disposed of within a day or two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21590, "end_char": 21617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21755, "end_char": 21782, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23423, "end_char": 23432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23816, "end_char": 23825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23843, "end_char": 23849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nApptal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_694_699_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "694 ..\n\nCONCORD OF INDIA INSURANCE CO. L1D. v.\n\nNIRMALA DEVI AND ORS.\n\nApril 16, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nNegligence of Counsel which misleads a litigant into delayed pursuit of his.- remedy-Propriety and reasonableness of cofnpanies and other persons relying upon legal opinion in the niatter of co1nputation of liniitation--Lirni-· tation Act, 1963 (Act XXXVl) Section 5.\n\nNeed for no fault tortious liability by State-LeKal rights, literacy in the case of automobile, accidents and the processual 1nodalities which secure redressal of grievances, explained.\n\n, A doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit by a jeep driver ..,, and both \\\\'ere killed in November 1971, but the Motor Accident claims Tri· bunal delivered judgment on 5·9 1976 five years later awarding sums of Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500 ;- to the two sets of claimants.\n\nThe appeal in this case had to be filed on or before 19-1-77 but was. actually filed 30 days later with an application for condonation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground of Counsel's mistake in the calculationof the period of limitation.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal and the~ application.\n\nDismissing the special leave petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : A company relies on its Legal Adviser and the Manager's. expertise is in company management and not in law.\n\nThere is no particular reason why when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counse1.\n\nOf course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or if there is i.tL comprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still be .vulnerable.\n\nIf legal Adviser's opinions are to be subjected by company managers to. further legal scrutiny of their own, an impossible situation may arise.\n\nInde_ed Government, a large litigant in this country, may find itself in difficulty •. [697EF. 698 F-Gl\n\nThis does not automatically secure a visa for the petitioner into this )C Court under Art. 136.. There musf be manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in factual findings.\n\n[698H] ,.-·\n\nState of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup, A.I.R. 1971 Keralai 211; approved.\n\nState of West Bengal v. Howrah Z..funicipal Corporation, AIR 1972 SC.- 749; referred to.\n\nObser; ations\n\n1~ The jurispfudence of compensation for motor accidentS IDus't develop in. the direction, of no-fault liability and the determination of the quantum !DU$\\ be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in 'a 'freet\n\ncountry in generous scales.\n\nSocial justice, the command of the Constitution A is being violated by the State itself by neglecting road repairs, ignoring deadly over-loads and contesting liability after nationalising the bulk of bus transport and the whole of general insurMtce business. [696CDl\n\n2. Medieval roads \\\\'ith treacherous dangers and total disrepair, explosive increase of heavy vehicles often terribly overloaded and without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy with speed and tipsy with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of traffic regulations_ designed for safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and little else and, as a cumulative effect, mounting high\\vay accidents, demand a new dimension to the law of torts through no fault liability and processual celerity and simplicity in compensation claims caseo. [696B-C]\n\n3. If only no-fault liability, automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory pro-forma signed by the claimants and forwarded to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu and decentralised empowerment of such tribunals in every district coupled with informal procedures and liberation from court-fees and the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of proof \\'\\it:re introduced-easy and inexpensive, if the State has the will to help the poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's. delays in this compassionate jurisdiction can be banished.\n\nSocial justice in action is the measure of the State's constitutional sensitivity. [696F-G]\n\nCIVIL Al'PELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 5228 and 5286 of 1977.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 8-8-1977 of the Pnnjab E and Haryana High Court in F.A.O. No. 81 and 82 of 1977.\n\nP. P. Malhotra and R. N. Dikshit for the Petitioner.\n\nS. K. Gambhir for the Respondent.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. An explosive escalation of automobile acci dents, accounting for more deaths than the most deadly diseases, has become a lethal phenomenon on Indian Roads everywhere.\n\nThe jural impact of this tragic development on our IgJslatures, courts G and law enforcing agencies is insufficient, with the result that the poor, who are, by and large, the casualty iu most of these cases, suffer losses of life or limb and are deprived of expeditious legal remedies in the shape of reasonably quantified compensation promptly paid-and this, even after compulsory motor insurance and nationalisatkm of insurance business.\n\nThe facts of this special leave peti- Fi\n\ntins;. which we dismiss by this order, raise two serious issues which o:mstrain us to make a speaking order.\n\nThe first deals with legal\n\nrights, literacy in the case of automobile accidents and the processual modalities which secure redressal of grievances.\n\nThe second relates to the consequences of negligence of counsel which misleads a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy.\n\nB Medieval roads with treacherous dangers and total disrepair, explosive increase of heavy vehicles often terribly overloaded and without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy with speed and tipsy with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of traffic regulations designed for safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and little else and, as a cumulative effect, mounting highway C accidents demand a new dimension to the law of torts through no fault liability and processual celerity and simplicity in compensation claims cases.\n\nSocial justice, the command of the Constitution is being violated by the State itself by neglecting road repairs, ignoring deadly overloads and contesting liability after nationalising the bulk of bus transport and the whole of general insurance business.\n\nThe D jurisprudence of compensation for motor accidents must develop in the direction of no-fault liability and the determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales.\n\nIn the present case, a doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit, by a jeep driver and both were killed. The fatal event occurred in November 1971 but the E Motor Accident Claims Tribunal delivered judgment five years later awarding sums of Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500/- to the two sets of claimants.\n\nThe delay of five years in such cases is a terrible commentary on the judicial process.\n\nIf only no-fault liability, automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory pro-forma signed by the claimants and forward to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu and decentralised empowerment of such tribunals in every district coupled with informal procedures and liberation from court-fees and the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of proof were introduced-easy and inexpensive if the State has the will to help the poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's delays in this compassionate jurisdiction can be banished. Social justice in action is the measure of the State's constitutional sensitivity.\n\nAnyway, we have made these observation hopefully to help focus the attention of the Union and the States.\n\nThe nationalised insurance company appealed to the High Court against the award.\n\nWe have no doubt that the finding on both the\n\n• •\n\nculpability and the quantum as rendered by the trial court are correct.\n\nBut the High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay, dismissing the application of the petitioner for condonation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThe Accident Claims Tribunal pronounced its award on Septem ber, 15, 1976, after making the necessary computations and deduc tions.\n\nThe appeal had to be filed on or before January 19, 1977 but was actually filed 30 days later.\n\nCounsel for the petitioner is stated to have made the mistake in the calculation of the period of limitation.\n\nHe had intimated the parties accordingly with the result that the petitioner was misled into instituting appeal late.\n\nThe High Court took the view that the lawyer's ignorance about the law was no ground for condonation of delay.\n\nReliance was placed on some decisions of the Punjab High Court and th_ere was reference also to a ruling of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 7 49 ('). The con clusion was couched in these words :\n\n\"The Assistant Divisional Manager of the Company appellant is not an illiterate or so ignorant person who could not calculate the period of limitation.\n\nSuch like appeals are filed by such companies daily. The facts of this case clearly show, as observed earlier, that the mistake is not bonafide and the appellant has failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay.\"\n\nWe are not able to agre.i;. with this reasoning.\n\nA company relies on its Legal Adviser and the Manager's expertise is in company management and not in law.\n\nThere is no particular reason why when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counsel.\n\nOf course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or if there is incomprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still be vulnerable.\n\nThe correct legal position has been explained with reference to the Supreme Court decision in a judgment of one of us in AIR 1971 Ker. 211 :\n\n\"The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as !aches\n\n(1) State of West Bengal v. Howrah:Municipa/ Corporation.\n\n6-330SCI/79\n\non the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way.\n\nThe High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation.\"\n\n\"The High Court took the view that Mr. Raizada being afi Advocate of 34 years' standing could not possibly make the mistake in view of the clear provisions on the subject of appeals existing under Section 39 (1) of the Punjab Courts Act and therefore, his advice to file the appeal before the District Court would not come to the rescue of the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThe Supreme Court upset this approach.\"\n\n\"I am of the view that legal advice given by the mem bers of the legal profession may sometimes be wrong even as pronouncement on questions of law by courts are sometimes wrong.\n\nAn amount of latitude is expected in such cases for, to err is human and lay men, as litigants are, may legitimately lean on expert counsel in legal as in other departments, without probing the professional competence of the advice.\n\nThe court must of course, see whether in such cases there is any taint of mala fides or element of recklessness or ruse.\n\nIf neither is present, legal advice honestly sought and actually given, must be treated as sufli cient cause when an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being considered.\n\nThe State has not acted improperly in relying on its legal advisers.\"\n\nWe haV'e clarified the legal position regarding the propriety and . • reasonableness of companies and other persons relying upon legal '!- opinion in the matter of computation of limitation since it is a pro blem which may arise frequently.\n\nIf Legal Adviser's opinions are to be subj•ected by company managers to further legal scrutiny of their own, an impossible situation may arise.\n\nIndeed Government, a large litigant in this country, may find itself in difficulty.\n\nThat is the reason why. we have chosen to explain at this length the application of S. 5 vis'a-vis counsel's mistake.\n\nThis does not automatically secure a visa for the petitioner into this Court under Article 136.\n\nThere must be manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in factual findings.\n\nWe have\n\n• •\n\nexamined the merits of the matter to the extent available on the record and have heard counsel for the petitioner.\n\nHe has hardly convinced us that the merits of the case call for any intervention at all.\n\nIn this view we are constrained to dismiss the Special Leave Petitions now that we have expressed ourselves or both the points\n\ndealt with above.\n\ns. R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "CONCORD OF INDIA INSURANCE CO. L1D", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CONCORD OF INDIA INSURANCE CO. L1D", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NIRMALA DEVI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIRMALA DEVI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5·9 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", A doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit by a jeep driver ..,, and both \\\\'ere killed in November 1971, but the Motor Accident claims Tri· bunal delivered judgment on 5·9 1976 five years later awarding sums of Rs."}}, {"text": "19-1-77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal in this case had to be filed on or before 19-1-77 but was."}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1028, "end_char": 1042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Inde_ed Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inde_ed Government, a large litigant in this country, may find itself in difficulty •. [697EF."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2020, "end_char": 2028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3602, "end_char": 3612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If only no-fault liability, automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory pro-forma signed by the claimants and forwarded to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu and decentralised empowerment of such tribunals in every district coupled with informal procedures and liberation from court-fees and the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of proof \\'\\it:re introduced-easy and inexpensive, if the State has the will to help the poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's."}}, {"text": "P. P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4289, "end_char": 4303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Malhotra and R. N. Dikshit for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "R. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4308, "end_char": 4321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Malhotra and R. N. Dikshit for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4343, "end_char": 4356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4419, "end_char": 4431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. An explosive escalation of automobile acci dents, accounting for more deaths than the most deadly diseases, has become a lethal phenomenon on Indian Roads everywhere."}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8020, "end_char": 8024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8032, "end_char": 8046, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Septem ber, 15, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8102, "end_char": 8122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Accident Claims Tribunal pronounced its award on Septem ber, 15, 1976, after making the necessary computations and deduc tions."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8665, "end_char": 8682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed on some decisions of the Punjab High Court and th_ere was reference also to a ruling of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 7 49 (')."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8732, "end_char": 8745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed on some decisions of the Punjab High Court and th_ere was reference also to a ruling of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 7 49 (')."}}, {"text": "AIR 1972 SC 7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8749, "end_char": 8762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assistant Divisional Manager of the Company appellant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8822, "end_char": 8875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The con clusion was couched in these words :\n\n\"The Assistant Divisional Manager of the Company appellant is not an illiterate or so ignorant person who could not calculate the period of limitation."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10477, "end_char": 10491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Raizada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10601, "end_char": 10608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The High Court took the view that Mr. Raizada being afi Advocate of 34 years' standing could not possibly make the mistake in view of the clear provisions on the subject of appeals existing under Section 39 (1) of the Punjab Courts Act and therefore, his advice to file the appeal before the District Court would not come to the rescue of the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act."}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10922, "end_char": 10931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10939, "end_char": 10953, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11667, "end_char": 11676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11684, "end_char": 11698, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12348, "end_char": 12352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_6_11_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nRAGHUVEER SINGH & ORS.\n\nFebruary 5, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nInterest Act 1839 (32 of 1839)-Suit for recovery of aniount due in respect of building contract-Claim if a \"sum certain\" under the Act,\n\nNotice oj demand for payment clain1ing \"los.r by way of intcrest\"-If, valid and suffecient-Notice not to be strictly construed.\n\nThe Interest Ac~ 1839 (32 of 1839) empowers the Court to allow interest to the plaintiff if the amount claimed is a sum certain which is payable at a certaifl time by virtue of a written instrument at lei rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the time when such amounts were payable and if the amount payable otherwise, then from the time when the demand of payment !hall have been made in writing.\n\nD As the amounts due in respect of a building work! contract renl6ined unpaid despite demands and notices, the re, pondent (plaintiff) filed a suit for its recovery together with interest.\n\nDecreeing the suit, the trial court awarded interest at 4t per cent. But in appeal, the High Court enhanced the rate of interest pendente Ute from 4t per cent to 6 per cent.\n\nIn the further appeal to this Court it vAl• contended that the Interest Act 1839, was not applicable as no sum certain was payable and there was no demand for payment of interest.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. The claim was for la \"sum certainl! within the meaning of the Act. [9F]\n\nThe claim was ascertainable on a calculation made in terms of the agreement and was therefore a sum certain within the meaning of the Act. It is \"a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation\" and in any case it was not for the payment of any unliquidated damages or for the payn1ent of any amount arising out of an inchoate obligation.\n\n[9E-F]\n\n2. The respondent issued hvo notices. In the second notice it dc; finite claim of interest had been made by them. The term \"loss by way of interest\" mentioned in the first notice suggested that what was being claimed was compensation for the damages suffered by them. The notice should not be construed literally or technically. The mention of loss was only explann~ tory. Without any manner of doubt the respondents were claiming interest as such. [9G-10DJ\n\n3. Nor again ctln it be said that there was no claim for future interest.\n\nA claim for past interest would necessarily imply a claim for future interest.\n\n[!OE]\n\n. ,\n\n' t I\n\n.r Kuppusanii Pillai v. Madras Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., ILR 23 Mad. 41; A Sita Ram & Ors. v. Mrs. S. Sullivan, [1901] 2 Punjab Law Reporter 464; referred to.\n\nMahabir Prashad Rungta v. Durga Datt, [1961] 3 SCR 639 and Union of India v. A.. L. Rallia Ram, [1964] 3 SCR 164; distinguished.\n\n4. Having regard to the various continuous default'5 committed by the B appe1lant and its officers the High Court v.i justified in enhancing the rate\n\nof interest to 6 per cent. [1 lE]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2008 of 1969. ,-4;- From the Judgment and Order dated 7-4-1965 of the Rajasthan\n\nr High Court in D. B. Civil Regular Appeal No. 67153.\n\n' .\n\nS. M. Jain for the Appellant.\n\nB. D. Sharma, Ramesh Chandra and B. P. Maheshwari for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgme_nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The Staie of Rajasthan, defendant in Civil Suit No. 9 of 1963 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur, is the appellant in this appeal filed pursuant to a certificate granted under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitntion of India (as it itood prior to the 30th amendment). The plaintiff respondent took a building work on contract from the erstwhile Government of the\n\nState of Udaipur.\n\nHe completed the work on 6th June, 1950.\n\nDespite demands and notices issued by the plaintiff a considerable amount due to him remained unpaid. He, therefore, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover a sum of Rs. 3,19,458111/-\n\ntogether with interest at the rate of 12 % .\n\nThe suit was contested by the State of Rajasthan.\n\nAn interim decree for a sum of Rs. 66,517/- was passed on 7th November, 1955.\n\nAfter full trial a decree for Rs. 1,67,6191- (including the sum of Rs. 66,517 /- for which a preliminary decree had already been passed) was passed ou 11-6-1958/30-6-1958. The decree also awarded interest at the rate of 4!% on the amount decreed from the date of suit till the date of realisation.\n\nThe plaintiff and the defendant preferred appeals to the High Court of Rajasthan.\n\nThe High Court reduced the decreetal amount by a sum of Rs. 9,991/-.\n\nThe High Court, however, held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest from 1st January, 1951, and not merely from the date of suit. The High Court also enhanced the rate of interest pendente lite from 4!% to 6%. The High Court having varied the decree of the Trial Court, the State of Rajasthan\n\nA sought an<l obtained a certificate under Article 133(1) \\a) of the Constitution and has filed this appeal.\n\nThe controversy in the High Court related primarily to (i) conveyance and lift charges; (ii) alleged double benefit in regard to bond-stones, lintels and sills; (iii) use of Jodhpur slabs and their high cost; (iv) charge for C. P. Teak wood at the same rates as for Burma Teak.\n\nIn regard to conveyance and lift charges the High Court pointed out that no question was raised in the Memorandum of grounds of appeal and there as, therefore, no justification for permitting the learned Counsel for the State to assail the finding of the Trial Court relating to those charges. We do not see any reason either why the learned Counsel should be permitted to agitate this question in this appeal.\n\nRegarding double-charge for bond-stone, lintels and sills, the complaint of the appe!Iant was that while separate payment was being made for them, they had also been included in the measurements of the walls in which they happened to be fixed.\n\nFrom the office circular issued by the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of the United State of Rajasthan on 12th July, 1948, it appears that it was the practice uptill then to allow payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills separately without deducting their\n\nubic contents from the general wa!I masonry. This had always been the practice and this was never objected to by the Accountant General. In view of the practice obtaining till then it could not be said that the contractor had wrongfully claimed double payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills.\n\nThe nse of Jodhpnr slabs was not questioned in the written statement.\n\nAll that was said was that the rate was high but at the trial there was no evidence worth the name, as observed by the High Court to show that the charge was excessive. Again there was no objection to the use of C.P.Teak-wood instead of Burma teak wood as the latter was not available. According to the letter of the Superintending Engineer dated 6th February, 1950, where Burma teak wood was not available and C. P. Teak wood was used, the rates specified for Burma teak wood should be taken for C.P. teak wood. It could not, therefore, be said that the contractor had charged more than what he should for C.P. Teak wood.\n\nThe last question which was argued before us by Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the State of Rajasthan was that no interest should have been awarded for the period before the filing of the suit and that the rate of interest should not have been enhanced by the High Court for the period subsequent to the filing of the suit. It was\n\n. '\n\n' I\n\nsubmitted that the Interest Act, 1839, was not applicable as no sum certain was payable and there was no demand for payment of interes~.\n\nIt was argued that what was demanded by the plaintiff was damages and not interest. It was also contended that the Trial Court having, in exercise of its discretion, awarded interest at the rate of 4t%\n\npendente lite, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the discretion of the Trial Court. Reliance was placed upon the decision in Maha]lir Prasad Rungta v. Durga Datt(') and Union of India v. A. L. Ral/ia Ram(2 ).\n\nWe are unable to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant.\n\nUnder the Interest Act, 1839, \"upon all debts or sums certain payable at a certain time or otherwise, the Court before which such debts or sums may be recovered may, if it shall think fit, allow interest to the creditor at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the time when such debts or sums certain were payable, if such debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time; or if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment : provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law\".\n\nThe claim of the present plaintiff was not for the payment of any unliquidated damages or for the payment of any amount arising out of an inchoate or contingent obligation. It was for the payment of a sum which was ascertainable on a calculation made in accordance with the terms of the agreement. It was clearly a \"sum certain\" within the meaning of the Interest Act. In any case it would be a debt, i.e., \"a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation\".\n\nThe further question for consideration is whether the plaintiff had made a demand of payment, \"so as such demand shall give notice that interest will be claimed from the, date of such demand until the term of p11.yment''.\n\nThe plaintiff issued two notices to the defendant demanding payment.\n\nThe first was on 21st December, 1950, and the second was on 5th April, 1953. There is no dispute that in the second notice of demand of payment of definite claim for interest had been made. In the first notice it wall said \"by with:holding payment of his bills absolutely, the Government h!!.S put my client to enormous loss by way of interest also .......... I intimate to you\n\n(I) !I %11 3 S.C.R. 639. (2l r1%4J 3 S.C.R. 164.\n\n2-196SCI!79\n\n:A through this notice that the said Sbri Ramsingh claims a sum of Rs. 2, s0,519/- from the Rajastban State as under :\n\n1. Unpaid bills for work done\n\n2. Interest on the above. 3. 4. 5. 6.\n\nTotal :\n\nRs. l,37,177/- ll,511/-\n\nR•. 2,50,519/-\n\nThe learned counsel submitted that what was claimed by the plaintiff in this notice was damages and not interest and that too for the past, without any indication that future interest was also being claimed. It is true that the plaintiff mentioned \"loss by way of interest\", suggesting that what he was claiming was compensation for the damage suffered by him.\n\nWe are, however, not prepared to construe the notice so literally cir technically.\n\nThe mention of loss was only explanatory. The plaintiff was, without any manner or doubt clai{ning interest as such.\n\nNor are we impressed with the argument that there was no claim for future interest .. In our opinion a claim for past interest would necessarily imply a claim for future interest, vide Kuppuswami Pillai v. Madras Electric Tramway Co.\n\nLtd.(') and Sita Ram & Ors. v. Mrs. S. Sulliv(m( 2).\n\nIn Mahabir Pras(ld Rungta v. Durga Datt(3) interest was disallowed on the ground that the notice which was given did not specify the sum which was demanded and therefore, the Interest Act did not ap_ply.\n\nOn the question whether interest could be awarded on grounds of equi- F, ty it was held that what was claimed by Durga Datt was interest as damages and that it could not, therefore, be awarded. The suit itself was one for damages for breach of contract. We do not think that this case is of any assistance to the appellant. In Union of India v.\n\nA. L. Ral/ia Ram, (supra)° the Arbitrator had awarded interest by way\n\nof compensation since the party had to borrow a large amount of money from its banker to meet its obligation under the contract. The Supreme Court pointed out that interest 'could not be awarded by way of damages. The Supreme Court also noticed that an Arbitrator was not a Court within the meaning of the Interest Act. No question . arose before the Supreme Court whether interest could not be awarded\n\nunder the Interest Act merely because the notice demanding payment\n\n(I) l.L.R. 23 Mad. 41.\n\n(2) !l901J 2 P.L.R. 464 .\n\n. !3) [1961) 3 S.G.R. 639.\n\n• •\n\n' •\n\nmentioned that the plaintiff IJ!!d snfl't.inw IP.SS of interest also.\n\nIn our view the condition prescribed by the Interest Act that such demand shall give notice to the debtor t)lat iµterest shall be claimed is fulfilled if interest is claimed, notwithstanding the fact that the notice of demand\n\nexplains that Joss by way of loss of interest has been suffered.\n\nTo take any qther view would be to be over teehni_cal in the copstruetion of pleadings, including notices preceeding the action.\n\nWe 11m&t notice here an argument acjvanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the contract prohibited the award of interest. • H~ re)id upon the following sentence ocrnrring in paragraph lo of vr. the Coµtract dated 1 Jth Mi!Y 1947: \"Neither the earnest money -/ deposit nor the with-held amount shall bear any interest\".\n\nThis sen- • tence far from supporting the case of the appellant appears to s4pp, c.ct the ca&e of the plaintiff.\n\nThe reference to \"tile wi\\)1-):)e\\d amounts\" is tq the al!IOl!nts represe11iflg jiye per cent of tl!e ruµning bills which are required to be with-held at the time of payment of the rumiing bills.\n\nThe provision that the contractor is not entitled to interest on these with-held amounts appears to imply that inten, st is claimable on otjier a111ounts pue to the contractor.\n\n' .\n\nWhile awarding interest pendente lite the Trial Court adopted the rate of 4t% but the Trial Court gave no reasons for so doing.\n\nThe Uigh court considered the matt!'!' in som1> detail a11d having regard to the variQ!lS contjnqous defaults committed by the defendant and its Officers, the High Court enhanced the rate of interest to 6%.\n\nThe High Court was jl)stified in doing so and we see no reason to interefere with th\" c]jscretion exercised PY the Uigh Court. ln the resiilt !lie appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.\\{.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nIi\\", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUVEER SINGH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUVEER SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 5, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3179, "end_char": 3191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, Ramesh Chandra and B. P. Maheshwari for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3193, "end_char": 3207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, Ramesh Chandra and B. P. Maheshwari for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3212, "end_char": 3228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, Ramesh Chandra and B. P. Maheshwari for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3504, "end_char": 3518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He completed the work on 6th June, 1950."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested by the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "7th November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4109, "end_char": 4127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66,517/- was passed on 7th November, 1955."}}, {"text": "11-6-1958/30", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4281, "end_char": 4293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66,517 /- for which a preliminary decree had already been passed) was passed ou 11-6-1958/30-6-1958."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff and the defendant preferred appeals to the High Court of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4661, "end_char": 4678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, however, held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest from 1st January, 1951, and not merely from the date of suit."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4925, "end_char": 4939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6020, "end_char": 6045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the office circular issued by the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of the United State of Rajasthan on 12th July, 1948, it appears that it was the practice uptill then to allow payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills separately without deducting their\n\nubic contents from the general wa!I masonry."}}, {"text": "12th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the office circular issued by the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of the United State of Rajasthan on 12th July, 1948, it appears that it was the practice uptill then to allow payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills separately without deducting their\n\nubic contents from the general wa!I masonry."}}, {"text": "6th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the letter of the Superintending Engineer dated 6th February, 1950, where Burma teak wood was not available and C. P. Teak wood was used, the rates specified for Burma teak wood should be taken for C.P. teak wood."}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last question which was argued before us by Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the State of Rajasthan was that no interest should have been awarded for the period before the filing of the suit and that the rate of interest should not have been enhanced by the High Court for the period subsequent to the filing of the suit."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7277, "end_char": 7295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last question which was argued before us by Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the State of Rajasthan was that no interest should have been awarded for the period before the filing of the suit and that the rate of interest should not have been enhanced by the High Court for the period subsequent to the filing of the suit."}}, {"text": "Interest Act, 1839", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7555, "end_char": 7573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Interest Act, 1839", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8198, "end_char": 8216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9292, "end_char": 9304, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "21st December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9765, "end_char": 9784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was on 21st December, 1950, and the second was on 5th April, 1953."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9808, "end_char": 9823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was on 21st December, 1950, and the second was on 5th April, 1953."}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11458, "end_char": 11470, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Durga Datt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11601, "end_char": 11611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether interest could be awarded on grounds of equi- F, ty it was held that what was claimed by Durga Datt was interest as damages and that it could not, therefore, be awarded."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12038, "end_char": 12051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court pointed out that interest 'could not be awarded by way of damages."}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12211, "end_char": 12223, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12319, "end_char": 12331, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12581, "end_char": 12593, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13369, "end_char": 13371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_700_708_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "' . A\n\nN. KRIS'HNAMMAL\n\nR. EKAMBARAM & ORS.\n\nApril 16, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nHindu Succession Act, 1956-Ss. 8 to 10- Scope of.\n\nTest at or's will stated that in case his son died sonless ''my heirs s/1(lll take the properties\" bequeathed to him-Testator's son died without leaving behind a male issue-Expression \"my heirs'' nleaning of-Testator whether created an artificial class of hefrs-Term heirs used in a will-How construed-The point of time when heirs should be ascertained.\n\nBy a will the testator bequeathed certain properties to each of his three sons.\n\nWith regard to his third son (NP) the testator provided in Clause 5 of the will that if he had no male issues \"my heirs shall take the aforesaid properties\" after his life time.\n\nNP died in 1957 without any male issue, His widow (plaintiff-appellant) filed a suit for declaration of her title to the properties on the ground that her husband got the same absolutely by way of partition and that she, as his heir, inherited the properties or in the alternative for a declaration of her right to the properties on a true construction of the testator's will. (Defendants 1 and 2 were the sons of the testator's eldest son while defendants 3 to 7 were the daughters and defendant 8 the widowed daughter-in-law of the testator's second son.)\n\nE The trial judge of the High Court decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that\n\non the termination of the life interest given to NP who died sonless the properties devolved on the heirs of the testator as if on intestacy, that the plaintiff was entitled to 1 /3 share of the properties, and that the remaining 2/3 share should be shared by the defendants.\n\nDefendants 1 and 2 appealed to a Division Bench of the High Court, claiming that as the only heirs of the testator they were entitled to get the entire property of NP who had only a life interest in it Construing cl. 5 of the \"ill, the Division Bench held : (1) that by his will the testator had made his heirs as an \"artificial\" class of ultimate residuary legatees; (2) that the mandate implicit in the words \"if there are no male issues as aforesaid\" is that such class of legatees or heirs of the testator would be ascertained and worked out at that point of time when NP died sonless and at no other;\n\n(3) that this class of heirs of the testator was to be ascertnined on the death of NP on the hypothesis that the testator had been upto the time of NP's death, but according to orthodox Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death in 1928; (4) that neitb:er Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, nor the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was applicable because the testator actually died long before the coming into force of these two enactments and he did not die intestate; (5) that according to Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death in 1928, respondents 1 and 2 would be the only persons entitled to the property on the death of NP, to the exclusion of the latter's widowi the plaintiff.\n\n.~ .\n\n• •\n\n~} ..\n\nAllowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : I(•) On a proper construction of the will the testator could not be said to have created or carved out an \"artificial\" class of heirs and made a residuary bequest in their favour. It is well established that the term \"heirs\"\n\nused in a will must be construed in a legal sense and cannot normally be limited to \"issues\" only. It must mean all persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of i\\1heritance. [705E-F[\n\nAngurbala Mullick v. Dcbabrala Mullick, [1951] 2 SCR 1125 at p. 1144; referred to .\n\n(b) The expression \"my heirs\" used in cl. 5 of the will must be construed as equivalent to \"my legal heirs\". The words \"if there are no male issues my heirs shall take the aforesaid properties\" are not words of gift over to any\n\nrtificial class of heirs.\n\n[705G]\n\n2. Construction of clause 5 of the will brings out expressly or by inevitable implication, these instructions of the testator\n\n(a) In the event of NP's death, without male issue, the property v;.uuld devolve on the testator's heir.\n\n(b) Such heirs of the testator would be ascertained according to Hindu Law of intestate succession.\n\n(c) A!certainment of these \"heirs\" of the testator, is to be done at the time of NP's death on the hypothesis that the testator lived up to and died a moment after NP's death.\n\n(d) It logically follows from (a), (b) and (c) that these heirs of the E testator would be ascertained according to the Hindu Succession Act 1956, which wa! the law in force on 31-1-57 when NP died sonless and succession opened out. [706 D-F]\n\n3. On the mport and scope of cl. 5 of the will, as spelled out above, ascertainment of the testator's heirs on whom the property would devolve on NP's death, is to be done according to ss. 8 to 10 of the Hindu Succession Act. At that point of time, the plaintiff (who would be assumed to be the widow of a \"predeceased\" son) and the defendants would all be the heirs of the testator, falling in Class I of the Schedule referred to in s. 8, and in accordance with Rules 3 and 4 in Section 10 of the Act, the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/3rd share, in the property, while the remaining 2/3rd share shall go equally to the branches of Ramaswami and Vedivelu. [707 DE]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2085 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 15-11-68 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Side Appeal No. 45 /65.\n\nM. Natesan and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Appellants.\n\nV. S. Desai, P. G. Gokhale and S. R. Agarwala for the Respondents 1-2.\n\nEx parte for the Respondents JS.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Thi's appeal by certificate is directed against an Appellate Judgment and Decree, dated November 15, 196.8, of the High Court of Madras.\n\nThe facts leading to this appeal are as follows : The following pedigree table will be helpful in understanding the relationships of the parties :\n\nPalaniandi Pillai (died on 19-5-1928)\n\nRamaswami Pi11ai Vadivelu Pillai\n\n(died in 1953) Dharmr.mbal (died in 1940)\n\nR. Ekambaram (!st Defdt.) . . . .\n\nR. Balasubrarnanian : (2nd Defdt.)\n\nR .1 . aJaman1 Kamala Padma Sar ad a Lalitha\n\nNataraja Pillai (died on 31-1-57)\n\n(3rd Defdt.) (4th Defdt.) (5th Defdt.) (6th Defdt.) (7th Defdt.)\n\nSelvaraj (died in 1952) = Rajammal (8th Defdt.)\n\nPalaniandi Pillai, shown in the above pedigree-table, owned considerable properties.\n\nOn December 12, 1927, he executed a Will whereby he bequeathed certain properties to each of his three sons.\n\nHe appointed his sons, Ramaswami Pillai and Vadivelu Pillai, as Executors of his Will.\n\nIn regard to his third son, Nataraja Pillai, the testator in clause 5 of the Will stated :\n\n\"My third son, Nataraja Pillai, shall take the income accruing from the properties, namely, my cart-stand, house and ground, situate in the Western Row of Mint Street, bearing Municipal Door No. 278, Re-survey No. 600, Collector's Certificate No. 750 and the 5 Godowns, namely, 2 Godowns situate in Varadaraja Mudali St., bearing Municipal Door No. 90 and 91, and 3 Godowns situate in 3rd North Beach Road bearing Municipal Door Nos. 5, 6 and 7 to 9, Re-survey No. 3158 and 3187, Collector's Certificate No. 2550. After his life-time, if he leaves any male issue, they shall take the aforesaid properties, with\n\n• • \"f.\n\n• ,.\n\npowers of alienations such as gift, usufructuary mortgage A and sale. If there are no male issue as aforesaid, my heirs shall take the aforesaid properties.\"\n\nAlthough the Will had not been probated, yet, by mutual arrangements between the first two sons who were named Executors in the Will, and the third son, Nataraja Pillai, the properties were distributed in consonance with the terms of the Will and the Executors conveyed and transferred the same to the respective legatees, and mutual release deeds were, also, executed by the three sons.\n\nRamaswamy Pillai died in 1954 and Vadivelu Pillai in 1953, Nataraja Pillai died on January 31, 1957, without leaving any issue.\n\nHis widow, Krishnammal, the appellant herein, filed the suit (C. S .\n\nNo. 7 of 1959) out of which this appeal has arisen. She claimed-\n\n(a) partition and separate possession of one-third share in the (plaint-schedule) properties left by her husband Palaniandi Pillai, alleging that the properties' were in the possession of the joint family consisting of his sons, or in the alternative, (b) for a declaration of D her title and for possession of the properties on the ground that her husband Nataraja Pillai got the same absolutely by way of partition under the deed, dated July 14, 1928, and she, as his heir, inherited the properties; in the alternative, (c) for a declaration of her rights to the properties on a true construction of the Will of her father-inlaw, Palaniandi Pillai, and for possession of the properties.\n\nThe sons of Ramaswamy Pillai, respondents 1 and 2 herein, were impleaded as defendants 1 and 2, and the daughters of Vadivelu Pillai, respondents 3 to 7, were defendants 3 to 7. The daughter-inlaw of Vadivelu Pillai, respondent 8 herein, was added as 8th defendant.\n\nThe findings of the learned trial Judge, material for our purpose, were as follows :\n\n(i) Nataraja Pillai got only a life estate in the properties set out in Schedule I of the Plaint; (ii) the contingent interest in favour of\n\nthe heirs of Palaniandi Pillai became vestoo only on the death of G Nataraja Pillai, (iii) it is not open to the plaintiff, Krishnammal, to invoke Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; (iv) on the termination of the life interest given to Nataraja Pillai, the gift over in favour of the male issues could not take effect as he did not leave any male issue, with the consequence, that the properties, in effect; became revested in Palaniandi Pillai, but devolved on his heirs H as if on intestacy; (v) Section 111 of the Indian succession Act would be applicable.\n\nIn the result, the appellants' suit was decreed and it was held that she was entitled to one-third share and separate possession of the same by partition of the Plaint-Schedule 1 properties, and defendants 3 to 8 were equally entitled to one-third share together with mesne profits relating to their shares in the said properties, while defendants 1 and 2 were entitled to the remaining one-third share.\n\nAggrieved, defendants 1 and 2 PH'ferred Letters Patent Appeal in the High Court, contending that, according to the terms of the Will of Palaniandi Pillai, they were his only heirs and entitled to get the entire properties in which Nataraja Pillai held only a life interest; and that neither the plaintiff nor defendants 3 to 8 were entitled to any share.\n\nThe Appellate Bench of the High Court purporting to proceed mainly on the scope and construction of Clause 5 of the Will of Palaniandi Pillai, held :\n\nD (!) By his Will (Ex. P. 2) the testator had made \"my heirs\", i.e. the testator's heirs as an \"artificial\" class of ultimate residuary legatees. .>o '\n\n(2) This class of legatees or \"my heirs\" did not acquire a vested interest in the residuary bequest on the death of the testator.\n\n(3) The ultimate bequest in their favour would become vested\n\nonly in the event of Nataraja dying son!ess.\n\n( 4) The mandate implicit in the words \"if there are no male issues as aforesaid\" occurring in Clause 5 of the Will (Ex. P. 2) is that such class of legatees or heirs of the testator would be ascertained and worked out at that point of time when Nataraja died sonless, and at no other.\n\n(5) This class of \"my heirs\" of the testator would be ascertained with reference to the point of Nataraja's death (without a son) on January 31, 1957, when succession opened out and the bequest became distributable, \"on the hypothesis that Palaniandi Pillai had lived up to that time\" i.e. January 31, 1957.\n\n(6) Although this class of the heirs of the testator was to be ascertained on January 31, 1957 on the hypothesis that the testator and Nataraja died simultaneously, such ascertainment could not be done either by resorting to the Hindu Women's Rights to Property\n\nH Act, 1937 or to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, because Palaniandi '\\- Pillai actually died in 1928, long before the corning into force of these two enactments and he did not die intestate.\n\n(7) Such class of heirs of the testator were to be determined according to the orthodox Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death on May 19, 1928.\n\n( 8) Section 111 of the Indian Succession Act was not applicable.\n\nOn the above reasoning, the Appellate Bench of the High Court reversing the decree of the learned trial Judge, held that Respondents 1 and 2 herein were the only persons entitled to the entire Schedule 1 property on the death of Nataraja Pillai, to the exclusion of the latter's widow, the plaintiff.\n\nThus the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed.\n\nAfter obtaining a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution C from the. High Court, the plaintiff, Krishnammal, has come in appeal before this Court.\n\nControversy in this case hinges around the scope and construction of Clause S of the Will (Ex. P-2). In that connec\\ion, the first question that arises for consideration is : Did the testator by this Clause D create or carve out an \"arificial\" class of his heirs, and make a residuary bequest in their favour ?\n\nIn our opinion, on a proper construction of the Will, the answer to this question must be in the negative.\n\nIt is well settled that legal terms such as \"heirs\", used in a Will must be construed in the legal sense, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed by the testator.\n\nThe word \"heirs\", as pointed out by this Court in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick(') cannot normally be limited to \"issues\" only. It must mean all persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance.\n\nThere is nothing in the language of Clause S of the Will which compels the construction that by use of the expression \"my heirs\" the testator meant somehing different from his 'heirs under the law.' The expression \"my heirs\" has therefore to be construed as equivalent to \"my legal heirs\".\n\nThus considered, the words used in the last two sentences of Clause S of the Will are not words of gift over to any 'artificial' class of heirs.\n\nThey only indicate that in the event of Nataraja's death without any male issue, further devolution of the estate that had been given to him for life, would be regulated in favour of the testator's heirs ascertained in accordance with Hindu Law of intestate succession.\n\nThat is to say, the testator did not specify or lay down any line of heirs, deviating from the Hindu Law of intestate succession.\n\n(!) (1951] S.C.R. 1125 at p. 1144.\n\nThe ground is now clear to consider the second question which is pivotal to the whole problem : Whether the heirs of the testator, on whom the estate was to devolve in the event of Nataraja dying sonless, were to be ascertained according to Hindu Law in force at the time of Nataraja's death or according to Hindu Law, prevailing in 1928 when the testator died. This question, also, is one of reaching at the real intent of the testator.\n\nIn order to expatiate, the true import of the last two sentences of Clause 5 of the Will (Ex. P 2), the same can be legitimately expanded, parenthesized and eludicated so as to read like this :\n\n\"After Nataraja's life-time, if he leaves any male issue, they shall take the aforesaid properties, with powers of alienation ... If Nataraja dies without leaving any male issue, then my heirs, then ascertained according to law of inheritance, shall take the aforesaid properties.\"\n\nThus amplified and elucidated, Clause 5 of the Will brings out, expressly or by inevitable implication, the intention and instructions of the testator in regard to the following :\n\n(a) In the event of the termination of the life-estate of Nataraja .>. ~\n\non his death, without male issue, the property will devolve on \"my heirs\" i.e. the testator's heirs.\n\n(b) Such heirs of the testator are to be ascertained according to the Hindu Law of intestate succession.\n\n( c) Such ascertainment of the heirs of the testator is to be done on the date of Nataraja's death without male issue, when succession opens out in favour of those heirs, and not with reference to the date of the testator's death.\n\nThis necessarily implies that \"my heirs\" of the testator are required to be ascertained on the hypothesis that the testator lived upto and died a moment after Nataraja's death.\n\nIf what is spelled out at (a), (b) and (c) be the true construction of Clause 5 of the Will, it logically and inexorably follows therefrom, that ascertainment of the heirs of the testator, on whom the property G was intended to devolve in the event of Nataraja dying sonless, was to be made in accordance with Hindu Law of intestate Succession as in force on the date of Nataraja's death, on January 31, 1957, when succession opened out, and not in accordance with the orthodox Hindu Law prevailing in 1928, which on the relevant date, January 31, 1957, stood abrogated and superseded by the Hindu Succession H Act. 1956. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that \"my heirs\" referred to by the testator in Clause 5 of his Will, have to be ascertained in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In so\n\n• • ~-\n\n~ ,.\n\nN. KRJSHANAMMAL v. R. EKAMBARAM & ORS. (Sarkaria, J.) 707\n\ndoing, we are only giving effect to the import and construction of the A Will of the testator, and no question of giving retrospective operation to the statute is involved.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have said that at the time of making the Will, the testator could not predicate that at the' time of Nataraja's death without leaving any son, the Hindu Law of Succession would be different from the one prevailing at the time of making the Will or the testator's death.\n\nNevertheless, the testator was definitely contemplating the contingency of Nataraja dying without any male issue, and the necessity of ascertaining the testator's heirs at that point of time for further devolution of the property. It cannot, therefore, be said that ascertainment of the testator's heirs according to the law in force at the time of happening of the contemplated contingency, was wholly beyond the ken of the testator.\n\nIn the view we take of the import and scope of Clause 5 of the Will (Ex. P. 2) ascertainment of the heirs of Palaniandi Pillai has\n\nto be done on the assumption that he died intestate, a moment after D Nataraja Pillai's death, according to Sections 8 to 10 of the Hindu Succession Act.\n\nAt that point of time, the plaintiff (who would be assumed to be the widow of a \"predeceased\" son), and the defendants would all be heirs of the testator, falling in Class I of the Schedule referred to in Section 8.\n\nAccording to Section 9, all the heirs in Class I of the Schedule shall take simultaneously, to the exclusion of all other heirs.\n\nThe distribution of the property among the plaintiff and defendants will be governed by Rules 3 and 4 in Section 10, which are as under :\n\n\"Rule 3. -The heirs in the branch of each predeceased son or each predeceased daughter of the intestate shall take between them one share.\"\n\n\"Rule 4.-The distribution of the share referred to in Rule 3-\n\n(i) among the heirs in the branch of the predeceased son shall be so made that his widow (or widows together) and the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions; and the branch of predeceased sons gets the same portion;\n\n(ii) among the heirs in the branch of the predeceased daughter shall be so made that the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions.\"\n\nIn accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Hindu Succession Ac!, the plaintiff would be entitled to get 1 /3rd share in Schedule I property in which her husband had a life-interest, while the remaining 2/3rd share in the property shall be equally distributed among the two branches of the defendants, the branches of Ramaswami and Vadivelu getting 1 /3rd share each.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and pass a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession in favour of the plaintiff with respect to her l/3rd share in the snit property.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to pay and bear !heir own costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nN. KRIS'HNAMMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. KRISHNAMMAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. EKAMBARAM & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. EKAMBARAM & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 16, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 8 to 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 653, "end_char": 661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1901, "end_char": 1906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NP", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of the \"ill, the Division Bench held : (1) that by his will the testator had made his heirs as an \"artificial\" class of ultimate residuary legatees; (2) that the mandate implicit in the words \"if there are no male issues as aforesaid\" is that such class of legatees or heirs of the testator would be ascertained and worked out at that point of time when NP died sonless and at no other;\n\n(3) that this class of heirs of the testator was to be ascertnined on the death of NP on the hypothesis that the testator had been upto the time of NP's death, but according to orthodox Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death in 1928; (4) that neitb:er Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, nor the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was applicable because the testator actually died long before the coming into force of these two enactments and he did not die intestate; (5) that according to Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death in 1928, respondents 1 and 2 would be the only persons entitled to the property on the death of NP, to the exclusion of the latter's widowi the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Right to Property Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2579, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2616, "end_char": 2642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1951] 2 SCR 1125", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3621, "end_char": 3626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3866, "end_char": 3874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "31-1-57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the law in force on 31-1-57 when NP died sonless and succession opened out. ["}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956"}}, {"text": "ss. 8 to 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4787, "end_char": 4798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4826, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that point of time, the plaintiff (who would be assumed to be the widow of a \"predeceased\" son) and the defendants would all be the heirs of the testator, falling in Class I of the Schedule referred to in s. 8, and in accordance with Rules 3 and 4 in Section 10 of the Act, the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/3rd share, in the property, while the remaining 2/3rd share shall go equally to the branches of Ramaswami and Vedivelu. [", "canonical_name": "Ramaswami Pillai"}}, {"text": "Vedivelu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5252, "end_char": 5260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that point of time, the plaintiff (who would be assumed to be the widow of a \"predeceased\" son) and the defendants would all be the heirs of the testator, falling in Class I of the Schedule referred to in s. 8, and in accordance with Rules 3 and 4 in Section 10 of the Act, the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/3rd share, in the property, while the remaining 2/3rd share shall go equally to the branches of Ramaswami and Vedivelu. [", "canonical_name": "Vadivelu Pillai"}}, {"text": "M. Natesan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5441, "end_char": 5451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5461, "end_char": 5478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, P. G. Gokhale and S. R. Agarwala for the Respondents 1-2."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5513, "end_char": 5526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, P. G. Gokhale and S. R. Agarwala for the Respondents 1-2."}}, {"text": "S. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, P. G. Gokhale and S. R. Agarwala for the Respondents 1-2."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Thi's appeal by certificate is directed against an Appellate Judgment and Decree, dated November 15, 196.8, of the High Court of Madras."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Thi's appeal by certificate is directed against an Appellate Judgment and Decree, dated November 15, 196.8, of the High Court of Madras."}}, {"text": "Palaniandi Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to this appeal are as follows : The following pedigree table will be helpful in understanding the relationships of the parties :\n\nPalaniandi Pillai (died on 19-5-1928)\n\nRamaswami Pi11ai Vadivelu Pillai\n\n(died in 1953) Dharmr.mbal (died in 1940)\n\nR. Ekambaram (!", "canonical_name": "Palaniandi '\\- Pillai"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami Pi11ai Vadivelu Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 6020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to this appeal are as follows : The following pedigree table will be helpful in understanding the relationships of the parties :\n\nPalaniandi Pillai (died on 19-5-1928)\n\nRamaswami Pi11ai Vadivelu Pillai\n\n(died in 1953) Dharmr.mbal (died in 1940)\n\nR. Ekambaram (!"}}, {"text": "R. Ekambaram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to this appeal are as follows : The following pedigree table will be helpful in understanding the relationships of the parties :\n\nPalaniandi Pillai (died on 19-5-1928)\n\nRamaswami Pi11ai Vadivelu Pillai\n\n(died in 1953) Dharmr.mbal (died in 1940)\n\nR. Ekambaram (!", "canonical_name": "R. EKAMBARAM & ORS"}}, {"text": "R. Balasubrarnanian", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Balasubrarnanian : (2nd Defdt.)"}}, {"text": "Kamala Padma Sar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aJaman1 Kamala Padma Sar ad a Lalitha\n\nNataraja Pillai (died on 31-1-57)\n\n(3rd Defdt.) ("}}, {"text": "Selvaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Selvaraj (died in 1952) = Rajammal (8th Defdt.)"}}, {"text": "December 12, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 12, 1927, he executed a Will whereby he bequeathed certain properties to each of his three sons."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appointed his sons, Ramaswami Pillai and Vadivelu Pillai, as Executors of his Will.", "canonical_name": "Ramaswami Pillai"}}, {"text": "Vadivelu Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6572, "end_char": 6587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appointed his sons, Ramaswami Pillai and Vadivelu Pillai, as Executors of his Will.", "canonical_name": "Vadivelu Pillai"}}, {"text": "Nataraja Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6644, "end_char": 6659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to his third son, Nataraja Pillai, the testator in clause 5 of the Will stated :\n\n\"My third son, Nataraja Pillai, shall take the income accruing from the properties, namely, my cart-stand, house and ground, situate in the Western Row of Mint Street, bearing Municipal Door No.", "canonical_name": "Nataraja Pillai"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6677, "end_char": 6685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramaswamy Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswamy Pillai died in 1954 and Vadivelu Pillai in 1953, Nataraja Pillai died on January 31, 1957, without leaving any issue.", "canonical_name": "Ramaswami Pillai"}}, {"text": "January 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswamy Pillai died in 1954 and Vadivelu Pillai in 1953, Nataraja Pillai died on January 31, 1957, without leaving any issue."}}, {"text": "Krishnammal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8023, "end_char": 8034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His widow, Krishnammal, the appellant herein, filed the suit (C. S .", "canonical_name": "Krishnammal"}}, {"text": "Palaniandi Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She claimed-\n\n(a) partition and separate possession of one-third share in the (plaint-schedule) properties left by her husband Palaniandi Pillai, alleging that the properties' were in the possession of the joint family consisting of his sons, or in the alternative, (b) for a declaration of D her title and for possession of the properties on the ground that her husband Nataraja Pillai got the same absolutely by way of partition under the deed, dated July 14, 1928, and she, as his heir, inherited the properties; in the alternative, (c) for a declaration of her rights to the properties on a true construction of the Will of her father-inlaw, Palaniandi Pillai, and for possession of the properties.", "canonical_name": "Palaniandi '\\- Pillai"}}, {"text": "July 14, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She claimed-\n\n(a) partition and separate possession of one-third share in the (plaint-schedule) properties left by her husband Palaniandi Pillai, alleging that the properties' were in the possession of the joint family consisting of his sons, or in the alternative, (b) for a declaration of D her title and for possession of the properties on the ground that her husband Nataraja Pillai got the same absolutely by way of partition under the deed, dated July 14, 1928, and she, as his heir, inherited the properties; in the alternative, (c) for a declaration of her rights to the properties on a true construction of the Will of her father-inlaw, Palaniandi Pillai, and for possession of the properties."}}, {"text": "Ramaswamy Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8850, "end_char": 8866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sons of Ramaswamy Pillai, respondents 1 and 2 herein, were impleaded as defendants 1 and 2, and the daughters of Vadivelu Pillai, respondents 3 to 7, were defendants 3 to 7.", "canonical_name": "Ramaswami Pillai"}}, {"text": "Vadivelu Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8955, "end_char": 8970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sons of Ramaswamy Pillai, respondents 1 and 2 herein, were impleaded as defendants 1 and 2, and the daughters of Vadivelu Pillai, respondents 3 to 7, were defendants 3 to 7.", "canonical_name": "Vadivelu Pillai"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9263, "end_char": 9273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G Nataraja Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9398, "end_char": 9415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The findings of the learned trial Judge, material for our purpose, were as follows :\n\n(i) Nataraja Pillai got only a life estate in the properties set out in Schedule I of the Plaint; (ii) the contingent interest in favour of\n\nthe heirs of Palaniandi Pillai became vestoo only on the death of G Nataraja Pillai, (iii) it is not open to the plaintiff, Krishnammal, to invoke Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; (iv) on the termination of the life interest given to Nataraja Pillai, the gift over in favour of the male issues could not take effect as he did not leave any male issue, with the consequence, that the properties, in effect; became revested in Palaniandi Pillai, but devolved on his heirs H as if on intestacy; (v) Section 111 of the Indian succession Act would be applicable.", "canonical_name": "G Nataraja Pillai"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9479, "end_char": 9488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9496, "end_char": 9522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9840, "end_char": 9851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Indian succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9859, "end_char": 9880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10071, "end_char": 10081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10764, "end_char": 10772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nataraja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11182, "end_char": 11190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The ultimate bequest in their favour would become vested\n\nonly in the event of Nataraja dying son!ess.", "canonical_name": "Nataraja Pillai"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11302, "end_char": 11310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12066, "end_char": 12077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12088, "end_char": 12114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Palaniandi '\\- Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12124, "end_char": 12145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) Although this class of the heirs of the testator was to be ascertained on January 31, 1957 on the hypothesis that the testator and Nataraja died simultaneously, such ascertainment could not be done either by resorting to the Hindu Women's Rights to Property\n\nH Act, 1937 or to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, because Palaniandi '\\- Pillai actually died in 1928, long before the corning into force of these two enactments and he did not die intestate.", "canonical_name": "Palaniandi '\\- Pillai"}}, {"text": "May 19, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12407, "end_char": 12419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) Such class of heirs of the testator were to be determined according to the orthodox Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death on May 19, 1928."}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12427, "end_char": 12438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12446, "end_char": 12467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12682, "end_char": 12692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12892, "end_char": 12903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Krishnammal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12963, "end_char": 12974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court, the plaintiff, Krishnammal, has come in appeal before this Court.", "canonical_name": "Krishnammal"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15227, "end_char": 15235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15668, "end_char": 15676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16581, "end_char": 16589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17219, "end_char": 17227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17287, "end_char": 17313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18360, "end_char": 18368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D Nataraja Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18513, "end_char": 18530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 2) ascertainment of the heirs of Palaniandi Pillai has\n\nto be done on the assumption that he died intestate, a moment after D Nataraja Pillai's death, according to Sections 8 to 10 of the Hindu Succession Act.", "canonical_name": "G Nataraja Pillai"}}, {"text": "Sections 8 to 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18553, "end_char": 18569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18577, "end_char": 18597, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18805, "end_char": 18814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18830, "end_char": 18839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19052, "end_char": 19062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19784, "end_char": 19794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vadivelu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the plaintiff would be entitled to get 1 /3rd share in Schedule I property in which her husband had a life-interest, while the remaining 2/3rd share in the property shall be equally distributed among the two branches of the defendants, the branches of Ramaswami and Vadivelu getting 1 /3rd share each.", "canonical_name": "Vadivelu Pillai"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_709_744_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "~ -.\n\n~··\n\nSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.\n\nHINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. LTD. & ORS.\n\nApril 17, 1979\n\n[P. N, SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nElectricity Act (9 of 1910), s. 2(h) & Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 (64 of\n\n1948) S. 2(b)-State Electricity Board if a licensee.\n\nElectricity Act 1910 (9 of 1910), S. 22-B (as inserted in 1959)-Scope and object of-Order under section-Factors to be taken into consideration & Elec tricity (Supply) Act 1948 (54 of 1948), S. 26 Proviso 2-Scope of.\n\nU.P. Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order 1977- Cl. 6(a) (i) Proviso-Validity of .\n\nWords & Phrases-'Regulmlon', 'restriction', 'prohibition'-Distinction between.\n\nAt the time of granting lincence to the company for the establishment of a new Aluminium factory the Government of India obtained the consent of the Government of U.P. to make available to the company in bulk clieap electricity\n\nfrom the Rihand Hydro-Electric Scheme. An agreement was entered into between the Company and the State Government for the bulk supply of electricity on a firm, continuous and uninterrupted basis at 1.99 odd paise per unit E for a period of 25 years.\n\nThe company set up and commissioned its aluminium plant at Renukoot in April, 1962. It was granted a further licence for the expansion of its installed capacity. As the State was unable to meet the extra requirement of energy, silnction under s. 28 of the Electricity Act 1910 was granted to the Company, at its request, on NOvember 12, 1964, to set up a generating station at Reno- F sagar, near Renukoot.\n\nIt set up two generating units of 67'.5 mw each. The first unit started generating power in 1967 and the other in 1968.\n\nIn the meantime, permission was granted to increase the Company's installed capacity from 40,000 metric tonnes to 60,000 metric tonnes. The Company thought of setting up a plant for the production of 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium in the State of Gujarat. But the Government of U.P.\n\nG entered into negotiations: with the Company and in its letter dated November 20, 1968, it stated that there could be no difficulty in meeting the interim requirements of energy for 2 to 3 years from the U.P. State Electricity Board and also for arranging for parallel running of their new power stations. The\n\nCompany was granted sanction to expand the Renu Sagar Generation by 250 mw, and after negotiations with the State Government it Was agreed that the U.P.S.E.B. would meet the additional energy under a phased programme. The H U.P.S.E.B. stated in its letter dated September 2, 1972, that the supply would be without prejudice to the power of the State Government to control the\n\ndistribution and consumption of energy under s. 22B of the Act. The additional energy was not made available to the Company during 1972-75 although the rate was substantially increased with retrospective effect.\n\nAn agreement \\Vas however entered into between the Company and the U.P.S.E.B. on November 30, 1976, in sup'ersession of the earlier agreements, and it was s-tipulated that it would be read and construed in all respects in conformity with the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and its rules and the regulations and the amendments thereto.\n\nTh~ State Government took a decision in December 1976 to reconnect some agricultural pumping sets which had been disconnected and this placed a.n additional load on the grid system of the State.\n\nOn the note of the UPSEB that there was acute shortage of energy, and its suggestion for the imposition of some restrictions, the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consumption) Order 1977, was issued by the Government on April 7, 1977. Under\n\ncl. 6(a)(i) of the Order, the Company could draw energy only to the extent of SO per cent of its monthly coi.1sumption.\n\nAs the shortage of energy became more acute the Secretary of the Power D DepMim'ent sent a note to the Governor dated May 3, 1977 stating that there was a large gap between demand and availability of energy and that overriding public interest, particularly the need to maintain food supply, required that units which were heavy consumers of 'energy should be subjected to further cut in the consumption of energy. It was particularly pointed out that as the Company was itself generating energy at Renusagar, it will have more than 50 per cent of en'ergy even if the Board's supply was completely withdrawn. The E Governor approved that proposal on June 1, 1977. A proviso was inserted in\n\ncl. 6(a) (i) of the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consump tion) Order, 1977 in June 2, 1977 according to which an industrial consumer having its own source of generation of energy from which it obtained 50 per cent or more of its consumption would suffer a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the UPSEB. The company was given time to bring about the total cut.\n\nFr'esh elections were held to the State Legislature Assembly, and the new Cabinet was sworn in on June 23, 1977. It decided to reduce the supply of energy to the company to zero, in pursua.nce of the ameudment dated June 2, 1977 and called for a fresh note on the position regarding the generation and distribution of energy. The Chairman of the UPSEB prepared a note on August 26, 1977, in which he pointed out the shortage of energy, including Dr substantial fall in the generation of thermal energy, and in the \"import\" of energy. The Stad:e Government made an order on September 19, 1977 called the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Supply Distribution, Consumption and Us'e) Order, 1977.\n\nThat order was made for maintaining th'e supply and securing equitable distribution of electrical energy, and to provide for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption and use thereof.\n\nClause 6 of the order which provided for compulsory cut in consumption of 'energy and demand, affected the company.\n\n• •\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 711\n\nThe clause provided as follows : A\n\n''6(a.) (i) : In respect of electrical energy consumed by all large and heavy .,_ power industrial consumers receiving power at 33 kv. and above excepting fertilizers, from the U.P.S.E.B. a cut of 50 per tent in their monthly consumption of electricity both in respect of energy and demand shall be exercised :\n\nProvided that where a1.ay such indu9rial consun1er has bis own source of generation of energy which alon'e enables him to obtain ~O per cent or more of his total consumption, then a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the UPSEB shall be exercised.\"\n\nBeing aggrieved by the compulsory cut imposed company filed its third writ petition against the earlier ~Tit petitions were dismissed as withd1nwn.\n\nThe High Court took the view :-\n\nby the Government the order.\n\nThe company's\n\n(a) th~! it was the •tatutory obligation of the UPSEB to supply electrical energy to a consumer and held that the Pipri Bus Bar was a \"distributing Main'' uncler s. 2(o) and was an electricity supply line as defined in s. 2(f) of the Act; (b) s. 22B of the Act did not confer power on the State Governments to cut off supply of energy to existing consumers or to iS&ue an order that certain preferences will be followed in supplying 'energy, (c) though the company deserved the writ, it could not be said that UPSEB had deliberately under utilised its generation capacity, and held tb'e first proviso to Clause 6(a) (i) of the order ultra vires, quashed it and directed the UPSEB to supply electrical energy to the comp2111y in accordance wlth law, without taking into consideration, the provisionsof th'e said proviso.\n\nAppeals were filed in this Court by the State and the Company, the State being aggrieved because the Hjgh Court had interfered with th'e U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order, 1977 dated September 19, 1977 made under s. 22B of the Electricity Supply Act, 1910 and the Company felt aggrieved on the ground that the High Court had not granted all the reliefs which it had claimed in its petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the appeals it was contended :\n\n(a) Only the energy which was generated by the Board could be the subfect-matter of an order under s. 22B of the Act and it was not permissible for the State to take into account the energy generated by the Company for its own use.\n\n(b) Sub-s. ( l) of s. 22B of the Act was confined to a licensee and would not ht! applicable to the energy supplied by a sanction-holder under s. 28.\n\n(c) The only permissible preference was that under s. 22A in favour of an establishment mentionep. in it and the preference sho\\vn to indivi dual consumers was illegal,\n\n(d) The validity of the Order, which was by way of subordinate legislation, was open to judicial scrutiny; the subjective satisfaction of the State Govern- H ment in making it was open to challenge in a court of law, the order suffered from the vice of malice in law; it had been made in the colourable exercise of\n\nA the power under s. 228 of the Act simply to compel the con1pany to agree to the payment of a higher rate for the supply of energy to it. While making the order the State Government failed to take into consideration the facts that the production. of aluminium was of considerable importance to the national economy and that the Board was capable of generating more energy but was not doing so. The issue of the Order was really a colourable exercise of the Stnte Government's power under s. 228 of the Act as power was supplied indiscri- B minately to new consumers after imposing a cut on the Company's consumption of energy.\n\n(e) The Board had deliberately reduced its thermal generation.\n\nHELD : 1. The High Court erred in taking the view that th'e Pipri Bus B&r~ which was composed of a set of conductors which were made up of thick aluminium core steel reinforced cables, was a 'distributing main' under s. 2(e) of the Act and was an electric supply line as defined in s. 2(f) and that cl. VI of the Schedule to the Act would be fully applicable to the Board in so far as its obligation to the Company was concerned.\n\nIn view of the second proviso of s. 26 of the Act of 1948, the provisions of cl. VI of the Sch'edule to the Act could apply to the U.P.S.E.B~ in reSopect of that area only where distribution mains had been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of them had commenced.\n\n[724B-F]\n\nThe High Court, therefore, erred in taking the view that the Board was bound by the term of cl. VI of the Schedule to the Act to supply energy to the Company within one month of the making of a requisition or within such longer period as the Electrical Inspector might allow. But even if the Board was under an obligation to supply energy to every person, the fact nevertheless remained that the State Government had th'e over-riding power to provide, by order made under s. 22B of the Act, for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption or use thereof. Sub-s. (2) of that section categorically states that, y.ithout prejudice to the generality of the power under sub-s. ( 1), the order may direct the BOard not to comply with any contract, agreement or requisition for the supply of energy.\n\n[725B-DJ\n\n2. Sub-s. (I) of s. 28 of the Act in terms refers to and deals with, engaging by a non-licensee, in the business of supplying energy to the \"public\". It was, therefore, futile to contend that what was generated by the Renusagar Power Company was not meant for supply to the public, but was the Company's own energy. It is true that generation became, in the circumstances, the ucaptive\" generation for the use of the Company, but that was far from saying that, in the eye of law, it was not energy meant for supply to the public or that it was not amenable to control under s 22B. It was therefore also liable to equitable distribution by an orcter unde~ s. 22B of the Act.\n\n[725G-726A]\n\n3. The expression \"energy\" had been defined by cl. (g) of s. 2 of the Act to mean electrical energy, generated, transmitted or supplied for any purpose or used fur any purpose except the transmission of a message. lt was th'crefore a pervading definition and there was no reason why energy generated and sup plied under s. 28 of the Act should not fall within its sweep. [726B-CJ\n\n4. Though the use of the article \"the\" in sub-s. (2) was not quite appropriate, there was no justification for the argument that section 22B was applicable only to licensees and not to a sanction holder under s. 28.\n\n[727C]\n\n¥ I\n\n•_, • ) •\n\nJ. ...\n\n)g;\n\n\"' - \"\n\n• - ·~ \"- •\n\n.Jo;\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 713\n\n5. What s. 22B of the Act authorised the State Government to do, was to A make an order providing for 'regulating\" the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy. [727D]\n\n6. A distinction between 'regulation' and 'restriction' or 'prohibition' had always been drawn. 'Regulation' promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas 'prohibition' obstructs or shuts off, or deni'es it to those to whom it is applied. The High B Court went wrong in thinking that the order had the effect of prohibiting the supply of energy to the Company, which was an 'exciting consumer'. [727G~\n\n728A, 728C]\n\nMunicipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, 1896 AC SB; Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion and the-Distillers and Brewers' Association of Ontario, 1896 AC 348; Birmingham and i'1id!and Motor On1nibus Co. Ltd. v. Worcestershire County Council, [1967] 1 WLR 409, Tarr v.\n\nTarr, [19721 2 WLR 1068; Tiu> Automobile Tranport (Raias; han) ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1963] 1 SCR 491; State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, [1967] 2 SCR 361; Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra etc. [1977] 2 SCR_,828 at P. 851.\n\n7. Whot had been ordered was no more than a cut of 50 per cent in the monthly conumption of electricity and not atotal prohibition of consumption D of energy.\n\nThat was a. step in the direc'ion of regulating the consumption of energy, and not a total prohibition as envisaged in the proviso tr> cl. 6(a) (i) of the Order.\n\n[728E]\n\n8. The proviso operateo;; in a special or particular field and for a particular purpose where it was considered necessary for regulating the supply etc., of the energy in the int:?Je<; t of t_he other con<; umers, for s. 22R w<1s mean to maintain the &U}Jply and secure the equitable distribution of energy to all concerned. The\n\nHgh <..ourt did not properly appreciate that aspect of the matter. [728F]\n\n9. Large and heavy industrial consumers of the category in cl. 6(a) (i) are a cla:; s by themselves and it is hardly permissible for them to complain that the small preference shown to agriculturists in supplying energy for their water pumps or tube-wells. or in energising State tube-wells, supplying water to them, or the supply of energy to sn1all scale industries had really created a privileged class of consumers or brought into existence any such concept of priorities as to run counter to or defeat the objective of bringing about the equitable distribution of energy by an order under s. 22B. The l-ligh Court had no rcul ju<; tification for recording an adverse finding against the State on the question of the socalled preference or priorities. [729G-H, 730B]\n\n10. There was no doubt that the State Government formed its opinion about the necessity and expediency of making the Order for the purpose of maintaining the supply and securing the equitable distribution of energy at a time when that was called for. and thi::; Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal to examine any and every arb'llment in an attempt to sho, v that the opinion of the State Government\n\nas vitiated for one fanciful reason or the other. [731 G-H]\n\nII. Although the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order, 1977, had been made on the ground that the State\n\nGovernment was of the opinion that it was necessary and expedient for main- 7-330SCl/79\n\ntaining the .supply and securing the equitable distribution of clectric; U e:aerc, to\n\nprovide for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption and U&C thereof, it did not deal with all those matters in detail. In fact it may well be said to k an order I'elating essentially to compulsory cut in the consumption of energy.\n\nBut that cannot detract from the basic fact that the order had the iianction of\n\n~. 22B of the A.ct and subserved the main purpose thereuf. 1berefore ito; validity wa~ not open to cha.llenge as a piece of subordinate legislation. [7320 ...... 7338]\n\n12. Malice in law is another aspect of the doctrine of ultra vires. Al. offeading Act can be condemned simply, for the reason that it is unauthorised. Bad faith has often been treated as interchangeable with unreasonableness and taking a decision on extraneous considerations. In that sense, it is not really a distinct ground of invalidity. It is well settled that if a discretionary power has been C exercised for an 'unauthorised purpose' that is enough to invite tbe Co\\.irt's review.\n\n[733-D]\n\nRoncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121 p. 141 (Canada Law Reports); referred to.\n\nIn the instant case. the Company had not been able to establish malice in law, n1erely because of what the Chief Secretary said in his press statemenU dated July D 8, 1977, or what the Minister informed the Assembly. It may well be that the new State Government was dissatisfied with the new agreement which had been entered into at the instance of the political party which was then in power, but it could not be said that the new Minister's desire to examing the validity or propriety of that agreement arose out of any extraneous or improper considem tion so as to amount to malice in law. [734H~735r\\]\n\n13. Although the High Court arrived at the conclusion that the company deserved, the writ which it granted, it did not find it possible to hold that the\n\nUPSEB, had deliberately under utilised its generation capacity. That was a finding of fact which did not ca.II for interference.\n\n[736E]\n\n14. As long ns the dominant motive \"'a_, proper and reasonable, and was not sullied by a mere pretext, the Order based on it would be valid when it was well F v1ithin the due scope and policy of the Act and was an honest attempt to deal with the situation for which the power to make the order had been granted by the Act.\n\nThere was thus no justification for the argument that there was malice in law on the part of the State Gov'emmeint in making the order. [736G, F]\n\ni15. That distribution can be said to be \"equitabl'e\" which is \"just and right under al1 the circumstances of the particular case\". The High Court had recorded a finding that there was shortage in the generatioo of energy when th'e order w2R made The fact remains that the demand for energy was far in excess of the supply from all sources available to the UPSEB. It had also been well established that a situation had arisen when it became necessary to obtain an order from the State Government about the course of action to be adopted by the Board.\n\nSelf-contained notes were therefore drawn Up in March, 1977 and on Mav 24. 1977, June 28, 1977 and August 26, 1977, which were quite detailed and objective and led to the making of the Order. The Order was a genuine ... attempt to secure equitable distribution of energy. It was true H1,1t the Coniranv was the worst sufferer under cl. 6(a) (i) of the Order, but .then it was also the greatest consumer.\n\n(737CF]\n\n' '\n\n1- '\n\nf-,, • ~·· • ;\n\n;>.\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 715\n\n16. From the Chief Secretary's letter dated November 20, 1968 it appeared that the S0.1-te Government had assured the Company that it would meet the interim requiren1ent of the Company for 2 or 3 years from the UPSEB and facilitate the p<iraHel running of the Company's new power station in addition to the station which had been set up at Renusagar.\n\nBut the State was not a party to the <igreement dated November 30, 1976 for the supply of additional\n\n30mw. because the agreement was made between the Company and the\n\n4 UPSEB. It was expressly stated in +hat agreeme>.1t that it would be subject to the provisions of the Electricity Acts of 1910 and 1948 and the rules a.nd\n\nreations thereunder, including the amendments thereto. Care was also taken to provide that the UPSEB shall not be responsible for damages or diminutions\n\n....,._ in the supply of energy according to the orders issued by the State Government. ,. / similar provision was made in the earlier greement of 1959. In the Board's\n\n( !:tter to the Company dated September 2, 1972 reference was specifically made to the State Government's power to \"control the distribution and consumption of energy m1der s. 22B of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.\"\n\n[739A-D] .. 17, Decisions in the matter of restrictions to be imposed on the consump~ tion of energy on account of acute shortage of 'energy in the State, were taken by the different State Governme~1ts, including the Governor's Advisor~. and it cannot be said that the cu~ were imposed suddenly, or without due regard to th'e company's difficultie~ in reducing its consumption of energy' in the manner\n\ndirected by the order.\n\nIt cannot therefore, be said that the State wantonly .disregarded its contractual obligai!ion to the company.\n\n[739E-F]\n\n18. Sub-section (2) of s. 22B of the Act specifically provided that it wos permissibl'e for the State Government to direct by the order that the UPSEB\n\nsbaH not comply with the provisions inter alia of any contra'\\:t n1ade by it. A direction to that effect was expressly made in cl. 11 of the Order, and so it is not permissible for the company to complain on that account.\n\n[739G]\n\n19. Crai<s on Statute Law (7th &in.) pages 357-58 has mentioned sh different\n\nclasse~ of enactments which are considered as having ceased to be in -. force.\n\nThese six have been mentioned as the enactments which are selected for inclusion in the Statute Law Revision Acts of England as having ceased to be in force otherwis'e than by express repeal, or having by lapse of time or f -0!herwioe become unnece., ary.\n\n[740G, 741D]\n\n\"~ • The question i11 whether the order could be said to have \"spent\" itself or become \"obsolet'e\". Whether a piece of legislation has spent itself or exhau!ted in operation by the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was pas11ed, or whether the state of things contemplated by the enactme•.1t has c'eased to exist are essentially quesHons of fact for the legislature to examine and no vested right exists in a citizen to ask for a declaration that the Jaw h~ been impliedly repealed on a.ny such ground.\n\n[741E-F] •\n\n20. Th.e pwer to legislate i11 bth positive in the &e'Jse of niaking a Ja.w, W?d n'c&ahv~ 1~ the sense of repeahng a law or making it inoperative. Jn either case 1t is the power of the legislature, and should lie where it belo'Jgs.\n\nIn an extreme and a clear case, no doubt, an antiquated law may be said to have become obsolete-th'e more so if it is a penal law and has become in4 H .capable of user by a drastic change in the circurntances.\n\nBut the judge f the chr.nge should be the legislature, and courts are not expected to undertile\n\nA that duty, unless that becomes unavoidable and the circutnstances are so apparent its to lead to one and only one conclusion.\n\nThis is equally so in regard to the delegated or subordinate legislation.\n\n[741G742A]\n\nElwood Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 64 L.ed. 194; Chastleton Corporation v. A. Leftwich Sinclair, 68 L.ed. 841; Nashville, Chatta~ nooga & St. Louis Railway v. Herbert S. Walters, 79 L.ed. 949; The Union of India v. Ram Kanwar & Ors., [1962] 3 SCR 313; referred to.\n\nThe Petition of the Earl of Antrim & 11 Other Iri'sh Peers, [1967] AC 691; distinguished.\n\n21. The High Court found three facts (i) the shortage in the reservoirs for generation of hydel energy had ceased, (ii) further supply of energy was C available from newly commissioned units, and (iii) fresh power connection had been given by the UPSEB, but lost sight of the important fact that it was all along the case of the State that hydel energy was only onethird of the total generation, and that generation of thermal energy which met two third of the total requirement had declined for reasons beyond the control of U.P.S.E.B. The High Court did not therefore undertake a careful examina tion of the facts, and took some new connections into consideration without D , attempting to examine their magnitude and effect on the overall generation and availability of energy from all the sources. The High Court therefore erred in taking the view that the continuance of the Orcter was no longer justified.\n\nEven so, the High Court ah1tained fri:>m striking down the whole of the Order and merely declared that the provision of the first proviso to cl. 6(n) (i) was ultra vires, and quashed it.\n\n[743C-F]\n\n22. Even though the proviso is valid and has wrongly been qu(lshed by the High Court, it is not n'ecessary to restore it in view of the statement of the Solicitor General, so that it shall not be deemed to form part of cl. 6(a) (i) of the Order.\n\nBut if there is deterioration in !he generatic1; i of energy again, or there are other sufficient reasons wiihin the purview of s. 22B of the Act to reinsert the proviso, in the present or modified form, it would be permis&ible for the State Government to do so accordingly to the l&w,\n\n[743GH, 744C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 921/78 and 425/79\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27-4-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 3732/77.\n\nM. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79.\n\nfl S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl. of India, G. C. Dwivedi, S. C. Bhudhwar, s. Markendaya and K. Madan Moha.n Reddy for U. P. State Electri-\n\n;>.\n\ncity Board (Appellant No. 2inCA921/78). :...-\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 717 (Shinghal J.)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL J .-These appeals by special leave ari~ from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated April 27, 1978. While Civil Appeal No. 921 of 1978 has been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the U .P. State Electricity Board and the Executive Engineer of the Rihand Power Station, hereinafter collectively referred to as the State, Civil Appeal No. 425 of 1979 has been filed by the Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd., its Vice President and Chief Accountant,\n\n~\" hereinafter referred to as the Company.\n\nWe have heard the two ' appeals together and will dispose them of by a common judgment. ( Tn\" controversy relates to the supply of electrical energy (for short\n\n' \"energy\") for the production of aluminium, which is the most modern of the common metals.\n\nUnlike the other common industrial metals like iron, copper, zinc and lead, pure aluminium is not produced by the direct smelting of its ores.\n\nThe metal is now produced by the modern electrolytic method under the influence of direct current.\n\nIt takes about 10 kilo watt-hours of electricity to produce a pound of aluminium, and the supply of cheap electric power is therefore an essential requisite or raw material for its production. The metal has many advantages and uses and has gained such importance that it is an essential commodity under the Essential Commoditk:s Act and its production is one of the scheduled industries under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act.\n\nWhile the State feels aggrieved because the High Court bas interfered with the Uttar Pradesh Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order, 1977, dated &eptember 19, 1977, hereinafter referred to as the , Order, which it made under section 22B of the Electricity Ac; t, 1910,\n\n(for short the Act), the Company's grievance is that the High Court ( lias not granted all the reliefs which it had claimed in its petition under \"'-. article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Court's record is much too volu- • minous, but it appears to us that the appeals can be adequately disposed of o\"n the basis of the important av\"rments in the lists of dates drawn up by counsel for the parties about which there is no dispute before us.\n\nWhen the question of establishing a new aluminium factory arose for consideration by the Govrnment of India, it took into consideration the consent of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make energy available for the factory from the Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme which was expected to go into operation by the end of 1960, and gra\"nted an industrial licence to the Company on September 26, 1959, for the manufacture of 20,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots per year at Rihand.\n\nAn agreement was also entered into between the State of\n\n(;;\n\nA Uttar Pradesh and the Company on October 29, 1959 for the 'supply of 55 m w of power on a firm, continuous and uninterrupted basis at a rate of 1.997717 paise per unit for a period of 25 years from th•o date of commencement of the supply.\n\nThe Company set up and commissioned its aluminium plant at Renukoot (near Rihand Dam) with an installed capacity of 20,000 metric tonnes per annum in April 1962. It was granted a further licence for th•o expansio\"n of its installed capacity by 40,000 metric tonnes per annum.\n\nAs the State was unable to meet the extra requirec\n\nment of energy, sanction under section 28 of the Act was granted to ,'-. the Company, at its request, on November 12, 1964, to set up a gene-~ rating station at Re\"nusagar, near Renukoot, through its subsidiary the ) Renusagar Pow\"r Company Ltd. It had two generating units of 67.5 ·\n\nm w each.\n\nThe first unit started generating power in 1967 and the other in 1968. Tne 40,000 metric tonnes expansion unit was commissioned i\"n 1968.\n\nIn the meantime th,; Company was granbcd a licence in December 1966 for effecting a further cxpan8ion of 60,000 metric tonnes P'\"r annum in its installed capacity for the production of aluminium.\n\nThe Company thought of setting up the plant for the production of 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium in Gujarat State as it was informed by the Gujarat State Electricity Board that it would be ab:e to meet the requirement of energy there at a rate of Rs. 320/- per kilowatt year, which was much higher than the rate at which it was receiving energy from U. P. State Electricity Board (U.P.S.E.B.). The Government of U.P. held negotiations with the Company, and it was decickd that the Company would produce the additional 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium also in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nThe Chief Secretary to the government of U.P. wrote a detailed letter to the Company on Novembzr 20, 19\"8, in which the position regarding the supply of energy was stated as follows,-\n\n\"Regarding the power plant, I can see no difficulty in meeting the interim requirements for 2 to 3 years from the U.P. State Electricity Board, nor do I sec any difficulty in G arranging for parallel running of your new power staion, with the U.P. State Electricity Board.\"\n\nThe Company then addressed a letter to the State Government on , September 26, 1969 stating the position regarding too supply and generation of increased energy for the expansion of aluminum production as H follows,-\n\n\"5(a) The Scheme, of power supply for our expansion by UPSEB is interlinked with the question of expansion of\n\n• (\n\n• ..\n\n-~ •\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 719 (Shinghal !.)\n\nour Renusagar power plant and its parallel operation with your system.\n\nThe application for the expansion of our Renusagar Power Plant has already been submitted to your office, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for your voady\n\nreference.\n\nThe necessary permission for the same is requested as early as possible.\n\n(b) The emergency assistance under parallel operation would b\" required for about 100 m w and the terms and conditions for the same would have to be decided simultaneous; y with the permission for expansion of our Power\n\nPlan~.\"\n\nIt may be mentioned that the Company was granted sanction to expand Renusagar generation by 250 m w .\n\nIn 1972 the Company expanded i's installed capacity for the production of aluminium by 35,000 metric tonnes per year.\n\nOn its part, the U.P.S.E.B. sanctioned 110 m w additional energy under a phased programme to be completed by June 1, 1975.\n\nIt was clearly stated in the letter of the U.P.S.E.B. dated September 2, 1972, that the supply would be without prejudice to the power of the State Government to control the distribution and consumption of energy under section 22B of the Act. Reference in the Jetter was made to the acute shortage of power because of scanty rainfall in the catchment area.\n\nIt so happened that additional energy was not made available to the Company during 1972-7 5 although the rate was substantially increased (to 11 paise instead of 1.997717 paise) with retrospective effect from June 30, 1975, under the new aluminium policy of the Government of India.\n\nAn agreement was however entered into between the Company and the U.P.S.E.B. on November 30, 1976. for the supply of 85 m w of energy on a continuous basis, for a period of 5 years, in supersession of the earlier agreements, and it was sti pulated that it would be read and construed in all respects in conformi'y with the provisions of the Act, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and the rules and the regula•ions and the amendments thereto The Company received that supp; y and was even promised an additional supply of 35 m w over a phased period from July 1977, but did not get it.\n\nThe Company was all the same able to raise its production of aluminium to 95,000 metric tonnes by April 7, 1977, lncause of the supply of 85 m w of energy.\n\nIn the meantime, the State Government took a decision by the end of December 1976 to reconnect some 70,000 pumping sets which had\n\nbeen disconnected for non-payment of the electricity dues.\n\nThat placed an additional load of about 400 m w on the grid system of the\n\nState. The Chairman of U.P.S.E.B. submitted a note on the power situation which was likely to obtain from April to July 1977. He pointed out that there was acute shortage of mrgy and suggested the imposition of some restrictions npto the end of July 1977 by when the demand for agriculture was expected to decrea&o and the Rihand and Matatila reservoirs would be filled up.\n\nThat was proposed to meet the needs of agriculture and relakd iudustries and to meet the industrial demand to the exte'nt possible.\n\nOne of the proposals was for a 50 per cent cut in the demand of the Company and some other industrial units including Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd.\n\nThat note came up for consideration in the State Cabinet on April 1, 1977, and was partially approved. The U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consumption) Ordr, 1977, was therefore issued on April 7, 1977.\n\nUnder clause 6(a) (i) of the Order, the Company could draw energy only to the extent of 42.5 m w i.e. 50 per cent of its monthly consumption; but it was allowed to draw 55 m w for the time being.\n\nUttar Pradesh came under the President's rule on April 30, 1977, and the Company was allowed 10 draw 55 m w until further orde-rs.\n\nIt is the case of the State that the shortage of energy became more acute in the third week of May.\n\nThe Company, in the meantime, filed its first writ petition [No. 1790 ( c) of 1977] on receipt of a letter of the Executive Engineer (O.&M.). Rihand, that the power supply to the Company should be cut off completely with immediate effect.\n\nThe writ petition was dismissed on May 20, 1977, because of a subsequent Jetter by the Government requiring the U.P.S.E.B. to continue the supply of 42.5 m w energy instead of 55 m w in accordance with the aforesaid Order of April 7, 1977.\n\nThe Secretary of the Power Department of the State government sent a note to the Governor on May 24, 1977, proposing some additional cuts in the supply of energy.\n\nDecision thcre0n was deferred until inforn1ation \\vas obtained from other States in regard to availability of energy to aluminium plants.\n\nA fresh note was thereafter prepared for orders.\n\nIn that note dated May 31, 1977, it was stated that there was a large gap between demand and availability of energy and that was creating a serious imbalance requiring load shedding on a large scale, and that had given rise to discontent in all sectors of the economy nnd. in particular, in the rural sector.\n\nIt was also pointed out that overriding public interest, particularly the need to maintain\n\n• • -\"\" ..\n\n( •\n\n:-, ; (F\n\n-~ • ..,\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. v. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 721 (Shinghal !.)\n\nfood supply 3nd the industrial production, required that units which were heavy consumers of energy should be subjected to further cut in the consumption of energy.\n\nIt was particnlary poin'ed out that as the Company wa:s itself generating energy at Renusagar,, it will have more than 50 per cent of energy even if the Board's supply of 42.5 m w was completely withdrawn, and that wiJI service some 8500 pumping sets. It was, all the same, stated that the Company would continue, to have 60 m w from the U.P.S.E.B. as stand by supply as in the past.\n\nThe Governor approved that proposal on June 1, 1977.\n\nA proviso was, inter alia, inserted in clause 6(a) Ii l of the U.P.\n\nElectricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consumption) Order,\n\n1977, on June 2, 1977, according to which the industrial consumer which had its own source of generation of energy from which it obtained 50 per cent or more of its total consumption would suffer a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the U.P.S.E.B.\n\nThe Company was accordingly given time to' bring about the total cut.\n\nIn the meantime, the Cbmpany filed its second writ petition [No. 2160(c) of 1977] along with an application for stay.\n\nThe High Court admitted the writ petition, but rejected the application for stay.\n\nThe Company then moved this Court for special leave•.\n\nThe Hon'ble Vacation Judge made an observation that the matter may be discussed b) the parties concerned, and the State agre<d to give 20\n\nm w of energy to the Company for the time being.\n\nFresh elections were held to the State Legislative Assembly, and the new Cabinet was sworn in on June 23, 1977. It decided to reduce the snpply of energy to the Company to zero, in pursuance of the amendment dated June 2, 1977, and called for a fresh note on\n\nthe position regarding the generation and distribution of energy.\n\nThe I' Executive Engineer, Rihand, accordingly asked the Company to reduce the consumption to zero .\n\nA detailed note was prepared by the Secretary concerned on June 28, 1977, and it came up for consideration in the Cabinet on June 30, 1977, but no decision was taken and the note was kept pending.\n\nG It appears that the Chairman of the U.P.S.E.B. prepared a note on August 26, 1977, in which he pointed out the shortage of energy, including a substantial fall in the generation of thermal energy and in the \"import\" of energy.\n\nIt appears that the Minister concerned made some satements in regard to the generation of energy in the State and the position of the Company, but we shall refer to them H later when we deal with the allegation regarding malice in Jaw.\n\nIt will be sufficient to say that the State Government made the Order\n\non September 19, 1977, called the Uttar Pradesh Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order, 1977.\n\nIt has undergone some amendments, but learned counsel are in argeement that they have no bearing on the controversy before us.\n\nThe Company filed its third writ petition (No. 3732 of 1977), against the Order, on Sep'ember 26, 1977.\n\nIt wa' admitted the same day and the earlier writ petition (No. 2160 of 1977) was diimisscd as withdrawn.\n\nThe High Court directed the Company tel make an app.lication under clause 10 of the Order, for exemption, but it was rejected on December 9, 1977 when made.\n\nThe High Court ultimately heard and decicl ct the writ petition by the impugned judgment dated April 27, 1978 against which these appeals by special leave have been directed as aforesaid.\n\nThis Court made an order on May 4, 1978 foe the suppl:; of 20 m w of energy to the Company as a purely interim arrangemcn1• That was raised to 35 m w by an order dated August 29, 1978, and the State is now supplying 42.5 • m w to the Company as an interim arrangement.\n\nThese basic facts are not in dispute before us.\n\nWe shall examine the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties with reference to them, after taking into consideration the other well settled facts on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel, and with due rei; ard to the relevant averments of the parties.\n\nThe High Court has recorded a number of findings.\n\nWo shall hue occasion to refer to those of the findings which have been challenged befnre us.\n\nIt may be sufficient to say here that the High Court has worded the operative part of its judgment as follows,-\n\n\"In •:ic\\v of the aforesaid discussion the provisions of the first proviso to clause VI (a)(i) of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order, 1977 dated September 19, 1977 are declared ultra vires and arc quashed.\n\nThe U. P. State Electricity Board is directed to supply electrical energy to the petitioner in accordance with law without. taking into consideration the provisions of the said proviso\".\n\nIn order to examine the findings of the High Court about the iuvalidity of the proviso to clause 6(a) (i) of the order, it willl be convenient to examine the relevant findings of the High Court on H tke various points of law.\n\nThe High Court has taken the view that it is the statutory obliga-\n\n• )·\n\n• ,.\n\ntion of the U.P.S.E.B. because of the obligation or a licensee under .__~\n\n• ,\n\n' • -~\n\n~ ..,\n\n •· U.P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 723 ( Shinghal J.)\n\nsections 18 and 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 to supply electrical energy to a consumer.\n\nReference in this connection has also been made to clause VI of the Schedule to the Act.\n\nOause (h) of section 2 of the Act defines a \"Licensee\" to mean any person licensed under Part II to supply energy.\n\nSection 26 of th0 Act ol 1948 provides, inter alia, that, subject to the provisions of that Act, the Electricity Board shall in respect of th0 whole State, have all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the Act of 1948 \"shall be deemed to be the licence\n\n' of the Board\" for purposes of the Act (of 1910).\n\nThe first proviso to the section excludes the application of some sectlons, inciuding sec- . tion 22, cJf the Act, and the second proviso stales that the provisions of clause VI of the Schedule lo the Act shall apply to the Board in respect of that area only where distrLbution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of the energy through any of them has commenced.\n\nWhile, therefore, the U.P.S.E.B. is a licensee under the Act, it will be sufficient, for purpose of the controversy before us, to say that section 22 of the Act is not applicable to it, and clause VI of the Schedule is applicable to it subject to the restrictio'n contairted in the second proviso to •eetion 26 of the Act ol 1948.\n\nSo even though the Board is a licensee, the obligation under section 22 of the Act to supply enery to every person within the area of its supply is not fastened on it.\n\nThe provisions of the Schedule to the Act are deemed to be incorporated in, and to form part of, every licence granted under Pan II.\n\nClause VI of that Sch•edule states that where after distributing mains have been laid down and the supply of energy through them has commenced, a requisition is made by the owner or occupier of any premises situate within tb.:: ')rea of supply requiring the licensee to supply energy for such premises, the licensee shall make the supply and shall con:inue to do so in accordance with the requisitio'n.\n\nBut, as has been pointed out, tbe second proviso to section 26 of the Act of 1948 places a restriction on that obligation for it says that the provisions of clause VI shall apply to the Board in respect of that area only \"where distribution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy througl!. any of them has commenced\".\n\nClause (i) of section 2 of the Act defines a \"main\" to mean any electric supply-line through which energy is, or is intended to be, supplied to the public. A \"distribution main\" has been defined by clause H ( e) of the same section to mean the portion of any main with which a service line is, or is intended to be, immediately connecDd. We\n\nhave also gone through the definitions of \"electric supply-line\" and\n\n\"service-line\".\n\nThey leave no doubt that a \"distributing main\" is different from an electric supply-line, for to it a service-line is immediately connected.\n\nThe High Court has stated that the Company gets its supply from the Pipri Bus Bar, which is composed of a set of conductors which are made up of thick aluminium core steel reinforced cables, and has taken the view that the Pipri Bus Bar is a \"distribut; ng main\" under section 2 ( e) of the Act and is an electric supply-line as d•ofined in section 2(f) so that clause VI of the Schedule to the Act would be fully applicable to the Board in so far as its obligation to the Company is concerned.\n\nBut as has ken stated in the second proviso of section 26 of the Act of 1948, the provisions of clause VI of the Schedule to the Act could apply to the U.P.S.E.B. in respect of that area where distribution mains had been \"laid by the Board\". lt was therefore a qwostion of fact whether that was so, and had to be examined on the basis of the averments of the parties to that effect.\n\nIt is however not disputed before us that the Company did not plead that distributing mains had been laid by the Board for supply of energy to the Compa'ny, or to any one else, from the Pipri Sub-station.\n\nThe State had therefore no occasion to controvert any such allegation.\n\nThis has in fact been admitted to be so by Mr. Ray in bi's arguments, and the High Court went wrong in recording a finding of fact against the State without any basis for it in the pleadings.\n\nWe have also gone through section 18 of the Act of 1948 to which reference has boen made in the F judgment of the High Court, but it is also of no avail to the Company.\n\nThe section makes a mention of the general duties of the Board, but it does not make it obligatory for it to supply energy to every person irrespective of its practical difficulties.\n\nThe High Court has in fact quoted extensively from_ its earlier G judgment in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 618 of 1972 to which one of the two Judges was a party.\n\nIt is not disput•ed, however, !hat when an appeal was taken against that judgment, the writ petition was itself withdrawn and was dismissed, so that that judgment of the High Court may not be said to have subsisted thereafter, and need not have formed the basis of the finding of the High Court against the II Board in regard to its duty to supply the cnergy asked for by the Company-the mor•o so when the decision on the point should have turned on the facts pleaded and established on the record.\n\n( -'\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. v. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 725 (Shinghal J.) Mr. Ray for the Company has however invited our attention to a decision 'of the Rajasthan High Court in firm Sadul Shahr Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Raiasthan Sklte Electricity Board.(') But that was a dificrent case where it was not pleaded by the Electricity Board that clause VI of the Schedule to the Act was not applicable to it as the distributing mains had not been laid by it The High Court therefore erred in taking the view in the present case that the Board was bound by the terms of clause VI of the Schedule to the Act to supply energy to the Company within on•e month of the making of the requisition or within such longer period as the Electrical Inspector may allow.\n\nBut even if it were assumed that the Board was under an obligation to supply e!l'ergy to every person, the fact nonetheless remains that the State Government had the overriding power to provide, by order made under section 22B of the Act, for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption or use thereof.\n\nIn fact sub-section (2) of that section categorically states that, without prejudice to the generality of the power under sub-section (I), the order, may direct the Board not to comply with any contract, agreement or requisition for the supply of energy etc.\n\nThe High Court erred in taking a contrary view.\n\nIt has 'next been argued that only the energy which was generated\n\n# ;. by the Board could be the snbject-mattcr of an order under section 22B of lhe Act and it was not permissible for the State to take into\n\n-+;-\n\naccount the energy generated by the Company for its own use.\n\nIt may be recalled that the Company applied for the grant of sanction under section 28 (1) of the Act to generate 120 m w of energy for the additional production of aluminium.\n\nThat was allowed and a notification was issued on November 12, 1964, granting sanction to the Renusagar Power Company Limited (a whol:y owned subsidiary of the Company) to engage in the business of supplying energy to the Company. It has two generating units and 135 m w power is being generated by the Renusagar Station for the exclusive use of the Company, and it is this energy for which it has been argued that it cannot be th~ subject-matter of an order under section 22B .\n\nBut sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Act in terms refers to G and deals with, engaging by a non-licensee, in the business of suppl;. ing energy to the \"public\". It is therefore futile to contend that what was generated by the Renusagar Power Company was not meant for supply to the pnblic,, but was the Company's own energy. It is true that that generation became, in the circumstances, the \"captive\" ge'neratton for the use of the Company, but that is far from saying that, in H\n\n- -\"\"' (I) A.LR. 1972 Raj 40.\n\nA the eye of law, it was not energy meant for supply to the public or that it was not amenable to control under section 22B.\n\nIt musl therefore be held that it was also liable to equitable distribution by an order under section 22B of the Act.\n\nThe expression \"energy\" has been defined by clause ( g) of scc1ion B 2 of the Act as follows,-\n\n\"(g) \"energy\" means electrical energy-\n\n(i) generated, transmitted or supplied for any purpose, or\n\n(ii) u&d for any purpose except the transmission of a inessage\".\n\nIt is therefore a pervading definition, and there is '.no reason why energy generated and supplied under s•:ction 28 of the Act should not fall within its sweep.\n\nWe are mindful of the fact that while section 22B of the Act occurs in Part II, the aforesaid sction 28 is in Part III, but that will not really take tbe supply of energy under scctio'n 28 out of the control of section\n\n22B.\n\nPart II deals with \"supply of energy\" by licensee, while Part III deals with \"supply, transmission and use of energy by non-licelll!ees\".\n\nBut when it was thought necessary to w:st the State Government with the power to give directions to licensees (under section 22A), and to control the distribution and consumption of energy (under section 22B), it became necessary to insert sections 22A and 22B by Act 32 of 1959.\n\nThe Legislature therefore inserted both the sections in Part II which occurred earlier than Part III, and under the broad rubric \"Supply of Energy\".\n\nAs is obvious, insertion of sections 22A and 22B would not have been appropriate in Part III, and the Legislature cannot be blamed if it preferred the inclusion of the two sections together in Part II rather than in the residuary Part, IV.\n\nMoreover it is by now well settled that th~ true meani'ng of a provision of Jaw should be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, and with due regard to the scheme of the law as a whole, and not merely by the place it finds in the formation of its Parts or\n\nChapters.\n\nAn ancillary argument has been advanced that if sub-section ( 1)\n\nof section 22B of the Act is read with due regard to sub-section (Z), • it will appear that, like sub-section (2), sub-section (1) is also confined to a licensee and will not be applicable to the energy supplied B by a 5anction-holder under section 28.\n\nOur attention in this connection has been invited to the use of the article \"the\" in sub-section (2) while stating that the order made under sub-section (!) may direct >- •\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 727 (Shinghal l.) \"'the licensee' not to comply with the matters stated in clauses (i) to (iii). The argument is untenable for two reasons.\n\nFirstly, subsection ( 1) of section 22B refers to the State Government's power to control the distribution of energy as a whoie and not merely the energy generated by a licensee, and there is no ru'le of construction by which the restricted scope of sub-section (2), which deals only with the licensees, should govern the scope of sub-section ( l) and confine it to !iceaIBees.\n\nSecondly, the purpose of sub-section (2) is to provide exceptions of the nature which are peculiar to licensees ahd are necesary to save them from the statutory obligations mentioned in the three clauses of the sub-section.\n\nIt appears that the use of 'he article \"the\" in sub-section (2) is not qurte appropriate, but we have no doubt that there is no justification for the argument that sec'ion 22B is applicable only to licensees and not to a sanction holder under section 28.\n\nWhat section 22B of the Act authorises the State Government to <lo, is to make an order providing for \"regulating\" the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, and it has been held by the High Court that the section does not confer the power to prohibit the supply -0f e'nergy to any consumer. The High Court has gone on to hold that Parliament did not confer on the State Governments the power to cut off supply to existing consumers.\n\nMr. Ray has supported the view of the High Court and has invited our attention to the decisions in Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo,(') Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion and th• Distillers and Brewers' Association of Ontario,(') Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nWorcesterJhire County Council('), Tarr v. Tarr('), The Automobile Transport (RajaJthan) Ltd. v. The State of Raja, sthan and others(') and Stat• of Mysor. v .\n\nH. Sanjeeviah( 6 ).\n\nAs against that the learned Solicitor General has placed reliance on the view taken in Fatechand Himmatlal a, nd olhus\n\nv. State of Maharashtra etc.( 1) that 'regulation', if the situation is\n\nnecesitous, may reach the limit of prohibition.\n\nIt appears that a distinction between 'regulation' and 'restriction' -0r 'prohibition' has always ben drawn, ever since Municipal CorP?ra-\n\n(1) [18%] A. C. 88.\n\n(2) [18%] A.C. 348.\n\n(3) [1967] I W.L.R. 409.\n\n(4) [1972] 2 W..L.R. 1068.\n\n(5) [1963] I S.C.R. 491.\n\n(6) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 361. f1) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 828 at p. 851.\n\ntion of the City of Toronto v. Virgo (supra). 'Regulation' promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas 'prohibition' obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied.\n\nThe Oxford English Dictionary does not define \"regulate\" to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the Legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word \"regulating\" without using the word \"prohibiting\" or some such word, to bring out that effect.\n\nBut where the High Court we'nt wrong was in thinking that the Order had the effect of prohibiting the supply of energy to the Company, which was an \"existing consumer\". The proviso to clause 6(a)\n\n(i) of tho Order to which exception has been taken, states as follows,--\n\n\"Provided that where any such industrial consumer has his [own source of generation of energy wh; ch alone enables him to obtain] 50 per cent or more of bis total consumption, then a cut of 100 per cent in the energy suppliod by the • Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board shall be exercised.\"\n\nWhat has therefore ben ordered is no more than a cut of 50 per cent in the monthly consumption of electricity and not a total prohibition of consumption of energy.\n\nThat is a step in the direction of regulating the consumption of energy as far as it goes, and it is overridden with the further regulation contained in the proviso in the ca'e of an industrial consumer having its ow'n source of generation of energy \"which alone\" enab'.ed him to obtain 50 per cent or more of his total consumption so as to ensure even to him a consumption of 50 per cent of energy and not a total prohibition.\n\nThe proviso therefore opcraDes in a special or particular field and for a particular purpose where it is considered necessary for regulating the supply etc. of the energy i'n the interest of ihe other consumers, for section 22B is meant to maintain the supply and secure the equ.itable distribution of energy to all concerned.\n\nWe are constrained to say that the High Court did not properly appreciate this aspect of the matter.\n\nThe High Court has gone on to hold that no power was vested in the State Government under section 22B of the Act to issue an order that certain prefereno::s will be fo:lowed in supplying energy.\n\nThe High Court has found it established that after power supply wao total'v \"disconnected\" by the Board to the Company, \"power sunplv connections were given to the agricultural sector and agro-based industries.\" This appears to be the High Conrt's finding in regard to the argument that the Order was bad as it was not permissible to adjust the priorities\n\n* •\n\n,. ,\n\n• -i- ' •\n\n,;_\n\n• '\n\n• ,\n\nI •\n\nU. P. STATE &. ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 729\n\n( Shinghal !. ) by an order under section 22B.\n\nLearned counsel for the Company A have argued that the only permissible prefere\"nce was that under section 22A in favour of an establishment mentioned in it and that the preference shown to individual consumers was illegal.\n\nNow so far as clause 6(a) (i) of the Order is concerned, it does not, by itself, provide for any preferences or priorities, beyond exciudi\"ng \"fertilizers\" from the cut of 50 per cent on all large and heavy industrial power consumers reoiving power at 33 k v and more. Clause 7 of the Order deals with \"exemptions\", and \"fertilizers manufacturing establishments\" have been included there amongst the consumers to whom the cut referred to in clause 6 of the Order shall not be appli cable.\n\nIt has not be>n argued before us that it was not permissible for the State Governme\"nt to provide for exemptions in an order under section 22B, and we have not been referred to any such data or material on the basis of which it may be possible to examine whether the exemptions in question were in derogation of the concept of \"maintaining and securing the equitable distributio\"n of energy\" under section\n\n22B.\n\nIt may be that the State Government was of the opinion that supply of energy to the agricultural sector and agro-based industries was more necessary and would benefit the state more substantially than the supply made to heavy industrial consumers, but merely because any such preference has been entertained by the State Government, it cannot be said that it necessarily runs counter to the concept of equitable distribution of energy stated in section 22B.\n\nIn fact counsel for the Company have. repeatedly urged before us that the cut of 50 per cent referred to in clause 6(a) (i) was meant to deprive only a few consumers of energy, and that the cut of 100 per cent under the proviso operated exclusively against the Company.\n\nAnd it has to be appreciated that clause 6(a) (i) deals only with large and heavy industrial power consumers receiving poW& at 33 kv and above, and it is hardly permissible for such a heavy consumer as the Company to complain of any preference that may have been shown to small consumers in the field of agriculture, or agro-based or other small industries.\n\nThe fact remains that large and heavy industrial consumers of the category mentioned in clause 6(a) (i) are a class by themselves and it is hardly permissible for them to complain that the\n\nsmall preference shown to agriculturists in supplying energy for their water pumps or tube-well, or in energising State tube-wells supplying water to them, or the supply of energy to small scale industries has really created a privileged class of consumers or brought into existence any such concept of priorities as to run counter to or defeat the objective of bringing about the equitable distribution of energy by an order\n\n9-330.!Cl/79 \\\n\n',.,..\n\n730 SUPREME COURr REPOR1S\n\n[ 1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nuncler section 22B.\n\nNo glaring instance of any preference has been brought to our notice so as to raise in us a desire to examine the question whether it was necessary or proper for the State Government to provide guidelines for the small preferences shown by it to the aforesaid consumers.\n\nIn fact it has been admitted in the written arguments which have been filed and received in Court that, in the present case. the Company is \"not sure as to what exactly has happended\". In such a situa1 tion, we are not pursuaded that the High Court had any real justification for recording an adverse finding against the State on the question\n\nof the so-called preferences or priorities.\n\nLearned counsel for the Company were not able to refer us to any plea in the writ petition about ' illegal priorities or preferenoes.\n\nNor could they refe.r to a plea that any \"' preference or priority shown by the State was the very antithesis of the ' concept of equitable distribution which, for the purpose of maintaining the supply of energy, was tlle very object of the Order. If any such plea had been taken, it would have been permissible for the State to take any defence that may have been open to tllem. But merely because the word preference or priority has been used by the State for the purpose of comparing the grantees of energy in preference to the Company, or as a matter of priority over the consumption of energy by a giant consumer like tlle Company, it will not be fair and reasonable for us to hold that the State has established a class of privileged consumers, and to set aside the grant of energy to them in their absence and without examining the facts and circumstances of their re.spective cases.\n\nThe purpose of the Order is to maintain the supply of energy and to secure its equitable distribution.\n\nOne such method was to conserve energy by virtue of the provisions of clause 6(a) (j). If that has been done according to law; and if tlle resultant saving of energy is frittered away by showing unlawful preferences or creating unlawful priorities by oilier orders of an administrative nature, there is nothing to prevent the aggri- _:... eved party, including the Company, from challenging it according to the law, in an appropriate proceeding, if so advised. But any such grievance cannot be examined in these proceedings for the Order has tlle avowed object of bringing about equitable distribution of the conserved energy in an honest and forthright manner and there is nothing on the record for us to hold otherwise.\n\nIt has next been argued that the validity of the Order, which is by way of a piece of subordinate legislation, is open to judicial scrutiny and that the subjective satisfaction of the State Government in making it is open to chalJenge in a court of law.\n\nIt will be enough for us to say that subordinate legislation is by now a well-recognised form of legislation for practical reasons.\n\nThe modern ~\n\n' •\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 7 31 ( Shinghal I.) administrative machinery is quite complex and it is often found difficult to pass complicated legislative measures through the full parliamentary procedure and on a permanent or durable basis.\n\nEven a carefully drafted Act may not work well in actual practice. It may also be that the exact means of achieving the object of an Act may not be adequately comprehended all atonce, and it may be useful to provide for some elasticity in the actual working of a law. That can best be done by leaving some of the details to subordinate legislation.\n\nThat is why soine legislative powers are delegated to executive authoiities, subject of course to the purpose and the scheme of the parent Act, the constant vigil of the Parliament or the State Legislature, and the judicial control.\n\nThese are reliable safeguards and with their easy availability, it ia no surprise that subordinate legislation is now so voluminous that it may well be said to have dwarfed the parent.\n\nThe grounds of challenging the validity of subordinate legislation are well known. The challenge may be on the ground that the power\n\nto make the law could not have been exercised in the circumstances D which were prevailing at the time when it was made, or that a condition precedent to the making of the legislation did not exist, or that the authority which made the order Wai not competent to do so, or that the order was not made according to the procedure prescribed by law, or that its provisions were outside the scope of the enabling powec in the parent Act or were otherwise violative of its provisions or of any other existing statute. As it happens, none of these grounds or circumstances\n\nhas been hown to exist in the present case.\n\nThe High Court hM taken the view that the Company was unable to establish as a fact that there was no shortage in the generation of energy at the time when the Order was made under section 22B. It is no body's case that the State Government was not competent to make the Order, or that it did not comply with any procedural requirement of the Act in making the Order, or that its provisions (or any of them) are outside the scope of the enabling power or are violative of the provisions of any other law. We have examined some of the points of law on which the High Court has found some provisions of the Order to be invalid, and we have given our reasons for taking a different view. We have no doubt that the State Government formed its opinion about the necessity and expediency of makmg the Order for the purpose of maintaining the supply and securing the equitable distribution of energy at a time when that was called for, and this Court\" cannot sit as a court of appeal to examine any and every argument 111 an attempt to show that the opinion of the State Government was vitiated for one fanciful reason or the other. It bas to be appreciated that the question whether the reasons which Jed to the\n\n' '\n\nA making of the Order were sufficient, was essentially for the State Government to consider.\n\nThe validity of the Order has been challenged on the ground that it suffers from the vice of malice in law.\n\nBut that is a point by itself and we shall examine it separately.\n\nIt will thus appear that the above arguments which have been advanced against the validity of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order are not justified.\n\nThe whole of the clause reads as follows,-\n\n\"6(a) (i) In respect of electrical energy consumed by all large and heavy power industrial consnmers receiving power at 33 kv and above, excepting fertilizers, from the U.P. State\n\nElectricity Board a cut of 50 per cent in their monthly consumption of electricity both in respect of energy and demand shall be exercised :\n\nProvided that where any such industrial consumer has his own source of generation of energy which alone enables him to obtain 50 per cent or more of his total consumption, then a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the Uttar Pradesh State electricity Board shall be exercised.\"\n\nIt thus deals with the consumption of energy by all (excepting fertilizers) E latge and heavy industrial power consumers receiving power from the U.P.S.E.B. a:t 33 kv and above. It imposes a cut of 50 per cent in their monthly consumption of energy.\n\nThen it adds the provision that where such an industrial consumer has his own source for the generation of energy which by itself gives him 50 per cent or more of his total consumption of energy (provided for in the main clause), then it will F not receive any energy from the U.P.S.E.B. as the cut in its supply will then be 100 per cent. The blause therefore subserves the purpose of section 22B for, in a period of scarcity or insufficiency of the supply, it will have the effect of regulating the same and thereby securing the equitable distribution thereof.\n\nG It is true that although the Order has been made on the ground that the State Government is of opinion that it is nec:eSsary and expedient for maintaining the supply and securing the equitable distribution of electrical energy, to provide for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption and use thereof, and has been called the Uttar Pradesh Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order H 1977, it does not deal with all those matters in details.\n\nIn fact it may well be said to be an order relating essentially to compulsory cut in the\n\n' + f ,\n\n,.._\n\nconsumption of energy.\n\nBut that cannot detract from the basic fact 6- ~\n\nU. P. STATE &; ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 733 ( Shinghal !. ) that the Order has the sanction of section 22B of the Act and subserves the main purpose thereof, even though there may be justification for the criticism that it does not go far enough in its regulative enterprise in the expansive field set out for it in the preamble. At any rate, it cannot be said to be beyond the scope and the ambit of that section, and its validity is not really open to challenge as a piece of subordinate legislation.\n\nIt has however been strenuously argued on behalf of the Company that the Order should be struck down on the ground of malice in law on the part of the State Government.\n\nThat no doubt is another aspect\n\nof the doctrine of ultra vires, for an offending Act can be condemned C simply for the reason that it is unauthorised. Bad faith has often been treated as interchangeable with unreasonableness and taking a decision on extraneous considerations.\n\nIn that sense, it is not really a distinct ground of invalidity.\n\nIt is well settled that if a discretionary power has been exercised for an \"nnauthorised purpose\", that is enough to invite the Conrt's review, for as has been said quite widely but properly by D I Rand J. in Roncarel/i v. Duplessis,(') malice is \"acting for a reason and pnrpose knowingly foreign to the administration.\" But the question Is whether this has been proved to be so in the present case.\n\nMr. Ray has argued on behalf of the Company tha; t the. Order is mala fide, and has been made in the colourable exercise of the power under section 22B of the Act simply to compel the Company to agree to the payment of a higher rate for the supply of energy to it.\n\nHe has tried to establish his argument on the basis of the. statement of the Chief Secretary of the State Government dated July 8, 1977 and some statements of the Minister concerned.\n\nWe shall examine them separately.\n\nWhat the Chief Secretary said in his press statement dated July 8, 1977, was that the State Government had reduced the supply of power to the Company from 85 m w to 10 m w and that it had been decided to almost double the rate for the supply of the power \"lhich was being given to the Company.\n\nIt will be remembered that by virtue of the amendment which was made to the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of distribution and consumption) Order on June 2, 1977, the Company was required to reduce its consumption of the Board's energy to zero, but it was, nonetheless, a11owed to draw 30 m w for some time.\n\nThat Jed to further directions for the reduction of consumption, and ultimately an order was made on June 29, 1977 for disconnecting the supply.\n\nA representative of the Company met the Minister concerned and explained the Com-\n\n(!) [1959] S.C.R. 121 at p. 141 (Canada Law Reports).\n\n; l\n\npany's difficulties. He asked for permission to draw at least 10 m w to keep the pots warm.\n\nThe Minister agreed to that request, but only agairu; t the standby agreement for the demand of 60 m w. A letter to that effect was sent to the Company on June 30, 1977.\n\nAs under the standby agreement, energy was to be supplied at the rate of 24 paise per unit, instead of 11 paise, the Chief Secretary merely stated the tactual\n\nposition on July 8, 1977.\n\nAt any rate there i's nothing to show that the plea of scarcity of energy was merely a ruse to charge a higher rate from the Company.\n\nMr. Ray has invited our attention to the statements of the Minister concerned dated July 18, 1977, July 28, 1977, September 14, 1977, August 29, 1978 and his reply to the Company dated October 18, 1978, to show that the State Government was not satisfied with the contractual rate for the supply of energy as it was below the cost of generation, and wanted to review and re'scind the agreement altogether.\n\nWe have gone through the record of the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly and we find that what the Minister said there was essentially correct that 10 m w energy was being supplied to the Company under the standby agreement.\n\nIt was in that context that the Minister informed tke Assembly that the charges for the said 'standby supply came to 26-28 paise per unit. The learned Solicitor General has taken us through the relevant record to show that the Minister did not really want to harm the Company unnecessarily, and if he stated further that he was never approached personally by the Company, or in a proper manner, or that the relief to the Company would be considered depending on how it contacted him for that purpose, the Minister simply wanted to state the facts and to convey his resentJDent against the attempt to influence him politically, or through any Minister of the Central Government.\n\nThe State has in fact filed a chart with its supplementary counteraffidavit about the supply of energy to the Company from February 1973 to April .7, 1977.\n\nIt shows that during the period February 1973 to August 7, 1975 the Company received energy from 27 .50 m w to 1.25 m w.\n\nIt was only after the declaration of emergency on June 26, 1975 that the Company received some 55 m w of energy, and then a fresh agreement was made soon after on November 30, 1976 to supply 85 m w of energy.\n\nBut even before that date, for a sufficiently long period, the Company got far more energy than what it was entitled to.\n\nWe are therefore not satisfied that the Company has been able to establish malice in law merely because of what the Chief Secretary or the Minister stated here and there.\n\nIt may well be that the new State Government was dissatisfied with the new agreement which had been\n\n-t-·\n\n~· • ~\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V, HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 735 ( Shinghal !. ) entered into at the instance of the political party which was then in power, but it cannot be said that the new Minister's desire to examine the validity or propriety of that agreement arose out of any extraneous or improper consideration so as to amount to malice in law.\n\nOur attention has also been invited in this connection to certain statements on behalf of the State Government and the Board that energy was available in abundance, and it has been nrged that even so the Compaay was denied its supply in'spite of the agreements and the assurances of the State Government to the contrary.\n\nThat is a point relating to the contractual rights of the Company and we shall come to it in a while.\n\nThen it has been argued that even though the State Government professed in its affidavit that the cut in the consumption of energy by the Company could not be restored because of the desire to provide more energy for agricu!tural pnrposes, that was not really so and that any snch attempt was in the nature of an extraneous consideration which vitiated the implementation of the Order.\n\nReference in this connection has been made to the Company's averments in the supplementary affidavit that the load on account of agriculture and irrigation had declined, and there was in fact no diversion of energy to agricu:ture.\n\nIn order to examine the point, we directed the State to prepare a statement for the entire period from January 1977 to December 1978.\n\nThe Order was made on September 19, 19.77, and the statement shows that consumption of energy for agricultural and irrigation pnrposes increased appreciably thereafter, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary.\n\nAnother \"extraneous\" factor which is said to have been taken into\n\nconsideration by the S'ate Government in making the Order is said to F be its view that the major portion of the aluminium produced by the Company was being consumed outside the State.\n\nA 'similar objection was raised before the High Court on the basis of an averment in the counter-affidavit of the State.\n\nThe High Court has, however, recorded the finding that it would be \"unsafe\" to uphold that contention, and we see no reason to take a different view.\n\nThe other facors to which reference has been made as extraneous factors which vitiated the Order are said to be consideration of the facts tJ_iat the Company had failed to expand its generating capacity, the finan-. cial loss suffer_ed by the U.P.S.E.B. and the non-payment of the coal surcharge by the Company. But there is nothing on the record to show H that these factors were taken into consideration at the time of making the Order. It may be that those or somewhat similar facts were mentioned\n\nat one time or the other in answer to the complaint of the Company, or in justification of what the State Government had done, by way of defence, but that cannot justify the argument that they formed the basis for the making of the Order.\n\nIt has also been argued that while making the Order the State Government failed to take into consideration the facts that the production of aluminium was of considerable importance to the national economy and that the Board was capable of generating more energy but was not doing so.\n\nReference has also been made to the new aluminium policy which the Central Government announced on July 15, 1975, and to the, benefits which the U.P.S.E.B. was deriving from the aluminium products manufactured by the Company.\n\nBut the argument is untenable b~ cause there is nothing to show that these factors were not taken into consideration while making the Order, and an inference that they were ignored cannot be drawn against the State merely because the Company was not permitted to consume all the energy it wanted and there was a fall in the production of aluminium because of the restriction imposed by the Order. It may be that the U.P.S.E.B. was capable of generating more energy, or that it was not running efficiently and had not succeeded in reaching its target of ideal generation.\n\nBut here again it will be enough to say that although the High Court arrived at the conclusion that the Company deserved the writ which it granted, it did not find it possible to hold that the U.P.S.E.B. had deliberately under u!i]ised its generation capacity. That is a finding of fact which doe; not call for interference by us.\n\nThere is thus no justification for the argument that there was malice in law on the part of the State Government in making the Order. It may be that the State gave an impression, after the Order had been made, that it had some spectacular effect on the fortune of the Company, or that it had brought about such efficiency as to ensure supply of energy to new entrepreneurs. It may also be that in doing so the State over-stated its resources of energy in order to open up a State which had not been able to develop its industrial resources satisfactorily, but what has to be examined in such cases is the true and the dominant purpose behind the Order. And as long as the dominant motive is proper and reasonable, and is not sullied by a mere pretext, the Order based on it will be valid when it is well within the true scope and\n\npolicy of the Act and is an honest attempt to deal with the situation for which the power to make the Order had been granted by the Act.\n\n...\n\n• _,_.\n\nB It has however been further argued by Mr. Ray that the Order is invalid as it does not subserve the purpose of section 22B of the Act inasmuch as it does not secure the \"equitable distribution\" of energy. + ~\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 737\n\n(Shinghal J.) Reference has been made to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, where \"equitable\" has been stated to mean \"that which is fair\", and to Corpus Juris Secundum to show that equitable is that which is done \"fairly, justly and impartially\".\n\nOur attention has been invited to the facts and circumstances which led to the establishment of the Company in the State of Uttar Pradesh and the agreement with and the assurances which were given to the Company. Our attention has also been invited to the new connections which were given by the U.P.S.E.B. to the other consumers while denying the contractual supply of energy 10 the Company.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that only that distribution can be said to be \"equitable\" which is \"just and right under all the circumstances of the particular case\" (The Century Dictionary) . It will be remembered that the High Court has recorded a finding that there was shortage in the generation of energy when the Order was made.\n\nA great deal of statistical data has been laid before us and Mr. Gupta has tried to make full use of it on behalf of the Company. But the fact remains that the demand for energy was far in excess of the supply from all the sources available to the U.P.S.E.B. It has also been well established that a situation had arisen when it became necessary to obtain an order from the State Government about the course of action to be adopted by the Board. Self-contained notes were therefore drawn up\n\nin March 1977, and ou May 24, 1977, June 28, 1977 and August 26, E 1977.\n\nWe have gone through the notes and they are quite detailed and objective. We have made a mention of the developments which took place because of those notes, including the making of the Order.\n\nWe have no doubt that it was made because a situation had arisen when regulation of the supply, distribution, consumption and use of energy had become necessary, and the Order was a genuine attempt F to secure equitable distribution of energy. It is true that the Company was the worst sufferer under clause 6(a) (i) of the Order but then it was also the greatest consumer. '\n\nThe basis. fo~ te making of the Order was the necessity or expedie_ncy for mamtammg the supply and securing the equitable distribu- G tion of enerll?' by means of an order providing for the regulation of the supply, d1str1button, consumption and use of energy. It has been argued by Mr. Ray that as power was supplied indiscriminately to new consumers after imposing a cut on the Company's consumption of energy, the issue of the Order was really a colourable exercise of the Sate . Govrnment's power under section 22B of the Act.\n\nOur ff attention m thIS connection has been invited to the averments in the affidavits which have been filed on behalf of the Company and to a\n\nlist of new connections filed as Annexure D to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit of Suresh Chandra, Special Officer of the Company.\n\nReference has also been made to a list of new connections filed in the High Court on March 6, 1978. Learned Solicitor General has however pointed out that even if all the new connections were to become effective within a period of two years, their incidence would be no more than 4 per cent of the total connected load as the real impact on the system would merely be an additional load of only 18 m.w.\n\nIt has also been pointed out that while there was an increase of 9 per cent in the installed capacity of the U.P.S-E.B. for the generation of energy, the increase in the connected load was not more than 2 per cent.\n\nWe have been informed that the percentage increase in the connected load had declined from 10 in 1974-75 to 2 in 1977-78, which showed that great care was being taken in incurring extra liability. The State has also filed a list of those applicants to whom new connections were sanctioned, but were not actually released, making a total of some 23 mw.\n\nIt has been urged on behalf of the Company that the Board had deliberately reduced its thermal generation. It has been pointed out that while there was a substantial increase in hydro-electrical generation, the performance in the thermal field was highly unsatisfactory.\n\nThe State has supplied the necessary information which shows that the fall in thermal generation was due to the initial troubles of new plauts, the poor performance of the plants, and the breakdown at Harduaganj.\n\nWe have been informed that the performance of the U.P.S.E.B. was better than the Boards in the other States. We have also been told that the proposition that there was deliberate under-capacity operation of thermal machines is technically unsound because of the operating constraints in running the large thermal machines at loads lower than the rated capacity. We have made a reference to the finding of the High Court against the Company in this respect.\n\nAnother aspect of the controversy before us relates to the contractual liability of the State to supply the energy which it had assured to the Company. It has been pointed out that under the agreement dated October 29, 1959, the State was bound to supply 55 m w of\n\nenergy upto 1987 and then an agreement was entered into on November 30, 1976, to supply additional 30 m w, making a total of 85 m w for a period of 5 years. It has therefore been argued that instead of fulfilling its obligation under the agreements and the other assurances which were given by the State from time to time, the State took resort to the provisions of section 22B to get out of its obligation ad the making of the impugned Order was really a colourable exercise of that statoutory power.\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 7 3 9\n\n(Shinghal I.) We find from the counter-affidavit of the State (October, 1977) that, as would appear from the Chief Secretary's Jetter dated November 20, 1968, what the State Government had assured the Company was to meet the interim requirement of the Company for 2 or 3 years from the U.P.S.E.B. and to facilitate the parallel running of the Company's new power station, in addition to the station which had been set up at Renusagar. It is also not without significance that the State was not a party to the agreement dated November 30, 1976, for the supply of additional 30 m.w., because that agreement was made between the Company and the U.P.S.E.B. It was in fact expressly stated in that agreement that it would be subject to the provisions of the Electricity Acts of 191 O and 1948 and the rules and regulations, including the amendments thereto.\n\nCare was also taken to provide that the U.P.S.E.B. shall not be responsible for damages or diminutions in the supply of energy according to the orders issued by the State Government, A similar provision was made in the earlier agreement of 19 5 9.\n\nReference was in fact specifically made in the Board's letter to the Company dated September 2, 1972, to the State Government's power to \"control the distribution and consumption of energy under section\n\n22B of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910\".\n\nWe have made a reference to the manner and the stages in which the State Government took decisions for the restrictions to be imposed on the consumption of energy with due regard to the detailed factual notes which were submitted for its orders on account of the acute !lhortage of energy in the State. Decisions in the matter were taken by the different State Governments, including the Governors' Advisors, and it cannot be said that the cuts were imposed suddenly, or without due regard to the Company's difficulties in reducing its consumption of energy in the manner directed by the Order.\n\nWe are therefore unable to take the view that the State wantonly disregarded its contractual obligations to the Company.\n\nBut even if the Company had some cause of grievance on that account, that may well be said to be unavoidable, in the situation which had arisen when the Order was made on September 19, 1977. It has to be appreciated that subsection (2) of section 22B of the Act specifically provided that it was\n\npermissible for the State Government to direct by the Order that the U.P.S.E.B. shall not comply with the provision, inter alia, of any contract made by it.\n\nA direction to that effect was expressly made in clause 11 of the Order, and it is not permissible for the Company to complain on that account.\n\nIt is not disputed that the consumers which were hit by the provi-\n\n- --1 sions of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order were the Company, the Kiinoria\n\nChemicals and Industries Ltd., the Indian Railways, the Indian Explosives Ltd., and the Fertiliser Corporation of India. The last three of these have been exempted from the rigour of the Order. As regards the Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd., the State has stated in its reply that it was manufacturing Benzena Chloride and BHC whicL are used for agricultural purposes and for purifying drinking water.\n\nThey were entitled to 50 per cent of their consumption, and. the State allowed them exemption to the extent of 3 m w making it permissible for them to consume 12.5 m.w.\n\nIt cannot therefore be said that the continued supply of energy to Kanoria Chemicals was proof of any hostility on the part of the State in so far as the Company was concerned. It may also be that, as has been argued on behalf of the Company, some other restrictions which were initially imposed on some other consumers under the Order were withdrawn, so that it is the Company which is the main sufferer under the Order. Even so, it is not reasonable to take the view that the Order was not justified when it was made, and it cannot be held to be invalid merely because the Company is the main sufferer under it. It is not its case that the Order was discriminatory and should be struck down under article 14 of the Constitution. As has been stated the High Court has in fact found that the Company was \"unable to establish as a fact that there was no shortage in the generation of electricity when the iinpugned Order was made under section 22B of the Act of 1910.\"\n\nThe Order was therefore justified and was a valid Order when it was made on September 19, 1977. The question is whether there is force in the argument that it has ceased to be in force and stood impliedly repealed because of the change in the circumstances which brought it into existence.\n\nThe High Court has recorded a finding in this connection in favour of the Company.\n\nCraies on Statute Law, seventh edition, has mentioned six different classes of enactments at pages 357-8 which are considered as\n\nhaving ceased to be in force,-\n\n\"1. Expired-that is, enactments which having been originally limited to endure only for a specified period by a distinct provision, have not been either perpetuated or kept i]l force by continuance, or which have merely had for their object the continuance of previous (!lmporary\n\neruictents for periods now gone by effiuxion of time;\n\n2. Spent-that is, enactments spent or exhausted in operation by the accomplishment of the purposes for which they were passed, either at tho moment of their first\n\n.• >-<\n\n...._\n\nU. P. STATE & OitS. v. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 741 ( Shinghal /.) taking effect or on the happening of some event or on A the doing of some act authorised or required;\n\n3. Repealed in general terms-that is, repealed by the operation of an enactment expre'ssed only in general terms as distinguished from an enactment specifying the Acts on which it is to operate; B\n\n4. Virtually repealed-where an earlier enactment is inconsistent with, or is rendered nugatory by, a later one;\n\n5. Superseded-where a later enactment effects the same purposes as an earlier one by repetition of its terms or otherwise; c\n\n6. Obsolete-where the state of things contemplated by the enactment has ceased to exist, or the enactment is of such a nature as to be no longer capable of being put in force, regard being had to the alteration of political or social circumstances.\"\n\nThese six have been mentioned as the enactments which are selected for inclusion in the Statute Law Revision Acts of England as having ceased to be in force otherwise than by express repeal, or having by lapse of time or otherwise become unnecessary. It is quite an exhaustive list and the question is whether the Order could be said to have \"spent\" itself or become \"obsolete\", for the other four categories are inappljcable to the present case. But whether a piece of legislation has spent itself or exhausted in operation by the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was passed, or whether the\n\nsta~ of things contemplated by the enactment has ceased to exist, are essentially questions of fact for the Legislature to examine, and no vested right exists in a citizen to ask for a declaration that the law has. been impliedly repealed on any such ground.\n\nIt has to be appreciated that the power to legislate is both positive in the sense of making a law, and negative in the sense of re-\n\n. pealing a law or making it inoperative. In either case, it is a power G of the Legislature, and should lie where it belongs. Any other view will be hazardous and may well be said to be an encroachment on the legislative field.\n\nIn an extreme and a clear case, no doubt, an antiquated law may be said to have become obsolete-the more so if it is a penal law and has become incapable of user by a drastic change in the circumstances. But the judge of the change should be the H Legislature, and courts are not expected to undertalce that duty unless that becomes unavoidable and the circumstances are so apparent\n\nas to lead to one and only one conclusion.\n\nThis is equally so in regard to the delegated or subordinate legislation.\n\nWe have gone through the cases reported in Elwood Hamilton v.\n\nKentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,(') Chastleton Corporation v.\n\nA. Leiftwich Sinclair(') and Nashville, Chattanoega & St. Louis Railway v. Herbert S. Walters(•) on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Ray, but they are of no real help to the CQmpany.\n\nThus in Elwood Hamilton(') it has been held that it requires \"a clear case\"\n\nto justify a court in declaring that a Federal Statute adopted to increase war efficiency has ceased to be valid, on the theory that the war emergency has passed and the power of Congress no longer exists. ln Chastleton Corporation(') it has been held that courts would pronounce on the continued operation of law upon facts which they \"judicially know.\" We have also gone through Nashville(') case where the view has been taken that a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied.\n\nWe have gone through The petition of the Earl of Antrim and Eleven other Irish Peers(') also where a declaration was asked for by some Irish Peers that the peerage of Ireland had in accordance with the provisions of the Union with Ireland Act, 1800, the right to be represented by 28 Lords tempor_al of Ireland for life.\n\nTheir petition was rejected because the provisioos of the Act of 18 00 had ceased to be effective on the passing of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922.\n\nThat was therefore quite a different case.\n\nMr. Ray has placed reliance on Pannalal Lalwti v. State of Hyderabad,(•) but what has been held there is that a temporary legislation cannot be allowed to outlast the war emergency which ''brought it forth\".\n\nIn The Union of India v. Ram Kanwar and others(') it was held that as the building in question was being used for a purpose other than that for which it was originally requisitioned under the law, it was liable to be derequisitioned.\n\nThe question is whether any such situation has been found to be established in the present case ?\n\nNow what the High Court has found in this respect is as follows,-\n\nG \"This Court finds that circumstances have materially\n\nchanged since the impugned order was made.\n\nThe shortage in reservoir from which water is drawn for the generation of\n\n(1) 64 L. ed. 194.\n\n(2) 68 L. ed. 841.\n\n(3) 79 L. ed. 949.\n\n(4) 1967 A. C. 691.\n\n(5) A.I.R. 1954 Hyderabad 129.\n\n(6) [!962] 3 S.C.R. 313.\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS. V. HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. 743 ( Shinghal l.) Hydro-electricity has ceased and further supplies of electrical energy are available from newly commissioned units. The respondents admit that fresh power connections have been given.\n\nIn these circumstances, the continuance of the impugned order is no longer justified and consequently, the order must be held to have outlived the purpose for which it was made and, as such, it must be held to be no longer\n\nvalid.\"\n\nIt has thus found three facts: (i) the shortage in the.reservoir(s) for generation of hydel energy had ceased, (ii) further supply of energy was available from newly commissioned units, and (iii) fresh power connections had been given by the U.P.S.E.B.\n\nBut what was lost sight of was the important fact that it was all along the case of the\n\nState that hydel energy was only one-third of the total generation, and that generation of thermal energy which met twcrthird of the total requirement had declined for reasons beyond the control of U.P.S.E.B. The High Court did not therefore undertake a careful examination of the facts, and took some new connections into consideration without attempting to examine their magnitude and effect on the over all generation and availability of energy from all the sources.\n\nThe State has filed a detailed affidavit dated October 12, 1978, where it has been stated that tho U.P.S.E.B. was at best capable of generating electrical energy to the \"tune of 10,185 m u,\" wherea! the total requirement of the State for 1978-79 was 13,866 m u so that there was a gap of 393 m u.\n\nThe High Court therefore er; ed in taking the view that the continuance of the Order was no longer justified .\n\nEven so, the High Court abStained from Striking down the whole of the Order and merely declared that the provisions of the first proviso to clause 6(a) (i) was ultra vires, and quashed it.\n\nWe have given our reasons for taking the view that the whole of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order, including the proviso, is valid, and the question remains whether we should restore the quashed proviso.\n\nThe answer to the question is simplti.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General has made a statement at the Bar that at present, or in the near future, there is no difficulty in supplying 42.5 m w energy to the Company, and that the Company is getting that much energy alrady. He has been frank enough to say that this will be so even if the proviso is restored by this Court. . He has stated that the State Government has been reviewing the position from time to time, and has given the\n\nassurance that it will continue to do so in future. He has also stated that although the application of the Company for grant of exemption under clause 10 of the Order had been rejected on December 9, 1977, there is nothing to prevent the Company from making a fresh application if it thinks that there is a real and substantial improvement in the gene.ration of energy in the State.\n\nThe fact therefore remains that, as things stand at present, the proviso, which admittedly applies only to the Company, is of no practical use for the time being.\n\nSo even though it is valid and has wrongly been quashed by the High Court, we do not think it necessary to restore it, so that it shall not be deemed to form part of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order. But if there is deterioration in the generation of energy again, or there are other sufficient reasons within the purview of section 22B of the Act to reinsert the proviso, in the present or modified form, it will be permissible for the State Government to do so according to the law.\n\nIn the resul\\, while C.A. No. 921 of 1978 is allowed to the extent mentioned above, C.A. No. 425 of 1979 fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs in both the appeals.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nC.A. 921/78 allowed.\n\n' C.A. 425 /79 dismissed.\n\n' - )-\n\n< I _.,\n\n.,.\n\nk • ..", "total_entities": 256, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. LTD. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPN. LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 143, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 259, "end_char": 279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Electricity Act 1910", "statute": "Electricity Act 1910"}}, {"text": "S. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Electricity Act 1910", "statute": "Electricity Act 1910"}}, {"text": "Cl. 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 563, "end_char": 571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Electricity Act 1910", "statute": "Electricity Act 1910"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of granting lincence to the company for the establishment of a new Aluminium factory the Government of India obtained the consent of the Government of U.P. to make available to the company in bulk clieap electricity\n\nfrom the Rihand Hydro-Electric Scheme."}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 828, "end_char": 846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of granting lincence to the company for the establishment of a new Aluminium factory the Government of India obtained the consent of the Government of U.P. to make available to the company in bulk clieap electricity\n\nfrom the Rihand Hydro-Electric Scheme."}}, {"text": "Renukoot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1218, "end_char": 1226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company set up and commissioned its aluminium plant at Renukoot in April, 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1402, "end_char": 1407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1415, "end_char": 1435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "NOvember 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1483, "end_char": 1500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the State was unable to meet the extra requirement of energy, silnction under s. 28 of the Electricity Act 1910 was granted to the Company, at its request, on NOvember 12, 1964, to set up a generating station at Reno- F sagar, near Renukoot."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company thought of setting up a plant for the production of 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium in the State of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "November 20, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Government of U.P.\n\nG entered into negotiations: with the Company and in its letter dated November 20, 1968, it stated that there could be no difficulty in meeting the interim requirements of energy for 2 to 3 years from the U.P. State Electricity Board and also for arranging for parallel running of their new power stations."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Government of U.P.\n\nG entered into negotiations: with the Company and in its letter dated November 20, 1968, it stated that there could be no difficulty in meeting the interim requirements of energy for 2 to 3 years from the U.P. State Electricity Board and also for arranging for parallel running of their new power stations."}}, {"text": "Renu Sagar Generation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2330, "end_char": 2351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nCompany was granted sanction to expand the Renu Sagar Generation by 250 mw, and after negotiations with the State Government it Was agreed that the U.P.S.E.B. would meet the additional energy under a phased programme."}}, {"text": "U.P.S.E.B.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nCompany was granted sanction to expand the Renu Sagar Generation by 250 mw, and after negotiations with the State Government it Was agreed that the U.P.S.E.B. would meet the additional energy under a phased programme."}}, {"text": "September 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The H U.P.S.E.B. stated in its letter dated September 2, 1972, that the supply would be without prejudice to the power of the State Government to control the\n\ndistribution and consumption of energy under s. 22B of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2709, "end_char": 2715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 30, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2958, "end_char": 2975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An agreement \\Vas however entered into between the Company and the U.P.S.E.B. on November 30, 1976, in sup'ersession of the earlier agreements, and it was s-tipulated that it would be read and construed in all respects in conformity with the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and its rules and the regulations and the amendments thereto."}}, {"text": "UPSEB", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the note of the UPSEB that there was acute shortage of energy, and its suggestion for the imposition of some restrictions, the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consumption) Order 1977, was issued by the Government on April 7, 1977."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3663, "end_char": 3676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the note of the UPSEB that there was acute shortage of energy, and its suggestion for the imposition of some restrictions, the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consumption) Order 1977, was issued by the Government on April 7, 1977."}}, {"text": "cl. 6(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3685, "end_char": 3696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 3, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the shortage of energy became more acute the Secretary of the Power D DepMim'ent sent a note to the Governor dated May 3, 1977 stating that there was a large gap between demand and availability of energy and that overriding public interest, particularly the need to maintain food supply, required that units which were heavy consumers of 'energy should be subjected to further cut in the consumption of energy."}}, {"text": "Renusagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4304, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was particularly pointed out that as the Company was itself generating energy at Renusagar, it will have more than 50 per cent of en'ergy even if the Board's supply was completely withdrawn."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The E Governor approved that proposal on June 1, 1977."}}, {"text": "cl. 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 2, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4594, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6(a) (i) of the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Distribution and Consump tion) Order, 1977 in June 2, 1977 according to which an industrial consumer having its own source of generation of energy from which it obtained 50 per cent or more of its consumption would suffer a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the UPSEB."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4985, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fr'esh elections were held to the State Legislature Assembly, and the new Cabinet was sworn in on June 23, 1977."}}, {"text": "August 26, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5258, "end_char": 5273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chairman of the UPSEB prepared a note on August 26, 1977, in which he pointed out the shortage of energy, including Dr substantial fall in the generation of thermal energy, and in the \"import\" of energy."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stad:e Government made an order on September 19, 1977 called the U.P. Electricity (Regulation of Supply Distribution, Consumption and Us'e) Order, 1977."}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pipri Bus Bar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6896, "end_char": 6909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was the •tatutory obligation of the UPSEB to supply electrical energy to a consumer and held that the Pipri Bus Bar was a \"distributing Main'' uncler s. 2(o) and was an electricity supply line as defined in s. 2(f) of the Act; (b) s. 22B of the Act did not confer power on the State Governments to cut off supply of energy to existing consumers or to iS&ue an order that certain preferences will be followed in supplying 'energy, (c) though the company deserved the writ, it could not be said that UPSEB had deliberately under utilised its generation capacity, and held tb'e first proviso to Clause 6(a) (i) of the order ultra vires, quashed it and directed the UPSEB to supply electrical energy to the comp2111y in accordance wlth law, without taking into consideration, the provisionsof th'e said proviso."}}, {"text": "s. 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6944, "end_char": 6951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7001, "end_char": 7008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7025, "end_char": 7031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7863, "end_char": 7869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7877, "end_char": 7905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8046, "end_char": 8054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8364, "end_char": 8370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8488, "end_char": 8493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8547, "end_char": 8553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stnte Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9440, "end_char": 9456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The issue of the Order was really a colourable exercise of the Stnte Government's power under s. 228 of the Act as power was supplied indiscri- B minately to new consumers after imposing a cut on the Company's consumption of energy."}}, {"text": "s. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pipri Bus B&r~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9735, "end_char": 9749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court erred in taking the view that th'e Pipri Bus B&r~ which was composed of a set of conductors which were made up of thick aluminium core steel reinforced cables, was a 'distributing main' under s. 2(e) of the Act and was an electric supply line as defined in s. 2(f) and that cl."}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9957, "end_char": 9964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 10007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10139, "end_char": 10144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "U.P.S.E.B~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10237, "end_char": 10247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VI of the Sch'edule to the Act could apply to the U.P.S.E.B~ in reSopect of that area only where distribution mains had been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of them had commenced."}}, {"text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10497, "end_char": 10526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10873, "end_char": 10879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11227, "end_char": 11232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Renusagar Power Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11428, "end_char": 11451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, therefore, futile to contend that what was generated by the Renusagar Power Company was not meant for supply to the public, but was the Company's own energy."}}, {"text": "s 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11784, "end_char": 11789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11865, "end_char": 11871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11956, "end_char": 11960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12218, "end_char": 12223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12408, "end_char": 12419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12488, "end_char": 12493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12622, "end_char": 12628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1963] 1 SCR 491", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13691, "end_char": 13707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 361", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13743, "end_char": 13759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14143, "end_char": 14151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "proviso operateo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14186, "end_char": 14202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proviso operateo;; in a special or particular field and for a particular purpose where it was considered necessary for regulating the supply etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 22R", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14397, "end_char": 14403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15178, "end_char": 15184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July D 8, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17374, "end_char": 17388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Company had not been able to establish malice in law, n1erely because of what the Chief Secretary said in his press statemenU dated July D 8, 1977, or what the Minister informed the Assembly."}}, {"text": "Mav 24. 1977,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19206, "end_char": 19219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Self-contained notes were therefore drawn Up in March, 1977 and on Mav 24."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1977 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19220, "end_char": 19237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1977, June 28, 1977 and August 26, 1977, which were quite detailed and objective and led to the making of the Order."}}, {"text": "Coniranv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19433, "end_char": 19441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was true H1,1t the Coniranv was the worst sufferer under cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19471, "end_char": 19479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19722, "end_char": 19724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20812, "end_char": 20818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20826, "end_char": 20854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21429, "end_char": 21435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "cl. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21685, "end_char": 21691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 SCR 313", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23756, "end_char": 23772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 6(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24933, "end_char": 24941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25209, "end_char": 25217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25365, "end_char": 25371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25539, "end_char": 25567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he generatic1; i of energy again, or there are other sufficient reasons wiihin the purview of s. 22B of the Act to reinsert the proviso, in the present or modified form, it would be permis&ible for the State Government to do so accordingly to the l&w,\n\n[743GH, 744C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25736, "end_char": 25749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "S. S. Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25784, "end_char": 25793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25795, "end_char": 25803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25805, "end_char": 25815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "N. R. Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25817, "end_char": 25830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "U. K. Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25832, "end_char": 25845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "G. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25850, "end_char": 25858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for the Appellant (In CA 921/78)\n\nS. S. Ray, D. Gupta, Shiv Dayal, N. R. Khaitan, U. K. Khaitan and G. Mitra for the Respondent in CA 921/78 and Appellant in CA 425/79."}}, {"text": "fl S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25920, "end_char": 25935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fl S. N. Kacker, Sol."}}, {"text": "G. C. Dwivedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25958, "end_char": 25971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, G. C. Dwivedi, S. C. Bhudhwar, s. Markendaya and K. Madan Moha.n Reddy for U. P. State Electri-\n\n;>."}}, {"text": "S. C. Bhudhwar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25973, "end_char": 25987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, G. C. Dwivedi, S. C. Bhudhwar, s. Markendaya and K. Madan Moha.n Reddy for U. P. State Electri-\n\n;>."}}, {"text": "s. Markendaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25989, "end_char": 26002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, G. C. Dwivedi, S. C. Bhudhwar, s. Markendaya and K. Madan Moha.n Reddy for U. P. State Electri-\n\n;>."}}, {"text": "K. Madan Moha.n Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26007, "end_char": 26028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, G. C. Dwivedi, S. C. Bhudhwar, s. Markendaya and K. Madan Moha.n Reddy for U. P. State Electri-\n\n;>."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26292, "end_char": 26312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "717 (Shinghal J.)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL J .-These appeals by special leave ari~ from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated April 27, 1978."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26392, "end_char": 26414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "921 of 1978 has been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the U .P. State Electricity Board and the Executive Engineer of the Rihand Power Station, hereinafter collectively referred to as the State, Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "U .P. State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26420, "end_char": 26449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "921 of 1978 has been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the U .P. State Electricity Board and the Executive Engineer of the Rihand Power Station, hereinafter collectively referred to as the State, Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26608, "end_char": 26644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "425 of 1979 has been filed by the Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd., its Vice President and Chief Accountant,\n\n~\" hereinafter referred to as the Company."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27627, "end_char": 27670, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "&eptember 19, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27855, "end_char": 27873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the State feels aggrieved because the High Court bas interfered with the Uttar Pradesh Electricity (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Consumption and Use) Order, 1977, dated &eptember 19, 1977, hereinafter referred to as the , Order, which it made under section 22B of the Electricity Ac; t, 1910,\n\n(for short the Act), the Company's grievance is that the High Court ( lias not granted all the reliefs which it had claimed in its petition under \"'-."}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27935, "end_char": 27946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28131, "end_char": 28142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Govrnment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28512, "end_char": 28530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the question of establishing a new aluminium factory arose for consideration by the Govrnment of India, it took into consideration the consent of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make energy available for the factory from the Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme which was expected to go into operation by the end of 1960, and gra\"nted an industrial licence to the Company on September 26, 1959, for the manufacture of 20,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots per year at Rihand."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28578, "end_char": 28605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the question of establishing a new aluminium factory arose for consideration by the Govrnment of India, it took into consideration the consent of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make energy available for the factory from the Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme which was expected to go into operation by the end of 1960, and gra\"nted an industrial licence to the Company on September 26, 1959, for the manufacture of 20,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots per year at Rihand."}}, {"text": "Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28656, "end_char": 28684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the question of establishing a new aluminium factory arose for consideration by the Govrnment of India, it took into consideration the consent of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make energy available for the factory from the Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme which was expected to go into operation by the end of 1960, and gra\"nted an industrial licence to the Company on September 26, 1959, for the manufacture of 20,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots per year at Rihand."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28798, "end_char": 28816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the question of establishing a new aluminium factory arose for consideration by the Govrnment of India, it took into consideration the consent of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make energy available for the factory from the Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme which was expected to go into operation by the end of 1960, and gra\"nted an industrial licence to the Company on September 26, 1959, for the manufacture of 20,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots per year at Rihand."}}, {"text": "Rihand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28894, "end_char": 28900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the question of establishing a new aluminium factory arose for consideration by the Govrnment of India, it took into consideration the consent of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make energy available for the factory from the Rihand Hydro-electric Scheme which was expected to go into operation by the end of 1960, and gra\"nted an industrial licence to the Company on September 26, 1959, for the manufacture of 20,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots per year at Rihand."}}, {"text": "State of\n\n(;;\n\nA Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28950, "end_char": 28980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An agreement was also entered into between the State of\n\n(;;\n\nA Uttar Pradesh and the Company on October 29, 1959 for the 'supply of 55 m w of power on a firm, continuous and uninterrupted basis at a rate of 1.997717 paise per unit for a period of 25 years from th•o date of commencement of the supply."}}, {"text": "October 29, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29000, "end_char": 29016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An agreement was also entered into between the State of\n\n(;;\n\nA Uttar Pradesh and the Company on October 29, 1959 for the 'supply of 55 m w of power on a firm, continuous and uninterrupted basis at a rate of 1.997717 paise per unit for a period of 25 years from th•o date of commencement of the supply."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29567, "end_char": 29577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29641, "end_char": 29658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Company, at its request, on November 12, 1964, to set up a gene-~ rating station at Re\"nusagar, near Renukoot, through its subsidiary the ) Renusagar Pow\"r Company Ltd. It had two generating units of 67.5 ·\n\nm w each."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30271, "end_char": 30284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company thought of setting up the plant for the production of 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium in Gujarat State as it was informed by the Gujarat State Electricity Board that it would be ab:e to meet the requirement of energy there at a rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30311, "end_char": 30342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company thought of setting up the plant for the production of 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium in Gujarat State as it was informed by the Gujarat State Electricity Board that it would be ab:e to meet the requirement of energy there at a rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "U. P. State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30521, "end_char": 30550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "320/- per kilowatt year, which was much higher than the rate at which it was receiving energy from U. P. State Electricity Board (U.P.S.E.B.)."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30731, "end_char": 30744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of U.P. held negotiations with the Company, and it was decickd that the Company would produce the additional 60,000 metric tonnes of aluminium also in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Novembzr 20, 19\"8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30835, "end_char": 30852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Secretary to the government of U.P. wrote a detailed letter to the Company on Novembzr 20, 19\"8, in which the position regarding the supply of energy was stated as follows,-\n\n\"Regarding the power plant, I can see no difficulty in meeting the interim requirements for 2 to 3 years from the U.P. State Electricity Board, nor do I sec any difficulty in G arranging for parallel running of your new power staion, with the U.P. State Electricity Board.\""}}, {"text": "September 26, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31272, "end_char": 31290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company then addressed a letter to the State Government on , September 26, 1969 stating the position regarding too supply and generation of increased energy for the expansion of aluminum production as H follows,-\n\n\"5(a) The Scheme, of power supply for our expansion by UPSEB is interlinked with the question of expansion of\n\n• (\n\n• ..\n~ •\n\nU. P. STATE & ORS."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32499, "end_char": 32511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On its part, the U.P.S.E.B. sanctioned 110 m w additional energy under a phased programme to be completed by June 1, 1975."}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32733, "end_char": 32744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33081, "end_char": 33094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It so happened that additional energy was not made available to the Company during 1972-7 5 although the rate was substantially increased (to 11 paise instead of 1.997717 paise) with retrospective effect from June 30, 1975, under the new aluminium policy of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34793, "end_char": 34830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the proposals was for a 50 per cent cut in the demand of the Company and some other industrial units including Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd.\n\nThat note came up for consideration in the State Cabinet on April 1, 1977, and was partially approved."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34892, "end_char": 34905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the proposals was for a 50 per cent cut in the demand of the Company and some other industrial units including Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd.\n\nThat note came up for consideration in the State Cabinet on April 1, 1977, and was partially approved."}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35059, "end_char": 35070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35299, "end_char": 35313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uttar Pradesh came under the President's rule on April 30, 1977, and the Company was allowed 10 draw 55 m w until further orde-rs."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35758, "end_char": 35770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was dismissed on May 20, 1977, because of a subsequent Jetter by the Government requiring the U.P.S.E.B. to continue the supply of 42.5 m w energy instead of 55 m w in accordance with the aforesaid Order of April 7, 1977."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36057, "end_char": 36069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary of the Power Department of the State government sent a note to the Governor on May 24, 1977, proposing some additional cuts in the supply of energy."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36336, "end_char": 36348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that note dated May 31, 1977, it was stated that there was a large gap between demand and availability of energy and that was creating a serious imbalance requiring load shedding on a large scale, and that had given rise to discontent in all sectors of the economy nnd."}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37468, "end_char": 37479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cbmpany", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37915, "end_char": 37922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, the Cbmpany filed its second writ petition [No."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38828, "end_char": 38841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A detailed note was prepared by the Secretary concerned on June 28, 1977, and it came up for consideration in the Cabinet on June 30, 1977, but no decision was taken and the note was kept pending."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38894, "end_char": 38907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A detailed note was prepared by the Secretary concerned on June 28, 1977, and it came up for consideration in the Cabinet on June 30, 1977, but no decision was taken and the note was kept pending."}}, {"text": "Sep'ember 26, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39849, "end_char": 39867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3732 of 1977), against the Order, on Sep'ember 26, 1977."}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40044, "end_char": 40053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 9, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40106, "end_char": 40122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court directed the Company tel make an app.lication under clause 10 of the Order, for exemption, but it was rejected on December 9, 1977 when made."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40230, "end_char": 40244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court ultimately heard and decicl ct the writ petition by the impugned judgment dated April 27, 1978 against which these appeals by special leave have been directed as aforesaid."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40352, "end_char": 40363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court made an order on May 4, 1978 foe the suppl:; of 20 m w of energy to the Company as a purely interim arrangemcn1• That was raised to 35 m w by an order dated August 29, 1978, and the State is now supplying 42.5 • m w to the Company as an interim arrangement."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40492, "end_char": 40507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court made an order on May 4, 1978 foe the suppl:; of 20 m w of energy to the Company as a purely interim arrangemcn1• That was raised to 35 m w by an order dated August 29, 1978, and the State is now supplying 42.5 • m w to the Company as an interim arrangement."}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41720, "end_char": 41731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 18 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42104, "end_char": 42122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reference in this connection has also been made to clause VI of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42205, "end_char": 42292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42308, "end_char": 42317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference in this connection has also been made to clause VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Reference in this connection has also been made to clause VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42411, "end_char": 42421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference in this connection has also been made to clause VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Reference in this connection has also been made to clause VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42627, "end_char": 42655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "VI of the Schedule lo the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42940, "end_char": 42969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43281, "end_char": 43291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule lo the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule lo the Act"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43535, "end_char": 43545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule lo the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule lo the Act"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44233, "end_char": 44243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44534, "end_char": 44543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pipri Bus Bar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45159, "end_char": 45172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has stated that the Company gets its supply from the Pipri Bus Bar, which is composed of a set of conductors which are made up of thick aluminium core steel reinforced cables, and has taken the view that the Pipri Bus Bar is a \"distribut; ng main\" under section 2 ( e) of the Act and is an electric supply-line as d•ofined in section 2(f) so that clause VI of the Schedule to the Act would be fully applicable to the Board in so far as its obligation to the Company is concerned."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45360, "end_char": 45369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45432, "end_char": 45444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45460, "end_char": 45489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45634, "end_char": 45644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45690, "end_char": 45719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46296, "end_char": 46299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has in fact been admitted to be so by Mr. Ray in bi's arguments, and the High Court went wrong in recording a finding of fact against the State without any basis for it in the pleadings."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46468, "end_char": 46478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "VI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 47622, "end_char": 47642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "725 (Shinghal J.) Mr. Ray for the Company has however invited our attention to a decision 'of the Rajasthan High Court in firm Sadul Shahr Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Raiasthan Sklte Electricity Board.(')"}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48452, "end_char": 48463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48986, "end_char": 48997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49208, "end_char": 49218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Renusagar Power Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49403, "end_char": 49434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was allowed and a notification was issued on November 12, 1964, granting sanction to the Renusagar Power Company Limited (a whol:y owned subsidiary of the Company) to engage in the business of supplying energy to the Company."}}, {"text": "Renusagar Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49612, "end_char": 49629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has two generating units and 135 m w power is being generated by the Renusagar Station for the exclusive use of the Company, and it is this energy for which it has been argued that it cannot be th~ subject-matter of an order under section 22B ."}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49774, "end_char": 49785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49812, "end_char": 49822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50417, "end_char": 50428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50525, "end_char": 50536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51013, "end_char": 51024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51186, "end_char": 51198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51457, "end_char": 51468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51536, "end_char": 51547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 22A and 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51580, "end_char": 51600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 22A and 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51799, "end_char": 51819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52377, "end_char": 52388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52615, "end_char": 52625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shinghal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52856, "end_char": 52864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "727 (Shinghal l.) \"'the licensee' not to comply with the matters stated in clauses (i) to (iii).", "canonical_name": "Shinghal"}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53020, "end_char": 53031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53839, "end_char": 53849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53857, "end_char": 53868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54197, "end_char": 54207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has gone on to hold that Parliament did not confer on the State Governments the power to cut off supply to existing consumers."}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 361", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55322, "end_char": 55341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 S.C.R. 828", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55347, "end_char": 55366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56173, "end_char": 56184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56495, "end_char": 56532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proviso to clause 6(a)\n\n(i) of tho Order to which exception has been taken, states as follows,--\n\n\"Provided that where any such industrial consumer has his [own source of generation of energy wh; ch alone enables him to obtain] 50 per cent or more of bis total consumption, then a cut of 100 per cent in the energy suppliod by the • Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board shall be exercised.\""}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57365, "end_char": 57376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57669, "end_char": 57680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shinghal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58231, "end_char": 58239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "729\n\n( Shinghal !. )", "canonical_name": "Shinghal"}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58263, "end_char": 58274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58376, "end_char": 58387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58516, "end_char": 58527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58771, "end_char": 58779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58943, "end_char": 58951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59123, "end_char": 59134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59390, "end_char": 59402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59850, "end_char": 59861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59972, "end_char": 59983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60169, "end_char": 60180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60582, "end_char": 60593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61187, "end_char": 61198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63063, "end_char": 63074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66084, "end_char": 66095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67479, "end_char": 67490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 67741, "end_char": 67745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole of the clause reads as follows,-\n\n\"6(a) (i) In respect of electrical energy consumed by all large and heavy power industrial consnmers receiving power at 33 kv and above, excepting fertilizers, from the U.P. State\n\nElectricity Board a cut of 50 per cent in their monthly consumption of electricity both in respect of energy and demand shall be exercised :\n\nProvided that where any such industrial consumer has his own source of generation of energy which alone enables him to obtain 50 per cent or more of his total consumption, then a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the Uttar Pradesh State electricity Board shall be exercised.\""}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68124, "end_char": 68161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole of the clause reads as follows,-\n\n\"6(a) (i) In respect of electrical energy consumed by all large and heavy power industrial consnmers receiving power at 33 kv and above, excepting fertilizers, from the U.P. State\n\nElectricity Board a cut of 50 per cent in their monthly consumption of electricity both in respect of energy and demand shall be exercised :\n\nProvided that where any such industrial consumer has his own source of generation of energy which alone enables him to obtain 50 per cent or more of his total consumption, then a cut of 100 per cent in the energy supplied by the Uttar Pradesh State electricity Board shall be exercised.\""}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68821, "end_char": 68832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69769, "end_char": 69780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71235, "end_char": 71246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 8, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71484, "end_char": 71496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "statement of the Chief Secretary of the State Government dated July 8, 1977 and some statements of the Minister concerned."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72283, "end_char": 72296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Jed to further directions for the reduction of consumption, and ultimately an order was made on June 29, 1977 for disconnecting the supply."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73141, "end_char": 73154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ray has invited our attention to the statements of the Minister concerned dated July 18, 1977, July 28, 1977, September 14, 1977, August 29, 1978 and his reply to the Company dated October 18, 1978, to show that the State Government was not satisfied with the contractual rate for the supply of energy as it was below the cost of generation, and wanted to review and re'scind the agreement altogether."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73171, "end_char": 73189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ray has invited our attention to the statements of the Minister concerned dated July 18, 1977, July 28, 1977, September 14, 1977, August 29, 1978 and his reply to the Company dated October 18, 1978, to show that the State Government was not satisfied with the contractual rate for the supply of energy as it was below the cost of generation, and wanted to review and re'scind the agreement altogether."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73242, "end_char": 73258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ray has invited our attention to the statements of the Minister concerned dated July 18, 1977, July 28, 1977, September 14, 1977, August 29, 1978 and his reply to the Company dated October 18, 1978, to show that the State Government was not satisfied with the contractual rate for the supply of energy as it was below the cost of generation, and wanted to review and re'scind the agreement altogether."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74354, "end_char": 74372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Solicitor General has taken us through the relevant record to show that the Minister did not really want to harm the Company unnecessarily, and if he stated further that he was never approached personally by the Company, or in a proper manner, or that the relief to the Company would be considered depending on how it contacted him for that purpose, the Minister simply wanted to state the facts and to convey his resentJDent against the attempt to influence him politically, or through any Minister of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74581, "end_char": 74595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shows that during the period February 1973 to August 7, 1975 the Company received energy from 27 .50 m w to 1.25 m w.\n\nIt was only after the declaration of emergency on June 26, 1975 that the Company received some 55 m w of energy, and then a fresh agreement was made soon after on November 30, 1976 to supply 85 m w of energy."}}, {"text": "June 26, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74704, "end_char": 74717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shows that during the period February 1973 to August 7, 1975 the Company received energy from 27 .50 m w to 1.25 m w.\n\nIt was only after the declaration of emergency on June 26, 1975 that the Company received some 55 m w of energy, and then a fresh agreement was made soon after on November 30, 1976 to supply 85 m w of energy."}}, {"text": "September 19, 19.77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76817, "end_char": 76836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order was made on September 19, 19.77, and the statement shows that consumption of energy for agricultural and irrigation pnrposes increased appreciably thereafter, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78681, "end_char": 78694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has also been made to the new aluminium policy which the Central Government announced on July 15, 1975, and to the, benefits which the U.P.S.E.B. was deriving from the aluminium products manufactured by the Company."}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80808, "end_char": 80819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jowitt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81002, "end_char": 81008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "737\n\n(Shinghal J.) Reference has been made to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, where \"equitable\" has been stated to mean \"that which is fair\", and to Corpus Juris Secundum to show that equitable is that which is done \"fairly, justly and impartially\"."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81996, "end_char": 82001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A great deal of statistical data has been laid before us and Mr. Gupta has tried to make full use of it on behalf of the Company."}}, {"text": "August 26, E 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82477, "end_char": 82494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Self-contained notes were therefore drawn up\n\nin March 1977, and ou May 24, 1977, June 28, 1977 and August 26, E 1977."}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82992, "end_char": 83003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83575, "end_char": 83586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Suresh Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83832, "end_char": 83846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our ff attention m thIS connection has been invited to the averments in the affidavits which have been filed on behalf of the Company and to a\n\nlist of new connections filed as Annexure D to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit of Suresh Chandra, Special Officer of the Company."}}, {"text": "March 6, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83966, "end_char": 83979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has also been made to a list of new connections filed in the High Court on March 6, 1978."}}, {"text": "U.P.S-E.B.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84394, "end_char": 84404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also been pointed out that while there was an increase of 9 per cent in the installed capacity of the U.P.S-E.B. for the generation of energy, the increase in the connected load was not more than 2 per cent."}}, {"text": "Harduaganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85327, "end_char": 85337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State has supplied the necessary information which shows that the fall in thermal generation was due to the initial troubles of new plauts, the poor performance of the plants, and the breakdown at Harduaganj."}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86430, "end_char": 86441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87921, "end_char": 87933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87941, "end_char": 87969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88930, "end_char": 88941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89195, "end_char": 89204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89374, "end_char": 89385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kiinoria\n\nChemicals and Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89425, "end_char": 89464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the consumers which were hit by the provi-\n--1 sions of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order were the Company, the Kiinoria\n\nChemicals and Industries Ltd., the Indian Railways, the Indian Explosives Ltd., and the Fertiliser Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89470, "end_char": 89485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the consumers which were hit by the provi-\n--1 sions of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order were the Company, the Kiinoria\n\nChemicals and Industries Ltd., the Indian Railways, the Indian Explosives Ltd., and the Fertiliser Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "Indian Explosives Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89491, "end_char": 89513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the consumers which were hit by the provi-\n--1 sions of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order were the Company, the Kiinoria\n\nChemicals and Industries Ltd., the Indian Railways, the Indian Explosives Ltd., and the Fertiliser Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "Fertiliser Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89523, "end_char": 89554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the consumers which were hit by the provi-\n--1 sions of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order were the Company, the Kiinoria\n\nChemicals and Industries Ltd., the Indian Railways, the Indian Explosives Ltd., and the Fertiliser Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "Kanoria Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 90081, "end_char": 90098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot therefore be said that the continued supply of energy to Kanoria Chemicals was proof of any hostility on the part of the State in so far as the Company was concerned."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90713, "end_char": 90723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90949, "end_char": 90960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Elwood Hamilton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94954, "end_char": 94969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus in Elwood Hamilton(') it has been held that it requires \"a clear case\"\n\nto justify a court in declaring that a Federal Statute adopted to increase war efficiency has ceased to be valid, on the theory that the war emergency has passed and the power of Congress no longer exists."}}, {"text": "Nashville", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 95404, "end_char": 95413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also gone through Nashville(') case where the view has been taken that a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied."}}, {"text": "Antrim", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 95607, "end_char": 95613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have gone through The petition of the Earl of Antrim and Eleven other Irish Peers(') also where a declaration was asked for by some Irish Peers that the peerage of Ireland had in accordance with the provisions of the Union with Ireland Act, 1800, the right to be represented by 28 Lords tempor_al of Ireland for life."}}, {"text": "October 12, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 98356, "end_char": 98372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State has filed a detailed affidavit dated October 12, 1978, where it has been stated that tho U.P.S.E.B. was at best capable of generating electrical energy to the \"tune of 10,185 m u,\" wherea!"}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98859, "end_char": 98870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98973, "end_char": 98984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99733, "end_char": 99742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100303, "end_char": 100314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100458, "end_char": 100469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_745_759_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "74 5\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nApril 17, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]\n\nIncome-Tax Act 1922, Section l0(2)(iii), !0(2)(xv)-Deduction against business incorne-Condition.r 'lo be satisfied under Section 10{2)(iii) and 10(2)(.[V) for c!ain1ing deduction, explained-Words and Phrases-\"For the purpose of business'', scope of.\n\nThe appellant-assessee carried on money-lending and other businesses and derived income from various sources such as investment in shares, properties and business.\n\nPursuant to her promise to donate a sum of Rs. 10 lacs for setting up an Engiiieer!~1g College to commemorate the memory of her lat'e husband, she actually made over a sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs by depositing the same in a joint account opened in the name of the District fagistrate, Bulandshahr aud Smt. Indcrmani Jntia for the College.\n\nThe lxtlance of Rs. 4.5 lacs was left with the asscssee and V.'as treated as a debt to the institution and interest thereon at 6% per annum with effect from October 21, 1955 was to be finally deposited in the technical institute account. Though in the books of accounts, on November 21, 1955, a sum of Rs. 10 lacs was debited to her capital account and corresponding credit was given to the account of the institute, the assessec aictual1y paid the sum of ~- 5.5 lacs to the institution on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India, Aligarh.\n\nIn the assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60, the assessee claimed the deduction of these sums-Rs. 20,107/- Rs. 25,470/- ood Rs. 18,445/- being th'e respective items of interest paid by her to the bank on Rs. 5.5 lacs during the samvat years. The assessee contended that she had preferred to draw on the overdraft account of the bank for the purpose of paying the institution in order to save her income earning assets, namely, the shares, which she would have otherwise been required to dispose of :lnd therefore, the interest paid by her should be allowed. As regards interest on the remaining sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs (which was left as a loan with the assessee) that was debited to her account, the assessee claimed that it was a permissible\n\ndeduction.\n\nThe taxing authorities took the view that the claim for deduction was not G admissible either against business income under section 10(2) or against income from investments under section 12(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe appeal!'i preferred to the Appellate Tribunal failed.\n\nThe references made to the High Court went against the assessee.\n\nDismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD : I. Under section 10(2)(iii) of Income Tax Act, 1922, three amditions are required to be satic; fi'ed in order to enable the ru; sessee to claim a deduction in respect of interest on borrowed capital, namely, (a) that money\n\n8-330 SCI/79\n\nA (ca.pita!) must have been borrowed by the assessee, (b) that it must have been borrDwcd for the purpose of business and (c) that the assessee must paid interest on the said amount and claimed it as a deduction.\n\n[7SSB-C]\n\n2. As regards the claim for deduction in respect of expenditure under s. !0(2)(xv), the assessee must also satisfy three conditions namely (a) it (the expenditure) must not be an allowance of the nature described in clauses (i) R to (xiv); (b) it must not be in the nature of capital expenditure or personal\n\nexpenses of the assessee and (c) it must have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of his business. [755C-D]\n\n3. The expression \"for the purpose of business\" occurring in s.10(2)(iii) as also in 10(2)(xv) is wider in scope than the expression \"for the purpose of earning income profits or gains\" occurring in s. 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, the scope for allowing a deduction uuder s. 10(2)(iii) or 10(2)(xv) would be much wider than the one available under s. 12(2) of the Act.\n\n[755D-EJ\n\n(.'on1n1issioner of Income Tax v. Malayala1n Plantations Ltd., 53 ITR 140 -. (SC); applied.\n\n4. Neither there had been any confusion of the issue nor any wrong D approach had been adopted by the taxing authorities, the Tribunal or the Hih Court. The case of the assessee had been considered both by the Tribunal as\n\nell as by the High Court under s.10(2)(iii) or 10(2)(xv) and not under s.12(2). In fact, in Reference No. 775 of 1970 the questions framed by the Tribunal in terms referred to s.10(2) (iii) and 10(2) (xv) and proceeded to seek the High Court's opinion as to whether the sums representing interest paid by tile assessee to the Ce.-.tral Bank on the overdraft of Rs. 5. 5 lacs for E the concerned three years were allowable as deduction under either of the said pro, isions of the Act and the High Court after considering the matter and the authorities on the point had come to the conclusion that such interest was not allowable as a deduction under either of the said provisions. [743J>-G)\n\n5. It is true that the High Court did refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhai Blturiben's case but that decision was referred to only for F the purpose of emphasising, one aspect which was propounded by that Court, namely, that the motive with which an assessee could be said to have made the borrowing would be irrelevant. In fact the High Court found that there was no material to show that the assessee, in tho instant case, would necessarily\n\nhave had to employ the business assets for making payment to charity. The High Court actually considered the assessee's case under section 10(2)(iii) and 10(2)(xv) and disallowed the claim for deduction under these provisions G principally on the ground that the said borrowing of Rs. 5.5 lacs was unrelated\n\nto the business of the assessee.\n\n[754G-H, 755A-BJ\n\nDiza/ Bhuriben Lallubhai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, North Cutch and Saura•htra, 29 I.T.R., 543; explained.\n\n(6) In the instant case:\n\n(a) The amount of Rs. 5.5 lacs having been actually parted with by the :i.ssessee on January 7, 1956, and having been accepted by the institute the same being deposited in the joint account of the assessee and the District\n\n> ..,\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V, C.I.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 747\n\nMagistrate, Bulandshahr for the Engineering College, the gift to lhal extent A\n\n-'I was undoubtedly complete with effect from the said date. [756A.q\n\n(b.) The said payment made by the assessee by drawing a cheque on the overdraft account was a borrowing which was made to meet her personal obligation and not the obligation of the business and as such Cxpenditure incurred by the assessee by way of payment of interest thereon was not for carrying on the business nor in her capacity as a person carrying on that I business. Such expenditure could by no stretch of imagination be regarded as business expenditure. [756C, Fl\n\n(c) It is true that initially on November 21, !955 the capital account\n\n~ of the assessee was debited and the college account wa9 credited with the\n\niF'8um of Rs. 10 lacs in the books of th'e assessee but making of these entri~\n\n~ in the assessee's books would not a1ter the character of the borrowing nor C would the said borrowing be impressed with the character of business expenditure for admittedly, the assessee maintained only one common set of books .. in which were inoorporated entries pertaining to her capital, assets and income from all her difference sources.\n\nThe borrowing was completely unrelated to the purpose of the business and was actually used for making charity. It is, therefore, clear that the interest that was paid on the sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs to the bank by the assessee for the three concerned years .vas D rightly held to be not deductible either 11t1der section 10(2) (iii) or under section 10(2)(xv) of th'e Act. [756FH, 757A]\n\nCommissioner of. Income Tax, Bombay City II v. Bombay Samachar Ltd., Bombay, 74 ITR 723; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bontbay City IV v.\n\nKishinchand, 109 I.T.R. 569; distinguished;\n\n( d) Both the Tribunal as well as the High Court were ri&ht in taking tho view that the certificate dated October 17, 1958 was of no avail to the\n\nas&essee inasmuch as it merely stated that the assessee had promised n: donation of Rs. 10 lacs on October 21, 1955, out of which RB. 5.5 lacs were deposited in the joint account maintained in the name of the assessee and ; the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr for the college and the remaining 'um of Rs. 4.5 lacs was left as a loan with the assessee and interest thereon at 6% per annum was to be finally deposited in the technical institute account. -(The Tribunal and the High Court were also right in taking two view. that\n\n\"'beyond making entries in the books of account of the assessee there was no ' material on record lo show that the assessee had actually made over a sum __. of Rs. 4.5 lacs to the college or that the college had accepted the said r donation with the result that the amount credited to the college account in her books represented her own funds and lay entirely within her power of disJl06ition and that being so, the interest credited by the ass.ssee on the said sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs and the accretion thereto continued to belong to the assessee, and, therefore she was not entitled to the deduction in respect of such interests, and [758C-0]\n\n( e) If no trust in favour of the college in regard to the amount of RB. 4.5 lacs could be said to have come into existence either on October 21, 1955 or November 21, 1955 or on any other subsequent date during the relevant years, no deduction in respect of interest credited by the ass.., ee to the account of the college over the said sum can be allowed.\n\n[759AB]\n\nClvn. APPELLATE JURISDICTI0:-1 : Civil Appeal Nos. 1831-1833 Of 1972\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-9-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in LT. References Nos. 775/70 and 342/64.\n\nS. C. Manchanda and Mrs. Urmila K; ipoor for the Appellant.\n\nV. S. Desai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\n;.-\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by .. - TuLZAPURKAR, J.-Tbe assessee, Smt. Indermani Jatia, widow of ·) Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia of Khurja, carried on money-lending and other businesses and derived income from various sources such as investment in shares, properties and businesses.\n\nHowever, the capital, assets and income in respect of different sources of income were incorporated in one common set of books.\n\nWith a view to commemorate the memory of her deceased husband, on October 21, 1955 she promised a donation of Rs. 10 lacs for setting up an Engineering College at Khurja to be named \"Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia Electrical Engineering Institute Khurja\".\n\nShe also promised a further sum of Rs. 1.5 lacs for the construction of a Femille Hospital at Khurja but this subsequent donation of Rs. 1.5 laC! was to include the total interest that was to accrue on the sum of Rs. 10 lacs earlier donated to the college. In pursuance of the promise made on October 21, 1955 she actually made over a sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs by depositing the same in a joint account opened in the names of the District Magistrte, Bulandshahr and Smt. Indermani Jatia for the college while the balance of Rs. 4.5 lacs was left • with the assessee and was treated as a debt to the Institution and interest thereon at 6% per annum with effect from October 21, 1955 )- was to be finally deposited in the Technical Institute account.\n\nThese , facts become clear from a certificate dated October 17, 1958, issued by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr which was produced before the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe aforesaid transaction came to be recorded in the books of the assessee as follows : At the beginning of the accounting year (Samvat year 2012-13-accounting period 13-11-1955 to 1-11-1956) relevant to the assessment year 1957-58 the capital account of the assessee showed a net credit balance of Rs. 23,80,753. Initially on November 21, 1955, a sum of Rs. 10 lacs was debited to her capital account and corresponding credit was given to the account of the\n\nsaid Institute.\n\nAt the close of the said accounting year (i.e. on\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V. C.I.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 749 (Tulzapurkar, !.) 1-11-1956) after debiting the aforesaid sum of Rs. 10 lacs the capital account showed a net credit balance of Rs. 15 ,06,891. Thereafter, during the sam.e year of account the assessee actually paid only a sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs to the institution on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India Ltd., Aligarh.\n\nAt the beginning of the accounting year the amount outstanding in the overdraft was Rs. 2,76,965; further overdrafts were raised during the accounting year with the result that at the end of the year th6 liability of the assessee to the bank was Rs. 9,55,660; among the further debits to this account during the year • < was said sum of Rs. S.S lacs paid to the Engineering College on rJanuary 7, 1956.\n\nThe balance of the promised donation, namely, , Rs. 4.5 lacs was, as stated earlier, treated as a debt due by her to the Institute and accordingly she was debited with interest thereon at 6% per annum with effect from October 21, 1955.\n\nIn the assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 the assessee claimed the deduction of three \"1ms-Rs. 20,107/-, Rs. 25,470/- and Rs. 18,445/• being the\n\nrespective items of interest paid by her to the bank on Rs. 5 .5 lacs during the Samvat years relevant to the said assessment yeaf!l.\n\nThe .. .._ assessee contended that she had preferred to draw on th.e overdraft account of the bank for the purpose of paying the institution in order to save her income earning assets, namely, the shares, which she would have otherwise been required to dispose of and, therefore, the interest paid by her should be allowed.\n\nAs regards interest on the remaining sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs (which was left as a loan with the assessee) that was debited to her account, the assessee urged • that she was also entitled to claim the same as a permissible deduction; the claim in respect thereof, however, was made for the assess- . ..; _ _f ment years 1958-59 and 1959-60. As regards the three sums paid\n\n...\n\n'-..by way of interest on Rs. 5.5 lacs to the bank, the taxing authorities ' took the view that said claim for deduction was not admissible either\n\nagainst business income under s. 10(2) or against income from investments under s. 12(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nalo the claim for deduction of interest credited to the college account G on Rs. 4.5 lacs was disallowed.\n\nThe assessee preferred appeals to\n\n• the Appellate Tribunal. It was contended on behalf of the assessee I.bat she bad promised a donation of Rs. 10 lacs to the Engineering College on October 21, 1955, that the obligation to pay the said amount arose on November 21, 1955 when the amount was debited to her capital account and the corresponding credit was given to the H account of the institution, and that out of this total donation a sum of Rs. 5 .5 lacs was actually deposited in the joint account of the\n\nI!'\n\nassessee and the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr on January 7, 1956 for which the overdraft with the Central Bank was operated and hence the interest was deductible as business expenditure.\n\nAs regards interest on Rs. 4.5 lacs that was debited to her account and credited to the Institute's account it was urged that this balance amount was kept in trust for the institution and hence the accruing interest thereon which was debited to her account should be allowed as a deduction.\n\nIn support of these submissions a certificate issued by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr dated October 17, 1958 was produced before the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, however, con- , _. firmed !he disallowance of interest claimed in respect of the sum o'-.\n\nRs. 5.5 lacs holding that the said sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs over-drawn ., from the bank was not borrowed for business purposes but was borrowed for maldng over the donation and, therefore, the claim could not be sustained under s. 10(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. ' As regards the interest accruing on the sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs in favour of the Engineering College, the Appellate Tribunal held that no donation of that sum had been made by the assessee, that it was at best a promise by the assessee to the District Magistrate to pay that amount for purpose of charity and the mere entries in the assessee's own account book crediting the trnst, which had yet to come into existence, would not amount to a gift or charity for a trust and as such the interest credited to the account of the Engineering College was also disallowed.\n\nMeanwhile, Smt. Indermani J atia died and her legal heir Madhav Prasad Jatia was substituted in the proceedings.\n\nOn the question whether the interest on Rs. 5.5 lacs was deductible for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60, the • Tribunal declined to make any reference to the High Court, whereupon the assessee applied to the High Court under s. 66(2) and)-. upon the application being allowed, the Tribunal referred the question whether interest on the overdraft of Rs. 5.5 lacs-the sums of ' Rs. 20,107 (for the assessment year 1957-58), Rs. 25,470 (for the ,.. assessment year 1958-59) and Rs. 18,445 (for the assessment year ' 1959-60)-paid to the Central Bank was allowable as a deduction under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (being Income Tax Reference No. 775 of 1970). As regards the deduction of interest on Rs. 4.5 lacs claimed for the assessment • years 1958-59 and 1959-60, the Tribunal itself made a reference to the Hivh Court under s. 66(1) and referred for the opinion of the High Court the question whether iu the facts and circumstances of the case the interest credited by the assessee to the account of Ganga Sagar Jatia Engineering College on the sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs >- '\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V. C.l.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 751 (Tulzapurkar, /.) and accretion thereto was an admissible deduction for each of the Said two years (being Income Tax Reference No. 342 of 1964).\n\nThe High Court heard and disposed of both the references by a common judgment dated September 22, 1971. In the Reference No. 775 of 1970, the case of the assessee was that there was an obligation to pay Rs. 10 lacs to the Engineering College, that for the time being the assessee decided to pay Rs. 5.5 lacs, that it was open to the assessee to pay the amount from her business assets or to preserve the business assets for the purposes of earning income llnd instead borrow the amount from the bank and that she had accordingly borrowed the amount from the bank and, therefore, since the borrowing was made to preserve the business assets, the interest therecn was deductible under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court observed that there was nothing to show that the\n\nassessee would necessarily have had to employ the business assets for making payment of that amount, and secondly, it was only where money is borrowed for the purposes of business that interest paid thereon becomes admissible as a deduction, and since, in the instant case, the sum of Rs. 4.4 lacs was admittedly borrowed from the Bank for making payment to the Engineering College it was not a payment directed to the business purposes.\n\nAccording to the High Court the mere circumstance that otherwise the assessee would have to resort to the liquidation of her income-yielding assets would not stamp the interest paid on such borrowings with the character of business expenditure.\n\nAfter referring to the decisions one of the Bombay High Court in Bai Bhuriben Lallubhai v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay North Cutch and Saurashtra(') and the other of the Calcutta High Court in Manna/al Ratanlal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Calcutta(2), the High Court rejected the contentioo of the assessee and held that interest paid on Rs. 5.5 lacs in any of the years was not deductible either nnder s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) of the Act and answered the questions against the assessee.\n\nAs regards the question referred to it in Income Tax Reference No. 342 of 1964, the High Court took the view that there was nothing on record before it to establish that the assessee had actually donated the entire amount of Rs. 10 facs to the Engineering College, that the certificate issued by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr on October 17, 1958 merely showed that a balance of Rs. 4.5 lacs was left as a loan with the assessee and that the interest accruing thereon from the da.te of tlw '\"i'ial donation \"was to be finally deposited in the account of the Technical Institute\" and that though the assessee bad made\n\n(I) 29 l.T.R. 543.\n\n(2) 58 l.T.R. 84.\n\nII'\n\nentries in her account books crediting the trust with the interest on the amount, th_e trust had not yet c001e into existence and as such the amount credited represented her own funds and lay entirely within her power of disposition.\n\nWith such material on record, the High Court confirmed the Tribunal's view that Rs. 4.5 lacs had not been donated by the assessee on October 21, 1955 in favour of the Engineering College and, therefore, the interest credited. by the assessee in favour of the Institute on the said sum and the accretion thereto continued to belong to the assessec and as such she was not entitled to the deduction claimed by her and accordingly the question wits also answered against the assessec. On obtaining special leave the C original assessee represented by her legal heir has preferred Civil Appeals Nos. 1831-1833 of 1972 to this Court.\n\n• R\n\nMr. Manchanda appearing for the appellant has raised two or three contentions in support of the appeals.\n\nIn the first place he has contended that though the deduction claimed by the assessee in this case was on the basis of business expenditure falling under either s. 10(2)(iii) or 10(2)(xv), the taxing authorities, the Tribunal and the High Court have confused the issue by considering the claim for deduction under s. 12(2) of the Act.\n\nAccording to him the scope for allowing the deduction under s. 10(2)(iii) or 10(2)(xv) was much wider than under s. 12(2) of the Act.\n\nHe urged that by applying the ratio of the decision in Bhuriben's case (supra), which was admittedly under s. 12 (2) of the Act, to the facts of the instant case the lower authorities as well as the High Court had adopted a wrong approach which led to the inference that the deduction claimed by the assesee was not admissible.\n\nSecondly, he urged that considering the case under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) the questn was when could the obligation to pay Rs. 10 lacs to the Engineering College be said to have been incurred by the assessee and according to him such obligation arose as soon as the donation or gift was complete and in that behalf placing reliance upon the certificate dated October 17, 1958, issued by the District Magistrate. Bulandshahr, as well as the entries made by the assessee in her books, he urged that the gift was complete no sooner the capital account of the assessee was debited and the college account was credited with the said rum of Rs. 10 lacs on November 21, 1955, especially when her capital account had a credit balance of Rs. 15,06,891 after giving the debit of Rs. 10 lacs; the gift in the circumstances would, according to him, be complete then as per decided cases such as Gopal Raf Swarup v.\n\n(1) 77 I.T.R. 912.\n\n(2) 77 I.T.R. 332.\n\nMADRAY PRASAD JATIA V. C.I.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 7 5 3 (Tulzapurkar, !.) Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Lucknow(') Naunihal Thakar Dass v.\n\nCommissioner of lncome-T(lx, Punjab(').\n\nHe further urged that though the sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs was actually paid by the assessee by borrowing the amount on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account with the Central Bank of India Ltd. the said overdraft was a running overdraft account opened by her for business purposes and if from such overdraft account any borrowing was made interest thereon would be deductible under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) as being expenditure incurred for the purposes of the business. According to him, once a borrowing was made from an overdraft account meant for business purposes, the ultimate utilization of that borrow- ..,('\"' ing will not affect the question of deductibility of interest. paid on \\ such borrowing under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) and in that behalf he placed reliance upon two decisions of the Bombay High Court, namely, Comniissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City ll v.\n\nBombay Samachar Ltd., Bombay(') and Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City-IV v. Kishinchand Chellaram.( 2 ) He, therefore, urged that the High Court had erred in sustaining the disallowance in respect of interest paid by the asses see on Rs. S. 5 lacs to the Bank in the three years in question as also the disallowance in regard to the interest credited by the assessee to the account of the Engineering College in the two years in question on the sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs and the accretion thereto.\n\n--<.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Desai for the Revenue, disputed that there was any confusion of the issue or that any wrong approach had been adopted by the lower authorities or by the High Court as suggested by learned counsel for the appellant. He pointed out that initially the assessee had specifically raised the plea that the borrowing of Rs. 5.5 lacs had been resorted to with a view to save income-yielding investments, namely, the shares and, therefore, both the alternative cases as to whether the interest paid on Rs. 5.5 lacs was an admissible deduction eiti1er against business income under s. 10(2) (iii) or income from investments under s. 12(2) were considered by the taxing authorities and the taxing authorities held that such interest was not admissible u.nder either of the provisions. He pointed out that so far as the Tribunal Uild the High Court were concerned the assessee's claim for deduction under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) had been speifically considered and ncga'ived. He sought to justify the view of the Tribunal and the High Court in regard to the disallowance of interest paid by\n\n(!) 74 I.T.R. 723.\n\n(2) 109 JTR. 569.\n\nthe assessee on the sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs to the Bank in the three concerned assessment years as also the disallowance of interest credited by the assessee to the account of the Engineering College on the sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs and the accretion thereto; as regards the sutn of Rs. 5.5 lacs he contended that the real question was not as to when the obligation to pay to the college was incurred by the assessee but whether the obligation incurred by the assessee was her personal obligation or a • business obligation arrd whether the expenditure by way of payment of interest to the Bank was incurred for the purpose of carrying on busi- ness and as regards the sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs whether the trust in favour of the college had at all come into existence on October 21, 1955 or * November 21, 1955 as contended for by the assessee and on both the . ...._) questions the view of the Tribunal and the High Court was right. As regards the two Bombay decisions, namely Bombay Samacha; 's case\n\n(supra) and Kishinchand Chellaram's case (supra), he urged that the ratio of the decisions was inapplicable to the instant case.\n\nAt the outset we would like to say that we do not find any substance in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that there has been any confusion of the issue or that any wrong approach has been adopted by the taxing authorities, the Tribunal or the High Court.\n\nAfter going through the Tribunal's order as well as the judgment of the High Court we are clearly of the view that the case of the assessee has been considered both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) and not under s. 12(2). In fact, in Reference No. 775 of 1970 the questions framed by the Tribunal in terms referred to s. 10(2) (iii) and 10(2) (xv) and proceeded to seek the High Court's opinion as to whether the sums representing interest paid by the assessee to the Central Bank on the overdraft of Rs. 5 .5 lacs for the concerned three years were allowable as a deduction under either of the said provisions of the Act and the High Court after )- considering the matter and the authorities on the point has come to ' • the conclusion that such interest was not allowable as a deduction nnder either of the said provisions It is true that the High Court did refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bai Bhuriben's case (supra) but that decision was referred to only for the purpose of emphasizing one aspect 'Vhich was propounded by that Court, namely, that the motive with which an assessee could be said to have made the borrowing would be irrelevant and that simply because the assessee in that case had ch0sen to borrow money to buy jewellery it did not follow that she had established the purpose required to be proved under s. 12(2) that she borrowed the money in order to maintain or preserve the fixed deposits or helped her to earn interest. This is far, from say-\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V. C.I.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 755 (Tulzapurkar, /.) ing that the ratio of that case has been applied by the High Court to the instant case. In fact, the High Court found that there was no material to show that the assessee fn the instant case would necssarily have had to employ the business assets for making payment to charity.\n\nThe High Court actually considered the assessee's case under s. 10(2)\n\n(iii) and 10\\2) (xv) and disallowed the claim for deduction under these provis:ons principally on the ground that the said borrowing of Rs. 5.5 lacs was unrelated to the business of the assessee.\n\nProceeding to consider the claim for deduction made by the assessee under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv), we may point out that under s. 10(2) (iii) three condi'.ions arc required to be satisfied in order to enable the assessee to claim a deduction in respect of interest on borrowed capital, namely, (a) that money (capital) must have been borrowed by the assessee, (b) that it must have been borrowed for the purpose of business and ( c) that the assessee must have paid interest on the said amount and claimed it as a deduction. As regards the claim for deduction in respect of expenditure under s. 10(2)(xv), the assessee must also satisfy three conditions, namely, (a) it (the expenditure) must not be an allowance of the nature described in clauses (i) to (xiv), (b) it must not be in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee and ( c) it must have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of his business. It cannot be disputed that the expression \"for the purpose of bminess\" occurring in s. 10(2) (iii) as also in 10(2) (xv) is wider in scope than the expression \"for the purpose of earning income profits or gains\" occurring ins. 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, the scope for a\\loy, ing a deduction under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) would be much wider than the one available under s. 12(2) of the Act. This Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Kera/a v. Malayalam Plantations\n\nLtd.(1) has explained that the former expression occurring ins. 10(2)\n\n{iii) and 10(2) (xv), its range being wide, may take in not only the day-to-day running of a business but also the rationalisation of its administration and modernisation of its machinery; it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation, coercive process or assertion of hostile title; it may also comprehend payment of statutory Jues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for the carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carry!ng on of the business but, however wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it; the purpose shall be for the purpose uc business, that is to say, the expenditure incurred shall be\n\n(1) 53 J.T.R. 140.\n\nA for the carrying on of the business and the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the business.\n\nSo far as the daim for deduction of interest paid by the assessee on the sum vf Rs 5.5 lacs to the Bank in the three concerned years is concerned, t11e real question that arises for determination is whether the particular borrowing of Rs. 5 .5 lacs was for the purposes of business of the asscssee or not? The amount of Rs. 5.5 lacs having been actually parted with by the assessce on January 7, 1956, and having been accepted by the institute the same being deposited in the joint account of the assessee and the District Magis:rate, Bulandshahr for the Engineering College, the gift to that extent was undoubtedly complete with effect from the said date. The said payment was made by the assessee by drawing a d, eque on the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India Ltd., Aligarh. In regard to this overdraft account the Tribunal has noted that a: the beginning of the accounting year the amount outstanding in the said over-draft was Rs. 2,76,965, that further overdraits were raised during the accounting year with th~ result that at the end of the year the assessee's liability to the bank in the said account rose to Rs. 9,56,660 and that among the further debits to this account during the year was said sum of Rs. 5.5 lacs paid to the college on January 7, 1956. On a consideration of the aforesaid position of the overdraft and the other material on record, the Tribunal has recorded a clear finding of fact which has been accepted by the High Court that the said borrowing of Rs. 5.5 lacs made by the assessee from the Bank on January 7, 1956 had nothing to do with the business of . the assessee but the amount was directly made over to the college in part fulfilment of the promised donation of Rs. 10 lacs with a virw to commemorate the memory of her deceased husband after whom the college was to be named. In other words the borrowing was made to meet her personal obligation and not the obligation of the business and as such expenditure incurred by the assessee by way of payment of interest thereon was not for carrying on the business nor in her capacity as a per.on' carrying on that business. Such expenditure can by no stretch of imagination be regarded as business expenditure. It is true that initially on November 21, 1955 the capital account of the assessce was debited and the college account was credited with the sum of Rs. 1 O lacs in .the books of the assessee but in our view making of these entries in the assessee's books would not alter the character of the borrowing nor would the said borrowing be impressed with the character of business expenditure, for, admittedly, the assessee maintained only one common set of books in which were incorporated entries pertaining to her capital, assets and income from all her different sources.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear to us that the interest that was paid on the sum\n\n>- •\n\n1~.\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V. C.I.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 757 (Tulzapurkar, J.) of Rs. 5.5 lacs to the bank by the assessee for the three concerned years A was rightly held to be not deductible either under s. 10(2) (iii) or under s. 10(2.J (xv) of the Act.\n\nThe two Bombay decisions on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, namely, Bombay Samachar's case tsupra) and Kishinc!Umd Chellaram's case (supra) are clearly distingubhable B and do not touch the issue raised in the instant case before us. In the former case, the assessee had during the relevant assessment years paid amounts of interest on capital which was borrowed from outsidas and had claimed deduction in respect of such interest. It was not disputed that the capital borrowed by the assessee from the outsiders was admittedly used by the assessee for the purpose of its business. The taxing C authorities had taken the view that if the assessee had collected outstandings wluch were due to it from others it would have been able to reduce its indebtedness and save a part of the interest which it had to pay oa its vwn borrowings, that the asscssee could not be justified in allowing its outstandings to remain without charging any interest thereon while it was paying interest on the amounts borrowed by it, and that to the extent to which it would have been in a position to collect interest on the outstandings due to it from others, it could not be permitted to claim as an allowance interest paid by it to outsiders. The High Court held that such a view was clearly unsustainable and observed that it is not the requirement under s. 10(2) (iii) that the assessec must further show that the borrowing of the capital was necessary for the\n\nbusiness \"° that if at the time of the borrowing the assessee has sufficient amount of its own the deduction could not be allowed and the High Court further took the view that in deciding whether a claim\n\nof interest on borrowing can be allowed the fact that the assessee had' llmple resources at its disposal and need not have borrowed, was not a relovant matter for consideration.\n\nThe decision in Kishinchand Chel/aram's case (supra) was rendered in the peculiar facts which obtained. In ll:tat case. The Tribunal had recorded a clear finding that since the business of the assessee was that of banking there was no borrowal as such but only acceptance of deposits by the assessee from its. clients which were made by the assessee in the conrse of and for the purposes of its business. In those circumstances the Tribunal took the view that the aspect as to how these deposits, which were admittedly received by the assessee from the depositors in the course of its banking business, were subsequently utilized would not be material for the purpose of deciding the question whether interest paid by the assessee on these deposits should be allowed under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act and the High Court refused to interfere with that view of the Tribunal and rejected the Revenue's application for a Reference. In the instant\n\ncase admittedly the borrowing of Rs. 5.5 lacs had been made by the assesseo to meet her personal obligation and not the obligation of her business. The borrowing was completely unrelated t9 the purpose of the business and was actually used for making charity. On these facts it will be clear that the interest paid on such borrowing cannot be allowed as deduction either under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv).\n\nTurning to the question of interest credited by the assessee during the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 to the aceount of the Engineering College on the sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs and the accretion thereto the real question is whether the gift or donation of Rs. 4.5 lacs was complete and a trust of that amount came into existence in C favour of the college as has been contended for by the assessee. The only material on which reliance has been placed by the assessee in this behalf consists of the entries made in the assessee's books of accounts and the certificate dated October 17, 1958 issued by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr but from this material it is difficult to draw the inference suggested by the counsel for the appellant. In D our view both the Tribunal as well as the High Court were right in taking the view that the certificate dated October 17, 1958 was of no avail to the assessee inasmuch as it merely stated that the assessee had promised a donation of Rs. 10 lacs on October 21, 1955, ont of which Rs. 5.5 lacs were deposited in the joint account maintained E in the name of the assessee and the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr for the college and the remaining sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs was left as a loan with the assessee and interest thereon at 6% per annum was to be finally deposited in the Technical Institute account. The Tribunal and the High Court were also right in taking the view that beyond making entries in the books of account of the assessee there was no p material on record to show that the assessee had actually made over a sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs to the college or that the college had accepted the said donation with the result that the amount credited to the college account in her books reprented her own funds and lay entirely. within her power of disposition and that being so, the interest credited by the assessee on the said sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs and the accretion thereto G continued to belong to the assessee, and, therefore, she was not entitled • to the deduction in respect of such interests. Counsel for the assessee attempted to contend that the obligation to make over the said sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs could be said to have become enforceable on the basis of promissory estoppel but in our view, no material has been placed on record by the assessee to show that acting on the promised H donation the college authorities had actually incurred any expenditure towards construction or acted to their prejudice during the accounting period relevant to Ille asses8ment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 so as\n\n...\n\n...\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V. C.l.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 7 59 (Tulzapurkar, !.) to support the plea of promissory estoppel. Of course, if in any subsequent years the assessee is in a position to place any material before the taxing authorities or the Tribunal or the Court which would support the plea of promissory estoppel the position in such years may be different. It is thus obvious that if no trust in favour of the college in regard to the amount of Rs. 4.5 lacs could be said to have come into existence either on October 21, 1955 or on November 21, 1955 or on any other subsequent date during the relevant years, no deduction in res'pect of interest credited by the assessee to the account of the college over the said sum can be allowed.\n\n-( In the circumstances, in our view, the High Court rightly answered\n\n, the questions referred to it against the assessee in both the references.\n\nC The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed .", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "5\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "5\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 17, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "74 5\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nApril 17, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 252, "end_char": 262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Bulandshahr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.5 lacs by depositing the same in a joint account opened in the name of the District fagistrate, Bulandshahr aud Smt."}}, {"text": "Indcrmani Jntia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 845, "end_char": 860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indcrmani Jntia for the College.", "canonical_name": "Indermani J atia"}}, {"text": "October 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4.5 lacs was left with the asscssee and V.'as treated as a debt to the institution and interest thereon at 6% per annum with effect from October 21, 1955 was to be finally deposited in the technical institute account."}}, {"text": "November 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though in the books of accounts, on November 21, 1955, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "January 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1369, "end_char": 1384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 lacs was debited to her capital account and corresponding credit was given to the account of the institute, the assessec aictual1y paid the sum of ~- 5.5 lacs to the institution on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India, Aligarh."}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India, Aligarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 lacs was debited to her capital account and corresponding credit was given to the account of the institute, the assessec aictual1y paid the sum of ~- 5.5 lacs to the institution on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India, Aligarh."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2382, "end_char": 2395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2437, "end_char": 2450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2458, "end_char": 2478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2674, "end_char": 2692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3773, "end_char": 3781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4305, "end_char": 4317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5032, "end_char": 5049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the High Court did refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhai Blturiben's case but that decision was referred to only for F the purpose of emphasising, one aspect which was propounded by that Court, namely, that the motive with which an assessee could be said to have made the borrowing would be irrelevant."}}, {"text": "Bhai Blturiben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5053, "end_char": 5067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the High Court did refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhai Blturiben's case but that decision was referred to only for F the purpose of emphasising, one aspect which was propounded by that Court, namely, that the motive with which an assessee could be said to have made the borrowing would be irrelevant."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(iii) and 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5558, "end_char": 5590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 21, !955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6863, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "756C, Fl\n\n(c) It is true that initially on November 21, !"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7714, "end_char": 7727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7743, "end_char": 7760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 17, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8077, "end_char": 8093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income Tax, Bombay City II v. Bombay Samachar Ltd., Bombay, 74 ITR 723; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bontbay City IV v.\n\nKishinchand, 109 I.T.R. 569; distinguished;\n\n( d) Both the Tribunal as well as the High Court were ri&ht in taking tho view that the certificate dated October 17, 1958 was of no avail to the\n\nas&essee inasmuch as it merely stated that the assessee had promised n: donation of Rs."}}, {"text": "21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9432, "end_char": 9440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4.5 lacs could be said to have come into existence either on October 21, 1955 or November 21, 1955 or on any other subsequent date during the relevant years, no deduction in respect of interest credited by the ass.., ee to the account of the college over the said sum can be allowed."}}, {"text": "22-9-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9786, "end_char": 9795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1831-1833 Of 1972\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-9-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in LT."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9803, "end_char": 9823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1831-1833 Of 1972\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-9-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in LT."}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9867, "end_char": 9882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda and Mrs. Urmila K; ipoor for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Urmila K", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda and Mrs. Urmila K; ipoor for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10037, "end_char": 10048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ";.-\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by .. - TuLZAPURKAR, J.-Tbe assessee, Smt.", "canonical_name": "TuLZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "Khurja", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10571, "end_char": 10577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 lacs for setting up an Engineering College at Khurja to be named \"Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia Electrical Engineering Institute Khurja\"."}}, {"text": "Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia Electrical Engineering Institute Khurja", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10591, "end_char": 10653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 lacs for setting up an Engineering College at Khurja to be named \"Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia Electrical Engineering Institute Khurja\"."}}, {"text": "Indermani Jatia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11122, "end_char": 11137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indermani Jatia for the college while the balance of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Indermani J atia"}}, {"text": "1-11-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12162, "end_char": 12171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-11-1956) after debiting the aforesaid sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12475, "end_char": 12501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.5 lacs to the institution on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India Ltd., Aligarh."}}, {"text": "Aligarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12503, "end_char": 12510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.5 lacs to the institution on January 7, 1956 from the overdraft account which she had with the Central Bank of India Ltd., Aligarh."}}, {"text": "rJanuary 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12898, "end_char": 12914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S lacs paid to the Engineering College on rJanuary 7, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14353, "end_char": 14361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14403, "end_char": 14411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14419, "end_char": 14446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16042, "end_char": 16050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16058, "end_char": 16078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indermani J atia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indermani J atia died and her legal heir Madhav Prasad Jatia was substituted in the proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Indermani J atia"}}, {"text": "Madhav Prasad Jatia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16703, "end_char": 16722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indermani J atia died and her legal heir Madhav Prasad Jatia was substituted in the proceedings.", "canonical_name": "5\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA"}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17003, "end_char": 17011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17312, "end_char": 17324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18,445 (for the assessment year ' 1959-60)-paid to the Central Bank was allowable as a deduction under s. 10(2) (iii) or 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (being Income Tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17360, "end_char": 17368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17396, "end_char": 17423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hivh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17623, "end_char": 17633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4.5 lacs claimed for the assessment • years 1958-59 and 1959-60, the Tribunal itself made a reference to the Hivh Court under s. 66(1) and referred for the opinion of the High Court the question whether iu the facts and circumstances of the case the interest credited by the assessee to the account of Ganga Sagar Jatia Engineering College on the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17640, "end_char": 17648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Ganga Sagar Jatia Engineering College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17816, "end_char": 17853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4.5 lacs claimed for the assessment • years 1958-59 and 1959-60, the Tribunal itself made a reference to the Hivh Court under s. 66(1) and referred for the opinion of the High Court the question whether iu the facts and circumstances of the case the interest credited by the assessee to the account of Ganga Sagar Jatia Engineering College on the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "22, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18174, "end_char": 18182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court heard and disposed of both the references by a common judgment dated September 22, 1971."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18763, "end_char": 18771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19732, "end_char": 19751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to the decisions one of the Bombay High Court in Bai Bhuriben Lallubhai v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay North Cutch and Saurashtra(') and the other of the Calcutta High Court in Manna/al Ratanlal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Calcutta(2), the High Court rejected the contentioo of the assessee and held that interest paid on Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19967, "end_char": 19975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manchanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21599, "end_char": 21608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• R\n\nMr. Manchanda appearing for the appellant has raised two or three contentions in support of the appeals."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21862, "end_char": 21875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22015, "end_char": 22023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22097, "end_char": 22110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22150, "end_char": 22158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhuriben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22227, "end_char": 22235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He urged that by applying the ratio of the decision in Bhuriben's case (supra), which was admittedly under s. 12 (2) of the Act, to the facts of the instant case the lower authorities as well as the High Court had adopted a wrong approach which led to the inference that the deduction claimed by the assesee was not admissible."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22279, "end_char": 22284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22552, "end_char": 22560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24003, "end_char": 24011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24338, "end_char": 24346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24750, "end_char": 24754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25034, "end_char": 25039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Desai for the Revenue, disputed that there was any confusion of the issue or that any wrong approach had been adopted by the lower authorities or by the High Court as suggested by learned counsel for the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25606, "end_char": 25614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25654, "end_char": 25662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25927, "end_char": 25935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Samacha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27121, "end_char": 27135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the two Bombay decisions, namely Bombay Samacha; 's case\n\n(supra) and Kishinchand Chellaram's case (supra), he urged that the ratio of the decisions was inapplicable to the instant case.", "canonical_name": "Bombay Samachar"}}, {"text": "Kishinchand Chellaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27158, "end_char": 27179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the two Bombay decisions, namely Bombay Samacha; 's case\n\n(supra) and Kishinchand Chellaram's case (supra), he urged that the ratio of the decisions was inapplicable to the instant case.", "canonical_name": "Kishinchand Chellaram"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27767, "end_char": 27775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27810, "end_char": 27818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27916, "end_char": 27924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bai Bhuriben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28508, "end_char": 28520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 .5 lacs for the concerned three years were allowable as a deduction under either of the said provisions of the Act and the High Court after )- considering the matter and the authorities on the point has come to ' • the conclusion that such interest was not allowable as a deduction nnder either of the said provisions It is true that the High Court did refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bai Bhuriben's case (supra) but that decision was referred to only for the purpose of emphasizing one aspect 'Vhich was propounded by that Court, namely, that the motive with which an assessee could be said to have made the borrowing would be irrelevant and that simply because the assessee in that case had ch0sen to borrow money to buy jewellery it did not follow that she had established the purpose required to be proved under s. 12(2) that she borrowed the money in order to maintain or preserve the fixed deposits or helped her to earn interest."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28939, "end_char": 28947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29489, "end_char": 29497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29770, "end_char": 29778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29828, "end_char": 29836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30293, "end_char": 30305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30744, "end_char": 30752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30963, "end_char": 30971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31041, "end_char": 31049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35064, "end_char": 35075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, clear to us that the interest that was paid on the sum\n•\n\n1~.\n\nMADHAV PRASAD JATIA V. C.I.T. U.P. LUCKNOW 757 (Tulzapurkar, J.) of Rs.", "canonical_name": "TuLZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35208, "end_char": 35216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2.J (xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35232, "end_char": 35246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Samachar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35356, "end_char": 35371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two Bombay decisions on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, namely, Bombay Samachar's case tsupra) and Kishinc!Umd Chellaram's case (supra) are clearly distingubhable B and do not touch the issue raised in the instant case before us.", "canonical_name": "Bombay Samachar"}}, {"text": "Kishinc!Umd Chellaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35391, "end_char": 35412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two Bombay decisions on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, namely, Bombay Samachar's case tsupra) and Kishinc!Umd Chellaram's case (supra) are clearly distingubhable B and do not touch the issue raised in the instant case before us."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36625, "end_char": 36633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kishinchand Chel/aram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37133, "end_char": 37154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Kishinchand Chel/aram's case (supra) was rendered in the peculiar facts which obtained.", "canonical_name": "Kishinchand Chellaram"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37890, "end_char": 37898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38435, "end_char": 38443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Bulandshahr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39591, "end_char": 39623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.5 lacs were deposited in the joint account maintained E in the name of the assessee and the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr for the college and the remaining sum of Rs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_760_767_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HUSSAINARA KHANTOON & ORS.\n\nHOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nApril 19, 1979 [P. N. BuAGWArs, 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY AND A P. Sm, JJ.]\n\nLeal Aid to Poor-Ad111i11istration of Criminal l11.stice-Co11.\\tilurional obligation of Srate Gorel'nflu'nt-Frce lrgal sen-ices-A b.\\l'llce of-I -i1it1rio1t of trial -Att. 21 Constitution of lndfa.\n\nCrilninal Procedure (,'ode, 1973-S. 167(2)(a)-Riu/11 uf u11d1r-triul p1iso1Ier-Release on bail-E11title111cnt to co101sel at Stale expense. .....\n\nOn further hearing the petition for r'elease of under-tri::ils in the State of~ Bihar. i HEID : 1. The State Governments do not seem to be alive t.i their constitutional responsibility in the matter of provision of free legal services in the field of administration of criminal justice. If law is net only to speak justice \" but abo deliver justice, legal aid is an absolute imperative. Legal aid is really nothing also but equal justice in action.\n\nIt is in fact the deliYi!ry system of •ecial justice.\n\n[765D]\n\n2. Every State Government will have to carry out its constitutional obligation to provide free legal services to every accused person who is in peril of losing his liberty and who is unable to defend himself through a lawyer by reason of his poverty or indigence in cases where the needs of justice so require. If free legal services are not provided to such an accused, the trial itself may run the risk of being vitiated as contravening Art. 21 and every State Government should try to avoid su'>'.':h a possible eventuality.\n\n!765F-G]\n\n3. When an under-trial prisoner is produced before a. 1v1agistrate and he has been in detention for 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, the f\\.fagistrate must, before making an order of further remand to judicial custody, poin.t out to the under-trial prisoner that he is entitled to b'e released on bail.\n\n[762H, 763A]\n\n4. The Magistrate must take care to see that the right of the under-trial prisoner to the assistance of a lawyer provided at State cost is secure.d to him with a view to enable him to apply for bail in exercise of his right under proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of s. 167 Criminal Procedure Code\n\n[763B]\n\n5. The Magistrate must deal with the application for bail in accordance with tho guidelines laid down in the Court's order dated February 12, 1979.\n\n[763C] ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 57 of 1979.\n\n• )-\n\n• >\n\nG Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner\n\nU. P. Singh and S. N. Jlw fo.r the Respondent.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by '\n\n...\n\n,< i\n\n~ ,\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis writ petition has again come up before us for further directions. Mr. U.P. Singh, learned Advocate on behalf of the H State of Bihar, has intimated to us that pursuant to the directions given by us in our order dated 9th March, 1979('), the State of Bihar\n\n(I) [1979] 3 SCR 532-544. > ..\n\n' I I\n\nhas already released 70 undertrial prisoners whose names were set out in th~ chart filed by Mrs. Hingi:>rani on 9th March, 1979. It is highly regretable that these undertrial prisoners should have remained in jail without trial for periods longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced if convicted. We fail to see what moral or\n\nethical justification could the State have to detain these unfortunate persons for such unreasonably long periods of time without trial. We feel a sense of relief that they should once again be able to breathe the air of freedom. But we find that there are still many more undertrial prisoners who fall within thls category of persons who have been in detention for periods li:>nger than the maximum term without their trial having been commenced. Mrs. Hingorani has filed before us at the hearing of the writ petition on 16th April, 1979 a second chart giving the names and particulars of some of these undertrial prisoners who have not yet got the benefit of the earlier order made by us.\n\nThere are 59 undertrial prisoners whose names and particulars are set out in this chart and we direct that they should be released forthwith as their continued detention is clearly illegal and in violation of their fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution. There are also several other undertrial prisoners who are accused of multiple offences and even if we were to proceed on the assumption that the State would be able to secure their conviction and maximum sentences would be imposed on them and such sentences would not be concurrent in accordance with the usual practice followed by the courts but would be consecutive, they have already sullered the aggregate imprisonment which could be inflicted on them, and there is no reason why they should be subjected to any further detention. It may be poiuted out' that ordinarily the sentences imposed on conviction for multiple offences are concurrent and if we proceed on that assumption which is more realistic, it would be found that there are many undertrial prisoners who have already been in jail for periods exceeding the maximum term which could be imposed on them even if they were convicted of the multiple offences with which they are charged. We have requested Mrs. Hingorani to prepare a chart showing separately the above two categories of undertrial prisoners so that we can pass appropriate orders in regard to them at the next hearing of the writ petition.\n\nMr. U.P. Singh, appearing on behalf of the State Government, will help Mrs. Hingorani in preparing this chart since Mrs. Hingorani has undertaken this public interest litigation as a matter of public duty and her resources are therefore,\n\nund to be limited.\n\nWe are informed that amongst the undertrial prisoners there are some who are lunatics or persons of unsound mind. It is difficult to under-\n\n10--330SCl/79\n\nI ~.\n\n' J\n\nstand how such persons could possibly be kept in the same jail along with other undertrial prisoners. We should like to know from the State Govermnent, in an affidavit to be filed before the next hearing of the writ petition, as to what are the circumstances in which these persons have been kept as undertrial prisoners in the ordinary jails and what the State Government proposes to do in regard to them. Mrs. Hingorani will prepare a list showing the names and particulars of these persons and Mr. U. P. Singh on behalf of the State Government will render the neces .. sary help in this connection. The list may be filed by Mrs. Hingorani at\n\nthe next hearing of the writ petition so that we' may be able to pass final • orders in regard to this category of undertrial prisoners.\n\n.- J\n\nWe find that pursuant to the directions given by us in our order dated . --, 9th March, 1979, Bageshwari Prasad Pandey, Superintendent of the Patna Central Jail has filed an affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 17 confined in the Patna Central Jail prior to their release on personal bond, were produced before the Magistrates in compliance with the proviso to section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A similar affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 has also been filed by Pradeep •\n\n•. ; Kumar Gangoli, Superintendent of Muzaffarpur Jail along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 18 who were previously confined in the Muzaffarpur Central Jail prior to their release on personal bond, were produced before the E Magistrates in compliance with the requirement of the proviso\n\nto section 167 (2).\n\nBhuvan Mohan Munda, Superintendent . of the Ranchi Central Jail has also filed an affidavit dated 12th April, 1979 together with a chart showing the dates on which some of the nndertrial prisoners referred to in our Order dated 9th March, 1979 were produced before the Magistrates in compliance •\n\nwit~ the requirement of the proviso to section 167(2}. It is apparent . )- from these charts that some of the petitioners and other undertrial prisoners referred to in these charts have been produced numerous times before the Magistrates and the Magistrates have been continually making orders of remand to judicial custody. It is difficult to believe that on each of the countless occasions on which these undertrial prisoners were produced before the Magistrates and the Magistrates made orders of remand, they must have applied their mind to the necessity of remanding those undertrial prisoners to judicial custody. We are also very doubtful whether on the expiry of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, from the date of arrest, the attention of the undertial prisoners was drawn to the fact that they were entitled to be released on ball nnder proviso (a) of sub-section (2) of section 167. When an undertrial prisoner is produced before a Magistrate and he has been in deten-\n\n• i 1\n\ni •\n\nH. KHATOON v. !IOME SECRETARY (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n7U3\n\ntion for 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the Magistrate muJt, bCforo making an order of further remand tQ. judicial custody, point out to the undertrial prisoner that he is entitled to be released on bail.\n\nThe State Government must also provide at its own cost a lawyer to the undertrial prisoner with a view to enable him to apply for bail in exercise of his right under proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 and the Magistrate must take care to see that the right of the undertrial prisoner to the assistance of a lawyer provided at State cost is secured to hiin and he must deal witli the application for bail in accordance with _ the guidelines laid down by us in our Order dated 12th February, '(1979.(') We hope and trust that every Magistrate in the country and every State Government will act in accordance with this mandate of the Court. This is the constitutional obligaiion of the State Government and the Magistrate and we have no doubt that if this is strictly • carried out, there will be considerable improvement in the situation in regard to undertrial prisoners and there will be proper observance of the rule of Jaw.\n\nThe State Government has also filed an affidavit of B. Srinivasan, SujJerintendent of Pol!ee (C.J.D.), Government of Bihar, giving in Annexure (I) particulitnl regarding nnmber of cases pending investigation by the police in each sob-division of the State as on 31st December, 1978 and in Annexure (II), particulars resarding number of cases pendieg investigation for more than six months. These aunexures Show that a total number of 10,339 cases relating to major offences and 17,687 cases relating to minor offencel! were pending investigation in the State of Bihar on 31st December, 1978 and out of these, 5835 cal!es relating to major offences and 7228 cases relating to minor • offences were pending investigation for a period of more than six months. It is a matter of great regret that snch a large number of cases __ ( •honld be pending investigation for a period of more than six months\n\n-- '--.and the number of such cases in relation to minor offences should be • over seven thousand. It is difficult to understand why as many as seven thousand and odd cases relating to minor offences should reniain pending investigation for more than six months. It is no doubt true that reasons have been attempted to be given by B. Srinivasan in a statement annexed to his affidavit, but we are not at all satisfied about the validity of these reasons, particularly in so far as investigation in rela- • tion to minor offences is concerned. One of the reasons given by B.\n\nSrinivasan in his statement is that in 10 per cent of the cases investigation is held up because of delay in receipt of opinions from experts.\n\nWe find it difficult to appreciate this reason. We fail to see why the\n\nState Government cannot employ more experts or set up a larger num-\n\n(1) [1979] 3 S.C.R. 169-183\n\nber of testing laboratories or establish more forensic laboratories. It is also necessary to have more than one serologists in the State. This is a situation which the late Government can certainly remedy by taking prompt action.\n\nThere are also many other measures which can be taken by the State Government for the purpose of accelerating the pace of the investigating machinery but it would not be proper for this Court to suggest or recommend any such measures because this Court has not the. requisite expertise of material for doing so and moreover the National Police Commission appointed by the Government of India is seized of thi&\n\nquestion and it is considering what steps and measures should .:- be taken for the purpose of expediting the investigative procei& and making qualitative improvement in it. But we would be failing itt .' our duty if we do not express our sense of amazement and horror at the leisurely and almost lethargic manner in which investigation into offences seems to be carried on in the State of Bihar. It is high time that the State of Bihar took steps to overhaul and streamline its investigative machinery so that no investigation may take more than the bare minimum time required for it and the judicial process may be set in motion without any unnecessary delay.\n\nWe directed by our Order dated 9th March, 1979 that on the next date when the undertrial prisoners, charged with bailable offenc.es, are produced before the Magistrates, the State Government should provide them with a lawyer at its own cost for the purpose of making applie3tion for bail and if any application for bail is made, the Magistra~ should dispose of the same in accordance with the broad guidelinei set out by us in our Judgment dated 12th February, 1979. We are told by Mr. U. P. Singh that the necessary instructions to this effect have been issued by the State Government to the District Magistrate, but we •\n\ndo not know whether and to what extent these instructions have been '\\. carried out and lawyers at State expense have been provided to the _r undertrial prisoners accused of bailable offences for the purpose of • making application for bail on their behalf. We should like the State Government to file an affidavit stating how many undertrial accused or bailable offences who have been in jail for a period of more than 18 months as on 1st February, 1979 have been provided lawyers at State expenses and whether or not they have been released on bail in accordance with the directions given by us. The State Government will also file an affidavit giving similar information in regard to those undertrial prisoners who have been in jail for periods longer than half the maximum term of imprisonment for which they could, if convicted, be sentenced, because we had given direction of a like nature also in regard to these undertrial prisoners in our iudgmeot dated 9th March. 1979.\n\nWe may point out that according to the law as laid down by Ui in our judgment dated 9th March, 1979, it is, the constitutional right of every accused person who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on account of reasons such as poverty, indigenctl c>r incommunicado situation, to have free legal services provided to him by the State and the State is under a constitutional mandate to provide a lawyer tosuch accused person if the needs of justice so require. We do not know whether the State Government has set up any machinery for the purpose of providing free legal services to persons who are -~. accused of offences involving possible deprivation of liberty and who\n\nrre unable to engage a lawyer on account of poverty or indigence. 111is \\ constitutional obligation cnnot wait any longer for its fulfilment, since more than 30 years have passed from the date of enactment of the Constitution and no State Government can possibly have any alibi for not carrying out this command of the Constitution. We are repeating this observation once again in the present judgment because we find that barring a few, many of the State Government dn not seem to be alive to their constitutional responsibility in the matter of provision o~ free legal services in the field of 'administration of criminal justice'. Let it not be forgotten that if law is not only to speak justice but also delive.r jlll!tice, legal aid is an absolute imperative. Legal aid is really nothing else but equal justice in action. Legal aid is in fact the delivery system of wcial justice. It is intended to reach justice to the common man who, as the poet song :\n\n\"Bowed by the weight of centuries be leans Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground,\n\nThe emptiness of ages on bis face, And on his back the burden of the World.\" -.( We hope and trust that every State Government will take prompt -..steps to carry out its constitutional obligation to provide free legal \" services to every accused person who is in peril of losing his liberty and .. who is unable to defend himself through a lawyer by reason of his poverty or indigence in cases where the needs of justice so require.\n\nIf free legal services are not provided to such an accused the trial itself may run the risk of being vitated as contravening Article 21 and we have no dcubt that every State Government would try to avoid such a possible eventuality. ·\n\nWe have no report from the State Government as to whether women under \"protective custody\" in jails have been transferred to\n\nremnd or welfare homes conducted by the social welfare department\n\na~ dfrected by us by our Order dated 26th February, 1979. Mr. U, P.\n\nSmgh on behalf of the State of Bihar stated before us that this directio'n has been carried out by th~ State Government, but we should like to have an affidavit of some responsible officer of the State Government stating that women who were confined in jail under the label of \"protective custody\" have been transferred to welfare homes and that necessary instructions have been issued by the State\n\nGovernment to the effect that women or children who are victims of offence or whose presence is required for giving evidence should not be kept in jail under so called \"protective custody\".\n\nThis affidavit may be filed by the State Government within ten days from today.\n\nWe had given direction by our Order dated 26th February, 1979 .~ that the State Government should enquire into cases where the offence - '). - charged against undertrial prisoners are triable as summons case•, 7 for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been compliance with the provision enacted in section 167, sub-section (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is clear from this provision that if in aay\n\ncase tried by a Magistrate as a summons case the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate must make an order stopping further investigation into the offence, unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice, the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six Irlonths is necessary.\n\nWith a view to securing coin pliance with this provision we directed that if, in a case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, it is found that investigation has been going on for a period of more than six months without satisfying the Magistrate that, for special reasons and in the interest of justice, the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six montha is .\n\nnecessary, the State Government will release the undertrial prisoner, • unless the necessary orders of the Magistrate. are obtained within a period of one month.\n\nThe reason for giving this direction wae that)- in such a case the Magistrate is bound to make an order stopping further investigation and in that e\\l'.:mt, only two courses would be • open: either the police must immediately proceed to file a chargesheet, if the investigation conducted till then warrants such a cour•e, or if no cae for proceeding against the undertrial prisoner is dil!C!Ofled by the investigation, the undertrial prisoner must be released forthwith from detention.\n\nThe State Government has not filed before us any report of compliance with this direction and we wo11ld, therefore, require the State Government to do so within a period of ten days\n\nfrom today.\n\nWe would also request the High Court to draw the attention of the Magistrates to the provision in section 167, sub-section\n\n(5) and ensure compliancc with the requirement of this provision by the Magistrate. >- -\n\nH. KllATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwati, J.) 76 7\n\nWe find thaf pursuant to the direction given by us in our Order dated 9th March, 1979, the High Court of Patna has forwarded to us a compilation containing particulars giving the location of courts of Magistrates and courts of Sessions in the State of Bihar together with the total number of cases pending in each of these courts as on 31st December, 1978 with yearwise break up of such pending cases and briefly explaining the reasons why it has not been possible to dispose of these cases within a reasonable period of time.\n\nThe figures of pending cares given in the compilation are staggering and it is distressing to find that quite a few of these cases have been pending for _ more than five years, sometimes extending even to seven or nine or ten ( years.\n\nWe shall examine the position arising from the pendency of such a large number of cases for such long periods of time at the next hearing of the writ petition, with a view to considering what directions are necessary to be given to the State Government by way of taking positive action for the purpose of securing enforcement of the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial.\n\nWe would, however, require tor this purpose information from the High Court of Patna as to the norms of disposals fixed by the High Court for the different categories of Magistrates and Sessions Judges in the State of Bihar, since without this information, it would not be possible for Ui\n\nto decide whether the existing strength of courts and judges in the State of Bihar is adequate for the purpose of ensuring !!J>t'cdy trial to the accused or it is necessary to have additional courts and judges.\n\nWe would request the High Court to furnish this additional information to us at the next hearing of the writ petition.\n\nWe will proceed with the further hearing of the writ petition on 24th ,.\n\nApril. 1979.\n\n-{_\n\nN.V.K .\n\n• - ...", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "HUSSAINARA KHANTOON & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUSSAINARA KHANTOON & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nApril 19, 1979 [P. N. BuAGWArs, 0."}}, {"text": "0. CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Leal Aid to Poor-Ad111i11istration of Criminal l11.stice-Co11.\\tilurional obligation of Srate Gorel'nflu'nt-Frce lrgal sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 258, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 167(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368, "end_char": 380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2122, "end_char": 2128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2129, "end_char": 2152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2391, "end_char": 2403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )-\n\n• >\n\nG Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner\n\nU. P. Singh and S. N. Jlw fo.r the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "K. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )-\n\n• >\n\nG Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner\n\nU. P. Singh and S. N. Jlw fo.r the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. N. Jlw", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2440, "end_char": 2449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )-\n\n• >\n\nG Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner\n\nU. P. Singh and S. N. Jlw fo.r the Respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by '\n\n...\n\n,< i\n\n~ ,\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis writ petition has again come up before us for further directions."}}, {"text": "U.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2620, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U.P. Singh, learned Advocate on behalf of the H State of Bihar, has intimated to us that pursuant to the directions given by us in our order dated 9th March, 1979('), the State of Bihar\n\n(I) [1979] 3 SCR 532-544.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 SCR 532", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2811, "end_char": 2827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hingi:>rani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2943, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "> ..\n\n' I I\n\nhas already released 70 undertrial prisoners whose names were set out in th~ chart filed by Mrs. Hingi:>rani on 9th March, 1979."}}, {"text": "9th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2958, "end_char": 2973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "> ..\n\n' I I\n\nhas already released 70 undertrial prisoners whose names were set out in th~ chart filed by Mrs. Hingi:>rani on 9th March, 1979."}}, {"text": "Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3653, "end_char": 3662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Hingorani has filed before us at the hearing of the writ petition on 16th April, 1979 a second chart giving the names and particulars of some of these undertrial prisoners who have not yet got the benefit of the earlier order made by us.", "canonical_name": "K. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "16th April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Hingorani has filed before us at the hearing of the writ petition on 16th April, 1979 a second chart giving the names and particulars of some of these undertrial prisoners who have not yet got the benefit of the earlier order made by us."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Hingorani will prepare a list showing the names and particulars of these persons and Mr. U. P. Singh on behalf of the State Government will render the neces .. sary help in this connection.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "Bageshwari Prasad Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9th March, 1979, Bageshwari Prasad Pandey, Superintendent of the Patna Central Jail has filed an affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "Patna Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6688, "end_char": 6706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9th March, 1979, Bageshwari Prasad Pandey, Superintendent of the Patna Central Jail has filed an affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6995, "end_char": 7009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7017, "end_char": 7043, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "4th April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7071, "end_char": 7086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 has also been filed by Pradeep •\n\n•. ; Kumar Gangoli, Superintendent of Muzaffarpur Jail along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "Pradeep", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7110, "end_char": 7117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 has also been filed by Pradeep •\n\n•. ; Kumar Gangoli, Superintendent of Muzaffarpur Jail along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "Kumar Gangoli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar affidavit dated 4th April, 1979 has also been filed by Pradeep •\n\n•. ; Kumar Gangoli, Superintendent of Muzaffarpur Jail along with a chart showing the dates on which petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7464, "end_char": 7475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhuvan Mohan Munda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7482, "end_char": 7500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhuvan Mohan Munda, Superintendent ."}}, {"text": "Ranchi Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7526, "end_char": 7545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Ranchi Central Jail has also filed an affidavit dated 12th April, 1979 together with a chart showing the dates on which some of the nndertrial prisoners referred to in our Order dated 9th March, 1979 were produced before the Magistrates in compliance •\n\nwit~ the requirement of the proviso to section 167(2}."}}, {"text": "section 167(2}. It is apparent . )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7819, "end_char": 7853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9244, "end_char": 9255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th February, '(", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9530, "end_char": 9547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government must also provide at its own cost a lawyer to the undertrial prisoner with a view to enable him to apply for bail in exercise of his right under proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 and the Magistrate must take care to see that the right of the undertrial prisoner to the assistance of a lawyer provided at State cost is secured to hiin and he must deal witli the application for bail in accordance with _ the guidelines laid down by us in our Order dated 12th February, '(1979.(')"}}, {"text": "B. Srinivasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10034, "end_char": 10047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government has also filed an affidavit of B. Srinivasan, SujJerintendent of Pol!ee (C.J.D.), Government of Bihar, giving in Annexure (I) particulitnl regarding nnmber of cases pending investigation by the police in each sob-division of the State as on 31st December, 1978 and in Annexure (II), particulars resarding number of cases pendieg investigation for more than six months.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nSrinivasan"}}, {"text": "31st December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10244, "end_char": 10263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government has also filed an affidavit of B. Srinivasan, SujJerintendent of Pol!ee (C.J.D.), Government of Bihar, giving in Annexure (I) particulitnl regarding nnmber of cases pending investigation by the police in each sob-division of the State as on 31st December, 1978 and in Annexure (II), particulars resarding number of cases pendieg investigation for more than six months."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10544, "end_char": 10549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were pending investigation in the State of Bihar on 31st December, 1978 and out of these, 5835 cal!es relating to major offences and 7228 cases relating to minor • offences were pending investigation for a period of more than six months."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nSrinivasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11450, "end_char": 11464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the reasons given by B.\n\nSrinivasan in his statement is that in 10 per cent of the cases investigation is held up because of delay in receipt of opinions from experts.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nSrinivasan"}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 S.C.R. 169", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11743, "end_char": 11762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "National Police Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12327, "end_char": 12353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "requisite expertise of material for doing so and moreover the National Police Commission appointed by the Government of India is seized of thi&\n\nquestion and it is considering what steps and measures should .:- be taken for the purpose of expediting the investigative procei& and making qualitative improvement in it."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12371, "end_char": 12390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "requisite expertise of material for doing so and moreover the National Police Commission appointed by the Government of India is seized of thi&\n\nquestion and it is considering what steps and measures should .:- be taken for the purpose of expediting the investigative procei& and making qualitative improvement in it."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12831, "end_char": 12845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is high time that the State of Bihar took steps to overhaul and streamline its investigative machinery so that no investigation may take more than the bare minimum time required for it and the judicial process may be set in motion without any unnecessary delay."}}, {"text": "12th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13518, "end_char": 13537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We directed by our Order dated 9th March, 1979 that on the next date when the undertrial prisoners, charged with bailable offenc.es, are produced before the Magistrates, the State Government should provide them with a lawyer at its own cost for the purpose of making applie3tion for bail and if any application for bail is made, the Magistra~ should dispose of the same in accordance with the broad guidelinei set out by us in our Judgment dated 12th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "1st February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14132, "end_char": 14150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We should like the State Government to file an affidavit stating how many undertrial accused or bailable offences who have been in jail for a period of more than 18 months as on 1st February, 1979 have been provided lawyers at State expenses and whether or not they have been released on bail in accordance with the directions given by us."}}, {"text": "9th March.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14659, "end_char": 14669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government will also file an affidavit giving similar information in regard to those undertrial prisoners who have been in jail for periods longer than half the maximum term of imprisonment for which they could, if convicted, be sentenced, because we had given direction of a like nature also in regard to these undertrial prisoners in our iudgmeot dated 9th March."}}, {"text": "Ui", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14736, "end_char": 14738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that according to the law as laid down by Ui in our judgment dated 9th March, 1979, it is, the constitutional right of every accused person who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on account of reasons such as poverty, indigenctl c>r incommunicado situation, to have free legal services provided to him by the State and the State is under a constitutional mandate to provide a lawyer tosuch accused person if the needs of justice so require."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16970, "end_char": 16980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17311, "end_char": 17330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have no report from the State Government as to whether women under \"protective custody\" in jails have been transferred to\n\nremnd or welfare homes conducted by the social welfare department\n\na~ dfrected by us by our Order dated 26th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "U, P.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17336, "end_char": 17341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U, P.\n\nSmgh on behalf of the State of Bihar stated before us that this directio'n has been carried out by th~ State Government, but we should like to have an affidavit of some responsible officer of the State Government stating that women who were confined in jail under the label of \"protective custody\" have been transferred to welfare homes and that necessary instructions have been issued by the State\n\nGovernment to the effect that women or children who are victims of offence or whose presence is required for giving evidence should not be kept in jail under so called \"protective custody\"."}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18323, "end_char": 18334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18359, "end_char": 18385, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20219, "end_char": 20230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20477, "end_char": 20496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">- -\n\nH. KllATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwati, J.) 76 7\n\nWe find thaf pursuant to the direction given by us in our Order dated 9th March, 1979, the High Court of Patna has forwarded to us a compilation containing particulars giving the location of courts of Magistrates and courts of Sessions in the State of Bihar together with the total number of cases pending in each of these courts as on 31st December, 1978 with yearwise break up of such pending cases and briefly explaining the reasons why it has not been possible to dispose of these cases within a reasonable period of time."}}, {"text": "24th ,.\n\nApril. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22221, "end_char": 22241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We will proceed with the further hearing of the writ petition on 24th ,."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_768_780_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SAITO & OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nApril 26, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nUtiur Prade.sh Children Act 1952 and approved School!. under it, Sectio11s 2(4), 29, 30, 34, 60, 68, 70, 79 and 79, Scope of-\n\nThree Petitioners between the ages of 10 & 14 .::ame by an eleven year eld girl, tending cattle in a village, near a neglected btick kiln which temptingly offered protective privacy for committing rape.\n\nT!iey ndvanced towards the: victim 11nd tied her up.\n\nThey forcibly went through the exercise of rape.\n\nThe courls beJO\\V have held the three petitioners guilty of an offence under section 376 J.P.C. and sentenced each to two yars' rigo1ous imprisonment.\n\nThe offenders being children the dilemmatic issue is to fix the. sentencing guide•lines for juvenile delinquents. It was argued that \"Justice and the Child\"\n\nis a distinct jurisprudential criminological branch of 3ocioleg<.Jl speciality which i5 still in its infant status in India and many other countries. The children Act is a preliminary exercise, the BO!!tal School is an experiment in reformation and even Section 360 Criminal Procedure Code tends in the same direction.\n\nIn the absence of any report from the Reformation Officer nor any consideration of the social milieu, personal oo.fecedents, parental influence, educational status and other material factorn bearing on the three petitioners, the Court while accepting the appeal,\n\n1-IELD : The appellant! should be released on probation of good conduct and com1nitted to the care of their respective pare.nts and if no surviving parents, then their guardian, .executing a bond each without sureties to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful oJfender for n. period of two years from the date of release and for the observance of a condition namely that the child shall he put to school or continue its studies if it is already at school and attend any recrea.tional or meditational centre, if any, of the parents' choice regulnrly. The Reformation Officer enjoying jurisdiction in the locality wilf have supervision over each Of the appellants and shall make a report once every three month! to the Trial Court. The Reformation Officer will explain to the appellants and their parents the import of this order.\n\n[776H, 777A-C]\n\nPathak, J. (concurring)-On the question \\vhether the youthful offender should be proceeded 3gainst under section 29 or Section JO of tbe U.P. Children Act 1951, the court must apply its mind to certain coniJerations like the age of the child, his family background, his general past conduct and antecedents, the circumstances in which he committed the ~!fence ar.d which of the measures provided by section 29 or section 30 would more effectively and yet not hatshly enable the child to develop into a responsible men1ber of society.\n\nThe statute is concerned with a person whose personality, judg1nent and discretion\n\nha;.! not yet attained maturity. A \"child\" has been defined under Sec. 2(4) of the Act as a person under the age of sixteen years.\n\nT1tcrefore the primary obj'ect must be to place the 'Child in an environment conducive to his reha.bilita-\n\nI._ )-\n\n~ -\n\n......\n\nSATTO & ORS v. u.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, I.) 7 6 9\n\ntion ai1d providing scope for corrective actiolt which fa the basic c.riteria for A detern1ining the choice between section 29 and section JO o( the Act. \\Vhere a child has acted on an impulse in committing an offnc~ and there is nothing to show the 1fresencc of any vicious streak of chara-cler, it would be more approp1 iate to leave him to the care and attention of parental authority under section 30( I) (b) of the Act rather than send him to an approved echool.\n\nOn the iarts of the present case, such an order would n1eet the ends of justice and serve the object of the statute.\n\n[779E-H, 780A-BJ B\n\nWillia111 v. /Vcw York, 337 US 241, 249, Sentencing and probation- Nationt.I College of the State Judiciary Reno, Nevada, page 258 relied upon .\n\n.,, CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 239 c of 1979.\n\n, Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3 11-78 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. l 064 and 1065/75.\n\nS. K. SabharwaJ for the Appellants.\n\n0. P. Rana for the Respondent.\n\n; The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Concurrent convictions by both the courts below have, by a rule of restriction and circumspection which tlu1 Court often adopts under Art. 136, persuaded me to circumscribe the leave to appeal to the critical question of punishment, usually answered by courts untouched by current humane criteria and drowned in the superstition that the gravity of the crime and the tariff prescribed in the Penal Code have a monopolistic hold on the sentencing court.\n\nQuackery in criminology is a deficiency in forensic ju•ticingespecia!ly disastrous is sensitiv~ areas like juvenile sente'ncing when unlettered punishment becomes unwitting crime.\n\nThe present case is an illustration of judicial habituation to prescribing sentences conditioned by the offence and its milieu, forgetting G the fundamental fact that the human delinquent, not the criminal deviance, is the cynosure of punitive processing.\n\nThe further Gandhia\\l axiom follows that crime is like disease, and correction, not cruelty, has dominance in the sentencing calculus. The sadistic appeal to severity of infliction takes on a sublimated form in the judicial process, as has happened in the instan1 case. The court has rightly been 8 horrified by the crime of rape here but wrongly bid farewell to the reform of the vernal criminals.\n\nThre~ boys. between the ages of ten and fourteen with simmering sex urges amidst societal inhibitions, and infatuating stimulations, came by an eleven year old girl tending cattle in a village, and this, by happen-stance, was near a neglected brick kiln which temptingly offered protective privacy for carnal assault. This lascivious opportullity excited the three juveniles, otherwise engaged in cutting grass, into erotic experimentalism.\n\nThey advanced aggressively towards the artless victim, tied up by way of preventive detention a young cowherd who chanced to be near the scene and forcibly went through the adolescent exercise of rape. The courts below have held the three petitioners guilty of an offence under s.376 I.P.C. and we do not feel it right to hibble at probabilities and disturb that conclusion.\n\nCurrent Indian ethos and standards of punitive deterrence make rape a heinous offence. The offenders, however, are children and the dilemmatic issue is to fix the sentencing guidelines when juvenile delinquents come before the court. 'Justice and the Child' is a distinct jurisprudential-criminological branch of socio-legal speciality which is still in its infant status in India and many other countries. the Children Act is a preliminary exercise, the Borstal School is an experimeht in reformation and even s.360 Cr. P.C. ~nds in the same direction.\n\nCorrection informed by compassion, not incarceration leading to degeneration, is the primary im of this field of criminal justice. Juvenile justice has constitutional roots in Articles 15(3) and 39 ( e) :na the pervasive humanism which bespeaks the superparental cohcern of the .State for its child-citizens including juvenile delinquents.\n\nThe penal pharmacopoea of India, in tune with the reformatory strategy currently prevalent in civilised criminology, has to approach the child offender not as a target of harsh punishment but of humane nourishment.\n\nThis is the central problem of sentencing policy whe'n juveniles are found guilty of delinquency. A scientific approach may insist on a search for fuller material sufficient to individuate . the therapy to suit the criminal malady.\n\nAs the United States Supreme Court stated in Williams v. New York,(') presente'nce reports :\n\n\"have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guess-work and inadequate information.\n\nTo deprive sehtencing judges of this kind of information . would undermine .modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation.\"\n\ntl) .m u. s. 241, 249.\n\n-<.\n\nSATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 771\n\nJudge F. Rayan Duffy has written :\n\n\"If the judgg has before him a complete and accurate presentence investigation report which sets forth the conditions, circumstances, background, and surroundings of the defendant, and the circumstances underlying the offenoe whicb has been committed, the judge can then impose sentence with greater assurance that he has adopted the proper course. He can do so with much greater peace of mind.\"\n\n\"Regrettably, our juvenile justice system still thinks in terms of terror, not cure, of wounding, not healing, and a sort of blind man's bu.ff is the result.\n\nThis negative approach converts even the culture of juvenile homes into junior jails. From the reformatory angle, the detainees are left to drift, there being no constructive programmes for the detainees nor correctional orientation and training for the institutional staff.\n\nI highlight these drawbacks largely because the State's response to punitive issues relating to juveniles has been stricken with 'illiteracy' and must awaken to a new 'enlightenment', at least prompted by the international year of the Child.\n\nPatricia M.\n\nWald has strengthened this perspective in a recent book on \"Pursuing Justice 1or the Child\".(').\n\n\"Juvenile detention needs a new focus and a new rationale.\n\nThe detention period ought to be used to begin to draw togeiher resources necessary for constructive change, whether or not the juvenile is adjudicated. There is abundant evidence that detention has failed as an isolated interlude between those more dramatic parts of the juvenile justice system-arrest and trial or disposition .\n\nThe Juvenile judge still has a vital function to fulfil in detention. The judge is charged with the solemn determination whether to deprive juveniles of liberty or whether they cari be released in their parents' custody or to a third party and, ii so, what conditions should apply to the release. In making such a decision the judge should follow dUe proces£ l!earing procedures and the legal presumption should favour release. If the decision is to detain, the judge must make a record to support that decision.\n\nThe legality of preventive detention in the juvenile court needs to be tested. If the power is upheld, the procedural safeguards should be a' precise as they are for adults. We should abandon the gotio11 that secure detention is good for the child.\n\n(J) pp.135-136.\n\nSome legal absolutes seem imperative; jail for juveniles should be outlawed; status offenders should not be put into secure detention; finite limits should be set on how long a child can be detained before or after adjudication; minimum standards for physical structure, staff, and program should be enforced by the courts. Even then, we should not cease inquiring whether there are yet better and more ehlightened ways to use the interlude after arrest to help juveniles so that, unless they are innocent, or so blighted that removal from the community before or after trial is an almoot indisputable necessity, there may be no need for the rest of the progress at all.\"\n\nThese general observations of futuristic import apart, we have toconcretise the measures to be taken i'n the present case under thfl available law and the available facilities.\n\nThe mainstream of criminat justice has not been refined by restorative legislations.\n\nWe have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952 and 'approved schools' of sorts under it.\n\nWe l,!ave provision for juvenile courts (s. 60), Reformation Officers (s. 34), and a flexible cluster of factors, social and personal, to be taken into consideration in pa!!i!ing orders when a tender-aged delinquent is to be taken into custodial care E by the court (s. 68). Reports by Reformation Officers have a helpful role in the sentencing process.\n\nThe finer focus of sentencing is not furious reaction to the offence but habilitative rescue of the youthful offender from moral-material abandonment and careful reformation by kindling his creative potential. Judicial responsibility is not mechanistic but humanistic, and the ritualistic magistrate is a misfit.\n\n F Section 70 of the U.P. Childr•m Act highlights it :\n\n70. Principles to be observed by Courts in dealing with children and young persons.-\n\nEvery Court in dealing with a child who is brought be- G fore it, either as needing care or as an offender or otherwis<' shall have regard to the welfare of the child and shall\n\nin a proper case take steps for removing him from undesirable surronndings and for securing that proper provision is mad\" for his education and training.\n\nH Functionally, a judicial order on a child must be guided by this legislative value judgment.\n\nNon-custodial disposition of the y-0ung offender is permissible under s. 30 of the Act which reads :\n\n> -\n\nSATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 77 3\n\n30. Power to discharge youthful offender or to commit him to suitable custody.-\n\n(1) A court may, if it thinks fit, instead of directing any youthful offeader to be detained in an approved school, order him to be--\n\n(a) discharged after due admonition; or\n\n(b) released on probation of good conduct and committed to the care of his parerrt or guardian or other adult relative or other fit person, on such parent, guardian, relative or person executing a bond, with or without sureties, as the Court may require, to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful offender for any period not exceeding three years and for the observance of suc!J:- other conditions as the Court may impose for securing that the youthful offender may lead an honest and industrious life.\n\nThe Court may order that the youthful offender released under this clause may be placed under the supervision of a Reformation Officer or of some other person appointed for the purpose by the Court.\n\n( 2) If it appears to the Court on receiving a report from\n\nthe Reformation Officer or otherwise that the offender has E '.llot been of good behaviour during the period of the probation, it may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, order the offender to be detained in an approved school.\n\nIndeed, a conscientious judge may consider it of better service to :society :\n\n\"If the criminal's past history gives good reason to be lieve that he is not of the naturally criminal type, that he is capable of real reform and of becoming a useful citizen, there is no doubt that probation, viewed from the selfish ltandpoint of protection to society alone, is the most efficient method that we have. And yet it is the least understood, the least deveioped, the least appreciated of all our efforts to rid eociety of the criminal.\"\n\n\"The basic idea underlying a sentence to probation is very simple.\n\nSentencing is in large part concerned with 1lVoiding future crimes by helping the defendant learn to live pmductively in the community 1 bich he has offended against.\n\nPm bation proceeds on the theory that the best way to pursue\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1979 j 3 S.C.ll.\n\nthis goal is to orient the criminal sanction toward the community setting in those cases where it is compatible with the other obj•ectives of sentencing. Other things being equal, the odds are that a give'n defendant will learn how to live successfully in the general community if he is dealt with in that community rather than shipped off to the artificial and a typical environment of an institution of confinement.\n\nBanishment from society, in a word, is 'not the way to integrate someone into society.\n\nYet imprisonment involves just such banishment-albeit for a temporary sojourn in most cases.\n\nThis is of course not to say that probation should be used in all cases, or that it will always produce better resulls.\n\nThere are many goals of sentencing, some of which in a give'n case may require the imposition of a s•.entence to imprisonment even in the face of a conciusion that probation is more likely to assure the public that the particular defendant will not offend again. And there are defendants as to whom forced removal from the environment which may in some part have co'ntributed to their offence may be the be11t beginning to a constructive and useful life.\"(')\n\nAppeal and revision provided under s. 79 of the Act involve the higher courts in the process. We are sad that this crucial judicial task E has been discharged with lesser awareness of its seriousness and complexity than necessary. For instance the Sessions Court, oblivious of the offender and obsessed with the offence, in brief confirmation, pent one sentence on sentence.\n\n\"Due to seriousness of the crime there is no justification to release the appellants on probation.\"\n\nThe High Court devoted a paragraph but was upset by the Criminal act and closed its mind to salvaging the sentence :\n\n\"Lastly, it is urged that the sentence awarded to the revisionists be reduced in view of their ages.\n\nI am reluc- G tant to do so because they committed a crime which repels against moral conscience. They chose a girl of 11 years to satisfy their lust.\n\nThey spoiled her life by committing this offence as her father would experience considerable difficulty in arranging her marriage. They were so cruel that all the three committed rape on that minor child. Such an act B deserves to be deprecated. The sentence awarded by the\n\n(1) Sentencing and Probation-National Co1lege of the State Judiciary Reno, Nevada, p, 258.\n\n• )-\n\nIi -' • • ~\n\n-< •\n\n:~·\n\n-Z. '4\n\n\"\"'\n\n, J.\n\n• •\n\nSATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 77 5\n\nlearned lower courts does not at all err on the side of severity.\n\nMoreover, the learned lower courts have already shown sym1pathy by keeping them in an approved school at Etawah.\"\n\nWhile the victim needs reparation, failure to pay heed to, which is a blind spot in our criminal justice system, the offender's circumstances are material in sentencing, omission to notice which is a systemic, though traditional failing.\n\nWe find no emphasis on the age antecedents, parental and social circumstances and curative possibilities or Reformation Officer's report bearing on the three children punished. The Children Act makes meticulous prov1S1ons which slumber on the statute book and seek no visa into the court room.\n\nWe hope this elaborate discussion will activate sentencing wisdom vested in the criminal courts.\n\nAt this late stage, without prolonging the process, we can only direct some pragmatic steps.\n\nNo report from a Reformation Officer is availble. No consideration of the social milieu, personal antecedents, p.arental influences, educational status and other material factors is apparent i'n the judgments.\n\nNor, indeed, ii; there any serious advertance to the advantages of community-oriented reformation or the disadvantages of institutional inter-mix and quasi-incarceration.\n\nThe juvenile detention system, it must be noted, has not fulfilled itself even i'n countries where it is heavily funded like in the U.S.A. where the young delinquents are\n\n\"penned like cattle, demoralized by lack of activities and trained staff, often brutalized.\n\nOver half the facilities in which juveniles are held have no psychiatric or social work staff. A fourth have no school program. The median age of detainees is fourteen; the novice may be sodomized within a matter of houNl.\n\nMany have not been charged with a crime at all. From New York to California, the field reports repeat themselves depressingly.(')\n\nOur 'approved schools' like our adult prisons sometimes remind us of animal farms, if only judges care to visit jails.\n\nThese blemishes, in far worse measure, have blighted our Homes and Schools and approved custodial institutions, although our correc-. tional repertory, augmented by meditational, recreational and oriented Gandhian tools, may inexpensively expand and deepen the rehabi-\n\n(1) Patricia M. Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles-Pursuing, Justice for the\n\nChild ed. by Margaret K. Rosenheim, p. 119.\n\nlitative potency of our sentencing strategies in this area.\n\nBe that as it may, the U.P. Children Act appears to have been virtually given a go-bye in the courts below, a phenomenon which frequently happens because practising lawyers and judicial officers have not yet given the deeper reflection that welfare-oriented rehabilitative legislations of the mentally and morally retarded in the criminal justice field deserve.\n\nThe Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, has made provision in s.360 to deal with persons under 21 years of age convicted of offences_, punishable with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less and s. 376 I.P.C., cannot come within its purview . But the U.P. Children Act defines a 'youthful offender' to mean \"any child who has been found < to have committed an offence punishable with transportation or im- prisonment\".\n\nThus, life imprisonment for the offence does not take\n\nthe delinquent out of the category of youthful offender as defined in s. 2(13) of the said Act. Section 30 authorises the Court, if it thinks fit, instead of directing any youthful offender to be detained in an approved school, order him to be released conditionally, as earliec indicated. We think that the present case deserves action undec s. 30.\n\nRape is horrific True. The victim is a pathetic child and deserve£ not merely commisseration but also compensation, an aspect which the State will take note of when a proper application is made to it. Our immediate problem is the disposition of the appellants who are nlsB very young.\n\nThey have served out some term in an 'approved school' which, making a realistic appraisal, is a 'junior jail'. It is not as if these little lads are incorrigible rapists or violent toughs running amok.\n\nParental neglect, tempting opportunity, sex perversionslibadences (sic) libidinous environs and a host of other factors where state in-action is contributory to exciting adolescent erotica, count for vulgar, vicious or violent delinquency.\n\nThese boys can and should be rehabilitated, and that is done best by obligating the parent to take care of the children concerned and not by institutionalised custody. Section\n\n3C of the Act is attracted by the facts of this case to the extent we are able to glean from the meagre material on record.\n\nWe hope that when children are brought before court, the provisions of the Childrea Act will be remembered by the Bench and the Bar and its rehabilitative engineerillg set in motion.\n\nIn the present case, we direct the appellants to be released on pro- H bation of good conduct and committed to the care of their respective parents and if no surviving parent then their guardian executing a bond each, without sureties, to be responsible for the good behaviour\n\n......\n\n• -<\n\n' I • ' ~\n\n~, 'ill l\n\n, '\n\nSATTO & ORS V. U.P. STATE (Pathak, J,) 777\n\nof. the youthful offender for a period of two years from the date of release and for the observance of a condition, namely, that the child shall be put to school or continue its studies if it is already at school and attend any recreational or meditational centre if any, of the parent's choice regularly. Many systematic experiments, acknowledged in prison reports and judgments of trial courts have proved the therapentic value of transcendental Meditation viz-a-viz juvenile delinquents.(') The Reformation Officer having jurisdiction over the locality shall have supervision over each of the appellants and shall make a report once in three months to the trial court. If the report shows laps into bad behaviour, the court may direct detention of the deviant appellant or appellants in an approved school. 'The Reformation Officer will explain to the parents of the delinquents and the appellants the import of this order so that they may appreciate the necessity for compliance therewith and cooperate in the rehabiliatory process.\n\nI may venture a view in conclusion that the revolutionary contribution Indian culture may make to criminology is apt to be the focus 1 on human consciousness whose mutilation leads to sickness, crime and sorrow and whose restoration, collective and individual, is 1he insurance against psychic stress and its off-shoots-crime and related maladies.\n\nThe technology of setencing must release man from distortions and pressures on lines ancient and modern. \"This parenthesis, in a sense, argues for the new orientation in juvenile justice.\n\nA copy of this order will be sent to the approved school, Etawah, and to the trial Judge for immediate compliance.\n\nA copy of the order will also be served on the Advocate for the appellants for communication to and compliance by his clients and to the Home Department for correctional actions.\n\nPATHAK, J. The petitioners were convicted by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Aligarh for the offence under s. 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment.\n\n(l) a. fn the Superior court of the State of Arizona dt. March 5, 1976 in Stateo\n\nArizona V. Jean Coston Preslay-Case 6878.\n\nb. Criminal action 4-81750 in the U. S. Direct court for Eastern District\n\nof Michigan-United States of America V. Robert Charles Rusch, Jr.\n\nc. Kentucky U Vol. 60, 1971 72 No. 2 and University of Mary Land Law Forum Vol. VIII No. 2 Winter 1973-article by David E. Sykes.\n\nd. Hiralal Mallick v. State of Bihar [1978] l\"SCR 301.\n\ne. pter 9, Juvenile Delinquency and the T. M. programme, Freedom from\n\nCrime by Roger Glenn Lanphear p-159 (Nellon Publishing Co Ny)\n\n1!-330SCI/79 . . ..\n\ndirected their detention for the period of their sentence in an approved school at Etawah. Their appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aligarh.\n\nThe High Court dechned to interfere in revision.\n\nFrom the material on the record it is not possible to say that the finding of the courts below that the petitioners committed the offence is not substantiated by the evidence on the record and, in my opinion, no case has been made out for interfering with the conviction.\n\nBut so far as the sentence is concerned, I think that the High Court and the courts below have not sufficiently appreciated the need for a proper order. Special leave granted on the question of sentence only.\n\nOrder on the appeal\n\nThe appellants are children. At the time of the offence the age of the three appellants ranged between 10 years and 14 years, the youngest, Satto, being 10 and the eldest, Bucha, being 14. They were cutting Rizka in their village fields when Kumari Bismillah, who was then about 12 years old, passed by grazing her cattle. Apparently, the three youngsters were seized with the temptation of having sex with her and borne on that impulse they forced the girl inside a brick kiln and committed rape on her, after securing a bystander, Baboo, who was also grazing his goats at the spot, to a tree.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the act cannot possibly be condoned. It calls for severe condemnation by the plainest moral standards. But on the question of sentence, the High Court and the courts below have, almost mechanically, affirmed a sentence of two years imprisonment to be served out by detention in an approved school.\n\nThey have failed to apply their mind to considerations which are relevant when a youthful offender is sentenced. The U.P. Children Act, 1951 contains two provisions in that regard. Section 29 provides that where a child is found to have committed an offence punishable with transportation or imprisonment, the court, if satisfied an inquiry that it is expedient so to deal with the child, may order him to be sent to an approved school for a stated period.\n\nSection 30 provides .-\n\n\"30. Power to discharge youthful offender ot to Commit him to suitable custody .\n\n(1) A court may, if it think fit, instead of directing any youthful offender to be detained in an approved school, order him to be -\n\n(a) discharged after due admonition; or (b) released on probation of good conduct and committed to the\n\nSATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Pathak, J,) 7 79\n\ncare of his parent, guardian or other adult relative or other fit person on such parent, guardian, relative or person executing a bond, with or without sureties, as the court may require, to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful offender for any period not exceeding three years and for the observance of such other conditions as the court may impose for securing that the youthful offender may lead an honest and industrious life.\n\nThe Court may order that the youthful offender released under this clause may be placed under the supervision of a Reformation Officer or of some other person appointed for the purpose by the Court.\n\n(2) If it appears to the Court on receiving a report from the Reformation Officer or otherwise that the offender has not been of good behavior during the period of the probation,\n\nit may after making such inquiry as it thinks fit order the D offender to be detained in an approved school.\"\n\nAlmost invariably the question will arise whether the youthful offender should be proceeded against under s. 29 or s. 30 The answer to the question lies in the judgment of the Court, which judgment must be made in the sound exercise of its discretion. Among the considerations to which the court must apply its mind are the age of the child his family background, his general past conduct and antecedents, the circumstances in which he committed the offence, and which of the measures provided by the statute, s. 29 or s. 30, will more effectively and yet not harshly enable the child to develop into a responsible member of society. It must be remembered that the U.P. Children Act deals with children, and a \"child\" is defined by s.2(4) as a person under the age of sixteen years.\n\nThe Statute is concerned with a person whose personality, judgment and discretion has not yet attained maturity. The primary object then must be to place the child. in an environment conducive to his rehabilitation and providing scope for corrective action.\n\nThat appears to be the basic criterion for determining the choice between s. 29 and s. 30.\n\nIn a case where the child has acted on impulse in committing an offence, and there is nothing to show the presence of any vicious streak of character, it would be more appropriate to leave him to the care and\n\nattention of parental , authority rather than to send him to an approved school.\n\nThat will depend, however on whethr parental attention is possible and forthcoming and whether it does not suffer from want\n\nA of sufficient effectiveness in moulding the proper moral development -r ... of the child. In my opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case the order contemplated bys. 30(1) (b) of\n\nthe Act would more appropriately meet the ends of justice and serve the objcet of the statute.\n\nAccordingly, the appeal is allowed on the question of sentence.\n\nThe sentence imposed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge and affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court,\n\nis set aside.\n\nThe appellants are ordered to be released on probation of ,_.. good conduct and to be committed to the care of their respective \"\"\"\"'\"' parents, and if there are no surviving parents then their guardian, on -~ such parents or guardian executing a bond each without sureties, to be responsible for the good behaviour of the youthful offender for a period of two years from the elate of the release and for the observance of a condition that the child should be put to school or continue his studies if he is already in school, and regularly attend any recreational centre or meditational centre (if any) of the parent's choice.\n\nThe Reformation Officer enjoying jurisdiction in the locality will have supervision over each of the appellants and shall make a report once every three months to the trial court.\n\nThe Reformation Officer will explain to the appellants and their parents the import of this order.\n\nA copy of this order will be sent to the approved school, Etawah, and to the trial court for immediate compliance.\n\nA copy of the order will also be served on counsel for the appellants for wmmwfication to, and compliance by, the appellants. ----·-\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n}--", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "SAITO & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SATTO & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 26, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAITO & OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nApril 26, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nUtiur Prade.sh Children Act 1952 and approved School!."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Children Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act 1952", "statute": "Children Act 1952"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued that \"Justice and the Child\"\n\nis a distinct jurisprudential criminological branch of 3ocioleg<.Jl speciality which i5 still in its infant status in India and many other countries."}}, {"text": "Section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090, "end_char": 1101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act 1952", "statute": "Children Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1102, "end_char": 1125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[776H, 777A-C]\n\nPathak, J. (concurring)-On the question \\vhether the youthful offender should be proceeded 3gainst under section 29 or Section JO of tbe U.P. Children Act 1951, the court must apply its mind to certain coniJerations like the age of the child, his family background, his general past conduct and antecedents, the circumstances in which he committed the ~!fence ar.d which of the measures provided by section 29 or section 30 would more effectively and yet not hatshly enable the child to develop into a responsible men1ber of society.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2386, "end_char": 2396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Children Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2423, "end_char": 2440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2680, "end_char": 2690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act 1951", "statute": "Children Act 1951"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act 1951", "statute": "Children Act 1951"}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2966, "end_char": 2975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act 1951", "statute": "Children Act 1951"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3329, "end_char": 3339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act 1951", "statute": "Children Act 1951"}}, {"text": "section 30( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3607, "end_char": 3621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. SabharwaJ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. SabharwaJ for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "; The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Concurrent convictions by both the courts below have, by a rule of restriction and circumspection which tlu1 Court often adopts under Art.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4446, "end_char": 4454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6324, "end_char": 6329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6330, "end_char": 6335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Articles 15(3) and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7153, "end_char": 7174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the United States Supreme Court stated in Williams v. New York,(') presente'nce reports :\n\n\"have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guess-work and inadequate information."}}, {"text": "s. 241, 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8265, "end_char": 8276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F. Rayan Duffy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8340, "end_char": 8354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 771\n\nJudge F. Rayan Duffy has written :\n\n\"If the judgg has before him a complete and accurate presentence investigation report which sets forth the conditions, circumstances, background, and surroundings of the defendant, and the circumstances underlying the offenoe whicb has been committed, the judge can then impose sentence with greater assurance that he has adopted the proper course."}}, {"text": "Patricia M.\n\nWald", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9445, "end_char": 9462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patricia M.\n\nWald has strengthened this perspective in a recent book on \"Pursuing Justice 1or the Child\".(').", "canonical_name": "Patricia M.\n\nWald"}}, {"text": "have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11794, "end_char": 11799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952", "statute": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11824, "end_char": 11829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952", "statute": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12020, "end_char": 12025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952", "statute": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952", "statute": "We have the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13063, "end_char": 13068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13127, "end_char": 13139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Non-custodial disposition of the y-0ung offender is permissible under s. 30 of the Act which reads :\n-\n\nSATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, J.) 77 3\n\n30.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16513, "end_char": 16518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17775, "end_char": 17787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )-\n\nIi -' • • ~\n< •\n\n:~·\nZ. '4\n\n\"\"'\n\n, J.\n\n• •\n\nSATTO & ORS v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.)", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19222, "end_char": 19228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The juvenile detention system, it must be noted, has not fulfilled itself even i'n countries where it is heavily funded like in the U.S.A. where the young delinquents are\n\n\"penned like cattle, demoralized by lack of activities and trained staff, often brutalized."}}, {"text": "New York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19632, "end_char": 19640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From New York to California, the field reports repeat themselves depressingly.(')"}}, {"text": "California", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19644, "end_char": 19654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From New York to California, the field reports repeat themselves depressingly.(')"}}, {"text": "Patricia M. Wald", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20104, "end_char": 20120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tional repertory, augmented by meditational, recreational and oriented Gandhian tools, may inexpensively expand and deepen the rehabi-\n\n(1) Patricia M. Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles-Pursuing, Justice for the\n\nChild ed.", "canonical_name": "Patricia M.\n\nWald"}}, {"text": "Margaret K. Rosenheim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20195, "end_char": 20216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Margaret K. Rosenheim, p. 119."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20655, "end_char": 20684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20708, "end_char": 20713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20848, "end_char": 20854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20855, "end_char": 20860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21198, "end_char": 21206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21224, "end_char": 21234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21471, "end_char": 21476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n3C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22378, "end_char": 22389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Etawah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24693, "end_char": 24699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of this order will be sent to the approved school, Etawah, and to the trial Judge for immediate compliance."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24931, "end_char": 24937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J. The petitioners were convicted by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Aligarh for the offence under s. 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Aligarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25014, "end_char": 25021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J. The petitioners were convicted by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Aligarh for the offence under s. 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment."}}, {"text": "s. 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25044, "end_char": 25050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25058, "end_char": 25075, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "David E. Sykes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25508, "end_char": 25522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Winter 1973-article by David E. Sykes."}}, {"text": "Roger Glenn Lanphear", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25661, "end_char": 25681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e. pter 9, Juvenile Delinquency and the T. M. programme, Freedom from\n\nCrime by Roger Glenn Lanphear p-159 (Nellon Publishing Co Ny)\n\n1!-330SCI/79 . . .."}}, {"text": "Satto", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26600, "end_char": 26605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of the offence the age of the three appellants ranged between 10 years and 14 years, the youngest, Satto, being 10 and the eldest, Bucha, being 14."}}, {"text": "Bucha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26632, "end_char": 26637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of the offence the age of the three appellants ranged between 10 years and 14 years, the youngest, Satto, being 10 and the eldest, Bucha, being 14."}}, {"text": "Kumari Bismillah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26702, "end_char": 26718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were cutting Rizka in their village fields when Kumari Bismillah, who was then about 12 years old, passed by grazing her cattle."}}, {"text": "Baboo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26993, "end_char": 26998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently, the three youngsters were seized with the temptation of having sex with her and borne on that impulse they forced the girl inside a brick kiln and committed rape on her, after securing a bystander, Baboo, who was also grazing his goats at the spot, to a tree."}}, {"text": "Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27504, "end_char": 27522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27563, "end_char": 27573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act, 1951", "statute": "Children Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27840, "end_char": 27850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act, 1951", "statute": "Children Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29275, "end_char": 29280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29284, "end_char": 29289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29679, "end_char": 29684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29688, "end_char": 29693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29901, "end_char": 29907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30286, "end_char": 30291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30296, "end_char": 30301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_781_784_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HARDIP SINGH & ANR.\n\nTHE INCOME TAX OFFICER, AMRITSAR & ORS.\n\nApril 26, 1979\n\n[!'{, L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act 1961-S. 179--Scope of-Resolution tor wi11ding up o/ co1np1Ut.y passed before the coming into force of tl1e Act-J.T.O. issued notices to Managing Director & Director topay large tax arrears due fro1n the company -Notice if ralid.\n\nSecticn 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (before it was amended in 1975) provided that when any private company is wound up after the commencement of the , Act and any tax assessed on the company whether before or in the course of or after its liquidation in respect of any income of any previous year cannot be recovered, then, every person who was a director of the ptivate company at any lime during the relevant previous year shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of such tax.\n\nThe appellants were the managing director anU director of a private limited company.\n\nOn November 13, 1961 a resolution for voluntary liquidation of the private company W2t5 passed. In February and November, 1970 the Income\n\nTax Officer issued notices to the appellants calling upon them to pay income tax which remained unpaid from the company to the tune o[ Rs. 1.34 Jakhs.\n\nThe contention of the appellants that the company had gone into liquidation before the Act came into force on 1st April, 1962 and, tl:erefore, s. 179 bad no appiiction to this case was rejected by the Income-tax Officer. The appellants' revision petition was rejected by the Commissioner; the High Court dismissed tbeir writ petition in lin1ine.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The appellants could not escape from their liability to pay the tax dues.\n\nSection 179 was meant to cover cases of this nature also. [784A]\n\nThere are three stages when a company goes into liquiJation, nmely : ( 1) the con1mencement of the winding up of the company; (2) continuation of the proceedings or the steps for winding up and (3) final winding up and dissolution of the company. Section 179 will be attracted if any on'e or more of the three\n\nstages occurred after the commencement of the Act even though the first or the first and second events had happened eairlier. The directors were made liable to pay the tax dues because on its liquidation it becon1es difficult for the department to realise the tax dues from the assets of the company.\n\n[783D-E]\n\n.Jn the instant case, although the commencement of the winding Up of the c-0mpany had begun on a date prior to the date of commencement of the Act, a.t the time when the Income-tax Officer issued notice, proceedings for its\n\nwindins up were pending.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2390 of 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order d-ated 7-3-72 of the Punjab and\n\nA Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 773/72. r ~\n\nBhagirath Das, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellants. _,..,, ':--. ' P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellants' writ application in limine.\n\nSandhu Transport Company (Private) Lin1ited is a private limited company.\n\nThe two appellants were its directors.\n\nOne of them was a Managing Director.\n\nA resolution ' -- was passed ou the 13th November, 1961 for a voluntary liquidation of the company at the instance of its creditors.\n\nIn respect of some years ending with the assessment year 1964-65 a huge arnont of income tax to the tune of Rs. 1,34,319/- remained due from the company. The Income Tax Officer issued a notice on 7th of February,\n\n1970 against appellant No. 2 under Section 179 of the Income Tax Act 1961, hereinafter called the Act, to show cause why action should not be taken against the directors of the company for realisation of the arrears of income-tax due from the company.\n\nA similar notice was issued to appellant No. 1 on the 1 W1 of Novembr, 1970.\n\nBoth the appellants filed their show cause before the Income Tax Officer mainly taking the stand that since the company had gone into liquidation before the Act had come into force, action under Section 179 could not be taken against them.\n\nSome other points were also taken in the show cause filed by the appellants but it is not necessary to state them as the only point pressed in this Court fa in relation to the jurisdiccion of the Income Tax Officer under Section 179 of the Act. •\n\nThe Income Tax Officer rejectcJ the appellant'' pleas by his ·}· order dated the 31st December, 1970.\n\nThe appellants went in revi _ sion before the Commissioner of Income Tax. It was rejected on 31st January, 1972.\n\nThereafter, when proceedings were taken for realisation of the income-tax arrears aforesaid against the appellants they mowcl the High Court for the quashing of the proceedings and the orders under Section 179 of the Act.\n\nAs already stated the High Court rejected their application in limine, but certificate to appea'l to tijs Court was granted only because of the rule of valuation then prevalent.\n\nSection 179 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time read as follows:-\n\n179. Liability of directors of private company in liquidation-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Com-\n\n. \"\"\"'\n\nHARDIP SINGH v. I.T.O. (Untwalia, J.) 783\n\npanies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) when any private. company is wound up after the commencement of this Act, and any tax assessed on the company, whether before or in the course of or after its liquidation, in respect of any income of any previous year cannot be recovered, then, every person who was a director of the private company at any time during the relevant previous year shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of such tax unless he proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company\".\n\nThe Section was amended in 1975 making it more stringent against the directors of a private company, but we are not concerned with the said amendment in this case .\n\nThere are three stages when a company goes into liquidation, namely :-(1) the commencement of the winding up of the company, (2) the continuation of the proceeding or the steps for winding up and (3) the final winding up and dissolution o~ the company.\n\nIf all the three stages were complete before the Act came into force on and from the 1st April, 1962, obviously Section 179 will not be attracted. If all of the three stages happened after the commencement of the Act, it is manifest that Section 179 would undoubtedly be attracted. But the difficulty presented before us by learned counsel for the appellants was because of some speciality of the facts of this case, the commencement of the winding np of the company began on a date which was prior to the date of commencement of the Act.\n\nAs it appears from the orders of the Income Tax Officer and the Commissioner the company had not even till then been finally wound up and dissolved. The proceedings for its winding up were pending.\n\nThe submission, therefore, is that in such a case Section 179 will not be attracted.\n\nWe have no difficulty in rejecting this argument. In our opinion the Section will be attracted if any one or more of the three events occurred after the commencement of the Act even though the first or the first and second events had happened earlier.\n\nThe Section was meant also to net a case like the instant one where it was resolved that the private company should be sent to liquidation and nobody cared to pay the huge arrear~ of incometax due from it. The Directors were sought to be caught exactly for\n\nthis purpo; e. When the company goes into liquidation it becomes difficult for the department to realise its dues from the assets of the H company and more so when the company has been finally wou Id up and dissolved.\n\nThe directors, therefore, have been made liable to\n\n' ...\n\nA pay such dues.\n\nSection 179 is meant to squarely cover such a case also and the appellants cannot escape their liability for the dues.\n\nThe proceedings were rightly initiated against them for realisation of the dues.\n\nThe High Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the appellants' writ petition in llmlne.\n\nB We find DO) merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed. 1 ...- )", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "HARDIP SINGH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARDIP SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, AMRITSAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, AMRITSAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 26, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 26, 1979\n\n[!'{,"}}, {"text": "L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "L. UNTWALIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 13, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 972, "end_char": 989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 13, 1961 a resolution for voluntary liquidation of the private company W2t5 passed."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1370, "end_char": 1385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the appellants that the company had gone into liquidation before the Act came into force on 1st April, 1962 and, tl:erefore, s. 179 bad no appiiction to this case was rejected by the Income-tax Officer."}}, {"text": "s. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1403, "end_char": 1409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1713, "end_char": 1724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2026, "end_char": 2037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2653, "end_char": 2681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bhagirath Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2829, "end_char": 2842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r ~\n\nBhagirath Das, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellants. _,..,, ':--. '"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2844, "end_char": 2860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r ~\n\nBhagirath Das, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellants. _,..,, ':--. '"}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r ~\n\nBhagirath Das, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellants. _,..,, ':--. '"}}, {"text": "P.A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2913, "end_char": 2925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellants' writ application in limine."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellants' writ application in limine."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellants' writ application in limine.", "canonical_name": "L. UNTWALIA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellants' writ application in limine."}}, {"text": "Sandhu Transport Company (Private) Lin1ited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sandhu Transport Company (Private) Lin1ited is a private limited company."}}, {"text": "7th of February,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3653, "end_char": 3669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Officer issued a notice on 7th of February,\n\n1970 against appellant No."}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3706, "end_char": 3717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4197, "end_char": 4208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4464, "end_char": 4475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "31st January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was rejected on 31st January, 1972."}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4906, "end_char": 4917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5110, "end_char": 5121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6614, "end_char": 6625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7165, "end_char": 7176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8008, "end_char": 8019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_785_787_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "NIMEON SANGMA & ORS.\n\nHOME SECRETARY, GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA & ORS\n\nApril 30, 1979 rv. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. s. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nA\"11thtistration of Justice-Pre-trial detention-Expeditious disposal of case1 , Jnclwli11g i1tvestigations and tri.a/s-Sections 167, 209 & 309 of Criminal Procedure Ce. 1973.\n\nla their petition for the issue of a \\Vrit of hab'eas corpus, the pctitionecs alleged -illegal detention of a large number of persongi under guise of the judicial\n\nprocess.\n\nlJEW : 1. Criminal Justice breaks down at a point 1, vhen expeditious trial is not '8.ttempted while the affected parties are languishing in jail. The Criminal Procedure Code in Sections 167, 209 and 309 has emphasised the importance of .expeditions disposal of tases including investigations and trials..\n\n[786E]\n\n2. The State Government to take a policy decision \\•iith a vie\\V to ensure that accused persons, too indigent to set in motion th.:: judicbt prucess, do not suffer incarceration silently.\n\n[787B]\n\n3. The Government will do \\vell to comply with the sy1irit of the Code of Criminal Procedure especially in the matter of pcr:\"; Oil\"i :;.ought to be bound over for good behaviour, persons against whom sumrnon::. caes are pending and persoas who have been in custody for more than six months..\n\nThis will involve a mass releas'e from j'ai!s, but Governn1ent has to pay homage in sub~ stance a1.d reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. [787C)\n\n1 he Court directed that :-\n\n(a) The State do consent to r'elease all persons who have been in custody for over six months and whose trials have not commenced or against whom. charge sheets have not been laid excepting in those cases under Se:clions 302 and 395 J.P.C.\n\n[786G]\n\n(b) The Stare shall complete investigation within t\\vo months in cases where ckarge.,, heets have not been laid.\n\n[786H]\n\n(C) The Sessions Court concerned should dispose of the cases where charge~ sheet$ have been laid and commitment has been made \\Vithin six monthi,\n\n[786HJ\n\nC!uMIN, AL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 211 of 1979.\n\nK. Hingorani for the Petitioners.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee for the Respondents.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRirnNA IYER, J.-This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of H habeas corpus in view of alleged illegal detention of a large number of persons under guise of the judicial proce'ss.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA Even \\\\ithout going into details, we are satisfied that petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 should be released on their own bonds to the satisfaction of the trial ro:; rt subject to their reporting to the nearest poliee stati0n once every fortnight nd appearing in court whenever called upon to do so to take their trial.\n\nWe direct accordingly. n So far as petitioner No. 1 is concerned, the State in its affidavit swenr that there is no such person in custody in connection with any case. This matter will be scrutinised further by the State so that it may satisfy itelf th~! no one is in custody except under due process of law.\n\n------ This Court in its earlkr order dated March 5, 1979 has directed the C State to file a statement containing particulars of the under-trial prisoners who have been confined in Jail for a period of over six months without their trials having commenced. Further details as to the ages of such under-trials, the dates from which they were confined and the offences with which they were 9harged were also called for.\n\nIn the reply statement put in by the respondent, we find a larg~ number of cases where D detention for considerable periods, without the trial having even commenced, is being su!Iered by various persons.\n\nCriminal justice breaks dawn, at a point when expeditious frial is not attempted while the affected parties are languishing in jail.\n\nThe Criminal Procedure Code in sections l67, 209 and 309 hns emphasised the importance o[ expedi- E tious disposal of cases includ; ng investigation.s and trials.\n\nIt is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have bcn such considerable delay in investigations by the police in.utter disregard of the fact th:it a citizen Jias been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an ofience.\n\nWe do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state F of a!Iairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under ·, .. e Cons.titution especially under Article 21 as interpreted by\n\n0this Court.\n\nEven so we do not wish to pass any orders at the moment until more p\"!ficulars are brought to our notice.\n\nIt will suffice for the presentand counsel for the State assures us that any direction given by this Court will be promptly complied with-that' we direct the State to consent to release all persons who have been in custody for over six months and whose trials have not commenced or against whom charge sheets have not been laid., But make one exception in cases\" where sections 302 and 395, IPC are involved. We direct that the State shall complete the investigation within two months from today where charge sheets have not been laid and further direct the Sessions Court concerned to dispose of the cases where charge sheets have been laid and commitment has been made, within six months from today.\n\nA report will be made to\n\n~. /\n\n,.._\n\nN. SANGMA v. HOME SECRETARY (Krishna Iyer, !.) 7 87\n\nthis Court at the end of six months from today by the State.\n\nWe must emphatically record our view that there has been a self-condemnation in the statement put in by the State Govermnent in that in quite a number of cases which are not of a serious character and even in those which involve serious offences, investigations have been pending for nearly two years.\n\nThere are cases where persons have been in custody for five years-a situation too ghastly for a civilised country like ours.\n\nWe therefore draw lhe attention of the State Government to take a policy decision with a view to ensnre that accnsed persons, too indigent to set in motion the judicial process, do not suffer incarceration silently. The Govermnent will do well to comply wi1h the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure especially in the matter of persons sought to be bound over for good behaviour, persons against whom summons cases are pending and persons who have been in custody for more than six months.\n\nMaybe this will involve a mass release from Jails, but Government has to pay homage in substance and reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. With these observations, and directions, we dispose of this petition.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition disposed", "total_entities": 18, "entities": [{"text": "NIMEON SANGMA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIMEON SANGMA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HOME SECRETARY, GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOME SECRETARY, GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1979 rv. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 167, 209 & 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256, "end_char": 279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 167, 209 and 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1065, "end_char": 1091, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2084, "end_char": 2096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Hingorani for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2119, "end_char": 2134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KRirnNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRirnNA IYER, J.-This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of H habeas corpus in view of alleged illegal detention of a large number of persons under guise of the judicial proce'ss."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in its earlkr order dated March 5, 1979 has directed the C State to file a statement containing particulars of the under-trial prisoners who have been confined in Jail for a period of over six months without their trials having commenced."}}, {"text": "Jias", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have bcn such considerable delay in investigations by the police in.utter disregard of the fact th:it a citizen Jias been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an ofience."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4453, "end_char": 4463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4973, "end_char": 4993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4995, "end_char": 4998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6166, "end_char": 6192, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition disposed"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_788_801_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ETC. ETC.\n\nPATEL RANJIBHAI DHANBHAI & ORS. ETC. El'C.\n\nMay 1, 1979\n\n(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.,\n\nR. S. SARKARIA,\n\nN. L. UNTWALIA,\n\nP. S. KAILASAM AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nBombay Soiro Tax Act 1959-Ss. 33(b) a11d 35(1)~Bombay Sale>' Tax Act, 1953-S. 14(b) validity of-lf offend Art. 14 of the Co11.rt1tufiun- Procedure under s. 33(b) if more onerous than the procedure under 1. 35,.\n\nSection 33(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1959 provides that if the CP1nmissioner of Sales Tax has reason to believe that a dealer i.~ liable to pay tnx bul has failed to apply for registration within the time as rcquited by s. 22, the Con1mhsioner shall assess to the best of his judgrnnt the au1ount Of tax due from the dealer in respect of such period and any period subsequent\n\nthereto.\n\nSection 35(1) provides that if the C'ornmission,:r has reason to believe that any turnover chargeabl'e to tax has esaped assessment he may proceed to assess or re-assess the amount of tax due, as the case nw.y be.\n\nSection 14(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 provides that if the Collector is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay the tax in respect of any period he shall assess to th'e best of his judgment the amount of tax from the dealer.\n\nSection 15 of the 1953 Act provides that if the Collector is satisfied that any turnover has escaped assess1ncnt he may proceed to assess or re-assess the an1ount of tax.\n\nIn C.A. 287/72 the Sales Tax Officer after isuing notice.; under s. 14(6) of 1953 Act to the erstwhile partners of the asses'iee firlll af(er its dissolution to show cause why they should not be assessed to tax and \\vhy a penalty should not be imposed on them for not getting themselves registered under the Act made a best judgment assessment under s. 33(6) of the 1959 Act and imposed a penalty. In C.A. Nos. 289/72 am! 290/72 the Sales Tax Officer made a best judgment ass'ess.ment and imposed penalty under s. 36(2) on account of the assessees' failure to get their respective firms regstered as dealers under the Act.\n\nRelying mainly on the judgment of this Court in Anandji llari Das & Co.\n\nv. S. P. Kasture & Ors. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 565) and Ghanshyan1das \\. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 766), the High Court held that the provisions of ss. 33(6) and 35 of the 1959 Act overlap each other and that s. 33(6) offends Art. 14 of the Constitution and as such\n\nis void because all cases of escapement of assessment by a dealer can be dealt with at the sweet will of the assessing authority under either of these provisions, that the procedure provided ins, 33(6) was more onerous than the one provided in s. 35 inasmuch as, unlike the latter section, no perio<l of limitation had been provided for taking action under s. 33(6), that no guidelines had been provided and that the choice of one procedure in preference to the other is left to the arbitrary whim of the' assessing authority.\n\n,,.. .\n\n....\n\nr \\\n\nGUJARAT V. P. R. DHANBHAI 789\n\nJn the second batch of cases the assessees were unregistered dealers who A were assessed under s. 14(6) of the, 1953 Act. Following the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which held that s. 14(6) of the 1933 Act was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and therefore void, the Sales tax Tribunal directed the orders passed by the aflsessing authorities be set a!ld.e.\n\nIt w.u contended on behalf of the State Governments that s. 33(6) is a B special provision confined to an unregistered dealer, who is guilty of committing a two-fold violation of the: law enacted in that provisio11, that the special provisi\"n excludes the application of the general provision ins. 35(1) and the case of unregistered dealer who escapes assessment on account of his failure to get himself registered, that the case of Anandii Hari Das C;:. Co. was distinguishable because that was a case of a registered dealer whil~ the cases on hand were cases of unregistered dealers and that the procedure provided in C s. 33(6) is not more onerous than the one prescribed undr s. 35.\n\nAUo\\\\ing the appeaols,\n\nHELD: I. Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act and s. 14(6) of the 1953 Act do not violate ArL 14 of the Constitution and are valid.\n\n[801C]\n\n2. Section 33(6) is, in terms, restricted in its application to the case of an D unregistered dealer whose modus operandi to evade tax involves ab .initio dis- • regard of the law. It does not apply to a registered dealer who has escaped 38.!essment or has bee~1 under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate or has been wrongly allowed any deductions or has concealed any material particulars relating to sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns. The case of such a registered dealer will fall under s. 35 and not under CJ. 33(6).\n\nSection 33(6) is a special provision confined to a pa.rticular ciass of tax-evaders, E namely, unregistered dealers; while s. 35 is a general provision to deal with cases of escapEd assessment or under-assessment.\n\nGeneralia special!buv nor. dt:rogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It mean'3 that the genera] provisions must always yield to the special provisions. Construed in accordance with this fundamental principle the special class of unregistered dealers covered by s. 33(6) must be, taken to have been excluded from the purview of the general proYisions in s. 35. Thus considered, it is clear that in the ce of an F unregistered dealer who evades tax by committing the double default qpecified ins. 33(6), action can be taken only under that section and not under s. 35.\n\nl799D-FJ\n\n3. Putting the umegistered dealer v;:ho, though liable to pay tax, fails to get himself registered and does not pay any tax in a separate class to be dealt with under s. 33 (6) differently from other dealers falling under s. 35. rests on inteJligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of p1'Cventing tax G evasion. Though no limitation has been prescribed for taking action under s. 33(6) against an unregistered dealer fa.Hing thereunder there i'3 rational basis for not putting any restriction as to the length of tima ~..-itb.in \\Vhich action can be taken under s. 33 (6). The reason is that tax evasion by the unregitered dealers in this class because of the clandestine modus operandi adopted by them, and wholesale disregard of the law, is more contumacious in character, more sinister in its effect both on the Iawabiding tax-payers anil the collection\n\nII of public revenue, and more difficult to detect than tax-evasion by a. registered dealer. When a dealer applies for and obtains a registration certificate under\n\nthe Act, he thereby admits his liability to pay tax.\n\nIn his case the Sales-tax Authorities have basic information in pursuance of which thef can, by the exercise 0f due vigilance, check and detect any tax-evasion by him within reasonable time. This reasonable time is the period of limitation fixed by the Legislature in s. 35. But the case of a tax-evading unregistered dealer is different. In his case, the Authorities have on their record no basic information such as the registration record which would supply them a 'lead' to work upon.\n\nFor lack of information and the secrative nature of the modus operandi, tax .. evading activities of an unregistered dealer may go on undetected for years on end. That is why for taking action under s. 33 (6) against a tax-evadina unregistered dealer, the Legislature has not fixed any period uf limitation.\n\n[SOOD; 799 G-Hl\n\n4. The procedure provided in s. 33(6) cannot be said to be more onerous than the one specified in s. 35. The requirement as to issue of a notice to the defaulter and giving an opportunity of being heard, is a CQmtn'Jn feature of both the sections. Although under s. 33(6) the assessment is made on best judgn1c:nt basis, it cannot be made arbitrarily or capriciously. It bas to be made after taking into account all relevant material gathered by the Taxation\n\nOfficer or produced before him by the assessee in response to the notice. If an assessment under s. 33(6) is made upon inadequate materials, but on honest and fair guess-work, then it will be but due to the deliberate default of the assessee in supplying the necessary information, 'The differrential mode of assessment under s. 33 (6) is thus founded upon rational criteria.\n\n[SOOE-0]\n\n5. The ratio of Anandji Haridas is not applicable to the facts of the present cases. 'fhe former was dealing with a registered dealer whereas the instant case is concerned with unregistered dealers. Upon a proper construction of the two provisions, such unregistered dealers can be proceeded again.;; t under s. 33(6) of the 1959 Act or s. 14(6) of the 1953 Act and not under s. 35 or s. 15 of the respective Acts. There is no over-lapping between these two because s. 35 cannot be applied to the case of an unrgistered dealer falling within the purview of the special provisions in s. 33(6). Thilj w&~ clear from s. 35(2) as it stood at the time material to tliese cases.\n\n[SOOH]\n\nAnandii Hari Das & Co. v. S. P. Kasture & Ors.\n\nA.I.R.\n\n1968 S.C. 565 and Ghansh)amdas v. Ret?ional Assistant Commissioner of Salts Tax, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1964 S.C, 766 distinguished.\n\nCivn, APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil APPeal Nos. 287-290 of 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 8-7-70 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 191168, 1378/68, 1643/69 and 8/70.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2450-2451/72 H (Appeals by Special Leave from the Order/Judgment dated 19-4-72 of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal in Revision Application Noli. 111 and 112/65.\n\n,... .\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2529 OF 1972\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 13-3-1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1959/71.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 303 OF 1974\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4-7-1973 of the Gujarat High Court in Sales Tax Reference No. 10/71.\n\nR. M. Mehta (287-90, 2529 and 303), M. C. Bhandare (2450-51) V. S. Desai (2450-51) and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in all tho matters.\n\nI. N. Shroff for the Respondents in C.A. 287-90/72 .\n\nR. P. Bhatt and B. R. Agarwala for the Respondents 2450-51/72.\n\nJ. Ramamurthi and Miss R. Vaigai for Re'spondent No. 1 in C.A.\n\nD 2529(72.\n\nM. N. Shroff for the Intervener in C.A. 2450-51172.\n\nThe, Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J .-This judgment will dispose of two batches of appeals.\n\nThe first batch includes Civil Appeals 287 to 290 and 2529 of 1972 and Civil Appeal 303 of 1974 preferred by the State of Gujarat/Sales Tax Officer on the basis of a certificate granted by the High Court. Of this batch,, Civil Appeals 287 to 290 of 1972 are directed against a common judgment, dated July 8, 1970, of the High Court of Gujarat : while Civil Appeal 303 of 1974 i's preferred against a judgment, dated July 4, 1973, of the Gujarat High Court, which follows its earlier decision in Patel Ranjibhai Dh1111bhai & Ors. v. A. S. Tambe, Sales Tax\n\nOfficer, Anand.\n\nThe Second batch comprises of Civil Appeals 2450 and 2451 of 1972 and {, Jvil Appeals 1260 and 1213 of 1975.\n\nThey have been preferred by the State of Maharashtra after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. Of these, the first two are directed against an Order dated April 19, 1972, of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal wl11ch, in turn, is based on a judgment, dated October 11/12, 1971, of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 444 of 1968 (B. M.\n\nJain v. State of Maharashtra), and the other two are directed against a judgment dated October 11/12, 1971 of the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThe common question posed for our decision in all these appeals is, whether any of the provisions in Sections 33(6) and 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 1959 Act) which are in pari materia with Sections 14(6) and 15, respectively, of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the 1953 Act), offend Article 14 of the Constitution and, as snch, are void.\n\nThe High Courts[I'ribunal in the concerned appeals have answered this question in affirmative, so far as Section 33(6) of 1959 Act/14(6) of 1953 Act is concerned.\n\nFIRST BATCH\n\nFacts in C.A. 287 /72 The facts in the Writ Petition (S.C.A. No. 191 of 1968), from which C.A. 287 /72 has arisen, are that writ petitioners 1, 4 and 6 (respondents herein) were running business in partnership under the name of 'The Laxmi Vijay Saw Mill' from November 2, 1955 to October 31, 1959.\n\nFrom November 1, 1959, writ petitioners 1 to 7 together with one Patel Muljibhai Bemjibhai, formed another partnership and executed a deed to that effect on February l, 1960.\n\nThis partnership was dissolved on November 10, 1964.\n\nOn November 13,. 1964, the Sales Tax Officer, Anand, was informed about this dissolution.\n\nOn November 11, 1965, the Sales Tax Officer issued notices in Form No. 13 under Section 14 of the 1953 Act, requiring the erstwhile partner's to show-cause why they should not be assessed under sub-section\n\n(6) of Section 14 of the said Act, and why a penalty on account of their failure to get their firm registered, when they were liable to pay tax, be not imposed.\n\nThese notices covered the period from April 1, 1955 to December 31, 1959.\n\nIn reply to the notices, the respondents contended that since !lie old partnership formed in 1955 and the new partnership formed on November 1, 1959, had both been dissolved, the proposed action was illegal, there being no machinery under the 1953 Act to oassess a dissolved firm. A further objection was raised that the assessment proposed was time-barred.\n\nAt this stage, the respondents moved the High Court by a petition (S.C.A. 191/68) under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging that the turn-over of the business during the relevant period, never exceeded the limit of Rs. 900/- in the past and, therefore, the question of their incurring liability to get the firm registered as a dealer and to file salestax returns under the 1959 Act, did not arise.\n\nDuring the pendency of this writ petition, on September 9, 1968, the Sales Tax Officer assessed the writ-petitioners under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act on 'best judgment' basis, and an amount of R's. 9,771.45\n\n,...\n\n• . .\n\n'( .........\n\nl .:\n\nwas determined as tax arrears and a further amount of Rs. 10,000/- was A imposed as penalty.\n\nA notice making demand of both these amounts was also issued on September 12, 1959.\n\nFacts of C.A. 289 /72.\n\nThe writ petitioner, respondent herein, i's carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling wooden boxes, bamboos, timber etc. under the name of M/s. Manila! Ranchoddas at Kaloi. On Ju!te 1, 1965, he was served with a notice under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act, by the Sales Tax Officer to show cause why he should not be assessed on best- Judgment basis for the period from January 1,, 1960 to June 31, 1964 and further with penalty on account of his failure to get himself registered.\n\nThereafter, on August 7, 1965, the Sales Tax Officer completed the 'best-Judgment' assessment.\n\nHe further imposed a penalty nuder Section 36(2) on the assessee on account of his failure to get the firm registered as a dealer.\n\nThe assessee,'s appeal was partly allowed by the Assessment Commissi<; mer of Sales Tax on November 10, 1967, only so far as the question of penalty was concerned.\n\nThe assessee's second appeal was dismissed by the Sales Tax Tribunal ou April 28, 1969.\n\nFacts of C.A. 290/72.\n\nThe facts in writ petition (S.C.A. 8/70) giving rise to Civil Appeal 290 of 1972, are that the petitioner did not get itself registered as a dealer under the 1959 Act. The business of the petitioner consisted of taki'ng catering contracts from the Railway Administration. The Sales\n\nTax Officer served a notice in Form No. 27 under Section 33 on March 25, 1969, requiring the writ petitioner to show cause why action be not taken against him under Section 33(~) of the 1959 Act, as applicable in the State of Gujarat, for assessing the petitioner oti 'best-Judgment' basis for the period from March 1, 1960 to February 28, 1969.\n\nThe respondent herein sent a reply to this notice denying his liability\n\nto get himself registered as a dealer.\n\nWhile the matter was still pend- G ing before the Sales Tax Officer, the respondent moved the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, impugning the action proposed to be taken or actually taken against him under the provisions of Sections 33(6) and 36(2) of the 1959 Act.\n\nBy a common judgment, dated July 8, 1970, the Gujarat High H Court held that the provisions of Sections 33 ( 6) and 35 overlap each other\" because all cases of escapement of assessment by a dealer can\n\n12-JJOSCI/79\n\nbe dealt with at the sweetwill of the as'sessing authority under either of these provisions; that a dealer who is subjected to the procedure provided in Section 33 ( 6) will find it more onerous than the ooo in Section 35 inasmuch as unlike the latter Section, no period of limitation has been provided for taking action under Section 33 ( 6). No guidelines\n\nhave been provided and the choice of one procedure in preference to the other, is left to the arbitrary whim of the assessing authority. On this reasoning, the High Court held that Section 33(6) offends Article 14 of the Constitution and as such is void.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion, the High Court relied mainly upon this Court's decision in Anandji Hari\n\nDas & Co. v. S. P. Kasture & Ors.( 1) It also drew support from this ,_... c Court's decision in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner-~ of Sales Tax, Nagpur( 2).\n\nFacts in C.A. 2529 of 1972.\n\nThis appeal is directed against a judgment, dated March 13, 1972, of th~ Gujarat High Court, whereby it, following its earlier decision, dated D July 8, 1970, in writ petition 1378 of 1968, quashed the assessment of the respondents herein, for the period, January 1, 1960 to April 5, 1964 on the ground that Section 33(6) under which it was made, was wiolative of the equality clau5e contained in Article 14 of the Omstitution, and as such, void.\n\nSECOND BATCH :\n\nFacts in C. As. 2450-2451 of 1972.\n\nIn these two cases, the respondent was assessed as an unregistered dealer under Section 14(6) of the Bombay Sales Ta-.: Act, 1953, for F the period from 1.11.52 to 31.3.54 and from 1.4.54 to 24.4.56.\n\nIn Revision, the Maharashtra Sale5 Tax Tribunal, following the decision, dated October 12, 1971, of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A.\n\nNo. 444 of 1968 (Bhikamchand Moolchand Jain v. A. G. Saudagar &\n\nAnr.) held that Section 14(6) is ultra vires the Constitution, and directed that the orders passed by the assessing authorities be set aside and if the applicant had paid anything in compliance with those orders, the 'same may be refunded.\n\nIn Balmokand Jain's case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, feeling itself bound by the ratio of this Court's decision in Anandii's case (ibid), held that Section 14(6) of the Bombay Act of 1953 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore void.\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1968 SC 565.\n\n(2\\ A.I.R. 1%4 SC 766.\n\nFacts in C. As. 1206 and 1213 of 1975.\n\nThese appeals by special leave arise out of a writ petition S.C.A. 444 of 1968 and Misc. Petition 330 of 1971, filed in the High Court of Bombay, which were disposed of by that Court by its judgments, dated 11/12 October, 1971 and October 12, 1971, respectively.\n\nThe writ petitioner/respond•ent herein was not at any time material to the case,\n\n-.- registered as a dealer either under the 1953 Act or under the 1959 Act.\n\nThe relevant periods of assessment are, April 1, 1956 to December 31, 1959, the period being covered by the 1953 Act, and January 1, __ 1960 to September 30, 1967, being the period covered by the 1959 \" Act.\n\nOn September 19, 1967, a notice under Section 14(6) of the t'1.953 Act was served on the respondent.\n\nOn November 22, 1967, ano, ther notice under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act was served on him.\n\nThereafter on November 22, 1967,, an order was made against him in • respect of the first period, levying a tax in the sum of Rs. 13,696.65 and a penalty under Section 14('7) in the sum of Rs. 4,500/-.\n\nOn January 30, 1968,, another assessment order was made which was in respect o~ the second period levying tax in the sum of RS. 17,887/- and a penalty under Section 36(2) (a) in the sum of Rs. 3001and under Section\n\n3f;(2)(c) in the sum of Rs. 500/-.\n\nIn his writ pe•ition, the respondent challenged the validity of these two as'sessment orders, on the ground that Section 14(6) and Section 33(6) of the aforesaid Acts of 1953 and 1959 be.ing violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, were void.\n\nFollowing the ratio of th.is Court's decision in Anandji's case, the High Court, accepted the respondent's contention and quashed the impugned assessments.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants submits that the Gujarat High Court was in error in holding that the provisions of Sections 33 ( 6) {and 35 of the Act of 1959 overlap each other; that it overlooked the\n\nmet that upon its very language, Section 33 ( 6) is a special provision confined to an unregistered dealer who is guilty of committing the two-fold violation of law indicated in that provision; that the special provision by inevitable implication excludes the application of the general provision in Section 35 ( l) to the case of an unregistered dealer who escapes assessment on account of his failure to get himself registered and failure to file a return.\n\nCounsel has further • submitted that Anandji Haridas is distinguishable inasmuch as that was a case of a registered dealer. While all the instant cases out of which these ppeals have arisen, are of unregistered dealers of the category specified in Section 33 ( 6).\n\nIt is submitted that putting unregistered dealers who escape assessment by the modus operandi ...\n\nmentioned in Section 33(6), in a separate class to be dealt with, under that provision, rests on rational criteria having a direct nexus . with the object of preventing tax evasion.\n\nAccording to Mr. Bhandare, the procedure provided in Section 33(6} is not more onerous than the one prescribed for taking action under Section 35.\n\nTax-evasion, proceeds the argument, by the modus operandi of the kind stated in Section 33(6), is of a more sinister kind and may go on for years an end without detection.\n\nThat is why, says the counsel, no limitation is provided for taking action under Section 33(6). ,,- On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents haw- C substantially reiterated the same reasons in support of the judgments ~· under appeal, which have been given by the High Courts.\n\nBefore dealing with these contentions, it is necessary to notice the material provisions of the 1959 Act and the 1953 Act.\n\nSubsection (5) of Section 2 of 1959 Act defines an 'unauthorised dealer' to mean \"a registered dealer who holds an Authorisation.\" 'Authorisation' means an \"authorisation granted under Section 24.\" 'Dealer' under sub-section ( 6) of the same Section is defined to mean \"any person who carries on the business of selling or buying goods in the pre-Reorganisation State of Bombay, excluding the transferred territories, whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and inclndes a State Government which carries on snch business and any society, club or association which sells goods to or buys goods from its members\".\n\nThen, there is an 'Exception' appended to this definition which excludes an agriculturist who sells exclusively agricultural produce grown on land cultivated by him personally, from the definition.\n\nThe definition of 'Dealer' in Section 2(6) of the 1953 Act is\".,_ substantially the same. /\n\nSub-section (i) of Section 22 of the 1959 Act requires that no dealer shall, while. being liable to pay tax, carry on business as a G dealer unless he possesses a valid certificate of registration under this Act.\n\nSub-sectiort (2) obligates every dealer who is liable to pay tax to apply for a certificate of registration in the prescribed manner to the pr68cribe<l nuthority within the prescribed time.\n\nSections 33(6) and 35 of the 1959 Act read as follows:\n\nH \"S. 33(6). If the Commissioner has reason to believe that a dealer is liable to pay tax in respect of any period, but has failed to apply for registration within time as re-\n\n-{_\n\nquired by Section 22, the Commissioner shall, after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess, to the best of his judgment the amount of tax, if any, due from the dealer in respect of such period; and any period subsequent thereto.\"\n\n\"S. 35 (I). If the Commissioner has reason to believe that , any turnover of sales or turnover of purchases of any goods chargeable to tax under this Act has in respect of any year escaped assessment, or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate, or that any deductions have been wrongly made, then the Commissioner may,\n\n(a) where such turnover has escaped assessment or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate by reason of the fact that the provisions of sub-section ( 1) 0f section 2 of the Bombay Sales Tax (Validating Provision;;) Act, 1957 were not then enacted, at any time within eight years,\n\n(b) where be bas reason to believe that the dealer bas concealed such sales or purchases or any material particular\n\nrelating thereto, or bas knowingly furnished incorrect re-- ' turns, at any time within eight years, and ( c) in any other case, at any time within five years of the end of the year, serve on the dealer liable to pay tax in respect of such turnover, a notice containing all or any of the requisitions which may be included in a notice under sub-section (3) of section 33 and may proceed to assess or re-assess the amount of the tax due from such dealer; and accordingly, the other provision of this Act shall apply as if the notice were a notice served under that sub-section:\n\nProvided that the amount of tax shall be assessed at the rates at which it would have been assessed bad there been no under-assessment or escapement, but after making\n\ndeductions, if any, pennitted from time to time by or under this Act :\n\nProvided further that, where in respect of such turnover an order has already been passed in appeal or revision under this Act, the Commissioner shall make a report to the appropriate appellate or revising authority under this Act, which shall thereupon after giving the dealer concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such order as it deems fit.\n\n(2) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall apply to any proceeding (including any notice issued) under section 33 or 57 or 6;!.\n\n(3) Nothing in section 57 or 62 shall affect a proceeding under this section.\"\n\nThe corresponding provisions of the Act of 1953 run as under:-\n\n\"S. 14(6). If upon information which has come into his possssion, the Collector is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay the tax in respect of any period, but has failed to apply for registration, the Collector shall, after giving the dealer reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess to the best of his judgment the amount of tax, if any. due from the dealer in respect of such period and all subsequent periods.\"\n\n\"S. 15. If in consequence of any information which has come into his possession the Collector is satisfied that any turnover in respect of sales or purchase of any goods chargeable to the tax has escaped assessment in any year or has been under assessed or assessed at a lower rate or any deductions have been wrongly made therefrom, the Collector may, in any case where he has reason to believe that the dealer has concealed the particulars of such sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns, at any time within five years, and in any other case, at any time within three years, of the end of that year, serve on the dealer liable to pay the tax in respect of such turnover a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (3) of section 14 and may proceed to assess or re-assess the amount of the tax due from such dealer and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice served under that sub-section :\n\nProvided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, the Bombay Sales Tax (No. 2) Ordinance, 1952, and this Act, as the case may be, at the rates at which it would have been as&essed had the turnover n.ot escaped assessment or full B assessment, as the case may be :\n\nProvided further that where in respect of such turnover or deduction, as the case may be, an order has already been\n\npassed under section 30 or section 31, the Collector shall make a report to the appropriate appellate or revising authority, as the case may be, which shall thereupon after giving the dealer concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such order as it deems fit.\"\n\nAn' analysis of Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act (corresponding to Section 14(6) of the 1953 Act) will show that it applies to that particular class of dealers, liable to pay tax, who -\n\n(i) fail to apply for registration as required by Jaw (vide Section 22); and\n\n(ii) who fail to pay the tax in respect of any period. c\n\nThus, Section 33(6) is, in terms, restricted in its application to the case of an unregistered dealer whose modus operandi to evade tax involves ab initio disregard of the Jaw. It does not apply to i: registered: dealer who has escaped assessment or has been underassessed or assessed at a lower rate or has been wrongly allowed any deduction or has concealed any material particulars relating to sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns. The case of such a registered dealer will fall under Section 35 and not under Section 33(6). Section 33(6) is a special provision confined to a particular class of tax-evaders, namely, unregistered dealers; while 'Section 35 is a general provision to deal with cases of escaped assessment or under assessment.\n\nGeneralia specialibus non derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that the general provisions must always yield to the special provisions.\n\nConstrued in accordance with this fundaniental principle the special class of unregistered dealers covered by Section 3 3 ( 6) must be taken to have been excluded from the purview of the general provisions in Section 35. Thus considered, it is clear that the case of an unregistered dealer who evades tax by committing the double default specified in Section 33(6), action can be taken only under that Section and not under Section 35.\n\nIt is true that no limitation has been prescribed for taking G action under Section 33 ( 6) against an unregistered dealer falling thereunder. But, there is rational basis for not putting any restriction as to the length of time within which action can be taken nnder Section 33 (6). The reason is that tax evasion by the unregistered dealers in thi§ class because of the clandestine modus operandi adopted by them, and wholesale disregard of the law, is more contu- B macious in character, more sinister in its effect both on the lawabiding tax-payers and the collection of public revenue,· and more\n\ndifficult to de, tect than tax-evasion by a registered dealer.\n\nWhen a dealer appliei\\_ for and obtains a registration certificate under the Act, he thereby admits his liability to pay tax.\n\nIn his case, the Sales-tax Authorities, have basic information, in pursuance of which, they can, by the exercise of due vigilence, check and detect any tax-evasion by him within a reasonable time.\n\nThis reasonable time is the period of limitation fixed by the Legislature, in its wisdom, in Section 3S. But the case of a tax-evading unregistered dealer is different. Jn his case, the Authorities have on their record no such basic information such as the registration record which would supply them a 'lead' to work upon.\n\nFor lack of information, or want of adequate staff, resources and time at the disposal of the Department, and the secretive nature of the modus operandi, tax-evading activities of an unregistered dealer may go on undetected for years on end. That is why for taking action under Section 33 ( 6) against a tax-evading unregistered dealer, the Legislature has not fixed any period of limil'ation. Thus, puling the unregistered dealer who, though liable to pay tax, fails to get himself registered and does not pay any tax, in a separate class, to be dealt with under :-ection 33 ( 6), differently from other dealers falling under\n\nSectic; m 35, rests on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of preventing tax-evasion.\n\nThe question of limitation apart, it cannot be said that the procedure provided in Section 33 (6) is more onerous than the one specified in Section 35.\n\nThe requirement as to issue of a notice to the defaulter and giving of an opportunity of being heard, is a common feature of both the sections. It is true that under Section 33 ( 6), the assessment is made on 'best-judgment basis'.\n\nNevertheless, it cannot be made arbitrarily or capriciously. It has to be made after taking into account all relevant material gathered by the Taxation Officer or pro-\n\n_ L... duced before him by the assessee in response to the notice.\n\nIf an /\n\nassessment under Section 33(6) is made upon inadequate materials, but on honest and fair guess-work, then it will be but due to the deliber- -<' ate default of the assessee in supplying the necessary information. The differential mode of assessment under Section 33 ( 6) is thus founded G upon rational criteria.\n\nThe ratio of Anandji Haridas is not applicable to the facts of the present cases.\n\nTherein, this Court was dealing with the case of a registered dealer under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act 194 7. It was in that context that this Court, by a majority of 3 to 2, held that H Section 11(4) (a) of that Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act.\n\nIn our opinion, upo'n a proper construction,\n\nof the two provisions, in juxtaposition to each other, such unregistered dealers can be proceeded against under Section 33(6) of the Bombay Act of 1959 or Section 14(6) of the Bombay Act of 1953, as the case may be, and not under Section 35 / Section 15 of the said Acts.\n\nThere is no overlapping between. these two, because Section 35 cannot be applied to the case of an unregistered dealer falling within the purview of the special provision in Section 33(6).\n\nThis was clear from sub-section (2) of Section 35, as it stood at the time material to these cases.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we. are of opinion that Section 33(6) o[ the 1959 Act and Section 14(6) of the 1953 Act do not violate Article 14 of the Constitution, and are valid.\n\nWe may mention in passing that the question raised with regard to the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions has become largely academic because mostly the impugned notices or assessments were within the period of limitation prescribed for taking action under Section 35 of the 1959 Act. In such cases, the question of subjecting the respondents to a more onerous procedure than the one envisaged in Section 35 in the matter of limitation, docs not arise.\n\nIn the result, we allow these appeal~, set aside the judgment of the High Courts/Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal and send the cases back\n\nto the High Court or the Tribunal concerned, with these directions : E\n\nIn matters in which assessment orders have been passed, it will be open to the respondents to file or refile appeals against the assessment orders or if the respondents have withdrawn any :ippeal filed by them, they will be at liberty to file fresh app_eals.\n\nJn that case, if there is delay in filing or refiling the appeals, the delay will hopefully be con- F1 do'ncd as it is attributed to tbese proceedings.\n\nThe matters remitted to the High Court will be further remitted to the Sales-tax Officer, for disposal.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 2450-2451/72 (Maharashtra appeals) will go back to tlte Sales Tax Tribunal, for decision or merits.\n\nAs already stated above, Civil Appeals Nos. 1213, 1206175, 1023- 1031/73, 2529172 and 303/74 will also be governed by this judgment in Civil Appeals 287-290 of 1972. In all these cases, the parties arc left to pay and bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 215, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATEL RANJIBHAI DHANBHAI & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATEL RANJIBHAI DHANBHAI & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. 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( 6) and 35 overlap each other\" because all cases of escapement of assessment by a dealer can\n\n12-JJOSCI/79\n\nbe dealt with at the sweetwill of the as'sessing authority under either of these provisions; that a dealer who is subjected to the procedure provided in Section 33 ( 6) will find it more onerous than the ooo in Section 35 inasmuch as unlike the latter Section, no period of limitation has been provided for taking action under Section 33 ( 6)."}}, {"text": "Sections 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16594, "end_char": 16605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16868, "end_char": 16878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16926, "end_char": 16936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17042, "end_char": 17052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17255, "end_char": 17268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17277, "end_char": 17287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17943, "end_char": 17956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18032, "end_char": 18042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18215, "end_char": 18228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.11.52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18288, "end_char": 18295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, 1953, for F the period from 1.11.52 to 31.3.54 and from 1.4.54 to 24.4.56."}}, {"text": "31.3.54", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18299, "end_char": 18306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, 1953, for F the period from 1.11.52 to 31.3.54 and from 1.4.54 to 24.4.56."}}, {"text": "1.4.54", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18316, "end_char": 18322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, 1953, for F the period from 1.11.52 to 31.3.54 and from 1.4.54 to 24.4.56."}}, {"text": "24.4.56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18326, "end_char": 18333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, 1953, for F the period from 1.11.52 to 31.3.54 and from 1.4.54 to 24.4.56."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Sale5 Tax Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18353, "end_char": 18383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Revision, the Maharashtra Sale5 Tax Tribunal, following the decision, dated October 12, 1971, of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "October 12, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18415, "end_char": 18431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Revision, the Maharashtra Sale5 Tax Tribunal, following the decision, dated October 12, 1971, of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18550, "end_char": 18563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balmokand Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18778, "end_char": 18792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Balmokand Jain's case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, feeling itself bound by the ratio of this Court's decision in Anandii's case (ibid), held that Section 14(6) of the Bombay Act of 1953 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore void."}}, {"text": "Anandii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18906, "end_char": 18913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Balmokand Jain's case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, feeling itself bound by the ratio of this Court's decision in Anandii's case (ibid), held that Section 14(6) of the Bombay Act of 1953 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore void.", "canonical_name": "Anandii"}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18939, "end_char": 18952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18996, "end_char": 19006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19262, "end_char": 19282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petition 330 of 1971, filed in the High Court of Bombay, which were disposed of by that Court by its judgments, dated 11/12 October, 1971 and October 12, 1971, respectively."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19705, "end_char": 19723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant periods of assessment are, April 1, 1956 to December 31, 1959, the period being covered by the 1953 Act, and January 1,  1960 to September 30, 1967, being the period covered by the 1959 \" Act."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19773, "end_char": 19791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 19, 1967, a notice under Section 14(6) of the t'1.953 Act was served on the respondent."}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19808, "end_char": 19821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19875, "end_char": 19892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 22, 1967, ano, ther notice under Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act was served on him."}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19917, "end_char": 19930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14('7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20127, "end_char": 20141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 30, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20173, "end_char": 20189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 30, 1968,, another assessment order was made which was in respect o~ the second period levying tax in the sum of RS."}}, {"text": "Section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20327, "end_char": 20340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20377, "end_char": 20387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20535, "end_char": 20548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20553, "end_char": 20566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20626, "end_char": 20636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anandji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20719, "end_char": 20726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the ratio of th.is Court's decision in Anandji's case, the High Court, accepted the respondent's contention and quashed the impugned assessments.", "canonical_name": "Anandii"}}, {"text": "Sections 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20945, "end_char": 20956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21066, "end_char": 21076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21333, "end_char": 21343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anandji Haridas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21530, "end_char": 21545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel has further • submitted that Anandji Haridas is distinguishable inasmuch as that was a case of a registered dealer.", "canonical_name": "Anandii Hari Das"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21741, "end_char": 21751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21871, "end_char": 21884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22058, "end_char": 22066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Bhandare, the procedure provided in Section 33(6} is not more onerous than the one prescribed for taking action under Section 35."}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22443, "end_char": 22456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22796, "end_char": 22805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22963, "end_char": 22973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23149, "end_char": 23155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealer' under sub-section ( 6) of the same Section is defined to mean \"any person who carries on the business of selling or buying goods in the pre-Reorganisation State of Bombay, excluding the transferred territories, whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and inclndes a State Government which carries on snch business and any society, club or association which sells goods to or buys goods from its members\"."}}, {"text": "Section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23630, "end_char": 23642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23712, "end_char": 23722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 33(6) and 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24098, "end_char": 24119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24157, "end_char": 24165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24346, "end_char": 24356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24588, "end_char": 24593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25086, "end_char": 25095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25688, "end_char": 25698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26605, "end_char": 26615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26646, "end_char": 26656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26776, "end_char": 26784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27206, "end_char": 27211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28011, "end_char": 28021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28716, "end_char": 28726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28730, "end_char": 28740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28996, "end_char": 29009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29044, "end_char": 29057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29224, "end_char": 29234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29306, "end_char": 29319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "Provided that the amount of the tax shall be assessed after making the deductions permitted from time to time under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29815, "end_char": 29825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29840, "end_char": 29853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29855, "end_char": 29868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29976, "end_char": 29986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30344, "end_char": 30353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30443, "end_char": 30453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30585, "end_char": 30598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30658, "end_char": 30668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30747, "end_char": 30757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30939, "end_char": 30949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31755, "end_char": 31765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32265, "end_char": 32275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32814, "end_char": 32824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32871, "end_char": 32881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33050, "end_char": 33060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33380, "end_char": 33393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33618, "end_char": 33628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33848, "end_char": 33867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33952, "end_char": 33965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Berar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33999, "end_char": 34009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Berar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34031, "end_char": 34112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34273, "end_char": 34286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34316, "end_char": 34329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34391, "end_char": 34401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34404, "end_char": 34414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34486, "end_char": 34496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34608, "end_char": 34621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34663, "end_char": 34673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34776, "end_char": 34789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 14(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34810, "end_char": 34823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34855, "end_char": 34865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Here we are concerned with the cases of unregistered dealers under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35176, "end_char": 35186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35316, "end_char": 35326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts/Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35442, "end_char": 35484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, we allow these appeal~, set aside the judgment of the High Courts/Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal and send the cases back\n\nto the High Court or the Tribunal concerned, with these directions : E\n\nIn matters in which assessment orders have been passed, it will be open to the respondents to file or refile appeals against the assessment orders or if the respondents have withdrawn any :ippeal filed by them, they will be at liberty to file fresh app_eals."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_78_168_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC. v.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ' February 9, 1979\n\nB. [V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. P~ SEN, JJ.j\n\nP.enal Cod~. 302---Scope of-Death Sentence-When should &e awartled.\n\n(Per majority-Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ.)\n\nI. The only question before the Court is a& to when and why shall capital puriishment be pronounced on a murderer and why not in other cases, within the confines of the Code.\n\nUrgency to the solution is obvious. The overt ambivalence and covert conflict among judges concerning continued rort k> the death sentence mirrors the uncertainties and conflict& of valuei in the community itself. [89G & 90D]\n\n2. Section 302 of the !PC throws little light on when the CO!lrt mall blang the seQ.tence of why the lesser penalty shall be preferred. Since Jaw reflects life. new meanings must permeate the Penal Code. Deprivation of life under our system is too fundamental . to be . permitted except on the gravCit ground and under the s, trictest scrutiny. [90F; 94C-D]\n\n3. To say that discretion of the Judge passiD.g the sentence under s. 302 !PC is guided by well-recognised principles shifts the issue to what thooe recognised rules. are. The big margin 0£ subjectivism. a preference fbr old precedents, theories of modem penology, behavioral emphasis or social an~\n\ncedents, judicial hubris or human ri&hts perspectives, reverence for outworn social philosophers-this plurality of forces play• a part in swinin& the pendulum of sentencing justice erratically. Until Parliament speaks, this Court cannot be silent. [95E; 9701\n\n4. Executive commutation is no substitute for judicial justice, at best it is administrative policy and at worst pressure-based partiality. The criteria for clemency are often different. [99C]\n\n5. In so far as s. 302 !PC is concerned several attempts had been made to restrict or remove dCath penalty but never to enlarge -its Bpplication. Parliamentary pressure has been to cut down death penalty, atthongh the section.\n\nformally remains the same. In the case of the Criminal Procedure Code the legislative development has shifted the punitive centre of gravity from life taldng to life sentence. In other words, the legislative trend seeml!l to be while formerly the rule was to sentence to death a person who is C-Onvicted for murder, it is now to impose a lesser sentence for reasons to be recorded in writing. Formerly, capital punishment was to be imposed unless special reasons could be found to justify the lesser sentence. After 1955 courts, were left equally free to award either sentence. The 1973 Code has made an unmistakable shift in legislative emphasise under which life imprisonment for murder is the rule and dapital sentence the exception for rc.uons to be stated. [IO!D; 104B-C]\n\n,.,.\n\n...\n\n... ..\n\n\" -'i\n\nRAJENDRA V. U.P. STATE 79\n\n6. Ct'iminologists al]. the world over, however, argued that death has deci..\n\nA 11ively lost the battle, and even in our Codes it has 'Shrunk into a, weak excep\n\ntion.\n\nWhat are the exceptional cases ?\n\nPersonal story of an actor in a shockingmurder, if considered, may bring tears and soften the serttence. He\n\nmi, aht have been a tortured child, an -ill-treated 'orphan, a jobless man or the <>onvict's poverty might be responsible for the crime.\n\n[106G; 107B]\n\n7. In the post Constitution periods. 302 IPC and s. 345(3) o( the Cr. P.C. llave to be relld in the humane light of Parts III and IV illumined by the Prumble to the Constitution. In other words the sacrifice of a life sentence is sanctioned only if otherwise public interest and social defence and public •rder would be smashed .irretrievably. Such extraordinary grounds alone\n\n~ -constitutionally qualify a.si special r'easons.\n\nOne stroke of murder hardly quali- L-..., fies for this drastic requirement, however gruesome the killing may be. The 'r 1CArching question the Judge' must put to himself is what is so-extra-ordinari- .,( IJ reas:onab1e as to validate the wiping out of life itself and with it the great • rig\\lt• which inhere in him in the totality of facts. [121F; llOEFJ\n\n8 .. The retributive theory has had its day and is no longer valid. Deterr•nceand reformation are the primary s6cial s.oals which make deprivation of life and liberty reasonable as penal penacea. [122C]\n\n9. The current ethos, with its strong emphasis en human rights and against D, tiefl.th penalty, together with the ancient strains of culture spanning the period from Buddh_~ to Gandhi must ethically inform the concept of social justice whiclt is a paramom:lt principle and cultural paradigm of our Constitution.\n\n[122C-D]\n\n10'. The personal and social, the motivational and physical circumstances, •f :the riminal are relevant factors in adjudging the penalty as clearly provided for under the Code of 1973.\n\nSo also the intense suffering alretldy endured 9y prison torture or agonishing death penalty hanging over head consequent on the Jen! process. T122DEJ\n\n11. Although the somewbat obsolescent Mc'Naughten Rules codified in s. 84 of tile Penal Code alone are exculpatory, mental imbalances, neurotic upsets and psychic crises may \"e extenu3rory and the sense of diminished responsibility may manifest itself in judicial , clemency of commuted life incar ceration. [122FJ\n\n12. The social justice which the Preamble and Part IV (Art. 38) highlight, as paramount in the governance of the country has a role to mould the\n\nentence. If the murderous operation of a die-hard criminal jeopardizes social security in a persistent, planned and perilous fashion then his enjoy ment of fundamental rights may be rightly annihilated. One test for impORition of death sentence is to find out whether the murderer offers such a traumatic threat to the survival of social order. Some of the principles 81'enever hang unless society or its members may lose more lives by keeping :alive an irredeemable convict. Therefore social justice projected by Art. 38\n\ncolours the concept of reaso_nableness in Art. 19 and non-arbitrariness in Art. 14. This complex of articles validates death penalty in limited cases.\n\nMaybe trin dacoity and bank robbery bandits reaching menacing proportio11S, -economic offenders profit killing in an intehtional and organised way, a.re 90.ch. categories in a Third World setting. [112D; 114C; 112Gl\n\n: '¢:\n\n13. Survival of an orderly society without which the extinction of .huilllllJ rights is a probability compels the higher protection of the law to those officers who are charged with the fearless and risky discharge of hazardous duties. in strategic situations. Those officers of law, like policemen on duty or soldiers and the like have to Perform their functions even in the face of threat of violence, sometimes in conditions of great handicap., If they are killed by desig11ers of murder and the law does not express its strong condemnation B in extreme penalisation, justice to those called upon to· defend justice may fail.\n\nThis facet of social justice also may in certain circumstances nnd at certain stages of societal life demand death sentence.\n\n[123D-E]\n\n14. Special reasons necessary for imposing death penalty must relate not \"- to the crime as such but ti:> the criminal. [124E] ,,_\n\nJagmohan Singh v. State of U .P., [1973] 1 sec 20; Ediga Annama v. State of A.P., [1974] 4 SCC, 443; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., J1978] 4 sec ' 494 at 569 & 572; referred to. (·\n\nCapital punishment in India; The Impact of the Ediga Anamma, by Prof ..\n\nA. R .. Blackshield-(July 1977), referred to.\n\nRajendra Prasad' s case :\n\nThe family to which the iappellant and the deceased belonged were 011 inimical terms. - The appellant who was the son of one of the families murder .. ed the deceased. After some years in the prison, he was released on Gandhi Jayanti day.\n\nOn return some minor incident ignited his latent feud and he: stabbed to death a friend of the opposite family, he woo: sentenced to death.\n\nThe secOnd murder is not to be confounded with the persistent potentiar for murderous attacks by the murderer. This was not a menace to the social order but a specific family feud. Here was not a youth of ccntrollable violent propensities against the comm.unity but one whose paranoid preoccupation with a family quarrel goaded him to go the rival. So long as thetherapeutic processes are absent from prisons these institutions, for from bein&' the healing hope of society, prove hardening schools to train desperate~ criminals. Desperate criminal is a convenient description to brand a person.\n\nSeldom is the other side of the story exposed to judicial view. There is noth:- ing on record to suggest that the appellant was beyond redemption;. nothing on record hints at any such attempt inside the prison.\n\nThe appellant showed no incurable disposition to violent outbursts against his feUow-men ..\n\nThere is therefore, no special reason to hang him. He should be awarded life:\n\nimprisonment.\n\n\" Kunjukunju's case :\n\nThe appellant, a married man with tWo children, developed illicit sex relations with a fresh girl. In order to win her hand he murdered his wife-. and two Children. Th\\'re is no evidence to show that he was a dperate hedonist or randy rapist. He is not a social security risk altogether beyond! salvage by therapeutic life sentence.\n\nDeath sentence is commuted to life imprilonme:Dt.\n\nB Dubey\"s case :\n\n.The appellant, a young man, aged about 20, stabbed to dct>th three members of the family with whom his family had a quarrej over partition of\n\nRAJBNDRA V. U.P. STATE 81\n\nproperty. It is illegal in this case to award capital sentence without considering A correctional possibilities inside prison. He wtts not a murderer born but made by the passion of fan1ily quarrel.\n\nHe could be saved for society with correctional techniques , and directed into repentance. A family feud, an altercation,. ai sudden passion, although :.attended with extraordinary cruelty, young and malleable age, reasonable prospect of reformation and absence of any conclusive circumstance that the assailant is a habitual murderer or given to chronic violence-these. catena of circumstances bearing on the offender B call for the lesser sentence.\n\nSen J, (DissentJnR)\n\n1. (a) It .is constitutionally and legally impermissible for the Supreme Court while helai_iug an appeal by special leave under Art. 13'6 of the Constitutionj on a question of sentence, to restructure s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or s. 354, sub-s. (J) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, so as to limit the scope of the sentenCe of death provided for the offence of murder under s. 302. [13 IF-Gl\n\n(b) The question whether the scope of the death sentence should be curtailed or not, is one for the arliament to decide. The matter is essentially\n\nof political expediency and, as such, it is the concern of statesmen and, thereforej properly the domain of the legislature, not the j'udiciary.\n\n[137E] D\n\n(c) In an appeal confined to sentence under Article 136 of, the Constitution, Supreme Court has not only the power but as well as the duty to interfere if it considers that 1he appeJlant should be sentenced 'differently', that is, to set aside the sentence of death and substitute in its place the sentence of impriSonment for life, where it considers, taking the case as a Whole, the sentence of death tobe erroneous, excessive or indicative of an E improper exercise of discretion; but at the same time, the Court must impose some limitations on itself in the exercise of this broad power. In dealing with a sentence which has been made the subject of an appeal, the Court will interfere with a sentence only where it is erroneous in principle'.· The question, therefore, in each case is whether there is an 'error of principle' in\n\nvolved.\n\n[1340-H]\n\n(d) The Court has the duty to see that on the particular facts and circumstances of each case the punishment fits the crime. Mere compassionate sentiments of a humane feelings cannot be a sufficient reason for. not confirming a sentence of death but altering it into a sentence of imprisonment for life. In awarding sentence, the Court must, las it should, concern itself with justice, that is, with unswerving obedience to established law.\n\nIt is, and must be, also concerned with the probable effect of its sentence both on the general public and the culprit. Judges are not concerned \"ith the morales or ethics of a punishment. It is but their duty to administer the law as it is and not to say what it should be. It is not the intention of the Supreme Court to curtail thescope of the death sentence under s. 302 by a process of judicial construction inspired by the personal . views. rt35B: !37D\"El\n\n2. It it also not legally permissible for this Court while hearing an appeal in a particular case where a capital sentence is imposed, to define the expreBsion \"special 'reasons\" occurring in sub-s. (3) of s. 354 of the Code, in such\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 ji.C.R.\n\n& manner by a process of judicial interpretation, which virtually has the effect ot abolishing the death sentence. [l 37H]\n\n(a) Under s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the .Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, tho Court is required to state the reasons for a sentence awarded, and in the cue of imposition of a sentence of death the Judge has to record \"special reasons\" for imposing death sentence. Punishment for n1urder as a rule should B be life imprisonment and death sentence is only an exc'Wtion. [159A]\n\n(b) It is neither feasible nor legally permissible for this Court to give + :a definite connotation to the expression \"special reasons\" occurring in s. 354\n\n•ub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is difficult to put 4\n\n11ipecial reasons\" in a straight-jacke~. Each case must depend on its own .,_ particular facts. The question of senence must be left to the discretion of the ~-----( Seasions Judge trying the accused. Under the present Code, a trial for murder - is divided into two stages. There is. a bifurcated trial. The first part of the ' \\._ __ trial is directed solely to the issue of guilt or innocence, and concludes with ( the finding of the Sessions Judge on that issue. At the end of the trial when he omes to a conclusion of guilt, he has to adjourn the case for hearing the accused on the question of sentence. [159CD]\n\nSection 235, sub-s. (2) of the Code specifical!y provides for an opportunity of hearing to the accused on the question of sentence after a verdict of guilt ia recorded against him. The burden is upon the prosecution to make out a case for igiposition of the extreme penalty. Where a sentence of death ii passed, the Sessions Jtidge has to make a reference to the High Court under s. 366, sub-s. (1) of the Code. Under s. 367, sub-s. (I) if the High Court t}1inks a further inqlliry should be made into, or additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make such inquiry OP. take such evidence itself, or direct it to be made or taken by the Court of Sessions. Jn a case subm'itted under s. 366, the High Court under s. 368(a) may either confirm the sentence, or pass any other eentence, i.e. \"reduce the sentence of death into a sentence of imprisonment for life. Thereafter an appeal 1ies to this Court by a special leave under Article 136 on the question of sentence. [159&H]\n\nFailing the appeal, there is the President's power to grant reprieve and pardon under Article 72(1), as wen the Governor's power of commutation under Article 161 of the ConstitutiOn which is a sovereign function.\n\nThe power of the President and of the Governor to grant reprieves and pardons is wide enough to include the power to commute land to remit sentence of punishment. All cases of capital punishment are closely scrutinised by the Executive at both the levels to see whether there are such extenuating circumstances as would justify a reprieve, and the power to commute a death sentence is freely exercised, whenever there is some doubt as to the severity of the punishmeot. Under the present system the Prerogative of Mercy in the case of persons under senterice of death works well and it produces reSults generally regarded as satisfactory.\n\nIt helps in mitigating the rigour of the death sentence, particularly in case of those murderers whose execution would offend the public conscience. Very few persons under a sentence of death-may be one or two in a _year, in, a State are usually executed. It is, therefore, not proper for the Court to trench . upon the President's or the Governors preroc•tive to grant pardon or reprieve under Articles 72(1) and 161 in taking\n\nRAJENDRA V. U.P. STATE 83\n\n>- . 'Upon itself the task of commutation of a death sentence, which is properly\n\nA \"· imposed, in the facts and circumstances , of a particular case, merely because there is a. doubt that the Executive may commute the sentence ultimately, or < by ones vi\"\"' as to the utility. of death penalty. [!60A-E]\n\n...\n\nBa/wait!. Singh's case [1976] 2 SCR 684; Ambaram's Case (1974] 4 SCC tl.98 and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma's case [1978] 1 SCR 360; referred to.\n\n(c) Judges are entitled to hold their own views, but it is the bounden duty of the Court to impose a .proper punishment, depending upon the de&ree of ;.. criminalitJ and the desirability to impOSe such punishment as a measure of social aecea; ity, as a means of deterring other potential offenders.\n\nIt iS only\n\n~1 in very grave cases Where it is a crime against the society and the brutality ' ......--Uf the crime shocks the judiciM conscience that the Court has the power, as J~ weJJ as lhe duty, to ia1pose the death sentence. In view of these adequate\n\n~ safeguards, it can hardly be asserted that the sentence of death provided for an offence of murder punishable under s. 302, is 'de-humanising• or that it is\n\nunnecessary•. Where the \"\"crime is cruel tind inhuman a death sentence may be called for. [160F-Hl\n\nZdifif Anamma, [1974) 4 S.C.C. 443; Bis/um Pas & Ors. (1975] 3 S.C.C. 700; referred to.\n\n(d) If Parliament thought it right to give to the Judges. discretion as to the sentence, they would not or ought not to shrink from their onerous responsibility. It would. not be appropriate to curtail the ambit o, f their dis- •Cretion by judicial process. A sentence of a wrong type, that is, to substitute a sentence of imprisonment for life where the death sentence is cttlled tor, causes grave miscarriage of justice. A sentence or pattern of sentences which faili to take due account Of gravity of the offence can seriously undermine respect for law.\n\n[164E-FJ ·\n\n(e)' In the three cases there were 'special reasons' within the meaning of -s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the passin~ of the death sentence in each and, therefore, the High Courts were justified in confirming the death sentence passed under s. 368(a) of the Code. Indeed,\n\n\\~ _ __.\"they are illustrative of the rate type of cases, that is, first degree murders, ._r -where a death sentence is usually awarded ln any civilised country.\n\nThese - were cases of diobolical, cold-blooded brutal murders of innocent persorui, -·-:--.a that is, first degree murders of extreme brutality or depritvity.\n\nThe1 inhumanity of some of these offences defied belief. Any interference with the sentence\n\n<>f death, would be wholly unwarranted in each case. [l64G] ·\n\n(f) It is the .duty of the Court to impose a proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment as a measure of socal necessity as a means of deterring other potential offenders. \"F\\iilure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases where it is a crime against the society-particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme \"brutality, will bring to nought the sentence of death provided for by s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. To allow the appellants to escape with the lesser punishment after they had committed such intentional. cold-blooded, .deliberate i\\nd brutal murders will deprive the. law of its effectiveness a.nd result in lcavesty of justice. [168AB]\n\n(g) In these 3ppeals it Cannot be asserted that the award of death se.ntenceto the appellants was \"erroneous in principle\". Nor can it be Sl; lid tl}.at thesentence of death passed on them was arbitrary or excessive or indicative of an improper exercise of discretion.\n\n[167H]\n\n(i) Rajendra Prasad's case is destructive of the theory of reformation. The 'therapeutic touch' which it is said is the best way of preventing repetition of the offence has been of no avail. Punishmeni must be designed so as to deter, as far as possible from commission of similar offences. It should also ,..... serve as a wUrning to other members of society. In both respects, the experi ment of reformation has miserably failed.\n\nThere is no doubt, with the com- -Ii: mutation of his death sentence, the accused will commit a {ew more murders, r,._ and he would again become a menace to the community,\n\n[165G] .\n\n(ii) In Kuniukunju Janardlian's case the accused, who acted aS a monster, ~>--- did not even spare his two innocent minor children in order to get rid of. -,( his wife and issues through her. The death sentence was the only and apprcr priafe penalty which should be awarded in such a case.\n\n[166D]\n\n(h) There is no inexorable rule that either the extreme youth of the accused or the flact that he acted in a heat of passion must always irres~ pective of the enormity of the offence or otherwise be treated as a sufficient_ ground for awarding the lesser punishment. The Court has to take into consideration all the circumstances which do not merit the extreme penalty ..\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of this particular case i.e.\n\nSheo Sha'nker Dubey's case these factors cannot outweigh other considerations. Three precious lives have been lost by the dastardly act of the accused. A family basv been wiped off.\n\nThe de3.th sentence was clearly called for in this cas~ firstly, as a threat or warning to deter potential murerers, and _secondly as the guarantee against the brutalisation of human nature. All facts and circumstances, constitute 'special reasons' why the accused should be sentenced to death. [167E-F]\n\n3. It cannot be said that imposition of death penalty, except in the classes~ of cases indicated in the majority Judgment would be viol.ative of Articles 14,..\n\n19 and 21 of the Constitution. Such a question really does not arise for consideration.\n\n[136GJ -- '\n\n(a) The citizen's right to life and personal liberty are guaranteed. by Arti- <:le 21 of the Constitution irrespective of his political beliefs, class, creed or religion. The Constitution ha&, by Article 21 itself forged certain procedural safeguards for protection to the citizen of his life and personal liberty.\n\nThe- G idealistic considerations as to the inherent worth and dignity of man is a funda~ mental and prevasive theme of the Constitution, to guard against the executiolh\n\nof a citizen for his political beliefs.\n\n[136C-D]\n\n(b) A patriot cannot be equated with an ordinary criminal. A humanistiC' approach should not obscure one's sense of realities. When a man commits a crime against the society by committing a diabolical, cold-blooded, pre-planned murder, of an innocent person the brutality of which shocks the conience of the Court, he must face the consequences of his act. Such a person forfeits hi&\n\nriaht to life. [136El\n\n' \\\n\n\" '\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE 85\n\nJagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. [19,73] 2 S.C.R. 541 followed.\n\nFurman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. ed. 2nd 346 explained and differed from.\n\nMichael de Freites v. Gaorgie Ramouter Benny, L.R. [1975] AC 39; quoted v:ith approval. \\\n\n(c) If the Courts were to be guided by the classification for inflicting death penalty only in tl1e case of three calegories of criminals, namely, (i) for White .collar offences (ii) for anti-social offences, and (iii) for exterminating a person\n\nV.'ho is a menace to the society, that is, a 'hardened 1nurderer', the death sentence for an offence of murder punishable under section 302, for all practical purposes r--wsiuid be virtually non-existent. Unfortunately our penal Jaws do not _provide f for death sentence for either white collar crimes or anti-social offences. As regards 'hardened' murderers, there are few to be found.\n\nMany murders unfor / tunately go undetected and many a brutal murderer bas to be acquitted for want of legal evidence bringing his guilt byond reasona-ble doubt. Nevertheless, when the guilt is proved, the Court should leave aside all humanitarian consi derations if the extreme penalty is called for. A 'professional' murderer must, as :a matter of course, be sentenced to death because he is menace to the society.\n\n\\Vhatever sympathy the Court can have should be reserved for the victims of D the crime rather than for the perpatrators. In such cases, the law must take its course.\n\n[162B-E; 163C..D]\n\n4. The criminality of a crime consists not only in the criminal act but in what that signifies. Its immediately apparent features, the obvious damage to person or property or to public security, are symptoms of a deeper disorder. It betokens, and it fosters, an attitude in man to man, of reckless sel&hness, decit <0r malice, which is incompatible in the long run with any decent sOcial life. In .any advanced society it. is, in part at least, on account of this wider character, less easily discerned, that the graver offence are punished. [143E-F]\n\n(a) All punishment properly implies moral accountability. It is related to injury and not only to damage or danger however greater. Capital punishment , does so in an eminent degree. It is directed against one who is ex-hypothesi an nhuman brute, i.e. it is imposed simply to eliminate who is held to have become .,.. irretrievably, a liability or a menace to society. [142E]\n\n(b) Punishment like crime has a dual character. The penalty which the convicted murderer incurs is not simply death, but death in disgrace and death . as .a disgrace. In so far as capital punishment is a threat, the thre_at consists not only in death but in hµamy.\n\nAny theory which ignores this characteristic is certainly defective. f!43Fl\n\nSir Walter Moberly The Ethics qf Punishment Ch. XI Capital Punishment pp. 271-81; referred to.\n\n( c) PuniShment inflicted by the State in response to a violation of criminal law has been justified in various ways namely, as society's vengeance upon the criminal as atonement by the wrong-doer; as a means of deterring other criminals, as , Protection for the law-abiding and as a way of rehabilitating the criminal.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( [1979] 3 s.c.It~\n\nA Theories of rehabilitation are largely speculative, since there is Jack of scientific- < evidence to support them, though it has been influential in the development of\"\n\nmodern penolozy. f!44A-Bl\n\n5. (a) The capital punishment controversy falls within the strict limits or 'independent' parliamentary law-making, and is a typical or representative of the kind of problems that leaders of Parliament face every day. In. short, the case for abolition of the death sentence is political; not constitutional, The Government carries the responsibility of law and order. That is the first. and fundamental duty of any Government. The Executive has the duty of advising the Government of the laws it believes necessary for the national well- • being. It is the duty of the Court, including this Court, to administer the laws:. /\"' as. they are.\n\n[157DE] ~\n\n(b) Analysing the substantive merits of the cases for and against the death '>- penalty for murder is essentially a question for the Parliament to resolve and' .f not for the Supreme Court to decide. Therefore, it would not be proper for the- Judges to attempt to project their personal views in a matter which lies in therealm of political decisiopmaking, by focussing on -a single controversy, the ques~. lion of the proper penalty for the crime of murder.\n\n[157B]\n\n(c) Any justification for the capital sentence, as for other salient features of the penal system must be sought in the protection of the society and that alone.\n\n[14~E]\n\nEven where it has been legally retained, as in India, Capital Puni!bment is. now seldom employed except in very grave cases where it is a crime against the society and the brutality of the crime shocks the judicial conscience. Indeed' the death penalty satisfies the society's retributive goals and is still pre!omed to be a deterrent to potential offenders, Of the three purposes commonly assigned' to punishment-retribution, deterrence and reformation-deterrence is generally held to be the most important, although the continuing public demand for rctri:. bution cannot be ignored. Prima facie, the death sentence is lik.e1y to have. a stronger affect as a deterrent upon normal human beings than any other form of punishment. People are believed to refrain from crime because they fear punish-- ment. Since people fear death more than anything else, the death penalty is the~ most effective deterrent. [146C-E] ' .~\n\n(d) If the appeal of capital punishment were merely to fear of death, it '\\. would be a very inefficient protector of society. In civilised society and in peace time, government relies for obedience more on its moral prestige than on violent r'epression of crime. Punishmtnt only protects life effectively if it produces i111 possible-murderers, not only fear of the consequences of committing murder, but a horrified recoil for the thing itself. It can only achieve, this, more ambitious, task, if sentence of death is felt to embody society's strongest condemnation of murder and keenest sense of its intolerable wickedness.\n\nIt is not. by tho fear of death but by exciting in the community a sentiment of horror against any particular act, that the offenders could be deterred from committina: it.\n\n[!43B-CJ\n\nH Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Para 59 : referred to.\n\n( e) The punishment of death should reflect adequately the revulsiOJt felt forthe gravest of crimes by the great majority of citizens. Legislators and Jlrdp\n\nI t '\n\nRAJENDRA V. U.P. STATE 87\n\nshare this revulsioq themselves; otflerwise indeed their action woulel be morally indefensible. Their aim then should be, not only to strike terror nor even to awaken popular indignation in a direction\\ convenient to Government. It would\n\nbe to arouse in all and sundry their own indignant repudiation of a wicked act _and at the same time, to deepen it in themselves. In this. vain, sentence of death bas been pronounced, carried out and acclaimed with stern satisfaction. Otherwise the conscience of the community would be revolted if the criminals were allowed . to live. (145F-G]\n\n6. (a.f The theory that (i) the death penalty is per se cruel and ununal\n\n~ punishment and (ii) alternatively the inordinate delay in carrying it out makee it \\ o. has now been completefy destoyed by two recent decisions of the Privy\n\n:B\n\n,,.--.council. [149FJ\n\n-I.· Eaton Baker v. The Queen, L.R. [1975] AC 774 Freites v. George Romouler C :.\n\nBenny, LR [1975] AC 239; discussed. .\n\n(b) In the United States of America also the death penalty has practically existed more or less harmoniously with humane theories of criminal justice for over two hundred years (e.g). [151E]\n\n(i) In Trop v. Dulles, [1958] 356 US 86, L. ed. 630, the Court refused to consider the death penalty as an indent of the constitutional limit of punishment;\n\n(ii) In McGouths v. California, [1971] 402 U.S. 183, it was held that the absence of any guidelines was not a violation of \"due process\" and (iii) In Furman v.\n\nGeorgia the multiple opinions did not rule out altogether re-imposition of the death penalty in the future provided there was legislative structuring of a permissible ystem providing for sufficient procedural safeguards; (iv) Later on, the death penalty has been reimposed and this judicial approach stood reoriei; ited.\n\nThe constitutionality of the death penalty was supported by four factors (I) th& reference to capital punishment in the Constitution (ii) the past Supreme, Court decisions on the death penalty (iii) the limitations of judicial restraints and (iv) the doctrine of se.paration of powers. [151F; 1520; l54E]\n\nM. C/Jerif Bassi Owni; Substantive Criminal Law p. 120-128; referred to\n\n' and (v) In Gregg v. Georgia, [1976] 428 U.S. 153; 49 L.ed. 2d. 859; Proffit v.\n\n~---Ploride, [1976] 428 242; 49 L.ed. 2d. 913; Jurek Texas, [1976]\n\n428 US 262;\n\n-.... 49 L.ed. 2nd, 929-all concerned with discretionary sentencing procedures--, ---,.. and in Woodson v. North Carolina, [1975] 428 US 280; 49 L.ed. 944 Qlld Roberts v. Lonisiana [1976] 428 US 326; 49 L.ed. 2d 974-both cont cerned with mandatory death sentence-it was held that (a) the punishment of • death did not invariably violates the Constitution (b) history and precedent did r\"\" .. ·' not support the conclusion that the death sentence 'vas pt!r s~ violation of 8th \\. and 14th Amendments (c) the evolving standards of decencY' arguments had been substantially under cut in the last four yea-rs because a large segment of the enlightened population regarded the death penalty as appropriate and nece'8ary . \\_\n\nas seen in the new legislation passed in response to Furman ·(d) tbedeath penalty\n\nwas not inherently cruel and unusual. It served two principal soci'al purpos~ retribution and deterrence, and therefore the death sentence for the crime of murder. was (1) not without justification (2) not unconstitutionally severe aed\n\n(3) not invariably disproportionate to the crime and (e) that Furman mandated.\n\nWhere di5CretiODary sentenc'ing was med, there must be suit; tble direction a*\n\n88 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 $.C.R.\n\nA limitation to minimise the risk of wholly and arbitrary and capricious action~ the bifurcated trial with standards modelled after the Modern Penal Code juriCs gave just such guidance. [155F-G; 156A]\n\nO, bservation :\n\n[If there has to be a law reform at all, some rega1'.d must be had to the plight of the victim or his or her family by making provision for payment of compensation.\n\nWhile it is commonly accepted that these convicted of violations of the criminal law must \"pay their debt to society, little emphasis is placed upon requiriD:g offenders to \"pay their debt\" to their victims. Theseagain are matters for the Parliament to provide.] --{.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 512 of,. ·.,_ c\n\n1978. *\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from th.e Judgment and Order dated\n\n12-9-74 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 501/74.\n\nAND\n\nCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 513 of 1978\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 9-1•1978 Kerala High Court in Cr!. A. No. 213/77 and Ref. Trial No. 3/77.\n\nAND\n\nCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 513 of 1978\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28-9-77 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 261/73 and Reference No. 6 /77.\n\nR. K. Garg for the Appellant in Cr!. A. No. 513 /78.\n\nS. K. Bagga, Amicus Curiae for the Appellant in Cr!. A.512/78\n\nP. K. Pillai, A.micus Curiae for the Appellant in Cr!. A. No. 511/78.\n\nD. P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the State of U.P.\n\nK. R. Nambiar for the State of Kerela.\n\nThe Judgment of Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.; Sen, J. gave a dissenting opinion.\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.\n\n.J •\n\nTHE DEADLY QUANDARY\n\nTo be or not to be : that is the question of lethal import and legal\n\nmomet, in each of these thiee appeals where leave is confined to the\n\nI,.\n\n' '\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 89\n\nissue of the propriety of the impost of capital penalty against which\n\nthe brutal culprits <lesparately beseech that their dear life be spared by the Summit Court and the incarceratory alternative be mwarded instead.\n\nThere is, as here, a judicial dimension to the quasi-Hamletian dile=a when \"a murder most foul\" demands of sentencing justice punitive infliction of eath or the lesser punishment of life , imprisonment, since the Penal Code leaves the critical choice between physical liquidation and life-long incarceration to the enlightened con- • science and sensitized judgment of the Court. • h A narration of facts is normally necessary at this early stage but\n\n~ we relegate it to a later part, assuming for the nonce the monstrosity I of the murder in each case.\n\nIs mere shock at the horrendous killing\n\n<. siWlicient alibi to extinguish one more life, de hors circumstance;, individual and social, motivational and psychical ? The crime and the criminal, contemporary societal crisis, opinions of builders and moulders. of the nation, cultural winds of world change and other profound factors, spiritual and secular, and above all, constitutional, inarticulately guide the Court's faculty in reading the meaning of meanings in preference to •a mechanistic interpretation of s. 302 I.P.C. projected in petrified print from Macaulay's vintage mint.\n\nWe banish the possible confusion about the precise issue before us\n\n...,.,. -it is not the constitutionality of the provision for death penalty, but only the canalisation of the sentencing discretion in a competing situation.\n\nThe former problem is now beyond forensic doubt after Jagmohan Singh(') and the latter is in critical need of tangible guidelines, at once constitutional and functional.\n\nThe law reports reveal the impressionistic and unpredictable notes struck by some decisions and the occasional vocabulary of horror and terror, of extenuation Md misericordia, used in the sentencing tail-piece of judgments. ..)\"1berefore, this jurisprudential exploration, within the framework of s. 302 I.P.C., has become necessitous, both because the awesome --.,,.. 'eithet/or' of the Section spells ont no specific indicators and law in • this fatal area cannot afford to be conjectural.\n\nGuided l)lissiles, witl1 ' lethal potential, in unguided hands, even judicial, is a grave risk\n\n~ where the peril is mortal though tempered by the appellate process.\n\nThe core question-the only question-that occupies our attention, •. , within the confines of the Code, is as to when and why shall capital sentence be pronounced on a murderer and why not in other cases.\n\nThe penological poignancy and urgency of the solution is obvious since the human stakes are high, and error, even judicial error H\n\n-.. -.. '. (I) Jagmohan Singh v. State af Uttar Pradesh (1973) l S.C.C. 20.\n\n7-19GSCIJ79 ...\n\nsilences for ever a living being and despatches him to that 'undiscovered country from whose boum no traveller returns' : nor, once executed, can 'storied um or animated bust back to its mansion call the fleeting breath': The macabre irrevocability of the extreme penalty makes the sombre issue before us too important to be relegated, !IS often happens, to a farewell paragraph, with focus on frightful features of the crime and less stress on the crime-doer and related factors.\n\nWhen human rights jurisprudence and constitutional protections have escalated to sublime levels in our country and heightened \" awareness of the gravity of dealth penalty is growing all over th~\n\ncivilised globe in our half-century, is it right to leave s. 302 I.P.C. in \"!\"\n\nvague duality and value-free neutrality ? Any academic who has \\ monitored Indian sentencing precedents on murder may awaken to \" 'the overt ambivalence and covert conflict' among judges 'concerning continued resort to the death sentence' which, according to Prof.\n\nBlackshield,(') 'seems to minor the uncertainties and conflicts of values in the community itself'.\n\nThis tangled web of case-law has . been woven around the terse terms of s. 302, LP .C. during the last hundred years.\n\nTHE OLD TEXT AND THE NEW LIGHT\n\nSection 302. Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine .\n\n. Such stark brevity leaves a deadly discretion but beams little legislative light on when the court shall hang the sentencee or why the lesser penalty shall be preferred. This facultative fluidity of the provision reposes a trust in the court to select.\n\nAnd 'discretionary navigation in an unchartered sea is a hazardous undertaking unless re -....\\ cognised and recoguizable principles, rational and constitutional, are -< crystallised as 'interstitial.legislation' by the highest court.\n\nThe flame ..,- of life cannot flicker unce!'.13in! and so s. 302 I.P.C. must be invested • with pragmatic concreteness that inhibits ad hominem responses of individual judges and is in penal conformance with constitutional •,. norms and world conscience.\n\nWithin the dichtomous frame-work of s. 302 I.P.C., upheld in Jagmohan Singh, we have to evolve working rules of punishment bearing fue markings of enlightened flexibility and societal sensibility.\n\nHazy law, where human life hangs in the balance, injects an agonising consciousness that judicial error may\n\n(1) Prof. A. R. Blackshield, Associate Professor of Law, University of _New\n\n. South Wales : Capital Punishment in India : The Impact of the Ediga Anamma Case-July 1977.\n\n' '\n\nMJENDRA v. U; P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 91\n\nprove to be 'crime' beyond 'punishment'.\n\nAnd history bears testi- A mony to reve.rsal of Court verdict by Discovery of. Time.\n\nThe tragic speech in the Commons of former Home Secretary (Cbuter Ede) makes ghastly reading : (')\n\n\"I w.is the Home Secretary who wrote on Evans' papers. \"The law must take its course.\" I never said, in 1948 that a mistake was impossible. I think Evans' case shows, in spite of all that has been done since, that a mistake was possible, and that, in the form in which the verdict was actually given on a particular case, a mistake was made.\n\nI hope that no future Home Secretary, while in office or after he has left office, will ever have to feel that althongh he did his best and no one could accuse him of being either careless or inefficient, he sent a man to the gallows who was not \"guilty as charged.\"\n\nThal is why we devote a whole judgment to what ordinarily is a 'brief . finaJe at the end of a long opinion.\n\nln Ediga Annamma(2 ), this Court did set down some orking formulae whereby a synthesis could be reached as between death sentence and life imprisonment.\n\nNotwithstanding the catalogue of grounds warranling death sentence as an exceptional measure, 'life' being the rule, the judicial decisions have been differing (and dithering) at various levels, with the result the need for a thorough re-exam!nafion has been forced olt us by counsel on both sides. Prof. Blacksh!eld makes an acid comment : (')\n\n\"The fact is that decisions since Ediga Anamma have displayed the same pattern of confusion, contraqictions and aberrations as decisions before that case .... To test this, I have abstracted from the All India Reporter seventy cases in which the Supreme Court has had to choose between life and death under Section 302 : the last twenty-fiv' reported cases before the date of Ediga A namma, and the next fortyfive (including, of course, Ediga Anamma itself) on or after that date.\"\n\n\"But where life and death are at stake, inconsistencies which are understandable may not be acceptable. The bard evidence of the accompanying \"kit of cases\" compels the\n\n(1) The Crusade against Capital Punishment in Great Britain by Elizabeth\n\nOrman Tuttle, 1961, p. 96.\n\n(2) Ediga Annama v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1974) 4 S.C.C. 43.\n\n(3) Prof. A. R. BlackshieJd, Associte Prcfcsscr of L<>.w, University of New H South Wales: Capital Punishment in India. The Impact of Ediga Annamma Case-July 1977.\n\nI B\n\nconclusion that, at least in contemporary India, Mr. Jnstice Douglas' argument in Furman v. Georgia(') is correct: that arbitrariness and uneven incidence are iQherent and inevitable in a system of capital punishment; and that therefore-- in Indian constitutional terms, and in spite of Jagmohan Singh-the retention of such a system necessarily violates Article 14's guarantee of \"equality before the law.\"\n\nThe author further observes :\n\n\"One source of the confusion seems to have been an under-current of disagreement as to the correctness and appli- . cability of the argument in Ediga Anamma. But the only direct challenge has been in Bishan Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 573 (January 10, 1975 : Case 52) and, with respect, the challenge there seems clearly misconceived.\"\n\nWhat a study of the decisions of the higher courts on the life-or-deiith choice shows is that judicial impressionism still shows up and it is none too late to enunciate a systematised set of criteria or at least reliable beacons Ediga Annamma (supra) in terms, attempted this systematisation :\n\n\"Let us crystallise the positive indicators against death sentences under Indian Law currently. Where the murderer is too young or too old, the clemency of penal justice helps him. Where the offender suffers from socio-economic, psychic or penal compulsions insufficient to attract a legal exception Qr to down-grade the crime into a lesser one, judicial commutation is permissible. Other general social pressures, warranting judicial notice, with an extenuating impact may in special cases, induce the lesser penalty.\n\nExtraordinary features in the judicial process, such as that the death sentence has hung over the head of the culprit excruciatingly long, may persuade the Court to be compassionate. Likewise, if others involved in the crime and similarly situated have received the benefit of life imprisonment or if the offence is only constructive (i.e. combining the \"murder\" provision with the \"unlawful assembly\" provision),. ... or again (if) the accused has acted suddenly under another's instigation, without premeditation, perhaps the court may humanely opt for life, even life where a just cause or real suspicion of wifely infidelity pushed the criminal into the crime. On the other hand, the weapons used and the manner of their use the\n\n(!) 408 U. S. at 238.\n\n' I' •\n\n- '\n\n. '\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, JJ\n\nhorrendons features of the crime and hapless, helpless state of the victim, and the like, steel the heart of the law for a sterner seqtence.\n\nWe cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer all such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an imperfect and undulating society. A legal poJicy on life or death cannot be left for ad-hoc mood or individual predilection and so we have sought to objectify to the extent possible, abandoning retributive ruthlessness, amending the deterrent creed and accepting the trend against the extreme and irrevocable penalty of putting out life.\"(1)\n\nFrom what we have said and quoted and from the persistence of forensic divarication, it has now become necessary to have a second look at the life versus death question, not for summarising hitherto decided cases and distilling the common factors but for applying the Constitution to cut the Gordian knot. The suprema lex must set the perspective and illumine the meaning of subordinate statutes especially where some provisions contain obfuscatory elements, for, our founding fathers have not hammered out a merely pedantic legal text but handed down a constellation of human values, cherished principles and spiritu11l\n\nnorms which belight old codes and imperial laws and impel new inter pretations and legislation~ to tune up the New Order.\n\nThe Indian Penal Code must be sensitized by the healing touch of the Preamble and Part III. Wrote Wheeler, J : (2)\n\n\"That court best serves the law which recognises that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to\n\nthe established and settled judgment of society .... '' F\n\nBenjamin N. Cardozo, said : (')\n\n\"If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors.\"\n\nSuch a solution to the death/life alternatives, where the Code fraves the Judge in the cold, has its limits. \"Justice Homesput his view pithily when he said that judges make law interstitially, {hat they are confined from molar to molecular motion.\n\nJustice Frankfurter puts\n\n(1) Ediga Annamma v. State of A. P. (1974) 4 S.C.C. 443 at 453.\n\n(2) Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99. ( 3) The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardozo. p. 152.\n\nit more colloquially, saying that judges make law at retail, legislators at wholesale.\"( 1)·· Therefore, it is no heresy to imbibe and in}ect the social philosophy of the Constitution into the Penal Code to resolve the tension between the Past and the Present.\n\nQUO VADIS DISCRETIONARY DEATH SENTENCE?\n\nIndian Justice and the constitutional order are centuries ahead of the barbarities of Judge Jeffreys of 'Bloody Assizes' fame; and idea-- logically away from the years of imperial butchery of Indian uprising when the Penal Code was drafted.\n\nSince Law reflects Life, new meanings must permeate the Penal Code. The deprivation of life .under our system is too fundamental to be permitted save on the gravest giound and under the strictest scrutiny if Justice, Diguity, Fair Procedure and Freedom arc creedally constitutional.\n\nSo it is that in this bunch of appeals the court is called upon by counsel for the appellants to repel sentence by hunch and to lay down broad norms and essential principles as beacon lights which make the law of murder, in the sentencing sector, most restrictive and least vagarious.\n\nMore illumination and closer examination of the provisions viz .. s. 302 in the larger humanist context and constitutional conspectus, is necessitous. Legal justice must be made of surer stuff where deprivation of life may be the consequence. So we have heard a wider range of submissions and sought the 'amicus' services of the learned Solicitor General. An intervener (C9mmittee for Abolition of Death Penalty), interested in abolition of death penalty has submitted, through Dr. L.\n\nM. Singhvi, some material. We record our appreciation of the assistance given by the former and take due note of the views presented by the latter.\n\nLight, not heat, is welcome from any SQurce in aid of judicial justice.\n\nWe are cognizant of the fact that no inflexible formula is feasible which will provide a complete set of criteria for the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime of murder, as pointed out by Palekar, J. in Jagmoharr Singh (supra). The learned c Judge further observed :\n\n\"The impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment. The discretion in the matter H of sentence is, as already pointed out, liable to be corrected by superior courts.\" (p. 35)\n\n(!) \"Social Justice\" Ed. by Richard B. Brandt, p. 109.\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P .. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 95\n\nWhat is important to remember is that while rigid prescriptions and random prescriptions which imprison judicial discretion may.play tricks with justice, the absence, altogether, of any defined principles\n\nexcept, a variorum of rulings may stultify sentencing law and denude it of decisional precision. 'Well-recognised principles' is an elegant phrase, But what are they, when minds differ even on the basics ?\n\nFluctuating facts and keleidoscopic circumstances, bewildering novelties and unexpected factors, personal vicissitudes and societal ' variables may defy standard-setting for all situations; but that does not '\\ mean that humane principles should be abandoned and blanket discre- }rrion endowed, making life and liberty the plaything of the mentality of human judges. J!enjamin Cardozo has pricked the bubble of illusion about the utter objectivity of the judicial process : (1)\n\n\"I have spc\\ken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and content of their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near the surface, however, that their existence and influence are nol likely to be disclaimed ... Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.\"\n\nSection 302 is silent; so the judges have to speak, because the courts must daily sentence. Merely to say that discretion is guided by' wellrecognised principles shifts the issue to what those recognised rules are.\n\nAre they the same as were exercised judicially when Bhagat Singh was swung into physical oblivion? No. The task is to translate in new r 1erms the currently consecrated. principles, informed by tradition, r methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the --., . primordial necessity of order in social life?. The error of parallax • which dated thought processes, through dusty precedents, may project needs to. be corrected. That is the essay we undertake here.\n\n. '\n\nMoreover, the need for well-recognised principles to govern the 'deadly' discretion is so interlaced with fair procedure that unregulated power may even militate against Art. 21 as expounded in Maneka Gandhi's case('), an aspect into which we do not , enter here. Judicial absolutism or ad-hocism is anathema in our constitutional scheme. It\n\n{I) The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardozo p. 167.\n\n(2) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) I S.C.C. 248.\n\n• 8\n\nhas been said that 'a judge untethered by a text is a dangerous instrument'; and we may well add, judge-power, uncanalised by clear principles may be equally dangerous when the consequence of his marginal' indiscretion may be horrific hanging of a human being until he be dead.\n\nPalekar, J. himself accepted that \"well-recognised princip)es\" must govern sentencing discretion .\n\nThe precise criteria which constitute, and the normative nature of those principles did not directly fall for decision as that case proceeded on the basis that the lower courts had rightly exercised the sentencing discretion. The precise and only issue that was mooted and decide~~ in Jagmohan Singh(') was the constitutionality of s. 302 I.P.C. and the.-' holding was that 'the death sentence imposed after trial in accordance '-, with procedure established by law is not unconstitutional'. T1ie accep- ,. tance of the invulnerability of discretionary power does not end the journey; it inaugurates the search for those 'well recognised principles' Palekar, J., speaks of in the Jagmohan case.\n\nIncidental observations with.out concentration on the sentencing criteria are notthe ratio of thedecision. Judgments are not Bible for every line to be venerated.\n\nWhen the legislative text is too bald to be self-acting or suffers zigzag distortion in action, the primary obligation is on Parliament to enact necessary clauses by appropriate amendments to s. 302 I.P.C.\n\nBut if legislative undertaking is not in sight judges who have to implement the Code cannot fold up their professional hands but must make the provision viable by evolution of supplementary principles even if it may appear to possess the flavour of Jaw-making.\n\nLord Dennings' observations are apposite :\n\n\"Many of the Judges of England have said that they ao not make law.\n\nThey only interpret it.\n\nThis is an illusion which they have fostered.\n\nBut it is a notion which is :now being discarded everywhere.\n\nEvery new decision---0n every new situation-is a development of the law.\n\nLaw does not stand still.\n\nIt moves continually.\n\nOnce this is recognised; then the task of the Judge is pnt on a higher plane.\n\nHe must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time.\n\nHe must not be a mere mechanic, a mere working mason, laying brick on brick, without thought to the overall design.\n\nHe must be an architect-thinking of the structure as a whole, building for society a system of\n\nlaw which is strong, durable and just. It is on his work that civilised society itself depends.\"\n\n(1) The Supreme Court of India-A Socio-Legal Cri.tique of its JuristicTecliniqu-es:\n\nby Rajeev Dhavan-Foreword by Lord Denning~ M. R.\n\n• • • . '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 97\n\nThe Court's tryst, with the Constitution obligates it to lay down general rules, not a complete directory, which will lend predictability to the law vis-a-vis the community and guide the judiciary in such a grim verdict as choke between life and death.\n\nThe right to life, in our constitutional order, is too sacred to be wished away without so .much as Directive Principles for its deprivation, save sweeping i_udical discretion and reference for confirmation or appellate reviewthe know-hova tor exercise of either 'being left to the assumed in.- fallibility of tbe curial process in the face of the daily reality ibat there are extreme variations among judges themselves on 'when' and 'why' the extreme penalty shalt or shall not be inflicted. ·\n\nCurrently, the welter of the British Indian and post-Independence decisions and the impact of laconic legislative changes in the Crimi- Hal Procedure Code the competition among the retributive, deterrent, the reformative and even the existentialist theories of punishment and of statistical . studies and sociological and cultural winds settle the letlial 'fate of the living man in the cage.\n\nLaw must be honest to itself.\n\nIs it not true that some judges count the number of fatal wounds, some the .nature of the weapons used, others count the corpses or the degree of horror and yet others look into the age or sex of the offender and even the lapse of time between the trial court's award of death sentence and the final disposal of the appeal ? With some judges, motives, provocations, primary or constructive gnilt, nicntal disturbance and old feuds, the savagery of the .murderous moment or the plan which bas preceded the killing, the social milieu, the sublimated class complex and other odd factors enter the sentencing calculus.\n\nStranger still, a good sentence of death by the trial court is sometimes upset by the Supreme Court becanse • of Law's delays.\n\nCourts have been directed execution of murderers who are mental cases, who do not fall within the McNaghten rules, because of the insane fury of the slaughter.\n\nA big margin of subjectivism, a preference for old English precedents, theories of modern penology, behavioural emphasis or social antecedents, judicial hubris or human rights perspectives, criminological literacy or fanatical reverence for outworn social philosophers buried in the debris of time except as part of history-this plurality of forces plays a part in swinging the pendulum of sentencing justi.ce erratically.\n\nTherefore, until Parliament speaks, the court cannot be silent. (Hopefully, s. 302 I.P.C. is being amended, at long last, but it is only half-way through as the Rajya Sabha proceedings show.\n\nWe will revert to it later).\n\nA Prof. Blackshield, on an analytical study of Indian death sentence\n\ndecisions, has remarked with nnconventional candour :\n\n\"But where life and death are at stake, inconsistenci(:s which are understandable may not be acceptable.\"\n\nHis further comments are noteworthy :\n\n\"The fact is that in most .cases where the sentence of death under s.302 is confirmed by the Supreme C<\\)rt, there is little or no discussion of the reasons for conlirmation.\n\nSometimes there is a brief assertion of \"no extenuating circumstances\" (which means to imply that the Court is making its own discretionary judgment ; at other times there ' is a brief assertion of \"no ground to interfere\" (which seems to 'imply that the Court is merely reviewing the legitimacy of the High Court's choke of sentence).\n\nThe result is to obfuscate, probably beyond any hope of rationalisation, the analytical issues involved.\"(supra)\n\nThe twists and turns in sentencing pattern and the under-emphasis on the sentencee's circumstances in decided cases make an in-depth investigation of the 'principles' justifying the award of death sentence a constitutional duty of conscience.\n\nThis Court must extricate, until Parliament legislates, the death sentence sector from judicial subjectivism and consequent uncertainty.\n\nAs Justice Cardozo, in The Nature of the Judicial Process, bluntly states : (')\n\n\"There has been a certain lack of candor in much of the discussion of the theme, or rather perhaps in the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must lose respect and confidence . by the reminder that they are subject to human limitations. . . . if there is anything of reality in my analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof on these chills and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do.\n\nThe great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.\" It is fair to mention that the humanistic imperatives of the Indian Constitution, as paramount to the punitive strategy of the Penal Code, have hardly been explored by courts in this field of 'life or death' at the hands of the l!'w.\n\nThe main focus of our judgment is on this poignant gap in 'human rights jurisprudence' within the limits of the.\n\nPenal Code, impregnated by the Constitution. To put it pithily, a world order voicing the worth of tlii; human person, a cultural legacy\n\n(1) pp. 167-168.\n\n, RAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 99\n\neharged with compassion, an interpretative liberation from colonial A callousness to life and liberty, a concern for social justice as setting the sights .if individual justice, interact with the inherited text of the ·\n\n~ Penal Code to yield the goals desiderated by the Preamble and Arti- ., des 14, 19 and 21.\n\nNor can courts be complacent in the thought that even if they err the clemency power will and does operate to save many a life condemned by the highest court to death.\n\nFor one thing, the un- • even politics of executive clemency is not an unreality when we re-\n\n., member it is often the violent dissenters, patriotic terrorists, despera- \\ ... ~_does nurtured by the sub-cu!tµre of poverty and neurotics hardened ,_ by social neglect, and not the members of the Establishment or conc .I formist class, who get executed through judicial and clemency pro- • . eesses. Executive commutation is no substitute for judicial justice; at best it is administrative policy and at worst pressure-based partiality.\n\nIn either case, that court self-condemns itself which awards death penalty with a sop to its conscience that the habitual clemency of Government will soften the. judicial excess in sentence.\n\nIf justice under the law jus\\ifies the lesser sentence it is abdication of judicial power to inflict the extreme penalty and extraneous to seek consolation in the possible benign interference by the President.\n\nThe criteria for clemency are often different.\n\nWe are thus left with the neces- Bity to decipher sente11cing discretion in the death/life situation.\n\nSENTENCING CYNOSURES Having stated the area and object bf investigation we address our- 'Selves to this grave penological issue purely as judges deciding a legal problem, putting aside views, philosophical or criminological, one holds.\n\nBut law, in this area, cannot go it alone\"; and cross-fertilisation frpm sociology, history, cultural anthropology and current :i,..-- national perils and developmental goals and above all, constitutional\n\nrl eurrents, c.annot be eschewed.\n\n. \\\n\nLet us leave 'law' a while and begin with drawing the backdrop with a lurid brush.\n\nEvery sombre dawn a human being is hanged by the legal process, the Jlag of humane justice shall be hung half-mast.\n\nG Such is the symbolic reverence the land of Gandhi should pay to buman life haltered up by lethal law.\n\nThe values of a nation and ethos of a generation mould concepts of crime and punishment.\n\nSo viewed, the lode-star of penal policy to-day, shining through the finer cultun; of former centuries, strengthens the plea against death penalty.\n\nMoreover, however much judicially screened and constitutionally H legitimated, there is a factor of fallibility, a pall that falls beyond reeall and a core of sublimated cruelty implied in every death penalty.\n\nThis is the starting point of our re-appraisal of precedential and legislative texts, with a view to evolving clearer criteria for choice between the Life-Death Alternatives enacted into the Penal Code.\n\nWe may, for emphasis, recalls. 302 J.P.C.,-at once laconic and draconic,. which reads : . ·\n\ns.302.-Punishmmt for murder.-Wl1oever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be Iiabl.e to fine.\"\n\nWe approach the resolution of the punishment predicament in a (' manner at once legal, logical and criminological and impregnated with--\\_\n\nvalues constitutional.\n\nTherefore, we will first study the significant · . legislative developments in the two interacting Codes and related par- ): liamentary essays at change.\n\nWhere broad conclusions emerge from such an investigation, constitutional reinforcement may be sought.\n\nSince the Constitution is paramount and paramountcy is paramonntcy, its expansive humanism must overpower traditional 'terrorism' in the practice of sentencing.\n\nWhen tjiis stage is reached and formulation of guidelines made, we will consider the criminological foaadations of theories of punishment which harmonise with the human rights jurisprudence of our cultural cosmos. Finally,. we will set down the salient cynosures for judges in their day-to-day labours.\n\nOne sentencing aspect which has found prominent place in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, but more often ignorantly ignored, needs to be highlighted for future guidance.\n\nThe cases actually demanding decision, their factual matrices and the actual applicatbn of the principles we l>ave formulated to the appeals under consideration\n\nare the decisive part of the judgment.\n\nThe sister Codes-the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Proce--, dure Code-are interwoven into the texture. of sentencing. So mucl1 so, the various changes in s.367 of the Procedure Code, 1898 and its re-incarnation in s.354 of the Code of 1973 impact on the interpretation of s. 302 of the Penal Code. The art of statutory construe- • tion seeks aid from connective tissues, as it were, of complementary \"\" enactments.\n\nThis mode offers a penological synthesis Parliament legislatively intended.\n\nFrom 'this angle, we may examine the history of the amendments to the Procedure Code in so far as they mould the sentencing discretion vested by s. 302 I.P.C.\n\nj •\n\nB Vintage words adapt their semantic content with change in. Society's thought, ways and people's mores.\n\nLlnkwise, Law-Life rimtual>- Jity moulds judicial construction.\n\nSo when a nineteenthcentury Code,\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nJOI\n\nwith vital impact on life and liberty, falls for examination !n the last quarter of thetwentieth c.entury, criminological developments finds their way into the process of statutory decoding.\n\nThis is obviously permissible, even necessary.\n\nA progressive construction which up-dates the sense of statutory language has been adopted in Weems v. United States(') and commended by jurists. .,.\n\nWe may ask ourselves whether the Pro'cedure Code, which inter- • twines with the Penal Code lends discretionary direction? Similarly, \\ ~\"brief survey of the trend of legislative endeavours may also serve to\n\ndicate whether the people's consciousness has. been projected to-\n\n, wards narrowing or widening the scope for infliction of death pepalty. \\ Current criminological theories, the march of the abolitionist move- 'ment across the continents, the national heritage and voice of the makers of modern India and parliamentary re-thinking on reform of the Penal Code may also be indicators.\n\nIn this setting, let us rationalize and humanize the discretionary exercise under s.302 I.P.C.\n\nSeveral attempts have been made to re$trict or remove death penalty under s. 302 but never even one~ to enlarge its application. Parliamentary pressure bas been to cut down death penalty, although the section formally remains the same and is very nearly being . wholly recast benignly. The cue for the Court is clear.\n\n\"In 1931, an abolition bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly by Gaya Prasad Singh; but a motion for circulation of the bill was defeated after it was opposed by the government.\n\nThe pattern after independence has been much the same.\n\nIn J 956, n bill introduced in the Lok Sabha by Mukund Lal Agarwal was ;.--rejected after government opposition. In 1958 a Resolution for aboli· ,.. tion, moved in the Rajya Sabha by Prithvi Raj Kapur, was withdrawn after debate. (Its purpose had been served, said Shri Kapur). \"The ripples are created and it is in the air\": Rajya Sabha Debates, April 25, 1958, Cols.444-528.\n\nIn 1961 a further Resolution, mo¥ed in •\n\n' the Rajya Sabha by Mrs Savitry Devi Nigam, was negatived after G\n\n. '\n\ndebate.\n\nIn 1962, ho.wever Resolution moved in the Lok Sabha by Raghunath Singh received more serious attention: Lok Sabha Debates, April 21, 1962, Cols.307-365.· The Resolution was withdrawn, hut only after the government had given an undertaking that a transcript of the debate would be• forwarded to the Law Commission, for consi-\n\n(1) 217 U .. S. 349.\n\n102.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR rs [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA deration ill the context of its review of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe result was a separate Law commission Rel'ort on Capital Punishment, submitted to the government in September, 1967.\" (supra)\n\nAt pages 354-55, the Law Commission summarized its main con- B clusions as follows :\n\n\"It is difficult to rule out that the validity of or the strength behind, many of the argumellts for abolition.\n\nNor does the commission treat lightly the argument based <>n the irrevocability of the sentence of death, the need for a modern approach, the severity of capital punishment, and the strong feeling shown by certain sections of public opinion in stressing deeper questions of human values.\n\nHaving regard, however, to the conditions in India, to the variety of the social upbringing of its inhabitants, to the disparity in the level of morality and education fu. the country, to the vastness of its area, to the diversity of its population and to the paramount need for maintaining law and order in the country at the present juncture, India caunot rislo the experiment of abolition of capital punishment.\"\n\nCurrently, there is a Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha for total abolition.\n\nThe most meaningful contribution to 'human rights legality' in the 'terminal' territory of punitivity is the parliamentary amendment to s.302 I.P.C. half-way through and, if we may say so with respect, half-fulfilling both the humanist quintessence of the Constitution and, may be, the creed of the Father of the Nation.\n\nGandhiji long ago wrote in the Harijan:\n\n\"God Alone Can Take Life Because He Alone Gives it.\"\n\nWe will dwell on this Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972 passed by the Rajya Sabha in.1978, later in this Judgment but mention this seminal event as a kindly portent against the 'homicidal' exercise of discretion, often an obsession with retributive justice in disguise.\n\nAnd the parliamentary prospects, to the extent relevant to judicial dis-· cretion disappoint those who are restless if murder is divorced -from de.atl1 penalty.\n\nThe Future shapes the Present on occasions and there- ' fore we take note of this big change in the offing.\n\nSection 302, as now recast by the Rajya Sabha, reads :\n\n302.(1) Whoever commits murder shall, save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), be punished with imprisonment\n\n- for life and shall also be liable to fine.\n\n• . ...\n\nj •\n\n' .-\n\n• •\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE. (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 03\n\n(2) Whoever commits murder shall,-\n\n(a) if the murder has been committed after previons plan·\n\nning and involves extreme brutality; or\n\n(b) if the murder involves exceptional depravity; or\n\n( c) if the murder is of a member of any of the armed forces of the Union or of a member of any police force or of any public servant and was committed-\n\n(i) while such member o.r public servant was on duty; or\n\n(ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted to be dorie by such member of public servant in the lawful discharge of his duty as such member or public servant whether at the time of murder he was such member or public servant as the case may be, or had ceased to be such member or public servant; or ( d) if the murder is of a person who had acted in the lawful discharge of this duty under section 43 of the\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or who had rendered assistance to a Magistrate or a poilce officer demanding his aid or reqiring his assistance under se-ction 37 or section 129 of the said Code; or ( e) if the murder has been committed by him, while under sentence of imprisonment for life, and such sentence has become final, be punished with death, or imprisonm.ent for life, and shall also be liable to fine.\n\n( 3) Where. a person while undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life. is sentenced to imprisonment for an offence under cfause (e) of sub-section (2) such sentence shall run consecutively and not concurrently.(')\n\nMaybe, the fuller and finer flow of the constitutional stream of human dignity and social justice will shape the provision more reforma- G lively.\n\nSuffice it to say that the battle against death penalty by parliamentary action is gaining ground and those who do live in the ivory tower-and Judges, hopefully, do not-will take cognizance of this compassionate trend.\n\nThe inchoate indicators gatherable from the direct reforms of R death penalty take us to the next 'neon sign' from the changes in the\n\n(l) Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972 as passed by Rajya Sabha.\n\n• F\n\nProcedure Code.\n\nSection 302 I.P.C., permits death penalty but s.354\n\n(3) of the Procedure Code, 1973 processes the discretionary power.\n\nThe central issue of death/life discretion is not left naked by the Procedure Code which, by necessary implication, has clothed it with prolife language.\n\nThe legislative development, through several successive amendments, has shifted the punitive centre of gravity from life-taking to life sentence. To start with, s. 367 (5) obligated the court to 'state the reason why sentence of death was noP passed'.\n\nIn other words, the discretion was directed positively towards death penalty.\n\nThe next stage was the deletion of this part of the provision leaving the judicial option open.\n\nAnd then came the new humanitarian sub-section [s. 354 (3)] of the Code of 1973, whereby the dignity, and wrnrth of the hmnan person, under-scored in the Constitution, shaped the penal policy related to murder.\n\nThe sul>-section provides:\n\n\"When the conviction is , for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reafons for such sentence.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nThus, on the statutory side, there has been a sigii.ificant shift since India became free.\n\nIn practice, the effect of the pre-1955 version is that while the former rule was to • sentence to death a person convicted for murder and to impose the lesser sentence for reasons 'to be recorded in writing, the process has suffered a reversal now.\n\nFormerly, capital punishment was to be imposed unlei; s special reasons could be found to justify the lesser sentence.\n\nThe 1955 amendment, removing the requirement, had left the courts equally free to award either sentence.\n\nFinally, with the new 1973 provision-\n\n\"a great change has overt'f\"ken the law . .. The unn1istakable shift in legislative emphasis is that life imprisonment for murder is the rule and capital sentence the exception to be resorted to for reasons to be stated .... It is obvious that the disturbed conscience of the State on the vexed question of legal threat to life by way of death sentence has sought to express itself legislatively, the stream of tendency being towards cautious, partial abolition and a retreat from total retention.,'\"\n\n' The twin survey of attempted and half accomplished changes in the Penal Code and the statutory mutation, pregnant with significance,\n\n) .\n\nr)\"\n\n• \"\n\n,, '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 105\n\nwrought into the procedure Code, definitely drives judicial discretion A to a benign destination.\n\nThe message of the many legislative exercises is that murder will ordinarily be visited only with life imprisonment and it is imperative that death sentence shall not be directed unless there exist \"special reasons for such sentence.\"\n\nThe era of broad discretion when Jagmohan's case was decided has ended and a chapter of restricted discretion has since been inaugurated.\n\nThis is a direct response, not merely to the humane call of the Constitution, but also to the, wider cultural and criminological transformation of opinion on the futility of the law of 'Life for Life' 'red in tooth and claw'.\n\nNo longer did judicial discretion depend on vague 'principies'. It became accountable to the strict requirements of s.354(3) of the 1973 Code.\n\nBy way of aside, we may note that the consolation that judicial discretion in action is geared to justice is not always true to life.\n\n\"The discretion of a , iudge is said by Lord Camden to be the law of tyrants : it is always unkonwn; it is different in\n\ndifferent men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper anc passion. In the best, it is of ten times caprice; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and_ passion to which human nature is liable ..... \" 1 Bouv. Law Diet., Rawles' Third ReYision, p.885.\"(')\n\n\"An appeal to a judge's discretion is an. appeal tu his judicial conscience.\n\nThe discretion must be exercised, nol in opposition to, but in accordance with, established principles of law.\" (Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615)\"(2)\n\nHere is thus an appeal to the informed conscience of the senicncing judge not to award death penalty save for special reasons whic~ have direct nexus with the necessity for hanging the murderer by law.\n\nThe revolutionary import of the target expression, m a death sentence situation, viz., 'the special reasons for such sentence' demantis\n\nperceptive exploration withc.ut emotional explosion or sadistic sublimatfon disguised as 'special reason'.\n\nHere we enter the penological area of lethal justice, social defence and purpose-oriented punishment.\n\nBefore launching on the decisive discussion it i~ fair to be frank on one facet of the judicial process.\n\nTo quote Richard B. Brandt:(')\n\n(1) \"Judicial Discretion\" National College of the State Judiciary University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, 19741 'p. 14.\n\n(2) Ibid p, :l3. 11\n\n(3) \"Social Justice\" Ed. by Richard B. Brandt, pp. 110-111.\n\n8-196SCIJ79\n\n\"Much of law is designed to avoid the necessity for the judge to reach what Holmes called his 'can't helps', his ultimate convictions or values.\n\nThe force of precedent, the close applicability of statute law, the separation of powers, legal presumptions, statutes qf limitations, rules of p, leading and evidence, and above all the pragmatic assessments of fact that point to one result whichever ultimate values be assumed, all enable the judge in most cases tO: stop short of a resort to his personal standards.\n\nWhen these prove unavailing, as is more likely in the case of courts of last resort at the frontiers of the law, and most likely in a supreme constitutional court, the judge necessarily resorts to his own scheme of values. It may, the.refore, be said that the most important thing about a judge is his philosophy; and if it be dangerous for him to have one, it is at all events Jess dangerous than the self-deception of having none.\"\n\nTHE CODES, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CULTURAi.\n\nBACKDROP\n\nPrimarily we seek gnidelines from the two Codes, in the omnipresence and omnipotence of the over-arching Constitution.\n\nThe Indian cultural current also counts and so does our spiritual chemistry, based on divinity in everyone, catalysed by the Buddha-Gandhi compassion. 'Every saint has a past and every sinner a fnture'-strikes a note of reformatory potential even in the most ghastly crime.\n\nThis axiom is a vote against 'death' and hope in 'life'.\n\nMany humane movements and sublime souls have cultured the higher consciousness of mankind, chased death penalty out of ha1f !he globe and changed world view on its morality.\n\nWe will, in the culminating part of ou_t; judgment, cull great opinions to substantiate this assertion but content here with pointing to their relevance as part of the conspectus,\n\nCriminologists have elabo.rately argued that 'death' has decisively lost the battle as the dominant paradigm and even in our Codes has shrunk into a weak exception.\n\nEven so, what are these exceptional cases? Not hunch or happen-stance but compelling grounds, lest me 'Chancellor's foot' syndrome reappear in different form.\n\nSo let us examine the grounds in this new sheen.\n\nAn easy confusion is over-stress on the horror of the crime and the temporary terror verging on insane violence the perpetrator displays, to the exclusion of a host of othe1' weighty factors when the scales are to settle in favour of killing by law the killer who resorts to unlaw.\n\n• g 11 i (-\n\ni- .. ii\n\n• '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. !•. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 0 7\n\nSpeaking illustratively i& shocking crime, without more, good to justify the lethal verdict?\n\nMost murders are horrifying, and an adjective adds but sentiment, not argument.\n\nThe personal story of a!l actor in a shocking murder, if considered, may bring tears and soften the sentence.\n\nHe might have been a tortu.red child, an ill-trrnted orphan. a jobless starveling, a badgered brothe.r, wounded son, a tragic person hardened by societal cruelty or vengeful justice, even a Hamlet or Parastlrama.\n\nHe might have been angelic boy but thrown , into mafia company or inducted into dopes and drugs by parental • neglect or morally-mentally retarded or disordered.\n\nImagine a harijan '- village backed out of existence by the, genocidal fury of a kulak group and one survivor, days later, cutting to pieces the villain of the earlier outrage.\n\nIs the court in error in reckoning the prior provocative\n\n---.\n\n• ,\n\nbarbarity as a sentencing factor?\n\nAnother facet.\n\nMaybe, the convict's poverty had disabled his presentation of the social milieu or other circumstances of extenuation in defence.\n\nJudges may be of moods, soft or severe; their weaknesses may be sublimated prejudices; their sympathies may be personal hypersensitivity.\n\nDid not Lord Camden, one of the greatest and purest of English judges, say\n\n\"that the discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper and passion.\n\nJn the best it is oftentimes cap.rice; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and passion to which human nature can be liable.\"\n\n(State v. Cummings 36 Mo.263 278 (1865)?(')\n\nWhen life is at stake, can such frolics of fortune play with judicial verdicts?\n\nThe nature of the crime-too terrible to contemplate-has often been regarded a traditional peg on which to hang a death penalty. 'Even Ediga Annamma (supra) has hardened here. But 'murder most foul' is not the test, speaking scientifically.\n\nThe doer may be a patriot, a revolutionary, a weak victim of an oveJpowering p2ssion who, given better environment, may be a good citizen, a good administrator, a good husband, a great saint . What was Valmiki once? And that sublime spiritual star, Shri Aurobindo, tried once for murder but by history\"s fortune acquitted.\n\nIf we go only by the nature of the c.rime we get derailed by subjecilve paroxysm. 'Special reasons' must vindicate the sentence and so\n\n(I) \"Judicial Discretion\" (supra) p. J~ . •\n\nmust be related to why the murderer must be hanged and why life imprisonment will not suffice.\n\nDecided cases have not adequately identfied the manifold components of comprehensive sentencing.\n\nResultantly, what is regarded as decisive is only relevant and what. is equally telling remains untold.\n\nFor reasons of ' special' grimness may be cancelled by juvenile justice.\n\nBrutality of the crime may be mollified at the level of sentencing justice by background of despair.\n\nEven a planned barbarity may be induced by an excessive obsession by one who could be a good person under other surroundings.\n\nWhy, the ghastly crime may in rare cases be due to a brain tumour.\n\nMyriad factors of varying validity may affect the death penalty either way.\n\nThe criminal will be projected on the scene and examined from different angles since the punishment is on the person, though for the offence.\n\nCAPITAL PENALTY AND THE CONSTITUTION In these pathless woods we must seek light from the Constitution regarding 'special reasons'.\n\nAfter all, no Code can rise higher than the Constitution and the Penal Code can survive only if it pays homage to the suprema lex.\n\nThe only correct approach is to read into s. 302 I.P.C. a_nd s.354(3) Cr.P.C., the human rights and humane trends in the Constituticm.\n\nSo examined, the right to life and to fundamenfal freedoms is deprived when he is hanged to death, his dignity is defifed when his neck is noosed and strangled.\n\nWhat does s.302 do by death penalty to the sentencee? It finally deprives him of his fundamental rights.\n\nTrue,.fundamental rights are not absolute and may be restricted reasonably, even prohibited totally, if '; ocial defence compels such a step.\n\nRestriction may expan~ into extinction in extreme situations. (see Narendra Kumar)(')\n\nPunishment by deprivation of life or liberty must be validated by Arts. 21, 14 and 19-the first guarantees fair procedure, the second is based on reasonableness of the deprivation of freedom to live and exercise the seven liberties and the last is an assurance of non-arbitrary and civilized punitive treatment. But in the connotation of these and olher Articles of Part III, the social justice promise of Part IV and the primordial proposition of human dignity set high in the Preamble must play upon the meaning.\n\nCrime and penal policy have to obey the behests set out above and we may gain constitutional light on the choice of 'life' or 'death' as appropriate punishment.\n\nArticle 14 surely ensures that principled sentences of death, not arbitrary or indignant capital penalty, shall be imposed.\n\nEqual protection emanates from equal principles in\n\n(I) AIR 1960 S.C. 430, •\n\n, .\n\n~.\n\n' •\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 109\n\nexercise of discretion.\n\nIn other words, the constraint o! consistency and the mandate against nnreasoning disregard ol material circumstances are implicit lest discretion attracts the acrid epigram of judicial caprice.\n\nThe dignity of the individual shall not be desecrated by infliction of atrocious death sentence merely because there is a murder proved although crying circumstances demand the ksser penalty. To exemplify, supposing a boy of fifteen incited by his elder brothers, chases with them a murde.rer of their father and after hours of search confronts the villain and vivisect~ him in blood-thirsty bestiality.\n\nDo you hang the boy, blind to his dignity and tenderness intertwined?\n\nWe mean to illustrate the applicability, not to exhaust the variables.\n\nEven here we may make it clear that equality is, not to be confounded with fiat uniformity.\n\n\"The element of flexibility and choice in the process of adjudicating is precisely what justice requires in many cases.\n\nFlexibility p_ermits more compassionate and more sensitive responses, to differences which ought to count in applying legal norms, but which get buried in the gross and rounded-off language of rules that are directed at wholesale problems instead of particular disputes.\n\nDiscretion in this sense allows the individualization of law and permits justice at limes to be hand-made instead of mass-produced.\n\nIn urging that discretion is the \"effective individualizin\" agent of the law\", Dean Pound pointed out that\n\nIn proceedings for custody of children, where compelling consideration (s) cannot be reduced to rules .... determination must be left, to no small extent, to the disciplined but personal feeling of the judge for what justice demands.\" (22 Syracuse L.R. 635, 636) (').\n\nEvery variability is not arbitrary.\n\nOn the contrary, it promotes rationality and humanity.\n\nArticle 19 is a lighthouse with seven lamps of liberty throwing luminous indications of when and when only the basic freedoms enshrined therein can be utterly extinguished.\n\nThe Judge who sits to decide between death penalty and life sentence must ask himself: Is it '<reasonably' necessary to extinguish hisl freedom of speech, of assembly and association, of free movement, by putting out finally the very flame of life? It is constitutionally permissible to swing a criminal out of corporeal existence only if the\n\n(I) Judicial Discretion, pp. 36-37.\n\nsecurity of State and society, public order and the interests of the general public compel that course as provided in Art. 19(2) to (6).\n\nThey are tho special reasons which s.354(3) speaks of.\n\nReas.onableness as envisaged in Art.19 has a relative connotation dependent on a variety of variables--cultural, social, economic and otherwise.\n\nWe may give concrete instances at a later stage of this judgment but feel it necessary to state here that what is reasonable at a given\n\n, lime or in a given country or in a situation of crisis may not be the same as on other occasions or in other cultural climates.\n\nIndeed, that is the unspoken but inescapable silent command of our constitutional .--! system. ·-,.\n\nSo, we search for guidelines within s.302 I.P.C. read with s.354 Cr. P.C., and find that ordinarily, for murder a life-term is appropriate save where 'special reasons' are found for resort to total extindlon of the right to life and farewell to fundamental rights.\n\nPublic order and social security must demand it.\n\nThat is to say, the sacrifice of a life is sanctioned only if otherwise public interest, social defence and public order would be smashed irretrievably.\n\nSocial justice is rooted in spiritual justice and regards individual dignity and human divinity with sensitivity.\n\nSo, such extra-ordinary grounds alone constitutionally qualify as 'special reasons' as leave no option to the court but to execute the offender if State and society are to survive.\n\nOne stroke of murder hardly qualifies for this drastic requirement, however gruesome the killing or pathetic the situation, unless the inhe1et testimony oozing from that act is irresistible that the murderous appetite of the convict is too chronic and deadly that ordered life in a given locality or society or in prison itself would be gone if this man were now or later to be at large. If he is an irredeemable murderer, like a bloodthirsty tiger, he has to quit his terrestrial tenancy.\n\nExceptional circumstances, beyond easy visualisation, are rieeded to fill this bill.\n\nTo repeat for emphasis, death--corporeal death--is adieu to fundamental rights.\n\nRestrictions on fundamental rights are permissible if they are reasonable.\n\nSuch restriction may reach the extreme state of extinction only if it is so compellingly reasonable to prohibit totally.\n\nWhile sentencing, you canot be arbitrary since ,,, hat is arbitrary is per se unequal.\n\nAs stated earlier you cannot be unusually cruel for that spells arbitrariness and violates Art.14.\n\nDouglas, J. made this point clear:(')\n\n-- (1) Furman v.\n\nGeorgia 408 U. S. 238 (1972).\n\n• '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 111\n\n\"There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic A\n\ntheme of equal protection is implicit in \"cruel and unusual\"\n\npunishments. \"A penalty ... should be considered 'wiusually' imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.\"\n\n\"They are pregnant with discrimination: and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on \"cruel and unusual\" punishments.\"\n\n;--- In Maneka Gandhi, this Court wrote:(')\n\n-----·\n\n\" '\n\n\"We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (') namely that \"from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.\"\n\nYou cannot inflict degrading punishment since the preamble speaks of 'dignity of the individual'.\n\nTo stone a man to death is lynch law which breaches human dignity and is unreasonable under Art.19 arid unusualy cruel and arbitrru:y under Art. 14. Luckily, our country is free from that barbarity legally.\n\nThe searching question the Judge must put to himself is: what then is so extra-ordinarily reasonable as to validate the wiping out of llfe itself and with it the great rights which inhere in him in the totality of facts, the circle being drawn with ampfo relevancy.\n\nSocial justice, which the Preamble and Part IV'. (Art.38) highlight as paramount in the governance of country, also has a role to mould the sentence.\n\nBut what is social justice? Despite its shadowy semantics we may get its essence once we grasp the Third World setting, the ethos and cultural heritage and the national goal or tryst with destiny.\n\nBalakrishna Iyer, J., in Sridharan Motor Service, Attur v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Others(') observed :\n\n\"Concepts of social justice have varied with age and clime.\n\nWhat would have appeared to be indubitable social justice to a Norman or Saxon in the days of William the\n\n(I) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) I S.C.C. 248 at 283.\n\n(2) (1974) 4 s.c.c. 3.\n\n(3) (1959) (1) L.L.J. 380,\n\n112 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nConqueror will not be recognised as such in England today.\n\nWhat may apear to be incontrovertible social justice to a resident of Quebec may wear a different aspect to a resident of Peking. If it could be possible for Confusius, Manu,\n\nHammurai and Solomon to meet together at a conference table, I doubt whether they would be able to evolve agreed formulae as to what constitutes social justice, which is a very controversial field. . . . In countries with democratic forms of Government public opinion and the law act and react on each other.\"\n\nWe may add that in a developing country, in the area of crime ---)_ C and punishment, social justice is to be rationally measured by social ? defence and, geared to developmental goals.\n\nThus, we are transported to the region of effective social defence as a large component of social justice. If the murderous operation of a die-hard criminal jeopardizes social security in a persistent, plan- • ned and perilous fashion, then his enjoyment of fundamental rights may be rightly annihilated.\n\nWhen, then, does a man hold out a terrible and continuing threat to social security in the setting of a developing country?\n\nHe does so if, by his action, he not only murders but by that offence, poses a grave peril to societal survival.\n\nIf society does not survive, individual existence comes to nought.\n\nSo, one test for impost of death sentence is to find out whether the murderer offers such a traumatic threat to the survival of social order.\n\nTo illustrate, if an economic offender wl]<) intentionally mixes poison in drugs professionally or wilfully adulterates intoxicating substances injuriously, and knowingly or intentionally causes death for the sake of private profit, such trader in lethal business is a_ l)lenace to social security and is, therefore, a violator of social justice whose extinction becomes necessary for society's survival.\n\nSupposing a murderous band of armed dacoits intentionally derails a train and large number al people die in consequence, if the ing<edients of murder are present and the object is to commit robbery inside the train, they practise social injustice and imperil social security to a degree that death penalty becomes a necessity if the crime is proved beyond doubt.\n\nThere may be marginal exceptions or special ex1enuations but none where this kind of dacoity or robbery coui:iled with murder becomes a contagion and occupation, and social seciLrity is so gravely imperilled that the fundamental rights on the defendant become a deadly instrument whereby many are wiped out and terror strikes community life.\n\nThen he 'reasonably' forefeits his fundamental rights ru1d takes leave of life under the law.\n\nThe style of violence and\n\n-.-\n\n. ~\n\n, '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 113\n\nsystematic corruption and deliberately planned economic offences by\n\ncarporatc top echelons are often a terrible technology of knowingly causing death on a macro scale to make a flood of profit.\n\nThe definition of murder will often apply to them.\n\nBut because of corpo.rate power such murderous depradations are not charged. If prosecuted and convicted for murder, they may earn the extreme penalty for taking the lives of innocents deliberntely for astronomical scales of gain.\n\nLikewise, if a man is a murderer, so hardened, so blood-thristy, c4hat within the prison and without, he makes no bones about killing others or carries on a prosperous business in cadavers, then he bcomes a candidate .. for death sentence. If psychoanalysts and psychrntnsts find him irredeemable in the reasonable run of time then his being alive will involve more lives being lost at his hands. If, however, he can be reformed in a few years' time by proper techniques of treatment imprisonment for life is good enough.\n\nBut, on the other hand if he is far too hadened that it has become his second nature to murder, society cannot experiment with correctional strategy, for, when he comes out of jail, he may kill others. Such an incurable murderer deserves to be executed under the law as it stands.\n\nDifficult to imagine though, but even the bizarre may happen. The socbl setting, the individual factors and like imp9nderables still remain to w spelt out.\n\nWhile the world is spiralling spiritually towards a society without Stasanctioned homicide, a narrow category may under current Indian societal distortions deserve death penalty although realistically the Law is held at bay by corporate criminals killing people through economic, product, environmental and like crimes.\n\n~ - Death penalty functionally fails to operate in this 3rea, for reasons r not relevant to unravel here but theta justice often claims human lives by hanging sentences by a distorted vision of the penological purposes anc! results.\n\nWhat we mean is that the retention of death sentence in s. 302 is rigorously restricted to these macro-purposes of social defence, state security and public order.\n\nBut in practice, purblind application of capital penalty claims victims who should not be hanged ' ' •\n\nat all.\n\nThe gross m_isapplication springs from professional innocence of the ideological, constitutional, criminological and cultural trends in India and abroad.\n\nJudicial decisions have hardly investigated these areas, have conjured up grisly images of crime and criminal. and, fed on discarded doctrines of retribution and deterrence, indulged in death awards blind to the socio-spiritual changes taking place in theoretical foundations of criminology and sublime movements on our human\n\nplanet. add to\n\nThe 'robes' are a <repository of many rare qualities but shall its repertory latest developments in sentencing wisdom.\n\nA paranoid preoccupation with the horror of the particular crime oblivious to other social and individual aspects is an error. The fact that a man has been guilty of barbaric killing haa-dly means that his head must roll in the absence of proof of his murderous recidivism, of incurable criminal violence, of a mafia holding society in ransom and • of incompatibility of peaceful co-existence between the man who did , the murder and society and its members. ~\n\nWe may constellate some of the principles.\n\nNever hang unless. society or its members may probably lose more lives by keeping alive an irredeemable convict. If rehabilitation is possible by long treatment > in jail, if deterrence is possible by life-long prison terms, capital sentence may be misapplied.\n\nDeath penalty is constitutionalised by reading into s. 354(3) Cr. P.C., those 'special reasons' which validate the sentence as reasonably necessitous and non-arbitrary, as just in the special societal circumstances.(')\n\nSocial justice turns on culture and situation.\n\nWe niust listen, even as judges who are human and not wholly free from sublimated violence, to the words of great men condensed in the message to the Delhi Conference Against Death Penalty a few months ago.\n\nLok Nayak Jai Prakash Narain said : (')\n\n\"To my mind, it is ultimately a question of respect for life and human approach to those who commit grievous hurts ilo others.\n\nDeath sentence is no remedy for such crimes.\n\nA more humane and constructive remedy is to remove the culprit concerned from the normal milieu and treat him as a mental case.\n\nI am sure a large proportion of the murderers could be weaned away from their path and their men- _ -....( ta! condition sufficiently improved to become useful citizens.\n\nIn a , minority of cases, this may not be possible.\n\nThey may be kept in prison houses till they die a natural death.\n\nThis may cast a heavier economic burden on society than hanging.\n\nBut I have no doubt that a humane treatment even of a murderer will enhance man's dignity and make society more human.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nAndrie Sakharov, in a message to the Stockholm Conference on Abolition organised by Amnesty International last year, did put the point more bluntly : (')\n\n(1) On the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Amnesty International, p. 13.\n\n(2) Message by Andrei Sakharov to the Amnesty International Conference held in Stockholm on Dec. 10 & 11, 1977.\n\n' '\n\n. --·\n\n\" '\n\nRAJBNDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J_) 115\n\n\"I regard the death penalty as a savage and immoral institution which undermines the moral and legal foundations of a society. A State, in the person of its functionaries, who hke all people are inclined to making superficial conclusions who like all people are subject to influences, connections, prejudices and egocentric motivations for their behaviour, takes upon itself the right to the most terrible and irreversible act -the deprivation of life. Such a State cannot expect an improvement of the moral atmosphere in its country. I reject the notion that the death penalty has any essential deterrent effect on potential offenders. I am convinced that the contrary is true-that savagery begets only savagery .. _I am convinced that society as a whole and each of its members individually, not just the person who comes before the courts, bears a responsibility for the occurrence of a crime .... I believe that the death penalty has no moral or practical justification and represents a survival of barbaric customs of revenge.\n\nBlood-thirsty and calculated revenge with no temporary insanity on the part of the judges, and therefore, shameful and disgusting.\" (emphasis added)\n\nTolstoy wrote an article \"I cannot be silent\" protesting against death\n\nsentence where he said : (1) E\n\n\"Twelve of those by whose labour we live, the very men whom we have depraved and are still depraving by every means in our power--from the poison of vodka to the terrible falsehood of a creed we impose on them with all our .\n\nmight, but do not ourselves believe in-twelve of those men strangled with cords by those whom they feed and clothe and house, and who have depraved and still continue to deprave them. Twelve husbands, fathers, and sons, from among those upon whose kindness, industry, and simplicity alone rests the whole of Russian life, are seized, imprisoned, and shackled.\n\nThen their hands are tied behind their backs lest they should seize the ropes by which are to be hung, and they are led to the gallows.\"\n\nVictor Hugo's words are not vapid sentimentalism :\n\n\"We shall look upon crime as a disease.\n\nEvil will be\n\ntreated in charity instead of anger.\n\nThe change will be H simple and sublime. The cross shall displace the scaffold,\n\n(1) Mainstream October 14, 1978 p. 17.\n\nA Reason is on our side, feeling is on our side, and experience is on our side.\"\n\nGandhiji wrote :\n\n\"Destruction of individuals can never be a virtuous act.\n\nThe evil-doers cannot be done to death. Today there is a movement afoot for the abolition of capital punishment and • attempts are being made to convert prisons into hospitals as If they are persons suffering from a disease.\" '\n\nQuotations from noble minds are not for decoration but for adapta- tion within the framework of the law.\n\nThis Gandhian concept was, put , to the test without effects calamitous in the Chambal dacoits' cases : (1) >\n\n\"Take the classic example of the blood-thirsty dacoits of Chambal.\n\nThe so-called dacoits, in reality the Thakurs of Delhi in the 12th century, were driven to the desolate Chambal Valley. They had no other recourse except to steal and, if necessary, murder for their survival. The 800 years injustice they suffered can be remedied only by their economic emancipation.\n\nRemember, no one is born a criminal.\n\nSarvodaya leaders Jayaprakash Narain and Vinoba Bhave won over dacoits with love, affection and understandingsomething sophisticated, automatic weapons failed to do.\"\n\n\\\\e have, unfortunately no follow-up s:udy of this experiment.\n\nComing down to unhappy pragmatism, death penalty is permissible only where reformation within a reasonable range, is impossible. The confusion is simple but die-hard.\n\nWe lawfully murder the murderer, not the murder, by infliction of capital sentence, for which the strictest justification is needed if human dignity assured by the Constitution is not to be judicially dismissed as an expendable luxury.\n\nThe deduction is inevitable that simply because a murder is brutal, lex talionis must not take over nor humane justice flee. This propositwn is tested in a crisis and the court's responsibility is heavy to satisfy itself that the nature of the crime is considered, not for its barbarity as such but for its internal evidence of incurably violent depravity. We have dealt with this aspect earlier but repeat, since it is horrendous or many lives have been lost. Our culture is at stake, our karuna is threatened, our Constitution is brought into contempt by a cavalier indifference to the deep reverence for life and a superstitious offering of human sacrifice to propitiate the Goddess of Justice.\n\n(1) Article by Dr. L. H. Hiranandani in Illustrated Weekly of India dt. 29th August, 1976.\n\n• ,.\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 117\n\nThese illustrations show that angry or scary irrationality has no place in awarding death sentence because 'reasonableness' and fairness are the touchstone of the constitutionality of capital penalty.\n\nThus, \"e hold that only in these very limited circumstances can the court award the extreme penalty. The terrible nature of the murder should not frenzy the court into necessary 'capital' penalty, for its pertinence i; only to the extent it helps to decide whether the prisoner, if released after a few years in a penitentiary, will reasonably be prone to conti-\n\nL ' nued killing. If life-long imprisonment will prevent further killing, he \"°\" t may be allowed to live with the limited fundamental rights allowed in . a prison setting.\n\nJ Even in extreme cases, one has to judge carefully whether the c ' social circumstances, personal remorse, the excruciation of long pendency of the death sentence, with the prisoner languishing in nearsclitary suffering all the time, are not adequate infliction, so as to make ca,:iital sentence too cruel and arbitrary and agonising not to violate Art. 14.\n\nOur penal pharmacopoeia must provide for the extreme remedy of extinction of the whole personality only in socially critical situations. This is spiritual-social justice.\n\nI . '\n\nSometimes the thought is expressed that the life of the victim, the misery of his family and the great pain cruelly caused, are forgotton by those who advocate mercy for the brutal culprit. This is a fallacy fraught with miscarriage of justice. Punishment is not compensation E like the 'blood money' ot Islamic law. It is not lex talionis of retributive genre.\n\nTo be strictly compensatory or retributive, the same type of cruel killing must be imposed on the killer. Secondly, can the banging of the murderer bring the murdered back to life ? 'The dull cold ear of death' cannot hear the cries or see the tears of the dying convict. There is a good case for huge fines along with life-terms in F sentences where the sum is realisable and payable to the bereaved.\n\nThe Indian Penal Code fabricated in the imperial foundry well over a century ago has not received anything but cursory parliamentary attention in the light of the higher values of the National Charter which is a testament. of social justice. Our Constitution respects the G dignity and, therefore, the divinity of the individual and preservation of life, of everyone's life.\n\nSo the Court must permeate the Penal Code with exalted and expanded meaning to keep pace with constitutional values and the increasing enlightenment of informed public opinion. A nineteenth century text, when applied to twentieth century conditions, cannot be construed by signals from the grave. So, while ff courts cannot innovate beyond the law, the law cannot be viewed as cavemen's pieces.\n\nThe penological winds of change, reflected in\n\nA juristic debates, bills for abolition of death penalty in Parliament and the increasing use of clemency and commutation by the highest Executive, must affect the living law of statutory application.\n\n,..\n\n• There is yet another consideration of grave moment which must, weigh with the court, vowed to uphold Justice-Social, Economic and Political. Who, by and large, are the men whom the gallows swallow?\n\nThe white-collar criminals and the corporate criminals whose wilful economic and environmental crimes inflict mass deaths or who ' .. hire assassins and murder by remote control? Rarely.\n\nWith a few , .... exceptions, they hardly fear the halter.\n\nThe feuding villager, heady~ with country liquor, the striking workers desperate with defeat, the \">-. political dissenter and sacrificing liberator intent on changing the social order from satanic misrule, the waifs and strays whom society has hardened by neglect into street toughs, or the poor householderhusband or \\Vile-driven by dire necessity or burst of tantrums-it s this person who is the morning meal of the macabre executioner.\n\nJustice Douglas, in a famous death penalty case, observed :\n\n\"Former Attorney Ramsey Clark has said : 'It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.\"\n\n\"A characteristic of village murderers in India : over 60 per cent of them have lost their parents, either one or both, at the time of commission of the crime. Inadequate parental protection is thus one of the primary factors in the upbringing of a murderer. The very existence of parents helps the healthy growth of the offspring and prevents the children from falling into the whirlpool of crime.\"\n\nComments the Editor, the Illustrated Weekly ol India dated August 29, 1976.\n\nHistorically speaking, capital sentence perhaps has a class bias and colour bar, even as criminal law barks at both but bites the proletariat to defend the proprietariat, a reason which, incidentally, explains why corporate criminals including top executives who, by subtle processes, account for slow or sudden killing of large members by adulteration, smuggling, cornering, pollution and other invisible operations, are not on the wanted list and their offending operations which directly derive profit from mafia and white.collar crimes are not visited with death penalty, while relatively lesser delinquencies have, in statutory and forensic rhetoric, deserved the extreme penalty. Penal\n\n. -\n\n\\ •\n\n' ..\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 119\n\nlaw is not what the printed text professes but what the prison cell and A the condemned man testify.\n\nCourts take a close-up of the immediate circumstances not the milieu which made the murderer nor the environs which make him man again. In equal justice under the Jaw, this imbalance of s. 302 I.P.C., in action cannot be missed.\n\n'°'\n\nThe tradition-bound agencies of justicing cocooned by judicial precedents reflecting by-gone values make sentencing processes 'soft' where they should be severe and tainted with torture where a healing\n\n'- touch comports with culture.\n\nIndeed, the habitual cerebrations of ~oth wings of the profession have been guiltless of the great experiment of injecting the humanism of the National Charter through the interpretative art into criminal statistics.\n\nSocial justice on the one hand, means social defence from white-collar and kindred criminals not through procrastinating illusions of punishment but instant deterrents to anti-social delinquents and, on the other, Prison Justice, Reforms of offenders, non-institutional strategies through community participation in correction and, above all, sentencing essays which ensure dignity of the individual human decencies and uplifting projects which re-make the criminal into a good citizen.\n\nSeveral of our prison houses and practi_ces make us wonder about institutional criminality and 'punishment' becoming a brand of crime and, worse, a manufacturing process of dehumanized criminals. Prison Reform is on the national agenda.\n\nSentencing Reform soon deserves to be added.\n\nAn Indo-Anglian appreciation of British Justice is sometimes relie.! on subconsciously, strengthened by the ambiguous Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Penalty to substantiate the retentionist theory.\n\nBut it is note-worthy that Sir Samuel Romilly, critical of the brutal ,,1r---penalties in the then Britain, said in 1817 : 'The Laws of England are written in blood'.\n\nAlfieri has suggested : 'Society prepares the ---• crime, the criminal commits it. 'We may permit ourselves the liberty\n\n~ to quote from Judge Sir Jeoffrey Streatfield : 'If you are going to have anything to do with the criminal courts, you should see for yourself the conditions under which prisoners serve their sentence.' ' ' I . \\\n\n\"It would be extremely gratifying to scan the. pages of British legal and social history and to find that the members of the judiciary were invariably in the fore-front of the movement towards enlightenment, progress and humanity.\n\nUnfortunately until very recently, this has never been the case; in fact, it would be fair to say the judges have usually been amongst the principal opponents of penal reform. It may be\n\nthat they were too far divided from the rest of the populace in the remoteness of their dignity, and too far removed in their standards of physical comfort and intellectual elegance.\n\nPerhaps if a number of them had personally investigated the pitiable squalor of the prisons, the depravity of the haulks, and the bestial cruelties on the scaffold, some at least might have been shocked into a public condemnation of the , entire penal system.\n\nBut, as it was, they preferred to remain either ignorant of or acquiescent to the aftermath of their judgments and of all the ensuing horrors which were being carried out in the name of the law.\"(')\n\nBritish Justice has abandoned death penalty for murder for two decades now (Homicide Act, 1957) without escalation of murderous crime.\n\nAttempts to get round the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965 have failed in Parliament and as Barbara Wooton says, 'Capital punishment thus appeared to be itself sentenced to death' for murder. To quote the Royal Commission's recommendation for retention after Parliament has abolished death penalty is only of historical interest : \"After the Abolition Act had been in force for ove.r seven years, the Criminal Law Revision Committee considered whether any further changes in the penalty for murder were desirable.\n\nTheir conclusions were almost entirely negative.\"\n\nThis perspective jlistifies judicial evolution of a humane. penal doctrine because the legislative text is not static; and as Chief Justice Warren wrote in Trop v. Dulles the court 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of a maturing society'. The great answer to grave crime is culturing of higher consciousness, removing the pressure of a perverted social order, and nourishing the fnner awareness of man's true nature.\n\nThis is true penal reform, including jail reform.\n\nA difficult category which defies easy solution, even in the developmental-social justice background, is the political or ideological murderer.\n\nWhere freedom of faith and conscience is affirmed, as in our Constitution, where concentration of wealth and ethnic and social suppression are anathema and egalitarian-cum-distributive justice are positive goals, 'criminals' motivated by the fundamental creed of our Constitution may well plead for the benefit of life imprisonment. Count Leo Tolstoy in his Recollections and Essays denounces death >malty even against revolutionaries by arguments too Gandhian to be dismissed by Indian judges in the sentencing sector of discretion.\n\n(I) The Power to Silence : A History of Punishment in Britain by Anthony llabingtton, p. 46-47.\n\n\\ '\n\nI •\n\n---·\n\n. '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 121\n\ndo not dogmatise but suggest the trend.\n\nLaw by itself is no answer A to Justice as the sublime instances of Socrates, Jesus and martyrs galore in the long story of Man point.\n\nWe do not underrate the importance of strong pulJlic denunciation of serious crimes like murder and heavy punishment for it.\n\nThe critical question is whether capital sentence or incarceration for life in B a hospital setting-both stern, but the former a final farewell to life itself, the latter a protracted living ordeal-which of the two harsh alternatives should be inflicted.\n\nCriminologists have reached near-consensus that death penalty for murder is judicial futility as a deterrent and is a vulgar barbarity, if fruitless.\n\nAnd Reformationists have made headway so much that about 80 countries have given up capital sentence.\n\nEngland had 200 offences which carried death sentences and publicly hanged boys and girls for stealing spoons and the like.\n\nStealing persists, death penalty has disappeared. The importance of death sentence as a deterrent is brought out with characteristic wit by Dr. Johnson, who according to Boswell, noted pickpockets plying their trade in a crowd assembled to ee one of their number executed'. There is no moral defence against the application of lustitia du/core misericordiac temperate (Justice tempered by mercy, literally by sweetness of compassion) even in the name of deterrence.\n\nCONDENSED GUIDELINES We may summarise our conclusions to facilitate easier application and to inject scientific formulation.\n\n1. The criminal law of the Raj vintage has lost some of its vitality, notwithstanding its formal persistence in print in the Penal Code so far as s. 302 I.P.C. is concerned.\n\nIn the post-Constitution period s. 302 I.P.C., and s. 345(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have to be read in the humane light of Parts III and IV, further illumined by the\n\nPreamble to the Corntitution. In Sunil Batra (') a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed :\n\n\"Consciously and deliberately we must focus our attention, while examining the challenge, to one fundamental fact that we are required to examine the validity of a pre-constitution statute in the context of the modern reformist theory of puishment, jail be; ng treated as a correctional institution\" \"Cases arc not unknown where merely on account of a long lapse of time the Courts have commuted the sentence of\n\n(1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494 at pp. 569 & 572.\n\n9-196 SCI/79\n\ndeath to one of life imprinsonment on the sole ground that the prisoner was for a long time hovering under the tormenting effect of the hadow of death.\"\n\n\"The scheme of the Code, read in the light of the Constitution, leaves no room for doubt that reformation, not retribution, is the sentencing lode\"star.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\n2. The retributive theory has had its day and is no lttnger valid.\n\nDeterrence and reformation are the primary social goals which make deprivation of life and liberty reasonable as penal panacea.\n\n3. The current e, thos, with its strong emphasis on human rights and against death penalty, together with the ancient strains of culture spanniug the period from Buddha to Gandhi must ethically inform the concept of social justice which is a paramount principle and cultural paradigm of our Constitution.\n\n4. The personal aud social, the motivational and physical drcumstances, of the criminal are relevant factors in adjudging the penalty as clearly provided for under the new Code of 1973. So also the intense suffering already endured by prison torture or agonising death penalty hanging over head consequent on the legal process.\n\n5. Although the somewhat absolescent M'N aughten Rules codified in s. 84 of the Penal Code alone are exculpatory mental imbalances, neurotic upsets and psychic crises may be extenuatory and the sense of diminished responsibility may manifest itself in judicial clemey of commuted life incarceration.\n\n6. Social justice, projected by Art. 38, colours the concept of reasonableness in Art. 19 and non-arbitrariness in Art.\n\n14. This complex of articles validates death penalty in a limited class of cases as explained above.\n\nMaybe, train dacoity and bank robbery bandits, reaching menacing proportions, economic offenders profit-killing in an intentional and organised way, are such categories in a Third World G setting.\n\nApart from various considerations which may weigh with the Court, one consideration which may be relevant in given circumstances, is the planned motivation that goaded the accused to commit the crime. Largely in India death is caused not by a cool, calculated, professionally cold B blooded planning but something that happened on the spur of the moment. In fact in faction-ridden society faction~ come to grip on a minor provocatio, n and a gruesome tragedy occurs.\n\n.fl• •I\n\n. -\n\n' . \\\n\n' .\n\n'- t\n\n, ---..\n\n. '\n\nRAJENDRA V u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 123\n\nBut with the development of the complex industrial society there has come into existence a class of murderers who indulge in a nefarious activity solely for personal, monetary or property gain.\n\nThese whitecollar criminals in apprnpriate cases do deserve capital punishment as the law now stands, both as deterrent and as putting an end to an active mind indulging in incurably nelfarious activities. It is such characteristics that determine more or less the gravity and the character of the offence and offender.\n\nWe may venture that sometimes there is big money in the subtle \"murder\" business disguised as economic offences or industrial clashes; and there social justice in certain circumstances punctures 'soft' justice and opts for lethal sentence. Where intractable mafia shows up in murderous profusion, the sentence of death must, reluctantly though, defond society.\n\n7. The survival of an orderly society without which the extinction of human rights is a probability compels the higher protection of the lllw to those officers who are charged with the fearless and risky diseharge of hazardous duties in strategic situations.\n\nThose officers of Jaw, like p01icemeu on duty or soldiers and the like have to perform their functions even in the face of threat of violence sometimes in conditions of great handicap. If they are killed by designers of murder and the law does not express its strong condemnation in extreme penalisation, justice to those called upon to defend justice may fail.\n\nThis facet of social justice also may in certain circumstances and at certain stages of societal life demand death sentence.\n\n8. When an environmental technologist, food and drug chemist or engine manufacturer intentionally acts in the process, abetted by the top decision-makers in the corporation concerned, in such manner\n\nthat the consumer will in all probability die but is kept wilfully in the F dark about the deadly consequence by glittering advertisement or suppressio veri, he deserves dealth penalty for society's survival, if he fulfils the elements of murder. Maybe, a re-definition of murder may be needed to make this legal mandate viable.\n\nParliamentarians and judicial personnel may benefit by the observations made by Rlph Nader on American Law-in-action .( 1) G\n\n\"In no clearer fashion has the corporation held the law at bay than in the latter's paralysis toward the corporate crime wave.\n\nCrime statistics almost wholly ignore corporate or business crime; there is l; st of the ten most wanted corporations; the law affords no means of regularly collecting H\n\n(1) Introduction by Ralph Nader to 'America Inc.' by Morton Mintz and Jerry\n\nS. Cohen, p. 11.\n\ndata on corporate crime; and much corporate criminal bchavionr (snch as pollution) has not been made a crime because of corporate opposition.\n\nFor example, wilful and knowing violations of auto, tire, radiation, and gas pipe-line safety standards are not considered crimes under the relevant\n\nstatutes even if lives are lost as a result. The descriptiion of an array of corporate crimes in this forthright book reveals a legal process requiring courage, not routine duty, by officials to enforce the laws against such outrages.\n\nThe Jaw is much more comfortable sentencing a telephone coin box thief to five years than sentencing a billion-dollar price-fixing executive to six weeks in jail. In one recounting after another, the authors pile up the evidence toward one searing conclusion-that corporate economic, product, and environmental crimes dwarf other crimes in damage to health, safety and property, in confiscation or theft of other people's monies, and in control of the agencies which are supposed to stop this crime and fraud.\n\nAnd it all goes on year after year by blue-chip corporate recidivists.\n\nWhy ? It is easy to answer- \"power.\" But that is the beginning, not the end, of understanding.\"\n\n9. 'Special reasons' necessary for imposing death penalty must relate, not to the crime as such but to the criminal.\n\nThe crime may be shocking and yet the criminal may not deserve death penalty. The crime may be less shocking than other murders and yet the callous criminal, e.g. a lethal economic offender, may be jeopardizing societal existence by his act of murder. Likewise, a hardened murderer or dacoit or anned robber who kills and relishes killing, the raping and\n\nmurdering to such an extent that he is jJeyond rehabilitatio11. within a reasonable period according to current psycho-therapy or curative techniques may deserve the terminal sentence.\n\nSociety survives by security for ordinary life. If officers enjoined to defend the peace are\n\ntreacherously killed to facilitate perpetuation of murderous and often plunderous crimes social justice steps in to demand death penalty dependent on the totality of circumstances.\n\n10. We must always have the brooding thought that there is a divinity in every man and that none is beyond redemption.\n\nBut death penalty, still on our Code, is the last step in a narrow category where, within a reasonable spell, the murderer is not likely to be cured a\\!d tends to murder others, even within the prison or immediately on release, if left alive-a king cobra which, by chronic habit, knows only\n\n' -..\n\n\\ .\n\nI ~\n\n•• ' . '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 12 5\n\nto sting to death unless defanged if possible. The patienre of society must be tempered by the prudence of social security and that is the limited justification for deprivation of fundamental rights by extinguishment of the whole human being. The extreme penalty can be invoked only in extreme situations.\n\nThe criminology of higher consciousness claims that by expanding Inner awareness through meditational and yogic techniques the worst offender can be reformed, if prisons can function more fulfillingly and less fatuously a consummation devoutly to be wished ! Murderers are not born but made and often can be unmade.\n\nThis claim, if experimented with and found credible, goes a long way to remove from the scales of justice stains of human blood. When this healing hope is developed adequately, may be the penal pharmacopoeia may remoye death sentence from the system. The journey is long and we are far from home.\n\nCurrently, our prisons often practice zoological, not humanising strategies, as some competent reports and writings tend to prove.\n\nWhat we have laid down is not in super\"session of those extenuating situations already considered by this Court as sufficient to commute death sentence but is supplementary to them and seeks to streamline, so that erratic judicial rcspon&os may be avoided.\n\nIn Ediga Annamma. (supra), for instance, this Court has held, and while endorsing, we repeat it for emphasis :\n\n\"Where the murderer is too young or too old, the clemency of P'cnal justice help him. Where the offender suffers from socio-economic, psychic or penal compulsions insufficient to attract a legal exception or to downgrade the crime into a lesser one, judicial commutation is permissible. Other general social pressures, warranting judicial notice, with an extenuating impact may, in special cases, induce the lesser penalty. Extraordinary features in the judicial process,. such as that the death sen'.•cnce has bung over the head of the culprit excruciatingly Jong, may persuade the Court to be compassionate. Likewise, if others rnvolved in the crime and similarly situated have received the benefit of life imprisonment or if the offence is only constructive, being under s. 302 read with s. 149, or again the accused had acted suddenly under another's instigation, without pre-meditation, perhaps the Court may humanely opt for life, even like where a just cause or real suspicion of wifely indefility pushed the criminal into the crime.\n\nOn the other hand, the weapons used and\n\nthe manner of their use, the horrendous features of the crime and hapkss, helpless state of the victim, and the like, ,; te<l/\n\nthe heart of the law for a sterner sentociee.\"( 1)\n\nIn Srirangan v. State of Tamil Nadu(') the Court set aside a death sentence even though three had been killed.\n\nThat was a case of three innocent lives Ifni down without provocation and although the courts below had concurrently inflicted death sentence, a Bench of three judges confining the focus on sentence alone commuted the punishment.\n\nThe crucial role of young age (in his twenties) and a trace of mental imbalance in robbing the propriety of a death impost even from such a ghastly case of tripe murder was emphasised. This Court's observations on the sensitive attitude to sentencing and the wide spectrums of considerations under s. 354(3) Cr.P.C. are helpful here:\n\n\"The plurality of factors bearing on the crime and the doer of the crime must carefully enter the judicial verdict.\n\nThe winds of penological reform notwithstanding, the prescription in s. 302 binds, the death penalty is still perrniss.ible in the punitive pharmacopoeia of India. Even so, the current of precedents and the relevant catena of clement facts, personal, social and other, persuade us to hold that even as in Nanu Ram v. State of Assam (AIR 1975 SC 762), the lesser penalty of life imprisonment will be a more appropriate punishment here.\"\n\nA brief word about Lalla Singh.(') That was a case of murder of three persons and the head of one of the deceased, a lady, was severed.\n\nThe trial judge awarded the extreme penalty to him who did this gruesome deed.\n\nBut the court reduced the sentence to life term grounded on the Jong and agonising gap between the date of offence and the disposal of the case by the Supreme Court :\n\n\"While we are unable to say that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in imposing the extreme penalty, we feel that as the offence was committed on 18-6-1971 more than six years ago, the ends of justice do not require that we should confirm the sentence of death passed on the first respondent.\"\n\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 274 at 275.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1978 SC 368 at 374.\n\n•• l\n\nI <\n\n• r-·.\n\nI ...\n\n----;\n\n• f . \\\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna lye.-, J.) 127\n\nWe have read the penal Code (s. 302) in harmony with the Procedure Code (s. 354(3)) and tuned up both the Codes to receive the command of the Constitution. 'Too kind for too Jong to criminals' is a cynical comment which comes with a call for revival of more hangings as a gut reaction to a horrible crime, forgetting that crimelessness comes only from higher consciousness.\n\nAnd, in a democracy, if such offences escalate beyond endurance and such cries rise from all over, penal policy may change, whether the judges and jurists and moralists and murderers relish it or not.\n\nEven so, the basic humanity of mankind cannot be surrendered to panicky calls and passionate rea£tions provoked by stray though shocking, events.\n\nTwo significant developments need to be stressed before we conclude the general discussion.\n\nThe first is the functional failure, at the forensic level, o! the meaningful provision in the Procedure Code, 1973 intended to help the court to individualise sentencing justice to fit the crime and the criminal.\n\nThe sentence of death can be imposed by the Sessions Judge and it can only be executed after it is confirmed by the High Court as provided in Chapter XXVIII of the Code. The procedure prescribed for the trial of session:; cases is contained in Chapter XVIII. Section 235 which is relevant for this purpose reads as under :-\n\n\"235 (1) After hearing arguments and points of Jaw (it any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case.\n\n(2) If the accusod is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to Jaw.\"\n\nA specific stage is prescribed in the trial of cases tried by the Sessions Cffurt in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Chapter\n\nXVIII.\n\nAfter the prosecution evidence is complete and the accused is called upon to enter the defence and if evidence is led on behalf of defence, after the defence evidence is complete, the Court should hear arguments of the Prosecutor and the advocate on behalf of the accused (see s. 234). Thereafter comes s. 235 which obligates the Court to give a judgment. The question of sentence does not enter the verdict or consideration at this stage. If the accused is to be acquitted, the matter ends there. If the Court, upon consideration of the evidence led before it, holds the accused gnilty of any offence it must pronounce judgment to the extent that it holds accused guilty of a certain offence.\n\n1 28 RAJENORA v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer,!.)\n\nThereafter a statutory duty is cast upon the Court to hear the accused on the question of sentence.\n\nSub-s. (2) obligate. the Court to hear the accused on the question of sentence.\n\nIn fact, this provision should be construed to mean that where the Court has to choose one or the other sentence and if with a view to inflicting a certain sentence, special reasons are required to be recorded, obviously the State which is the prosecutor, must be called upon to state to the Court which sentence as prosecutor it would consider appropriate in the facts and circumstnaces of the case.\n\nWhere the accused is convicted for an offence under s. 302, I.P .C., the Court shodJd call upon the Public Prosecutor at the stage of s. 235 (2) to state to the Court whether the case is one where the accused as a matter of justice should be awarded the extreme penalty of law or the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life. If the Public Prosecutor informs the Court that the State as Prosecutor is of the opinion that the case is not one where extreme penalty is called for and if the Sessions Judge agrees with the submission, the matter should end there.\n\nIf on the other hand the Public Prosecutor states that the case calls for extreme penalty prescribed by law, the Court would be well advised to call upon the Public Prosecutor to state and establish, if necessary, by leading evidence, facts for seeking extreme penalty prescribed by law.\n\nThose reasons and the evidence in support of them would provide the special reasons according to the State which impel capital punishment. It would be open to the accused to rebut this evidence either by submissions or if need be, by leading evidence.\n\nAt that stage the only consideration relevant for the purpose of determining the quantum of punishment would be the consideration bearing on the question of sentence alone and not on the validity of the verdict of guilty.\n\nAfter considering the submissions and evidence it would be for tile Court with its extreme judicious approach and bearing; in mind the question that the extreme penalty is more an exception, :to determine what would be the appropriate sentence.\n\nThis would ensure a proper appreciation of vital considerations entering judicial verdict for determining the quantum of sentence.\n\nWe hope the Bar will assist the Bench in fully using the resources of the new provision to ensure socio-personal justice, instead of ritualising the submissions on sentencing by reference only to materials brought on record for proof or disproof of guilt\n\nThe second major development is the amendment of s. 302 IPC moved by Government and already passed by the Rajya Sabha doing\n\n--\\.\n\n...\n\n' . l\n\nI '\n\naway with death penalty for murder save in exceptional categories. So A far as it goes, the benignity of the change reflects the constitutional culture we have explained.\n\nThe discretion still left, in our view, must be guided by the mariner's compass we have supplied !r. this Judgment.\n\nTHE FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS\n\n~· Having stated the law at length, we have to apply it to the facts , of the cases, which we proceed to state.\n\nAfter all, \"Let the facts be known as they are, and the law will sprout from the seed and turn ..-.~ ) its branches towards the light\"(').\n\nWe may now state the facts needed \" for the application of the principles set out above.\n\nRAJENDRA PRASAD'S CASE\n\nA long-standing family feud, with years-long roots, Jet to a tragic murder. The houses of Ram Bharosey and Pyarelal had fallen out and periodic fuelling of the feud was furnished by the kidnapping of a wife, the stabbing of a brother and the like.\n\nLok Adalats of village elders brought about truce, not peace.\n\nThe next flare-up was a murder by the appellant, a rash oon of one of the feuding elders Pyarelal.\n\nHe was sentenced to life imprisonment (which means no reformation but hardening process, since our jails are innocent of carefully designed programme of re-humanizing but have an iatrogenic, inherited drill of de-huma11ising), The young man, after some years served in prison, was released on Gandhi Jayanti Day.\n\nBut Gandhian hospitalsetting was, perhaps, absent in the prison which, in all probability, was untouched by reformation of diseased minds, the fundamental Gandhian thonght.\n\nThe result was the releasee kept alive his vendetta on return, aggravated by the 'zoological' life inside.\n\nSome minor mcident ignited his latent feud and he stabbed Ram Bharosey and his friend Mansukh several times, and the latter succumbed. The 'desperate character' once sentenced, deserved death this second time, said the Sessions Court and the High Court confirmed the view.\n\nAn application of the canons we have laid down directly arises.\n\nThere is the conm1on confusion here.\n\nA second murder is not to be confounded with the persistent potential for murderous attacks by the murderer. This was not a menace to the social order but a specific family feud.\n\nWhile every crime is a breach of social peace, the assailant is bound over only if he is a public menace.\n\nLikewise, here was not a youth of uncontrollable violent propensities against the com-\n\n(1) Benjamin Nathan Cardozo \"What Medicine Can Do For Law\" Address before the New York Acade1ny of Medicine Nov. 1, 1928.\n\n130 liUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.11..\n\nA munity but one whose paranoid preoccupation with a family quarrel goaded him to go at the rival.\n\nThe distinction is fine but real.\n\nHow do we designate him 'desperate' without blaming the jail which did little to make a man out of the criminal clay ? So long as thereapeutic processes are absent from prisons, these institutions, far from being B the healing hope of society, prove hardening schools to train desperate criminals.\n\nThe pitiless verse of Oscal Wilde is pitifully true even today :\n\n\"The vilest deeds, like poison weeds, Bloom well in prison air; It is only what is good in Man That wastes and withers there\"\n\n\"Desperate criminal\" is a convenient description to brand a person.\n\nSeldom is the other side of the story exposed to judicial view-the failure of penal institutions to cure criminality and their succeis in.\n\nD breaking the spirit or embittering it.\n\nPrasad's prison term never 'cured' him.\n\nWho bothered about cure ? The blame for the second murder is partly on this neglect.\n\nNothing on record suggests that Rajendra Prasad was beyond redemption; nothing on record hints at any such attempt inside the prison Lock-up of a criminal for long years behind stone walls and iron bars, with drills of breaking the morale, will not change the prisoner for the better Recidivism is an index of prison failure, in most cases.\n\nAny way, Rajendra showed no incurable disposition to violent outbursts against his fellow-men.\n\nWe see no special reason, to hang him out of corporeal existence. But while awarding him life imprisonment instead, we direct for him mental-moral healing courses through suitable work, acceptable meditational techniques and psychotherapic drills to regain his humanity and dignity.\n\nPrisons are not human warehouses but humane retrieval homes.\n\nEven going by precedents like Lalla Singh (supra) this convict has had the hanging agony hanging over his head since 1973, with nearsolitary confinement to boot.\n\nHe must, by now, be more a vegetable than a person and hanging a vegetable is not death penalty. This is an additional ground for our reduction.\n\nTHE KUN!UKUNJU CASE\n\nThe next case is no different in the result but very different on the facts.\n\nThe scenario is the usual sex triangle, terribly perverted. One\n\n-'\\----\n\n, ,\n\n...\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 131\n\nrandy Janardanan-the appellant-with a wife and two children, developed sex relations with a fresh girl and the inevitable social resistance to this betrayal of marital fidelity led to a barbaric short-en! by this in criminal of cutting to death the innocent wife and the immaculate kids in the secrecy of night.\n\nTo borrow the vivid words of the courts below, 'deliberate', 'cold-blooded' was the act, attended as it was with 'considerable brutality'.\n\nThis ruled out mitigation and supplied 'special reasons', according to both the coarts below, for the awesome award of death penalty.\n\nWas that right? If the crime alone was the ;-criterion, yes; but if the criminal was the target, no .\n\nThe brucial question is whether the crime and its horrendous character except to the extent it reveals irreparable depravity and chronic propensity is relevant. The innocent three will not be haopy because one guilty companion is also added to their number.\n\nIs J anardanan a social security risk, altogether beyond salvage by therapeutic life sentence ? If he is, the pall must fall on his cadayer. If not, life must burn on.\n\nSo viewed, no material, save juridical wrath and grief, is discernible to invoke social justice and revoke his fundamental right to life. A course of anti-aphrodisiac treatment or willing castration is a better recipe for this hypersexed human than outright death sentence.\n\nWe have not even information on whether he was a desperate hedonist or any rapist with 'Y' chromosomes in excess,\n\nwho sipped every flower and changed every hour, so as to be a sex E menace to the locality.\n\nSentencing is a delicate process, not a b\\ing man's buff. We commute the death sentence to life imprisonment.\n\nTHE DUBEY CASE )r . - There were three accused to begin with.\n\nThe appellant was con- F ,. victed of the murder of three relatives and sentenced to death. The\n\n. '\n\nother two were held g:iilty, by the Sessions Judge of an offence of s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and awarded life imrrisonment.\n\nThe appeal of the latter was allowed and that of the former dismissed both on crime and punishment.\n\nThe learned Judges expressed themselves ~: G\n\n\"Considering that Sheo Shankar, appellant caused the death of three persons so closely related to kim, by stabbing each of them in the chest one after the other, and that too on no greater provocation than that there had been an exchange of abuses, I do not see how it can be said that sen- B tence of death errs on the side of severity. It was urged that this appellant was only 17, 18 years old and so in view of\n\nthe ruling of the Supreme Court in .Harnam v. State\n\n(AIR 1976 SC 2071), he should not be sentenced to death. In the first place, the note of learned Sessions Judge on his statement shows that he was 19, 20 years old and he had understated his age.\n\nSecondly, I doubt that the observation of the Supreme Court in the said case can be applicable to such a case of triple murder, where such victim is deliberately stabbed in the chest.\"\n\nThe whole reasoning crumbles on a gentle probe.\n\nA thumbnail sketch of the case is that the appellant, his father and his brother were~ angrily dissatisfied with a family partition and, on the tragic day, flung ~· the vessels over the division of which the wrangle arose, went inside the house, emerged armed, picked up an altercation eventuating in the young man (whose age was around 18 or 20) stabbing to death three members of the other branch of the family.\n\nHe chased and killed, excited by the perverted sense of injustice at the partition. It is illegal to award capital sentence without considering the correctional possibilities inside prison.\n\nAnger, even judicial anger, solves no problems but creates many.\n\nHave the courts below regarded the question of sentence from this angle? Not at all.\n\nThe genesis of the crime shows a family feud.\n\nHe was not a murderer born but made by the passion of family quarrel.\n\nHe could be saved for society with correctional techniques and directed into repentence like the Chambal dacoits.\n\nWhat startles us is the way the adolescence of the accused has been by-passed and a ruling of this Court reduced to a casualty by a casual observation. Hardly the way decisions of the Supreme Court, read with Art. 141 should be by-passed.\n\nHad the appellant been only 18 years of age, he would not have been sentenced to death as the High Court expressly states.\n\nThe High Court is right in stating so.\n\nTender age is a tender circumstance and in this country, unlike in England of old, children are not executed. Since the age of the accused is of such critical importance in a marginal situation like the present one, one should have expected from the courts below a closer examination of that aspect.\n\nUnfortunately, they have not got the accused medically examined for his age nor have they received any specific evidence on the point but have disposed of the question in a rather summary way : \"In the first place, the note of the learned Sessions Judge on his statement shows that he was 19/20 years old and he had understated his age. Secondly,\n\n' .\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 133\n\nI doubt that the observations of the Supreme Court in the said case (AIR 1976 SC 2071) can be applicable to such a case of triple murder, where each victim is deliberately stabbed in the chest.\" A judge is no expert in fixing the age of a person and when precise age becomes acutely important reliance on medical and other testimony is necessary.\n\nOne cannot agree with this manner of disposal of a vital factor bearing on so grave an issue as death sentence. Nor are we satisfied with , the court vaguely distinguishing a ruling of this Court. It is not the number of deaths caused nor the situs of the stabs that is telling on that decision to validate the non-application of its ratio.\n\nIt is a mechanistic art which counts the cadavers to sharpen the sentence .N eblivious of other crucial criteria shaping a dynamic, realistic policy J. . h \"•\n\nof pums ment.\n\nThree deaths are regrettable, indeed, terrible.\n\nBut it is no social solution to add one more life lost to the list. In this vk, w, we arc satisfied that the appellant has not recived reasoQable consideration on the qirestion of the appropriate sentence. The criteria we have laid down are clear enough to point to the softening of the sentence to one of life imprisonment.\n\nA family feud, an altercation, a sudden passion, although attended with extra-ordinary cruelty, young and malleable age, reasonable prospect of reformation and absence of a11y conclusive circumstance that the assailant is a habitual murderer or given to chronic violence-these catcna of circumstances bearing on the offender call for the ksser sentence.\n\nIt is apt to notice in this context that even on a traditional approach this is not a case for death senrence, if we are to be belighted by the guidelines in Carlose John('). The murder there was brutal but the act was committed while the accused were in a grip of emotianal stress.\n\nThis was regarded as persuasive enough, in the background of the case, )-- to avoid the extreme penalty. The ruling in Kartm Singh(') related to -·\n\n_. a case of brutal murder and of hired murderers \\Vith planning of the criminal project.\n\nIn that background, the affirmation of lhe death senrence, without any discussion of the guidelines as between 'lire' and 'death' awards was hardly meant as a mechanical formula. It is difficult to discern any such ratio in that ruling on the qwcstion of sentence in the. grey area of life versus death.\n\nThe holding was surely right even by the tests we have indicated but to decoct a principle that if three lives are taken, death sentence is the sequel], is to read, without warrant,\n\n• l\n\n• •\n\ninto that decision a reversal of the process spread over decades.\n\n(I) Carlose John v. State of Kera/a, A.LR. 1974 SC 1115\n\n(2) Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 349.\n\nSocial defence against murderers is best insured in the short run by caging them but in the long run, the real run, by transformation through re-orientation of the inner man by many methods including neuro-techniques of which we have a rich legacy. If the prison system will talk the native language, we have the yogic treasure to experiment with on high-strung, high-risk murder merchants. Neuroscience stands on the threshold of astounding discoveries.\n\nYoga, in its many forms, seems to hold splendid answers. Meditational rchnology as a tool of criminology is a mascent-ancient methodology. The State must experiment. It is cheaper to hang than to heal, but Indian life-any human life-is too dear to be swung dead save in extreme circumstances. •\n\nWe are painfully mindful that this Judgment has become prolix and~ diffuse.\n\nBut too many pages are not too sigh a price where death sentence jurisprudence demands de nova examination to do justice by the Constitution.\n\nMuch of what we have said is an exercise in penal philosophy in D the critical area of death sentence.\n\n\"Philosophizing is distrusted by most of the professions that are concerned with the penal system. It is suspect for lawyers because they are conscious that if the criminal law as a whole is the Cinderella of jurisprudence, then the law of sentencing is Cinderella's illegitimate\n\nJi. baby.\"(1)\n\nAfter all, the famous words of Justice Ho\\mes \"The Law must keep its promises\" must be remembered.\n\nThe appeals stand allowed a'nd the death sentences stand reduced to life imprisonment; and, hopefully, human rights stand vindicated.\n\nSEN, J. In an appeal confined to sentence under Article 136 of -·(\" the Constitution, this Court has not only the power, but as well as the duty to interfere if it considers that the appellant should be sentenced 'differently', that is, to set aside the sentence of death and substitute in its place the sentence of imprisonment for life, where it considers, • taking the case as a whole, the sentence of death to be erroneous, excessive or indicative of an improper exercise of discretion; but at the same time, the Court must impose some limitations on itself in the exercise of this broad power. In dealing with a sentence which has been made the subject of an appeal, the Court will interfere with a -------\n\n(1) \"Sentencing and Probation\"-National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada, p. I.\n\n, '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, J.) 135\n\n• sentence only where it is 'erroneous in principle'. The question, there- A fore, in each case is whether there is an 'error of principle' involved.\n\nThe Court has the duty to see that on the particular facts and circumstances of each cas~ the punishment fits the crime. Mere compassionate sentiments of a humane feeling cannot be a sufficient reason for not confirming a sentence of death but altering it into a sentence oi imprisonment for life. In awarding sentence, the Court must, as it should, concern itself with justice, that is, with unswerving obedience to established Jaw. It is, and must be, also concerned with the probr- able effect of its sentence both on the general public and the culprit.\n\n\"..\n\nIn the three cases before us, there were 'special reasons' within\n\n. >--··\n\nthe meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the passing of the death sentence in each and, therefore, the High Courts were justified in confirming the death sentence passed under s. 368(a) of the Code. Indeed, they are illustrative of the rare type of cases, that is, first degree murders, where a death sentence is usually awarded in any civilised country. These were cases of diabolical, cold blooded brutal murders of innocent persons, that is, first degree murders of extreme brutality or depravity. The inhumanity of some of these offenders defies belief.\n\nI had the advantage of reading the judgment as originally prepared by my learned brother Krishna Iyer J., which, by defining the class of cases in which a death sentence may be passed upon conviction of a person for having committed an offence of murder punishable under 6.\n\n302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and by putting a restrictive constrnction on the words \"special reasons\" appearing ins. 354, sub-s. (3) o[ the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does, in my opinion, virtually abolish the death sentence .\n\nI was, therefore, constrained to write this dissenting opinion, as it\n\ni:> difficult to share the views of my learned brother Krishna Iyer J.\n\nHe has now completely revised his draft judgment in which he has endeavoured to meet my point of view, and I have had the advantage of reading it. But I sec no particular reason to change my views on the subject or to re-write or revise my dissenting opinion as the matter e; sentiaJly involves a question of principle.\n\nMy learned brother Krishna Iyer J. pleads for abolition of the death penalty, in accordance with the Stockholm Declaration of the Amnesty International. He believes that the death penalty is not only physically but psychologically \"brutal\", referring to the lengthy period between sentencing and execution as a \"lingering death\"'. He recalls the names of many patriots who faced the firing squad or died by the hangmen's\n\nr '\n\nnoose, in the cause of the country's freedom, and pleads that it is the duty of the State to protect the life of all persons without exception.\n\nHe asserts that by its application, the death penalty contradicts the very sanctity of life which all human society claims to hold among the highest values. He tells us that almost all civilised countries have abolished it as a symbol of their respect for human life, and expresses deep anguish that we, in our country, still cling to it with little regard to the basic rights of the man.\n\nI fully reciprocate the feelings of my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. in so far as he speaks of the barbarity involved in killing of patriots - ~\n\nwho have sacrificed their lives in the country's struggle for freedom. ; r The citizen's right to life and personal liberty are guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution irrespective of his political beliefs, class, creed or religion. The Constitution has, by Article 21 itself forged certain procedural safeguards for protection to the citizen of his life and personal liberty. The idealistic considerations as to the inherent worth and dignity of man is a fundamental and pervasive theme of the Constitution, to guard against the execution of a citizen for his political beliefs.\n\nI, however, must enter a dissent when my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. tries to equate a patriot with an ordinary crimi)lal.\n\nThe humanistic approach should not obscure our sense of realities. When a man commits a crime against the society by committing a diabolical, cold-blooded, pre-planned murder, of an innocent person the brntality of which shocks the conscience of the Court, he must face the consequences of his act. Such a person forfeits his right to life.\n\nThe main thrust of his judgment is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Furman v. Georgia('). I am afraid, Furman no longer holds the field even in the United States. 1 shall deal with this aspect in detail at a later stage.\n\nThe constitutionality of the death sentence provided for the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code is not before the Court. I fail to appreciate how can we say that imposition of death penalty, except in the classes of cases indicated by my learned brother, would be violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The question really does not arise for our consideration. In Jagmohan Singh\n\nv. State of U.P.(2) this Court rejected the contention that capital punishment for an offence of murder punishable under s. 302 infringes Article 19 of the Constitution in as much as it could not be said that snch punishment was unreasonable or not required in public interest. It fur-\n\n(l) 408 us 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d. 346.\n\n(2) [1973] 2 s.c.R. s41.\n\nRAJBNDRA v. u. P. STATB (Sen, 1.) 137 • ther held that s. 302 was not violative of Article 14 as it did not suffer by the vice of excessive delegation of legislative functions, merely because it does not provide for the cases in which a Judge should sentence the accused to death and the cases in which he should sentence him to life imprisonment. It was observed that the exercise of judicial discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment was based on well recognised principles and on the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused.\n\nNor it could be said that s. 302 confers uncontrolled and unguided discretion to Judges in the matter of sentence and is, therefore, hit by Article 14. The Court further held that s. 302 did not contravene Article 21 of the Constitution insofar as the trial was held as per provisions of the Code of Criminal Procednre ,:\"\"\"- 1973 and the Evidence Act 1872 which were undoubtedly part of the\n\n\"'l< procedure established by law.\n\nI, therefore, take it that the opinion of my learned colleague that imposition of a death sentence in a case outside the categories indicated would be constitutionally invalid, is merely an expression of his personal views.\n\nAs Judges we are not concerned with the morals or ethics of a punishment. It is but our duty to administer the law as it is and not to say what it should be. It is not the intention of this Court to curtail the scope of the death sentence under s. 302 by a process of judicial construction inspired by our personal views.\n\nThe question whether tbe scope of the death sentence should be curtailed or not, is one for the Parliament to decide. The matter is essentially of political expediency and, as such, it is the concern of statesmen and, therefore, properly the domain of the legislature, not the judiciary\n\nTwo propositions, I think, can be stated at the very outset :\n\n( 1) It is constitutionally and legally impermissible for this Court while hearing an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution, on a question of sentence, to re-structnre s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, so as to limit the scope of the sentence of death provided for the offence of murder under s. 302.\n\n(2) It is also not legally permissible for this Court while hearing an appeal in a particular case where a capital sentence is imposed, to define the expression \"special reasons\" occurring in sub-s. (3) of s. 354 of the Code, in such a manner, by a process of judicial interpretation, which virtually has the effect of abolishing the . death sentence.\n\nI0-196SCI, n9\n\n[1979) 3 s.c.R.\n\nSection 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provides:\n\n\"Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.\"\n\nSub-section (3) of s. 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, enacts :\n\n\"When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence.\"\n\nThe question of abolition of capital punishment is a difficult and controversial subject, long and hotly debated and it has evoked, during the past two centuries strong conflicting views.\n\nOpinion as to whether the death penalty is necessary in order to prevent an outraged community from taking the law into its own hands has been sharply divided. Immanual Kant in his 'Philosophy of Law', in upholding the death penalty observes :\n\n\"It is better that one man should die than the whole people should perish for if justice and righteousness perish, human life could no longer have any value in the world.\"\n\n\"Even if a Civilised Society resolve to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members-as might be supposed in the case of People inhabiting an island resolve to separate and scatter itself throughout the world-the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution is carried out\". This ought to be done in order that everyone may realise the dessert of his deeds.\" •\n\nMontesquieu in L' Esprit des Lois regarded the death penalty as repugnant, but necessary-\"the remedy of a sick society\".\n\nJohn Stuart Mill, made a very strong speech in the House of Commons(') advocating the use of the death penalty when it was applied to the most heinous cases. Attacking the argument that this punishment was not a deterrent to crime, he said :\n\n\"As for what is called the failure of death sentence, who is able to judge that. We partly know who those are wliom it has not deterred; but who is there who knows whom it has deterred, or how many human beings saved who should have lived.\"\n\n(!)Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., vol. 191, cols. 1047-48, 1050, 1953- '\n\n1 ..\n\n• • •\n\n\" ;\n\n' .\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, J.) 139\n\nMill felt that the probability of an innocent person's suffering the A death penalty was very slight indeed. Judges and juries would let the guilty escape before the innocent would suffer. If there were the slightest doubt of a man's innocence the death sentence would not be imposed or carried out.\n\nSir Henry Maine, the English legal historian, observed that punishment evolved from social necessity. The concept of punishment as a form of expiation or atonement reaches far back into human nature as well as into human history. The notion that the threat of punishment by the State will restrain the potential criminal is one of the most commonly accepted justifications for it. The idea has a philosophical basis in the utilitarians' concept of the rational man acting upon a deliberate calculation of possible losses and gains. If men choose rationally among possible future courses of action then surely the likelihood of a criminal course of action could be decreased by attaching to it a qnick, certain and commensurate penalty.\n\nThe value of capital punishment, as an aspect of deterrence, was perhaps most strongly put forward and very clearly stated by the great jurist, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen more than a hundred years ngo(') :\n\n\"No other punishment deters man so effectually from committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all. The whole experience of mankind is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute necessity for producing some result .... No one goes to certain inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the other way. Was there ever yet a criminal who, when sentenced to death and brought o_ut to die, would refuse the offer of commutation of his sentence for the severest secondary punishment ? Surely_ not. Why is this ? It can only be because 'All that a man has will he give for his life'.\n\nIn any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly.\"\n\nSupporters of capital punishment commonly maintain that it has a uniquely deterrent force which no other form of punishment has or\n\n(I) Royal Commission on CClpital Punishmont 1949-53 Report, p.19.\n\n140 &UP!llMI COW!lT !llPe!!.TS\n\ncould have. The arguments adduced both in support of this proposition and against it fall into two cateiories. The first consists of what we may call the 'common sense argument' from human nature applicable particularly to certain kinds of murders and certain kinds of murderers. This, a priori argument proceeds on the view that by doing so, the law helps to foster in the community a special abhorrence of murder as \"a crime of crimes\". By reserving the death penalty for murder the criminal law stigmatises the gravest crime by the gravest punishment, so that the elelllent of retribution merges into that of deterrence. The second justifies the ethics of capital punishment.\n\nWhatever be the ultimate justification for the punishment, the law cannot ignore the public demand for retribution which heinous crimes undoubtedly provoke; it would be generally agreed that, though reform of the criminal law ought sometimes to give a lead to public opinion, it is :dangerous to move too far in advance of it.\n\nThe movement to abolish death penalty started with the humanitarian doctrine evolved by Marchese De Cesars Bonesana Beccaria, Italian publicist. In 1764, Bonesana published the famous little treaties Dei Delitti e della Pene('). The French translation contained an anonymous preface by Voltaire. In the preface to this book first appeared the phrase \"the greatest happiness of the greatest number\".\n\nIt advocated the prevention of crime rather than punishment, and promptness in punishment, where punishment was inevitable; above all it condemned confiscation, capital punishment, and torture.\n\nBeccaria's ideas directly influenced the reforming activities of many social thinkers and philosophers. This represented a school of doctrine, born of the new humanitarian impulse of the Eighteenth Century with which Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu in France and Bentham in England were associated, which came afterwards to be known as the classical school.\n\nMoved by compassionate sentiment of a humane feelin!, Beccaria asserted that all capital punishment is wrong in itself and unjust. He maintained that since man was not his own creator, he did not have the right to destroy human life, either individually or collectively. It is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, and violates the righ_t to life. Its basic value, he affirmed, is its incapacitative effect.\n\nBeccaria claimed capital punishment was justified in only two instances, first if an execution would prevent a revolution against a popularly established government, and secondly, if an execution was the only way to deter others from committing a crime.\n\n(1) Beccaria .. Bonesana : An Essay on Crim•s tnd Punishment, Academic Re ..\n\nprint!!, Stanford, CaJifornia, 1953.\n\n• '\n\n>-··\n\nRAJJ!NDRA v. U.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 141\n\nThe policy of retribution is justified and sustained by an ethical philosophy which regards punishment as an integral and inviolative element in wrong doing, as a moral necessity. This doctrine has been consistently maintained by intuitive or idealistic philosophers from Plato to Thomas Aquinas and from Kant to T. H. Green and his disciples. The deterrent effect of punishment has also been claimed by adherents of this school but its widespread adoption as a policy has probably been due more to the influence of the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham, Paley, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, which malces the welfare of the society \"the greatest good or the greatest number\", the aim of all moral activity. It is this utilitarian philosophy which is now in the asccndent in penal legislation and which governs\n\nthe view of most modern penologists.\n\nIt still survives in the death penalty for murder and in the drastic penalties imposed for rape and other crimes which are peculiarly offensive to the moral sentiment as to the sense of security of the community.\n\nNearly everywhere, in the more recent stages or social development, D this motive has been supplemented, but never wholly supplanted, by an unquestioning faith in the deterrent effect on potential offenders of exemplary, i.e., drastic, punishment, inflicted on actual offenders which, in practice if not in theory, comes to much the same thing.\n\nThe doctrine of the \"individualisation of punishment\", that is to say of the punishment of the individual rather than the crime committed by him, which is o! commanding importance in present day penology, is only a development of the neo-classical school or the revolutionary period in France, which modified Beccaria's rigorous doctrine by insisting on the recognition of the varying degrees of moral, and. therefore, legal responsibility. Its fundamental doctrine is that the criminal is doomed by his inherited trait• to a criminal career and is, therefore, a wholly irresponsible actor. Society must, of course, protect itself against him, but to punish him as if he were a free moral agent is as irrational as it is unethical.\n\nJn his 'Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation', the veal worl in which the Engfah philowpher and juri•t, Jeremy Bentham wa• engaged for many year., was published in 1789. Manlind, he said, was governed by two sovereign motives-pain and pleasure, iind the principle of utility recognised this subjection.\n\nThe object of all legislation must be the \"greatest happiness of the greatest\n\nnumber\".\n\nOn the legal side, he deduced from the principle of utility that since all punishment is itself evil it ought only to be admitted \"so far as it promises to exclude some greater evil\".\n\n.. H\n\nThe English social refonner, Sir Samuel Romilly devoted himself primarily to rofonn the criminal l:iw of England, then at once cruel and illogical, by attempting to influence Parliament to pass three Bills designed to repeal the death penalty for theft. By statute Jaw innumerable offences were punishable with death in England, but, as wholesale execution would b_e impossible, the larger number of thoe convicted and sentenced to death at every assizes were respited, after having heard the sentence of death solemnly passed upon them. This led to many acts of injustice, as the lives of convicts depended on the caprice of the Judges, while, at the same time it made the whole system of punishment and of the criminal law ridiculous.\n\nIn 1808 Romilly managed to repeal the Elizabethian statute, which made it a capital offence to steal from the person.\" In the following year, three equally sanguinary statutes were thrown out of the House of Lords under the influence of Lord Ellenborough. Year after year the same influence prevailed, and Romilly saw his bills rejected; but his patient efforts and his eloquence ensured victory eventually for his cause by opening the eyes of Englishmen to the barbarity of their criminal law. In spite of the efforts which Romilly made lo procure the aboJition of the death penalty in many cases, it should be noted, however, that he was not an \"abolitionist\" in the sense of the tenn today.\n\nAll punishment properly implies moral accountability. It is related E to injury and not only to damage or danger, however great. Capital ptµ1ishment does so in an eminent degree. It is directed against one who is ex-hypothesi an inhuman orute, i.e. it is imposed simply to eliminate one who is held to have become, irretrievably, a liability or a menace to society.\n\nAs Aristotle put it, just retribution consists not in simple but in proportionate retaliation, that is, in receiving in return for a wrongful act not the same thing but its equivalent, and, what this is, can only be stimated if the whole context is taken into account. It may be argued that murder for instance, as tlie one crime which is quite irrevocable, as justly met by the one punishment which is equally irrevocable, il unique form of punishment for a unique form of crime.. To reduce its punishment to something of the same order as other punishments, is to weaken the abhorrence which it should express and diffuse.\n\nOn this showing an execution expresses absolute condemnation. It both satisfies and educates the public concience; for those-In authority thus deepen in themselves and diffuse throughout the community their sense of \"the wickedness of wickedness, the criminality of crime\". It is an outward and visible sign of the utmost imaginable disgrace. The death\n\n• ,,\n\n:RAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, J.) 143\n\npenalty has signified shame and infamy and has generally been underc\n\nstood to do so; and all this is expressed in symbolic action of a kind that is both spontaneous and calculated to arrest attention.\n\nIf the appeal of capital punishment were merely to fear of death, it would be a very inefficient protector of society. In civilized society and in peacetime, government relies for oBedience more on its moral prestige than on violent repression of crime.\n\nPunishment only protects life effectively if it produces in possible murderers, not only fear • of the consequences of committing murder, but a horrified recoil from , the thing itself. It can only achieve this, more ambitious, task, if ser;-· '....-. tence of death is felt to embody society's strongest condemnation ot murder and keenest sense of its intolerable wickedness. It is not b}'\n\n~ the fear of death but by exciting in the community a sentiment of horror against any particular act, that we can hope to deter offenders from committing it. The Royal Commission sucinctly explained the normal character of capital punishment thus('):\n\n\"by building np in the community, over a long period of time, a deep feeling of peculiar abhorrence for the crime of murder.\"\n\nThe criminality of a crime consists not only in tho criminal act, but in what that signifies.\n\nIts immediately apparent features, the obvious damage to person or property or to public security, are symptoms of a deeper disorder. It betokens, and it fos.ters, iin attitude ia man to man, of reckless selfishness, deceit or malice, which is incompatible in the long run with any decent social life. In any advanced society it is, in part at least, on account of this wider character, less easily discerned, that the graver offences are punished. Also punishment like crime has a dual character. The penalty which the. convicted murderer incurs is not simply death, but death in disgrace and death as a disgrace. In so far as capital punishment is a threat, the threat consists not only in death but in infamy.\n\nAny theory which ignores this characteristic is certainly defective.(')\n\nFor a long time the problem of capital punishment was regarded G as a purely academic question. Everything that couJd be said appear to have been said on a question which Beccaria had brilliantly brought to public notice in the second half of the Eighteenth Century, but which had been exhausted by subsequent controversy.\n\nPunishment inflicted by the State in response to a violation of the criminal law\n\n(I) Roy•t Commission Report, para 59.\n\n(2) Sir Walter Moberly : The Ethics of Punishment, Ch. XI, , Capital Punishment', pp. 271-81.\n\n144 SWPl\\llMI'. IM\\IRT IWIPllRTS\n\n[1,79] 3 S.C.R.\n\nhas been justified in various ways. It has been seen as society's vengeance upon the criminal as atonement by the wrong doer, us a means of deterring other criminals, as protection for the law-abiding and as a way of rehabilitating the criminl. The individual who has inflicted harm on another, runs the revenge argument, should be made to suffer in return; for only an act of vengeance can undo the harm that has been done and assuage the suffering of the victim.\n\nAs against this, some social reformers have ma.intained that punishment ought to be decent to transform the values and attitudes of the criminal so that he no longer wishes to commit illegal acts.\n\nThe problem, of course, has been to discover how to do it.\n\nTheories of rehabiliMion are largely speculative, since there is lack of scientific evidence to support them.\n\nNevertheless, it has been influential in the development of modem penology.\n\nIn England, during the Nineteenth Century, Disraeli and Gladstone, the leading politicians in the country, took no part in the movement to abolish the death penalty. Leadership in this crusade fell to lesser men, and the abolitionists formed a distinct minority.\n\nThe majority in the House of Commons evidel), lly felt, as Sir John Holkar, the Attorney C:eneral felt, that criminals were deterred from adding deliberate murder to their other crimes by the fear of the death penalty.\n\nIn the period between the first and second world wars, however, the emergence of authoritarian systems of penal law raised once mofe the problem of capital punishment in a particularly acute manner. At the end of the second world war, there was a renewed upsurge of this humanitarian tendency which, like the desire to safeguard human rights and human dignity, had been the mainspring of the movement for the abolition of the death penalty.\n\nSeveral attempts were made to break the parliamentary fortress but without any success.\n\nVery little was actually accomplished by the abolitionists in Parliament till after the 5econd world war, when the Labour Government came to power. In between 1949 and 1953 the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment carried out an exhaustive inquiry.\n\nThe Royal Commission made a study of this complex and manysided task. It held its inquiries not only in Great Britain but also in the United States and several European countries and heard evidence H from every possible source. It listened to an impressive array of witnesses. In addition to all this, information was collected from Commonwealth countries and several other European countrieg, Its\n\n4 ----\n\nRAJl!ND!lA V. U. P. STAU (Sm, J.) 145\n\nresult is reflected in the Royal Commi.ssion Report on Capital Punishment which presents a comprehensive and dispassionate picture of the whole subject.\n\nThe Commission was debarred by their terms of reference from considering the question of abolition of capital punishment, but in the course of their investigation they naturally accumulated a good deal of information which is just as relevant to this issue as to the question of limiting the scope of capital punishment.\n\nThe report contains a, good deal of material on the \"Deterrent Value of Capital Punishment\".\n\n1 It is evident from the report that some of the most distinguished\n\n~--judicial witnesses including Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls, and some very \"+ experienced Judges like Mr. Justice Humphreys, Sir John Beaumont, Mr. Justice Byrne, were fumly of the view that the capital punishment must be retained for the protection of the socie_ty.\n\nThey went to the extent of expressing their strong disapprobation of the free use of prerogative as being an interference by the Executive with the Judiciary and argued that the exercise of the power should be narrowly confined.\n\nAs a justification for retention of death penalty, some of these distinguished Judges put forth the principle of retribution, and the others placed greater importance on deterrence.\n\nThere was, however, general agreement that justification for the capital sentence, as for other salient features of the penal system must be sought in the protection of the society and that alone.\n\nThe punishment of death, said Lord Denning to the Royal Commission, (1) should reflect adequately the revulsion felt for the gravest of crimes by the great majority of citizens.\n\nBut, in saying this, he >---implied that legislators and Judges share this revulsion themselves; other-\n\n. wise indeed their action would be mmally indefensible. Their aim then _ • should be, not only to strike terror nor even to awaken popular indignation in a direction convenient to Government. It would be to arouse in all and sundry their own indignant repudiationof a wicked • act and, at the same time, to deepen it in themselves.\n\nIn this vein, sentence of death has been pronounced, carried out and acclaimed, with stern satisfaction.\n\nThis principle of action is still avowed in high place~, and, I believe, it is semi-consciously at work rnrue often than it is avowed, for it is said that otherwise, the conscience of the community would he revolted if the criminal were allowed to-live.\n\nIn the same vein, Lord Chief Justice Goddard said in 1948 : (').\n\n{I) Royal Commission Report, p.18 para 53.\n\n(2) Hansard (Hon•• of Lord•), Vol. 155, p. 492.\n\n\"The public conscience will not tolerate that persons who deliberately condemn others lo painful, and it may be lingering, deaths should be allowed to live . . . . Some of these bestial murderers should be destroyed.\"\n\nThe use of capital punihsment has declined in recent times, although it is still permitted by law, as in this country, for various kinds of offences like treason, murder etc.\n\nThe issue of abolishing it has aroused much controversy. The advocates of capital punishment • claim it as a necessary deterrent to crime and relatively painless if done • properly.\n\nEven where it has been legally retained, as here, capital.~....:., punishment is now seldom employed except in very grave cases where '-, it is a crime against the society and the brutality of the crime shocks the judicial conscience.\n\nIndeed, the , death penalty satisfies the society's retributive goals and is still presumed to be a deterrent to potential offenders, Of the three purposes commonly assigned to punishment-retribution, deterrence and refo.rmation--deterrence is generally held to be the most important, although the continuing public demand for retribution cannot be ignored.\n\nPrima facie, the death sentence is likely tc have a stronger effect as a deterrent upon normal human beings than any other form of punishment.\n\nThe.re is some evidence that this is, in fact, so and also that abolition may be followed by an increase in homicides and crimes of violence. ~\n\nIn brief, people arc believed to refrain from crime because they fear punishment Since people fear death more than anything else the death penalty is the most effective deterrent.\n\nIn Britain, following the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, the Homicide Act, 1957 was enacted due to the_ ._J growing pressure of public opinion to mitigate the rigour of the crimi- nal law. (1 =6) It brought about a division of criminal homicide into degrees of murder.\n\nIt resulted in the establishment of a distinction between capital and non-capital murders. It not only eliminated long-standing iniquities and rigidities in the law of murder such as the doctrine of \"constructive malice\", but also brought the law into accord with modern criminological thoughts by the impartation of the doctrine of \"diminished responsibility\".\n\n(1) Roy Calbert : Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century,\n\n(2) Arthur Koestler : R•flections on Hanging,\n\n(3) Sir Ernest Gowers : A Life for Life.\n\n(4) Gerald Gardiner: Capital Punishment as a Deterrent: and the Alternuive.\n\n(5) Lord 'Pemplewood : 'Phe Shadow of the Gallows.\n\n(6) Victor Gollancz: Capital Punishment: The Heert of the Matter.\n\n• ' . • . '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, /.) 147\n\nBy s. 7 the Act abolished the liability to suffer the death penalty on conviction of murder and. substituted the sentence of imprisonment for life by s. 9, sub-s. ( 1) except in cases of first degree murders falling within ~. 5 or s. 6. Section 5 reserved the death penalty for five classes of first d, gree murders, namely :\n\n(i) any murder done in the course or furtherance of theft;\n\n(ii) any murder by shooting or by causing an explosion;\n\n(iii) any murder done in the course or for the purpose of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody;\n\n(iv) any murder of a police officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a person assisting a police officer so acting; and - •'\n\n( v) in the case of a person who was a prisoner at the time when he did or was a party to the murder, any murdeaof a prison officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a person assisting a prison officer so acting.\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 5 provided for death penalty on the principal assailant and not his accessories before the fact, where a group of persons made a murderous assault causing grievous .bodily hurt resulting in death. The distinction drawn in felonies between principals in the first and second degree and acceosories before the fact have since been abolished by virtue of the Criminal Law Act 1967, s.1, and all these\n\nparticipants have to be punished in accordance with the Accessori'es and Abettors Act 1861. Section 6 provided the death penalty for repeated murders.\n\nThe cases in which the death penalty was retained were those where, in the view of the Government, murder was most dangerous ti\\ the preservation of law and order, and where the death penalty was likely to be a particularly effective deterrent.\n\nThe death penalty for murder was thereafter temporarily abolished for a period of five years, as an experimental measure by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965.\n\nThis Act was to expire on July 31, 1970 bu! was made permanent by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.(')\n\nThe punishment for murder in Britain is now imprisonment for life\n\nby s.l, sub-s.(1) of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act H\n\n0) 793 H. of C. Official Report (5th series) 16th Dec. 1969, col. 1297 ; 306 H. L.\n\nOft'cial Report (5th series) 18th Dec. 1~69, col. 1321.\n\n1965. On sentencing any person convicted of murder to imprisonment for life, the Court may at the mme time declares a period which it recommends to the Secretary of State as the minimum period which in its view should elapse before the Secretary of State orders the release of that person on licence under s. 27 of the Prison Act 1952. In R.\n\nv. Flemming(') it has been suggested that no such recommendation should be for a period of less than twelve years.\n\nIt must, howevec, be observed that in Britain a sentence of death can still and only be awarded for high treason (Treason Act 1814) s. 1; piracy with violence (Piracy Act 183 7) s. 2; setting fire to the Queen's ships, arsenals etc. (Dockyards etc. Protection Act 1772) C . s.1.\n\nWhen a person is convicted of treason, sentence of death must be pronounced, but in case of piracy with violence and setting fire to the Queen's ships, arsenals, etc., i_t may be merely recorded.\n\nSentence of death cannot, howevec, be pronounced on or recorded agairist an expectant mother [Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act 1931]\n\ns. l, or against a person who was under the age of eighteen when the offence was committed (Children and Young Persons Act 1933) s. 53 (1).\n\nThe successful campaign to abolish the death penalty in Britain has been achieved in a comparatively short period of time by no more than a handful ardent penal reformers like Sydney Silverman, who carried out the unfinished wmk of Romilly and other reformers, pertinacious in their lobbying and propaganda, ('-') in the face of majority opinion favouring retention of an admittedly barbaric but, to that majority, necessary penal instrument. If the final debates were protracted-Silverman's private members' Bill (with invaluable legislative time given by the Government) was introduced on December 4, 1964, and reached the Statute Book only on November 2, 1965--the history of the campaign is a remarkable testament to British democracy which can convert convinced minority opinion into progressivo legislative action.\n\nDue to an increase in the incidence of criminal behaviour, and steady rige in the volume of reported crime, there i! a genuine public concern in Britain for rc-asse!sment of the penal policy of the Government.\n\n(I) [1973] 2 All ER 407.\n\n(2) Radzinowicz Laon : A History of Engli•h Criminal Law and its Administration, vol. 9.\n\n(3) Jame• Christopher : Capital Puni•hment in Great Britain.\n\n(4) Elizabeth Orman Tuttis : The Crusade against Capital Punishment in Great Britain\n\n• ••\n\n. .\n\n• •\n\n• ' . ;\n\n, .\n\nRAJEJ'1DRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, l.) 149\n\nD.A. Thomas in his article \"Development in Sentencing 1964- A 1973\"(') observes :\n\n\"As a society, we have made inconsistent demands on our official system of social control. expecting greater security from violence, disorder and depreciation and simultaneously requiring that penal sanctions become less rigorous and more adopted to the individual offender.\"\n\n-rile learned author proceeds to say :\n\n\"The provisions of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 provides a simple illustration. Taken in\n\nisolation, they provide that a preson convicted of murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and the judge> passing such a sentence may make a recommendation that a specified minimum period should elapse be.fore the offenders may be released on licence.\n\nThe mandatory life sentence, part of the political price of the abolition of the death penalty, cannot be defended on any rational grounds.\"\n\nAnd then concludes :\n\n\"In assessing the future trend of penal policy in this country, it is probably wise to bear in mind that the problems facing the criminal justice system are unlikely to diminish during the next decade of their own accord-things will almost certainly become worse rather than better.\n\nThere seems to be no reason to suppose that the relatively steady rate of increase in the volume of reported crime over the last ten years will not continue.\"\n\nThe two recent decisions of the Privy Council in Eaton Baker v.\n\nThe Queen(') and Michael de Freitas v. George Ramoutar Benny(') are completely destructive of the theory that (1) the death penalty Is\n\nper se cruel and unusual punishment, and\n\n(2) alternatively, the inordinate delay in carrying it out, lllJ\\kes it so.\n\nIn Eaton Baker's case\n\nthe appeal was on a question of sentence.\n\nThe issue was whether the G Court of Appeal of Jamaica was right in sentencing to death the two youngmen who when they committed the murder we.re under the age of eighteen years, but when they were convicted of the offence and\n\nsentenced to death, had both attaiped the age of 18 years.\n\nThe mandatory sentence of death upon conviction for murder is imposed\n\n(I) [19741 Crim. L. R. 685. 8\n\n(2) [19751 A. C. 774.\n\n(3) [1976] A. C. 239.\n\nby s. 2 of the Offences against the Person Act 1925. The exceptlon on account of youth is contained in s. 29(1) of the Juveniles Law which interdicts that a sentence of death shall not bo pronounced on or recorded against a person under the age of 18 years.\n\nThe Judicial Committee while holding that the statutory exemption from death penalty under s. 29 ( 1) of the Juveniles Law was not applicable, observed that the time for ascertaining whether the appellants were to be treated as Juveniles was the date on which the sentence was passed and not the date of the offence.\n\nAs to the constitutional issue, the Judicial Committee held that when a person was held guilty of a charge of murder, the death sentence passed on him cannot be treated as a contravention of s. 20(7) of the Constitution of Jamaica, stating:\n\n\"One's opinion as to whether the consequences of giving effect to the sub-section would be irrational or unjust is inevitably coloured by whethe.r one starts with lhe be_lief that capital punishment should be abolished for all offences except, perhaps, for treason-a view accepted by the legislature, if not by public opinion in general, in.the United Kingdom; or with the contrary belief that capital punishment is normally the appropriate penalty for murder-a view which the continuance in force of section 2 of the Offences against the Person Law suggests is accepted by the legislature in Jamaica.\" (Emphasis supplied).\n\nIn de Freitas case the Privy Council confirmed the sentence of death passed by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, and held that there was no violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed under ss. 1 and 2 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago inasmuch as the sentence of death was passed according to the \"due process of law\".\n\nIn repelling the alternative argument based upon delay, it observed that \" the delay was of the appellant's own making\" and he could not pmt forth this as a ground for commutation of the sentence of death. It stated :\n\n\"It is not contended that the executive infringed the appellant's constitutional rights by refraining from executing him while there were still pending legal proceedings that he himself had instituted to prevent this execution.\"\n\nThere was evidence that prior to independence, the normal period spent in condemned cell by the prisoner before execution was five months and that this practice was sufficient to give rise to an 'unfl written rule of law' in force at the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nThe contention was that the executive was, therefore, bound to so organise the procedure for carrying out the death sentence that the\n\n' ' •\n\n. '\n\nRAJl!NDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, !.) 151\n\naverage lapse of time is not more than five months, and the carrying ont of the death sentence beyond the period was incompatible with the right of the individual under il. l (a) of the Constitution not to be deprived of life \"except by due procesil of law\" because it involves the imposition of \"cruel and unurnal punishl!lent\" within the meaning of s.2, (b). The Judicial Committee rejected the contention saying :\n\n\"This contention in their Lordships' view needs only to be stated to be rejected. Not only docil it involve attributing to the expression \"unwritten rule of law\" in sec, tion 105 ( 1) of the Constitution a meaning which it is incapable of\n\n' L bearing, but it conflicts with the very concept of the nature r of law.\"\n\nThat takes us to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Furman v. Georgia (ilupra) in which my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. strongly relieil.\n\nThere, the question was whether the death penalty at least ail t, enerally practised in the United States, per se, was 'cruel and unusual' because the imposition of capital punishment \"does not comport with human dinity\" or berause it was\n\n\"morally unacceptable\" and \"exceilsive\" and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment.\n\nIn the United States of America, the death penalty has paradoxically existed more or less harrnoniouilly with humane theories of crirnim\\l justice for over two hundred years.\n\nThe Eighth Amendment prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishment'.\n\nThe Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment\n\nhas raised some very difficult moral issues.\n\nThe Supreme Court applied various iltandards in interpreting the provision. In Trap v.\n\nDulles(') the Court by a majority of five to four, refused to consider F death penalty ail an index of the constitutional limit on punish- .........-menf', stating :\n\n\"Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment .... the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day\" when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the comtitutional conceot or crualty.\"\n\n' Chief Justice Warren, speaking for Mr, Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Whittak'ar, asserted that:\n\n\"this Court has had little occaion to give precise content H to the Eighth Amendment\", that itl content is not static, but\n\n(1) [1958] 356 US 86 : 2 L. Ed. 2d. 630.\n\n152 SUPREME COUll T REP OR TS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA \"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.\" This amendment whose \"basic concept is nothing less than the dignity of man\" guarantees \"the principle of civilised treatment.\"\n\nThere began concerted legal attacks on the constitutionality of capital punishment in the 1960s, stimulated in part by the fact that those receiving death sentences were disproportionately Blacks. The issue as to the • constitutionality of the death penalty in a State usually arose in the Supreme Court of the United States on procedural grounds, that is, on the question of fairness of the procedural aspect and its application, viz., • the practice under which state statutes left a jury to mote out the death~ penalty at its discretion, with no standards of any sort to guide them, t or the application of. the penalty without judicial standards. In McGoutha v. California(') the Supreme Court rejected the contention holding that the absence of any guidelines was not a violation of \"due process\". Mr. Justice Harlan thought it would be impossible to draft 'tatutory standards for this purpose, saying :\n\n\"To identify before the fact these characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human\n\nability.\"\n\nIn Furman v. Georgia, the Court by a majority oi five to four ultimately held that capital punishment, at least as generally administered, did violate the Eighth Amendment. It held that imposition of the death penalty in the three cases, one for murder and two for rape, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court issued a brief per curiam order,--(. followed by substantial statements by every member of the Court. The judgment in the case was reversed and the cases remanded for further • - proceedings.\n\nEach of the five majority Justices and four dissenters • wrote a separate opinion, supporting his position. ,\n\nThe five Justices in the majority each wrote a concurring opinion which approached tho matter from a different angle so that clear categorisation is impossible. It can thus be seen that the multiple opinions did not rule out altogether re-imposition of the death penalty in the future provided there was legislative structuring of a permissible system\n\n(I) [1971] 402 U.S. 183.\n\ni r\n\nll •\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, J.) 153\n\nproviding for sufficient procedural safeguards. This is exactly what has happened in the United States where the death penalty has been re-imposed and the judicial approach stands re-oriented .\n\nBroadly stated, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr .\n\nJustice White held that the death Penalty as imposed, is arbitrarily and infrequently meted out, in violation of the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments.\n\nThey took an analytic and empirical approach, appraising the practice under the Eighth Amendment in the light of due process and equal protection.\n\nTheir concern was whether the death penalty • was evenly applied, and of course they found that it was not.\n\nThis is ..)---- reflected in the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas who held that the death J penalty was cruel and unusual because applied irregularly and \"selectively to minorities whose members are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenence general application of the same penalty across the boards\".\n\nMr. Justice Stewart's comment was :\n\n\"These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.\n\nFor, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.\"\n\nMr. Justice White conceded that the death penalty, while cruel in \"the dictionary sense\", would nevertheless be justified if it served\n\n\"social ends''.\n\nBut he did not believe \"that society's need\" for specific deterrence justifies death for so few when for so many in like circums- .)-·· lances life imprisonment or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient. -.\n\n' }\n\n' '\n\nMr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall took a normative approach. They advocated the total abolition of the death penalty because it is in all cases violative of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause.\n\nFor them, the Eighth Amendment posed a core question of values; they were concerned less with fairness and equality and more with mercy and charity. For Mr. Justice Brennan, \"the primary principle .... is that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human dignity''. Mr. Justice Marshall, in by far the longest opinion of the day pleaded for an humanistic approach. His impassioned conclusion was that ending the death sentence would recognise \"the humanity of our fellow beings\" and achieve \"a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism\".\n\n11-196SCI/79\n\nS)JPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe opinions of the four dissenting Justices were as important as the majority statements because any subsequent challenges on Furman would incorporate their reasoning.\n\nMr. Justice Blackman and Mr.\n\nJustice Rehnquist, who are advocates of strict judicial conservation, felt that the matter was essentially political, and properly the domain of the legislature, not the judiciary.\n\nChief Justice Burger, admitting that since the ruling a Trop v.\n\nDulles (supra) in 1958, it is necessary to evaluate a challanged punish- ment in terms of the \"evolving standards of decency .... of a maturing society\", felt nonetheless that there is no judicially significant public .......i... opposition to capital punishment in the United States.\n\nPointing out .\n\nthat the decision rejecting the death penalty was essentially based on t procedural grounds, as the majority agreed that the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty was unconstitutional, Burger contends that the Eighth Amendment does not deal with procedure, and with only the substantive nature of the punishment in question.\n\nHe believes that the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for certain offences would not be invalidated by the holding in this case because a mandatory penalty could not be arbitrarily meted ant.\n\nMr. Justice Powell dissented by establishing that the constitutionality o! the death penalty is supported by four factors, viz., (i) the references to capital punishment in the Constitution, (ii) the past Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty, (iii) the limitation of judicial restraint, and (iv) the doctrine of separation of powers.\n\nHe found that the evidence of the petitioners fell short of satisfying their burdens of persuasion with respect to these factors.(\").\n\nDue to the ambiguity of the Furman decision, it is fortunate that the Supreme Court gave further indication of its intentions regarding the death penalty in subsequent decisions.\n\nBut Furman was not determinative of the issue on the merits, namely, the constitutionality of the penalty because it violates the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment.\n\nIt was widely assumed that the Court had not declared capital punishment unconstitutional per se but only its unpredictable and fortuitous use.\n\nSince the Furman decision, the legislatures of thirty-five states in the United -States acted to tighten up the laws under which the death penalty was to be imposed.\n\nThey took two different approaches.\n\nSome State including Georgia, Florida and Texas, established new procedures for capital cases requiring sentencing judges and juries to\n\n(I) M. Cherif Bassiouni : Substantive Criminal Law, pp, 120-26.\n\n' ' •\n\n' '\n\n, ~.\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, J.) 155\n\nconsi<ler certain specified aggravating or mitigating circumstances of A the crime and the offender.\n\nThere was a bifurcated trial wit]~ presentcncing, hearing.\n\nCourts of Appeal were given broader authority to decide whether the death penalty was fair in the light of the sente.nces for similar offences.\n\nThese laws were intended to redress the arbitrariness and racial prejudices renounced in Furman. But the other States, including North Carolina, Louisiana and Oklahoma sought to meet the Furman objections by removing all flexibility from the sentencing process, though limiting the offences for which the death sentence could be imposed.\n\nAnyone found guilty of the specified offences was to be sentenced to death automatically.\n\nThe constitutionality of the sentences imposed under such procedures has been upheld by five State Supreme Courts.\n\nOn July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States delivered the judgment it had postponed a year earlier. It handed down five opinions dealing with the death penalty. Three of these were concerned with the mandatory sentence of death. All involved the crime of murder. The five cases were: Gregg v. Georgia('), Proffitt v.\n\nF/orida(2), Jurek v. Texas( 3), Woodson v. North Carolina(•), and Roberts v. Louisiana(').\n\nThe issue in the three cases dealing with discretionary sentencing ,\n\n(Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek) was whether imposition of the sentence of , death for the crime of murder under the laws of the respective states E violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.\n\nIn all three, th~ 'Court reached the same conclusion, that the punishment of death did not invariably violate the Constitution.\n\nThe Court's reasons in Gregg as to \\Vhy the death sentence was not .a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments were as F follows : First, history and precedent do not support the conclusion that the death sentence is a per se violation.\n\nSecond, the evolving standards of decency argument has been substantially undercut in the last four years because a large segment of the enlightened population Tcgards the death penalty as appropriate and necessary, as seen in the new legislation passed in response to Furman.\n\nThe Court came to the conclusion that the death penalty was not inherently cruel and unusual.\n\nIt se.rved two principal social purposes,\n\n(I) [1976] 428US153: 49 L. Ed. 2d859.\n\n(2) [1976] 428 US 242: 49 L. Ed. 2d 913. (3) [1976] 428 US 262 : 49 L. Ed. 2d 929.\n\n(4) [1976] 428 US 280 : 49 L. Ed. 2d 944.\n\n(5) [1976] 428 US 325 : 49 L. Ed. 2d 974.\n\nretribution and deterrence, and held that the death sentence for the crime of murder was (1) not without justification, (2) not unconstitutionally severe, and (3) not invariably disproportionate to the crime.\n\n'111e Court found that Furman mandated, where discretionary sentencing was used there must he suitable direction and limitation to minimise the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. The bifurcated trial with standards modelled after the Model Penal Code gives juries just such guidance.· Therefore, the concerns of Furma11 can be met by carefully drafted statutes that ensure sentencing authorities are given adequate information and guidance in making their decision.\n\nAs a general proposition, the Court concluded that these concerns were best met by bifurcated proceedings with standards to guided the use of the evidence.\n\nI wish to conclude this part of the judgment by quoting Herbert L.A. Hart, who in his article on \"Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States( 1)\", admirably sums up the two D points of view :\n\n\"There are indeed ways of defending and criticising the death penalty which are quite independent of the utilitarian position and of the questions of fact which the utilitarian will consider as crucial.\n\nFor some people the death penalty is ruled out entirely as something absolutely ev11 which, like torture, should never be used however many lives it might save.\n\nThose who take this view find that they are sometimes met by the counter-assertion that the death penalty is something which morality actually demands, a uniquely appropriate means of retribution or \"reprobation\" for the worst of crimes. even if its use adds nothing to the p.rotection of human life.\n\n\"Here we have two sharply opposed yet similar attitudes : for the one the death penalty is morally excluded; for the other it is moral necessity; but both alike are independent of any . question of fact or evidence as to what the use of the death penalty does by way of fll11l1ering the protection of society.\n\nArgument in support ef views as absolute as these can co11sist only of an invitation, on the one hand, to consider in detail the execution of a human being, and on the other hand, to consider in detail some awful murder, and then to await the\n\n(I) Harbert L. A. H'ft : ''Murder and the Principles of Punishment : Engknd\n\nand the United States\": North\\Vestern University Ltw Revic.W, vet: 52,\n\n19~7-58.\n\n• '\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, J.) 157\n\nemergence either of a conviction that the death penalty muit A never be used or, alternatively, that it must never be completely abandoned.\"\n\nThe controversy over capital punishment is not nJ:W.\n\nIts roots lie deep in human history, and its batt!s have been waged on and off on a political level for almost two centuries. It is not necessary for this Court to attempt to analyse the substantive merits of the cases for and against the death penalty for murder. It is in my view, essentially, a question for the Parliament to resolve and not for this Court to\n\n~,_decide.\n\nl I feel that it is futile for ns to attempt to project our personal views in a matter which lies in the realm of political decision-making, by focussing on a single controversy, the question of the proper penaity for the crime of murder. The capital punishment controversy falls within the strict limits of 'independent' parliamentary law-making, and is a typical or representative of the kind of problems that leaders of Parliament face every day. In short, the case for abolition of the death sentence is political, not constitutional. The Government carries the responsibility of law and order.\n\nThat is the first and fundamental duty of any Government.\n\nThe Executive has the duty of advising the Government of the laws it believes necessary for the national well-being.\n\nIt is the duty of the courts, including this Court, to administer the laws as they are.\n\nThe Law Commission, in its Thirty-fifth Report has dealt with the question of abolition of capital punishment, of limiting the scope of death sentence under s. 302, and of the mode of execution of the sentence. It sent out questionnaires.\n\nAlmost all the State Governy ments, all High Court Judges, all the Bar Associations throughout the\n\n~ country, many distinguished lawyers were in favour of retention of the death sentence.\n\nThere was, in fact, almost complete 'unanimity' of view on this complex question.\n\nThe Commission examined a large number of witnesses including many distinguished Judges and lawyers and ultimately was in favour of its retention. It concluded stating that:\n\n' . ,\n\n' . \"Having regard to the conditions in India, to the variety of social upbringing of its inhabitants, to the disparity of the level of morality and education in the country, the vastness of its area, to the diversity of its population and to the paramount need for maintaining law and order, the country cannot risk the abolition of capital punishment.\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.llt.\n\nA Indeed, a distinguished lawyer while giving his evidence before the Joint 'committee of the Indian Penal Code Bill thought that the abolition of death sentence would be a dangerous experiment and we should continue to have this form of deterrent punishment till we reach \"a certain state of enlightemnent\".\n\nB The basic principle of the nineteenth century Indian Penal Code, .,\n\nsaid Lord Macauley who drafted it, is 'the principle of suppressing crime with the smallest possible amount of suffering(')'.\n\nHe lays this down as an unassailable axiom rather than as a contention for debate.\n\nSection 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 gives the Court a dis~~ cretion as to the punishment to be imposed for an offence of murder and that discretion has to be exercised between the two alternatives .!- mentioned, namely, a sentence of death and a sentence of imprisonment for life.\n\nPrior to the amendment of s. 367, sub-s. (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 it was a well settled principle that where a person was convicted for an offence of murder, the Court was normally bound to sentence him to death unless there were extenuating or mitigating circumstances.\n\nThis rule was stated in Rattanlal's Law of Crimes, 21st ed., p. 813;\n\n\"The extreme sentence is the normal sentence; the mitigated sentence is the exception. It is not for the Judge to ask himself whether there are reasons for imposing the penalty of death, but whether there are reasons for abstaining from doing so.\"\n\nThe reason , irobably was that this provision was not more than restatement or the law as it stood in England at that time, where the year 1965 the only penalty for murder was death, except in specific cases.\n\nthe till two........(_\n\nThe effect of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955, which repealed s. 367, sub-s. (5) of the Code with effect from January I, 1956, was to restore to the Court the discretion conferred by s. 302 to award the appropriate sentence having regard to the attendant circnmstances, including the mitigating circumstances, if any. This brought the law into conformity with the intentions of the framers of the Code.\n\nAs regards the death sentence, tar from making it the normal sentence for an offence of murder, they sl'!ted that it ought to be 'sparingly used'.\n\nUnder s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the law is now entirely changed.\n\n(!) Travelyan, Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay, vol. I, p. 459.\n\n, . ,\n\nRAJBNDRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen,!.) 159\n\nUnder s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is required to state the reasons for a sentence awarded, and in the case of imposition of a sentence of death and Judge has to record \"special reaso.ns\" tor imposing death sentence.\n\nPunishment for murder as a rule should be life imprisonment and death sentence is only an exception.\n\nIn Balwant Singh's case('), Ambaram's case(2) and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma'~ case(') the Court held that it was neither necessary nor possible to specify the \"special reasons\" which may justify the passing of death sentence in a given case .\n\nIt would thus be obvious that it is neither feasible nor legally permissible for this Court to give a definite connotation to the expression\n\n\"special reasons\" occurring in s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is difficult to put \"special reasons\" in a straight-jacket. Each case must depend on its own particular facts.\n\nThe question of sentence must, in my view, be left to the discretion of the Sessions Judge trying the accused.\n\nUnder the present Code, a trial for murder is divided into two stages. There is a bifurcated trial.\n\nThe first part ol the trial is directed solely to the issue o! guilt or innocence, and concludes with the finding of the Sessions Judge on that issue.\n\nAt the end o! the trial when he comes to a conclusion of guilt, he ha3 to adjourn the case for hearing the accused on the question of sentence.\n\nSection 235, sub-s. (2) of the Code specifically provides for an opportunity of hearing to the accused on the question of sentence after a verdict of guilt is recorded against him.\n\nThe burden is upon the prosecution to make out a case for imposition of the extreme penalty.\n\nWhere a sentence of death is passed, the Sessions Judge has to make a reference to the High Court under s. 366, sub-s. (1) of the Code.\n\nUnder s. 367, sub-s. ( 1) if the High Court thinks a further inquiry should be made into, or additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to be made or taken by the Court of Sessions.\n\nIn a case submitted under s. 366, the High Court under s: 368(a) may either confirm the sentence, or pass any other sentence, i.e. reduce the sentence of death into a sentence of imprisonment for life. Thereafter, an appeal lies to this Court by a special leave under Article 136 on the question of sentence.\n\nFailing the appeal, there is the President's power to grant reprieve and pardon under Article 72 (1), as well a~ the Governor's power of\n\n\n(2) [1976] 4 s.c.c. 298.\n\n\ncommutation under Article 161 of the, Constitution which is a sovereign function.\n\nThe power of the President and of the Governor to grant reprieves and pardons is wide enough to include the power to commute and to remit sentence of punishment.\n\nAll cases of capital punishment are closely scrutinised by the Executive at both the levels to see whether there are such extenuating circumstances as would justify a reprieve, and the power to commute a death sentence is freely exercised, whenever there is some doubt as to the severity of the punishment.\n\nUnder the present system the prerogative of Mercy in the case of persons under sentence of death works well and it produces results generally regarded as satisfactory.\n\nIt helps in mitigating the rigour of the death sentence, particularly in case of those murderers whose execution would offend the public conscience. Very few persons under a sentence of death-may he one or two in a year, in a State are usually executed.\n\nSuch cases are usually of the kind indicated by me above, and even some of them escape the sentence of death.\n\nIt is, therefore, not proper for the Court to trench upon the President's or the Governor's prerogative to grant pardon or reprieve under Articles 72(1) and 161, in taking upon itself the task of commutation of a death sentence, which is properly imposed, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, merely because there is a doubt that the Executive may commute the sentence ultimately, or by one's views as to the utility of a death penalty.\n\nJudges are entitled to hold their own views, but it is the bounden duty of the Court to impose a proper punishment, depending upon the degree of criminality and the desirability to impose such punishment llS a measure of social necessity, as a means of deterring other potential offenders. It is only in very grave cases where it is a crime against the society and the brutality of the crime shocks the judicial conscience that the Court has the power, as well llS the duty, to impose the death sentence.\n\nIn view of these adequate safeguards, it can hardly be asserted that the sentence of death provided for an offence of murder punishable under s. 302 is 'de-humanising' or that it is 'unnecessary'.\n\nWith respect, my learned brother Krishna Iyer J., despite his sense of humanism, does not appear to be wholly an 'abdlitionist'.\n\nThat is the impression I get from his various judgments on the subject.\n\nIn Ediga Anamma(') and Bishan Dass(2 ) he clearly accepts that where the crime is cruel and inhuman, a death sntence may be called for. In the present judgment also, he observes\n\n(!) [1974] 4 S.CR. 443.\n\n(2) [1975] 3 s.c.c. 700.\n\n• . .}\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Sen, J.)\n\n\"If the murderous operation of a die-hard criminal jeopardises social security in a persistent, planned and perilous fashion then his enjoyment of fundamental rights may be rightly annihilated.\n\nIf society does not survive,, individual existence comes to nought. So, one test for impost of death sentence is to, find out whether the murderer offers such a traumatic threat to the survival of social order.\n\nTo illustrate, if an economic offender who intentionally mixes poison in drugs professionally or wilfully adulterates intoxicating substances injuriously, and knowingly or intentionally causes death for the sake of private profit such trader in lethal business is a menace to social security and is, therefore, a violator of social justice whose extinction becomes necessary for society's survival.\n\nSupposing a murderous band of armed dacoits intentionally derails a train and large number of people die in consequence, if the ingredients of murder are present and the object is to commit robbery inside the train, they practise social injustice and imperil social security to a degree that death penalty becomes a necessity if the crime is proved beyond doubt. There may be marginal exceptions or special extenuations but none where this kind of dacoity or robbery coupled with murder becomes a contagion and occupation, and social security is so gravely imperilled that the fundamental rights of the defendant become a deadly instrument whereby many are wiped out and terror strikes community life.\n\nThen he 'reasonably' forfeits his fundamental rights and takes leave of life under the law. The style of violence and systematic corruption and deliberately planned economic offences by corporate top echelons are often a terrible tech-\n\n110logy of knowingly causing death on a macro scale to make a flood of profit. . The definition of murder will often apply to them.\n\nBut because of corporate power such murderous depredations are not charged. If prosecuted and convicted for murder, they may earn the extreme penalty for taking the lives of innocents deliberately for estronomical scales of gain.\n\nLikewise, if a man is murderer, so hardened, so bloodthirsty, that within the prison and without, he makes no bones\n\nA about killing others or carries on a prosperous business in cadavers, then he becomes a candidate for death sentence.\"\n\nMy learned brother Krishna Iyer J. wants the death penalty to be inflicted in the case of three categories of criminals, namely (1) for white-collar offences, (2) for anti-social offences, and (3) for extermi- 8 nating a person who is a menace to the society, that is, a 'hardened murderer'. Edwin H. Stherland defines a white-collar offence as 'a crime in relation to business'. (')The validity of white-collar crime llS a\n\ncrime has been a subject of severe controversy in social studies. Now >c\n\n'white-collar crime', as commonly understood, means a crime committed • by a person of respectability and of high social status in the course his occupational role.\n\nIt takes in such forms as restraint of trade, mis-representation in advertising, infringement of patents, unfair labour i practices, financial fraud, unethical or il1egal rebating and violation of trusts.\n\nIt may also take the form of theft, sale and export of entiques like sculptures, any work of art of historical value, illegal sale of narcotics and alcohol, abortion, fraudulent accident report, income-tax frauds etc. An 'anti-social offence' may consist of sale of spurions drugs, adulteration of articles of food meant for human consumption, autothefts, 'sharp' business practices which do not conform to the national well-being.\n\nSome of these offences must undoubtadly be ruthlessly dealt with.\n\nBut unfortunately our penal laws do not provide for a death sentence for either white collar crimes or anti•social offences, although I wish they did, at least for certain .anti-social offences.\n\nThere wilt be general measure of agreement that some of the serious anti-social offences call for a death sentence viz. acts of sabotage by a person who hijacks a plane and the like and large number of persons die or are injured in consequence, or disrupts lines of communications, or\n\nhnlds up a train and commits armed robbery with murder inside the _..., j train.\n\nHe is a menace to the society and deserves a death sentence, as .._.. ltis existence does not conform to the national well-being.\n\nLike-wise, a person who indulges in theft or illegal trade and export of Jrt treasures such as mvaluable monuments, paintings and sculptures of historical importance and of priceless antiques of what remains of our national herritage, or in adulteration of articles of food meant for human consumption, or in manufacturing and selling of spurious drugs, or engages in illegal sale in narcotics or alcohol, which are injurious to the very life of the community, also deserves a death sentence, as in many other countries, or at any rate a sentence of imprisonment for life.\n\nThe same applies to economic offences which may disrupt the economic life of the\n\ncommunity as a whole, like smuggling of gold and other contraband\n\n(1) Edwin H. Stherland, White-Collar Crime, New York DrYdon p(.s 1949.\n\n' . '\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Sen, J.)\n\ngoods, which call for a very deterrent punishment. to protect the basic economic order of the nation. matters for the Parliament to decide. '\n\nThis is necessary But these are all\n\nIt may be stated that the State of West Bengal has taken a step for-\n\n\\1 ard in that direction.\n\nThe Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1973 (West Bengal Act 42 of 1973) makes the offence of sale of spurious drugs, adulteration of articles of food meant for human consumption etc., punishable with imprisonment for life.\n\nAs regards 'hardened' murderers,, I am afraid, there are few to be found. Many murders unfortunately go undetected, and many a brutal murderer has to be acquitted for want of legal evidence QI'.inging his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.\n\nNevertheless, when the guilt is proved, the Court should leave aside all humanitarian considerations, if, the extrenw penalty is called for.\n\nA 'professional' murderer must, as a matter of course, be sentenced to death because he is a menace to the society.\n\nWhatever sympathy the Court can have should be reserved for the victims of the crime rather than for the perpetrators.\n\nIn such cases, the law must take its course.\n\nI do not intend to enter upon any philosophical dialectics as to the 'utility' of the death sentence or enter into the controversy whether it is 'unnecessary', 'brutal' or 'de-humanizing', but I would, for my part, like to say, that I am of the opinion-with much deference for the groat authority of those who think otherwise-that the weight of evidence and reason is in favour of the retentidn of the death penalty.\n\nI am afraid, if the Courts were to be guided by the classification made by the majority the death sentence for an offence of murder punishable under s. 302, for all practical purposes would be virtually non-existent.\n\nI feel that it is not necessary for the purposes of these appeals to refer 10 the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1976, which bys. 125 int1oduces a news. 302 in the Indian Panel Code, 1860. The re-drafted section seeks to bring about a change in the law. It abolishes the liability to sufl'er the death sentence on conviction of murder and substitutes the sentence of imprisonment tor life hy sub-s. (I) except in cases of \"I certain first degree murde'5 falling within sub-s. (2) thereof. The cases in which the death sentence is to be retained are those where, in the view of the Government, murder is most dangerous to the preservation of law and order, and where the death sentence is likely to be a particularly effective deterrent, viz., pre-planned murders involving extreme brutality and murders involvirig exceptional depravity.\n\nThe Bill is not before the Court. It is, therefore, not proper to deal with it.\n\nIt is, however, necessary to emphasise that if there has to be a law reform at all, some regard must be had to the plight of the victim or his or her family by making provision for payment of compensation. While it is commonly accepted that those convicted of violations of the criminal law must \"pay their debt to society'', little emphasis is p'laced upon requiring offenders to \"pay their debt\" to their victims. These again are matters for the Parliament to provide.\n\nFrom a life time of experience, Sir John Beaumont, speaking with unrivalled authority, told the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment(') that the alternative sentence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 had \"worked well\" in India, and that he had never himself felt that the responsibility of choosing between the sentence of death and a lesser punishment was unfair or excessive, nor had he ever heard any Judge in India express such a feeling.\n\nHe expressed the opinion that there was \"no class of offences in which the degree of moral culpability differs more than in case of murder''.\n\nIt is wholly illogical to require a Judge to pass the same sentence in every case.\n\nIn his view, the proper solution lies in giving to the Judge the same discretion that he had in regard to other offences. A large body of judicial opinion still shares the same view.\n\nIf Parliament thought it right to give to the Judges discretion as to the sentence, I do not think they would or ought to shrink from the onerous responsibility.\n\nI feel it would not be appropriate for this Court to curtail the ambit of their discretion by judicial process.\n\nWe cannot but be oblivious that a sentence. of a wrong type, that is, to substitute a sentence of imprisomuent for life where the death sentence is called for,\n\n,_ • •\n\nF causes grave miscarriage of justice.\n\nA sentence or pattern of 'sentences --J which fails to take due account of the gravity of the offence can seriously \"'-. undermine respect for law.\n\nTurning to the appeals before us,, I cannot say that the award of death sentence in any of these cases was not appropriate or uncalled for.\n\nG In the three caes before us, there were \"special reasons\" within the meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( for the passing of the death sentence in each and, therefore, the High Courts were justified in confirming the death sentences passed, under\n\n1s. 368(a) of the Code.\n\nIn the circumstances, any interference with the sentence of death, in my view, would be wholly unwarranted in each of H these cases.\n\n11) Royal Commission Report pp. 191-93\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 165\n\nIn Rajendra Prasad's -case, the Allabhabad High Court in confirming the death sentence observes that the accused Rajendra is a 'd_esperate character', who after having been convicted under s. 302 and unde.rgone a sentenc~ of imprisonment for life was released only a few days prior to the occurrence, on October 2, 1972, that is, on the _ occasion of Gandhi J ayanti, committed the brutal murder of the deceased Mansukh by striking him, with a knife.\n\nOn the date of occurrence, that is, on October 25, 1972,. at about 11 a.m. the accused along with his brother Pooran rushed towards Sri Kishan, brother of Rambharosay, armed with a knife but Sri Kishan ran to safety and was not hurt.\n\nLater in the evening at about 5 .30 p.m.; the same day, while Rambhaosay and the deceased Mansukh were standing in the Jane in front of Rambharosay's house, the accused suddenly appeared and dealt several blows with the knife on vitl parts of the body of Rambharosay but Rambharosay released himself from his grip and ran inside his house and bolted the door.\n\nThe accused chased him all the way with the blood-stained knife and knocked at the door asking him to open it.\n\nMeanwhile, the deceased Mansukh came and tried to entreat the accused not to asault Rambharosay. Thereupon the accused struck deceased Mansukh, who tried to escape, but the accused chased him over a distance of 200 to 25Q feet and inflicted repeated knife blows on the deceased resulting in his death. The deceased was done to death by the accused merely because he tried to prevent him from assaulting Rambharosay. ·\n\n\\ Not only there are no mitigating circumstances but this was a preplanned, cold-blooded murder. While Rajendra was in jail, his family members used to wield out a threat that the members of the family of Rambharosay would be dealt with after Rajendra is released from jail:\n\n. The case of this acc\"5ed is destructive of the theory of reformation .\n\nThe 'therapeutic touch' which it is said is the best way of preventing repetition of the offence has been of no avail.\n\nPunishment must be desig~ ned so as to deter, as far as possible, from commission of similar offences.\n\nIt should also serve as a warning to other members of society.\n\nIn both respects, the' experiment of reformation has miserably failed.\n\nI am quite sure that with the commutation of his death sentence, the accused will commit a -few more murders and he would again become a menace to the community.\n\nIn Kunjukunju Janardhanan's case, the Kerala IBgh. Court while confirming the death sentence of the accused observes that he acted,\n\nwith extreme depravity. Infatuated by the charm of a village girl, Smt.\n\nSanthamma, then aged about 21 years, the accused Kunjukunju Janardhanan, aged 28 years, committed the brutal murder of his innocent wife, Smt. Chandramathi, aged 26 years and his two minor sO'lls, Sunil aged 7 and Manoj aged 5 at the. dead of night while they were sleep by repeatedly striking them with a sharp-edged deadly weapon.\n\nIt redounds to the credit of Smt. Santhamma, P.W.2, the village girl, with whom the accused was on terms of illicit intimacy, that she used to entreat him in her letters not to court her as it would destroy the happiness of his family.\n\nIt was then that the accused wrote the letter, Ext. P-2, that he would exterminate his wife and children once for all so that he may live happily with her.\n\n• ' , I fail to understand what is meant by the 'eternal triangle' as a mitigat- ! ing circumstance.\n\nThe accused, who acted as a monster, did not even / ·-, c spare his two innocent minor children in order to get rid of his wife an\"r\n\nissues through her. . If the death entence was not to be awarded in a case like this I do not see the type of offence which calls for a death sentence.\n\nI In Shea Shankar Dubey's case, the Allahabad High Court has found the accused Shea Shankar guilty of triple murder and rightly _confirmed the sentence of death passed on him.\n\nThe accused Shea Shankar murdered his uncle.Narottam Dubey, and his two sons Chandra Bhushan and Chandra Shekher.\n\nOn the date of occurrence, i.e., on June 15, 1976 after there was a partition of the joint'family lands between the deceased Narottam and Purushottam, father of the accused Shea Shankar, there was a dispute regarding division of three bataulis.\n\nThe three bataulis could not be F equally divided because they were of diflerent sizes.\n\nThe accused insis-. ted that they should be broken and then partitioned. Smt. Vidyawati, 'widow of Narottam, in fact, in trying to pacify her brother-in-law Purushottam, brought out. one batauli and the remaining two were taken out by Chandra Shekhar.\n\nIt all happened over the act of Chandra Shekher in flinging the two bataulis on the ground which collided making a sound G showing his resentment.\n\nThe expression of resentment implicit in the gesture of Chandra Shekhar infuriated the accused Shea Shankar to such an extent that he committed the three murders in a row. These were nothing bnt first-degree murders.\n\nThe weapon used by the accused in committing the crime, the man- H ner in which the operation was carried out, and the determination with . which the accused acted, as well as the number of injuries inflicted on the unfortunate victims, give a clear picture of the cruelty and brntality\n\n....\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Seu, J.) 167\n\nwith which the accused murdered his uncle and his two sons.\n\nHe first inflicted a knife blow on his uncle Narottam Dubey who tried to run away and as he turned, the accused dealt him another knife blow resulting in his death on the spot.\n\nN arottam Dubey, it appears, attempted his best to escape. Even afte.r he had sustained bleeding injuries at the hands of the accused, he made an effort to run away but he was chased by the\n\nacused and the accused finished the victim with grim determination. His cousin Chandra Bhushan tried to intercept with a view to protect the life of his aged father but he was even not spared by the accused who • i; truck a fatal blow on the chest. The second cousin, Chandra She- _'.....kher, who moved forward to save his brother was chased by the accused 4 who also finished him off by a stroke of the blade of knife he wielded.\n\nIt was no doubt a triflling incident over the division of three betaulis resulting in the triple murder.\n\nIt is said that the murders were not 'pre-meditated'.but committed in the heat of passion over a 'family feud'.\n\nBut that hardly furnishes a justification for the extreme brutality with which the accused acted.\n\nThere is uo inexorable rule that either the extreme youth of the accused or the fact that he acted in a heat of passion must always irrespec-! tive of the enormity of the offence or otherwise be treated as a 'sufficient g(ound for awarding the lesser puni'shment.\n\nThe Court has to take into consideration all the circumstances which do not merit the extreme penalty.\n\nI find that in the facts and circumstances of this particular case, these factors cannot outweigh other considerations.\n\nThree preciouo lives have been lost by the destardly act of the accu'sed.\n\nA family bM been wiped off.\n\nThe death sentence was clearly called for in this case-firstly, as a }hreat or warning to deter potential murderers, and secondly, as the ,.F guarantee against the brutalisation of human nature. The grim determination of the accused to bring the entire operation to the end desired y him is also reflected in the manner of his repelling ihe mtercept10n of Chandra Bhushan who went to the rescue of his father\n\nand Chandra Shekher who tried to rescue his brother Chandra Bhushan the unfortunate victims of the murderous assault.\n\nAll these facts and G circumstances, to my mind, constitute 'special reasons' why the accused should be sentenced to death.\n\nIn retrospect, I venture to say that in these appeals, it cannot be asserted that the award of death sentence to the appellants was 'erroneous in principle'.\n\nNor can it be said that the sentence of death passed on them H was arbitrary or excessive or indicative of an improper exercise of dis- <eretion.\n\nIt is the duty of the Court to impose a proper punishment,\n\ndepending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment as a measure of social necessity, a:s a means of deterring other potential offenders.\n\nFailure to impose a death sentence in such grave calles where it is a crime against the society-particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme brutality, will bring to nought the sentence of death provided bys. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. To allow the appellants to escape with the lesser punishment after they had committed such intentional, cold-blooded, deliberate and brutal murders will deprive the law of its effectiveness and result in travesty of justice.\n\n' •\n\nI would, therefore, for these reasons dismiss the appeals.\n\nThe ap- . \" pellants are at liberty to apply for reprieve for commutation of their se~\"- tence which is an executive act of clemancy.\n\nORDER\n\nIn the light of the opinion of the majority the death sentence in each of these appeals is commuted to a sentence of imprisonment for life.\n\nP. B. R.\n\n.. \"", "total_entities": 545, "entities": [{"text": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P~ SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 649, "end_char": 660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 838, "end_char": 848, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1505, "end_char": 1515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Until Parliament speaks, this Court cannot be silent. 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R .. Blackshield-(July 1977), referred to.", "canonical_name": "Ediga Annamma"}}, {"text": "A. R .. Blackshield-(July 1977)", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7447, "end_char": 7478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Capital punishment in India; The Impact of the Ediga Anamma, by Prof ..\n\nA. R .. Blackshield-(July 1977), referred to."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajendra Prasad' s case :\n\nThe family to which the iappellant and the deceased belonged were 011 inimical terms. -", "canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Kunjukunju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" Kunjukunju's case :\n\nThe appellant, a married man with tWo children, developed illicit sex relations with a fresh girl."}}, {"text": "B Dubey\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9305, "end_char": 9314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Dubey\"s case :\n\n.The appellant, a young man, aged about 20, stabbed to dct>th three members of the family with whom his family had a quarrej over partition of\n\nRAJBNDRA V. U.P. STATE 81\n\nproperty."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10146, "end_char": 10149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sen J, (DissentJnR)\n\n1. (", "canonical_name": "Sen"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10232, "end_char": 10245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) It .is constitutionally and legally impermissible for the Supreme Court while helai_iug an appeal by special leave under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10295, "end_char": 10302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10368, "end_char": 10374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10382, "end_char": 10405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10409, "end_char": 10415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10559, "end_char": 10565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10926, "end_char": 10937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12546, "end_char": 12552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 ji", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12876, "end_char": 12909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It it also not legally permissible for this Court while hearing an appeal in a particular case where a capital sentence is imposed, to define the expreBsion \"special 'reasons\" occurring in sub-s. (3) of s. 354 of the Code, in such\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 ji."}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13050, "end_char": 13056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13077, "end_char": 13109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13562, "end_char": 13568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14266, "end_char": 14277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14646, "end_char": 14652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14684, "end_char": 14690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15017, "end_char": 15023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 368(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15046, "end_char": 15055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15259, "end_char": 15270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 72(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15395, "end_char": 15408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15459, "end_char": 15470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 72(1) and 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16558, "end_char": 16580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16940, "end_char": 16945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh's case [1976] 2 SCR 684; Ambaram's Case (1974] 4 SCC tl.98 and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma's case [1978] 1 SCR 360; referred to."}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 SCR 684", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16953, "end_char": 16969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ambaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16971, "end_char": 16978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh's case [1976] 2 SCR 684; Ambaram's Case (1974] 4 SCC tl.98 and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma's case [1978] 1 SCR 360; referred to."}}, {"text": "Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17009, "end_char": 17033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh's case [1976] 2 SCR 684; Ambaram's Case (1974] 4 SCC tl.98 and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma's case [1978] 1 SCR 360; referred to.", "canonical_name": "Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma'~"}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 SCR 360", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17041, "end_char": 17057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17749, "end_char": 17755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zdifif Anamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17891, "end_char": 17904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "160F-Hl\n\nZdifif Anamma, [1974) 4 S.C.C. 443; Bis/um Pas & Ors. ("}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18626, "end_char": 18632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18652, "end_char": 18684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 368(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18824, "end_char": 18833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19789, "end_char": 19795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19803, "end_char": 19826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20348, "end_char": 20363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[167H]\n\n(i) Rajendra Prasad's case is destructive of the theory of reformation.", "canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Kuniukunju Janardlian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20968, "end_char": 20989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) In Kuniukunju Janardlian's case the accused, who acted aS a monster, ~>--- did not even spare his two innocent minor children in order to get rid of. -,("}}, {"text": "Sheo Sha'nker Dubey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21693, "end_char": 21712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court has to take into consideration all the circumstances which do not merit the extreme penalty ..\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of this particular case i.e.\n\nSheo Sha'nker Dubey's case these factors cannot outweigh other considerations."}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22326, "end_char": 22337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22640, "end_char": 22650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 238, 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23515, "end_char": 23525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.'ho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23909, "end_char": 23914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) If the Courts were to be guided by the classification for inflicting death penalty only in tl1e case of three calegories of criminals, namely, (i) for White .collar offences (ii) for anti-social offences, and (iii) for exterminating a person\n\nV.'ho is a menace to the society, that is, a 'hardened 1nurderer', the death sentence for an offence of murder punishable under section 302, for all practical purposes r--wsiuid be virtually non-existent."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24037, "end_char": 24048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Walter Moberly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26178, "end_char": 26192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f!43Fl\n\nSir Walter Moberly The Ethics qf Punishment Ch."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28171, "end_char": 28176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[14~E]\n\nEven where it has been legally retained, as in India, Capital Puni!bment is."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31094, "end_char": 31118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) In the United States of America also the death penalty has practically existed more or less harmoniously with humane theories of criminal justice for over two hundred years (e.g). ["}}, {"text": "S. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31478, "end_char": 31484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32339, "end_char": 32345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Furman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33232, "end_char": 33238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as seen in the new legislation passed in response to Furman ·(d) tbedeath penalty\n\nwas not inherently cruel and unusual.", "canonical_name": "Furman"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33845, "end_char": 33855, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34923, "end_char": 34933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34977, "end_char": 34988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Bagga, Amicus Curiae for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "P. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35040, "end_char": 35052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.512/78\n\nP. K. Pillai, A.micus Curiae for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "D. P. Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35111, "end_char": 35123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the State of U.P.\n\nK. R. Nambiar for the State of Kerela."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35128, "end_char": 35141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the State of U.P.\n\nK. R. Nambiar for the State of Kerela."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35165, "end_char": 35178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the State of U.P.\n\nK. R. Nambiar for the State of Kerela."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35320, "end_char": 35332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J.\n\n.J •\n\nTHE DEADLY QUANDARY\n\nTo be or not to be : that is the question of lethal import and legal\n\nmomet, in each of these thiee appeals where leave is confined to the\n\nI,.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35992, "end_char": 36002, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36847, "end_char": 36853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36854, "end_char": 36859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Macaulay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36895, "end_char": 36903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the nation, cultural winds of world change and other profound factors, spiritual and secular, and above all, constitutional, inarticulately guide the Court's faculty in reading the meaning of meanings in preference to •a mechanistic interpretation of s. 302 I.P.C. projected in petrified print from Macaulay's vintage mint.", "canonical_name": "Macaulay"}}, {"text": "Jagmohan Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37202, "end_char": 37216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former problem is now beyond forensic doubt after Jagmohan Singh(') and the latter is in critical need of tangible guidelines, at once constitutional and functional.", "canonical_name": "Jagmoharr Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37616, "end_char": 37622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37623, "end_char": 37628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39146, "end_char": 39152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39153, "end_char": 39158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Blackshield", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39434, "end_char": 39445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any academic who has \\ monitored Indian sentencing precedents on murder may awaken to \" 'the overt ambivalence and covert conflict' among judges 'concerning continued resort to the death sentence' which, according to Prof.\n\nBlackshield,(') 'seems to minor the uncertainties and conflicts of values in the community itself'.", "canonical_name": "Blackshield"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39607, "end_char": 39613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39686, "end_char": 39697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40364, "end_char": 40370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40371, "end_char": 40376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40598, "end_char": 40604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40605, "end_char": 40610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. R. Blackshield", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40879, "end_char": 40896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazy law, where human life hangs in the balance, injects an agonising consciousness that judicial error may\n\n(1) Prof. A. R. Blackshield, Associate Professor of Law, University of _New\n\n.", "canonical_name": "A. R. Blackshield"}}, {"text": "Evans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41359, "end_char": 41364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tragic speech in the Commons of former Home Secretary (Cbuter Ede) makes ghastly reading : (')\n\n\"I w.is the Home Secretary who wrote on Evans' papers. \""}}, {"text": "Blacksh!eld", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42499, "end_char": 42510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Blacksh!eld makes an acid comment : (')\n\n\"The fact is that decisions since Ediga Anamma have displayed the same pattern of confusion, contraqictions and aberrations as decisions before that case .... To test this, I have abstracted from the All India Reporter seventy cases in which the Supreme Court has had to choose between life and death under Section 302 : the last twenty-fiv' reported cases before the date of Ediga A namma, and the next fortyfive (including, of course, Ediga Anamma itself) on or after that date.\"", "canonical_name": "Blackshield"}}, {"text": "Ediga Anamma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42574, "end_char": 42586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Blacksh!eld makes an acid comment : (')\n\n\"The fact is that decisions since Ediga Anamma have displayed the same pattern of confusion, contraqictions and aberrations as decisions before that case .... To test this, I have abstracted from the All India Reporter seventy cases in which the Supreme Court has had to choose between life and death under Section 302 : the last twenty-fiv' reported cases before the date of Ediga A namma, and the next fortyfive (including, of course, Ediga Anamma itself) on or after that date.\"", "canonical_name": "Ediga Annamma"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42847, "end_char": 42858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. R. BlackshieJd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43370, "end_char": 43387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Prof. A. R. BlackshieJd, Associte Prcfcsscr of L<>.w, University of New H South Wales: Capital Punishment in India.", "canonical_name": "A. R. Blackshield"}}, {"text": "Jnstice Douglas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43583, "end_char": 43598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I B\n\nconclusion that, at least in contemporary India, Mr. Jnstice Douglas' argument in Furman v. Georgia(') is correct: that arbitrariness and uneven incidence are iQherent and inevitable in a system of capital punishment; and that therefore-- in Indian constitutional terms, and in spite of Jagmohan Singh-the retention of such a system necessarily violates Article 14's guarantee of \"equality before the law.\""}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43884, "end_char": 43894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1975 SC 573", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44201, "end_char": 44216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ediga Annamma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44544, "end_char": 44557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What a study of the decisions of the higher courts on the life-or-deiith choice shows is that judicial impressionism still shows up and it is none too late to enunciate a systematised set of criteria or at least reliable beacons Ediga Annamma (supra) in terms, attempted this systematisation :\n\n\"Let us crystallise the positive indicators against death sentences under Indian Law currently.", "canonical_name": "Ediga Annamma"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47299, "end_char": 47316, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wheeler", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47393, "end_char": 47400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wrote Wheeler, J : (2)\n\n\"That court best serves the law which recognises that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to\n\nthe established and settled judgment of society .... '' F\n\nBenjamin N. Cardozo, said : (')\n\n\"If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors.\""}}, {"text": "Benjamin N. Cardozo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47769, "end_char": 47788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wrote Wheeler, J : (2)\n\n\"That court best serves the law which recognises that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to\n\nthe established and settled judgment of society .... '' F\n\nBenjamin N. Cardozo, said : (')\n\n\"If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors.\"", "canonical_name": "Benjamin Nathan Cardozo"}}, {"text": "Homesput", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48122, "end_char": 48130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Homesput his view pithily when he said that judges make law interstitially, {hat they are confined from molar to molecular motion."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48262, "end_char": 48273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Frankfurter puts\n\n(1) Ediga Annamma v. State of A. P. (1974) 4 S.C.C. 443 at 453."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48656, "end_char": 48666, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian uprising when the Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48958, "end_char": 48993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49064, "end_char": 49074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49644, "end_char": 49650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian uprising when the Penal Code", "statute": "Indian uprising when the Penal Code"}}, {"text": "L.\n\nM. Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50060, "end_char": 50074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An intervener (C9mmittee for Abolition of Death Penalty), interested in abolition of death penalty has submitted, through Dr. L.\n\nM. Singhvi, some material."}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50512, "end_char": 50519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are cognizant of the fact that no inflexible formula is feasible which will provide a complete set of criteria for the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime of murder, as pointed out by Palekar, J. in Jagmoharr Singh (supra)."}}, {"text": "Jagmoharr Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50527, "end_char": 50542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are cognizant of the fact that no inflexible formula is feasible which will provide a complete set of criteria for the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime of murder, as pointed out by Palekar, J. in Jagmoharr Singh (supra).", "canonical_name": "Jagmoharr Singh"}}, {"text": "Richard B. Brandt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50956, "end_char": 50973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Richard B. 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Confusius, Manu,\n\nHammurai and Solomon to meet together at a conference table, I doubt whether they would be able to evolve agreed formulae as to what constitutes social justice, which is a very controversial field. . . ."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99053, "end_char": 99059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100713, "end_char": 100722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101137, "end_char": 101165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narain said : (')\n\n\"To my mind, it is ultimately a question of respect for life and human approach to those who commit grievous hurts ilo others."}}, {"text": "Andrie Sakharov", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101976, "end_char": 101991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(emphasis added)\n\nAndrie Sakharov, in a message to the Stockholm Conference on Abolition organised by Amnesty International last year, did put the point more bluntly : (')\n\n(1) On the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Amnesty International, p. 13.", "canonical_name": "Andrie Sakharov"}}, {"text": "Andrei Sakharov", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102220, "end_char": 102235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Message by Andrei Sakharov to the Amnesty International Conference held in Stockholm on Dec. 10 & 11, 1977.", "canonical_name": "Andrie Sakharov"}}, {"text": "Stockholm", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 102284, "end_char": 102293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Message by Andrei Sakharov to the Amnesty International Conference held in Stockholm on Dec. 10 & 11, 1977."}}, {"text": "Tolstoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103566, "end_char": 103573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "emphasis added)\n\nTolstoy wrote an article \"I cannot be silent\" protesting against death\n\nsentence where he said : (1) E\n\n\"Twelve of those by whose labour we live, the very men whom we have depraved and are still depraving by every means in our power--from the poison of vodka to the terrible falsehood of a creed we impose on them with all our ."}}, {"text": "Victor Hugo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104395, "end_char": 104406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Victor Hugo's words are not vapid sentimentalism :\n\n\"We shall look upon crime as a disease."}}, {"text": "Chambal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105233, "end_char": 105240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Gandhian concept was, put , to the test without effects calamitous in the Chambal dacoits' cases : (1) >\n\n\"Take the classic example of the blood-thirsty dacoits of Chambal."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105382, "end_char": 105387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The so-called dacoits, in reality the Thakurs of Delhi in the 12th century, were driven to the desolate Chambal Valley."}}, {"text": "Jayaprakash Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105690, "end_char": 105708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarvodaya leaders Jayaprakash Narain and Vinoba Bhave won over dacoits with love, affection and understandingsomething sophisticated, automatic weapons failed to do.\""}}, {"text": "Vinoba Bhave", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105713, "end_char": 105725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarvodaya leaders Jayaprakash Narain and Vinoba Bhave won over dacoits with love, affection and understandingsomething sophisticated, automatic weapons failed to do.\""}}, {"text": "L. H. Hiranandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 107027, "end_char": 107044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Article by Dr. L. H. Hiranandani in Illustrated Weekly of India dt."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108244, "end_char": 108251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109203, "end_char": 109220, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "So the Court must permeate the Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109575, "end_char": 109616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ramsey Clark", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111193, "end_char": 111205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Douglas, in a famous death penalty case, observed :\n\n\"Former Attorney Ramsey Clark has said : 'It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.\""}}, {"text": "August 29, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 111766, "end_char": 111781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comments the Editor, the Illustrated Weekly ol India dated August 29, 1976."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112518, "end_char": 112530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ •\n\n' ..\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.)", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112829, "end_char": 112835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112836, "end_char": 112841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Samuel Romilly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114345, "end_char": 114359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is note-worthy that Sir Samuel Romilly, critical of the brutal ,,1r---penalties in the then Britain, said in 1817 : 'The Laws of England are written in blood'."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 114413, "end_char": 114420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is note-worthy that Sir Samuel Romilly, critical of the brutal ,,1r---penalties in the then Britain, said in 1817 : 'The Laws of England are written in blood'."}}, {"text": "Alfieri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114482, "end_char": 114489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alfieri has suggested : 'Society prepares the ---• crime, the criminal commits it. '"}}, {"text": "Jeoffrey Streatfield", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114629, "end_char": 114649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may permit ourselves the liberty\n\n~ to quote from Judge Sir Jeoffrey Streatfield : 'If you are going to have anything to do with the criminal courts, you should see for yourself the conditions under which prisoners serve their sentence.' ' '"}}, {"text": "Homicide Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115958, "end_char": 115976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Barbara Wooton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 116123, "end_char": 116137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attempts to get round the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965 have failed in Parliament and as Barbara Wooton says, 'Capital punishment thus appeared to be itself sentenced to death' for murder."}}, {"text": "After the Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116363, "end_char": 116386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Warren", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116737, "end_char": 116743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "penal doctrine because the legislative text is not static; and as Chief Justice Warren wrote in Trop v. Dulles the court 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of a maturing society'.", "canonical_name": "Warren"}}, {"text": "Leo Tolstoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117567, "end_char": 117578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Count Leo Tolstoy in his Recollections and Essays denounces death >malty even against revolutionaries by arguments too Gandhian to be dismissed by Indian judges in the sentencing sector of discretion."}}, {"text": "Anthony llabingtton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117828, "end_char": 117847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) The Power to Silence : A History of Punishment in Britain by Anthony llabingtton, p. 46-47."}}, {"text": "Socrates", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118038, "end_char": 118046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Law by itself is no answer A to Justice as the sublime instances of Socrates, Jesus and martyrs galore in the long story of Man point."}}, {"text": "Jesus", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118048, "end_char": 118053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Law by itself is no answer A to Justice as the sublime instances of Socrates, Jesus and martyrs galore in the long story of Man point."}}, {"text": "Johnson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119011, "end_char": 119018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The importance of death sentence as a deterrent is brought out with characteristic wit by Dr. Johnson, who according to Boswell, noted pickpockets plying their trade in a crowd assembled to ee one of their number executed'."}}, {"text": "Boswell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119037, "end_char": 119044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The importance of death sentence as a deterrent is brought out with characteristic wit by Dr. Johnson, who according to Boswell, noted pickpockets plying their trade in a crowd assembled to ee one of their number executed'."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119585, "end_char": 119595, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119606, "end_char": 119612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119613, "end_char": 119618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119667, "end_char": 119673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119674, "end_char": 119679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 345(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119686, "end_char": 119695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119703, "end_char": 119729, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sunil Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119846, "end_char": 119857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sunil Batra (') a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed :\n\n\"Consciously and deliberately we must focus our attention, while examining the challenge, to one fundamental fact that we are required to examine the validity of a pre-constitution statute in the context of the modern reformist theory of puishment, jail be; ng treated as a correctional institution\" \"Cases arc not unknown where merely on account of a long lapse of time the Courts have commuted the sentence of\n\n(1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494 at pp."}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 119864, "end_char": 119882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sunil Batra (') a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed :\n\n\"Consciously and deliberately we must focus our attention, while examining the challenge, to one fundamental fact that we are required to examine the validity of a pre-constitution statute in the context of the modern reformist theory of puishment, jail be; ng treated as a correctional institution\" \"Cases arc not unknown where merely on account of a long lapse of time the Courts have commuted the sentence of\n\n(1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494 at pp."}}, {"text": "Buddha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121105, "end_char": 121111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The current e, thos, with its strong emphasis on human rights and against death penalty, together with the ancient strains of culture spanniug the period from Buddha to Gandhi must ethically inform the concept of social justice which is a paramount principle and cultural paradigm of our Constitution."}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121645, "end_char": 121650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121658, "end_char": 121668, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121911, "end_char": 121918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121961, "end_char": 121968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121994, "end_char": 122002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rlph Nader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125098, "end_char": 125108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliamentarians and judicial personnel may benefit by the observations made by Rlph Nader on American Law-in-action .(", "canonical_name": "Ralph Nader"}}, {"text": "Ralph Nader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125463, "end_char": 125474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crime statistics almost wholly ignore corporate or business crime; there is l; st of the ten most wanted corporations; the law affords no means of regularly collecting H\n\n(1) Introduction by Ralph Nader to 'America Inc.' by Morton Mintz and Jerry\n\nS. Cohen, p. 11.", "canonical_name": "Ralph Nader"}}, {"text": "America Inc.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125479, "end_char": 125491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crime statistics almost wholly ignore corporate or business crime; there is l; st of the ten most wanted corporations; the law affords no means of regularly collecting H\n\n(1) Introduction by Ralph Nader to 'America Inc.' by Morton Mintz and Jerry\n\nS. Cohen, p. 11."}}, {"text": "Morton Mintz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125496, "end_char": 125508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crime statistics almost wholly ignore corporate or business crime; there is l; st of the ten most wanted corporations; the law affords no means of regularly collecting H\n\n(1) Introduction by Ralph Nader to 'America Inc.' by Morton Mintz and Jerry\n\nS. Cohen, p. 11."}}, {"text": "Jerry\n\nS. Cohen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125513, "end_char": 125528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crime statistics almost wholly ignore corporate or business crime; there is l; st of the ten most wanted corporations; the law affords no means of regularly collecting H\n\n(1) Introduction by Ralph Nader to 'America Inc.' by Morton Mintz and Jerry\n\nS. Cohen, p. 11."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130369, "end_char": 130375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130386, "end_char": 130392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131499, "end_char": 131508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131509, "end_char": 131515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131722, "end_char": 131728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "AIR 1975 SC 762", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 131986, "end_char": 132001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lalla Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 132109, "end_char": 132120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A brief word about Lalla Singh.(')"}}, {"text": "18-6-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 132626, "end_char": 132635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the court reduced the sentence to life term grounded on the Jong and agonising gap between the date of offence and the disposal of the case by the Supreme Court :\n\n\"While we are unable to say that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in imposing the extreme penalty, we feel that as the offence was committed on 18-6-1971 more than six years ago, the ends of justice do not require that we should confirm the sentence of death passed on the first respondent.\""}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132961, "end_char": 132967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133005, "end_char": 133014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133844, "end_char": 133864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134223, "end_char": 134234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134502, "end_char": 134513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135034, "end_char": 135040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135060, "end_char": 135066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136135, "end_char": 136141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136217, "end_char": 136223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138092, "end_char": 138098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 138099, "end_char": 138102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "RAJENDRA PRASAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 138850, "end_char": 138865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJENDRA PRASAD'S CASE\n\nA long-standing family feud, with years-long roots, Jet to a tragic murder.", "canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Ram Bharosey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 138964, "end_char": 138976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The houses of Ram Bharosey and Pyarelal had fallen out and periodic fuelling of the feud was furnished by the kidnapping of a wife, the stabbing of a brother and the like.", "canonical_name": "Ram Bharosey"}}, {"text": "Pyarelal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 138981, "end_char": 138989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The houses of Ram Bharosey and Pyarelal had fallen out and periodic fuelling of the feud was furnished by the kidnapping of a wife, the stabbing of a brother and the like."}}, {"text": "Mansukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 139968, "end_char": 139975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some minor mcident ignited his latent feud and he stabbed Ram Bharosey and his friend Mansukh several times, and the latter succumbed.", "canonical_name": "Mansukh"}}, {"text": "Benjamin Nathan Cardozo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 140638, "end_char": 140661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise, here was not a youth of uncontrollable violent propensities against the com-\n\n(1) Benjamin Nathan Cardozo \"What Medicine Can Do For Law\" Address before the New York Acade1ny of Medicine Nov. 1, 1928.", "canonical_name": "Benjamin Nathan Cardozo"}}, {"text": "Nov. 1, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 140742, "end_char": 140754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise, here was not a youth of uncontrollable violent propensities against the com-\n\n(1) Benjamin Nathan Cardozo \"What Medicine Can Do For Law\" Address before the New York Acade1ny of Medicine Nov. 1, 1928."}}, {"text": "Oscal Wilde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141259, "end_char": 141270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pitiless verse of Oscal Wilde is pitifully true even today :\n\n\"The vilest deeds, like poison weeds, Bloom well in prison air; It is only what is good in Man That wastes and withers there\"\n\n\"Desperate criminal\" is a convenient description to brand a person."}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141681, "end_char": 141687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prasad's prison term never 'cured' him."}}, {"text": "Rajendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 142159, "end_char": 142167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any way, Rajendra showed no incurable disposition to violent outbursts against his fellow-men.", "canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRASAD ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "randy Janardanan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 143132, "end_char": 143148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One\n'\\----\n\n, ,\n\n...\n\nRAJENDRA v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 131\n\nrandy Janardanan-the appellant-with a wife and two children, developed sex relations with a fresh girl and the inevitable social resistance to this betrayal of marital fidelity led to a barbaric short-en!"}}, {"text": "J anardanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 144085, "end_char": 144096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is J anardanan a social security risk, altogether beyond salvage by therapeutic life sentence ?"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145078, "end_char": 145084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145095, "end_char": 145100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145101, "end_char": 145106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sheo Shankar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 145305, "end_char": 145317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges expressed themselves ~: G\n\n\"Considering that Sheo Shankar, appellant caused the death of three persons so closely related to kim, by stabbing each of them in the chest one after the other, and that too on no greater provocation than that there had been an exchange of abuses, I do not see how it can be said that sen- B tence of death errs on the side of severity."}}, {"text": "AIR 1976 SC 2071", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 145757, "end_char": 145773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147388, "end_char": 147396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1976 SC 2071", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 148354, "end_char": 148370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Carlose John", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 150038, "end_char": 150050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is apt to notice in this context that even on a traditional approach this is not a case for death senrence, if we are to be belighted by the guidelines in Carlose John(')."}}, {"text": "Kartm Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 150283, "end_char": 150294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ruling in Kartm Singh(') related to -·\n\n_."}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 349", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 151063, "end_char": 151078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Yoga", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 151537, "end_char": 151541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yoga, in its many forms, seems to hold splendid answers."}}, {"text": "Ho\\mes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152492, "end_char": 152498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"(1)\n\nAfter all, the famous words of Justice Ho\\mes \"The Law must keep its promises\" must be remembered.", "canonical_name": "Holmes"}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152688, "end_char": 152691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J. 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"metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the following year, three equally sanguinary statutes were thrown out of the House of Lords under the influence of Lord Ellenborough."}}, {"text": "Aristotle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 173927, "end_char": 173936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Aristotle put it, just retribution consists not in simple but in proportionate retaliation, that is, in receiving in return for a wrongful act not the same thing but its equivalent, and, what this is, can only be stimated if the whole context is taken into account."}}, {"text": "Disraeli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 178608, "end_char": 178616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, during the Nineteenth Century, Disraeli and Gladstone, the leading politicians in the country, took no part in the movement to abolish the death penalty."}}, {"text": "Gladstone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 178621, "end_char": 178630, "source": "ner", "metadata": 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"end_char": 179795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In between 1949 and 1953 the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment carried out an exhaustive inquiry."}}, {"text": "Royal Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 179836, "end_char": 179852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Royal Commission made a study of this complex and manysided task."}}, {"text": "Great Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 179936, "end_char": 179949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It held its inquiries not only in Great Britain but also in the United States and several European countries and heard evidence H from every possible source."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 180954, "end_char": 180961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 It is evident from the report that some of the most distinguished\n\n~--judicial witnesses including Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls, and some very \"+ experienced Judges like Mr. Justice Humphreys, Sir John Beaumont, Mr. Justice Byrne, were fumly of the view that the capital punishment must be retained for the protection of the socie_ty."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 181003, "end_char": 181010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 It is evident from the report that some of the most distinguished\n\n~--judicial witnesses including Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls, and some very \"+ experienced Judges like Mr. Justice Humphreys, Sir John Beaumont, Mr. Justice Byrne, were fumly of the view that the capital punishment must be retained for the protection of the socie_ty."}}, {"text": "Humphreys", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181086, "end_char": 181095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 It is evident from the report that some of the most distinguished\n\n~--judicial witnesses including Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls, and some very \"+ experienced Judges like Mr. Justice Humphreys, Sir John Beaumont, Mr. Justice Byrne, were fumly of the view that the capital punishment must be retained for the protection of the socie_ty."}}, {"text": "John Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181101, "end_char": 181114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 It is evident from the report that some of the most distinguished\n\n~--judicial witnesses including Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls, and some very \"+ experienced Judges like Mr. Justice Humphreys, Sir John Beaumont, Mr. Justice Byrne, were fumly of the view that the capital punishment must be retained for the protection of the socie_ty.", "canonical_name": "John Beaumont"}}, {"text": "Byrne", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181128, "end_char": 181133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 It is evident from the report that some of the most distinguished\n\n~--judicial witnesses including Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls, and some very \"+ experienced Judges like Mr. Justice Humphreys, Sir John Beaumont, Mr. Justice Byrne, were fumly of the view that the capital punishment must be retained for the protection of the socie_ty."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 181886, "end_char": 181893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The punishment of death, said Lord Denning to the Royal Commission, (1) should reflect adequately the revulsion felt for the gravest of crimes by the great majority of citizens.", "canonical_name": "Denning~ M. R."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182867, "end_char": 182874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same vein, Lord Chief Justice Goddard said in 1948 : (')."}}, {"text": "Hansard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182944, "end_char": 182951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Hansard (Hon•• of Lord•), Vol."}}, {"text": "Homicide Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184716, "end_char": 184734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Roy Calbert", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 185292, "end_char": 185303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Roy Calbert : Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century,\n\n(2) Arthur Koestler : R•flections on Hanging,\n\n(3) Sir Ernest Gowers : A Life for Life."}}, {"text": "Arthur Koestler", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 185356, "end_char": 185371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Roy Calbert : Capital Punishment in the 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Act, 1957", "statute": "the Homicide Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185839, "end_char": 185843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185920, "end_char": 185924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185926, "end_char": 185935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186690, "end_char": 186694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187072, "end_char": 187075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abettors Act 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 187165, "end_char": 187182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187184, "end_char": 187193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abettors Act 1861", "statute": "Abettors Act 1861"}}, {"text": "July 31, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 187691, "end_char": 187704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was to expire on July 31, 1970 bu!"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188358, "end_char": 188363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prison Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188371, "end_char": 188386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Treason Act 1814", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188625, "end_char": 188641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188643, "end_char": 188647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Treason Act 1814", "statute": "Treason Act 1814"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188689, "end_char": 188693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Treason Act 1814", "statute": "Treason Act 1814"}}, {"text": "Protection Act 1772", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188760, "end_char": 188779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188785, "end_char": 188788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Protection Act 1772", "statute": "Protection Act 1772"}}, {"text": "Children and Young Persons Act 1933", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189223, "end_char": 189258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189260, "end_char": 189265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children and Young Persons Act 1933", "statute": "Children and Young Persons Act 1933"}}, {"text": "Sydney Silverman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 189448, "end_char": 189464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The successful campaign to abolish the death penalty in Britain has been achieved in a comparatively short period of time by no more than a handful ardent penal reformers like Sydney Silverman, who carried out the unfinished wmk of Romilly and other reformers, pertinacious in their lobbying and propaganda, ('-') in the face of majority opinion favouring retention of an admittedly barbaric but, to that majority, necessary penal instrument."}}, {"text": "Romilly", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 189504, "end_char": 189511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The successful campaign to abolish the death penalty in Britain has been achieved in a comparatively short period of time by no more than a handful ardent penal reformers like Sydney Silverman, who carried out the unfinished wmk of Romilly and other reformers, pertinacious in their lobbying and propaganda, ('-') in the face of majority opinion favouring retention of an admittedly barbaric but, to that majority, necessary penal instrument."}}, {"text": "Silverman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 189752, "end_char": 189761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the final debates were protracted-Silverman's private members' Bill (with invaluable legislative time given by the Government) was introduced on December 4, 1964, and reached the Statute Book only on November 2, 1965--the history of the campaign is a remarkable testament to British democracy which can convert convinced minority opinion into progressivo legislative action."}}, {"text": "December 4, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 189863, "end_char": 189879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the final debates were protracted-Silverman's private members' Bill (with invaluable legislative time given by the Government) was introduced on December 4, 1964, and reached the Statute Book only on November 2, 1965--the history of the campaign is a remarkable testament to British democracy which can convert convinced minority opinion into progressivo legislative action."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 189918, "end_char": 189934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the final debates were protracted-Silverman's private members' Bill (with invaluable legislative time given by the Government) was introduced on December 4, 1964, and reached the Statute Book only on November 2, 1965--the history of the campaign is a remarkable testament to British democracy which can convert convinced minority opinion into progressivo legislative action."}}, {"text": "Radzinowicz Laon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190335, "end_char": 190351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Radzinowicz Laon : A History of Engli•h Criminal Law and its Administration, vol."}}, {"text": "Jame• Christopher", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 190425, "end_char": 190442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Jame• Christopher : Capital Puni•hment in Great Britain."}}, {"text": "Elizabeth Orman Tuttis", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 190487, "end_char": 190509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Elizabeth Orman Tuttis : The Crusade against Capital Punishment in Great Britain\n\n• ••\n\n. ."}}, {"text": "D.A. Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190640, "end_char": 190651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJEJ'1DRA v. u. P. STATE (Sen, l.) 149\n\nD.A. Thomas in his article \"Development in Sentencing 1964- A 1973\"(') observes :\n\n\"As a society, we have made inconsistent demands on our official system of social control."}}, {"text": "Eaton Baker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 192342, "end_char": 192353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Eaton Baker's case\n\nthe appeal was on a question of sentence."}}, {"text": "G Court of Appeal of Jamaica", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 192431, "end_char": 192459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The issue was whether the G Court of Appeal of Jamaica was right in sentencing to death the two youngmen who when they committed the murder we.re under the age of eighteen years, but when they were convicted of the offence and\n\nsentenced to death, had both attaiped the age of 18 years."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192844, "end_char": 192848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Offences against the Person Act 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 192856, "end_char": 192892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192944, "end_char": 192952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Offences against the Person Act 1925", "statute": "the Offences against the Person Act 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193191, "end_char": 193196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Offences against the Person Act 1925", "statute": "the Offences against the Person Act 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 20(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193609, "end_char": 193617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Offences against the Person Act 1925", "statute": "the Offences against the Person Act 1925"}}, {"text": "Jamaica", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 193641, "end_char": 193648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As to the constitutional issue, the Judicial Committee held that when a person was held guilty of a charge of murder, the death sentence passed on him cannot be treated as a contravention of s. 20(7) of the Constitution of Jamaica, stating:\n\n\"One's opinion as to whether the consequences of giving effect to the sub-section would be irrational or unjust is inevitably coloured by whethe.r one starts with lhe be_lief that capital punishment should be abolished for all offences except, perhaps, for treason-a view accepted by the legislature, if not by public opinion in general, in.the United Kingdom; or with the contrary belief that capital punishment is normally the appropriate penalty for murder-a view which the continuance in force of section 2 of the Offences against the Person Law suggests is accepted by the legislature in Jamaica.\" ("}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 194005, "end_char": 194019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As to the constitutional issue, the Judicial Committee held that when a person was held guilty of a charge of murder, the death sentence passed on him cannot be treated as a contravention of s. 20(7) of the Constitution of Jamaica, stating:\n\n\"One's opinion as to whether the consequences of giving effect to the sub-section would be irrational or unjust is inevitably coloured by whethe.r one starts with lhe be_lief that capital punishment should be abolished for all offences except, perhaps, for treason-a view accepted by the legislature, if not by public opinion in general, in.the United Kingdom; or with the contrary belief that capital punishment is normally the appropriate penalty for murder-a view which the continuance in force of section 2 of the Offences against the Person Law suggests is accepted by the legislature in Jamaica.\" ("}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194161, "end_char": 194170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "de Freitas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 194288, "end_char": 194298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In de Freitas case the Privy Council confirmed the sentence of death passed by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, and held that there was no violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 1 and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194507, "end_char": 194518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195907, "end_char": 195910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Warren", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197651, "end_char": 197657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Chief Justice Warren, speaking for Mr, Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Whittak'ar, asserted that:\n\n\"this Court has had little occaion to give precise content H to the Eighth Amendment\", that itl content is not static, but\n\n(1) [1958] 356 US 86 : 2 L. Ed.", "canonical_name": "Warren"}}, {"text": "Black", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197684, "end_char": 197689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Chief Justice Warren, speaking for Mr, Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Whittak'ar, asserted that:\n\n\"this Court has had little occaion to give precise content H to the Eighth Amendment\", that itl content is not static, but\n\n(1) [1958] 356 US 86 : 2 L. Ed.", "canonical_name": "Blackman"}}, {"text": "Whittak'ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197727, "end_char": 197737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Chief Justice Warren, speaking for Mr, Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Whittak'ar, asserted that:\n\n\"this Court has had little occaion to give precise content H to the Eighth Amendment\", that itl content is not static, but\n\n(1) [1958] 356 US 86 : 2 L. Ed."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 198499, "end_char": 198533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The issue as to the • constitutionality of the death penalty in a State usually arose in the Supreme Court of the United States on procedural grounds, that is, on the question of fairness of the procedural aspect and its application, viz., •"}}, {"text": "Harlan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 199024, "end_char": 199030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Harlan thought it would be impossible to draft 'tatutory standards for this purpose, saying :"}}, {"text": "S. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200482, "end_char": 200488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stewart", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 200785, "end_char": 200792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Broadly stated, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr ."}}, {"text": "White", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 200811, "end_char": 200816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice White held that the death Penalty as imposed, is arbitrarily and infrequently meted out, in violation of the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments."}}, {"text": "Brennan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 202378, "end_char": 202385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' }\n\n' '\n\nMr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall took a normative approach."}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 202402, "end_char": 202410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' }\n\n' '\n\nMr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall took a normative approach."}}, {"text": "Furman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 203337, "end_char": 203343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe opinions of the four dissenting Justices were as important as the majority statements because any subsequent challenges on Furman would incorporate their reasoning.", "canonical_name": "Furman"}}, {"text": "Blackman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 203392, "end_char": 203400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Blackman and Mr.\n\nJustice Rehnquist, who are advocates of strict judicial conservation, felt that the matter was essentially political, and properly the domain of the legislature, not the judiciary.", "canonical_name": "Blackman"}}, {"text": "Rehnquist", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 203418, "end_char": 203427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Blackman and Mr.\n\nJustice Rehnquist, who are advocates of strict judicial conservation, felt that the matter was essentially political, and properly the domain of the legislature, not the judiciary."}}, {"text": "Burger", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 203606, "end_char": 203612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice Burger, admitting that since the ruling a Trop v.\n\nDulles (supra) in 1958, it is necessary to evaluate a challanged punish- ment in terms of the \"evolving standards of decency .... of a maturing society\", felt nonetheless that there is no judicially significant public .......i... opposition to capital punishment in the United States.", "canonical_name": "Burger"}}, {"text": "Burger", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 204148, "end_char": 204154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the decision rejecting the death penalty was essentially based on t procedural grounds, as the majority agreed that the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty was unconstitutional, Burger contends that the Eighth Amendment does not deal with procedure, and with only the substantive nature of the punishment in question.", "canonical_name": "Burger"}}, {"text": "Powell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 204501, "end_char": 204507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Powell dissented by establishing that the constitutionality o!"}}, {"text": "Georgia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 205695, "end_char": 205702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some State including Georgia, Florida and Texas, established new procedures for capital cases requiring sentencing judges and juries to\n\n(I) M. Cherif Bassiouni : Substantive Criminal Law, pp, 120-26."}}, {"text": "Florida", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 205704, "end_char": 205711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some State including Georgia, Florida and Texas, established new procedures for capital cases requiring sentencing judges and juries to\n\n(I) M. Cherif Bassiouni : Substantive Criminal Law, pp, 120-26."}}, {"text": "Texas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 205716, "end_char": 205721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some State including Georgia, Florida and Texas, established new procedures for capital cases requiring sentencing judges and juries to\n\n(I) M. Cherif Bassiouni : Substantive Criminal Law, pp, 120-26."}}, {"text": "M. Cherif Bassiouni", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 205815, "end_char": 205834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some State including Georgia, Florida and Texas, established new procedures for capital cases requiring sentencing judges and juries to\n\n(I) M. Cherif Bassiouni : Substantive Criminal Law, pp, 120-26."}}, {"text": "Louisiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 206385, "end_char": 206394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the other States, including North Carolina, Louisiana and Oklahoma sought to meet the Furman objections by removing all flexibility from the sentencing process, though limiting the offences for which the death sentence could be imposed."}}, {"text": "Oklahoma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 206399, "end_char": 206407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the other States, including North Carolina, Louisiana and Oklahoma sought to meet the Furman objections by removing all flexibility from the sentencing process, though limiting the offences for which the death sentence could be imposed."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 206789, "end_char": 206801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States delivered the judgment it had postponed a year earlier."}}, {"text": "Gregg", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 207279, "end_char": 207284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The issue in the three cases dealing with discretionary sentencing ,\n\n(Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek) was whether imposition of the sentence of , death for the crime of murder under the laws of the respective states E violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.", "canonical_name": "Gregg"}}, {"text": "Jurek", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 207299, "end_char": 207304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The issue in the three cases dealing with discretionary sentencing ,\n\n(Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek) was whether imposition of the sentence of , death for the crime of murder under the laws of the respective states E violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."}}, {"text": "Gregg", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 207622, "end_char": 207627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court's reasons in Gregg as to \\Vhy the death sentence was not .a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments were as F follows : First, history and precedent do not support the conclusion that the death sentence is a per se violation.", "canonical_name": "Gregg"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 208941, "end_char": 208951, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Herbert L.A. Hart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 209381, "end_char": 209398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I wish to conclude this part of the judgment by quoting Herbert L.A. Hart, who in his article on \"Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States( 1)\", admirably sums up the two D points of view :\n\n\"There are indeed ways of defending and criticising the death penalty which are quite independent of the utilitarian position and of the questions of fact which the utilitarian will consider as crucial."}}, {"text": "Harbert L. A. H'ft", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 210773, "end_char": 210791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Argument in support ef views as absolute as these can co11sist only of an invitation, on the one hand, to consider in detail the execution of a human being, and on the other hand, to consider in detail some awful murder, and then to await the\n\n(I) Harbert L. A. H'ft : ''Murder and the Principles of Punishment : Engknd\n\nand the United States\": North\\Vestern University Ltw Revic."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212567, "end_char": 212573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.llt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 213461, "end_char": 213499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.llt."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213596, "end_char": 213613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213860, "end_char": 213877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Macauley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 213893, "end_char": 213901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "said Lord Macauley who drafted it, is 'the principle of suppressing crime with the smallest possible amount of suffering(')'.", "canonical_name": "Macaulay"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214094, "end_char": 214105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 214113, "end_char": 214136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214409, "end_char": 214415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 214435, "end_char": 214467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rattanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 214751, "end_char": 214760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule was stated in Rattanlal's Law of Crimes, 21st ed.,"}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215360, "end_char": 215366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215481, "end_char": 215487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215856, "end_char": 215862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 215882, "end_char": 215914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216068, "end_char": 216074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 216094, "end_char": 216126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Balwant Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216426, "end_char": 216439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Balwant Singh's case('), Ambaram's case(2) and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma'~ case(') the Court held that it was neither necessary nor possible to specify the \"special reasons\" which may justify the passing of death sentence in a given case ."}}, {"text": "Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma'~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216473, "end_char": 216499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Balwant Singh's case('), Ambaram's case(2) and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma'~ case(') the Court held that it was neither necessary nor possible to specify the \"special reasons\" which may justify the passing of death sentence in a given case .", "canonical_name": "Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma'~"}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216839, "end_char": 216845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 216865, "end_char": 216897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217524, "end_char": 217535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217904, "end_char": 217910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217943, "end_char": 217949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218274, "end_char": 218280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218516, "end_char": 218527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218644, "end_char": 218654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218742, "end_char": 218753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 72(1) and 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 219951, "end_char": 219973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220915, "end_char": 220921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bishan Dass(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 221197, "end_char": 221210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ediga Anamma(') and Bishan Dass(2 ) he clearly accepts that where the crime is cruel and inhuman, a death sntence may be called for."}}, {"text": "[1974] 4 S.CR. 443", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 221357, "end_char": 221375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Edwin H. Stherland", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 224088, "end_char": 224106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Edwin H. Stherland defines a white-collar offence as 'a crime in relation to business'. (')", "canonical_name": "Edwin H. Stherland"}}, {"text": "Edwin H. Stherland", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 226589, "end_char": 226607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same applies to economic offences which may disrupt the economic life of the\n\ncommunity as a whole, like smuggling of gold and other contraband\n\n(1) Edwin H. Stherland, White-Collar Crime, New York DrYdon p(.s 1949.", "canonical_name": "Edwin H. Stherland"}}, {"text": "s 1949", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226648, "end_char": 226654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 226904, "end_char": 226924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is necessary But these are all\n\nIt may be stated that the State of West Bengal has taken a step for-\n\n\\1 ard in that direction."}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 227015, "end_char": 227044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 227046, "end_char": 227061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228459, "end_char": 228465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 228610, "end_char": 228627, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Panel Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 228697, "end_char": 228720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "John Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 229960, "end_char": 229973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From a life time of experience, Sir John Beaumont, speaking with unrivalled authority, told the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment(') that the alternative sentence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 had \"worked well\" in India, and that he had never himself felt that the responsibility of choosing between the sentence of death and a lesser punishment was unfair or excessive, nor had he ever heard any Judge in India express such a feeling.", "canonical_name": "John Beaumont"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230098, "end_char": 230104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 230112, "end_char": 230134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231647, "end_char": 231653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231673, "end_char": 231705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allabhabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 232119, "end_char": 232140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "191-93\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 165\n\nIn Rajendra Prasad's -case, the Allabhabad High Court in confirming the death sentence observes that the accused Rajendra is a 'desperate character', who after having been convicted under s. 302 and unde.rgone a sentenc~ of imprisonment for life was released only a few days prior to the occurrence, on October 2, 1972, that is, on the  occasion of Gandhi J ayanti, committed the brutal murder of the deceased Mansukh by striking him, with a knife."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232276, "end_char": 232282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Gandhi J ayanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 232438, "end_char": 232453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "191-93\n\nRAJENDRA v. U.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 165\n\nIn Rajendra Prasad's -case, the Allabhabad High Court in confirming the death sentence observes that the accused Rajendra is a 'desperate character', who after having been convicted under s. 302 and unde.rgone a sentenc~ of imprisonment for life was released only a few days prior to the occurrence, on October 2, 1972, that is, on the  occasion of Gandhi J ayanti, committed the brutal murder of the deceased Mansukh by striking him, with a knife."}}, {"text": "Pooran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 232649, "end_char": 232655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at about 11 a.m. the accused along with his brother Pooran rushed towards Sri Kishan, brother of Rambharosay, armed with a knife but Sri Kishan ran to safety and was not hurt."}}, {"text": "Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 232675, "end_char": 232681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at about 11 a.m. the accused along with his brother Pooran rushed towards Sri Kishan, brother of Rambharosay, armed with a knife but Sri Kishan ran to safety and was not hurt."}}, {"text": "Rambharosay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 232694, "end_char": 232705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at about 11 a.m. the accused along with his brother Pooran rushed towards Sri Kishan, brother of Rambharosay, armed with a knife but Sri Kishan ran to safety and was not hurt.", "canonical_name": "Ram Bharosey"}}, {"text": "Rambhaosay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 232836, "end_char": 232846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later in the evening at about 5 .30 p.m.; the same day, while Rambhaosay and the deceased Mansukh were standing in the Jane in front of Rambharosay's house, the accused suddenly appeared and dealt several blows with the knife on vitl parts of the body of Rambharosay but Rambharosay released himself from his grip and ran inside his house and bolted the door.", "canonical_name": "Ram Bharosey"}}, {"text": "Kunjukunju Janardhanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234542, "end_char": 234564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kunjukunju Janardhanan's case, the Kerala IBgh."}}, {"text": "Kerala IBgh. Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 234577, "end_char": 234595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kunjukunju Janardhanan's case, the Kerala IBgh."}}, {"text": "Santhamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234745, "end_char": 234754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Santhamma, then aged about 21 years, the accused Kunjukunju Janardhanan, aged 28 years, committed the brutal murder of his innocent wife, Smt."}}, {"text": "Chandramathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234888, "end_char": 234900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandramathi, aged 26 years and his two minor sO'lls, Sunil aged 7 and Manoj aged 5 at the."}}, {"text": "Sunil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 234942, "end_char": 234947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandramathi, aged 26 years and his two minor sO'lls, Sunil aged 7 and Manoj aged 5 at the."}}, {"text": "Manoj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 234959, "end_char": 234964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandramathi, aged 26 years and his two minor sO'lls, Sunil aged 7 and Manoj aged 5 at the."}}, {"text": "Santhamma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 235113, "end_char": 235122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Santhamma, P.W.2, the village girl, with whom the accused was on terms of illicit intimacy, that she used to entreat him in her letters not to court her as it would destroy the happiness of his family."}}, {"text": "Shea Shankar Dubey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 235867, "end_char": 235885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In Shea Shankar Dubey's case, the Allahabad High Court has found the accused Shea Shankar guilty of triple murder and rightly _confirmed the sentence of death passed on him.", "canonical_name": "Shea Shankar Dubey"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 235898, "end_char": 235918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In Shea Shankar Dubey's case, the Allahabad High Court has found the accused Shea Shankar guilty of triple murder and rightly _confirmed the sentence of death passed on him."}}, {"text": "Narottam Dubey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236083, "end_char": 236097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narottam Dubey, and his two sons Chandra Bhushan and Chandra Shekher.", "canonical_name": "N arottam Dubey"}}, {"text": "Chandra Bhushan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236116, "end_char": 236131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narottam Dubey, and his two sons Chandra Bhushan and Chandra Shekher.", "canonical_name": "Chandra She- _'.....kher"}}, {"text": "Chandra Shekher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236136, "end_char": 236151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narottam Dubey, and his two sons Chandra Bhushan and Chandra Shekher.", "canonical_name": "Chandra She- _'.....kher"}}, {"text": "June 15, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 236190, "end_char": 236203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the date of occurrence, i.e., on June 15, 1976 after there was a partition of the joint'family lands between the deceased Narottam and Purushottam, father of the accused Shea Shankar, there was a dispute regarding division of three bataulis."}}, {"text": "Narottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236279, "end_char": 236287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the date of occurrence, i.e., on June 15, 1976 after there was a partition of the joint'family lands between the deceased Narottam and Purushottam, father of the accused Shea Shankar, there was a dispute regarding division of three bataulis.", "canonical_name": "N arottam Dubey"}}, {"text": "Purushottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236292, "end_char": 236303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the date of occurrence, i.e., on June 15, 1976 after there was a partition of the joint'family lands between the deceased Narottam and Purushottam, father of the accused Shea Shankar, there was a dispute regarding division of three bataulis."}}, {"text": "Vidyawati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236567, "end_char": 236576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vidyawati, 'widow of Narottam, in fact, in trying to pacify her brother-in-law Purushottam, brought out."}}, {"text": "Chandra Shekhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236724, "end_char": 236739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "one batauli and the remaining two were taken out by Chandra Shekhar.", "canonical_name": "Chandra She- _'.....kher"}}, {"text": "N arottam Dubey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 237679, "end_char": 237694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N arottam Dubey, it appears, attempted his best to escape.", "canonical_name": "N arottam Dubey"}}, {"text": "Chandra She- _'.....kher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 238138, "end_char": 238162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second cousin, Chandra She- _'.....kher, who moved forward to save his brother was chased by the accused 4 who also finished him off by a stroke of the blade of knife he wielded.", "canonical_name": "Chandra She- _'.....kher"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 240637, "end_char": 240660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_802_831_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "UNION OF INDIA ETC.\n\nVALLURI BASAVAIAH CHAUDHARY ETC. ETC.\n\nMay 1, 1979\n\n[Y. V. OIANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATJ, V. R. KRISHNA lYER,\n\nV. 0. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India 1950. Art. 252(1)-Term 'legislature' therein 1neans only the House or Houses of Legislature and not the Governor-'An Act of Legislature', 'A legislative Act', 'A resolution , of the House', 'Bill'-Difference between.\n\nThe Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976-Whether ultra vires Parlianzent so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned-Inclusion of State of Rajasthan in Schedule I ofthe Act and categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and to1vns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajn1er, Kata and Bikaner in Category 'D' whether beyond legislative con1p•?tcni:c of Parlia1nent-Existence of a master plan not li sine qua non for applicability of D Act to an urban agglomeration.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956. S. 244( 1) (c) (iii)~Master plan to designate the land subject to con1pul!ory acqui sition.\n\nThe State Legislatures of eleven States, (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jii111achal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, U.P. and West Bengal) considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole a.nd in compliance with cl. (I) of Art. 252 of the Constitution pas5ed a resolution to that effect.\n\nParliament accordingly, enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. In the first instance, the Act came into force on the date of its introduction in the Lok Sabha i.e. January 28, 1976 and covered the Union Territories and the eleven States which had already passed the requisite resolution under Art. 252 (I ) of the Constitution, including the State of Andhm Pradesh. Subsequently, the Act was adopted, after passing resolutions under Art. 252( 1) of the Constitution by the State Legislatures of Assam, Biber, Madhya Pradesh. Manipur, Meghalaya and Rajasthan. The Act is in force in seventeen States and all the Union Territories in the country.\n\nThe primary object and the purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was to provide for the imposition of a C'eiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the Directive Principles of Articles 39(b) and (c).\n\nUNION v. V. B. CHAUDHRY 803\n\nThe legislation faJls under Entry 18, List II of Seventh Schedule of th~ Constitution which refers to 'Land, that is to ooy, rights in or over land, etc.\n\nThe State Legislatures alone are competent to enact any legislation rcJating to land of every description including lands situate in urban areas.\n\nThe resolutions passed by the State Legislatures, vested in Parliament the power to regulate by law, the imposition of a ceiling on urban im1nuvable property and acquisition of such property in excess of this ceiling, as well as in respect of 'all matters connected therewith and ancillary or incidental thereto.'\n\nIn writ petitions filed by the respondents, the High Court being of the view that the term 'legislature' in Art. 252 ( 1) of the Constitution comprise' both the Houses of Legislature, (the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council) and the Governor of the State, struck down the Act on the ground that the Parliament was not competent to enact the impugned Act for the State of Andhra Pradesh inasmuch as the Governor of Andhra Pradesh did not pe.rticipate in the process of authorisation for the passing of the Act by the Parliament.\n\nThe High Court observed that since two distinct terms 'legislature' and 'Houses of Legislature' were used in the same article they must, as a matter of construction, bear different meanings, and The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 is ultra vires the Parliament so far as the State of Andhra Pra- D desh is concerned. It also held that even assuming the Act is in force in the State, il is not applicable to Wo.rangal because there was no master plan prepared in accordance with the requirements of s. 244( 1) ( c) of the Andhra Pradesh\n\n(Tclengana Area) District Municipa.J.ities A'Ct, 1956.\n\nIn the connected writ petition under Art. 32, the question raised was \\Vbether the inclusion of the State of Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban (Land Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomeration of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmcr, Kota nntl Bikaner in category 'D' therein is beyond the legislative competence of Parlia~ ment and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent.\n\nIn tlvJ appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the apreJlant, that the term 'legislature' in Art. 252(1) must, in the context, mean the House or the Houses of Legislature, as the case may be and it does not include the Governr.r. The key to the interpretation of the first part of cl. (I) of Art. 252 lies in the words 'to that effect', and they obviously refer to the 'desirability' of Parlia.nent making a law on a State subject. It was pointed out that though the Governor is the component part of the State Legislature under Art. 168, be Hi precluded by the terms of Art. 158(1) from being a member of either l!ouse of Parliament or of a House of Legislature of any State. Not being a met:1ber of the House er Houses of Legislature of a State, as the case may be, the question of his participation, in the proceedings of the State Ugislature in passing a reso lotion under Art. 252(1) does not at a.Ii arise. To concede to the Governor the power to participate in the process of authorization for the passing of a law by the Parliament on a State subject under Art. 252(1), as the High Court had dor.e, or to the process of ratification of a constitutional amendment by the State Legislature under proviso to Art. 368(2) to a constitutional amendment by the Parliainent under Art. 368(1), would create a dangerous situation and would be destructive of the constitutional system which is based on the Westminster model unJer which the Governor is only the constitutional head of the state.\n\nThe Ptuhament being invested with the power by resolution passed under the first part of Art. 252( 1) by as many as eleven states, to legilate on t~ subject i.e. tc make a law for the imposition of a ceiling on immo-1able pnrperty, it h:id the competence to so structure the Act that it was capable of being adopted by other States under the second part of Art. 252(1). A forriori, the specification of the State of Rajasthan by which the Act may be adopted, as weli as the categorisation of the urban agglomerations therein to which it may\n\napply, had to be there.\n\nAllowir.g the appeals and dismissing the writ petition;\n\nHELD; 1 (a) Declared that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 ai Jaw enacted by the Parliament by virtue of its powers under A.rlide 252(1) is and has always been in force in the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from January 28, 1976. [8310]\n\n(b) Declared that the Act extends to the Urban agglon1erations of Wan1ngal. [8310]\n\n(c) The Act applies to the Slates of Rajasthan with effect from March 9, 1976. [8310]\n\n2 .. Art. 252 appears in Part XI headed 'Relations between the Union and the States' and occurs in Chapter I relating to 'Legislative Relations', i.e., dealing with the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States. Our constitution though br'oadly federal in structure is modelled on the British Parliamentary system, ¥.'ith unitary features.\n\nParlioment may assume legislative po\\vers (though temporarily) over any subject under Art. 249, by a two third vote that such legislation is necessary in 'the national interest', while a Proclamation of Emergency under 1\\rt. 352 is in operation, Parliamentis also competent under Art. 250 to legislate with respect to any such matter in the State List. Art. 251 makes it clear that the legislative po~'er\n\nof the State legislatures to make any lav.., \\Vhich they have power under the Constitution to m.:1ke, is restricted by the provisions of Articles 249 and 250, but, if any Jaw made by the lcgisl<iture of a State is repugnant to ~1ny provision of a law enacted by the Parlia1nent, the la\\V nladc by Pnrlian1ent shall prevail and the la\\V made by the State legislature to the extent of repugnancy shall not be valid so long ns the law enacted by Parliament is effective and operative.\n\n[812H-813C]\n\n3. \\Vhile' Art. 263 provides for the creation of an Inter-St:1te Cuun.:il for effecting administnitive co-ordin;:ition between the St<1tes in matters of common interes.t, .Art. 252 proviL11::s the Jeghslative means to attain that object. [813F]\n\n4. The effect of the passing of a resolution under cl.(1) of Art. 252 i~ that Parliament, which has no power to legislate with respect to the matter which is th~ subject of the resolution, becomes entitled to legislate \\Vith respect to it. and the State legislature ceases to have a po'Aer to make a Jaw relating to that matter.\n\nAfter the enactment of a la\\v by the Parliament under this Article, it is open to any of the other States to adopt the Act for such State by merely passing a resolution to that effect in its legislature, but the operation of the Act in such State cannot be from a date earlier than the date of the resolution. passed iu the Legislature adopting the Act. [8 I 3E, Fl\n\nUNION v. V. B. CHAUDHRY 805\n\n5. The question as to v:hether or not there is surrender by the State Legis ]ature of its power 'to legislate, and if so, to what extent, must depend on the language of the resolution passed under Art. 252(1).\n\n[813G]\n\nM/S. R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Prirnte Ltd. v, The State of Mysore [1962] 3 SCR 230 referred to : ·\n\n6, Article 252(2) specifically lays down that after Parliament makes an Act in pursuance of the resolu1ion, such Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the n1atter to which the Act of Parliament relates was included in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.\n\n[813H]\n\n7. Art. 252(1) is in two parts.\n\nThe first part of the Article is only introductory the second is the operative part.\n\nThe first part merely recites about\n\nthe \"desirability\" of the Parliament legislating on a subject in respect of which C it has no power to make laws except as provided in A:ticles 249 and 250. The v.urds \"to that effect\" in the first part, therefore, refer to the 'desirability' for effecting administrative control by the Parliament over two or more States in respect of matters of common interest. Thus the word 'legislature' in the first part of Art. 252(1), in the context in which it appears, cannot mean the three\n\ncomponent parts of the State Legislature contempl~1ted by Art. 168, but only the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be, i.e. excluding the D Governor.\n\n[8150, 815H-816AJ\n\n8. The High Court had completely overlooked the fact that there is a clear distinction between 'an Act of legislature,' 'a legislative act' and 'a resolution of the House.\n\n[816BJ\n\n9. lt is quite clear fron1 an enumeration of the powers, functions and duties of the Governor, that he cannot, in the very nature of things, participate in the proceedings of the House or Houses of Legislature, while the State Legislature passes a 'resolution' in terms of Art. 252(1), he not being a member of the legislature under Art. 158.\n\n[817C]\n\n10. The right of the Governor to send messages to the House or Houses of the Legislature under Art. 175 (2), with respect to a Bill pending in the legislature or otherwise, norn1al1y arises when the Governor withholds his assent to a Bill under Art. 200, or when the President, for \\.\\\"hose consideration a Bill is reserved for assent, returns the Bill withholding his assent.\n\n[817E]\n\n11. /\\ 'Bill' is something quite different from a 'resolution of the House' and, therefore, there is no question of the Governor sending any me<; sage under Art. 175 (2) wfth regard to a resolution pending before the House or Houses\n\nof the Legi•lature.\n\n[817FJ G\n\n12. The constitutional requirement under proviso to Art. 368 (2) of a ratification by the legislature of not less than one half of the States is that so far as the State legislatures are concerned, it re')uires that a resolution should be passed ratifying the amendment. Such a resolution requires voting, and the Governor never vo.tes upon any issue.\n\n[818E]\n\nJatin Chakravarty v. Shri H. K, Bose A.1.R. 1964 Cal. 500 approved.\n\n13. What is tn1e of a ratification by the State legislatures under proviso to Art. 368(2), is equally true of a resolution of the House or Houses of the\n\nA Legislature under Art. 252(1). The Governor, nowhere comes in the picture at all in those matters.\n\n[818F]\n\n14. The absence of the words 'unless the context otherwise requires' in Art. 168, cannot control the meaning of the term 'legislature' in Art. 252(1). The term 'legislature', in the context in which it appears, can only mean the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be.\n\n[819C, D]\n\n15. The subject matter of Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule i.e. 'land' covers 'land and buildings' and would, therefore, necessarily include 'vacant land.' The expression 'urban inlillovable property' may mean 'land and buildings' or 'buildings' or 'land'.\n\nIt would take in lands of every descrip tion i.e. agricultural land, urban land or any other kind and it necessarily include& vaca<1t land.\n\n{820G-H]\n\n16. Before the Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January 28, 1976 it was preceded by State wise deep consideration and consultation by the respec~\n\ntive States, including the State of Andhra Pradesh. A working Group was constituted and in its report it proposed the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and defined 'urban area' to include the area within the territorial limits of municipalities or other local bodies and also the peripheral areas outside the said limits. The Govt. prepared a Model Bill in pursuance of the Report and a copy of each of the Report of the working Group and tho Model Bill was placed on the table of Parliament. The said documents were forwarded to the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, besides other State Governments for consideration by the State Legislatures before they passed a re.'lOlution under Art 252(1).\n\n[821A.C]\n\n17. The State Legislatures were, therefore, aware of the position when they passed a resolution authorising the Parliament to make a la\\\\>' in reipCCt of urban immovable property. Their intention was to include the lands within the territorial area of a municipality or other local body of an urban area and also its peripheral area. The concePt of ceiling on urban immovable property and the nature and content of urban agglomeration ultimately defined by s. 2(n) of the impugned Act, \\\\'as, therefore, fully understocxl by the State Government•. [821D-El\n\n18. It is but axiomatic that once the legislatures of two or more states, by a resolution in terms of Art. 252(1), abdicate or surrender the area i.e. their IX>Wer of legislation on a State subject, the Parliament is competent to make a law relating to the subject. It would indeed be contrary to the terms of Art. 252(1) to read the resolution passed by the State Legislature subject to any restriction. The resolution, contemplated under Art. 252(1) is not hedged in with conditions. In making such a law, the Parliament was not bound to exhaust the whole field of legislation. It could make a la\"'· like the present Act, with respect to ceiling on vacant land in an urban agglomeration, as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every other description.\n\n[822B-D]\n\n19. Under the scheme of the Act the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration does not depend on the existence of a master plan.\n\nThe definition of 'urban land', as contained in s. 2(o) of the Act m ill two\n\nparts, namety (i) in a case where there is a master plan prepared under the\n\nlaw, for the time being in force, any land within the limits of an urban agglo meration and referred to as such in the master plan, is treated to be urban '.land, and (2) in a case where there is no master plan, or the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situate in any area included within the local limits of a municipality or other local authorities is regarded as such. The existence of a master plan within the meaning of s. 2(h) is, therefore, not a sinr qua non for the applicability of the Act to an urban agglomeration. [824D-F]\n\n20. A master plan prepared by a municipality may or may not contain a proposal for compulsory acquisition of land, or any descriptive matter or map to illustrate a scheme for development.\n\nMere a.bsence of such proposal for compulsory acquisition or a map or descri:Ptive matter v.uuld not be tantamount to there being no master plan. A master plan may include proposals for development of areas required to be covered by s. 244, sub-s.(1), cl.(c) contiguous and adjacent to the municipal limits of a city or town. but may not designate the land to be compulsorily acquired, the absence of which would not invalidate the scheme. This is because the municipality has always the power under s. 250 of the Act to acquire the land required for implementation of such scheme.\n\n[825E-F]\n\n21. The revised master ple.n prepared for Warangal does, as it should pro- D vide for various development schemes, it also designates the lands subject to compulsory acquisition.\n\nEven, if it were not so, the master plan prepared under s. 244, sub-s.(1), cl,(c) did not cease to be 'a master plan prepared in accordance with the law for the time being in force', within the meaning of s. 2(h) of the Act, in relation to the town of Warangal. The Act is, therefore clearly applicable to the urban agglomerations of Warangal and it extends not only to all the lands included within the local limits of the Warangal Munici- E pality but also includes the peripheral areas specified i.e. one kilometre around such limits. [825G-826A]\n\n22. The Parliament having been invested '\"'ith po\\vers to legislate on a State subject, by resolutions passed by Legislatures of two or more States under Art. 252(1) has plenary powers to make suitable legislation. It follows, as a necessary corollary, that the Act passed by the Parliament under Art. 252(1) can be so structured as to be capable of being effectively adopted by the other States. Article 252(1) undoubtedly enables the Parliament to make a uniform law. The Act so passed would automatically apply to the States, the legislatures of which have passed a resolution in terms of Art. 252 ( 1), and at the same time it must be capable of being adopted by other States which have not sponsored a resolution, i.e. the non-sponsoring States. The second part of Art. 252(1) will be meaningful only if it were so interpreted otherwise. it would be rendered wholly redundant. [830A-C]\n\n23. The Act would automatically apply from the date of its application to thoee States which had passed the resolution in terms of the first part of Art . 252(1 ), and would extend to the adopting States from the date of the resolutiot!S passed by the legislatures of such States. The Parliament had, therefore, in fact and in lav.•, competence to legislate on the subject of the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property, and the Schedule to the Act cannot therefore, be sm1ck down in relation to the State of Rajasthan.\n\n[830F]\n\n24. Jn a law relating to the imposition of ceiling on vacant 1;:1nd in urban\n\nagglomerations throughout the territory of India, it was competent for the Parliament under Entry 18, List II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act where the law will extend, but also include the categorisation of urban agglomerations in respect of the whole of the territory of India. [830E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 11196/76, 165-300/77 and 29-38/77 and 5/77. '\n\n(From the Judgme11t and Order dated 3-12-1976 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1634/76, 2068, 2426, 2477, 2585, 3026, 2914, 2918, 2926, 2965, 3471, 2517, 2522, .-- 258 l, 2597, 2401, 2461-2462, 2465, 2469, 2485, 2507. 2877, 2949 3213, 3469, 2492, 2509, 2513, 2514, 2520, 2523, 2818, 2935, 295[ I c\n\nand 2936 of 1976, 2509, 2513, 2514, 2520, 2523, 2818, 2'132, 2935, 2936 and 2951/76 and 2492 of 1976).\n\nAND\n\nWRIT PBTITION NO. 350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As. 1896 and 265-300/ 77 for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. 350/77 and for the Union o[ India in C.As. 29-38/77 and Respondent No. 4 in C.A. 5/77.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, K. K. Mehrish, S. M. Jail! and S. K. J!dn for the Petitioner in W.P. 350/77.\n\nT. V. S. Narasimhachari and M. S. Ganesh for the Appellant in CAs. 5 and 29-38/77. ~\n\nK. K. Venugopal, Addi. Sol. Genl. and S. S. Khanduja for Res- , pondents 2-3 in W.P. 350/77.\n\nB. Kanta Rao for RR 1-50, 53-66, 68-113, 85-91, 93-95, 97-100 and 112-114 in C.A. 1896/76.\n\nVepa P. Sarathi and B. Parthasarathi for RR 28 and 53 in C.A. 276/77.\n\nP. Ram Reddy, A. V. V. Nair and Subodh Markendaya for the other appearing Respondents in C.As. 279, 280-84, 286 and 293/77.\n\nR. K. Mehta, for Advocate General for the State of Orissa.\n\nBadridas Shanna, for Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-These appeals, by certificate, are directed against the judgment and order of tbe Andhra Pradesh High Court dated Decem ber 3, 1976 allowing a batch of thirty-seven writ petitions.\n\nThe appeals raise an important question, namely, whether the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is ultra vires the Parliament so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.\n\nA subsidiary question is also involved as to whether even assuming the Act is in force in the State, it is not applicable to Warangal because there was no master plan prepared in accordance with the requirements of s. 244(1) (c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District\n\n• r Municipalities Act, 1956.\n\nA further question arises in a connected writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, whether the inclusion of the State ol Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmer, Kata and Bikaner in category 'D' therein, is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent.\n\nThe State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ( 1) of Art. 252 of the Constitution passed a resolution to that effect.\n\nOne merit of such Central legislation is that --4 property owned by families anywhere in India can be aggregated for \"-· valuation purposes, and the basis of acquisition and compensation can be uniform all over the country.\n\nThe Parliament accordingly, enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. In the first instance, the Act came into force on the date of its introduction in the Lok Sabha, i.e., January 28, 1976 and covered the Union Territories and the eleven States which had already P.a.ssed the requisite resolution under Art. 252 (I) of the Constitution, including the State of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nSubsequently, the Act was adopted, after passing resolutions under Art. 252 ( 1) of the Constitution by the State Legislature of Assam on March 25, 1976, and those of Bihar on April 1, 1976, Madhya Pradesh on September 9, 1976, Manipur on March 12, 1976,\n\n13-330SCI/79\n\nA Meghalaya on April 7, 1976 and Rajasthan on March 9, 1976.\n\nThus, the Act is in force in seventeen States, and all the Union terri- -< ~\n\ntori~ in the country.\n\nSchedule I to the Act lists out all States, irrespective of whether or not t)ley have passed a resolution under Art. 252(1) authorising the Parliament to enact a law imposing a ceiling on urban immovable property, and the urban agglomerations in them having a population of two lacs or more.\n\nThe ceiling limit of vacant land of metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras having a population exceeding ten lacs falling under category 'A' is 500 sq. mtrs.; ,-- urban agglomerations with a population of ten lacs and above, ex- eluding the four metropolitan areas falling under category 'B' is J 1000 sq. mtrs.; urban agglomerations with a population between three lacs and ten lacs falling under category 'C' is 1500 sq. mtrs., and urban agglomerations with a population between two lacs and three lacs falling under category 'D' is 2000 sq. mtrs.\n\nThe schedule does not mention the urban agglomerations having a population of one lac and above; but if a particular State which passed a resolution under s. 252 (1), or if a State which subsequently adopts the Act, wants to extend the Act to such areas, it could do so by a notification under s. 2(n)(B) ors. 2(n)(A)(ii), as the case may be, after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government.\n\nThe primary object and the purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, 'the Act', as the long title and the preamble show, is to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition or such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land nd for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with_ a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good, in furtherance or the Directive Principl~ of Art. 39(b) and (c).\n\nThe legislation falls under entry 18, List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which refers to : 'Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, etc.' Admittedly, the State Legislatures alone are competent to enact any legislation relating to land of every descrip-\n\nB lion including lands situate in urban areas.\n\nThe two Houses of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature, however, passed the following resolution on April 8, 1972 and April 7, 1972 rpectively : \"\n\n• .. \"Resolution passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly on A the 8th April, 1972.\n\nRESOLUTION Whereas this Assembly considers that there should be a ceiling ()n Urban Immovable Property; • And whereas the imposition of such a ceiling and acquisition of urban immovable property in excess of that ceiling are matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make law for the State -,. except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of\n\nMidia; r And whereas it appears to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative \" Assembly to be desirable that the aforesaid matters should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law; • Now, therefore, in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, this Assembly hereby resolves that the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Anclhra Pradesh by Parliament by law.\"\n\nThe record shows that similar resolutions were passed by all the remaining ten State Legislatures.\n\nThese resolutions vested in the Parliament the power to regulate in the aforesaid eleven States by law the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of this ceiling, as well as in respect of 'all matters connected therewith and ancillary or inciden- • ta! thereto'.\n\nThe expression 'immovable property' takes in lands of every description, i.e. agricultural lands, urban lands or of any other\n\nnd.\n\nThe High Court was of the view that the term 'legislature' in Art. 252 (1) of the Constitution comprises both the Houses of Legislature i.e., the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council and the Governor of the State.\n\nIt struck down the Act on the ground that the Parliament was not competent to enact the impugned Act for the State of Andhra Pradesh inasmuch as the Governor of Andhra Pradesh did not participate in the process of authorization • for the passing of the Act by the Parliament.\n\nIt observed, since two distinct terms 'Legislature' and 'Houses of Legislature' were used in the same article they must, as a matter of construction, bear different meanings. In that view, it went on to say that the passing ()f an Act in terms of the first part of Art. 252 ( 1) is a condition ,.\n\npre-requisite to the passing of a resolution by the House or Houses\n\nA of Legislature, as the case may be, entrusting to the Parliament the power to legislate on a State subject, stating :\n\n\"In our opinion, the only way in which the Legislature of a State, consisting of the Governar and one or two Houses of Legislature, as the case may be, can express its view that it is desirable to enact a law regulating a particular matter, is by enacting a law and passing an Act to that effect.\n\nBecause it is difficult to conceive of the Legislature consisting of the Governor and the House or Houses of the Legislture of a State acting in any manner than by -- • passing an enactment; no such Act has been passed by the Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh consisting of the Governor and the Houses of Legislature of Andhra Pradesh, expressing the desirability of having the matter of imposition of a ceiling; on urban lands regulated by Parliament.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nWe arc afraid, the construction placed by the High Court on Art. 252(1) cnnot. be sustained.\n\nArticle 252(1) of the Constitution reads :\n\n\"If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House, or where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State.\"\n\nIn order to appreciate the content, scope and meaning of the provisions of Art. 252, it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the Constitution. It appears in Part XI headed 'Relations between . • the Union and the States' and occurs in Chapter I relating to 'Legislative Relations', i.e., dealing with the distribution of legisla- H tive powers between the Union and the States. It wonld appear that our Constitution though broadly federal in structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary System, with unitary features.\n\nThus, lL\n\n• even apart from emergencies, the Pa.rliament may assume legislative power (though temporarily) over any subject under Art. 249, by a two-third vote that such legislation is necessary in 'the national interest'.\n\nWhile a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 352 is in operation the Parliament is also competent nnder Art. 250 to legislate with respect to any such matter in the State list.\n\nArticle 251 • makes it clear that the legislative power of the State legislatures to make any law which they have power under the Constitution to make, is restricted by the provfsions of Arts. 249 and 250; but, if -\"tany law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant to any provion of a law enacted by the Parliament, the law made by Parliament r shall prevail and the law made by the State legislature to the extent ' vf repugnancy shall not be valid so long as the law enacted by Parliament is effective and operative . • Reverting back to Art. 252, it will be noticed that this article corresponds to s. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIt empowers the Parliament to legislate for two or more States on any of the matters with respect to which it has no power to make laws except as provided in Arts. 249 and 250 .\n\n..; The effect of the passing of a resolution under cl. (1) of Art. 252 is that Parliament, which has no power to legislate with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolution, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to it. On the other hand, the State legislature ceases to have a power to make a law relating to that matter. While Art. 263 provides for the creation of an Inter-State Council for effecting administrative co-ordination between the States in matters of com-\n\n~ mon interest, Art. 252 provides the legislative means to attain that\n\nobject. After the enactment of a law by the Parliament under this _..i:article, it is open to any of the other States to adopt the Act for such\n\n-si_ate by merely passing a resolution to that effect in its Legislature, • but the operation of the Act in such State cannot be from a date > earlier than the date of the resolution passed in the Legislature adopting the Act. The question as to whether or not there is surrender by the State Legislature of its power to legislate, and if so, to what extent, must depend on the language of the resolution passed under Art. 252 (1) : M/s. R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. The State • of Mysore.(') Clause (2) specifically lays down that after Parliament makes an Act in pursuance of the resolntion, such Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act of Parliament relates was inclnded in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitntion.\n\n(I) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 230.\n\nThe learned Attorney General rightly contends that the term 'legislature' must, in the context, mean the House or the Houses of Legislature, as the case may be and it does not include the Governor. It is urged that the key to the interpretation of the first part of cl. ( 1) of Art. 252 lies in the words 'to that effect' and they obviously refer to the 'desirability' of Parliament making a law on a State subject.\n\n\" \"\n\nis pointed out that though the Governor is the component part of the • State Legislature under Art. 168, he is precluded by the terms of Art. 158 ( 1) from being a member of either House of Parliament or of a House of the Legislature of any State.\n\nNot being a member of the ,-- House or Houses of Legislature of a State, as the case may be, th~ question of his participation, it is said, in the proceedings of the Stat•e Legislature in passing a resolution under Art. 252(1) does not at all arise.\n\nHe drew our attention to different provisions of the Constitution, and in particular !o proviso to Art. 368(2) which requires a rati- , fication by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States to a Bill passed by the Parliament under Art. 368(1) in exercise of its constituent powers to amend the Constitution. It is urged that to concede to the Governor the power to participate in the process of authorization for the passing of a law by the Parliament on a State subject under Art. 252(1), as the High Court had done, or to the process of ratification of a constitutional amendment by the State Legis- 1latures under proviso to Art. 368(f2) to a constitutional amendment by the Parliament under Art. 368 ( !) , would create a dangerous situation\n\nand would be destructive of our constitutional system based on the Westminster model, under which the Governor is only the constitutional head of the State.\n\nThe contentions of the learned Attorney General must, in our op, inion, he accepted.\n\nIn the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh\n\nof Darbhanga & Ors.(') in repelling the contention that the words, li..--\n\n'law' and 'legislature' were deliberately used in Art. 31 ( 3) as a specml , safeguard, which, in order to ensure that no hasty or unjust expropriatory legislation is passed by a State Legislature, requires for .such legislation the assent of both the Governor and the President, Patanajali Sastri C.J. observed :\n\n\"It is true that the \"Legislature\" of a State includes the Governor iind that a bill passed by such Legislature cannot become a law until it receives the Governor's assent. ..... .\n\nThe term \"legislature\" is not always used ih the Constitution as including the Governor, though article 168 makes him a component Part of the State Legislature. In article\n\n[19521 S.C.R. 889\n\n• •\n\n173, for instance, the_ word is cleEIY used in the sense of the \"Houses of legislature\" and excludes the Governor.\n\nThere are other provisions also where the word is used in contexts which exclude the Governor.\n\nSimilarly the word 'law' is sometimes loosely used in referring to a bill. Article 31 ( 4), for i'nstance, speaks of a \"bill\" being reserved for the President's assent \"after it has been passed\" by the \"legislature of a State\" and of \"the law so assented to.\" If the expression \"passed by the legislature\" were taken to mean \"passed by the Houses of the legislature and assented to by the Governor\" .... then, it would cease to be a \"bill\" and could not longer be reserved as such.\n\nNor is the phrase \"law so assented to\" strictly accurate, as the previous portion of the clause makes it clear that what is reserved for the President's assent and what he assents to is a \"bill\" al}d not a \"law.\"\n\nThis decision really clinches the whole issue.\n\nArticle 252 ( 1) is in two parts.\n\nThe first part merely recites about the \"desirability\" of the Parliament legislating on a subject in respect of which it has no power to make laws excep_t as provided in Articles 249 and 250.\n\nThis power to legislate is ,¥ested in the Parliament only if two or more State Legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted by the Parliament on such matter in List II, i.e., with respect to which the Parliament has no power to make laws for the States, and all the Houses of the Legislatures oil' those States express such desire by passing a resolution to that effect.\n\nThe Legislatures of those States should not only think it desirable and expedient, but actually pass resolution that the Parliament should regulate the matter in those States, in order to invest the Parliament with the power to legislate on such subject.\n\nThe passing of such resolution by the State Legislatures of two or more States, is a condition precedent for investing the Parliament with the power to make a law on that topic or matter, and then only it shall be lawful for the Parliament to make a law for regulating that matter accordingly.\n\nThe law so made or enac'.ed by the Parliament under Art 252 ( 1) will apply only to those States whose Legislatures have passed resolutions under that provision and also to those Sta~.:s which have afterwards adopted the same by resolution passed by the Legislatures of such States in that behalf.\n\nIt would appear that the first part of the article is only introductory, the second is the operative part.\n\nThe words ''.to that effect\" in the first part, therefore, refer to the 'desirabiliy' for effecting administrative control by the Parliament over two or more States in respect of matters\n\nSI6\n\nSUPREI\\.1E COURT REPORTS\n\n\noi common interest.\n\nThus, the word 'legislature' in the first part of Art. 252(1), in the context in which it appears, cannot, mean the three component parts of the State Legislature contemplated by Art. 168, but only the House or Houses 0£ Legislature, as the case may be, i.e., excluding the Governor.\n\nThere is a clear distinction between 'an Act of legislature', 'a legislative act' and 'a resolution of the House'.\n\nThe High Court has comple.tely overlooked this distinction.\n\nThe Governor is a constitutional head of the State Executive, and , ,_ has, therefore, to act on the advice of a Council of Ministers under\n\n- Art. 163.\n\nThe Governor is, however, made a component part of the State Legislature under Art. 164, just as the President is a part of Parliament.\n\nThe Governor has a right of addressing and sending messages to under Arts. 175 and 176, and cf summoning, proroguing and dissolving under Art. 174, the State Legislature, just as the Pres'dent has in relat'on to Parliament.\n\nHe abo has a similar power of causing to be bid before the State Legislature the annual fnancial statement under Art. 202 (I) , and of making demands for grants and recommending 'Money Bills' under Art. 207 (1). In all these matters the Governor as the consitutional head of the State is bound by the advice of the Councii of Ministers.\n\nThe Governor is, however, made a component part of the leg:s- Jature of a State under Art. J 68, because every Bill passed by the State legislature has to be reserved for his assent under Art. 200.\n\nUnder that article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses, namely\n\n(i) he may give his assent to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law; or (ii) he may except in the case of a 'Money Bill' withhold his assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed, i.e., return the Bill to the Assembly for reconsideration with a message, or (iii) he may (subject to Ministerial advice) reserve the Rill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procednre laid down in Art. 201. The first proviso to Art. 200 deals with a situation where the Governor is bound to give his assent when the Bill is reconsidered and passed by the AS>embly.\n\nThe second proviso to that article makes the reservation for consideration of the President obligatory where the Bill would, 'if it became law', derogate from the powers of the High Court.\n\nThus, it is clear that a BiJJ passed by a State Assembly may become Jaw if the Governor g'.vcs his assent to it, or if, having been reserved by the Governor for the considcrat'on of the President, it is assented to by the President.\n\nThe Governor is, therefore, one of\n\n• •\n\nthe three components of a State legislature.\n\nThe only other legislative function of the Governor is that of promulgating Ordinances under Art. 213(1) when both the Houses of the State legislature or the Legislative Assembly, where the legislature is unicameral, are not in session.\n\nThe Ordinance-making power of the Governor is similar to that of the President, and it is co-extensive with the legislative powers of the States legislature.\n\nFrom an enumeration of the powers, functions and duties of the Governor, it is quite clear that he cannot, in the very nature of things, participate in the proceedings of the House or Houses of Legislature, whik the State legislature passes a resolution in terms of Art. 252(1), not being a member of the legislature under Art 158.\n\nThe function assigned to the Governor under Art. 176(1) of addressing the House or Houses of Legislature, at the commencement of the first session of each year, is strictly not a legislative function but the object of this address is to acquaint the members of the Houses with the policies and programmes of the Government.\n\nIt is really a policy statement prepared by the Council of Ministers which the Governor has to read out. Then again, the right of the Governor to send messages to the House or Houses of the Legislature under Art. 175 (2), with respect to a Bill then pending in the legislature or otherwise, normally arises when the Governor withholds his assent to a Bill under Art. 200, or when the President, for whose consideration a Bill is reserved for assent, returns the Bill withholding his assent.\n\nAs already stated, a 'Bill' is something quite different from a 'resolution of the House' and, therefore, there is no question of the Governor sending any message under Art. 175 (2) with regard to a resolution pending before the House or Houses of the Legislature.\n\nSimilar considerations must also arise with regard to ratification of a Bill passed by the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power of amending the Constitution under Art. 368 (1). In Jatin Chakravorty\n\nv. Sn! Justice H. K. Bose(') D. N. Sinha J., as he then was rightly negatived a challenge to the contitutional validity of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, which amended Art. 217 of the Constitution raising the age of retirement of a Judge of the High Court from 60 to 62 years on the ground that no assent of the Governor in the State of West Bengal was taken, observing :\n\n\"A legislature discharges a variety of functions.\n\nThe ff __ House has to be summoned or prorogued, bills have to\n\n(!) A.l.R. 1964 Crl. 500\n\nbe introduced, voted upon and passed, debates take place on important political questions, ministers are interrogated, and so on.\n\nThe Governor, though a limb of the legislature does not take part in every such action.\n\nWhile the Governor summons the House and may prorogue or dissolve it (Art. 174) or address the legislature (Art. 175), he does not sit in the House or vote upon any issue.\n\nWhen a Bill has been passed by the House or Houses, Art. 200 requires that it shalJ be presented to the Governor for assent.\n\nThe assent of the Governor is necessary, only because the Constitution expressly requires it.\n\nWhenever the assent of the Governor is necessary or the assent of the President is necessary, it is specifically provided for in the Constitution (see Articles 31-A, 200, 201 and 304).\n\nThe necessity of such assent cannot be implied, where not specifically provided for.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nD Reverting to the constitutional requirement under proviso to Art. 368(2) of a ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States he observed :\n\n\"So far as the State legislatures are concerned, it requires that a resolution should be passed ratifying the amendment.\n\nE Such a resolution requires voting, and the Governor never\n\nvotes upon any issue.\" (Emphasis supplied)\n\nThe interpretation placed by D. N. Sinha J. upon the proviso to Art. 360(2) in !atin Chakravorty's case (supra) is in consonance with the constitutional system. Any other construction would result in an alarming situation as constitutional amendments by the Parliament under Art. 368 (1), could be held up by the Governor of a State.\n\nWhat is true of a ratification by the State legislatures under proviso to Art. 368 (2), is equally true of a resolution of the House or Houses of the Legislature under Art. 252(1). The Governor, in our view, nowhere comes in the picture at all in these matters.\n\nIt is, however, argued, on behalf of the respondents that both the expressions 'legislature' as well as 'Houses of Legislature' arc used in\n\nArt. 252 and, therefore, the term 'Legislature' must be understood in • the sense in which it is used in Art. 168. In support of the contention, it is said that it is the 'Legislature' which is surrendering its H sovereign legislative functions and, therefore, it must be the legislature, as defined in Art. 168, which should do that, and not a part of the legislature. It is pointed out that Art. 168 does not use the words.\n\ni -\n\n.. ..,.\n\n'unless the context otherwise requires'. It is, accordingly, urged that the words 'to that effect' in Art. 252(1) mean that the iegislature, meaning the House or Houses of Legislature and the Governor, is desirous that the Parliament sb, ould legislate on a State rnbject.\n\nConceptually, it is said to be the better interpretation of the term 'legislature' in the first part of Art. 252(1).\n\nThe respondents' contention in the present appeals is the same as that prevailed in the High Court.\n\nThe point has already been dealt with by us at length.\n\nThe contention cannot be accepted because it runs counter to this Court's decision in Kameshwar Singh's case (supra). The absence of the words 'unless the context otherwise requires' in Art. 168, cannot control the meaning of the term 'legislature' in Art. 252 ( 1). It was fairly conceded at the Bar that even without these words, a word or a phrase may have a different meaning, if the context so requires, than the meaning attached to it in the definition clause. The term 'legislature' in the context in .which it appears, can only mean the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be. Learned counsel for the respondents, tries to draw sustenance from s. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which read:\n\n\"If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more Provinces to be desirable that any of the matters enumerated in the Pmvincial Legislative List should be regulated in those Provinces by Act of the Federal Legislature, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Chambers of those Provincial Legislatures, it shall be lawful for the Federal Legislature to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly but any Act so passed may, as respects any Province to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that Province.\"\n\nIt is submitted that when an Act passed by the Federal Legislature in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List based on the resolution of the Legislatures of two or more G Provinces, could be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that P; rovince, the Governor had necessarily to be consulted at the stage of introduction of a resolution before the Legislature of that Province.\n\nThere is a fallacy in the argument.\n\nThe second part of s. 103 of the Government of India Act is replaced by Art. 252(2) of the Constitution which takes away the power of repeal from the H State Legislature and entrusts it to the Parliament. When his attention was drawn to the fact that cl. (2) of Art. 252 of the Constitution\n\ndiffers from the provisions of s. 10:3 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the learned counsel did not pursue the point any further.\n\nUnder Art. 252(2) an amending or repealing Bill must go through the same procedure as prescribed for the original Bill i.e., by the process laid down in cl. (1) of Art. 252.\n\nThe surrender or abdication of the legislative power of the State Legislature places the matter entirely in the hands of the Parliament.\n\nNext, it is urged that the impugned Act passed by the Parliament was without legislative competence. It is said that the resolution, as passed by the State Legislature, gave authority to Parliament to legislate on a particular subj•\"ct, i.e., 'ceiling on immovable property', whereas the Parliament contrary to the resolution, passed a law on a different subject i.e., 'ceiling on urban land'.\n\nIt is pointed out that the Working Group with the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development, in its report dated July 25, 1970 recommended that the ceiling on urban property should be imposed on the basis of the monetary value nf properties and suggested a ceiEng of 4 to 5 lacs of rupees.\n\nThe Prime Minister forwarded the aforesaid report of the Working Group along with a draft Bill, prepared on the basis of its recommendations, to the Chief Ministers of various States, with a view to securing concurrence and authorisation of the State legislatures under Art. 252(1) to enable the Parliament for enacting a uniform law for the whole country. It was said that the State Legislature gave the authorisation to the Parliament on the distinct understanding that there was to be a law for the imposition of ceiling on the basis of valuation of immovable property. It is said that the authorisation was for ceiling on ownership of immovable property and not on area of land. Idea of ceiling, it is said, has been transferred from persons to objects. It is, accordingly, urged that the impuged Act, insofar as it provides for ceiling for acquisition of vacant land by the State was not in conformity with the real intendment of the resolution.\n\nW c are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted.\n\nIt is not disputed that the subject matter of Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule i.e., 'land' covers 'land and buildings' and would, therefore, necessarily include 'vacant land'.\n\nThe expression 'urban immovable property' may mean 'land and buildings', or 'buildings' or 'land'. It would take in lands of every description, i.e., agricultural land, urban land or any other kind and it necessarily includes vacant land.\n\nThe Union of India before the High Court in its counter ayerred that, before the Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January\n\n' ...\n\n~ __,\n\nr r\n\n•• \"\n\n28, 1976, it was preceded by State-wise deep consideration and consultation by the respective States, including the State of Andhra Pradesh for a period of over five years starting from 1970. A Working Group was constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary, Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development.\n\nThe report of the Working Group shows that the proposal was to impose a ceiling on urban immovable property.\n\nIn its report the said Working Group defined 'urban area' to include the area within lhe territorial\n\nlimits of municipalities or other local bodies and also the peripheral area outside the said limits.\n\nSuch inclusion of the peripheral limits in an urban area was accepted by the Government and a Model Bill prepared in pursuance thereof also contained such a definition.\n\nA copy of each of the report of the Working Group and the Model Bill referred to was placed on the table of the Parliament on December 15, 1970 and March 22, 1972 respectively.\n\nThe said documents were forwarded to the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, besides other State Governments, for consideration by the State Legislatures before they passed a resolution under Art. 252(1). The State Legislatures were, therefore, aware of the position when they passed a resolution authorising the Parliament to make a law in respect of urban immovable property.\n\nTheir intention was to include the lands within the territorial area of a municipality or other local body of an urban area and also its peripheral area.\n\nThe concept of ceiling on urban inunovable property and the nature and content of urban agglomeration ultimately defined by s. 2(n) of the impugned Act was, therefore, fully understood by the State Governments.\n\nIn this Court the Union of India has placed on record an Approach Paper of the Study Group which indicated that the Parliament was faced with several practical difficulties to implement the proposal to F place a ceiling on ownership of built-up properties, namely :\n\n\"Firstly, the valuation of such properties is very difficult task, Secondly, it varies from urban area to urban area and within the same area also and might result in inequitable application. Thirdly, in our inflationary situation the values of properties quickly change from time to time.\n\nFourthly, investment by persons in housing and building is like other forms of investment and. subject to certain restrictions, primarily to prevent speculation, needs to be encouraged to serve social purposes.\n\nFifthly, the management of properties which may vest with the government on account of any ceiling would pose serious problems; perhaps, a large number of properties may be in the form of slums or dilapidated\n\nbuildings and in respect of other types of houses it may not be possible to manage or dispose them of economically.\" It was, therefore, suggested that ceiling in respect of built-up properties was to be brought about through fiscal and other restrictive measures.\n\nIt is but axiomatic that once the legislature of two or more States, by a resolution in terms of Art. 252( l), abdicate or surrender the area, i.e., their power of legislation on a State subject, the Parliament is competent to make a law relating to the subject. It would i:ideed be contrary to the terms of Art. 252(1) to read the resolution passed by the State Legislature subject to any restriction.\n\nThe resolution, contemplated under Art. 252 (l) is not hedged in with conditions. In making such a law, the Parliament was not bound to e:Jhaust the whole field of legislation.\n\nIt could make a law, like the present Act, with respect to ceiling on vacant land in an urban agglomeration, as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on i=ovable property of every other description.\n\nThere is no need to dilate on the question any further in this judgment, as it can be better dealt with separately. It is sufficient for purposes of these appeals to say that when Parliament was invested with the power to legislate on the subject i.e., 'ceiling on immovable property', it was competent for the Parliament to enact the impugned Act, i.e., a law relating to 'ceiling on urban land'.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, was not applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh.. In reaching that conclusion, it proceeded on the wrong assumption that 'legislature' for purposes of Art. 252 (l) means the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be, and the Governor. In consequence whereof, it fell into an error in holding that the State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh could not, in law, be regarded to have authorised the Parliament to enact the impugned Act, in relation to that State, due to the non-· participation of the Governor.\n\nThere still remains the question whether the Act is not applicable to Warangal for the reason that there was no master plan prepared in conformity with s. 244(1) (c) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956.\n\nThe section, so far as material, runs thus :\n\n\"244 ( l) ( c) The Master Plan shall include such maps and such descriptive matter as may be deemed necessary t~\n\nillustrate the proposals, and in particular :\n\n(i) .................................. .\n\n, .,_\n\n\" .\n\n(ii) ..\n\n(iii) designate the land subject to compulsory acquisition under the powers in that behalf conferred by this Act or any other law for the time being in force.\"\n\nThe High Court has clearly erred in holding that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 cannot apply to the urban agglomeration of Warangal. In reaching that conclusion, it observed that under s. 244(1) (c) (iii) the master plan must designate the land subject to compulsory acquisition under the powers in that ber half conferred by the Act or any other law for the time being in force; 'f .. ·- otherwise, the master plan prepared for the town cannot be treated \\. to be a master plan as prepared in accordance with law.\n\nThe view taken by the High Court is wholly unwarranted and proceeds on . a misconception of the scheme of the Act. •\n\nSection 3 of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided in the Act, on and from the commencement thereof, no person shall be entitled to hold any 'vacant land' in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-s. (2) of s. 1. By !·\n\n4(1) (d), the ceiling limi11 placed on such land situate in an 'urban agglomeration' falling within category 'D' specified in Schedule I, is fixed at two thousand square metres.\n\nAn urban agglomeration i! made up of the main town together with the adjoining areas of urban growth and is treated as one urban spread. The expression 'vacant land' is defined in s. 2(q) as meaning land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include certain categories thereof.\n\nThe term 'urban land' i! defined in s. 2 ( o) as meaning :\n\n\"(o) 'Urban land' means.-\n\n(i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or\n\n(ii) In a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area co=ittee, a town area committee ' a city and town committee, a small town committee , a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture.\"\n\n···--------1\n\nA The expression \"urban agglomeration'',· as defined ins-:- 2(~) .of the Act, so far as material, reads :\n\n(n) \"urban agglomeration,-\n\n(A) in relation to any State or Union Terr:tory spe6fied .\n\nin column (I) of Schedule I, means :\n\n(i) the urban agglomeration specified in the corre, pcnding entry in column (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area specified in the corresponding enry in column (3) thereof; and\"\n\nC The utban agglomeration of Warangal is specified in Schedule I to the Act. The relevant entry reads )\n\n\"St: tc s\n\n{I) ___ _\n\nI. Andhrn Pr. dcsh\n\nTowns (2)\n\n5. Wo:.10 ng; I ri.l\n\nPeripl-.er~·-·\n\n(l) 1 Km. -\n\nC; .trgory\n\n!1)\n\nD\"'\n\nIt is quite clear that under the scheme of the Act the inoposit!on of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations does no\\ depend on the existence of a master plan .. The definition of 'urban land', as contained in s. 2 ( o) of the Act is in two parts, namely (I) ia a case where there is a master plan prepared under the law for the time being in force, any land within the limits cf an urban agglcmerafon and referred to as such in the master plan, is treated to be urban land, and (2) in a case where there is no master plan, or the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included w; thin the local limit of a municipality or other local authorities is regarded as such. The existence of a master plan within the meaning of s. 2(h) is, therefore, not a sine qua non for the applicability of the Act to an urban agglomeration.\n\nThe only difference is that where there is. a master plan, the Act extends to all lands situate within the local limits of a municipality or other local authority, and also covers the peripheral area thereof; but where there is no such master plan, its appkability is confined to the muncipal limits or the local area, as the case may be.\n\nIt is common ground that there was a master plan prepared for Warangal on October 26, 1949. On September 7, 1963, the Warangal Municipality resolved by a resolution to prepare a. fresh master H plan and on February 18, 1966, the State Government. directed that untill the new plan was prepared, the old master plan should continue.\n\nThereafter, a revised master plan was prepared by the Direcr\n\n. ..\n\n....\n\n• -!\n\ntor of Town Planning, Hyderabad after conducting physical and socio-economic surveys and sent to the Municipal Council, Warangal for adoption and approval, in pursuance of its resolution dated September 7, 1963. The Municipal Council by its resolution dated April 30, 1969 approved the same with some modifications.\n\nThe revised master plan was submitted by the Municipal Council, Warangal to the State Government for sanction under s. 244, sub-s. ( 1), cl.(d) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipa- lities Act, 1956.\n\nOn November 25, 1971, the old master plan was -.,. revoked by the State Government and a new master plan sanctioned.\n\nThe master plan contains proposals for areas required to be ..,,-- covered by s. 244, sub-s.(1), cl.(c), contiguous and adjacent to the\n\n\\ municipal limits of Warangal which were under the jurisdiction of\n\nvarious gram panchayats and all such lands were deemed to be lands needed for public purpose within the meaning of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, 1309 Fasli, and the Municipality could under s. 251 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956 acquire the lands required for the implementation of the master plan. The learned Attorney General has placed before us the relevant notifications.\n\nThe word \"shall\" in cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 244 of the Andhra Pradesh (Tele'ngana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956 in its context and setting, is directory.\n\nA master plan prepared by a municipality may or may not contain a proposal for compulsory acquisition of land, or any descriptive matter or map to illustrate a scheme for development.\n\nMere absence of such proposal for compulsory acquisition or a map or descriptive1 matter would not be tantamount to there being no master plan.\n\nA master plan may include proposals for development of areas required to be covered by s. 244, sub-s. >J (1), cl.(c), contiguo\\l!S and adjacent to the municipal limits of a ·\"'- city or town, but may not designate the land to be compulsorily acquired, the absence of which would not invalidate the scheme. It is because the municipality has always the power under s. 250 of the Act to acquire the land required for implementation of such scheme.\n\nIt appears that the revised master plan prepared for Warangai does, as it should, provide for various development schemes.\n\nFor ought we know, it also designates the lands subject to compulsory acquisition.\n\nEven if it were not so, the master plan prepared under s. 244, sub-s. ( 1), cl. ( c) did not cease to be 'a master plan prepared in accordance with law for the time being in force', within the meaning of s. 2(h) of the Act, in relation to the town of Warangal. The Act, is, therefore, clearly applicable to the urban agglomerations of 14-331lSCI/79\n\nW arangal and it extends not only to all the lands included within the local limits of the Warangal Municipality but also includes the peripheral areas specified, i.e. one kilometre around such limits.\n\nIn this group of cases, there is a writ petition filed by Maharao Saheb Bhim Singhji, former ruler of the erstwhile princely State of Kota.\n\nIt raises the question whether the Parliament had legislative competence to enact the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, in relation to the State of Rajasthan.\n\nThe question involved is common to all the States which subsequently adopted the Act.\n\nThe Bill, after it was passed by both the Houses of Parliament, received the assent of the President on February 17, 1976. There is a schedule annexed to the Act and among the various States specified in the schedule, is the State of Rajasthan with the urban agglomerations of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Ajmer, Kata and Bikaner.\n\nOf these, the cities of Jaipur and Jodhpur are declared to be agglomrations belonging to category 'C' while Ajmer, Kata and Bikaner are placed in category 'D'.\n\nOn March 9, 1976, the State Legislature of Rajasthan passed the following resolution adopting the Act :\n\n\"Whereas the Legislature of Rajasthan State considers it expedient to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban\n\nagglomerations to subserve the common good.\n\nAnd whereas the Parliament has no power to make laws for the States with regard to the matters aforesaid except as provided in Article 249 and 250 of the. Constitution.\n\nAnd whereas this Legislature is of the opinion that aforesaid matter may be regulated in Rajasthan State by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of Central Act of 1976) enacted by the Parliament.\n\nNow therefore the Legislature of Rajasthan State passes the following resolution in pursuance of Article 252:, clause (1) : -\n\n\"Rajasthan State adopts the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of Central Act of 1976) for this State\".\"\n\n. -\n\n- .\n\nWhen the Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January 28, 1976, it cannot be denied that the State of Rajasthan was not one of the eleven States which had passed a resolution under the first part of Art. 252(1), and the question that arises is whether the Parliament had the legislative competence to enact a law in relation to that State.\n\nIt is argued that the inclusion of the State of Rajasthan in the Schedule as one of the States specified to which the Act applies, or the categorisation of the various cities and towns of that State, including the town of Kata, was non est. It is submitted that the legislature of Lhe State of Rajasthan never authorised the Parliament to enact a law\n\ny-for the imposition of ceiling on immovable properties in that State\n\n\\ and, therefore, the Act was still-born in respect of the State of Rajas-\n\n, than. It is accordingly urged that the Act being legislatively incompetent in so far as the State of Rajasthan was concerned, it could not be adopted by a subsequent resolution passed by the State legislature of Rajasthan on March 9, 1976.\n\nThe learned Attorney General, however, tries to meet the challenge to the applicability of the Act to the State of Rajasthan from two aspects.\n\nHe contends that th' Parliament was undoubtedly invested with legislative competence to enact a law for the imposition of a ceiling on urban land for the State of Rajasthan, both under Art. 250 as well as under Art. 252. First of all, he points out that while there was a Proclamation of Emergency in force on February 17, 1976, the Parliament had the power to legislate with respect to any matter in the State List under Article 250, which reads :\n\n\"250. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this: Chapter, Parliament shall, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matter enumerated in the State List.\n\n(2) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.\"\n\nThe learned Attorney General is no doubt right in saying that i.f a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, under Art. 250(1) the power of the Parliament extends to the milking of Jaws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters\n\nfl A\n\nenumerated in the State List, but the Act so passed will die out with the revocation of the Proclamation of Emergency, by reason of Art. 250(2) on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclama tion has ceased to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period. That conclusion is inevitable from the words \"shall cease to have effect\" appearing in Art. 250(2).\n\nNow, the further difficulty in accepting the learned Attorney\n\n• •\n\nGeneral's contention is that the Parliament never professed to act ,- under Art. 250 ( 1). Although he drew our attention to the second ' part of the preamble to the Act which reads : ~\n\n\"AND WHEREAS Parliament has no power to make laws for the States with respect to the matters aforesaid except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitu tion;\"\n\nit is amply clear from the third pare of the preamble, which reads ..\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in pursuance of clause ( 1) of Article 252 of the Constitution resolutions have been passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of the States of Andhra Pra desh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal that the matters aforesaid should be regulafed in those States by Parliament by law;\" '\n\nthat the Parliament never intended to take recourse to its powers under Art. 250(1), but proceeded to make such a law, being clothed with its powers to legislate on the subject under Art. 252(1). The Act was, therefore, a law enacted by the Parliament by virtue of its powers under Art. 252 (I). The Statement of Objects and Reasons reallY.,--..- places the matter beyond ali doubt.\n\nIts material portion reads :\n\n\"Statement of Objects and Reasons\n\nThere has been a demand for imposing a ceiling on urban property also, especially after the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural lands by the State Governments.\n\nWith the growth of population and increases in urbanization, a need for orderly development of urban areas has also been felt.\n\nIt is, therefore, considered necessary to take measures for exercising social control over the scarce resource of urban land with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution amongst the various sections of society and also avoiding speculative transactions relating to land in urban agglomera-\n\n- •\n\ntions. With a view to ensuring uniformity in approach Government of India addressed the State Governments in this regard; eleven States have so far passed resolutions under Art. 252 (1) of the Constitution empowering Parliament to undertake legislation in this behalf.\n\nThe present proposal is to enact a Parliamentary legislation in pursuance of these resolutions.\" (Emphasis supplied)\n\nThere is also some difficulty in accepting the contention of the\n\n---._, learned Attorney General on a matter of construction of Art. 252(1). y-The q. uestion of adoptin of a la\"'. mad~ by the Parliament in respect \\ of any of the matters ,1n State List anses under the second part of Art. 252 (I ) and is dependent upon the 'desirability' expressed by the legislatures of two or rµore States empowering the Parliament to make -such a law under the first part thereof. We are inclined to think that some meaning must be given to the words \"any Act so passed\".\n\nThe •\n\npower of adoption, is, therefore, related to a law made under Art. '.252(1) and cannot be exercised in respect of laws made by the Parliament under Art. 250(1) while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force.\n\nFurthermore, such a faw, in terms of Art. 250(2), ceases to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Prodamation has ceased to operate.\n\nThe learned Attorney General, however, rightly contends, in the alternative, that the Parliament being invested with the power by resolutions passed under the first part of Art. 252 (1) by as many as eleven States, to legislate on the subject, i.e., to make a law for the imposition of a ceiling or immovable property, it had the competence to so structure the Act that it was capable of being adopted by other \"1.. \"States under the second part of Art. 252(1). A fortiori, the specifica-\n\n-ion of the State of Rajasthan by which the Act may be adopted, as well as the categorisation of the urban agglomerations therein to which it may apply, had to be there.\n\nIt is, however, strenuously urged on behalf of the petitioner that\n\na law made by the Parliament under Art. 252(1) cannot be so desig- G nated as to extend to the States which had not sponsored a resolution.\n\nEmphasis is laid upon the words \"in such States\", and it is said that they mean \"in those States\", i.e., the sponsoring States. In support of the contention, our attention was particularly drawn to the word -accordingly', and it is urged that the law passed by the Parliament\n\nunder Art. 252(1) must be restricted in its operation to those States, H i.e., to those States in which the Legislature passed a rflSo[ution.\n\nWe are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted.\n\nIn our considered judgment, the Parliament having been invested with powers to legislate on a State subject, by resolutions passed by Legislatures of two or more States under Art. 252 (1), has plenary powers to make suitable legislation. It follows, as a neces&'ary corollary, that the Act passed by the Parliament under Art. 252(1) can be so structured as to be capable of being effectively adopted by the other States.\n\nArticle 252( 1) undoubtedly enables the Parliament to make a uniform law.\n\nThe Act so passed would automatically apply to the States the legislatures of which have passed a resolution in terms\n\n. '-\n\nof Art. 252 ( 1), and at the same time it must be capable of being .-- ' c\n\nadopted by other States which have not sponsored a resolution, i.e., the_ non-sponsoring States.\n\nThe second part of Art. 252(1) will be meaningful only if it were so interpreted; otherwise, it would be rende.red wholly redundant.\n\nTo illustrate, if the part of the Schedule relating\n\nto the State of Rajasthan is treated as non est, the schedule which forms part of the Act cannot be amended except under Art. 252(2), i.e., 'in the like manner'.\n\nWe fail to appreciate how two or more States can now pass a resolution for extension of the Act to the State of Rajasthan.\n\nIn a law relating to the imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations throughout the territory of India, it was competent for the Parliament under Entry 18, List 1I of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act where the law will extend, but also include the categorisation of urban agglomerations in respect of the whole of the territory of India. The Act would automatically apply from the date of its application to those States which bad passed the resolution in terms of the first purt of Art. 252 (1), and would extend to the adopting States from the date of the resolutions passed by the legislatures of such Stat~\"· The Parliament had, therefore, in fact and in law, competence to kgislateY on the subject of the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property, and the Schedule to the Act cannot, therefore, be struck down in relation to the State of Rajasthan.\n\nG It is conceded by learned counsel for the petitioner that if the Act had been enacted without the Schedule, with an appropriate definition, of 'an urban agglomeration' in s. 2(n), in general terms, making the law applicable to cities and towns having, for example, a population of one lac and above, five lacs and above etc., it would ha\\'e been within the legislative competence of the Parliament. If that be so, then it is H inexplicable why simply because some of the areas in some of the States have been specified, although their State legislatures had not sponsored any resolution, the schedule, in so far as those States are\n\nconcerned should be regarded as non est. If it is competent for the Parliament to make a general law under Art. 252 (1) to facilitate its adoption by other States, it must logically follow that the Parliament could also pass the Act in its present form.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the Act with the Schedule annexed became applicable in those States where the legislatures passed B resolutions expressing the 'desirability' for the Parliament to make a law for the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property, and it lay dormant insofar as the other States were concerned. It became applicable to these other States from the date that their Houses of Legislatures adopted it.\n\nIn that view, we must hold that the impugned Act is not beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament insofar C as the State of Rajasthan is concerned .\n\nIn the result, the appeals succeed and are allowed.\n\nThe judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is set aside, and it is declared that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is, and has always been, in force in the State of Andhra Pradesh w.e.f. January 28,\n\n, D\n\n1976. It is further declared that the Act extends to the urban agglomerations of Warangal. It must, for reasons already staed, also be held that the Act applies to the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. March 9,\n\n1976. The remaining contentions advanced in the writ petition will be dealt with separately. There shall be no order as to costs in these proceedings.\n\nN.\\'.K.\n\nAppeals allowed .", "total_entities": 333, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VALLURI BASAVAIAH CHAUDHARY ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VALLURI BASAVAIAH CHAUDHARY ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 1, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 1, 1979\n\n[Y. V. OIANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATJ, V. R. KRISHNA lYER,\n\nV. 0."}}, {"text": "V. 0. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976-Whether ultra vires Parlianzent so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned-Inclusion of State of Rajasthan in Schedule I ofthe Act and categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and to1vns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajn1er, Kata and Bikaner in Category 'D' whether beyond legislative con1p•?tcni:c of Parlia1nent-Existence of a master plan not li sine qua non for applicability of D Act to an urban agglomeration."}}, {"text": "Kata", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 721, "end_char": 725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976-Whether ultra vires Parlianzent so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned-Inclusion of State of Rajasthan in Schedule I ofthe Act and categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and to1vns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajn1er, Kata and Bikaner in Category 'D' whether beyond legislative con1p•?tcni:c of Parlia1nent-Existence of a master plan not li sine qua non for applicability of D Act to an urban agglomeration."}}, {"text": "Existence of a master plan not li sine qua non for applicability of D Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 810, "end_char": 883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 244( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 983, "end_char": 993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1432, "end_char": 1440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "January 28, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first instance, the Act came into force on the date of its introduction in the Lok Sabha i.e. January 28, 1976 and covered the Union Territories and the eleven States which had already passed the requisite resolution under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1811, "end_char": 1819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "State of Andhm Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1860, "end_char": 1882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "252 (I ) of the Constitution, including the State of Andhm Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Art. 252( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1951, "end_char": 1963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2027, "end_char": 2041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "252( 1) of the Constitution by the State Legislatures of Assam, Biber, Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2043, "end_char": 2050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manipur, Meghalaya and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Meghalaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2052, "end_char": 2061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manipur, Meghalaya and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2066, "end_char": 2075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manipur, Meghalaya and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Articles 39(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The resolutions passed by the State Legislatures, vested in Parliament the power to regulate by law, the imposition of a ceiling on urban im1nuvable property and acquisition of such property in excess of this ceiling, as well as in respect of 'all matters connected therewith and ancillary or incidental thereto.'"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3573, "end_char": 3581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "252 ( 1) of the Constitution comprise' both the Houses of Legislature, (the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council) and the Governor of the State, struck down the Act on the ground that the Parliament was not competent to enact the impugned Act for the State of Andhra Pradesh inasmuch as the Governor of Andhra Pradesh did not pe.rticipate in the process of authorisation for the passing of the Act by the Parliament."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3893, "end_char": 3907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "252 ( 1) of the Constitution comprise' both the Houses of Legislature, (the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council) and the Governor of the State, struck down the Act on the ground that the Parliament was not competent to enact the impugned Act for the State of Andhra Pradesh inasmuch as the Governor of Andhra Pradesh did not pe.rticipate in the process of authorisation for the passing of the Act by the Parliament."}}, {"text": "s. 244( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4519, "end_char": 4529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4714, "end_char": 4732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32, the question raised was \\Vbether the inclusion of the State of Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban (Land Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomeration of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmcr, Kota nntl Bikaner in category 'D' therein is beyond the legislative competence of Parlia~ ment and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent."}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Ceiling and Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4761, "end_char": 4788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4888, "end_char": 4895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32, the question raised was \\Vbether the inclusion of the State of Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban (Land Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomeration of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmcr, Kota nntl Bikaner in category 'D' therein is beyond the legislative competence of Parlia~ ment and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent."}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5194, "end_char": 5205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Ceiling and Regulation", "statute": "Land Ceiling and Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5393, "end_char": 5401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Ceiling and Regulation", "statute": "Land Ceiling and Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Ceiling and Regulation", "statute": "Land Ceiling and Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 158(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Ceiling and Regulation", "statute": "Land Ceiling and Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5978, "end_char": 5989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 10205, "end_char": 10219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10468, "end_char": 10484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11084, "end_char": 11095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11214, "end_char": 11222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11794, "end_char": 11805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11854, "end_char": 11862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11968, "end_char": 11976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12416, "end_char": 12424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12576, "end_char": 12584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13032, "end_char": 13043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13128, "end_char": 13139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13290, "end_char": 13298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13356, "end_char": 13367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13562, "end_char": 13578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14109, "end_char": 14132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January 28, 1976 it was preceded by State wise deep consideration and consultation by the respec~\n\ntive States, including the State of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Art 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14786, "end_char": 14796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15266, "end_char": 15273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15469, "end_char": 15480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15677, "end_char": 15688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15807, "end_char": 15818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16375, "end_char": 16382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16984, "end_char": 16991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 244", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17518, "end_char": 17524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17785, "end_char": 17791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Warangal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17920, "end_char": 17928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The revised master ple.n prepared for Warangal does, as it should pro- D vide for various development schemes, it also designates the lands subject to compulsory acquisition."}}, {"text": "s. 244", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18114, "end_char": 18120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18763, "end_char": 18774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18906, "end_char": 18917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19006, "end_char": 19020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19201, "end_char": 19209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19379, "end_char": 19390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20161, "end_char": 20166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn a law relating to the imposition of ceiling on vacant 1;:1nd in urban\n\nagglomerations throughout the territory of India, it was competent for the Parliament under Entry 18, List II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act where the law will extend, but also include the categorisation of urban agglomerations in respect of the whole of the territory of India. ["}}, {"text": "List II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20220, "end_char": 20312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20459, "end_char": 20487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "830E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21023, "end_char": 21033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "List II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21056, "end_char": 21067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As."}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21106, "end_char": 21117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21128, "end_char": 21142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21144, "end_char": 21158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As."}}, {"text": "K. N. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21160, "end_char": 21171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21189, "end_char": 21202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 OF 1977\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. V. Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U. R. Lalit (1896/76) R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) E Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants in C.As."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21369, "end_char": 21383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. K. Mehrish, S. M. Jail!"}}, {"text": "K. K. Mehrish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21385, "end_char": 21398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. K. Mehrish, S. M. Jail!"}}, {"text": "S. M. Jail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21400, "end_char": 21410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. K. Mehrish, S. M. Jail!"}}, {"text": "S. K. J!dn", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21416, "end_char": 21426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and S. K. J!dn for the Petitioner in W.P. 350/77."}}, {"text": "T. V. S. Narasimhachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21463, "end_char": 21486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. V. S. Narasimhachari and M. S. Ganesh for the Appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "M. S. Ganesh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21491, "end_char": 21503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. V. S. Narasimhachari and M. S. Ganesh for the Appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21549, "end_char": 21564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nK. K. Venugopal, Addi."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and S. S. Khanduja for Res- , pondents 2-3 in W.P. 350/77."}}, {"text": "B. Kanta Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21643, "end_char": 21655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Kanta Rao for RR 1-50, 53-66, 68-113, 85-91, 93-95, 97-100 and 112-114 in C.A. 1896/76."}}, {"text": "Vepa P. Sarathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21735, "end_char": 21750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vepa P. Sarathi and B. Parthasarathi for RR 28 and 53 in C.A. 276/77."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21755, "end_char": 21771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vepa P. Sarathi and B. Parthasarathi for RR 28 and 53 in C.A. 276/77."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21806, "end_char": 21818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy, A. V. V. Nair and Subodh Markendaya for the other appearing Respondents in C.As."}}, {"text": "A. V. V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21820, "end_char": 21833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy, A. V. V. Nair and Subodh Markendaya for the other appearing Respondents in C.As."}}, {"text": "Subodh Markendaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21838, "end_char": 21855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy, A. V. V. Nair and Subodh Markendaya for the other appearing Respondents in C.As."}}, {"text": "R. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21931, "end_char": 21942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Mehta, for Advocate General for the State of Orissa."}}, {"text": "Badridas Shanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21991, "end_char": 22006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badridas Shanna, for Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22102, "end_char": 22105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-These appeals, by certificate, are directed against the judgment and order of tbe Andhra Pradesh High Court dated Decem ber 3, 1976 allowing a batch of thirty-seven writ petitions."}}, {"text": "Warangal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22607, "end_char": 22615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A subsidiary question is also involved as to whether even assuming the Act is in force in the State, it is not applicable to Warangal because there was no master plan prepared in accordance with the requirements of s. 244(1) (c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District\n\n• r Municipalities Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 244(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22697, "end_char": 22706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22764, "end_char": 22788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22852, "end_char": 22859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "State ol Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22910, "end_char": 22928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution, whether the inclusion of the State ol Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmer, Kata and Bikaner in category 'D' therein, is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent."}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22932, "end_char": 22942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23113, "end_char": 23118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution, whether the inclusion of the State ol Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmer, Kata and Bikaner in category 'D' therein, is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent."}}, {"text": "Bikaner", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23129, "end_char": 23136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution, whether the inclusion of the State ol Rajasthan in Schedule I to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban agglomerations of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category 'C' and Ajmer, Kata and Bikaner in category 'D' therein, is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23398, "end_char": 23405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23407, "end_char": 23414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23416, "end_char": 23432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23434, "end_char": 23443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23445, "end_char": 23456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23458, "end_char": 23464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23466, "end_char": 23472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Tripura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23474, "end_char": 23481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23484, "end_char": 23497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23502, "end_char": 23513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura,\n\nUttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23702, "end_char": 23710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24314, "end_char": 24322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24455, "end_char": 24463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24821, "end_char": 24842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24933, "end_char": 24944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25172, "end_char": 25177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ceiling limit of vacant land of metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras having a population exceeding ten lacs falling under category 'A' is 500 sq."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25179, "end_char": 25185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ceiling limit of vacant land of metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras having a population exceeding ten lacs falling under category 'A' is 500 sq."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25187, "end_char": 25195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ceiling limit of vacant land of metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras having a population exceeding ten lacs falling under category 'A' is 500 sq."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25200, "end_char": 25206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ceiling limit of vacant land of metropolitan areas of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras having a population exceeding ten lacs falling under category 'A' is 500 sq."}}, {"text": "s. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25838, "end_char": 25844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)(B)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25977, "end_char": 25987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26071, "end_char": 26089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(n)(A)(ii), as the case may be, after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 39(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26772, "end_char": 26782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26842, "end_char": 26858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 8, 1972 and April 7, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27209, "end_char": 27240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two Houses of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature, however, passed the following resolution on April 8, 1972 and April 7, 1972 rpectively : \"\n\n• .. \"Resolution passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly on A the 8th April, 1972."}}, {"text": "Articles 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27682, "end_char": 27702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Legislative \" Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27766, "end_char": 27803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of\n\nMidia; r And whereas it appears to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative \" Assembly to be desirable that the aforesaid matters should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law; • Now, therefore, in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, this Assembly hereby resolves that the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Anclhra Pradesh by Parliament by law.\""}}, {"text": "Article 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27968, "end_char": 27979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anclhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28258, "end_char": 28273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of\n\nMidia; r And whereas it appears to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative \" Assembly to be desirable that the aforesaid matters should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law; • Now, therefore, in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, this Assembly hereby resolves that the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Anclhra Pradesh by Parliament by law.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28912, "end_char": 28920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29619, "end_char": 29627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30685, "end_char": 30696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30719, "end_char": 30733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30956, "end_char": 30976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31543, "end_char": 31551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32126, "end_char": 32134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32260, "end_char": 32268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32324, "end_char": 32332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32398, "end_char": 32409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32585, "end_char": 32602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32946, "end_char": 32954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33008, "end_char": 33014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33022, "end_char": 33051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33212, "end_char": 33229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33296, "end_char": 33304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33583, "end_char": 33591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33742, "end_char": 33750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34361, "end_char": 34369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34547, "end_char": 34645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34699, "end_char": 34715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act", "statute": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act"}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R. 230", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34742, "end_char": 34761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35042, "end_char": 35050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act", "statute": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35281, "end_char": 35289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act", "statute": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35323, "end_char": 35331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act", "statute": "Act cannot be amended or repealed by the State 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36396, "end_char": 36404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36879, "end_char": 36886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanajali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37109, "end_char": 37126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 ( 3) as a specml , safeguard, which, in order to ensure that no hasty or unjust expropriatory legislation is passed by a State Legislature, requires for .such legislation the assent of both the Governor and the President, Patanajali Sastri C.J. observed :\n\n\"It is true that the \"Legislature\" of a State includes the Governor iind that a bill passed by such Legislature cannot become a law until it receives the Governor's assent. ..... ."}}, {"text": "article 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37422, "end_char": 37433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37810, "end_char": 37820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38480, "end_char": 38491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38685, "end_char": 38705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39692, "end_char": 39699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40338, "end_char": 40349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40467, "end_char": 40475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40893, "end_char": 40901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40983, "end_char": 40991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 175 and 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41110, "end_char": 41127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41179, "end_char": 41187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41379, "end_char": 41387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 207", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41464, "end_char": 41472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41792, "end_char": 41800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42382, "end_char": 42390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42413, "end_char": 42421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 213(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43155, "end_char": 43166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43725, "end_char": 43736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43782, "end_char": 43789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 176(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43836, "end_char": 43847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44325, "end_char": 44333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44479, "end_char": 44487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44778, "end_char": 44786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45049, "end_char": 45057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D. N. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45114, "end_char": 45125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice H. K. Bose(') D. N. Sinha J., as he then was rightly negatived a challenge to the contitutional validity of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, which amended Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45272, "end_char": 45280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45908, "end_char": 45916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45946, "end_char": 45954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46063, "end_char": 46071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46383, "end_char": 46394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46589, "end_char": 46600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 360(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46985, "end_char": 46996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "!atin Chakravorty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47000, "end_char": 47017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "360(2) in !"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47196, "end_char": 47204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47330, "end_char": 47338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47424, "end_char": 47435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47660, "end_char": 47668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47765, "end_char": 47773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47963, "end_char": 47971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48053, "end_char": 48061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48203, "end_char": 48214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48479, "end_char": 48490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48736, "end_char": 48751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention cannot be accepted because it runs counter to this Court's decision in Kameshwar Singh's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Art. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48836, "end_char": 48844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48902, "end_char": 48910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49314, "end_char": 49320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49328, "end_char": 49357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50420, "end_char": 50426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 252(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50473, "end_char": 50484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50663, "end_char": 50671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50724, "end_char": 50729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50739, "end_char": 50768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 252(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50835, "end_char": 50846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50993, "end_char": 51001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "July 25, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51691, "end_char": 51704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pointed out that the Working Group with the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development, in its report dated July 25, 1970 recommended that the ceiling on urban property should be imposed on the basis of the monetary value nf properties and suggested a ceiEng of 4 to 5 lacs of rupees."}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52139, "end_char": 52150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52944, "end_char": 52960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53304, "end_char": 53318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India before the High Court in its counter ayerred that, before the Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January\n\n' ...\n\n~ ,\n\nr r\n\n•• \"\n\n28, 1976, it was preceded by State-wise deep consideration and consultation by the respective States, including the State of Andhra Pradesh for a period of over five years starting from 1970."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54380, "end_char": 54397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of each of the report of the Working Group and the Model Bill referred to was placed on the table of the Parliament on December 15, 1970 and March 22, 1972 respectively."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54402, "end_char": 54416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of each of the report of the Working Group and the Model Bill referred to was placed on the table of the Parliament on December 15, 1970 and March 22, 1972 respectively."}}, {"text": "State Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54473, "end_char": 54507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said documents were forwarded to the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, besides other State Governments, for consideration by the State Legislatures before they passed a resolution under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54624, "end_char": 54635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55090, "end_char": 55097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 252( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56520, "end_char": 56532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56731, "end_char": 56742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56862, "end_char": 56870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57905, "end_char": 57913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58064, "end_char": 58099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence whereof, it fell into an error in holding that the State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh could not, in law, be regarded to have authorised the Parliament to enact the impugned Act, in relation to that State, due to the non-· participation of the Governor."}}, {"text": "s. 244(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58420, "end_char": 58429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58479, "end_char": 58512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 244(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59150, "end_char": 59159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59599, "end_char": 59608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59863, "end_char": 59867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60002, "end_char": 60012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(q)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60235, "end_char": 60242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60432, "end_char": 60436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61319, "end_char": 61329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61580, "end_char": 61590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61977, "end_char": 61981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62582, "end_char": 62589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 26, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63099, "end_char": 63115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that there was a master plan prepared for Warangal on October 26, 1949."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63120, "end_char": 63137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1963, the Warangal Municipality resolved by a resolution to prepare a. fresh master H plan and on February 18, 1966, the State Government."}}, {"text": "Warangal Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63143, "end_char": 63164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1963, the 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"District Municipa- lities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64542, "end_char": 64575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 244", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64770, "end_char": 64776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64817, "end_char": 64850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 244", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65311, "end_char": 65317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65588, "end_char": 65594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipalities Act, 1956", "statute": "District Municipalities Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Warangai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65724, "end_char": 65732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the revised master plan prepared for Warangai does, as it should, provide for various development schemes."}}, {"text": "s. 244", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65934, "end_char": 65940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66083, "end_char": 66090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Warangal Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66320, "end_char": 66341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act, is, therefore, clearly applicable to the urban agglomerations of 14-331lSCI/79\n\nW arangal and it extends not only to all the lands included within the local limits of the Warangal Municipality but also includes the peripheral areas specified, i.e. one kilometre around such limits."}}, {"text": "Maharao Saheb Bhim Singhji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66490, "end_char": 66516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this group of cases, there is a writ petition filed by Maharao Saheb Bhim Singhji, former ruler of the erstwhile princely State of Kota."}}, {"text": "Kota", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66566, "end_char": 66570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this group of cases, there is a writ petition filed by Maharao Saheb Bhim Singhji, former ruler of the erstwhile princely State of Kota."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66937, "end_char": 66954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bill, after it was passed by both the Houses of Parliament, received the assent of the President on February 17, 1976."}}, {"text": "March 9, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67317, "end_char": 67330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 9, 1976, the State Legislature of Rajasthan passed the following resolution adopting the Act :\n\n\"Whereas the Legislature of Rajasthan State considers it expedient to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban\n\nagglomerations to subserve the common good."}}, {"text": "State Legislature of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 67336, "end_char": 67366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 9, 1976, the State Legislature of Rajasthan passed the following resolution adopting the Act :\n\n\"Whereas the Legislature of Rajasthan State considers it expedient to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban\n\nagglomerations to subserve the common good."}}, {"text": "Legislature of Rajasthan State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 67432, "end_char": 67462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 9, 1976, the State Legislature of Rajasthan passed the following resolution adopting the Act :\n\n\"Whereas the Legislature of Rajasthan State considers it expedient to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban\n\nagglomerations to subserve the common good."}}, {"text": "Article 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68105, "end_char": 68124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68237, "end_char": 68252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And whereas this Legislature is of the opinion that aforesaid matter may be regulated in Rajasthan State by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of Central Act of 1976) enacted by the Parliament."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68395, "end_char": 68410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now therefore the Legislature of Rajasthan State passes the following resolution in pursuance of Article 252:, clause (1) : -\n\n\"Rajasthan State adopts the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of Central Act of 1976) for this State\".\""}}, {"text": "Article 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68459, "end_char": 68470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68822, "end_char": 68833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "legislature of Lhe State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 69230, "end_char": 69267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is submitted that the legislature of Lhe State of Rajasthan never authorised the Parliament to enact a law\n\ny-for the imposition of ceiling on immovable properties in that State\n\n\\ and, therefore, the Act was still-born in respect of the State of Rajas-\n\n, than."}}, {"text": "Art. 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70035, "end_char": 70043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70061, "end_char": 70069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70272, "end_char": 70283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71063, "end_char": 71074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71360, "end_char": 71371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71645, "end_char": 71656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71803, "end_char": 71811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 249 and 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72039, "end_char": 72059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72199, "end_char": 72210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pra desh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72315, "end_char": 72330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although he drew our attention to the second ' part of the preamble to the Act which reads : ~\n\n\"AND WHEREAS Parliament has no power to make laws for the States with respect to the matters aforesaid except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitu tion;\"\n\nit is amply clear from the third pare of the preamble, which reads ..\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in pursuance of clause ( 1) of Article 252 of the Constitution resolutions have been passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of the States of Andhra Pra desh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal that the matters aforesaid should be regulafed in those States by Parliament by law;\" '\n\nthat the Parliament never intended to take recourse to its powers under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 250(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72608, "end_char": 72619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72719, "end_char": 72730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72818, "end_char": 72826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73634, "end_char": 73653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With a view to ensuring uniformity in approach Government of India addressed the State Governments in this regard; eleven States have so far passed resolutions under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73753, "end_char": 73761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74097, "end_char": 74108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74253, "end_char": 74261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74684, "end_char": 74695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 250(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74781, "end_char": 74792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75079, "end_char": 75087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75355, "end_char": 75366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75670, "end_char": 75681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76059, "end_char": 76070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76422, "end_char": 76430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76568, "end_char": 76579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 252( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76669, "end_char": 76684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76872, "end_char": 76880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77062, "end_char": 77073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77351, "end_char": 77362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "fail to appreciate how two or more States can now pass a resolution for extension of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77396, "end_char": 77488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77701, "end_char": 77782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78066, "end_char": 78074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78425, "end_char": 78443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "252 (1), and would extend to the adopting States from the date of the resolutions passed by the legislatures of such Stat~\"· The Parliament had, therefore, in fact and in law, competence to kgislateY on the subject of the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property, and the Schedule to the Act cannot, therefore, be struck down in relation to the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78619, "end_char": 78626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79188, "end_char": 79196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 79997, "end_char": 80022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is set aside, and it is declared that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is, and has always been, in force in the State of Andhra Pradesh w.e.f."}}, {"text": "March 9,\n\n1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80396, "end_char": 80410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 9,\n\n1976."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_832_838_EN", "year": 1979, "text": ".832\n\nK. S. DHARMADATAN\n\nCENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ORS.\n\nMay 1, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nPrevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Section 6 scope of-Whether sanction of competent authority is necessary for prosecution when in fact on the said date the employee was out of service, but on appeal in a departmental enquiry, he is ordered to be reinstated with retrospective efject--Construction of deeming - provision.\n\nThe appellant was being prosecuted for offences under sections 120-B, 420, 471 and 468 read with section 34 I P.C., Section 167 (72) of the Sea Customs Act and Section 5(2) read with section 5(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947.\n\nAt the time when the charge sheet was filed and the special judge took cognizance agains.t th'e appellant sometime in October, 1970, the appellant ceased to be a public servant and, therefore, no sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was obtained. The depa.rtmental enquiry against th'e appellant ended in his dismissal but the President of India allowed his appeal ailld set aside the order of removal from service passed by the Collector of Customs against him with directiolli'! to treat the period of absence from 5-9-1967 till the date of reinstatement as und'er suspension, and to institute de novo proceedings against the appellant after rectifying the defect in the charge sheet.\n\nWhile the departmental proceedings were going on, the trial against the appeliant proceeded to its logical end except the arguments being heard.\n\nThe appellant on being reinstated filed an application before the special Judge praying that all furth'er proceedings be dropped as the prosecution against the appellant was initiated in the absence of a proper and valid sanction haivi'=lg been obtained under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nThe special Judge rejected it and the High Court confirm'ed' the rejection.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 applies only where at the time wh'en the offence WM committed the offender was acting as a public servant.\n\nIf the offender had ceased to b'e a public servant then section 6 would have no application at aU.\n\nFurthermore, the point of time G when the sanction has to be tc..ken must be the time when the Court takes cognizance of an offence and not before or after. If at the relevant time, the offender was a public servant no sanction under section 6 was necessary at alI.\n\n[835E-FJ •\n\nIn the instant case, no sanction under section 6 of the Act was n'ecessary, as the appellant had ceased to be a public servant at the time when the cogniz~ H ance of the case was taken against him by the special Judge.\n\n[836E]\n\nS. A. Venkataraman v. The State, [1958] SCR 1037; C. R. Bansi v. State of Maharashtra, [1971] 3 SCR 236 followed.\n\n2. A deeming provision cannot be pushed too far as to result in a mof.t A anamolous or absurd position.\n\nA deeming provision should be confined only for the purpose for it is meant.\n\n[837C, 838A]\n\nCommissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. The Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., [1961] 2 SCR 189; Braithwaite & co. India Ltd. v.\n\nEmployees' State Insurance Corporation, [1968] 1 SCR.771; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1955] 2 S.C.R. 603; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City v. Elphinstone B Spinning and JVeaving Mills Co. Ltd., 40 I.T.R. 142; applied.\n\n3. In the instant case :\n\n(a) Th'e order of the Pre&ident reinstating the appellant and creating a legal fiction regarding the period of suspension must be limited only so far as the period of and the incidents of suspension were concen.1ed and could not be\n\ncarried too far as to project it even in cases where actions had already been C taken\n\n[838A-B]\n\n(b) Th'e dismissal was not a nullity so as to vitiate all proceedings.\n\nThe order passed by the President was not an order on merits. It was merely an order passed by the President in an appeal M a departmental enquiry and the '3:ppellant succeded because of a manifest defect in the charge sheet.\n\nThe President n'ever intended that the appellant should be deemed to have been D reinstated even for the purpose of section 6 of the POCA, 1947 so as to nullify\n\nacticns completed, consequences ensued or transactions closed.\n\nIn fact when the President observed that the appellant shall b'e deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal it merely meant that for the purpose of certain civil consequences flowing from the order of the President namely the grant of subsistence allowa!lce or other benefits the order would be deemed to be retroactive in character.\n\n[837A-C] E\n\n(c) At the time when actual cognizance by the Court was taken the appel~ lant ceased to be a public serva.nt having be'en removed from service.\n\nIf some years later h'e had be£.n reinstated that would not make the cognizance which \"' was validly taken by the Court in October, 1970, a nullity or render it nuga- 1ory, so 26 to necessitate the taking of a fresh sanction.\n\n[838B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 362 • of 1975. ' 1 < i\n\n• Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the\n\n1 lth July, 1975 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 73 of 1975.\n\nS. Govind Swaminadhan, E. V. Rangam and N. S. Sivam for the Appellant.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, Add!. Sol. Genl. of India, R. N. Sachthey and E. C.\n\nAga1wala for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala dated lilth July, 1975\n\ndismissing a criminal revision petition filed by the appellant before the High Court.\n\nThe point involved in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass.\n\nThe appellant was being prosecuted for offences under sections 120-B, 420, 471 and 468 read with section 34 I.P.C., section 167\n\n(72) of the Sea Customs Act and section 5 (2) read with section 5(1 )(d} of the Prevention of Corrnption Act.\n\nAt the time when the chargesheet was filed and the Special Judge took cognizance against the appellant sometime in October, 1970 the appellant ceased to be a public servant and, therefore, no sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of 0Jrruption Act (herein>after referred to as the Act) was obtained It appears that in pursuance of a departmental enquiry held against the appellant he was charge-sheeted and ultimately dismissed by the appointing authority. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the President of India on 18-10-1967 against his removal from service.\n\nAfter comuiting the Union Public Service Commission the President by his order dated 25-9-1972 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of removal from service passed by the Collector of Customs against '.he appellant. The order of the President further directed that the period of absence from 5-9-1967 till the date of reinstatement was to be treated as under suspension. The appeal appears to have been allowed by the President mainly on the gmund that there was some defect in the E )'.'.harge-sheet served by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority was directed to institute de nova proceedings against the appellant after rectifying the defect in the charge-sheet. While these proceedings before the President were going on, the trial against the appellant proceeded to its logical end and we now understand that evidence has already been led and the arguments have to be heard.\n\nThe appellant on being reinstated by the President filed an application before the special Judge praying that all further proceedings be dropped inasmuch as the prosecution against the appellant was initiated in the absence of a proper and valid sanction having been obtained under section 6 of the Act.\n\nThe special Judge, however, rejected the petition as a result of which the appellant moved the High Court but was not successful there.\n\nThe only point raised by the appellant before the High Court a's also before us was that in view of the order of the President reinstating the appellant retrospectively, the appellant must be deemed to be in service with effect from the date from which the departmental proceedings were started against him, and, therefore, he would be a public servant at the time when cognizance was taken by the special Judge, and\n\nas no sanction under section 6 of the Act WaS obtained, the entire pro-. ceedings became void abinitio. Mr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondents has submitted that admittedly aud factually at the point of time when the special Judge took cognizance of the case on 14-10-1970 the appellant having been dismissed from service was no longer a public servant, and, therefore, section 6 of the Act had no application.\n\nSection 6 of the Act runs .thus :-\n\n\"6( 1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3A) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction.\n\n(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government or of the Central Government;\n\n(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the; Central Government or of the State Government;\n\n( c) in the case of any other person, of .the authority competent to remove him from his office.\"\n\nA perusal of this section would clearly disclose that the section applies only where at the time when the offence was committed the offender was acting as a public servant. If the offender had ceased to be a public servant then section 6 would have no applicat10n at all.\n\nFurther more, it is also manifest from the perusal of section 6 that the\n\npoint of time when the sanction has to be taken must be the time when F the court takes cognizance of an offence and not before or after. If at the relevant time, as indicated above, the offender was not a public servant no sanction nn4er section 6 was necessary at all.\n\nConstruing section 6 of the Act this Court in the case of S. A.\n\nVenkataraman v. The State(') pointed out as follows:- G\n\n\"When the provisions of s. 6 of the Act are examined it is manifest that the two conditions must be fulfilled before its provisions become applicable.\n\nOne is that the offences mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant and the other 1s that that person is employed in connection with the H affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his\n\n1) [1958] S.C.R. 1037.\n\noffice save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or is a public servant who is removable from his office by any other competent authority.\n\nBoth these conditions must be present to prevent a court from taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office.\n\nIf either of these conditions is lacking, the essential requirements of the section are wanting and the provisions of the section do not stand in the way of a court taking cognizance without a. previous sanction ..... . ........... Conversely, if an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code was committed by a public servant, but, at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of the offence, that person had ceased to be a public servant one of the two requirements to make s. 6 of the Act applicable would be lacking and a previous sanction would be unnecessary.\n\nThe words in s. 6 (1) of the Act are clear enough and they must be given eff<.tt to\".\n\nTo the same effect is a later decision of this Court in the ca.e of C. R. Bansi v. State of Maharashtra(')\n\nIn view of the observations referred to above, it is manifest that as the appellant had ceased to be a public servant at the time when the cognizance of the mse was taken against him by the Special Judge no sanction under section 6 of the Act was necessary.\n\nIt was, however, argued by Mr. Swaminadhan, learned counsel for the appellant that the logical consequence of the order of the President reinstating the appellant was that he would be deemed to have been put\n\n'rack into service on the date the charge-sheet was submitted againsr him, and, therefore, he must be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 6 of the Act. In other words, the learned counsel wanted us to import a legal fiction arising from the Presidential order by which even though factually the appellant may not have been a public servant at the time when the cognizance was taken, he would be deemed to be so by virtue of the Presidential order even though the Presidential order may have been passed years after the cognizance was taken.\n\nWe are however unable to agree with the somewhat broad arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant.\n\n(I) [19711 3 S.C.R. 236.\n\n·.,,-\n\nTo begin with, the dismissal of the appellant was not a nullity so as to vitiate all proceedings previous or subsequent. It was merely an order passed by the President iu an appeal and the appellant succeeded because of a manifest defect in the charge-sheet. The mder passed by the President was therefore not an order on merits. There is nothing to show that the President ever intended that the appellant should be deemed to have been reinstated even for the purpose of section 6 of the Act so as to nullify actions completed, consequences ensued or trans• actions closed.\n\nIn fact, when the President observed that the appellant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal it merely meant that for the purpose of certain civil consequences flowing from the order of the President, .namely, the grant of subsistence allowance or other benefits the order\n\nwould be deemed to be retroactive in character. It is well settled that\n\n• a deeming provision cannot be pushed too far so as to result in a most anamolous or absurd position.\n\nIn the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. TM D Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.(') while laying down the principles on the basis of which a deeming provision should be construed this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"A legal fiction must be limited to the purposes for which it has been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field\".\n\nSimilarly in the case of Braithwaite & Co. (India) Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation(') this Court further amplifying the principle of the construction of a deeming provision observed thus :-\n\n\"A legal fiction is adopted -in law for a limited and definite' purpose only and there is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted''.\n\nIn the Bengal Immunity Co.1Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors.(•) this Court pointed out that \"explanation should be limited to the purpose the Constitution-makers had and legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose''.\n\nIn the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City v. Elphins~ tone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.(') this court observed as follows :-\n\n(!) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 189.\n\n(2) [1968] I S.C.R. 771.\n\n\n4) 40 I.T.R. 142.\n\n\"As we have already stated, this fiction cannot be carried further than what it is intended for\".\n\nThus, it is well settled that a deeming fiction should be confined only for the purpose for it is meant.\n\nIn the instant case, the order of the President reinstating the appellant and creating a legal fiction regarding the period of suspension mnst be limited only so far as the period of and the incidents of suspension were concerned and could not be carried too far so as to project it even in cases where actions had already ben taken and closed.\n\nIn other words, the position seems to be that at the time when actual cognizance by the court was taken the appellant had ceased to be a public servant having been removed from service'.\n\nIf some years later he had been reinstated that would not make the cognizance which was validly taken by the court in October, 1970 a nullity or render it nugatory so as to necessitate the taking of a fresh sanction. We, therefore, entirely agree with the view taken by the High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the present case legal fiction arising out of the Presidential Order cannot be carried to nullify the order of cognizance taken by the special Judge. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is, thernfore, overruled.\n\nNo other point was pressed before us.\n\nThe appeal being without merit is accordingly dismissed. The special Judge would now hear the arguments of the parties and dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible.\n\nLet the records be sent back to the special Judge immediately.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n- < .. '1", "total_entities": 73, "entities": [{"text": "832\n\nK. S. DHARMADATAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "832\n\nK. S. DHARMADATAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 1, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 1, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. 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Govind Swaminadhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminadhan, E. V. Rangam and N. S. Sivam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "E. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5353, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminadhan, E. V. Rangam and N. S. Sivam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. S. Sivam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5370, "end_char": 5381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminadhan, E. V. Rangam and N. S. Sivam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Add!."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, R. N. Sachthey and E. C.\n\nAga1wala for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "E. C.\n\nAga1wala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5466, "end_char": 5481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, R. N. Sachthey and E. C.\n\nAga1wala for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5547, "end_char": 5556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala dated lilth July, 1975\n\ndismissing a criminal revision petition filed by the appellant before the High Court."}}, {"text": "sections 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5903, "end_char": 5915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5957, "end_char": 5962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5965, "end_char": 5976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5994, "end_char": 6005, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6010, "end_char": 6019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the President of India on 18-10-1967 against his removal from service."}}, {"text": "18-10-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the President of India on 18-10-1967 against his removal from service."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6692, "end_char": 6723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After comuiting the Union Public Service Commission the President by his order dated 25-9-1972 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of removal from service passed by the Collector of Customs against '.he appellant."}}, {"text": "25-9-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6757, "end_char": 6766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After comuiting the Union Public Service Commission the President by his order dated 25-9-1972 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of removal from service passed by the Collector of Customs against '.he appellant."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7857, "end_char": 7866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8543, "end_char": 8551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondents has submitted that admittedly aud factually at the point of time when the special Judge took cognizance of the case on 14-10-1970 the appellant having been dismissed from service was no longer a public servant, and, therefore, section 6 of the Act had no application."}}, {"text": "14-10-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondents has submitted that admittedly aud factually at the point of time when the special Judge took cognizance of the case on 14-10-1970 the appellant having been dismissed from service was no longer a public servant, and, therefore, section 6 of the Act had no application."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8809, "end_char": 8818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8851, "end_char": 8860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8971, "end_char": 8982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8986, "end_char": 8997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9005, "end_char": 9022, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9072, "end_char": 9081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9371, "end_char": 9389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government or of the Central Government;\n\n(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the; Central Government or of the State Government;\n\n( c) in the case of any other person, of .the authority competent to remove him from his office.\""}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9927, "end_char": 9936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10285, "end_char": 10294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10329, "end_char": 10338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10464, "end_char": 10468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11545, "end_char": 11551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11559, "end_char": 11576, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11764, "end_char": 11768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11868, "end_char": 11872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Swaminadhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12340, "end_char": 12351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, argued by Mr. Swaminadhan, learned counsel for the appellant that the logical consequence of the order of the President reinstating the appellant was that he would be deemed to have been put\n\n'rack into service on the date the charge-sheet was submitted againsr him, and, therefore, he must be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 6 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12672, "end_char": 12681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 189", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15444, "end_char": 15463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17083, "end_char": 17089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_839_877_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "83 9\n\nCHETTIAM VEETTIL AMMAD AND ANR.\n\nTALUK LAND BOARD AND ORS.\n\nMay 2, 1979\n\n(P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nKera/a Land Reforms Act, 1963, Sections 81, 82, 82(4), 84(3) & 84(5)- Scope of.\n\nThe Kerala State Legislature felt the necessity of making cornpreh'ensive\n\n~ land reforms in the State.\n\nThe Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Act IV .of 1961) was accordingly passed and receiv'ed the assent of the President on January 21, 1961. Some of its provisions were brought into force with effect from February 15, 1961.\n\nThat Act was struck down as unconstitutional by •\n\nthis Court.\n\nThe Kerala Ryotwari Tenants a.nd Kud'ikidappukars Protection Act, 1962 was then paSBed for the temporary protection of t'enants in those taluks.\n\nThe .K'erala High Court declared it null and void iin its application to the ryotwari lands of the Malabu area and most of the lands of Travancore area.\n\nAs an interim legis-1ation, the Ker&la Tenants and Kudikidappukars Pro- 1ection Act 1963 was passed to provide some protection to the tenants. But it repealed the Keral& Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1962, and suspended the operation of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act,\n\n1960. After re-examining the requirements in the field of land refonns as a whole, the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963 was published in the Slate Gazette on Sept. 15, 1963. It covered a wide field in th'e matter of land reforms and, inter alia, provided for the imposition of a ceiling on 'holdings' of lands, the surrend'er of excess of lands, grant of compensation thereof, and the assignment of the surrendered lands in accordance with the order of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals etc, The Land Reforms Act 1963 (Act 1 of 1964) received the assent of the President on Dec., 31, 1963. It was amended extensively, and in several 1natcrial particulars by Act, 35 of 1969, Act 25 of 1971 and Act 17 of 1972.\n\nThe following three main points of controversy arose in the appeals :\n\n1. Whether lands converted into plantations between April 1, 1964 a.nd January l, 1970 qualified for exemption under s. 8I(l)(e) of the Act.\n\n2. Whether a certificate of purchas'e issued by the Land Tribunal under s. 72K of the Act was binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under -Chapter III of the Act.\n\n3. Whether the validity or invalidity of transfers effected by persons owning or holding lands exceeding the ceiling limit could be detennined with reference • 1o the ceiling area in force on the date of the transfer or in accordance with 1he ceiling area prescribed by Act 35 of 1969-whether sub-section (3) of 6.\n\n~4 was retrospective in operation.\n\nHELD : Point No. 1. The controversy is whether the restriction of sub section (4) of section 82 came into force on January 1, 1970, beca.ure section 12 of the amending Act of 1971 was brought into forc'e on that date, or\n\nA whether it came ii1to force on April 1, 19641 when section 82 as originally enacted came into force.\n\n[853H, 854G]\n\nAll the three Acts contain provisions about their \"commencement\".\n\nSubsection (3) of s'ection 1 of the Act provides that : (i) Section 1 of the Act shall come into force at once, (ii) the other provisions of the A.ct shall con1e into force on such dates as the Government may appoint, (iii) <liilerent d\"te:-. may be appointed for different prov1s1ons of the Act, and (iv) any reference in a'ny such provision to the \"commencement of th:s Act\" shall be construed as a reference to the corning into for.::e of that provision.\n\nThe Act was published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964, ;.•.1d. by vir1ue of section 3 of the Ker&la Interpretation and General Clau3es Act, section 1 came into force on that date. Sec. 82, as has been sta!ed, came into for.:e on - • April 1, 1964, and the reference in sub-section ( 4) of that sectieo.1 to the _ \"commencement of this A•;::t\" meant a reference to the coming into force of J that provision with effect from April 1, 1964.\n\nIt may be that the firs.t three rules or directions contained in .sub-section (3) were spent on the com:~1g into force of sec. 1 of the Act or its other provisions on th'e dates appointed for them, but, for obvious reasons, rule (iv) continued to hold the field inasmuch as it laid down the rule of construction that a1.1y reference to the commencement of th'e Act s-hall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that particular provision.\n\nIt was therefore applicableas a general rule of construction whenever it became necessary to ascertain the date of commencement of a particular provision of the Act other thaa. section I. [854G, 855B-F]\n\nSub-section ( 4) of section 82, as originally incorporated in the Act, came into force on April 1, 1964. It was amended by section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969, which came into force on January 1, 1970, but that proved to be fortuitous and was supplanted by section 12 of the Amending Act o:t 1971 from the sam'e date.\n\nThe sub-section as 2.mended by the Amending Act of 1971 also dealt with the conversion of land into any other class of land \"after the commenlcement of this Act'', but it added the words \"or into a plantation\" and provided that such conversion shall not be taken into conslderation for determining the extent of the land to be surrendered.\n\n[855FH]\n\nOn the plain meaning of the proviso to sub-section 3 of section 1, it '\n\nollos that wAhen _ 1 th 1 e r 1\n\nr 9\n\no 6\n\nv 4\n\n1s1tn of sudb-sdection_ 4 of 1 section ~2 w 1 as bro 1 ught _,,...-( mto iorce on pn , , I s amen e version a so came into orce rom that date. [856B, Ej\n\nNo particular s'ignificanc'e attaches to the use of the expression \"provisons'' or \"provision\" in section 1 (3) of the Act.\n\nA provis-ion is a distinct rule or principle of law in a statute which governs the situa.tion covered by it.\n\nSo an incomplete idea, even though stated in the form of a section of a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its incompl'eteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned.\n\nA provision of law cannot therefore be sa.id to exisit if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing. [856G, 857C-D]\n\nH The amended section 82 of the Act is a distinct rule or a clause for it provides the extent of the ceiling area In the cases mentioned in it, its effect on the lands owned or held individually by members of a fan1ily or jointly\n\nby some or all the memb'ers of the family, the taking into acoount of the A shares of the members of. the family or an adult unmarried person, the effect of conv'ersion of z.ny class of land into any other class of land specified in the Schedule or into a plantation and th'e extent of land liable to be surrendered, lands covered by a private trust or a private institution a.nd exemption of lafl:d covered by section 81(6). The section is therefore a \"provision\" by any standard a9 it states th'e law relating to the imposition of ceiling on land.\n\nIt may well be stated that sub-9ection ( 4) of section 82 is also a provision B of the law by itself, for it lays down a distinct rule relating to conversion of bnd for observance by all concerned. [857D-F, H, 858A]\n\nThe view taken by the High Court in Ramunni Nair v. State of Kera!a,\n\n(1976) KLT 632, in regard to the meaning to be attached to the words \"the commencement of this Act\" is substantially correct and do'es not call for interference. [859B]\n\nThere is ~10 force in the other argument that a landholder is, in any event, entitled to~ the benefit of the exemption under section 81 as an1ended by the Act of 1969 in respect of the \"extent of plantation within the ceiling airea\" even though it were , converted into a plantation during th'e period April 1, 1964 to December 31, 1969.\n\nThe argument is untenable because 'while sub-section ( 1) of section 81 provides that th'e provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to lands and plantatio119 mentioned in it, that is overridden by, and is subject to the requiren1ent of, sub-section ( 4) of section 82. [859D-F]\n\nReference made to Saidu Muhammed v. Bhanukuitan (1967) KLT 947 State of Kera/a & Ors. v. Philomina etc,, [1977] I SCR 213, and State of Kerala & Ors. v. K. A. Gangadharan, [1977] 1 SCR 960.\n\nPoint No. 2.\n\nThe question for consideration is whether the certificate of puixhase issued by the Land Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of th'e Act for the purpose of taking a decision in regard to the ceiling &ea under sub-section (5) of section 85.\n\nSub--section (1) of that section shows that the question for examination by the Board is not that relating to the 'existence of the tenancy rights of the person who files the statement under sub-section (2), but that xelating to the bona (ides of his belief that the land sought to be excluded by him is liable to be purchased by a cultivation tenant.\n\nThe Land Tribunal and the Taluk Land Board thus operate in their respective fi'elds for the purpose of the Act. [86() B, E-G].\n\nSub-section (2) of section 72K merely declares that the certificate of purchase shall be conclusive proof of the \"assignment\" of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediary (if any) to the tenant in respect of the holding concerned.\n\nThere is nothing in the sub-section to require that the finding recorded by the Tribunal in those proceedings would be conclusive proof of any other matter so as to bind the Taluk Land Board or any authority.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 72K therefore does not impinge on the authority of the Taluk Land Board to discharge its own functions under section 85 (5). [8600-H, 861A-B]\n\nAs such the Board is quite free to cause the particulars mentioned in the statement to. be verified, and to ascertain whether the person filing it owns or holds any other land, and to determine the \"extent\" as Well as the \"identity\"\n\nof the excess land which he is required to surrender. In that sphere of work,\n\n15-330SCI/79\n\n• •\n\nA the certificate of purchas'e is not required by law to be conclusive proof in regard to the surplus or any other land held by its holder so as to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (5) of section 85.\n\n[861B-DJ\n\nMoreover, &!though the certificare of purcha~ is conclusive proof in respect of the matters stated in section 72K(2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so called conclusiv'e evidence is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown (Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth edition, vol. 17, page 22 para.graph 28). \"Inaccuracy on the fac'e\" of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an \"error apparent on the face of the record\".\n\nIt will therefore not be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it boo not been is.sued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidenc'e on record, or that the Tribunal's finding suffers from any procedural error.\n\nWhat sub-section (2) of section 72K provides is an irrebutable presumption of Jaw, and it may well be regardeG as a ruh.~ of subst&'!'ltive law.\n\nBut even so, it thereby does not take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under section 85(5) after taking into consideratio•.1 the \"conclusive\" evidentiary value of the certificate as far as it goes.\n\n[861E-H, 862A] The view taken in Kunianujan Thampuran & Ors. v. Taluk Land Board,\n\n(1976) KLT 716 is thus not quite correct.\n\n[862B]\n\nPoint No. 3.\n\nSome of the persons who owned or held lands exceeding the ceiling: pres~ cribed by the Act, had voluntarily transferred some of their lai.1ds after the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the State Gazette rn September 15, 1963.\n\nSection 84 of the Act therefore provides that, except E for the transfers mentioned in the section, the transfers so rnad'e sha.U be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act, and shall be invalid.\n\nThe s'ection has thus been linked with section 82 which specifics the ceiling area, and has been so amended as to reduce that area\n\nconsiderably.\n\nThe question is whether the validity of a voluntary transfer ,.\n\nis to be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force on the date of the transfer, or the reduced ceiling area prescribed by the An1endi11g Act Y of 1969. As has been observed by this Court in State of Kerala & Ors. v. K. A. Gangadharan, [1977] 1 SCR 960, section 84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of sections 83 and 85 effective.\n\nSection 15 of the Amending Act of 1972 (which ins'erted sub-section (3) in s-ection 84) .,, does not state that it has been made with retrospective effect, and sub-section\n\n(3) does not, in terms, state that it shall be deemed to hav'e come into force from the da.te of the amendment which was made by the Amending Act of 1969.\n\nEven so, it is necessary to examine th'e true effect of the ins-ertion and to decide whether it is retroactive.\n\n[8620-H, 863A, D, G, H, 864A-BJ\n\nThe primary rule of construction is that courts should be guided by the plain and clear language of the statute, for the legislature i& IDtended to mean what it has expressed.\n\nIt is an equally important rule of interpretation that a sta-tute is not to be read retrospectively except for necessity.\n\n[864BJ\n\nSo construed, it is obvious that although the Act had not even come into force on September 15, 1963, it invalidafed the transfers m&:ie after that date\n\nin excess of the ceiling area it pre&eribed.\n\nIt follows therefore that so long a<; September 15, 1963 continues to remain the date with reference to which\n\nc. v. AMMAD v. TALUX LAND BOARD (Shingha/, l.) . 843\n\nthe transfers are to be invalidated, the Variation in the extent of the ceiling has necessarily to work back to that date.\n\nThe fegislature therefore inserted sub-section (3) of section 84 to clarify that the expression \"ceiling. area\" in the earlier sub-sections would mean the ceiling area specified in section. 82(1f as amended by \"the Amending Act of 1969, i.e. the reduced ceiling.\n\n[864D-F] In taking this vieW the Coiirt made a reference to the notes on clauses to the Amending Bill of 1972 and observed that while it was true that the intention of the legislature. cannot be ascertained from any statement by way of a note on the clauS'es of the Bill or, breviate, and the duty of the Court is t.o find the natural meaning of the words in a statute in the context in which they are used, it has always been considered permissible and even desirabl'e to take note of the history of the st&tute and the circumstances in which it was passed or the mischief at which it was directed. 'The reason is that the meaning which is 1'o be given to a statute s.fiould be such as \\\\ill carry out its object.\n\nSo viewed, it appears that, as has plainly been Btat'ed in it, th'! \"ceiling area\" refCrred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 84 is the reduced ceiling area specified by the Amending Act of 1969. It is clearly retrostive, as if is meant to invalidate the transfers made after September 15, 1963 when th'e Bill of 1963 was published.\n\n[864F,\n\n865G-H,\n\n866A-B, CJ\n\nThe Court theri examined some of the appeals separately and recorded it.9 finding thereen. [866F-868 & 869, 879-877];\n\nWhlle examining civil appeal No. 1015 of 1976, the .Court Cxamincd the question whether a child in the womb on January 1, 1970 was a member of the family for the purpose of section 82(1)(c) of the Act.\n\nIt referred to the definition of the expression \"'family\" in clause (14) of sec. 2 and of the expression \"minor\" as defined in clause (36A) anq'. held that two postulates were necessary for obtaining the benefit of the increase of one standard acre for each member of the family in excesS of five, namely, that tho member should be in existence, and it should be possible to ascertain that be had not attained the age of/ 18 years on the appointed date. It was held that as bathe these conditions could not be said to exist in the case of a child en ventre sa tnere, it would not be regarded as a memb!r of the family for purposes of sec. 82 of the Act. (8680-F]. ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL NO.\n\n1015 OF 1976 . (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 31-5-1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1615/75).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1023 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and , Order dated 3-1-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2879/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2811 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-10-1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1086/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 574-575 OF 1978 (Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Orders dated 30-3-1976 and 11-10-76 of the Kera!a High Court in CRP No_ 1640 and Review Petition No. 73176 respectively).\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 25·11·1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1880/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 143 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 28.9.1976 of the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. No. 599/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1309 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 25·2·1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4194/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1863 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 26-5-77 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1815/76A).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2070 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 18.8.1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 68/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2584 OF 1977\n\ndated\n\ndated\n\n,--\n\nda 17\n\ndated ,\n\ndated\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2-9-1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 332/76-E).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2585 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12-10-1976 of the. Kerala High Court in CRP No. 829/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2586 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 11.10.1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 726 of 1976).~\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2587 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3209/76).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623 OF 1977 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment a11d Order dated 10-12-1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2626/75).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 290 OF 1978 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-1-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1977 of 76-A).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 362 OF 1978 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 29-7-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1553/77-D).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 882 OF 1978\n\n~ ('Appeal by Special Leave from tbe Judgment and Order dated 29-11-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4574/78-G).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 1978 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 15-3-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3028/76-E).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 869 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12-10-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP Nos. 635 and 859 of 1976).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 870 OF 1979 Y (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order \\25-7-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2333/77).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 871 OF 1979\n\ndated\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27-9-1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 128/76-B).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 872 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 15-10-1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 465176).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 873-874 OF 1979 (Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4-3-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP Nos. 1682 and 1706/760).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 875 OF 1979 (Appeal by Specal Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2-2-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 383/7.8-A).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 876-877 OF 1979 (Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated ,17-3-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP Nos. 4977 and 4978 of\n\n~6-A). .\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 878 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 20-3-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4980 of\n\nB).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 879 OF 1978\n\ndated 1976-\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated • 20-3-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 21/77-B).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 881 OF 1979 H (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26-7-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2098/78).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated ·\n\n- ' 2-8-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2203/77-G).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 884 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated B 1-9-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1978 of 78-F).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 885 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17-7-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 146/77-C).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 886 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 16-8-79 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2351/78A).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 889 OF 1979\n\ndated '\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n,--\n\n23.11.1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 28 of 77-C).. •\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 890 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-11-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 5358/76-E).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 894 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-12-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3980/77E).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 895 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2-12-1977 of the Ke.rala High Court in CRP No. 2542/77B).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 896 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 31-3-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3264/76-F).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 897 OF 1979 , {Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order d~ 27-5-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1978/76-A).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 898 OF 1979 G (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12-8-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2898/77-C).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 899 OF 1979\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-8-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4686/76-A). • H\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 900 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8-9-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3941/76).\n\n/ ~-\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 901 OF 1979 A (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28-2-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1665 of 1976).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 902 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2-3-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 633/78-E).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 903 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26-7-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4762/76-F).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1019 OF 1979 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated C 18-10-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1117/78-H).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1015/76 For the Appellants: T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar and A. S.\n\nNambiar For the Respondents : P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1723/77 For the Appellant : K. S.\n\nRamamurthi, T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar, S. Balakrishnan, C. S. A. Iyer, M. K. D. Namboodari and C. K.\n\nBharthan, 1 For the Respondents : M. M. Abdul Khader, Advocate General, Kerala and K. M K. Nair.\n\nFor the Intervener: K. K. Venugopal, Addi. Sol. Genl, and K. J. John.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2811 OF.1977 For the Appellant : K. N. Bhat and V. K. Verma, For the Respondents : Dr. V. A.\n\nSeiyed Mohammad K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 574-575/78\n\nand\n\nFor the Appellants : G. B. Pai, K. J. John and J. B.\n\nDadachanji.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. T. Harindra Nath and V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 40/77 For the Appellant : M. C. Bhandare, K. J. John, and J. B. Dadachanji.\n\nFor the Respondents: P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 143/77 H For the Appellants : T. C. Raghavan and P. K. Pillai.\n\nFor Respondents 1-2 : K. M. K. Nair.\n\n. ·~ F\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1309/77 For the Appellant : T. C. Raghavan, and N. Sudhakaran, For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.\n\nFor the Intervener : Mathai M. Paikeday and N. Sudhakaran.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1863/77 For the Appellant : T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar, For the Respondents : K. R. Nambiar and V. J. Francis,\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2070/77 Far the Appellant : T. C. Raghavan, N. Sudhakaran and P. K.\n\nPillai,\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair,\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2584/77 For the Appellants : T. C. Raghavan, N. Sudhakaran and P. K.\n\nPillai,\n\nFor Respondents l-3 : P. A. Francis and K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2585/77 For the Appellant: M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. S. Bhandare, P. Santhalingam, A. N. Karhanis and Miss M. Poduval.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair,\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2586/77 For the Appellant : P. K. Pillai.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2587 /77 For the Appellant : K. T. Harindra Nath and N. Sudhakarim.\n\nFor the Repondents : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623/77 For the Appellant : T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar .\n\nFor the Respondents: G. Govindan Nair and K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 290/78 For the Appellants : Anant Krishnan, S. Balakrishnan and M. K.\n\nD. Namboodri.\n\nFor the Respondents l-3 : P. Govindan Nair and K.M.K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 362/78 For the Appellants: K. T. Harindernath and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 882/78 H For the Appellants : T. C. Raghavan, S. Balakrishnan, C. K.\n\nBharathan, CSA Iyer and M. K. D. Namboodri.\n\nFor the Respondents : P. Govindan Nair and K. R. Nambiar:\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 /78 For the Appellants : Dr. V. A. Syed Mohd and K. R. Nambiar.\n\nFor 'Ifie Respondent- : F. S. Nariman, K. Joseph and K. J. John.\n\nFor the Intervener (Rubber Board) : K. K. Venugopal, Addi. Sol.\n\nGenl. and K. J. John.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 869/79 For the Appellants: N. Sudhakaran.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 870/79 For the Appellant : N. Sudhakaran.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 871/79 For the Appellant : A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondent : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 872/79 For the Appellant : P. K. Pillai.\n\nFor the Responderlt, s : K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 873-1!74/79 For the Appellant : N. Sudhakaran.\n\nFor the Respondents 1-3 : V. J. Francis.\n\nFor the Respondents 4-5 : A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondent No. 6 : S. B. Saharya.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 875/79 For the Appellants : A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondents : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 876/79 For the Appellants : T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondents 1-3 : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 877 /79 For. the Appellant: A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondents 1-3 : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 878/79 For the Appellants : A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondents 1-3 : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 879/78 For the Appellants : A. S. Nambiar .\n\nFor the Respondents 1-2 : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 881/79 F11r the Appellant : Saroja Goplakrishnan.\n\nFor the Respondents 1-3 : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL l'{O. 883/79 For the Appellants : S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodri.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 885/79 For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.\n\nB For the Respondents 1-3 : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 884/79 For the Appellant : P. K. Pillai, Sr.\n\nfor the Respondents: Mr. K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 886/79 For the Appellant : A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondents : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 889/79 For the Appellants : S. Balakrisbnan and M. K. D. Namboodri.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 890/79\n\nFor the Appellants : A. S. Nambiar,\n\nFor the Respondents: V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 894/79 For the Appellant : N. Sudhakaran.\n\nFor the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 895/79 For the Appellants : M. C. Bhandare, S. Bhandare, Miss M. Poduval and J. Santhalingam.\n\nFor the Respondents l-3 : K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 896/79 For the Appellant : N. Sudbakaran.\n\nFor the Respondents: V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 897 /79 For the Appellants: P. K. Pillai.\n\nFor the Respondents : V. J. Francis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 898/79 For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.\n\nFor the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 899/79 For the Appellants: S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodri.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. R.. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 900179 For the Appellant : S. Balakrishnan anu M. K. D. Namboo<lri.\n\nFor the Respondents : 1-3 : K. R. Nambiar.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 901/79 For the Appellant : P. K. Pillai.\n\nFor the Respondents : K. M. K. Nair.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 902/79\n\nFor the Appellant : S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodri.\n\nFor the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar. :B\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 903/79 For the Appellant : S. B. Saharya.\n\nFor the Respondents : V. J. Fmacis.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1019/79 For the Appellant : T. T. Kunhikannan.\n\nFor the Respondents: V. J. Francis.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J. The learned counsel for the appellants have categorically stated at the Bar that no question relating to the validity of the Kerala L'and Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), hereafter referred to as the Act, or any of its provisions, arises in these appeals by special leave.\n\nWe have heard them together virtually as companion appeals at the instance of learned counsel for they arise out of several judgments of the High Cburt of Kerala in matters relating to the implementation of the provisions for the restriction on ownership and possession of land in excess of the ceiling area and the disposal of excess land.\n\nThese are the subject matter of Chapter III of the Act, as amended from time to time. It is not necessary to refer to the dates of all judgments of the High Court of Kerala, or to all the points of controversy there, as learned counsel have been able to channelise their arguments into three main points of controversy, which have been argued at length. It is true t'hat all these points do not arise in all the cases before us, and some learned counsel have raised additional arguments in the peculiar facts and circumstances of their cases. lt will therefore be convenient and proper to deal with the three main point's first, and to take up the additional point~ for consideration with reference to the appeals in which they have been raised for our consideration. This, it is agreed, will be a proper and a fair course to adopt for the disposal of these appeals. It is also agreed by learned counsel that the other appeals in which such additional points have not been raised shall stand decided according to our decision on the three main points.\n\nIn order to understand the controversy in its proper perspective, ff it may be mentioned that, as in the other States in the country, the Kerala State legislature felt the necessity of making \"comprehensive\"\n\nland refonns in the State.\n\nThe Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 1961) was accordingly passed, and received the assent of the President on January 21, 1961. Some of its provisions were brought into force with effect from February 15,\n\n1961. This Court struck down that Act: as unconstitutional in its application to the ryotwari lands of Hosdurg and Kasaragod taluka.\n\nThe Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappulmrs Protection Act, 1962, was then passed for the temporary protection of tenants in those taluks.\n\nThe State High Court declared it null and void in its application to the ryotwari lands of the Malabar area and most of the fands of Travancore area.\n\nSo the Kerala Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1963, was passed to provide some protection to tenants.\n\nIt was an interim legislation.\n\nEven so it repealed the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudilddappukars Protection Act, 1962, and suspended the operation cf the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960.\n\nAfter re-examining the requirements in the field of land reforms as a whole, the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, was published in State Gazette on September 15, 1963. It covered a wide field in the matter of land refonns and, inter alia, provided for the imposition of a ceiling on \"holding\" of lands, the surrender of extess lands grant of compensation therefor, and the assignment of the surrendered lands in accordance with the order .of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals and Land Baard etc. The Bill was enacted as the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), and received the assent of the President on December 31, 1963.\n\nIt was amended extensively, and in several material particulars, by Act 35 of 1969, and then by Act 25 of 1971 and Act 17 of 1972. There were other amendments also, but it is agreed that they do not bear .on the controversy before us.\n\nThe three main points of controversy in these appeals have been formulated by learned counsel for the 'appellants as follows :-\n\n1. Whether fands converted into plantations between April I, 1964 and January 1, 1970 qualify for exemption under section 81 (l)(e) of the Act\n\n2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act.\n\n3. Whether the validity or invalidity of transfers effected by persons owning or holding lands exceeding the ceiling limit should be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force on the date of the transfer or in accordance with the ceiling area prescribed by Act 35 of 1969-whethcr subsection ( 3) of section 84 is retrospective in operation.\n\nWe shall examine the three points one by one but before doing so it A will be advantageous to refer briefly to the substantive provisions of the Act which bear on the appeals before us.\n\nIt will be recalled 'that the Act came into existence when the other attempts to make legislative provision for land reforms did not work out satisfactorily for one reuson or the other.\n\nThe Act was therefore enacted by way of \"a comprehensive legislation\" to bring about land reforms in the Kerala State. While Chapter I of the Act contains provisions relating, inter alia, to its commencement and defines some of the important terms and e){pressions, Chapter II contains many provisions for the benefit of tenants and \"deemed tenants\", including restoration of lands and fixity of their tenure, purchase of landlords' rights by cultivating tenants and rent payable by certain categories of tenants etc.\n\nThe provisions of the Chapter do not apply to the leases, tenancies and transferred lands and transactions mentioned in section 3.\n\nWe are however primarily concerned with Chapter III under the general rubric \"Restrictions on ownership and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and disposal of excess lands.\" Section 81 deals with \"exemptions\", including \"plantations\". Section 82 prescribes the\n\n\"ceiling area'', section 83 prohibits the owning or holding or posses•ing under a mortgage lands in excess of the ceiling area. Section 84 declares what voluntary transfers shall be deemed to be invalid. Subsection (3) of the section has attracted much controversy and we shall deal with it in due course. Section 85 makes it obligatory to surrender the excess land, and section 86 vests such excess lands in the State\n\nGovernment free from all encumbrances. Section 87 makes provision for the surrender of excess land obtained by gift, purchase or mortgage, lease, surrender or any other transfer inter vivas or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise if the total extent of land thereby exceeds the ceiling area.\n\nThese are the main provisions which bear on the three points which have been raised for our consideration.\n\nPoint No. 1\n\nThe question is whether lands converted into plantation between April 1, 1964 and January 1, 1970 are exempt from the operation of\n\nthe provisions of Chapier III of the Act in regard to the restriction on G ownership and possession of land in excess of the ceiling area prescribed by it. It will be recalled that while section 82 prescribes the ceiling area of the land, section 81 states what shall be exempted from its operation. Clause ( e) of sub-section (1) of that section thus specifically provides that the provisions of Chapter III sh'all not be applicable to \"plantations\".\n\nThat has been so from the inception of B the Act, and the question therefore is whether those who felt tempted by tlte exemption in favour of plantations and converted their lands\n\nA into plantations after the coinmencement of the Act, would get the benefit of the exemption and, if so, from which date would the conversion be recognised ?\n\nThis has been dealt with in sub-section ( 4) of section 82 of the Act which prescribes the ceiling. It is not in dispute before us that section came into force on April 1, 1964.. The sub-section as origi- B nally enacted in Act I of 1964 therefore came into force on that date.\n\nIt read as follows :-\n\n\" 82 ( 4) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule I1 has been converted into any other c1'ass of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding such land at the time of the conversion shall be determined without taking into account such conversion.\" Sec, tion 82 was however substantially amended by section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969 which, inter alia, reduced the ceiling area of the land and amended the wordings of sub-section ( 4) also.\n\nThat section came into force on January 1, 1970. It is not necessary to refer to it as the legislature amended sub-section ( 4) ot section 82 once again, by section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971, which, by virtue of section 1 of that Act, also =e into force on January 1, 1970 and thereby supplanted, from the very inception, the amendment which had been bronght about by the Amending Act of 1969.\n\nThe amended sub-section, which is the subject matter of the point unde.r consideration, reads as follows,-\n\n\"82 ( 4) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Section II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or into a plantation, the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined without taking into consideration such conversion.'' The controversy therefore is whether the restriction of sub-section ( 4) of section 82 came into force from January 1, 1970 because section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971 was brought into force on that date, or whether it came into force on April 1, 1964, when section 82 as originally enacted by the Act came into force. As it happens, all the three Acts contain provisions about their \"commencement\" and it is these which have to be interpre.ted for the purpose of resolving the dispute.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act provides as follow~,\n\n\"1 (3). The provisions of this Act, except this section which shall come into force at once, shall come into force\n\non such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint : Provided that differen! dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act, and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act, shall be constrned as reference to the coming into force of toot provision.\" It therefore provides that : (i) section 1 of the Act shall come into\n\n~, force atonce, (ii) the other provisions of the Act shall come into force r-on such dates as the Government may appoint, (iii) different dates\n\n\\ may be appointed for different provisions of the Act, and (iv) any reference in any such provision to the \"commencement of this Act\" st.all be construed as a reference to the coming into force of th-at pro- -, vision.\n\nThe Act was published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964, and, by virtue of section 3 of the Kerala Interpretation and General clauses Act, section 1 came into force on that date.\n\nSection 82 as has been stated, came into force on April l, 1964, and the reference in sub-section ( 4) of that section to the \"commencement of this Act\" meant 11 reference to the coming into force of that provision with effecf from April 1, 1964. It may be that the first three rules or directions contained in sub-section (3) (mentioned above) were spent on the coming into force of section 1 of the Act or its other provi. sions on the dates appointed for them, but, for obvious reasons, rule\n\n(iv) continned to hold the field in as much as it laid down the rule of construction that any reference to the \"commencement of this Act\"\n\n• shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that particular provision. It was therefore applicable as a general rule /of construction whenever it became necessary to ascertain the date of . mmencement of a particular provision of the Act other than section 1.\n\nIt will be recalled that sub-section ( 4) of section 82, as originally incorpor<itcd in the Act, came into force on April 1, 1964.\n\nAs has been mentioned, sub-section ( 4) of section 82 was emended by section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969, which came into force on Ja:mary 1, 1970, but that proved to be fortuitous because it was supplanted by section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971 from the same date.\n\nThe sub-section, aj. amended by the Amending Act of 1971, also dealt with the conversion of land into any other class of land \"after the commencement of this Act\", but it added the words \"or into a plantation\" and provided tha£ such conversion shall not be taken into H consideration for determining the extent of land liable to be surrendered. It has been argued that the expression \"the commencement\n\nf G\n\nof this Act\" refers to January I, 1970, on which date section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971 was brought into force, and not to April I, 1964 when it was first brought into force as mentioned above. Reference in this connection has been made to sub-section (2) of section I\n\nof the Amending Act of 1971.\n\nThe argument is however untenable on the plain meaning of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section I of the Act which clearly states that any reference in any provision of the Act to the \"commencement of this Act\" shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force , of that prov!Slon.\n\nSo when the \"provision\" of sub-section ( 4) of ~\"'; f section 82 was brought into force on April I, 1964, its amended verf sion would also come into force from that date.\n\nAnd it will be a matter of no consequence that section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971, which amended the sub-section, came into force on January I,\n\n1970. It will be remembered that section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969 which amended section 82 came into force on January I, 1970, and as the legislature decided to amend it once again by section 12 of the Act of 1971, with retrospective effect from the same date (January I, 1970), it made a specific provision to that effect in section 1 of the Amending Act of 1971 and left the date of commencement of the Act for purposes of sub-section ( 4) of section 82 to be determined according to the proviso to sub-section ( 3) of section 1 of the Act which, as has been stated, was a subsisting provision. It would follow that sub-section ( 4) as amended by the Amending Act of 1971 came into force on April I, 1964.\n\nIt may be that, as has been argued by Mr. Venugopal, the expression \"commencement of this Act\" is a term of \"art\".\n\nWe have interpreted it as it stands, without detracting from the value attributed to it by Mr. Venugopal.\n\nMr. Warriyar has however argued that particular significanc:,...( attaches to the use of the expression \"provisions\" or \"provisionH in section 1 (3) of the Act and that the High Court erred in presuming that \"at all relevant times a 'provision' which resulted in certain consequences was in force from April 1, 1964 onwards.\" He has invited our attention to Saidu Muhammed v. Bhanukuitan(') for the contention that the true meaning of \"provision\" is a section or series of sections forming a self-contained integral whole, that section 82 to 85 should be construed as a \"composite provision\" dealing with the ceiling area, and that the assumption that section 82 ( 4) alone was brought into force as a distinct provision, when section 83 had not been brought into force, is not legally sustii.inable.\n\nThe Century Dictionary (which is an encyclopaedic lexicon of the English language) defines \"provision\" as follows,-\n\n(I) 1967 K. L. T. 947.\n\n-r.\n\n'In law, a stipulation; a rule provided; a distinct clause in an instrument or statute; a rule or principle to be referred for guidance; as, the provisions of law; the provisions of the Constitution.\"\n\nIn \"Words and Phrases\" (Permanent Edition) the definition i~ as follows:-\n\n\"As applied to legislation, the word \"provi'sion\" hM\n\nthis well-understood meaning : \"Actual expression in language\"-the clothing of legislative ideas in words which can \")_ be pointed out on the page and read with the eye.\"\n\nA provision is therefore a distinct rule or principle of law in a statute which governs the situation covered by it.\n\nSo an incomplete idea, even though stated in the form of a section of a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its inromp!eteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned.\n\nA p; ovision of law cannot •herefore be said to. exist if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing.\n\nExamined in this perspective, section 82 of the Act (as amended by section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971) is, to say the least, a distinct rule or clause for it provides the extent of the ceiling area in the cases mentioned in it (sub-section ( 1) ) , its effect on the lands owned or held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of the family (sub-section (2) ), the taking into account of the shares of the members of the family or an adult unmarried person (sub-section (3) ), the effect of conversion of any class of land specified in Schedule II into any other class of land specified in the schedule or into a plantation and the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land (sub-sec ; \\. ti on ( 4) ) , lands owned by a private trust or a private institution\n\n~.(sub-section (5) ) and exemption of lands covered by section 81 (subsection ( 6) ) .\n\nThe section is therefore a \"provision\" by any standard, and it is futile to argue that this is not so merely because the provisions relating to the prohibition on the owning or holding or possessing under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area and the surrender of excess land a!ld its vesting in the State Government have been dealt with in the other sections (83, 85 and 86). Sections 83, 85 and 86 contain certain other provisions relating to the law of ceiling on land, but that cannot detract from the basic fact that section 82 contains a provision-in fact an important provision-of the law relating to the imposition of ceiling on land deai1 with in Chapler III. It may well be said that sub-section ( 4) of section 82 is ako a provision of the law by itself, for it lays down a dis-\n\n16-33 OSCI/79\n\nA tinct rule relating to conversion of lands for observance by all concerned.\n\nWe have gone through Saidu Muhammed v. Bhanukuitan,(') but that was quite a different case where the section which authorised the launching of the prosei; ution of a defaulter was brought into force, but not the other provision which prescribed the period of limitation for the prosecution, and the High Court, was persuaded to take the view that it was the legislative intent that the prosecution should be governed by the limitation prescribed by the other section.\n\nIn the case be- fore us, however, the application of section 82 is not dependent on any other section, so as to make it an incomplete provision by itself.\n\nIt deals with \"ceiling area\" and is a provision by itself, so that it could be brought into force from a date different from section 83 which prohibited the holding of land in excess of the ceiling area. It may be pointed out, that the \"ceiling\" prescribed by section 82 was material not only for the purpose of Chap!er III of the Act, but had a direct co-relation to some of the provisions of Chapter II e.g. sections 16 and 53.\n\nIt has next been argued by Mr. Warriyar that in view of the decisions of this Court in State of Kerala and others v. Philomina etc.(') and State of Kerala aVuI others v. K. A. Gangadharan,(~) the High Court erred in taking the view that section 82 ( 4) came into force on April 1, 1964 because it has been held in both those cases that determination of the surplus land was to be on the basis of the situation existing on January 1, 1970, and that if any land had been converted into a plantation before that date, it had necessarily to be exempted from the operation of the ceiling law by virtue of section 81.\n\nBut they were different cases. Thus State of Kera/a v. Philomina (supra) related to the transfer of \"Kaya!\" lands between September 15, 1963 and January 1, 1970. As Chapter III of the Act was not applicable to ' 1 those lands because of the exemption under section 81, and as that,,.......,._\n\nexemption continued until !anuary 1, 1970 when section 65 of the Amending Act of 1969 came into force, it was held by this Court that as the exemption was not withdrawn until January 1, 1970, the transfers made between September 15, 1963 and January 1, 1970 were valid under the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe decision in that case thus turned on the meaning of section 83 and 85.\n\nThat view was noticed by this Court in State of Kerala and others v. K. A. Gangadharan\n\n(<upra) and it was held that the dominant legislative intent was the imposition of the ceiling on lands and the consequential obligation to\n\n(I) 1967 K. L. T. 947.\n\n(2) [1977] l S.C.R. 273.\n\n(3) [1977] l S.C.R. 960.\n\n• surrender lands owned or held in excess of the ceiling area on the A notified date, nam!:ly, January 1, 1970. The gifts of excess land made on March 28, 191'4 were therefore ignored. That was also, therefore,\n\na different case and cannot avail the appellants.\n\nThe view taken by the High Court in Ramunni Nair v. State of Kera/a(') in regard to the meaning to be attached to the words \"the B commencement of this Act\" is thus substantially correct and does not call for interference by us.\n\nIt may be mentioned that learned Advocate General has poin\\ed out that in the Act as it stands amended at present, the expression \"commencement of this Act\" refers to the commencement of the Act, and while referring to the commencement of the Amending. Act of 1969, the words used are \"commencement C of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969\" and that the Amending Act of 1971 has also been referred to as such.\n\nIt is therefore futile to contend that the rule of interpretation mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 1 that any reference in a provision of the Act to the \"commencement of this Act\" shall be con- . D strued as a reference to the coming into force of that provision, shall not be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision as originally enacted.\n\nMr. Balakrishnan tried to raise the argument that a landholder is, in any event, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under section 81 as amended by the Act of 1969 in respect of the \"extent of plantation within the ceiling area\" even if it were converted iQto a plantation during the period April I, 1964 to December 31, 1969. The argument is untenable because while sub-section (I) of section 81 provides that\n\n~ the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to the lands and planta- / tions mentioned in it, that is overridden by, and is subject to,. the re- ~- quirement of sub-section ( 4) of section 82.\n\nPoint No. I is decided against the appellants.\n\nPoint No. 2\n\nThe question is whether a certificate of purchase issued by the\n\nLand Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk G Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act.\n\nThe provisions relating to the purchase of the landlord's rights by cultivating tenants appear under that heading, and are contained in sections 53 to 74 of the Act.\n\nThe Tribunal is competent to pass orders on the application for purchase, including the determination of the H compensation and the purchase price under section 72F. Section 72K\n\n(!) 1976 K. L. T. 632.\n\nA provides for the issue _of the certificate of purchase sub-section (2) of that section reads as follows,- • \"(2) The certificate of purchase issued under sub-section ( 1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the lands owner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates.\"\n\nThe real question for consideration therefore is whether the certificate is bindnig on the Taluk Land Board for the purpose of taking a decision in regard to the ceiling area under sub-section ( 5) of 'section c 85.\n\nIJ'\n\nIt may be mentioned in this connection that while the Land Tribunal deals with most of the matters relating to tenants and is constituted under section 99, the Taluk Land Board is constituted under section\n\nlOOA and deals with siatements filed under sub-section (2) of section 85 by persons owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area.\n\nSub-section (5) of section 85 provides further that the Taluk Land Board shall-\n\n( a) cause the particulars mentioned in the statement to be verified,\n\n(b) ascertain whether the person to whom the statement\n\nn; la\\es owns or holds !!_DY other lands, and\n\n( c) by order de1ermine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.\n\nA reading of sub-section (1) of section 85 shows that the question for examination is not that relating to the existence of the tenan~~ rights of the person who files the i; tatement, but that relating to the bona fides of his belief that the land sought to be excluded by him is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant. The Land Tribunal\n\nand the Taluk Land Board thus operate in their respective. fields and serve the purpose of the Act.\n\nNow the certificate of purchase which the Land Tribunal issues (in the prescribed form) evidences the \"assignment\" of the assigned land to the purchaser. Sub-section (2) of section 72K of the Act mentioned above merely declares that the certificate shall be onclusive proof of that 'assignment' of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries (if aJ1Y) to the tenant in respect of the holding concerned (or portion thereof).\n\nThere is nothing in 'he sub-section which could be said to declare that the finding recorded\n\nby the Tribunal in those proceedings would be conclusive proof ; if any other matter which it may determine so as to bind the Taluk and Board or any other authority.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 72K therefore does not, in terms or in substance, impinge on the authority 0f the Taluk Land Board to discharge its own functions under section 85(5) of the Act.\n\nThe Board is thus quite free to cause the particulars mentioned in the statement filed under sub-section (2) of section 85 to be verified and to ascertain whether the person filing the statement owns or holds any other land, and to determine the \"extent\" as well as the \"identity\" of the excess land which he is required to surrender. If a certificate of purchase is issue\\! by the Land Tribunal to any such person and he tenders it in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board, the Board is required by law to treat it as conclusive proof of the fact that the right, title and interest of the land owner (and intermediary) over the land mentioned in it has been assigned to him. It is however not the requirement of the law that the certificate of purchase shall be conclusive proof of the surplus or other land held by its holder so as to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (5) of setcion 85.\n\nMr. Warriyar is not justified in arguing that the Taluk Land Board\n\nhas power only to determine the \"identity\" of the surplus land, leaving every other matter to the Land Tribunal. The argument loses sight of E requirement of sub-section (5) of section 85 that the Board shall, inter alia, by order, determine not only the \"identity\" of the land to be surrendered but also its \"extent\".\n\nIt would thus appear that eveu though the certificate of purchase ,, issued under sub-section ( 1) of section 72K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section • (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to ' displace it, unless the so-called conclusive effective is inaccurate on its\n\nface, or fraud can be shown (Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth edition, vol. 17, page 22 paragraph 28). It may be stated that \"inaccuracy on the face\" of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an \"error apparent on the face of the record\".\n\nIt will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence. on record, or that the Tribunal's finding suffers from any procedural error.\n\nWhat sub-section (2) of section 72K provides is an irrebutahle presumption of law, and it may well be regarded as a rule\n\nA of substantive law.\n\nBut even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make 'an order under section 85(5) after taking into consideration the\n\n\"conclusive\" evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to section 72K (2) as far as it goes.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the view taken in Kun/anujan Thampuran and others v. Taluk Land Board(') is not quite correct.\n\nWhile the High Court was justified in taking the view that the cope of the enquiry in the Taluk Land Board is that relating !o the surplus land with which the Land Tribunal is not concerned, the certificate of purchase has its own \"conclusive\" evendcntiary vlaue to the extent provided in section 72K (2) in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board. It will therefore be for the Board to arrive at its own decision\n\nunder sub-section (5) of section 85, according to the law, and it will be permissible for it to examine, where necessary, whether the certificate is inaccurate on its face, or has been obtained by fraud or collusion.\n\nPoint No. 2 is decided accordingly.\n\nMr. Bhandare tried to raise an ancillary argument in C.A. No. 2585 of 1977 that if on the date on which the Taluk Land Board undertakes an enquiry for the determination of surplus land, a proceeding is pending before the Land Tribunal for the grant of a certificate cf purchase, the Board will have no jurisdiction to examine a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We find, however, that no such question was raised for the consideration of the High Court, where the controversy was confined to the genuineness of the lease, and we are therefore not requird to examine the abstract point of law\n\nset out by Mr. Bhandare.\n\nIt will be sufficient for us to say that the ancillary argument can easily be answered in the light of our decision ' l on point No. 2 if and when it arises for consideration in a given case,,..,...._ for the function of the Board is to determine the extent and the ic:cntity\n\nof the Land to be surrendered and not matters relating to the issue of a certificate of purchase. If a certificate of purchase has a bearing on what the Board is called upon to decide, we have no doubt that the Board will take it into consideration, if it is produced for its consideration, with due regard to the evidentiary value assigned to it under section 72K (2) in the light of our decision on point No. 2.\n\nPoint No. 3\n\nSome of the persons who owned or held lands exceeding the ceiling prescribed by the Act, had voluntarily transferred some of their lands after the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the\n\n,,,\n\n(1) 1976 K, L. T. 716.\n\nState Gazette on September 15, 1963. Section 84 of the Act therefore provides that, except for the transfers mentioned in the section, the transfers so made shall be deemed to 'be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act, and shall be invalid. 'Th~ section has thus . been linked with section 82 which specifies the ceiling area.\n\nAs bas been stated, the ceiling area was considerably reduced by the amendment which was made in section 82 by the Amending Act of 1969.\n\nThat Act amended section 84 also, with effect from January I, 1970. It was again amended by Act 17 of 1972 (hereafter referred to as the . Amending Act of 1972) with effect from November 2, 1972, when -<. that Act came into force.\n\nIt, inter alia, inserted sub-section (3) in \\ section 84 as follows,-\n\n\" (3) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the expression \"ceiling area\" in sub-sections (1) and\n\n(2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (I) of section 82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, (35 of 1969) .\"\n\nThe question therefore is whether the validity of the voluntary transfer is to be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force on the date of transfer, or the reduced ceiling area prescribed by the Amending Act of 1969.\n\nAs has been stated, sub-section (3) of section 84 was inserted on November 2, 1972, and the point for determination is whether it was retrospective or retroactive in operation so as to govern the transfers effected after September 15, 1963 (date of publication of the Bill of 1963) even though the original section 84, read w; th the original section 82, invalidated only those transfers which were in excess of the higher ceiling prescribed by the original section 82. . Section 84 follows section 82 which, it will be recalled, prescribes !he ceiling area, and section 83, which prohibits the owning or holding or possession (under a mortgage) land in excess of the ceiling area.\n\nAs has been observed by this Court in Gangadharan' s case, section 84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of section 83 and 85 effective. It makes references to \"ceiling area\" in sub-sections\n\n(1) and (2), and sub-section (3) states what exactly is meant thereby.\n\nThe sub-section clarifies that the expression \"ceiling area\" in subsections (1) and (2) of section 84 means the area specified in substction ( 1) of section 82 \"as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act,, 1969 (35 of 1969)\".\n\nAs has been mentioned, that amendment was made by section 66 which came into force on January 1, \\970. It is true that section 15 of the Amending Act of 1972 (which inserted sub-section (3) in section 84 of the Act) does\n\nSUPREME_COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nnot state that it has been made with retrospective effect, and subsec> ion (3) does not, in terms, state that it shall be deemed to have come into force from the date o~ the amendment which was made by the Amending Act of, 1969. Even so, it is necessary to examine the true effect of the insertion of the sub-section and to decide whether it is retroactive.\n\nIn doing so, we shall be guided by the plain and clear language of the sub-section, that is the primary rule of construction, for the legislature is intended to mean what it has expressed. We shall also bear in mind the other equally important rule of interpretation that a statute is not to be read retrospectively except for necessity.\n\nSection 84 has been enacted for the purpose of making certain voluntary transfers invalid on the ground that they are deemed to be calculated to defeat the provision of the law relating to imposition of ceiling on land. It is therefore co-related to section 82 (which fixed the ceiling), and if the Legislature decided that the ceiling should be reduced, it is natural that the deeming provision of section 84 should attach to transfers in excess of the reduced ceiling because the crucial date of invalidation has been stated in section 84, right from the inception of the Act, to be September 15, 1963, irrespective of the Jaw relating to the ceiling. It will be remembered that the Act had not even come into force on September 15, 1963, but it, all the same, invalidated the transfers made after that date in excess of the ceiling it prescribed. So, as long as September 15, 1963 continues to remain the ciate with reference to which the transfers are to be invalidated, the variation in the extent of the ceiling has necessarily to work back to that date. The legislature therefore inserted sub-section (3) in section\n\n84 to clarify that the expression \"ceiling area\" in the earlier subsections would mean the ceiling area specified in section 82(1) as ,,....( amended by the Amending Act of 1969, i.e. the reduced ceiling. In taking this view we have only taken into consideration the plain and •\n\nclear wordings of the sub-section, and if in doing so it so happens that sub-section (3) becomes retroactive in operation, we must hold that it is so. Any other view of the meaning and effect of sub-section (3) will :1.mount to disregarding what the legislature has expressed and reading more in the law than what it provides.\n\nIt has to be appreciated that, from the inception, the Act forwned on voluntary transfers effected after September 15, 1963, for the obl'ious reason that the Bill was published on that date in the State II Gazette and, those concerned know that they would be required to surrender the excess lands. It is not surprising that volunlfry transfers of land should have been made to get over that eventuality.\n\nSection 84 therefore provided from the very beginning that such transfers shall be deemed to be calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and shall be invalid. When the ceiling fixed by the original section 82 was considerably reduced by the Amending Act of 1969, and when the reduced ceiling was to govern the liability to surrender the excess land, it was only natural that provision should have been made to invalidate voluntary transfers effected after September 15, 1963 with reference to that reduced ceiling. It has to be appreciated that even those who did not want to defeat the provisions of the Act by voluntary transfers after September 15, 1963 and retained the lands themselves, were affected by the amendment which was made by fr.c Amending Act of 1969 and were not entitled to claim that this should not be so merely because the Amending Act came into force later. A doubt was however raised about the matter in V. N.\n\nNarayanan Nair and others v. State of Kera/a and others('). It was therefore considered necessary to introduce the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1972, clause 15 of which, inter alia, provided for the insertion of the following as sub-section (3) of section 84 of the Act,-\n\n\"(3) For the removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that the expression \"ceiling area\" in sub-sections (1) and (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section ( 1) of section\n\n82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) E Act, 1969 (35 of 1969).\"\n\nNotes on clauses were appended to the Bill. In paragraph 10 thereof it wa~ stated as follows :-\n\n\"There have been some doubts as to the scope of tho expression \"ceiling area\" as used in the section. It is proposed to provide that the ceiling area referred to in the section is the ceiling area under the principal Act as amended by the\n\nKerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of\n\n1969) .\"\n\nThe legislature inserted the sub-section without any change.\n\nIt is true that the intention of the legislature cannot be ascertained from any statement by way of a note on the clauses of a Bill or breviate and, as has been stated, the duty of the court is to find the natural meaning of the words in a statute, in the context in which they are used\" but it has always been considered permissible, and even desirable, for a court, while interpreting a statute, to take note of the history of the, statute and the circumstances in which it was passed or\n\n(l) 1970 K. L. T. 659.\n\nthe mischief at which it was directed. The reason is that the meaning which is to be given to a statute should be such as will carry out its object. If sub-section (3) of section 84 is examined with due regard to all these factors, it will appear that, as has plainly been stated in it, foe \"ceiling area\" referred to in sub-sections ( 1) and (2) of that section for examining the question of the validity of the transfers made after September 15, 1963 is the reduced \"ceiling area\" specified by the Amending Act of 1969.\n\nIn fact as has been stated in the C.raies on \"Statute Law,\" seventh edition, at page 395, to explain a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time. when the earlier Act was passed. In such c a case, as the Act is \"declaratory\", the presumption against construing it retrospectively so as to respect vested rights, is not applicable. As sub-section (3) of section 84 in terms clarifies the meaning of the expression \"ceiling area\" with reference to which certain voluntary transfers are to be invalidated, it is clearly retrospective as it is meant to invalidate the transfers made after September 15, 1963 when the D Bill of 1963 was published.\n\nWe are therefore satisfied that the view taken in Narayana Patar\n\nv. State of Kera/a(') and others in this respect is quite correct and point No. 3 is decided accordingly.\n\nIn the result, the appeals in which only points Nos. 1 and 3 have E been raised for our consideration fail and are dismissed.\n\nWe shall now examine those appeals in which point No. 2 and/or additional points have been raised for our consideration.\n\nC.A. No. 869 of 1979 Issac Joseph and another vs.\n\nState of Kerala and others As we have taken a different view on point No. 2, and as the purchase certificate came up for consideration in the High Court, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the High Court shall re-examine F the matter in the light of our decision on that point.\n\nC.A. No. 876 of 1979 P. Kunhukutta Tharakan and others vs.\n\nState of Kerala and others Mr. Warriyar has argued that the High Court has committed an error of law in taking the view that the certificate of purchase was not\n\n(I) 1977 K. L. T. 64.\n\nconclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title or interest of the A landowner and the intermediaries over the holding. In view of our decision on point No. 2, it is necessary that the High Court should re-examine the controversy. The appeal is therefore allowed, and it is ordered accordingly.\n\nC. A. No. 877 of 1979 B\n\nK. Parukutty Ammal\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\n. ( In the view we have taken on point No. 2 about the evidentiary c\n\n, ) value of the certificate of purchase, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal according to law in that respect,\n\nC.A. No. 878 of 1979\n\nK. Devaki Amma and others\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\nThe view taken by the High Court in regard to the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate is not correct for reasons mentioned !Jy us while dealing with point No. 2. The appeal is therefore allowed to this extent and the High Court shall re-examine its decision in this respect.\n\nC.A. No. 879 of 1979\n\nC. S. Raman Mannadiar\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\nWhile examining revision petition No. CRP No. 4988/76-C, certificates of purchase came up for consideration in the High Court. In view of our decision on point No. 2, it will be necessary for the High Court to re-examine the matter. The appeal is allowed to this extent and it is ordered accordingly.\n\nC.A. No. 2623 of 1977\n\nP. Kunhilakshmi Amma vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another\n\nMr. Warriyar has argued that the appellant {s a widow ana that the ancestral lands have wrongly been treated as her own lands. We\n\nhave gone through the judgment of the High Court but no such point was raised for its consideration.\n\nIt cannot be allowed to be raised now and as no other point has been argued in this Court, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 1015 aj 1976\n\nChettiam Vettil Ammad and another vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Badagar and others\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Warriyar that a child in the womb on January 1, 1970 is a member of the family for purposes of section 82 (1) ( c) of the Act and the contrary view taken by the High Court on the basis of its decision in Ba/akrishna Kurup v. State of Kera/a and another(') is incorrect and should be set aside.\n\nClause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Act provides that in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, the ceiling area of the land shall be ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member in excess of five, subject to the limit prescribed by the clause. The expression \"family\" has been defined in clause (14) of section 2 as follows:-\n\n\" 'family' means husband, wife and their unmarried minor children or such of them as exist\".\n\nAnd the expression \"minor\" has been defined by clause\n\n(36A) to mean \"a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years.\" So\n\ntwcpostulates are necessary for obtaining the benefit of the increase ,,, of one standard acre for each member of the family in excess of five, namely, that the member should be in existence, and it should be.~ possible to ascertain that he had not attained the age of eighteen years - on the appointed date.\n\nBoth these conditions cannot be said to exist in the case of a child en ventre sa mere and it will not therefore be regarded as a member of the family tor purposes of section 82.\n\nWe are awarn that a child en ventre sa mere has been regarded in some legal systems as a person \"in being\" for the purpose of acquisition of property by the child itself, particularly in regard to gifts, but section 82 of the Act with which we are concerned does not deal with any such contingency or benefit to the unborn child. The view taken by the High Court in Ba/akrishna Karup case is therefore correct and as it has been rightly followed in the appeal before us, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed.\n\n(1) 1976 K. L. T. 421.\n\nC. V. AMMAD v. TALUI< LAND BOARD (Shinghal, /.)\n\nC.A. No. 1863 of 1977 C. A. Venkatachallam Chettiar vs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Chittor and another\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Warriyar that the lands in question should have< been treated as joint fa..<n'ly property and if that had been done there would have been no excess land for surrender. The claim was advanced on thebasis of parol evidence and was rejected by the High Court. It is therefore a finding of fact and does not call for reexamination here. The appeal fails and is dismissed. t.\n\nC. A. No. 40 of 1977 ·\n\n\\ E. V. Paul v. The Taluk Land Board, Talappilly and another.\n\nIt is not disputed that there is a pine-apple-canning factory on 2.15 acres, and there is a pine-apple plantation on the adjoining area of 11 acres. It has been argued that the whole of 13 .15 acres shollld\n\nhave been exempted from the ceiling limit a:s it was a commercial site within the meaning of section 2(5) of the Act. But, a=ding to . that definition, \"commercial site\" means (leaving out the inapplicable portion) any land which is used \"principally for the purposes of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business.\" A cross reference to sub-section (5) of section 101 shows that such a question has to be decided after taking into account the extent of, the amount invested in, and the income from, the portion so used and the remaining portion and the other releant matters. It has been held that the 11 acres of land did not fall within this definition and the finding of fact that it is not a commercial site does not call for interference.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nCA. No. 2585 of 1977\n\nP. J. Vetrivel\n\nVS.\n\nState of Kerala and others We have made a reference to this appeal in connection with the\n\nancillary argnment of Mr. Bhandare on point No. 2. It has been argued G; further that although 1.50 acres was given on lease to the other appellant who held a certificate of purchase, the High Court ignored the parol evidence and the certificate of purchase. We find however that the High Court did not interfere with the finding of the Taluk Land Board because there was no lease deed and there was \"absolutely no\n\nmaterial\" to prove that the land was held by the tenants. The two \"demand bills\" of the Panchayat .dated November 1, 1974 could not possibly prove that a lease was in existence before September 15,\n\n1963. There is nothing on the record to show that a certificate of purchase was produced for the Board's consideration, and it is futile to argue that its evidentiary value was ignored by the Board. No such argument was advanced for the consideration of the High Court. The other argument regarding exclusion of 1.75 acres, on the basis of an alleged gift to the appellant's son, was not urged for the consideration of the High Court; and does not require consideration by us. The appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 2811 of 1977\n\nJaya Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.\n\nvs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Nedumangad and others\n\nMr. Bhatt has argued that the High Court erred in not granting the\n\nexmption for the entire area as a coffee plantation; but the finding of fact in this respect is against the appellant. The conversion of the land bas also been held to be illegal. On the claim that the land used for growing fuel was exempt as it fell within the definition of \"plantation\" under section 2(44) (a) as it was an \"ancillary purpose\" also, there is a finding of fact against the Company. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 227 of 1978\n\nThe Taluk Land Board Peermade and others\n\nvs.\n\nSouthern India Tea Estates Co. Ltd.\n\nThe controversy before us relates to exclusion of \"fuel area\" and \"rested area\" The Company bas claimed that it bas planted red gunµ as fuel in 924.01 acres as it was required for the \"manufacture of tea.\" The Taluk Board found it to be an exhorbitant claim an reduced it to 200 acres, but the High Court has restored the entire claim. The General Manager of the Company has stated that fire wood is being supplied to the employees free of cost. So the claim to plant red gum all over is belied by its General Manager's statement. Moreover supply of fuel wood cannot be saig to be a purpose \"ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops.\" The Land Board has disallowed the claim for exemption of 136.17 acres, but it has been allowed in full by the High Court. Here again the High Court was not justified in interfering with the Board's finding of fact for there was nothing to show that it was an area from which crop was not gathered at the relevant time. If that had been so, it might have been an area within the plantation. In fact it appears from the order of the Board that no\n\n~ \"\n\n' -\n\nII!\n\nc. v. AMMAD v. TALUK LAND BOARD (Shinghal,.J.) 871\n\nother estate had made any such claim. The appeal is therefore allowed to the extent that the Board's decision is restored in both these matters.\n\nC.A. No. 1309 of 1977\n\nV. G. Kuriakose, Vadakkckara House,\n\nvs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nMr. Raghavan has argued that the Land Board erred in excluding only 25 cents on account of road and 55 cents for the house site and the approach road. These are findings of fact which have not been C shown to be vitiated by any error of law or procedure and the High Court has given its reason for refusing to take additional evidence in regard to the alleged dedication of the road. The appeal has no merit and it is dismissed.\n\nD C.A. No. 2070 of 1977\n\nSubhadra vs .\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nThe appeJiant has been called upon to surrender 8.75 acres of land E and the claim to exclude 6.29 acres on account of a will of 1963 in favour of the grand daughter has been rejected as the will has not been found to be genuine. Mr. Raghavan has not been able to show how that finding, which is essentially one of fact, can be said to require reconsideration when it is admitted that the will has not been probated so far. The appeal is without merit and is dismissed.\n\n.....___\n\nC.A. No. 143 of 1977\n\nP. A. Sivasubramaniam vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nMr. Raghavan has argued that the High Court has erred in rejecting the contention that as the appellant had two unmarried daughters who had attained majority before January 1, 1970, they were entitled to 6 acres each under section 82 ( 1) of the Act. But the two daughters\n\ndid not have any share in the property under their personal law, and H the Act did not give it to them. The High Court cannot be blamed for rejecting the claim, and the appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 882 of 1978\n\nDr. T. R. Chandrasekhar vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\n\nThe High Court has remanded the case in some respects, but the pievance here is that although the appellant's unmarried daughter Sheela became a major in 1969 and was given a share iu ~:1e partition held on December 15, 1969, that has not been excluded from the appellant's holding. We find that there was no satisfactory evidence to prove the partition and separate possession ot the daughter. The finding of fact is therefore against the appellant and does not call for reconsideration here. The appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 883 of 1979\n\nSmt. Unneema Antherjanam vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nThe grievance of the appellant is that the Taluk Land Board has revised its earlier order and raised the excess land for surrender from 7.66 acres to 11.09 acres. But that is permissible under section 85(9) of the Act. The Board has justified the correction with reference to the reports already on the record and it has not been argued before us that they were not read correctly or that the excess land has been incorrectly determined. It may be mentioned that the Collector and tile Tahsildars were authorised under section 105A ( l) to make the reports which were lost sight of when the first determination of surplus land was made, and all that the Board has done is to rectify the mistake. There is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 362 of 1978\n\nMammad\n\nVB.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others It has been argued by Mr. Harindranath that Mammad son of Mohammad Kutty was a major on January 1, 1970 and he was wrongly taken to be a minor for the determination of the ceiling area. But . we find from the High Court's order dated July 5, 1976 that Mohammad Kutty had hinlself mentioned in the statement which he filed about hls holding that his son Mammad was a minor on that date. It is therefore clear fuat the attempt to show that he was a major on January 1, 1970 was an after thought, and it has rightly been rejected.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\n...\n\n)' ; i\n\n-~ J I\n\n7 •I\n\n• I\n\n• ..\n\nC.A. No. 881 of 1979\n\nKodoth Krishnan Nair vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Kasargod and others\n\nMr. Harindranath has argued that the house, cattleshed, tank, well and outhouse should have been exempted. But no such argument was advanced in the High Court and it cannot be agitated here. The other argument that the land which was on lease with C. Ouseph should have been allowed to be surrendered, is also futile in view of the findiugs about the alleged lease. The appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 2587 of 1977 Thomas Kuriyan vs.\n\nThe Tahsildar, Taliparamba Taluk, and others\n\nIt bas been argued that out of the 30 acres of land which was taken on lease on May 2, 1962, from Haji, one Palakkat Varkey was in possession of 13 acres which he refused to surrender and that land should have been left out of consideration. It has however been found as a fact that the alleged tenancy of Varkey had not been established, and there is nothing wrong if the plea to that effect has been rejected.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 895 of 1979\n\nKuttikrishnan and another vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\n{ We have dealt with the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate bile examining point No. 2 which has a bearing on this appeal. The appeal is therefore allowed and the case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal in this respect, according to the law.\n\nC.A. No. 894 of 1979\n\nK. Kesava Pillai\n\nVS.\n\nThe State of Kerala and another\n\nThe only argument which has been advanced before us relates to\n\nthe• question whether the finding about unculturable waste land is H eofrect. That is a finding of fact which has not been shown to have been vitiated for any reason. The appeal is dismissed.\n\nl7-310SCl/79\n\nSuPllBMB COURT llBPORTS\n\nC.Jf. No. 870 of 1979\n\nKurian Thomas vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Sudhakaran that although certificate& of purchase had been obtained by some of the tenants, they were not taken into consideration by the Land Board and the High Court. We find that no such argument was advanced in the Board or before the High Court and, as it happens, there is nothing to show that even the existence of the certificate of purchase was brought to the notice of the Board or the High Court. All that was urged in the High Court was that out of 30 acres acquired in 1962, the appellant got possession of only 17 acres, and that there was a lease of some land in favour of Avirah Joseph in 1962. These were questions of fact which the High Court rightly refused to re-examine. There is no merit in thi11 appeal and it is dismissed.\n\nC.A. Nos. 873 and 874 of 1979\n\nKandu\n\nvs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nThe controversy relates to the three gift-deeds executed aft\" January 1, 1970. The High Court has refused to exclude the gifted lands, and in view of this Court's decision in Gangadharan's case,\n\n(supra) that decision is correct as transfers made after January 1, 1970 have to be ignored even if they are of the excepted variety mentioned in section 84 of the Act. The appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 875 of 1979 T. Devidas and others vs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Talappilly and others It has been argued by Mr. Rammurthy that the High Court errei G in upholding the Taluk Land Board's view that the properties received by the deceased N anikutty Amma under the partition deed of 1117 belonged to her exclusively as the property really belonged to the \"tavazhi\" consisting of herself, her daughter and the lineal descendants. The High Court has examined the document concerned and held that the properties were private properties of the executants ol the H ducument. This is a finding of fact and thero is nothing wrong with the view that the property which fell to Nanikutty's share :was her QWl1\n\nproperty. There ia no merit in tho appeal and it is dismissed.\n\n• •\n\n...\n\nC. V. AMMAD v. TALVK LAND JIOAJ\\D (Shinghal, J.) 875\n\nC.A. No. 1019 of 1979\n\nII..\n\nP. V. Thomas v. The State of Kerala and others.\n\nThe appellant was directed by the Taluk Land Board to surrender 18.93 acres of land. His grievance was that the land in R.S. No. 1/2 was a private forest until it was converted into rubber plantation. The Board held that the conversion took place after April 1, 1964. As in J • a document of December 12, 1963 the land was a private forest, the High Court remanded the case for further enquiry.\n\nThe Board reexamined the evidence and found that there was satisfactory evidence -.. to prove that the land was not a private forest as on April 1, 1964. • , The High Court has upheld that finding after examining the document\n\n\\ of 1963. In view of that finding of fact, there is no merit in this C ' appeal and it is dismissed.\n\n,.\\\n\nC.A. No. 890 of 1979 K C. Thomas v. The Taluk Land Board, Vaikam and others Mr. Nambiyar has argued that the High Court erred in upholding the finding of the Taluk Land Board that the land in question was not P forest but \"paramba\" and its conversion into \"plantation\" after April 1, 1964 had to be ignorep under section 82(4) of the Act.\n\nBut that is a finding of fact, which has not been shown to have been vitiated, and does not call for interference here.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. No. 885 of 1979 I: K. P. Mohammad and other•\n\nvs . . Taluk Land Board, Perinthalmanna and o!hers The Ta1uk Land Board mai:Je its order on November 21, 1975 flcterminin.g the extent of the la.nd to be surrendered by the appellant.\n\nAle applied to the Board much after the period of 60 days prescribed\n\n'\\mub-section (8) of section 85 to have that order set aside. No real attempt was made to explain the delay and the High Court therefore rightly upheld the Board's decision that the application was barred by limitation.\n\nThe appeal fails and is , dismissed.\n\nC. A. No. 886 of 1979 P. M. Kunhammed and another vs.\n\nTal¥k Land Board, Qulandy and others\n\nThe Taluk Land poari:J's earlier order was set aside by the High\n\nGoo.rt to 1he eirtent mentionep in its order dakd November 16, 1976 H d pie, ; Board was , directed to dispose of the matter afres!J. ']'he Board aHowed relief to the extent of 53.59 acres by exempting it as rubber\n\nplantation. Bnt it disallowed the claini that 3.41 acres was arecanut garden in a part of the rubber plantation as it was interspersed within the boundary of the rubber estate, because it was found from the report of the authorised officer that this was not so.\n\nThe High Court ha; given satisfactory reasons for that view and there is no\n\noccaion for us to interfere with that finding.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nC. A. No. 903 of 1979 T. V. Krishnan vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others 7\n\nThe main controversy was that relating to the date of birth of the daughter of the appellant.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board has held that she was minor on January 1, 1970 and was a member of the appellant's family.\n\nThat finding has been based on the entries in the school certificate, and as a certified copy of the birth register was not produced, it cannot be said that the High Court erred in refusing to disturb the Board's finding.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nC.A. Nos. 574-575 of 1978 Ravi Kamna Karan\n\nV5.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Quilon and others\n\nSpecial leave in these appeals has been granted \"limited to the question of urban lands measuring 7 .19 acres.\" The Board gave its finding in this matter after making the necessary enquiries and\n\n\"visiting\" the lands.\n\nThe High Court has stated in its order dated October 11, 1976 on the review petition that the question of ''nonapplicability of the Act to non-agricultural lands\" was not urged for\\ its consideration. As it is essentially a question of fact, it does -n6f' require consideration in this Court. The appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nC. A. No. 2584 of 1977\n\nSmt. Varghese Marium and another\n\nvs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nThe evidentiary value of the purchase certificate came up for consideration in this case in the High Court.\n\nIn view of cur c'ecision on point No. 2, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal in this respect according to\n\nlaw. ~\n\nC. V. AMMAD v. TALUK LAND BOARD (Shi11ghnl, J.)\n\nC. A. No. 2586 a/ 1977\n\nP. M. Kuruvilla vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nIn view of our decision on point No. 2, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal accordin)! to the law in so far as the question of exclusion of 23.57 acres of land in Trikhadambe village is conc_emed.\n\n• In the result C. A. Nos. 869/79, 876/79, 877/79, 878/79, • / 879/79, 224178, 895/79, 2564/77 and 2586/77 are allowed to the extent mentioned above. All the other appeals fail and are dismis C \\ sed.\n\nThe parties are left to pay and bear their own costs.\n\nN. I<;:. A.\n\n~', • '", "total_entities": 347, "entities": [{"text": "9\n\nCHETTIAM VEETTIL AMMAD AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHETTIAM VEETTIL AMMAD AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TALUK LAND BOARD AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 2, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 2, 1979\n\n(P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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"start_char": 885, "end_char": 895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .K'erala High Court declared it null and void iin its application to the ryotwari lands of the Malabu area and most of the lands of Travancore area."}}, {"text": "Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala Agrarian Relations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Reforms Act 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dec., 31, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1830, "end_char": 1844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It covered a wide field in th'e matter of land reforms and, inter alia, provided for the imposition of a ceiling on 'holdings' of lands, the surrend'er of excess of lands, grant of compensation thereof, and the assignment of the surrendered lands in accordance with the order of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals etc, The Land Reforms Act 1963 (Act 1 of 1964) received the assent of the President on Dec., 31, 1963."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether lands converted into plantations between April 1, 1964 a.nd January l, 1970 qualified for exemption under s. 8I(l)(e) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 8I(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Land Reforms Act 1963", "statute": "The Land Reforms Act 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2252, "end_char": 2258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Land Reforms Act 1963", "statute": "The Land Reforms Act 1963"}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2289, "end_char": 2305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether a certificate of purchas'e issued by the Land Tribunal under s. 72K of the Act was binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under -Chapter III of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2790, "end_char": 2800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 1, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2820, "end_char": 2835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy is whether the restriction of sub section (4) of section 82 came into force on January 1, 1970, beca.ure section 12 of the amending Act of 1971 was brought into forc'e on that date, or\n\nA whether it came ii1to force on April 1, 19641 when section 82 as originally enacted came into force."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 19641", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy is whether the restriction of sub section (4) of section 82 came into force on January 1, 1970, beca.ure section 12 of the amending Act of 1971 was brought into forc'e on that date, or\n\nA whether it came ii1to force on April 1, 19641 when section 82 as originally enacted came into force."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2980, "end_char": 2990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 14, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3611, "end_char": 3627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964, ;.•.1d."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3650, "end_char": 3659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3754, "end_char": 3761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4693, "end_char": 4703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4933, "end_char": 4943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5401, "end_char": 5410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5718, "end_char": 5727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7047, "end_char": 7057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7582, "end_char": 7592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 31, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7776, "end_char": 7793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "859B]\n\nThere is ~10 force in the other argument that a landholder is, in any event, entitled to~ the 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9560, "end_char": 9571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9677, "end_char": 9687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10263, "end_char": 10273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10388, "end_char": 10402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11108, "end_char": 11119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11337, "end_char": 11350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11855, "end_char": 11865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12121, "end_char": 12131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 SCR 960", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12542, "end_char": 12558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12560, "end_char": 12570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 83 and 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12659, "end_char": 12669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13985, "end_char": 13995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15037, "end_char": 15047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15574, "end_char": 15590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15680, "end_char": 15686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16238, "end_char": 16245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23170, "end_char": 23188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1015/76 For the Appellants: T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar and A. S.\n\nNambiar For the Respondents : P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran.", "canonical_name": "T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar"}}, {"text": "A. S.\n\nNambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23193, "end_char": 23207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1015/76 For the Appellants: T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar and A. S.\n\nNambiar For the Respondents : P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nNambiar"}}, {"text": "P. A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23230, "end_char": 23243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1015/76 For the Appellants: T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar and A. S.\n\nNambiar For the Respondents : P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran."}}, {"text": "N. 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A.\n\nSeiyed Mohammad K. M. K. Nair."}}, {"text": "V. A.\n\nSeiyed Mohammad K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23684, "end_char": 23720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2811 OF.1977 For the Appellant : K. N. Bhat and V. K. Verma, For the Respondents : Dr. V. A.\n\nSeiyed Mohammad K. M. K. Nair."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23779, "end_char": 23788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "574-575/78\n\nand\n\nFor the Appellants : G. B. Pai, K. J. John and J. B.\n\nDadachanji."}}, {"text": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23805, "end_char": 23822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "574-575/78\n\nand\n\nFor the Appellants : G. B. Pai, K. J. John and J. B.\n\nDadachanji.", "canonical_name": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji"}}, {"text": "K. T. Harindra Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23847, "end_char": 23866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the Respondents : K. T. 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Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24102, "end_char": 24114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "143/77 H For the Appellants : T. C. Raghavan and P. K. Pillai.", "canonical_name": "P. K.\n\nPillai"}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24139, "end_char": 24152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For Respondents 1-2 : K. M. K. Nair.", "canonical_name": "K. M. K. Nair"}}, {"text": "Mathai M. Paikeday", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24301, "end_char": 24319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the Intervener : Mathai M. Paikeday and N. Sudhakaran."}}, {"text": "T. R. G. Warriyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24385, "end_char": 24402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1863/77 For the Appellant : T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar, For the Respondents : K. R. Nambiar and V. J. Francis,\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO.", "canonical_name": "T. R. G.\n\nWarriyar"}}, {"text": "A. S. 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Syed Mohd and K. R. Nambiar."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25891, "end_char": 25904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For 'Ifie Respondent- : F. S. Nariman, K. Joseph and K. J. John."}}, {"text": "K. Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25906, "end_char": 25915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For 'Ifie Respondent- : F. S. Nariman, K. Joseph and K. J. John."}}, {"text": "S. B. Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26591, "end_char": 26604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 : S. B. Saharya."}}, {"text": "Saroja Goplakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27186, "end_char": 27206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "881/79 F11r the Appellant : Saroja Goplakrishnan."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrisbnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27728, "end_char": 27743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "889/79 For the Appellants : S. Balakrisbnan and M. K. D. Namboodri.", "canonical_name": "S. 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Fmacis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29008, "end_char": 29020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the Respondents : V. J. Fmacis.", "canonical_name": "V. J. Francis"}}, {"text": "T. T. Kunhikannan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29068, "end_char": 29085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1019/79 For the Appellant : T. T. Kunhikannan."}}, {"text": "SHINGHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29169, "end_char": 29177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J. 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"regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48035, "end_char": 48045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48263, "end_char": 48273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48398, "end_char": 48408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48548, "end_char": 48566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48806, "end_char": 48816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49169, "end_char": 49179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49439, "end_char": 49449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "!anuary 1, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49502, "end_char": 49517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "exemption continued until !"}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49523, "end_char": 49533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83 and 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49835, "end_char": 49852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramunni Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50459, "end_char": 50471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by the High Court in Ramunni Nair v. State of Kera/a(') in regard to the meaning to be attached to the words \"the B commencement of this Act\" is thus substantially correct and does not call for interference by us."}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50968, "end_char": 50996, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51172, "end_char": 51181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51454, "end_char": 51466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Balakrishnan tried to raise the argument that a landholder is, in any event, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under section 81 as amended by the Act of 1969 in respect of the \"extent of plantation within the ceiling area\" even if it were converted iQto a plantation during the period April I, 1964 to December 31, 1969.", "canonical_name": "S. Gopalakrishnan"}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51578, "end_char": 51588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51841, "end_char": 51851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52052, "end_char": 52062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52211, "end_char": 52222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taluk G Land Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52252, "end_char": 52270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2\n\nThe question is whether a certificate of purchase issued by the\n\nLand Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk G Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act."}}, {"text": "sections 53 to 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52453, "end_char": 52470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52637, "end_char": 52648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52650, "end_char": 52661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53439, "end_char": 53449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53564, "end_char": 53574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53660, "end_char": 53670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54008, "end_char": 54018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54597, "end_char": 54608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55155, "end_char": 55166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55299, "end_char": 55312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55438, "end_char": 55448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56495, "end_char": 56505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56740, "end_char": 56751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57651, "end_char": 57662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57908, "end_char": 57921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58034, "end_char": 58045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58492, "end_char": 58503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58643, "end_char": 58653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 58877, "end_char": 58885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhandare tried to raise an ancillary argument in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "S. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "section 72K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60148, "end_char": 60159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60495, "end_char": 60505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60759, "end_char": 60769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60902, "end_char": 60912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60960, "end_char": 60970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61121, "end_char": 61137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amending Act of 1972) with effect from November 2, 1972, when -<."}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61221, "end_char": 61231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61421, "end_char": 61431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61457, "end_char": 61485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61780, "end_char": 61790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62048, "end_char": 62058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62084, "end_char": 62094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62199, "end_char": 62209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62213, "end_char": 62223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62232, "end_char": 62242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62304, "end_char": 62314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gangadharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62462, "end_char": 62473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been observed by this Court in Gangadharan' s case, section 84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of section 83 and 85 effective."}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62483, "end_char": 62493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83 and 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62551, "end_char": 62568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62798, "end_char": 62808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62856, "end_char": 62866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62893, "end_char": 62921, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62995, "end_char": 63005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 1, \\970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63031, "end_char": 63046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been mentioned, that amendment was made by section 66 which came into force on January 1, \\970."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63064, "end_char": 63074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63138, "end_char": 63148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63904, "end_char": 63914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64154, "end_char": 64164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64303, "end_char": 64313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64434, "end_char": 64444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65019, "end_char": 65030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65145, "end_char": 65158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66042, "end_char": 66052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66246, "end_char": 66256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67141, "end_char": 67150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67239, "end_char": 67249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67437, "end_char": 67448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67871, "end_char": 67899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68672, "end_char": 68682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69404, "end_char": 69414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Parukutty Ammal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71026, "end_char": 71044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "877 of 1979 B\n\nK. Parukutty Ammal\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\n. ("}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71051, "end_char": 71066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "877 of 1979 B\n\nK. Parukutty Ammal\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\n. ("}}, {"text": "K. Devaki Amma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71333, "end_char": 71347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "878 of 1979\n\nK. Devaki Amma and others\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\nThe view taken by the High Court in regard to the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate is not correct for reasons mentioned !"}}, {"text": "C. S. Raman Mannadiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71701, "end_char": 71722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "879 of 1979\n\nC. S. Raman Mannadiar\n\nvs.\n\nState of Kerala and others\n\nWhile examining revision petition No."}}, {"text": "P. Kunhilakshmi Amma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 72082, "end_char": 72102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2623 of 1977\n\nP. Kunhilakshmi Amma vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another\n\nMr. Warriyar has argued that the appellant {s a widow ana that the ancestral lands have wrongly been treated as her own lands."}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72112, "end_char": 72151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2623 of 1977\n\nP. Kunhilakshmi Amma vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another\n\nMr. Warriyar has argued that the appellant {s a widow ana that the ancestral lands have wrongly been treated as her own lands.", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "Chettiam Vettil Ammad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 72536, "end_char": 72557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1015 aj 1976\n\nChettiam Vettil Ammad and another vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Badagar and others\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Warriyar that a child in the womb on January 1, 1970 is a member of the family for purposes of section 82 (1) ( c) of the Act and the contrary view taken by the High Court on the basis of its decision in Ba/akrishna Kurup v. State of Kera/a and another(') is incorrect and should be set aside."}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board, Badagar and others", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72579, "end_char": 72615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1015 aj 1976\n\nChettiam Vettil Ammad and another vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Badagar and others\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Warriyar that a child in the womb on January 1, 1970 is a member of the family for purposes of section 82 (1) ( c) of the Act and the contrary view taken by the High Court on the basis of its decision in Ba/akrishna Kurup v. State of Kera/a and another(') is incorrect and should be set aside.", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72738, "end_char": 72748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72971, "end_char": 72981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73298, "end_char": 73307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74025, "end_char": 74035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74246, "end_char": 74256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ba/akrishna Karup", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74404, "end_char": 74421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by the High Court in Ba/akrishna Karup case is therefore correct and as it has been rightly followed in the appeal before us, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed."}}, {"text": "section 2(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75507, "end_char": 75519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75782, "end_char": 75793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. J. Vetrivel", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 76229, "end_char": 76243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2585 of 1977\n\nP. J. Vetrivel\n\nVS."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76862, "end_char": 76878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two \"demand bills\" of the Panchayat .dated November 1, 1974 could not possibly prove that a lease was in existence before September 15,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "September 15,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76941, "end_char": 76960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two \"demand bills\" of the Panchayat .dated November 1, 1974 could not possibly prove that a lease was in existence before September 15,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "Jaya Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 77482, "end_char": 77516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2811 of 1977\n\nJaya Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.\n\nvs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Nedumangad and others\n\nMr. Bhatt has argued that the High Court erred in not granting the\n\nexmption for the entire area as a coffee plantation; but the finding of fact in this respect is against the appellant."}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77523, "end_char": 77539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2811 of 1977\n\nJaya Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.\n\nvs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Nedumangad and others\n\nMr. Bhatt has argued that the High Court erred in not granting the\n\nexmption for the entire area as a coffee plantation; but the finding of fact in this respect is against the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "Bhatt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77568, "end_char": 77573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2811 of 1977\n\nJaya Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.\n\nvs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Nedumangad and others\n\nMr. Bhatt has argued that the High Court erred in not granting the\n\nexmption for the entire area as a coffee plantation; but the finding of fact in this respect is against the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 2(44)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77927, "end_char": 77940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board Peermade", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78101, "end_char": 78126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 of 1978\n\nThe Taluk Land Board Peermade and others\n\nvs.\n\nSouthern India Tea Estates Co. Ltd.\n\nThe controversy before us relates to exclusion of \"fuel area\" and \"rested area\" The Company bas claimed that it bas planted red gunµ as fuel in 924.01 acres as it was required for the \"manufacture of tea.\"", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "Southern India Tea Estates Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78144, "end_char": 78179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 of 1978\n\nThe Taluk Land Board Peermade and others\n\nvs.\n\nSouthern India Tea Estates Co. Ltd.\n\nThe controversy before us relates to exclusion of \"fuel area\" and \"rested area\" The Company bas claimed that it bas planted red gunµ as fuel in 924.01 acres as it was required for the \"manufacture of tea.\""}}, {"text": "Taluk Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78391, "end_char": 78402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Taluk Board found it to be an exhorbitant claim an reduced it to 200 acres, but the High Court has restored the entire claim."}}, {"text": "V. G. Kuriakose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 79506, "end_char": 79521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1309 of 1977\n\nV. G. Kuriakose, Vadakkckara House,\n\nvs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nMr. Raghavan has argued that the Land Board erred in excluding only 25 cents on account of road and 55 cents for the house site and the approach road."}}, {"text": "Raghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79585, "end_char": 79593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1309 of 1977\n\nV. G. Kuriakose, Vadakkckara House,\n\nvs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nMr. Raghavan has argued that the Land Board erred in excluding only 25 cents on account of road and 55 cents for the house site and the approach road."}}, {"text": "Subhadra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80036, "end_char": 80044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2070 of 1977\n\nSubhadra vs ."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80868, "end_char": 80878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sheela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81324, "end_char": 81330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "882 of 1978\n\nDr. T. R. Chandrasekhar vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nThe High Court has remanded the case in some respects, but the pievance here is that although the appellant's unmarried daughter Sheela became a major in 1969 and was given a share iu ~:1e partition held on December 15, 1969, that has not been excluded from the appellant's holding."}}, {"text": "section 85(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81993, "end_char": 82006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 105A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82319, "end_char": 82331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mammad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82573, "end_char": 82579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "362 of 1978\n\nMammad\n\nVB.", "canonical_name": "Mammad"}}, {"text": "Harindranath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82643, "end_char": 82655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Kerala and others It has been argued by Mr. Harindranath that Mammad son of Mohammad Kutty was a major on January 1, 1970 and he was wrongly taken to be a minor for the determination of the ceiling area."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Kutty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82869, "end_char": 82883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we find from the High Court's order dated July 5, 1976 that Mohammad Kutty had hinlself mentioned in the statement which he filed about hls holding that his son Mammad was a minor on that date."}}, {"text": "Mammad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82970, "end_char": 82976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we find from the High Court's order dated July 5, 1976 that Mohammad Kutty had hinlself mentioned in the statement which he filed about hls holding that his son Mammad was a minor on that date.", "canonical_name": "Mammad"}}, {"text": "Kodoth Krishnan Nair", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 83232, "end_char": 83252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "881 of 1979\n\nKodoth Krishnan Nair vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Kasargod and others\n\nMr. Harindranath has argued that the house, cattleshed, tank, well and outhouse should have been exempted."}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board, Kasargod", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83262, "end_char": 83288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "881 of 1979\n\nKodoth Krishnan Nair vs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board, Kasargod and others\n\nMr. Harindranath has argued that the house, cattleshed, tank, well and outhouse should have been exempted.", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "C. Ouseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83549, "end_char": 83558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other argument that the land which was on lease with C. Ouseph should have been allowed to be surrendered, is also futile in view of the findiugs about the alleged lease."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83861, "end_char": 83872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2587 of 1977 Thomas Kuriyan vs.\n\nThe Tahsildar, Taliparamba Taluk, and others\n\nIt bas been argued that out of the 30 acres of land which was taken on lease on May 2, 1962, from Haji, one Palakkat Varkey was in possession of 13 acres which he refused to surrender and that land should have been left out of consideration."}}, {"text": "Haji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83879, "end_char": 83883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2587 of 1977 Thomas Kuriyan vs.\n\nThe Tahsildar, Taliparamba Taluk, and others\n\nIt bas been argued that out of the 30 acres of land which was taken on lease on May 2, 1962, from Haji, one Palakkat Varkey was in possession of 13 acres which he refused to surrender and that land should have been left out of consideration."}}, {"text": "Palakkat Varkey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83889, "end_char": 83904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2587 of 1977 Thomas Kuriyan vs.\n\nThe Tahsildar, Taliparamba Taluk, and others\n\nIt bas been argued that out of the 30 acres of land which was taken on lease on May 2, 1962, from Haji, one Palakkat Varkey was in possession of 13 acres which he refused to surrender and that land should have been left out of consideration."}}, {"text": "Varkey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84087, "end_char": 84093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has however been found as a fact that the alleged tenancy of Varkey had not been established, and there is nothing wrong if the plea to that effect has been rejected."}}, {"text": "Kuttikrishnan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84242, "end_char": 84255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "895 of 1979\n\nKuttikrishnan and another vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\n{ We have dealt with the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate bile examining point No."}}, {"text": "K. Kesava Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84596, "end_char": 84612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "894 of 1979\n\nK. Kesava Pillai\n\nVS."}}, {"text": "Kurian Thomas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84971, "end_char": 84984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "870 of 1979\n\nKurian Thomas vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Sudhakaran that although certificate& of purchase had been obtained by some of the tenants, they were not taken into consideration by the Land Board and the High Court."}}, {"text": "Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 85049, "end_char": 85059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "870 of 1979\n\nKurian Thomas vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Sudhakaran that although certificate& of purchase had been obtained by some of the tenants, they were not taken into consideration by the Land Board and the High Court.", "canonical_name": "N. Sudhakaran"}}, {"text": "Avirah Joseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85637, "end_char": 85650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that was urged in the High Court was that out of 30 acres acquired in 1962, the appellant got possession of only 17 acres, and that there was a lease of some land in favour of Avirah Joseph in 1962."}}, {"text": "Kandu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 85828, "end_char": 85833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "873 and 874 of 1979\n\nKandu\n\nvs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nThe controversy relates to the three gift-deeds executed aft\" January 1, 1970."}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86214, "end_char": 86224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rammurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86388, "end_char": 86397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "875 of 1979 T. Devidas and others vs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Talappilly and others It has been argued by Mr. Rammurthy that the High Court errei G in upholding the Taluk Land Board's view that the properties received by the deceased N anikutty Amma under the partition deed of 1117 belonged to her exclusively as the property really belonged to the \"tavazhi\" consisting of herself, her daughter and the lineal descendants."}}, {"text": "N anikutty Amma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86512, "end_char": 86527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "875 of 1979 T. Devidas and others vs.\n\nTaluk Land Board, Talappilly and others It has been argued by Mr. Rammurthy that the High Court errei G in upholding the Taluk Land Board's view that the properties received by the deceased N anikutty Amma under the partition deed of 1117 belonged to her exclusively as the property really belonged to the \"tavazhi\" consisting of herself, her daughter and the lineal descendants."}}, {"text": "Nanikutty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86942, "end_char": 86951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is a finding of fact and thero is nothing wrong with the view that the property which fell to Nanikutty's share :was her QWl1\n\nproperty."}}, {"text": "Nambiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87992, "end_char": 88000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "890 of 1979 K C. Thomas v. The Taluk Land Board, Vaikam and others Mr. Nambiyar has argued that the High Court erred in upholding the finding of the Taluk Land Board that the land in question was not P forest but \"paramba\" and its conversion into \"plantation\" after April 1, 1964 had to be ignorep under section 82(4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 82(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88225, "end_char": 88238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. P. Mohammad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 88423, "end_char": 88437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "885 of 1979 I: K. P. Mohammad and other•\n\nvs . ."}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board, Perinthalmanna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88457, "end_char": 88489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taluk Land Board, Perinthalmanna and o!hers The Ta1uk Land Board mai:Je its order on November 21, 1975 flcterminin.g the extent of the la.nd to be surrendered by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "Ta1uk Land Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 88505, "end_char": 88521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taluk Land Board, Perinthalmanna and o!hers The Ta1uk Land Board mai:Je its order on November 21, 1975 flcterminin.g the extent of the la.nd to be surrendered by the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88726, "end_char": 88736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ravi Kamna Karan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90322, "end_char": 90338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "574-575 of 1978 Ravi Kamna Karan\n\nV5."}}, {"text": "Taluk Land Board, Quilon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 90349, "end_char": 90373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Taluk Land Board, Quilon and others\n\nSpecial leave in these appeals has been granted \"limited to the question of urban lands measuring 7 .19 acres.\"", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "October 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 90650, "end_char": 90666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has stated in its order dated October 11, 1976 on the review petition that the question of ''nonapplicability of the Act to non-agricultural lands\" was not urged for\\ its consideration."}}, {"text": "Varghese Marium", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90964, "end_char": 90979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varghese Marium and another\n\nvs.\n\nThe Taluk Land Board and others\n\nThe evidentiary value of the purchase certificate came up for consideration in this case in the High Court."}}, {"text": "TALUK LAND BOARD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 91319, "end_char": 91335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nC. V. AMMAD v. TALUK LAND BOARD (Shi11ghnl, J.)\n\nC. A. No.", "canonical_name": "Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another"}}, {"text": "P. M. Kuruvilla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91377, "end_char": 91392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2586 a/ 1977\n\nP. M. Kuruvilla vs.\n\nThe State of Kerala and others\n\nIn view of our decision on point No."}}, {"text": "Trikhadambe village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91642, "end_char": 91661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the law in so far as the question of exclusion of 23.57 acres of land in Trikhadambe village is conc_emed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_878_896_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SASSOON J. DAVID & CO. (P) LTD., BOMBAY\n\nC.I.T., BOMBAY\n\nMay 3, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income Ttx Act 1922-Section 10(2)(xv)-Scvpe of-Retrenchment compeTJ.Sation paid to emplOyees whose services were terminated-If an allowable deductiolt-\"Wiwlly and exclusively\" meaning of-Benefit to third party-Whether a consideradon for not allowing deduction.\n\nIn January, 1956 the assessee company whose assets had been valued at -·-_.'f Rs. 155 lacs as on December 31, 1955 decided to terminate the services of 22 ( of its employees with effect from 31st March, 1956 and to pay them retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of employment. Thereafter Davids, who held the share~ of the company entered into an agreement with Taw to sell to them all the wares for Rs. 155 lacs. The agreement provided that compensation and grtuity payable to the Directors and employees whose :!ervices had been terminated and the annuity payable to the managing director should be deducted from the purchase consideration.\n\nThe assessee claimed deduction under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 of a sum of Rs. 1.64 laths paid by way of retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of ervice during the assessment year 1957-58 and a sum of Rs. 16,885 which was tbe amount of annuity paid to the managing director in each of the three succeeding assessment years.\n\nThe lncome Tax officer disallowed the amounts on the ground that the services of the directors and employees had been terminated not as business expediency but became the purchaser~ of the shares made it a condition under\n\nthe agreement.\n\nOn appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, affirming the view of the\n\n. .-· •\n\nTncome Tax Officer, held that the decision to pay compensation could not be • Ji' said to have been taken solely with a view to the business requirement of the .......\n\ncompany. , ---~\n\nDismissing the assessee's appeal the Appellate Tribunal held that the expensc.s had not been incurred for the purpose of the company but purely as a result of the bargain between Davids and Tatas and assuming that the paymen~ were beneficial to the assessees by reason of the reduction in its establishment expenes, no deduction could be ollowed under s. 10(2) (xv) since the payment wa~ made to the benefit of a third party.\n\nRelying principally upon the decision of this Court in Gordon W oodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. v. The Commr. of Income-tax, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 211, the High Court held that the amount involved in the case did not satisfy the test applicable to the expeJlditure allowable under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act and, therefore, disallowedthe expenditure of Rs. 1.27 lakhs out of a sum of Rs. 1.64 lakhs on the ground that it had not been incurred for commercial expediency. The High Court also disallowed the annuity paid to the managin! director in the succeeding three assessment years.\n\n• ...\n\nSASOON J. DAVID V. C.I.T. 879\n\nAllowing the assessee's appeals\n\n1:tF1D : 1 (a) The three tests Iai:d down by this Court in Gordon Woodroi/te'l case viz., (1) that the payment should have been made as a matter ot vractice which affected the quantum of salary, (ii) that there was an expectation by the employee of getting a gratuity and (iii) that the sum of money was expended on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the assessee have to be read disjunctively. So read the present case which satisfied the third test fell under s. 10(2) (:xv) of the Act. The High Court was in error in holding that the amount in question did not satisfy any of the test> applicable to the expenditure allowable under the section.\n\n[893H]\n\n(li) In order to claim deduction under the section an assessee has to show that the expenditure in question (1) was not an allowance of the nature described in any of the clauses (i) to (xiv) of the section, (ii) was not in the nature of a capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee and (iii) bad\n\nbeen laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of his business, profe!!Sion or voca!lon.\n\n[891G]\n\n(c) l!.'fen assuming that the motive behi, d the payment of retrenchment cotion was that the terms of the agreement of the sale of shares should\n\nbe satiified, 1111 long as the amount had been laid out or expended wholly and ciclllirively for the purpose of the business of the assessee there could be no\n\naood rea30n for denying the benefit of this section if there was no other imptdiment to do so. [89tH]\n\nIn the instant case the assessee company was neither diliSolved nor was its business undertaking sold. It continued to exist as a juristic entity and continued to function even after the transfer of its shares to Tata.s. The expenditure was\n\nlaid out for the purpose of the assessee company's own trad'e and not for the trade of Tatas who were only shareholders of the company.\n\nAs a result of the expenditure the company was benefited and it was pos9ible for it to eam more profits as a. cOnsequell(:e of the reduction in the wage bill. It cannot be said that Tatas were in any way benefited financially by reason of reduction ia the ooMideration payable by them for the shares.\n\n[893B-C]\n\nGordon Woodroffae Leather Manufacturing Co. v. The Commissiontr of Incmrw-tax, Madras, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 211, applied.\n\n(i) Commissionrr of Inland Revenue v. Patrick Thomson, Ltd. (in Liquidation), G\n\n(ii) Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. J. & R. A.Ilan, Ltd. (In liquidation),\n\n(iii) Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Pattigrew & Stephens, Ltd., 37 T. C. 145, referred to.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Laxmi Cement Distributors (P) Ltd., 104 ITR 711, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Fairdeal Corporation (P) Ltd., 108 ITR 280; Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Patel Cotron Co. Pvt. Ltd., 108 ITR 846; approved.\n\n(d) Moreover it is too late in the day whatever might have been the pOOition about two decades ago, to treat the expenditure incurred by the management in paying reasonable sums by way of gratuity and retrenchment compensation or compensation for termination of services as not business expenditure.\n\nSuch expenditure would ordinarily fall within the S<:Ope of s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\n\n[889C]\n\n2. The argument that since there wa~ no necessity to retrench the &ervices of all the employees, the expenditure could not be treated as ane laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of bwiness has no force.\n\nTh'e expression \"wholly and exclusively\" does not mean \"necessarily\". Ordinarily it is for the asseee to decide whether any expenditure should be incurred in the course of his or its busin'ess.\n\nSuch expenditure may be incurred volU!ltarily and without any necessity and if it is incurred for promoting the business and C to eam profits the assessee can claim deduction under the section even though there was no comp'c:lling necessity to incur such expenditure.\n\nThe fact that somebody other than the as9essee wali also benefited by the expenditure should not come in the way of an expenditure being allowed by way of deduction under the section, if it satisfies otherwise the test laid down by law.\n\n[894D<J]\n\nIn the instant case the company thought that its buiness could be carried on with a smaller numb'er of employees and the only wa.y to reduce the number was to terminate the services of all employees by paying compensation a~ to re-employ only some of them.\n\nThereby the company reduced its txpenditure on wages payable to its employees. It could not therefore be said that compensation was paid . with an oblique motive and without regard to commerciiil considerations or expediency.\n\n[895F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2501 of 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 5-2-1970 of the Bombay High Coul\"t in Income Tax Reference No. 58/73 ..\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2502-2504 OF 1972\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25thj26th Feb. 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Ref. No. 87 f63.\n\nV. S. Desai, Dinesh Vyas, K. 1. John and Sree Narain for the Appellants in all the appeals.\n\nHardyaJ Hardy, Champat Rai, B. B. Tawekley and Miss A Su, hashini for the Respondent in all the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nB VENKATARAMIAH, J.-Since these appeals by certificate involve a common question of law, we find it convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment.\n\nSASOON J, DAVID V. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 881\n\n .. Civil Appeal No. 2501 of 1972 is filed against the Judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Income Tax Reference No. 58 of 1963 and Civil Appeals Nos. 2502-2504 of 1972 are filed against the judgment of that High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 87 of 1965.\n\nThe assessee, M/s Sasoon J. David & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Company') is the appellant in all these cases and the assessment\n\nyean e 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959>60 .and 1960-61, the relevant calendar years being 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959 respectively .\n\n..,..\n\nThe Company is an investment company and its shares were origi- '1\" nally heJd either directly or through their nominees by Sir Percival David, Lady David and Mr. V. P. David (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Davids') .\n\nThe issued capital of the Company consisted of 1000 ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 10,000/- each.\n\nAccording to the valuation made by the auditors, the assets of the Company were worth Rs. 155 lacs as on December 31, 1955.\n\nAt a meeting of the directors of the Company held on December 2, 1955, a resolution was passed recommending that the employees of the Company whose nameS\n\nwere ret out in the statement attached thereto be paid certain sums or annuity as set out against the names of each of them as and by way of retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of employment and also for long and faithful services rendered by them to the Company in the past and that their services might be terminated.\n\nIt was. also resolved to call an extra-ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company to consider and if thought fit to approve the recommendation made by the directors as stated above.\n\nAccordingly •\n\nan extra ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company wa$ held on January 17, 1956 but it was adjourned to January 25,1956.\n\n( On the adjourned date, the meeting passed a resolution approving the reccmunendation made by the directors to pay the employees retrench.; ment COmpensation and compensa-tion for termination of employment and alro additional retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of employment in the case of some of them and to terminate their services on or after April 1, 1956.\n\nThereafter an agreement was entered into between Davids and Tata Sons Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tatas') on March 23, 1956 agreeing to sell the 1000 shares held by Davids or their nominees in the Company in favour of Tatas or their nominees for a sum of Rs. 155 lacs. The said agreement inter alia provided that the sum voted by the Company for payment of gratuities and/ or as compensation for loss of employment to existing directors and employees of th~ Company with respect to their services upto and inclusive of March 31, 1956 and a further amount of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt..\n\nR~ . 16,188/- payable to the Managing Director, Mr. Mathalone lhould' be paid in accordance with the resolution by the Company and tke amount so paid should be deducted from the purchase price of Rs. 155 lacs agreed upon.\n\nIt also provided that Davids should arrange to terminate the services of all employees with effect from March 31, 1956 and also to arrange that all directors (including the Managing Director) resign their offices and Tatas or their nominees should thereafter be entitled to appoint or elect all or any of the members of the staff and directors (including existing directors and members of the staff) of the Company as they deemed fit.\n\nOf the 22 employees covered by the resolution of the directors dated' December 2, 1955 followed by the confirmation at the extra-ordinary general meeting of January 25, 1956, 9 were re-employed and 13 persons. were not re-employed.\n\nIn the books of the assessee, there was a debit for a total sum of Rs. 1,64,899/- during the accounting year 1956, the\n\ndetails for which were as follows :-\n\nAmount payable to the 22 employees as per resolution dated\n\n2-12--1955 and 25-1-1956 R 1,01.,626{-\n\nAmount described as \"additional retrenchment compensation\n\nand compensation for termination of employment and also\n\nforlongandfaithfulservices\", as per resolution No. 2dated\n\n25-1-1956 Rs. 6.000/·\n\nCompensation for termination of pension allowance Rs. 21,200 .\n\nAnnuity ofShri A. E. Joseph, former Director as per resolutions dated 2·12-1955 and 25-1-1956 .\n\nRs . 16,885/-\n\nAmount described as \"compensation for loss of office. Managing\n\nDirector Mr. R. Mathalone.\" Rs. 16,1&8/-\n\nTotal: Rs. 1,64,899/-\n\nIt should be mentioned here that A.E. J dseph, the former Director of the Company had to be paid as per the resolution of the Company Rs. 16,885/- by way of annuity during a period of five years commencing with 1956.\n\nDuring the assessment year 1957-58, the relevant previo~ year being 1956, the Company claimed deduction of Rs. 1,64,899/- referred to above before th~ Income-tax Officer under section 10d2)(xv) of the\n\n• _.)\n\n• ...\n\nSASOON J. DAVID v. C.l.T. (Venka'tatamiah, J.) 883'\n\n1ndian Income-tax Act\" 1922 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').· During each of the three succeeding assessment year's with which we\n\nare concerned, the Company claimed deduction of Rs. 16,885/- being the annuity pid to Mr. A. E. Joseph pursuant to the resolution.\n\nDuring the assessment year 1957-58, the claim in respect of the entite sum of Rs. 1,64,899/- was disallowed-by the Income-tax Officer on the ground that the services of the directors and employees had been tenninated not because of business expediency but because Tatas, the purchasers of the shares made it a condition under the agreement. The relevant part of the order read as follows :-\n\n\"Thus, it emerges that tlJ.~ expenditure of the type of gratuity would be allowable u/ s 10(2) (xv) only if the persons retiring had such expectancy or they accepted lower salaries in such expectation and hnce it was an incentive to existing employees of future employees.\n\nAs against that we find that here even before the Tatas took up the management of the company, services of the employe~ and directors were terminated and the amount of compensation fixed.\n\nThe fact that there was no expectancy or custom of such gratuity with the company is clearly borne out by the fact that tnany of the employees whose services arc. terminated had put in a number of years of service in some case6 even going upto 40 years.\n\nAs against this the assessee has been pleading that most of the employees were very old and tha:t as a result of change of staff the Company was able to effect considerable economy.\n\nHowever, I understand that some of the old employees were reinstated and as stated the whole transaction was a part of the overall transaction of purchase of shares and passing over of control.\n\nThe manner in which the services of all the employees tinder the old management were terminated is also significant. Thus I am unable to see how this expenditure can fall u/s. 10(2) (xv). I am unable to find any distinctin ret.ween compensation paid to employees and .those pmd to drrectors and also any distinction between\n\nou~1ght compensation paid to a director and annuity paid to a drrector. None of the expenses are allowable and I add the whole amount claimed by way of gratuity, compensation for loss of empl.oyment and annuity or compensation for loss of office to a dtrector or former director.\"\n\n. Aggrieved by the decision of the Income-tax Officer, the Company filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of\n\nIncometax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner after taking into account the records before the Incometax Officer and the statement filed by the Company refore him found that the Income-tax Officer was right in disallowing the claim even though he was of opinion that the Company had by the termination of services of the directors and the employees by payment of gratuity and/or comp:!nsation been bene fited.\n\nThe relevant part of his order was as follows:-\n\n'The o'nly contention remaining to be considered is that the Income-tax Officer was wrong in disallowing a sum of Rs. 1 ,64,899 Ipaid to certain employees and directors aa compensation for termination of services.\n\nThe circumstances leading to the payment of this compensation have en narrated in detail in the order of the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIt is strongly urged that the termination of the services of the persons concerned was of great benefit to the Company even considering the payment of the compnsation since the establishment expehses were very substantially reduced as a result.\n\nFrom the information furnished to me, this statemrnt is no doubt quite justified.\n\nHowever, it is seen that the termination of the services and the payment of compensation were not done wholly with a view to the business requirements of the company, but wrc bound up with the cha'nging of hands of the shares of the company.\n\nAccording to the agreement for the sale of all the shares of the company the selb-s had to arrange to terminate the services of all the employees and also arrange that all directors resigned their offices.\n\nIt is expressly stated that this requirement was to enable the purchasers to appoint or elect all members of the staff and directors.\n\nAs a matter of fact some of the persons to whom compensation had been paid for termination of service5 were immediarely re-employed by the Company. The decision to pay compensation cannot in the circumstances be said to have been taken solely with a view to the business requirement of the company though incidentally the company might have been benefited by it. In view of what has reen stated above.\n\nI feel that the Income-tax Officer was justified in his action.\n\nThe appellant has referred to the Bombay High Court decision in the case of F.E. Dinishaw Ltd., but the facts in the present case are not identical with those of the case mentioned.\"\n\nOn further appeal to the Tribunal by the Company, the Tribunal affirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ho1di'ng\n\n.. r 41\n\nSASOON J. DAVID v. C.l.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 8'85\n\nthat .the inference drawn by the Incometax Officer that the payments in question were motivated by the reorganisation of share-holding had not been chaUenged by the Company; that the reference made to the said payments in the agreement of .sale of shares led to such an inference and that the expenditure had not been incurred for the purpose of the Company but purely as a result of the bargain between Davids and Tatas. It was further held by the Tribunai that even assuming that the paymnts were beneficial to the Company, no deduction could be allowed since they had been made to benefit third parties.\n\nAccordingly the Tribunal dismissed the appe.al.\n\nAn application made under section 66(1) of the Act before the Tribunal was rejected.\n\nThereafter the Company filed an application before the High Court of Bombay under section 66(2) of the Act and\n\nthe High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case and to refer the following questions of law for its opinion:-\n\n\" ( 1) Whether the Tribunal erred in law disallowing the D amount of Rs. 1,64,8991as a deduction under section\n\n10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?\n\n(2) Whether there was any evidence to justify the Tribunal's finding that the payment of Rs. 1,64,899/- or any part thereof was made in view of and in order to effectuate E the agreement entered into between the old shareholders and the new shareholders and that the payment had no commercial purpose behind it ?\n\n(3) Whether in any event the sum of Rs. 16,188/~ paid to the Managing Director by way of pay in lieu of six Jl' months' notice was all.owable as a deduction under section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?\"\n\nAccordingly, the Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred the abov~ questions.\n\nLater on the Tribunal referred tinder section 66 (1) the following question of law arising out of the orders G of assessment for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960- 61 in respect of the annuity paid to Mr. A. E. Joseph:-\n\n\"Whethe~ in computing the assessee's business income of the accounting years 1957, 1958 and 1959, relevant for the assessment ars 1958-59, 1959~60 and 1960~61, the .H sum of Rs. 16,885/- is an admissible deduction under section 10{2) (xv) of the Act?\n\nA , It is n9t n.e.cessary to refer to the other matters involved in the\n\norders of assessment of the years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 and to the various stages of the cases until they reached the High Court.\n\nIncome-tax Reference No. 58 of 1963 arising out of the assessment proceeding~S of the year 1957-58 was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay and decided on February 5, 1970. The High Court found that out of Rs. 1,64,899/- referred to in question No.1 only a sum of Rs. 21,200/- which was commutation of liability for payment of pension to some retired employees and/or widows of such employees and a sum of Rs. 16,188/- paid to Mr. Mathalone, Managing Director in lieu of six months notice that had to be given prior to termination of his service were allowable as deductions and that the Company was not entitled to claim deduction of the remaining sum of Rs. 1,27,511/-. It according)y answered question No.1 in the negative in so far as the sum of Rs. 1,27,511/- (excluding two\n\nitems of Rs. 21,000/- and Rs. 16,188/-) was concerned, question No. 2 in the affinnative in so far as the amount aggregating to Rs. 1,27,511/- (excluding the two items of Rs. 21,200/- and Rs. 16,188/-) was concerned and question No. 3 in the affirmative.\n\nThe High Court was of the view that the expenditure of the sums amounting to Rs. 1,27,511/- paid to the employees and a director of the Company by way of retrenchment compensation or compensation for termination of service had not been incurred by the Company for commercial expediency and/or considerations. It accord1ngly disallowed the claim made by the Company to the extent indicated above.\n\nThe Income-tax Reference case arising from the assessme'nt orders relating to assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 came before another Division Bench of the High Court and that Division Bench following the decision rendered by the High Court earlier disallowed the claim of the Company for deduction in respect of the payment of Rs. 16,885/- to Mr. A E. Joseph in each of the accoonling years relative to the assessment years in question. Aggrieved y the judgments of the High Court of Bombay, the Company has filed these appeals.\n\nWe are concerned in these appeab with the claim of the Company in respect of a sum of Rs. 1,27,511/- out of Rs. 1,64,899/- referred to in questions Nos. 1 and .2 in the reference relatmg to the assessment B year 1957-58 and the claim in re5pect of payment of Rs. 16,885/- made to Mr. A. E. Joseph during each of the three succeeding yean;.\n\nThe undisputed facts of the case are : The shares of the. Company\n\n~N J. -DAVID .v. C.U. (Venkataramiah, I.) 887\n\n-were held by Davids or their nominees till they were transferred to\n\nTatas; that according to the valuation made by the auditors of the Company, its assets were worth Rs. 155 lacs as on December 31, 1955; that -t a meeting of the directors held on December 2, 1955, it had been resolved that the services of 22 employees should be terminated by paY, ing retrenchment compensation; that on January 25, 1956 al the extra-ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company, it was resolved that the employees of the Company be paid certain\n\nSUll1S or annuity set out against the names of each of them and their services should be terminated with efkct from April 1, 1956; that an •) agreement was entered into between Davids and Tatas on March 23,\n\nT - - 1956 rgarding the J; ale of the shares in favour of the Tatas; that the \\ uid agreement referred to the resolution passed at the meeting of the '\n\nshareholders of the Company; that the Company paid retrenchment compensation according to the said resolution and that the Tatas dedtlcted from the purchase price the sum payable by the Company in\n\naccordance with the resolution of the Company from out of the con aideration of Rs. 155 lacs which they had agreed to pay under tho agreement dated March 23, 1956 to Davids.\n\nApart from the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company dated Decmber 2,\n\n1955, the resolutions passed at the extraordinary general meeting ol the shareholders of the Company held on January 25, 1956, the agree-- meat dated March 23, 1956 entered into between Davids and Taw, 1he Jx>oks of aceount of the Company showing payments made by the Company by way of retrenchment compensation and the fact that 9 \"the 22 employees whose services had been terminated had peen reployed, there was no other evidence before the Income-tax Officer.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer presumably because of the proximity of the\n\n~~ 9f Jhe resolutions, the date of the agreement and the dates on / .,., rucb retrenchment compensation was paid to the employees came 1 _ to the conclU8ion that the rtrenchmen_t of the employes had lx:en ,. -etfocted as a part of the bargain entered mto between .Oav1ds .and Tata~\n\nand therefore compensation pai4 to the employees on retrenchment of their services and to the director on the termination of his service had\n\naot been paid in the course of the business of the Company by way of commercial expediency.\n\nHe accordingly disallowed the claim of the Company under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Although the Appellate Assistant CommiS8ioner in the course of his order observed that the Company had been benefited by reason of the retrenchment of the ienices of the employees as it had resulted in the reduction of the e.:penditure on the establishment, he disal1owed the claim on the very\n\ni~ .ground on which the Income-tax Officer had rejected it. The Tr:ibu, pal proced .to dispose of tbe case before it on e basis that\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nthe inference drawn by the Income-tax Officer that the payments were motivated by the re-organisation in the shareholding had not . been questioned by the Company either before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or before it.\n\nWe do not find in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that any concession had been made by the Company to the effect that the finding of the Income-tax Officer referred to above was correct. In the grounds of appeal before the Tribunal, the Company had stated that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner erred in holding that \"the decision to pay compensation cannot in the circumstances be said to have been taken solely with a view to the business requirement of the Company though incidentally the - Company might have benefited by it.\" The appellants submitted be-- fore the Tribunal that the above amount was expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of their business and as such it should have ocen deducted as an admissiable expense in computing their i'llcoe\n\nliale to income-tax.\n\nThe Tribunal while deciding the question whether the sums paid by way of compensation were deductible or not observed that the fact that a reference to payment to the staff of compensation had been made in the agreement led to the inference that such payment was a part of the bargain between Davids and Tatas;\n\n-..__\n\nthat on account of such payment, the purchasers had actually been\n\nbenefied while the Company had to make payment in order to give effect to the agreement and therefore there was no commercial purpose involved in making the said payment. The Tribunal also held that even assuming that the Company was benefited by payment of compensation by reason of reduction in its establishment expenses, since the payment had been made as a result of the bargain between Davids and Tatas, it could not be allowed as a deductible expenditure ..\n\nIt should be stated here that the Tribunal did not reverse the finding of ', 1 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the Company had been -~ b.::nefited by such payment. In fact it did not go into the question whether the payment had really resulted in any benefit to the Company.\n\nThe High Court, however, in the course of its judgment found that on account of the retn:nchment of the employees and re-emp!oyment of only 9 of them. the yearly wage bil1 of the Company for salaries was reduced from Rs. 1,14,197/- in 1955 to Rs. 67,268/- in 1956 and thereaftt>r in 1957 ::<nd 1958 respectively to Rs. 54,124/- and Rs. 54.960/-.\n\nI'n the instant case, it is no:-:cessary to bf'ar in mind that the Companv w::s neither dissolved nor was its business undertaking sold . . It continued to exist as a juristic entity even after the transfer of it!!\n\n\\7T J .--\n\ni •\n\n• !i' '\n\n~ !\n\n' ,'>\n\n•. :.,:-----\n\nSASOON J. DAVID V. C.I.T. (Jienkatarpmiah, /.) SSg\n\nhar~ by Davids to Tatas. . On account of such transfer of shares A e transferees no doubt gained control on the Company. But on~\n\nimportant fact of the case which was lost sight of by the High Court\n\n'- I l .\n\nand the Tribunal was that neither Davids nor Tatas derived any direct benefit out of the payment of retrenchment compensation to the employees even though such retrenchment might have facilitated the B transfer of shares. It is also not the case of the Department that the payment was excessive. That there was a substantial reduction in the wage bill in the future years as a consequence of retrenchment was also not disputed. It is too late in the day now, whatever may have been the position about two decades ago, to treat the expenditure incurred by a management in paying reasonable sums by way of gratuity, bonus, retrenchment compensation or compensation for temJination of service as not business expenditure. Such expenditure would ordinarily fall within the scope of section 10 (2) (xv) of the Act which authorised the deduction of any expenditure not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee laid out of expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession or vocation.\n\nThe Higlt Court, bov.o::ver, declined to allow the deduction of the sums referred to above in these cases principally relying upon the decision of this Court in Gordon Woodrof!ee Leather Manufacturing\n\nCo. v. The Commissioner of Income-ta.x, Madras('). The facts of that case were briefly thus : One J. H. Phillips was the Director of the assessee Company in that case from the year 1940. On March 22, 1949, he wrote a letter to the assessee expressing his intention to\n\nre~; i~ from its Board as from April 4, 1949 and requested that his resignation be accepted.\n\nOn March 24, 1949, the Board of Directors of the assessee passed a resolution that his resignation be accepted and in appreciation of his long and valuable services to the assessee he be paid a gratuity of Rs. 50,000/- out of which the nss-ssee was to pay • Rs. 40,000/· and its Managing Agent was to pay Rs. 10,000/ -. Subsequently the resolution was approved at the extra-ordinary general IIlecting of the assessee.\n\nAccordingly a sum of Rs. 40,000/- was paid by the asscssee to Mr. J. H. Phi:tipc;.\n\nThe assessee claimed deduction , of the 5aid sum of Rs. 40,000/- under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\n\ne Income-tax Officer as well as the Appcl!ate Assistant Commis lloncr disallowed the said claim on the ground that the Company had no pcnion 6cl\"r:me; that the payment was voluntary and that the entry in the assessee's books clearly indicated that the payment was ---\n\n(1) {1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 211.\n\n: ~\n\n1 ;\n\na capital payment.\n\nThe Tribunal upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioll'r. It held that accordin& to the resolution .the\n\ngratuity was paid \"for long and valuable services to the assC~See\", that there was nothing to indicate that Mr. J. H. Phillips had ad<:epted a lowr salary in expectation of getting a gratuity at the. end of his service; that there was no such practice in the assessee..compa'ny; that during the course of his servic~ he was being remunerated at a graduated scale of salary and a commission of 2!% on the profits; that there was no \"expectancy\" that at the end of the service there wollld\n\nbe recompense for faithful and efficient service and that he had been suitably rewarded by being given a commission oil the profits \"in oi:der G to whip up his enthusiasm\". It was als() found by the Tribunal that in the books of the assessee, the amount had not been debited in the profit and loss account but was debited to the appropriation account thereby indicating that it was an extra payment or a payme11t made in the nature of a capital expense.\n\nOn a reference under sec- 8 tion 66(1) of the Act, the High Court of Madras answered the question relating to the above item of expenditure against the aSBessee. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the High Court.\n\nWhile holding that the claim made by the assessee did not satisfy the proper\n\ntests for claiming exemption under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act, this Court observed as follows:- •\n\n\"In our opinion the proper test to. apply in this case is, was the payment made as a matter of practice which affected the quantum of salary or was there an expectation by. the employee of getting a gratuity or was the sum of money ex- ·\n\npended on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business. But this has not been shown and therefore the amount claimed is not a deductible item under s. 10(2) (xv) .\"\n\nAfter quoting in the course of its judgment the above passage, the High Court proceeded to observe as follows :-\n\n\"Having regard to the test applicable in connection with the contentions made by Mr. Palkhiwala, what required to be investigated is whether the payments in question were made as a matter of practice which had affected the quantum of salary or whether there was an expectation by the employees (whose employment was terminated) of getting a gratuity or, . in the alternative, the above sums were expended on the\n\n• ..\n\nSASOON ~. DAVID V. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 891\n\ngrc;:mnd of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to A facilitate the carrying on of the business.\"\n\nAfter making the above observation, the High Court held that the Company had not placed any evidence to show that there was a practice\n\nin the Company to pay compensation even though its attention was drawn that in the past i.e. between 1946 and 1952, the Company had paid such compensation in two cases on the basis of one monthts basic salary for each year of servke. It also rejected the case of the Company that th~ amount involved had been expended on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the Company even though it observed that the\n\niedy wage bill of the Company was reduced after such payment. The High Court held that the consideration of reduction of the wage bill\n\na\"s foreign to the decision taken by the Company to terminate the\n\nseyices of the employees and to pay them retrenchment compensation and observed that the purpose of the payment so far as could be ascertained from the contents of the resolutions of the Board of Directors and the Company when read with the relevant contents of the agreement for sale was the carrying out of the. obligation arising under the agreement. It also held that the fact the expenses became reduced was\n\nifficient to record a finding that the amount of retrenchment compensation was paid for commercial considerations or expediency, From\n\nthe, perusal of 'the judgment of the High Court it becomes cJear that th'e High Court placed more emphasis on the motive with which the\n\nmounf was expended than the fact that the expenditure had been . incurred in connection with the business of the Company and that such\n\n~ expenditure resulted in the reduction of the annual wage hill of the\n\n~- Compey in the future years. .\n\nIn order to claim deduction under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act, an assessee has to show that the expenditure in question (i) was not an alloance of .the nature described in any of the cJauses (i) to (xiv)\n\n. G of section 10(2); (ii) was not in the nature of a capital expenditure\n\nor peto.Qa, J epeuses of the assessee and (iii) had been laid out or expende<; I whotly and exclusively for the purposes of his business, profession or vocation.\n\nEven assuming that the motive behind the payment ofretrenchment compensation was that the terms of the agreement of the sale of shares should be satisfied, as long as the amount had been B laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the ass~SSC() , there appears to be no good reason for denying\n\nt\\ the benefit of section 10(2) (xv) of the Act to the Company if tilere is no other impediment to do so.\n\nThe facts of these cases are very close to the facts found in {i) Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Patrick Thom8on Ltd. (in liquip dation), (ii) Commissioners oj Inland Revnue v. J. & R. Allan, Ltd. f. (in liquidation), (iii) Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Ptte>, p\n\n& Stephens Ltd. C). The respondent-companies in the said u~ were subsidiaries of a Company called Scottish Drapery Corporati!Nl Ltd., the control of which was acquired by the House of Fraser Ltd.\n\nChanges of organisation which were made in accordance with the policy of the House of Fra, ser Ltd. involved the termination of the contracts of service of the Managing Directors of the respondent-companies and also the eventual liquidation of those companies.\n\nCertain sums were paid by the companies to the managing directors in connection with the <>ancellation of their contracts, the payments being expressed in the first two cases to be in satisfaction of rights to future remuneration, and in the third to be. in lieu of notice.\n\nBefore the Special Commissionen, the companies contended that the payments made by them to the\n\nManaging Directors in connection with the cancellation of theit eofl:.. tracts had been made to relieve them from onerous contracts and were allowable deductions.\n\nThe Crown contended that the payments were not exnses of the companies' businesses t were incidental tO the schemes by which those businesses were acquired by the House ef Fraser Ltd. and were made primarily for the benefit 0f that rompaay~ The Commissioners, however, decided that the deductions claimed wepe\n\nallowable. Upholding the findings of the Commissioners, the Lord Presideat observed at page 156 :-\n\n\"In my opinion the contention put forward by tbe Crown is unsound and the Special Commissioners were correct in rejecting it.\n\nAdmittedly in this case tto question arises in regard to the words \"wholly and exclusively\", and if the Crown's contention is unsound it is not disputed that the disbursement in question falls within section 137 (a). To succeed in their contention the Crown must establish two matters. In the first place it must show thai the liquidation involved a discontinuance of the trade carried on prior to it by the Respondent Company and the subsequent operation of a new trade carried on by House of Fraser. In the second plac_e it must show that the expenditure in question was laid\n\n(1) !7 T.C. 14~.\n\n,. ••\n\n[ l\n\nSASOON J. DAVID v. C.J.T. (Vtnkataramiah, /.) . 893\n\nout fo~ the purposes ?f the new trade. Without both these . steps, tts a:&nment fails. In my opinion neither step in the argument IS made out.\"\n\nIn the present case also, it is seen that the Company continued to function even after its control passed on to the bands of Tatas and the expenditure in question was laid out for the purpose of the Company's own trade and not for the trade of Tatas who were only the shareholders of the Company. We cannot overlook the distinction between the Company and its shareholders. As a result of the expenditure in question, the Company was in fact benefited and it was possible for it to earn more pr:ofits as a consequence of the reduction in the wage bill. It was suggested in the course of the armeots before us that Tatas were actually benefited by the payment in question because the price payable by them for the shares was reduced by the amount spent by the Company. We do not find any substance in this contention.\n\nAdmittedly the assets of the Company bad been valued as on December 31, 1955 at Rs. 155 lacs. Naturally the total value ot the shares of the Company would be Rs. 155 lacs which Tatas had agreed to pay.\n\nSubsequent to December 31. 1955, the Company had by passing the resolution incurred the liability to pay retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of service as stated above. On account of the said resolution, the total value of the assets of the Company was reduced by the amount payable to the employees by way of compensation. It is nat11ral that the purchaser of the shares would ordinarily claim reduction in the consideration payable for the shares by the amount which the Company had undertaken to pay 8ll assets of the Company became reduced to that extenl It cannot, therefore, be said that the Tatas were in any way benefited financially by reason of the reduction in the consideration payable by them (\"f the shares. We feel that the expenditure in respect of which deduction is claimed by the Company in this case fal]j within the third test laid down by this Court in the caso of Gordon Woodroffu Ltather Mllllu/acturlng Co. v. The Commissioner of Income--ta.t Madras (supra) viz. that the sum of money had been expended n the ground of commercial exped}ency\n\nand in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on o~ the bumess~ Wo are of the view that the three tests laid down by this Court 10 th above case viz. (i) that the payment should have been made as a matter ot practice which affected the quantum of salary; (ii) th~~. there was an . t 'ty and (m) that the expectatJGn by the employee of getting a gra w . sum of money was expended on the ground of commercial .exped•ency\n\na d • . . . • or the busme!s of the n tn order mdtrectly to faclhtate the carrymg oa\n\n\"''I I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA.' assessee have to be read disjunctively and if they are so read, the present case .which satisfies the third test should be held as falling under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court -of Gujarat in Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Laxmi Cement Distributors •\n\nPvt. Ltd. ( 1 ) and the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Fairdeal Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (2) and in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Patel Cotton Co. Pvt.\n\nLtd.(') have also understood the principle underlying the decision of_ this Court in Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (supra) in the same way.\n\nThe High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the amount involved in the case did not satisfy the test applicable to the expenditure allowable under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\n\nThe next contention urged on behalf of the Department was that since Davids and Tatas were indirectly benefited by the retrenchment of\n\nthe services of the employees of the Company and payment of compensation to them and since there was no necessity to retrench the services of all the employees, the expenditure in question could not be treated asan expenditure laid m1t wholly and exclusively for business purposes of the Company. It has to be observed here that the expression \"wholly\n\nand exclusively\" used in section 10(2) (xv) of the Act does not mean 'necessarily'.\n\nOrdinarily it is for the assessee to decide whether any expenditure shoul~ be incurred in the course of his or its business.\n\nSuch expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and without any necessity and if it is incurred for promoting the business and to earn profits~ the assessee can claim deduction under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act even though there was no compelling necessity to incur such expenditure.\n\nIt is relevant to refer at this stage to the legislative history of section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which corresponds to section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. An attempt was made in the Income-tax Bill of 1961 to lay down the 'necessity' of the expenditure as a condition fO't' claiming deduction under section 3 7. Section 3 7 ( 1) in the Bill read \"any expenditure .... laid out or expended wholly, necessarily and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed .... \" The introduction of the word 'necessarily' in the above section resulted in public protest.\n\nConsequently when section 37 was finally enacted into law, the word 'necessarily' came to be dropped.\n\nThe fact that somebody other than the assessee is also benefited by the\n\n(1) 104 I.T.R. 711.\n\n. (2) 108 I.T.R. 280.\n\n(3) 108 I.T.R.'846.\n\nJ .,\n\n-. r \\\n\nSASOON J. DAVID v. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, l.) 895\n\n~ : .\n\n_expenditure should not come in the way of an expenditure being\n\n-allowed by way of deduction under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act if it\n\nsatifies otherwise the tests laid down by law.\n\nThis view is in accord with the followini observations made by this Court in The Commissioner of Income.tax, Madras v.Chandulal KesMvlal & Co. PetladC)\n\n\"Another fact that emergs from these cases is that if the B\n\n expense is incurred for fostering the business of another only or was made by way of distribution of profits or was wholly gratuitous or for some improper or oblique purpose outside the course of business then the expense is not deductible. Jn deciding whether a payment of money is a deductible expenditure orie. has to take into consideration questions of commercial expediency and the principles of ordinary commercial trading. If the payment or expenditure is incurred for the purpose of the trade of the assessee it does not matter that the payment may inure to the benefit of a third party (Usher's Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce) (6 T. C. 388). Another\n\ntest is whether the transaction is properly entered into as a part of the assessee's legitimate commercial undertaking in order to facilitate the carrying on of its business; and it is immaterial that a third party also benefits thereby (Eastern Investments Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, West\n\n, Bengal) (1951) S.C.R. 594. But in every case it is a question of fact whether the expenditure was expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of trade or business of the assessee.\"\n\n--- --..u>· In the instant case, it was the case of the Company that many of the employees were old and superfluous and the business could be , carried on with a smaller number and the only way in which they could reduce the number was to terminate the services of all the employees by paying tem compensation and thereafter remploying some of them only. If the Company felt that that was a method which would inure to its benefit, it cannot be said that the payment of compensation was made with an oblique motive and without regard to commercial considerations or expediency. The High Court, therefore, erred on the facts and in the circumstances of the case in holding that the sum of Rs. 1,27,511/- was not deductible under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act and in answering questions Nos. ( 1) and ( 2) referred to it in Income-tax Reference No. 58 of 1963 arising out of the assessment\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979} 3 S.C.lt\n\nA order for the year 1957-58 agaimt the assessee and in favour of t}le\n\nDepartment to the extent of Rs. 1,27,511/-. Similarly it erred in disallowing the claim made in respe\\:t of Rs. 16,885/- for each of the three succeeding assessment years.\n\nWe, therefore, allow these appeals and hold that Rs. 1,27,511/- a was also deductible under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act during the assessment year 1957-58 and sum of Rs. 16,8851referred to above was allowable as a deduction durlng each of the three succeeding assessment years. The Department shall py costs to the appellant. (Hearing fee one set only). c P.B.R.\n\nAppeals ttUowed.\n\n. ' /\n\nMGIPF-330SCil/i79:.......2500-4-12-79", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "SASSOON J. DAVID & CO. (P) LTD., BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SASSOON J. DAVlD & CO. (P) LTD., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOMBAY\n\nC.I.T., BOMBAY\n\nMay 3, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income Ttx Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Ttx Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Ttx Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Davids", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Davids, who held the share~ of the company entered into an agreement with Taw to sell to them all the wares for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Davids"}}, {"text": "Taw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 769, "end_char": 772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Davids, who held the share~ of the company entered into an agreement with Taw to sell to them all the wares for Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Ttx Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Ttx Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1108, "end_char": 1135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tatas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2118, "end_char": 2123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "---~\n\nDismissing the assessee's appeal the Appellate Tribunal held that the expensc.s had not been incurred for the purpose of the company but purely as a result of the bargain between Davids and Tatas and assuming that the paymen~ were beneficial to the assessees by reason of the reduction in its establishment expenes, no deduction could be ollowed under s. 10(2) (xv) since the payment wa~ made to the benefit of a third party."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2637, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SASOON J. DAVID", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2947, "end_char": 2962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ...\n\nSASOON J. DAVID V. C.I.T. 879\n\nAllowing the assessee's appeals\n\n1:tF1D : 1 (a) The three tests Iai:d down by this Court in Gordon Woodroi/te'l case viz., ("}}, {"text": "Gordon Woodroi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ...\n\nSASOON J. DAVID V. C.I.T. 879\n\nAllowing the assessee's appeals\n\n1:tF1D : 1 (a) The three tests Iai:d down by this Court in Gordon Woodroi/te'l case viz., ("}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8063, "end_char": 8074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, Dinesh Vyas, K. 1."}}, {"text": "Dinesh Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, Dinesh Vyas, K. 1."}}, {"text": "Sree Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John and Sree Narain for the Appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "HardyaJ Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8156, "end_char": 8169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HardyaJ Hardy, Champat Rai, B. B. Tawekley and Miss A Su, hashini for the Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "Champat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HardyaJ Hardy, Champat Rai, B. B. Tawekley and Miss A Su, hashini for the Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawekley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8184, "end_char": 8198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HardyaJ Hardy, Champat Rai, B. B. Tawekley and Miss A Su, hashini for the Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "A Su", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HardyaJ Hardy, Champat Rai, B. B. Tawekley and Miss A Su, hashini for the Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "B VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8306, "end_char": 8321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nB VENKATARAMIAH, J.-Since these appeals by certificate involve a common question of law, we find it convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment."}}, {"text": "SASOON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8462, "end_char": 8468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SASOON J, DAVID V. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 881\n\n .. Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "DAVID V. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SASOON J, DAVID V. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 881\n\n .. Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Sasoon J. David & Co. Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8794, "end_char": 8825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee, M/s Sasoon J. David & Co. Pvt."}}, {"text": "Percival David", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9183, "end_char": 9197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..,..\n\nThe Company is an investment company and its shares were origi- '1\" nally heJd either directly or through their nominees by Sir Percival David, Lady David and Mr. V. P. David (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Davids') ."}}, {"text": "David", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9204, "end_char": 9209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..,..\n\nThe Company is an investment company and its shares were origi- '1\" nally heJd either directly or through their nominees by Sir Percival David, Lady David and Mr. V. P. David (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Davids') .", "canonical_name": "Davids"}}, {"text": "V. P. David", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9218, "end_char": 9229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..,..\n\nThe Company is an investment company and its shares were origi- '1\" nally heJd either directly or through their nominees by Sir Percival David, Lady David and Mr. V. P. David (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Davids') ."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9498, "end_char": 9515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "155 lacs as on December 31, 1955."}}, {"text": "December 2, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9571, "end_char": 9587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a meeting of the directors of the Company held on December 2, 1955, a resolution was passed recommending that the employees of the Company whose nameS\n\nwere ret out in the statement attached thereto be paid certain sums or annuity as set out against the names of each of them as and by way of retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of employment and also for long and faithful services rendered by them to the Company in the past and that their services might be terminated."}}, {"text": "January 17, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10313, "end_char": 10329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly •\n\nan extra ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company wa$ held on January 17, 1956 but it was adjourned to January 25,1956."}}, {"text": "January 25,1956.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly •\n\nan extra ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company wa$ held on January 17, 1956 but it was adjourned to January 25,1956."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10744, "end_char": 10757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ment COmpensation and compensa-tion for termination of employment and alro additional retrenchment compensation and compensation for termination of employment in the case of some of them and to terminate their services on or after April 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "Tata Sons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10820, "end_char": 10834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter an agreement was entered into between Davids and Tata Sons Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tatas') on March 23, 1956 agreeing to sell the 1000 shares held by Davids or their nominees in the Company in favour of Tatas or their nominees for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10879, "end_char": 10893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter an agreement was entered into between Davids and Tata Sons Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tatas') on March 23, 1956 agreeing to sell the 1000 shares held by Davids or their nominees in the Company in favour of Tatas or their nominees for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11289, "end_char": 11303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said agreement inter alia provided that the sum voted by the Company for payment of gratuities and/ or as compensation for loss of employment to existing directors and employees of th~ Company with respect to their services upto and inclusive of March 31, 1956 and a further amount of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt..\n\nR~ ."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11329, "end_char": 11366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said agreement inter alia provided that the sum voted by the Company for payment of gratuities and/ or as compensation for loss of employment to existing directors and employees of th~ Company with respect to their services upto and inclusive of March 31, 1956 and a further amount of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt..\n\nR~ ."}}, {"text": "Mathalone", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11422, "end_char": 11431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16,188/- payable to the Managing Director, Mr. Mathalone lhould' be paid in accordance with the resolution by the Company and tke amount so paid should be deducted from the purchase price of Rs.", "canonical_name": "R. Mathalone"}}, {"text": "A. E. Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12797, "end_char": 12809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annuity ofShri A. E. Joseph, former Director as per resolutions dated 2·12-1955 and 25-1-1956 .", "canonical_name": "A. E. Joseph:-"}}, {"text": "R. Mathalone", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12971, "end_char": 12983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Managing\n\nDirector Mr. R. Mathalone.\"", "canonical_name": "R. Mathalone"}}, {"text": "A.E. J dseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13056, "end_char": 13068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,64,899/-\n\nIt should be mentioned here that A.E. J dseph, the former Director of the Company had to be paid as per the resolution of the Company Rs."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13417, "end_char": 13427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. E. Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13738, "end_char": 13750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16,885/- being the annuity pid to Mr. A. E. Joseph pursuant to the resolution.", "canonical_name": "A. E. Joseph:-"}}, {"text": "s 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14259, "end_char": 14266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15441, "end_char": 15449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18229, "end_char": 18246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has referred to the Bombay High Court decision in the case of F.E. Dinishaw Ltd., but the facts in the present case are not identical with those of the case mentioned.\""}}, {"text": "F.E. Dinishaw Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18271, "end_char": 18289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has referred to the Bombay High Court decision in the case of F.E. Dinishaw Ltd., but the facts in the present case are not identical with those of the case mentioned.\""}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19255, "end_char": 19268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19370, "end_char": 19390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Company filed an application before the High Court of Bombay under section 66(2) of the Act and\n\nthe High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case and to refer the following questions of law for its opinion:-\n\n\" ( 1) Whether the Tribunal erred in law disallowing the D amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19397, "end_char": 19410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19646, "end_char": 19657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19665, "end_char": 19692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20173, "end_char": 20183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20191, "end_char": 20218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20354, "end_char": 20364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "A. E. Joseph:-", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20534, "end_char": 20548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on the Tribunal referred tinder section 66 (1) the following question of law arising out of the orders G of assessment for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960- 61 in respect of the annuity paid to Mr. A. E. Joseph:-\n\n\"Whethe~ in computing the assessee's business income of the accounting years 1957, 1958 and 1959, relevant for the assessment ars 1958-59, 1959~60 and 1960~61, the .H sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "A. E. Joseph:-"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20770, "end_char": 20780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "February 5, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21185, "end_char": 21201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1963 arising out of the assessment proceeding~S of the year 1957-58 was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay and decided on February 5, 1970."}}, {"text": "A E. Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22822, "end_char": 22833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16,885/- to Mr. A E. Joseph in each of the accoonling years relative to the assessment years in question.", "canonical_name": "A. E. Joseph:-"}}, {"text": "January 25, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23850, "end_char": 23866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "155 lacs as on December 31, 1955; that -t a meeting of the directors held on December 2, 1955, it had been resolved that the services of 22 employees should be terminated by paY, ing retrenchment compensation; that on January 25, 1956 al the extra-ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company, it was resolved that the employees of the Company be paid certain\n\nSUll1S or annuity set out against the names of each of them and their services should be terminated with efkct from April 1, 1956; that an •) agreement was entered into between Davids and Tatas on March 23,\n\nT - - 1956 rgarding the J; ale of the shares in favour of the Tatas; that the \\ uid agreement referred to the resolution passed at the meeting of the '\n\nshareholders of the Company; that the Company paid retrenchment compensation according to the said resolution and that the Tatas dedtlcted from the purchase price the sum payable by the Company in\n\naccordance with the resolution of the Company from out of the con aideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 23,\n\nT - - 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24205, "end_char": 24226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "155 lacs as on December 31, 1955; that -t a meeting of the directors held on December 2, 1955, it had been resolved that the services of 22 employees should be terminated by paY, ing retrenchment compensation; that on January 25, 1956 al the extra-ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company, it was resolved that the employees of the Company be paid certain\n\nSUll1S or annuity set out against the names of each of them and their services should be terminated with efkct from April 1, 1956; that an •) agreement was entered into between Davids and Tatas on March 23,\n\nT - - 1956 rgarding the J; ale of the shares in favour of the Tatas; that the \\ uid agreement referred to the resolution passed at the meeting of the '\n\nshareholders of the Company; that the Company paid retrenchment compensation according to the said resolution and that the Tatas dedtlcted from the purchase price the sum payable by the Company in\n\naccordance with the resolution of the Company from out of the con aideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Decmber 2,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24815, "end_char": 24831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company dated Decmber 2,\n\n1955, the resolutions passed at the extraordinary general meeting ol the shareholders of the Company held on January 25, 1956, the agree-- meat dated March 23, 1956 entered into between Davids and Taw, 1he Jx>oks of aceount of the Company showing payments made by the Company by way of retrenchment compensation and the fact that 9 \"the 22 employees whose services had been terminated had peen reployed, there was no other evidence before the Income-tax Officer."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25933, "end_char": 25950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26392, "end_char": 26429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tr:ibu, pal proced .to dispose of tbe case before it on e basis that\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "SASOON J. DAVID V. C.I.T. (Jienkatarpmiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29222, "end_char": 29263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ,'>\n\n•. :.,:-----\n\nSASOON J. DAVID V. C.I.T. (Jienkatarpmiah, /.) SSg\n\nhar~ by Davids to Tatas. ."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30262, "end_char": 30272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. H. Phillips", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30827, "end_char": 30841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that case were briefly thus : One J. H. Phillips was the Director of the assessee Company in that case from the year 1940.", "canonical_name": "J. H. Phillips"}}, {"text": "March 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30919, "end_char": 30933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 22, 1949, he wrote a letter to the assessee expressing his intention to\n\nre~; i~ from its Board as from April 4, 1949 and requested that his resignation be accepted."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31029, "end_char": 31042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 22, 1949, he wrote a letter to the assessee expressing his intention to\n\nre~; i~ from its Board as from April 4, 1949 and requested that his resignation be accepted."}}, {"text": "March 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31095, "end_char": 31109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 24, 1949, the Board of Directors of the assessee passed a resolution that his resignation be accepted and in appreciation of his long and valuable services to the assessee he be paid a gratuity of Rs."}}, {"text": "J. H. Phi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31577, "end_char": 31586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000/- was paid by the asscssee to Mr. J. H. Phi:tipc;.", "canonical_name": "J. H. Phillips"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31666, "end_char": 31679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33147, "end_char": 33167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference under sec- 8 tion 66(1) of the Act, the High Court of Madras answered the question relating to the above item of expenditure against the aSBessee."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33431, "end_char": 33444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33946, "end_char": 33954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palkhiwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34163, "end_char": 34173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After quoting in the course of its judgment the above passage, the High Court proceeded to observe as follows :-\n\n\"Having regard to the test applicable in connection with the contentions made by Mr. Palkhiwala, what required to be investigated is whether the payments in question were made as a matter of practice which had affected the quantum of salary or whether there was an expectation by the employees (whose employment was terminated) of getting a gratuity or, ."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36434, "end_char": 36447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36614, "end_char": 36627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37195, "end_char": 37208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Scottish Drapery Corporati!Nl Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37655, "end_char": 37689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent-companies in the said u~ were subsidiaries of a Company called Scottish Drapery Corporati!Nl Ltd., the control of which was acquired by the House of Fraser Ltd.\n\nChanges of organisation which were made in accordance with the policy of the House of Fra, ser Ltd. involved the termination of the contracts of service of the Managing Directors of the respondent-companies and also the eventual liquidation of those companies."}}, {"text": "House of Fraser Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37732, "end_char": 37752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent-companies in the said u~ were subsidiaries of a Company called Scottish Drapery Corporati!Nl Ltd., the control of which was acquired by the House of Fraser Ltd.\n\nChanges of organisation which were made in accordance with the policy of the House of Fra, ser Ltd. involved the termination of the contracts of service of the Managing Directors of the respondent-companies and also the eventual liquidation of those companies."}}, {"text": "section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39289, "end_char": 39300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 31. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40931, "end_char": 40948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent to December 31."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42715, "end_char": 42728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court -of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42751, "end_char": 42773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court -of Gujarat in Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Laxmi Cement Distributors •\n\nPvt."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43404, "end_char": 43417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43950, "end_char": 43963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44316, "end_char": 44329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44488, "end_char": 44498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44506, "end_char": 44526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44548, "end_char": 44565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44722, "end_char": 44731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44735, "end_char": 44744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45030, "end_char": 45040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45425, "end_char": 45438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47607, "end_char": 47620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48145, "end_char": 48158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4-12-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48474, "end_char": 48481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MGIPF-330SCil/i79:.......2500-4-12-79"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_897_904_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "JANARDAN DATTUAPPA BONDRE, ETC. v.\n\nGOVINDPRASAD SHIVPRASAD CHOUDHARY & ORS. ETC.\n\nMay 3, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nRepreS<11tation of the People Act 1951 (43 of 1951)-S. 97-Notice of r<- crimination wllen neces, sary-Every order of recount does not bring the section into play.\n\nThe appellant was declared elected to the State Assembly in the General Election in 1978. He secured 27785 votes. The fifth respondent was given 27,604 votes and the third respondent 27,447 votes.\n\nThe election of the appellant was questioned by an election petition filed in the High Court by a voter, the first respondent.\n\nHaving regard to the allegations made in respect of a number of ballot papers,\n\nthe High Court allo\\ved fresh scrutiny and recount of the votes, and entrll5ted D the task to a Special Officer of the High Court. The Special Officer pointed out that in one envelope from the box of the 3rd respondent out of 278 ballot papers 28 were of the 3rd respondent while the balance of 250 \\Vere the votes cast in favour of the appellant. Similarly in the envelope of the appellant out of 408 ballot papers found in this box only 158 were votes cast in his favour and\n\n250 were in favour of the 3rd respondent and that by reason of this some mistake \\.vas committed by the Returning Officer while packing the ballot papers £ in the two. envelopes of the appellant and the 3rd repondent. On the report of the Special Officer, it was contended before the High Court on behalf of the fifth respondent that it was not permissible to take into account the 250 votes cast in favour of the appellant which v./ere found in the packet of the third respondent because the order of the High Court directing a recount \\'\\'as limited to finding out whether any improper votes had been accepted in favour of the appellant and whether any proper vote!5 of the fifth repondent had been reject- F ed.\n\nThe High Court relying on P. Malaichami v. M. Ambalam. [1973) 3 SCR 1016 took the view that as the appellant had not filed a notice of recrimination under s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was not open to him to allege that any of his votes had been improperly counted in favour of\n\nome other candidate.\n\nOn the basis of the report of the Special Officer the High Court held that the fifth respondent had received 191 votes more than the appellant and declared the appellan't's election to be void.\n\nIt declared the fifth respondent to be duly elected.\n\nIn the appellant's appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court H had erred in holding that s. 97 comes into play and that no notice of recrin1ination was necessary for the purpose of having the 250 votes, whose validity was\n\nnever in dispute and \\Vhich had been cast in favour of the appellant, counted in the total number of votes secured by the appellant.\n\nHELD : 1. When the High Court directed the \"physical\" count of the votes cast in favour of the appellant, third respondent and others, \\Vhat was intended was a n1echanical recount of these votes and nothing more.\n\nIt did not envisage any inquiry into their validity, and \\Vhether any of them had been improperly received.\n\nWhen the appellant requested that the 250 votes cast in his favour but included in the packet pertaining to the third respondent should be counted in his total, he was asking for nothing more than the application of a mechanical process.\n\nThese votes had never been regarded as cast in favour of the third respondent. There \\Vas never any dispute that they were vote:> for the appellant.\n\nTheir validity was never doubted. Plainly what had happened was that by an error, 250 ballot papers cast in favour of the appellant had been erroneously placed in the packet of the third respondent.\n\n[901G-902A]\n\n2. The accident that they were not placed in his packet but in the third respondent's packet did not render them any the less votes belonging to the appellant. Their inclusion in calculating the appellant's total was a necessary part of the process involved in deciding \\Vhether he had been duly elected or whether on the election petition his election should be declared void. It was a process relevant to the first of the reliefs claimed by the election petition. that is to say, the election of the appellant be declared void.\n\nThe other relief claimed by the election petitioner \\Vias that the fifth respondent be declared duly elected. [902CEl\n\n3. A notice of recrimination under s. 97 of the Act is necessary only when the returned candidate or any other candidate disputes the grant of the further declaration that he or some other candidate should be declared duly elected.\n\n[902FJ\n\nIn the instant case \\Vhen the recount was taken, the High Court had not yet concluded that the election of the appellant was invalid. It was in the process of determining that question, and the question could properly be determined only after giving to the appellant the benefit of all the votes cast for him. These would include the 250 votes cast in his favour, even though they were found placed in the third respondent's packet.\n\nOnce the benefit of his 250 votes is given to the appellant, he becomes the candidate with the highest number of votes.\n\nHis election cannot be declared void. That being so, no question arises of the 2ppe1Iant wanting to give evidence to prove that the election of any other candidate would have been void if he had been the returned candidate.\n\nTherefore, no notice for recrimination under s, 97 was necessary. [902G-903AJ\n\n4. The appellant was concerned with his claim to his 250 votes. The claint did not involve any reconsideration of the validity of any votes, whether cast in his favour or any other candidate. What \\Vas called for v, ras a mere mechanical process of counting. Every order of recount does not bring s. 97 into play, [9030-El\n\nJabar Singh v. G<nda Lal [1964] 6\n\nSCR 54, 60; Anirudh Prasad v.\n\nRaieshwari Saroi Das & Ors., [1976] Suppl. SCR 91; referred to.\n\nH P. Malaiclwmi v. M. Ambalam [1973] 3 SCR 1016; distinguished.\n\n5. The High Court should not have declined to include in the appellanfs total votes the 250 votes cast in favour of the appellant but included in the packet\n\nof the third respondent. If those votes are included in the appellant's tolal the app::-llant secures the highest number of votes and is entitled to be declared elected. [903F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1936 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 19-8-78/3-10-78 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in E.P. No. 1/78.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2387 of 1978\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 3-8-78122-9-7813-10-78 of C the Bonbay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Election Petition No.\n\n]178.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, B. Pc Salve, A. N. Karkhanis and Mrs. S. Bhandare for the Appellant in C.A. 1936/78.\n\nN. M. G1wtate and S. V. Deshpande for the Appellant i_n C.A. 2387178.\n\nM. N. Phadke, Mrs. V. D. Khanna and P. G. Palsikar for R. 2 in C.A. 1936 of 1978.\n\nU. R. Lalit and V. N. Ganpule for R. 5 in C.A. 1936/78.\n\nT!cc Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAKi J.-These two appeals under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay declaring void the election of Janardan Dattuappa Bondre to the 104-Chikhli Legislative Assembly Constituency, F Maharashtra and declaring Bharat Rajabhau Bondre to be duly elected.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1936 (NCE) of 1978 has been filed by Janardan Dattuappa Bondre and Civil Appeal No. 2387 (NCE) of 1978 by Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar.\n\nThe parties will be referred to G ' hereinafter according to their array in the former appeal.\n\nGeneral elections to the Legislative Assembly of Maharashtra were held in February. 1978.\n\nThe appellant Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, was declared elected to the 104-Chikhli Assembly Constituency.\n\nHe secured 27,785 votes.\n\nThe fifth respondent, Bharat H Rajabhau Bondre was given 27,604 votes and the third respondent, Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar 27,447 votes.\n\nThe election of the\n\nappellant was questioned by an election petition filed in the High Court of Bombay by a vot, r, the first respondent, Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhary.\n\nThe High Court did not find substance in most of the ground> raised in the election petition, but having regard to the allegations made in respect of a number of ballot papers it allowed fresh scrutiny and. recount of the votes.\n\nThe task was entrusted to a Special Officer of the High Court. After considering his report and the material before it, the High Court made an order dated September 22, 1978 allowing the election petition, detlaring the election of the .. appellant'to. be void and further declaring the fifth respondent to be duly elected.\n\nThe decision was rendered on the finding that after taking into account the votes now counted in favour of the different candidates, the fifth respondent was found to have received 191 votes more than the appellant .. This result wa~ rcachcd .. aftef\" denying to the appellant the benefit of 250 ballot papers cast in his favour but found included in the packet of Bahckar's ballot papers. If these 250\n\nballot papers are counted in favour of the appellant, it is not disputed\n\nthat the _result of the election must swing in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe submissions of learned counsel for .the parties have, therefore, centred mainly on this aspect of the case.\n\nE The relevant portion of the report of the Special Officer reads :-\n\n1\\Vhile the counting \\Vas in progress, it 'vas found that in one envelope from Box No. 2 of candidate No. 4 Shri Bahekar, there were 278 ballot papers noted by the Returning Officer on the envelope but at the time of actual counting it was found that from them 28 ballot papers were of Shri Bahekar, while the. remaining were of votes cast, in favour of candidate No. 3 Shri Janardhan Bondre.\n\nSimilarly, in the envelope of Shri J anardhan Bondre there were 408 ballot papers noted by the Returning Officer but :it the time of actual counting of that envelope it was noticed that from out of 40\"8 ballot papers, 158 only were of Shri\" Janardhan Bondre and the remaining were of Shri Bahekar.\n\nIt would be therefore clear that there was some mistake committed by the Returning Officer while packing the ballot papers in the two envelopes of Shri Bahekar and Janardhan Bondre.\"\n\nOn the report of the Special Officer, it was contended before the High Court on behalf of the fifth respondent that it was not pennis- •\n\nsible to take into account the 250 votes cast in favour of the appellant and found in the packet of Bahekar because the order of the\n\nHiQh Court directincr a recount was limited to finding out whether any b improper votes had been accepted in favour of the appellant and whether any proper votes of the fifth respondent had been rejected.\n\nRelying on P. Malaichami v. M. Ambalam,('), the High Court took the view that as the appellant had not filed a notice of recrimination under s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was not open to him to allege that any of his votes had been improperly counted in favour of some other candidate.\n\nIn the appeal filed by Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, the principal contention on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court has erred in holding that Section 97 comes into play. It is vehemently contended that no notice ofl recrimination was necessary for the purpose of having the 250 votes, whose validity was never in dispute and which had been cast in favour of the appellant, counted in the total number of votes secured by the appellant.\n\nIt seems to us that the appellant is right.\n\nThe order for a recount was made by the High Court on an application made by the election petitioner.\n\nThe directions in the order required the Special Officer, among other things, to physically count the votes recorded in favour of the appellant, Bahekar and other candidates in order to ascertain whether those votes were less than the number of votes declared as having been respectively secured by them.\n\nDuring the recount, the appellant applied to the Special Officer that if any votes cast in his favour were found to have been erroneously counted in the total of ot_her candidates the mistake should be rectified by including them in his total.\n\nA similar application was made by Bahekar.\n\nThe High Court rejected the appellant's application on the ground that h_e had not filed a notice of recrimination.\n\nIt seems to us that when the High Court directed the \"physical\" count of the votes cast in favour of the appellant, Bahekar and others what was intended was a mechanical recount of those votes and nothing more.\n\nIt did not envisage any enquiry into their validity, and whether any of them had been improperly received.\n\nWhen the appellant requested that the 250 votes cast in his favour but included in the packet pertaining to Bahekar should be counted in his total, he was asking for nothing more than the application of a mechanical process.\n\nThose votes had never been regarded as cast in favour of Bahekar.\n\nThere was never any dispute that they were votes for the appellant.\n\nTheir validity was never doubted.\n\nPlainly\n\n(1) [197313 S.C. R. 1016\n\nwhat had happened wµs that by an error 250 ballot papers cast in favour of the appellant had been erroneously placed in the packet of Bahekar.\n\nIt is quite probable that as equal numbers of ballot papers of the two candidates were exchanged, the error occurred after the ballot papers of each candidate had been separately tied in bundles of 50, as is required by the \"Handbook for Returning Officers\".\n\nAfter withdrawing the 250 votes of Bahekar from the appellant's packet and the appellant's 250 votes from Bahekar's packt, the Special Officer could not stop there.\n\nThe 250 votes of each candidate had then to be counted in his total.\n\nThey were not valid votes.\n\nThe inclusion of the 250 votes cast in favour of the appellant was material for the purpose of determining the total number of votes received by him.\n\nThe accident that they were not placed it1 his packet but in Bahekar's packet did not render them any the less votes belonging to the appellant.\n\nTheir inclusion in calculating the appellant's total was a necessary part of the process involved in deciding whether he had been duly elected or whether on the election petition, his election should be declared void. It was a process relevant to the first of the reliefs claimed by the election petitioner, that is to say, that the election of the appellant be declared void.\n\nThe other relief claimed by the election petitioner was that the fifth respondent be declared duly elected.\n\nNow, as was observed in Jabar Singh v.\n\nGenda Lal,(') where both reliefs are claimed in an election petition the Court must first \"decide the question whether the ekction of the returned candidate is valid or not, and if it is found that the said election is void, it makes a declaration to that effect and then deals with the further question whether the petitioner himself or some other person can be said to have been duly elected\".\n\nA notice of recrimination under section 97 of the Act is necessary only where the returned candidate or other candidate disputes the grant of the further declaration sought by the election petitioner that he or some other candidate should be declared duly elected.\n\nWhen the recount wllS taken, the High Court had not yet concluded that the election of the appellant was invalid. It was in the process of determining that question, and the question could properly be determined only after giving to the appellant the benefit of all the votes cast for him. These would include the 250 votes cast in his favour, even though they were found placed in Bahekar's packet.\n\nOnce the benefit of his 250 votes is i:iven to the appellant, he becomes the candidate with the highest number of votes.\n\nHis election cannot be declared void.\n\n(1) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 54, GO.\n\n--'¥\n\n~ • ..\n\n- .\n\nThat being so, no question arises of the appellant wanting to give evidence to prove that the election of any other canddiate would have been void if he had been the returned candidate.\n\nTherefore, no notice for recrimination under section 97 was necessary. In the circumstances, the High Court erred in declining to count the appellant's 250 votes in his total on the ground that no' notice of recrimination under section 97 of the Act had been given.\n\nIn P. Malaichami v. M. Ambalam (supra), on which the High Court relied, the facts were different. In that case, the recount ordered did not inolvc the mere mechanical process of counting the valid votes cast in favour of the parties. It involved the kind ot counting contemplated under Rule 56 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, \"with all its implications\".\n\nThe validity of the votes was to be under re-examination.\n\nAnd if the returned candidate intended to take the benefit of such a recount against the election petitioner or other candidate, in whose favour the further declaration of being duly elected had been claimed, it was necessary for him to file a notice of recrimination.\n\nIn fhe present case, the appellant was concerned with his claim to his 250 votes.\n\nThe claim did not involve any reconsideration of the validity of any votes, whether cast in his favour or any other candidate; what was called for was\n\na mere mechanical process of counting.\n\nThat every order of recount does not bring section 97 into play was laid down by this E Court in Anirudh Prasad v. Rajeshwari Saroj Das & Ors.(')\n\nWe are of opinion that the High Court should not have declined to include in the appellant's total votes the 250 votes cast in favour of the appellant but included in the packet of Bahekar. If those votes are included in the appellant's total, the appellant secures the highest F number of votes and is entitled to be declared elected.\n\nJn the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the other contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court was in error in directing a recount of the ballot papers .\n\nA submission was made by learned counsel for the fifth respondent that the postal ballot papers were printed in Hindi and therefore, Rule 22 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 was contravened.\n\nThe point was raised before the High Court and, has, in our opinion, been rightly repelled.\n\nOn the material before us it is not possible to s;.y that the result of the election has been materially effected by that irregularity.\n\n;, (I) [1976] Suppl. S. C. R. 91.\n\nA In the appeal filed by Bahekar, the contention raised for him is\n\nthat on a proper and complete reconnt of the votes cast for the respective candidates it is he who should be declared duly elected. We are not satisfied that the grounds raised have any substance, and we see no force in his appeal.\n\nIn the result, Civil Appeal No. 1936 (NCE) of 1978 is allowed and Civil Appeal No. 2387 (NCE) of 1978 is dismiS>ed. The order of the High Court declaring the election of the appellant void and declaring the fifth respondent duly elected is set aside.\n\nThe election petition is dismissed.\n\nThe appellant is entitled to his costs throughout against the second and the fifth respondents in the election petition as well as in the appeal filed by him.\n\nThe remaining respondents will bear their own costs in that appeal.\n\nAll the parties will bear their own costs in the other appeal.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nC.A. 1936/78 allowed.\n\nC.A. 2387 /78 dismissed.\n\nr •", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "JANARDAN DATTUAPPA BONDRE, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JANARDAN DATTUAPPA BONDRE, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVINDPRASAD SHIVPRASAD CHOUDHARY & ORS. 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["}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 6\n\nSCR 54", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 SCR 1016", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6013, "end_char": 6030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6724, "end_char": 6738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, B. Pc Salve, A. N. Karkhanis and Mrs. S. Bhandare for the Appellant in C.A. 1936/78."}}, {"text": "A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, B. Pc Salve, A. N. Karkhanis and Mrs. S. Bhandare for the Appellant in C.A. 1936/78."}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6778, "end_char": 6789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, B. Pc Salve, A. N. Karkhanis and Mrs. S. Bhandare for the Appellant in C.A. 1936/78."}}, {"text": "N. M. G1wtate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6826, "end_char": 6839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. M. G1wtate and S. V. Deshpande for the Appellant i_n C.A. 2387178."}}, {"text": "S. V. Deshpande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6844, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. M. G1wtate and S. V. Deshpande for the Appellant i_n C.A. 2387178."}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6897, "end_char": 6909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, Mrs. V. D. Khanna and P. G. Palsikar for R. 2 in C.A. 1936 of 1978."}}, {"text": "V. D. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, Mrs. V. D. Khanna and P. G. Palsikar for R. 2 in C.A. 1936 of 1978."}}, {"text": "P. G. Palsikar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, Mrs. V. D. Khanna and P. G. Palsikar for R. 2 in C.A. 1936 of 1978."}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6980, "end_char": 6991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit and V. N. Ganpule for R. 5 in C.A. 1936/78."}}, {"text": "V. N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit and V. N. Ganpule for R. 5 in C.A. 1936/78."}}, {"text": "PATHAKi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7082, "end_char": 7089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T!cc Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAKi J.-These two appeals under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay declaring void the election of Janardan Dattuappa Bondre to the 104-Chikhli Legislative Assembly Constituency, F Maharashtra and declaring Bharat Rajabhau Bondre to be duly elected."}}, {"text": "section 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7137, "end_char": 7175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Janardan Dattuappa Bondre", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7265, "end_char": 7290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T!cc Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAKi J.-These two appeals under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay declaring void the election of Janardan Dattuappa Bondre to the 104-Chikhli Legislative Assembly Constituency, F Maharashtra and declaring Bharat Rajabhau Bondre to be duly elected.", "canonical_name": "JANARDAN DATTUAPPA BONDRE, ETC"}}, {"text": "Bharat Rajabhau Bondre", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7373, "end_char": 7395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T!cc Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAKi J.-These two appeals under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay declaring void the election of Janardan Dattuappa Bondre to the 104-Chikhli Legislative Assembly Constituency, F Maharashtra and declaring Bharat Rajabhau Bondre to be duly elected.", "canonical_name": "Bharat H Rajabhau Bondre"}}, {"text": "Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7540, "end_char": 7568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2387 (NCE) of 1978 by Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar.", "canonical_name": "Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar"}}, {"text": "Janardan Dattuappa Bondre", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7772, "end_char": 7797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, was declared elected to the 104-Chikhli Assembly Constituency.", "canonical_name": "JANARDAN DATTUAPPA BONDRE, ETC"}}, {"text": "Bharat H Rajabhau Bondre", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7911, "end_char": 7935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fifth respondent, Bharat H Rajabhau Bondre was given 27,604 votes and the third respondent, Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar 27,447 votes.", "canonical_name": "Bharat H Rajabhau Bondre"}}, {"text": "Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7985, "end_char": 8013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fifth respondent, Bharat H Rajabhau Bondre was given 27,604 votes and the third respondent, Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar 27,447 votes.", "canonical_name": "Keshavrao Jaiwantrao Bahekar"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election of the\n\nappellant was questioned by an election petition filed in the High Court of Bombay by a vot, r, the first respondent, Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhary."}}, {"text": "Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election of the\n\nappellant was questioned by an election petition filed in the High Court of Bombay by a vot, r, the first respondent, Govindprasad Shivprasad Choudhary.", "canonical_name": "GOVINDPRASAD SHIVPRASAD CHOUDHARY & ORS. ETC"}}, {"text": "September 22, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8589, "end_char": 8607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After considering his report and the material before it, the High Court made an order dated September 22, 1978 allowing the election petition, detlaring the election of the .. appellant'to."}}, {"text": "Bahckar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9124, "end_char": 9131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision was rendered on the finding that after taking into account the votes now counted in favour of the different candidates, the fifth respondent was found to have received 191 votes more than the appellant .. This result wa~ rcachcd .. aftef\" denying to the appellant the benefit of 250 ballot papers cast in his favour but found included in the packet of Bahckar's ballot papers.", "canonical_name": "Bahckar"}}, {"text": "Bahekar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9606, "end_char": 9613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 Shri Bahekar, there were 278 ballot papers noted by the Returning Officer on the envelope but at the time of actual counting it was found that from them 28 ballot papers were of Shri Bahekar, while the.", "canonical_name": "Bahckar"}}, {"text": "Janardhan Bondre", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9868, "end_char": 9884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 Shri Janardhan Bondre.", "canonical_name": "J anardhan Bondre"}}, {"text": "J anardhan Bondre", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9922, "end_char": 9939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in the envelope of Shri J anardhan Bondre there were 408 ballot papers noted by the Returning Officer but :it the time of actual counting of that envelope it was noticed that from out of 40\"8 ballot papers, 158 only were of Shri\" Janardhan Bondre and the remaining were of Shri Bahekar.", "canonical_name": "J anardhan Bondre"}}, {"text": "Janardhan Bondre", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10128, "end_char": 10144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in the envelope of Shri J anardhan Bondre there were 408 ballot papers noted by the Returning Officer but :it the time of actual counting of that envelope it was noticed that from out of 40\"8 ballot papers, 158 only were of Shri\" Janardhan Bondre and the remaining were of Shri Bahekar.", "canonical_name": "J anardhan Bondre"}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10989, "end_char": 10994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11002, "end_char": 11040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11312, "end_char": 11322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Bahekar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11900, "end_char": 11907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The directions in the order required the Special Officer, among other things, to physically count the votes recorded in favour of the appellant, Bahekar and other candidates in order to ascertain whether those votes were less than the number of votes declared as having been respectively secured by them."}}, {"text": "Bahekar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12583, "end_char": 12590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that when the High Court directed the \"physical\" count of the votes cast in favour of the appellant, Bahekar and others what was intended was a mechanical recount of those votes and nothing more.", "canonical_name": "Bahckar"}}, {"text": "s 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13712, "end_char": 13717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15140, "end_char": 15150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R. 54", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15940, "end_char": 15958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16216, "end_char": 16226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16321, "end_char": 16326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16399, "end_char": 16409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16739, "end_char": 16770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17449, "end_char": 17459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18230, "end_char": 18261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_905_919_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "GUJARAT STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ETC.\n\nV ALJI MULJI SONEJI AND ORS.\n\nMay 3, 1979\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 4 am! 6-Validity of Section 6 Notification atruck down by the Supremt Court after 13 years of legal battle inter\n\nparttonsequent to the decision second notification under Section 6 issued\n\nMl J()..10-1967 after giving frtsh notice under Section 5A and personal h'!aring of the parties-Whether the second notificatio11 is hit by the postulate that \"every statutory power n1ust be exercised reasonabl_v\"-E!Ject of the Land Acquisition\n\n(Amendment and Validation) Act 1967 introducing amendments to Secrion 4(2) and proviso to Section 6.\n\nLegtil Rcprt:.entatives to be brought on record-Civil Procedure Code, 1908- Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule 10 instead of under Order ),:XXL Rule 4 i.f not correct.\n\nA suit (No. 1262/53) challenging the notification under Section 4 •)f the Land. Acquisition Act dated 10-10-1952 issued by the former Governml!nt of Bombay and later another notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 14-8-1953\n\n(issued during the pendency of the suit), notifying that the final plots Nos. 41. 42 and 43 were requited for public purpose viz. State Transport-was dismissed\n\nby the Trial Court on 28-1-1959. The first and the second appeals having\n\nfailed, the respondents came up to this Court. This c:ourt in its decision E inter partes, Valii Bliai's case struck down Section 6 notification on the ground that the acquisition being for the benefit of a Corporation, though for a _ryublic purpose was bad because no part of the compensation was to come out of the public revenue and the provisions of Part VII of the Act had not been complied with.\n\nAfter the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bombay, the land acquisition p proceedings came within the cognizance of Gujarat State. The State by its letter dated. 22~8-1966 decided to contribute towards compensation a sum of Re. ] /- which was subsequently raised to Rs. 500 /-. The Government felt that as long time has elapsed since the earlier report under Section 5A was submitted by the Collector, a fresh enquiry should be made.\n\nAccordingly the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice dated 1-8-1966 inti~ mating to the respandents that if they so desired they might submit their further\n\nG . objections on or before 16-8-1966. Complying with this notice, the respondents submitted further objections on 31-8-1966 and they were also given a personal hearing. After examining the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 6 on 10-10-1967.\n\nThe respondents questioned the validity and legality of this notification in the writ petition filed by them on 14-2-1968 on the only ground that it was H: issued more than 15 years after the date of Section 4 notification. The lligh Court was of the opinion that if the power to make a declaration under Section\n\n2-409 SCI /79\n\n1!I. 6 is exercised after an unreasonable delay from the date on which notification under Sei..:tion 4 is issued such exercise of power would be invalid and it accordingly struck do\\vn the notification under Section 6 of the Act.\n\nHence the two appeiils one by the State of Gujarat and the other by the Ciujarat S:ate Road\n\nTranport Corporation.\n\nAllov.'ing the appeals by certificate, the Court\n\nJfELD : 1. The impugned section 6 notification was issued \\vithin the pres cribed period introduced by the 1967 Amendment Act and, therefore could not be struck down on the only ground that the power to issue second section 6 notification 'vas exercised after an unrcasonablC and unexplained delay.\n\nSection 6 notification, dated 10th October 1967, therefore is valid and legal.\n\n[918G-H, 919A]\n\n2. A combined reading of the prov1s1ons contained in sub-section (2) of Se<:tion 4 with the one contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Sectioe 6 introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and ValidatioR) Act, (Central Act 13 of 1967) with effect from 20-1-1967 would make it clear that the Government would be prcluded from making a declaration under section D 6 after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of issue of a notif 1 - cation under Section 4 which may be issued after the Amendment Act can1e into force. l\\.nd in respect of those section 4 notifications which were issued prior to the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 20-1-1967, any notification which is required to be issued under section 6 must be made within a period of t\\vo years \\\\'hereafter as a necessary corollary all s. 4 notificatio11s issued prior to 20th January 1967 woult.l stand t=xhausted and \\Voul<l not provide either E a source of reservoir for issuing s. 6 notification. Consequently the mischief sought to be set at naught by the High Court by reading by necessary implication in the scheme of ss. 4, SA, and 6 the concept of exercise of statutory power within a reasonable time bas been statutorily remedied. The apprehensions of the High Court that if not checkmated by implying that such statutory powr must be exercised within a reasonable time to curb arbitrary exercise of pov.'cr to the detriment of a citizen have been taken note of by the legislature and F fully met. Absence of any decided case on the subject of which High Court took note could not permit an inference as has been done by the High Court that in the absence of a decided case the legislature would not remedy the possible mischief.\n\nLegislature often does take note of a possible abuse of power by the executive and proceed to nip it in the bud by appropriate legislation and that has been done in this case. There i_s now no more possibility of a gap of. more than three years from the date on which s. 4 notification is G issued, otherwise it would be invalid as being beyond the prescribed period.\n\n[916 G-H, 917 A-DJ\n\nJn the instant case, the notifications under section 4 was prior to the commencement of the ordinance. Therefore, the provision contained in sub-section\n\n(2) of section 4 of the 1967 Amendment Act would be directly attracted. The Government could, therefore, make a declaration within a period of two years from 20th January 1967. The Government has in fact issued the impugned notification under section 6 on 10th October 1967 i.e. within the period prescribed by the Statute. [917 E-F]\n\n• • ._\n\nG. S. T. CORP. V. V. M. SONEJl 907\n\n3. \\Vhen a period is prescribed for exercise of power it manifests the legis A {ative intention that the authority exercising the power within the prescribed time .could not at least be accused of inaction or dithering and, therefore, such exer cise of po\\O\\'er could not be said to be bad or invalid on the only ground that there \\Vas unreasonable delay in the exercise of the po, ver. The very prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in \\Vhich it is to be exercised would consume at least that much time which the Gtatute prescribes as reasonable and, therefore, exercise of power within tllat B time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay. [917 H,\n\n918 A-B]\n\nTherefore, in this case, there. was no unreasonable delay in exercise of pow.er and hence the exercise was neither bad nor invalid.\n\n[918BJ\n\n4. Once the legislature stepped in and prescribed a sort of limitation within which power to issue notification under section 6 could be exercised, it was n1Jt necessary to go in search of a further fetter on the po, ver of the Governme9.t\n\nby raising the implication.\n\n[918F-G]\n\nIn this case, the High Court by implico.1:ion read a fetter on the power of the !Government to issue s. 6 notification within a reasonable time after the issue of s. 4 notification after observing that there was no express provision that such -power ought to be exercised within a reasonable time. In raising this implica.·\n\ntion the High Court took into account the postulate that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably and a reasonable exercise of power implies its exercise withil). a reasonable time.\n\nCoupled with it two other factors were taken into consideration such as the effect of issuing a s. 4 notification on the rights and obligations of the owner of the land whose land is proposed to be acquired; the right of the Government to unilaterally cancel s. 4 notification in\n\nthe event of fall in prices; history of legislation; and delayed issue of s. 6 notification would deny adequate compensation to the owner. But by the time the High Court examined this matter the legislature had already introduced a provision by which the power to issue s. 6 notification was to be exercised with in the prescribed period of time. At that stage there hardly arose a question of a search of the fetter on the power of the Government ignoring to some\n\nextent the express statutory provision.\n\n[918C-F]\n\n5. In the case of death of a party to a proceeding who is joined in his capacity as Karta of an undivided Hindu family, if the undivided Hindu family continues to be in existence the succeeding Karta can be substituted for the deceased Karta of the family and that would be sufficient compliance with Order XXII Rule 4 of C.P.C. [911D-E]\n\nIn the insant case an application made under Order XXIl Rules 10 C.P.C., made aftCr the prescribed period of limitation and in order to avoid seeking condonation of delay for setting aside abatement is not correct.\n\n[911E]\n\n[fhe Court, however, overruled the objection on this ground since the L.rs. nave already been substituted].\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2316/69 and 1598/70.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 14/17/18th March, 1969 .of the Gujarat High Coun in S.C.A. No. 729/68.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA R.H. Dhebar and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in C.A. 2316/69,\n\nD. V. Patel, M. V. Goswami and Ambrish Kumar for RR 1-S ill C.A. 2316/69 and RR. 1-4 in C.A. No. 1598/70.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-These two appeals by certificate under article 133(l)(c} of the Constitution arise from a judgment rendered by the Gnjarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 720/68, being a petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of a notificatiot1. issued by the Government of Gujarat on 10th October 1967 under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, J 894 ('Act' for short). Civil Appeal No. 2316/69 is preferred by the original respondent No. 2 Gujarat State Transport Corporation, and the cognate Civil Appeal No. 1598/70 is preferred by the State of Gujarat, the first respondent in the petition. As both the appeals arise from the same proceedings and raise identical contentious they were heard together and are being di•posed of by this conunon judgment.\n\nA notification under s. 4 of the Act was issued by the former Government of Bombay on 10th October 1952 notifying that final plots 41, 42 and 43 \\\\ere likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz., State Transport. The respondents who are tenants of different parcels of land comprised in the aforementioned final plots objected to the proposed acquisition. Socn after filing the objections under s. SA ot the Act the respondents filed Civil Suit No. 1262/53 in the Court of Civil Judge, Second Division, Ahmedabad, for a declaration that the notification under s. 4 was illegal and uUr,. vires and for an injunction restraining the respondent State from procee<ling with the acquisitio• of the lands in possession of the respondents. During tho pendency of this suit the then Government of Bombay, after considering the report submitted under s. SA, made a declaration under s. 6 as per the notification dated 14th August 1953 declaring, inter alia, that final plots 41, 42 and 43 were required for the purpose of State Transport. The respondents amended their plaint adding a relief for quashing the notification under s. 6. The suit filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the trial court and first and second appeals did not meet with success- They carried the matter to this Court and succeeded as per judgment reported in Valjlbhai Muljibhai Soneji & Anr. v. The State of Bombay (now Gujarat) & Ors.('). As per that judgment this Court decreed\n\nthe plaintiff's suit which would imply that this Court quashed both noti fications under ss. 4 and 6. Reading the judgment as a whole it\n\n(1) [1964) 3 S. C. R. 68~.\n\nG. S. T. CORP. v. V. M. SONEJJ (Deai, J.) 909\n\n:appears that the validity of s. 4 notification was upheld and only the A notification under s. 6 was struck down. In the mean time on the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bombay these land acquisition proceedings came witi]in the cognizance of Government of Gujarat and when the State Government became aware some where in 1965 about the\n\nerror in the decree, Review Applications Nos. 11 and 12 of 1965 were made for correcting the decree. This Court granted the applications and modified the decree on 13th September 1965.\n\nThe Government taking its clue from the judgment of this Court which invalidated s. 6 notification on the ground that the acquisition having been made for the benefit of a Corporation, though for public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of the public revenue and provisions of Part VIl of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with, decided as per its lettet< dated 22nd August 1966 to contribute Re. !/-, which was subsequently raised to Rs. 500/- towards payment of compensation. The Government, however, felt tl1at as long time has elapsed since the earlier report under s. SA was submitted by the Collector, a fresh enquiry should be made Accordingly the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice dated 1st August 1966 intimating to the respondents that if they so desired they may submit their further objections by or before 16th August 1966. Complying with this notice the respondents submitted further objections on 31st August 1966 and they were also given a personal hearing .. After examining the report submitted by the enquiry officer the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under s. 6 on 10th October, 1967.\n\nThe respondents questioned the validity and legality of this notification in the petition filed by them on 14th February, 1968.\n\nRespondents questioned the validity of the impugned s. 6 notification on the only ground that it was issued more than 15 years after the date of s. 4 notification and thus it hacl been issued after an unreasonable delay and it was illegal and void. While this was the only conten- G tion which found favour with the High Court, in reaching this conclusion the High Court, after taking note of the fact .that there was no express provision in the Act requiring that the notification under s. 6 must be issued within a reasonable time after issue of s. 4 notification, primarily relied upon the postulate that. every statutory power must be exercised reasonably, a doctrine too finally entrenched in our jurispru- H <lence to brook any refutation which would assist in raising the implication that s. 6 notification must follow within a reasonable time\n\nafter issue of s. 4 notification. The Court also drew support from the scheme of ss. 4, SA and 6 as well as the history of the legislation. On behalf of the appellants it was pointed out to the High Court that in view of the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 ('Amendment Act' for short), as well as the proviso to s. 6(1) also introduced by the same amendment Act the situation as bas arisen in this case is not likely to arise and the apprehended mischief is not likely to be committed in, future and, therefore, the Court should not gci in search of the fetters on the powe{of the Government to issue s. 6 notification, in the absence of any express provision, by implication that statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable time. It was further submitted on their behalf that once the legislature has clearly permitted a thing to be done within the time specified ; ri the statute it would' be impern1issible by a process of interpretation\\ to reduce the statutory period by implying a further fetter on the power of the Government and that would be the 'effect if the contention on behalf of the respondents was accepted.\n\nIn 1other words, as the legislature has now provided that in respect of a notification issued under s. 4 before the commencement of the Land Acquisition' (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, no declaration under s. 6 shall be made after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the aforesaid Ordinance, and further that in case of section 4 notification issued after the commencement of the Ordinance a statutory limit of three years is fixed within which declaration under s. 6 can be made, the apprehended arbitrary exercise of power is thwarted and the Court should not further restrict or curtail the power of the Government to issue notification under s. 6 within the time prescribed by the statute.\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that if the power to make a declaration. under S 6 is exercised after an unreasonable delay from the. date on which notification under s. 4 is issued such ex:rc:se of . power would be invalid and accordingly struck down the notification\n\nunder s. 6.\n\nHence these two apeals.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the . respondents in . both the appeals contending that as the appellants in both the appeals failed to seek within the prescribed time substitution of the heirs and leal representatives of respondent 5 who died on 8th\n\nMarch, 1970 during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, in the circumstances of the case these appeals would abate as a whole.\n\nUndoubtedly, respondent 5 who is described in the cause title of tho.\n\nMemos.· of Appeals as \"Ramesh Ramjibhai, Manager, Ramesh Restaurant, a joint hindu family business\", died on 8th March 1970.\n\nWhat\n\nappears to have happened thereafter is that applications were made by the appellants under Order 22, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, for br:nging Shri Krishnakant Ramjibhai, :V1anage, r of Ramesh Restaurant, a joint hindu family business, on record in place of deceased respondent 5.\n\nAccording to the appellants the deceased respondent 5 had filed the original petition in. his capacity as manager of joint hindu family business and on his death as the interest devolved upon the succeeding manager of the joint hindu family business, applications under order 22, rule 10, C.P .C. were made to hring the per$on on record on whom the interest devolved pending the appeal.\n\nMr. D. V.\n\nPatel took serious exception to the procedure adopted by the appellants and there is some merit in this criticism. In fact, when Ramesh Ramjibhai who filed the initial petition in his capacity as karta of the undivided hindu family business died during the pendency of the appeal, proper applications should have been made by the appellants unde.r\n\n0. 22, r. 4, to substitute heirs of Ramesh Ramjibhai who was respondent 5 in the appeals before this Court. In case of death of a party to a proceeding who is joined in his capacity as .karta of an undivided hindu family, if tho undivided hindu family continues to be in existence the succeeding karta can be substituted for the deceased karta of the family and that would be sufficient compliance with Order 22, r. 4.\n\nWhat appears to have been done is to make applications under 0. 22, r. I 0 and those applications appear to have been granted subject to just exceptions.\n\nThe applications appear to have been made after the prescribed period of limitation, and in order to avoid seeking condonation of delay for setting aside abatement, O. 22, r. 10 appears to have bcrn invoked.\n\nMr. Patel is right in saying that this was a device but in any event if proper applications were made under 0. 22, r. 4 the gentleman who bec:imc the karta of the undivided hindu family after the death of the former karta could have been substituted on record for the dcccaseJ respondent 5.\n\nIn any evem, succeeding karta of the undivided hindu family having been brought on record though nc>t strictly in accordance \\Vith law, we do not prop::::se to give any irnportance to this technical objection and overrule the same.\n\nIn a <lccision inter partcs, Valjibhai's case, (supra) this Court struck down the first section 6 notification issued on 14th August 1953 on the ground that the acquisition being for the benefit of a Corporation. though for a public purpose, was bad because no part of the compensation . was to come out of the public revenue and the provisions of Part VII of the Act had not been complied with. It would appear thats. 4 notification was issued on 10th October 1952 and within less tban one year, after .completing the enquiry under s. SA and the\n\nexamination of the report by the appropriate Government, s. 6 notification was issued on 4th August 1953.\n\nBy any yard-stick it could. n.ot have been said that there was delay, much less an unreasonable delay, in making the necessary declaration under s. 6 after the issue of the notification under s. 4.\n\nThe chronology of events that followed in the wake of issuance of a notification under s. 6 dated 14th August 1953 would wholly exonerate the Government of any charge of dithering or dilatoriness or inaction.\n\nThese events be noticed now so as to\n\nappreciat~ the submission on behalf of the appellants that they cannot be accused of any inaction. deliberate dilatoriness or dithering.\n\nSoon after the issue of the notification under s. 4 dated 10th .C October 1952 and even before the declaration was made under s. 6 as per notification dated 14th August 1953 the respondents tiled Civil Suit No. 1262/53 challenging the notification under s. 4 and sought an injunction restraining the then State of Bombay from proceeding with the acquisition of the lands in possession of the respondents.\n\ninterim injunction was sought but the same was refused.\n\nThereafter came the notification under s. 6 dated 14th August 1953. It appears that thereafter the rcspm; dents amended the plaint to add a relief for quashing and setting aside the notification under '\" 6 also. It would thus appear thal whatever was required to be done by the Government for completing the proceedings of acquisition was undertaken and finished within a period of less than one year from the date of the notification under s. 4.\n\nThe suit filed by the respondents was dismissed by the trial court as per its judgment dated 28th January 1959. Both the notifications were held valid and they were not found to suffer from any infirmity as contended for and on behalf of the respondents. The respondents carried the matter in appeal to the District Court and this appeal was dismissed by the first appellate court as per its judgment dated 28th September 1959.\n\nThe respondents preferred second appeal to the High Court but failed to carry conviction with the High Court, with the result that the appeal failed and was dismissed on 1st August\n\n1960. The respondents did not rest content with the dismissal of their •econd appeal and applied for and obtained special leave of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appeal of the respondents by special leave succeeded as per judgment rendered by this Court on 8th May 1963.\n\nThe question is whether there was any delay much less unreasonable delay on the part of the State Government in taking follow up B action after issuing notification under s. 4.\n\nThe State GO\\ernment had actually taken the follow up action expeditiously within less than a year when on .Pth August 1953, s. 6 notificat.ion was ;,; sued.\n\nEven\n\nbefore s. 6 notification was issued the respondents filed the suit and went on preferring appeals.\n\nThey succeeded for the first time in this when this Court allowed their appeals on May 8, 1963.\n\nTill then the Government could not be accused of any inaction or delay in taking ; the follow up action.\n\nWhat was the Government expected to do during the time the respondents went on preferring successive appeals?\n\nWas the Government expected, even though it succeeded in the tria~\n\ncourt and first and second appellate courts to foresee in advance that at some stage by some court in the pyramid of appeals its notificaction under i. 6 would be found to be ineffective and forestall such a decision by issuing another s. 6 notification ex majore cautela ? If the Government succeeded in three courts and was assured by three courts that both its notiiications under ss. 4 and 6 were valid and effective, it is difficult to appreciate the observation of the High Court that when the G0vernmcnt issued the first s. 6 notification it was ineffective exercise of power under s. 6 and the Government wrongly went on contending that it was a valid exercise of power.\n\nThis criticism is not wdl 1'1erited.\n\nThere would have been some legitimacy in this criticism of D ihe stand of the Government if the Government had lost in the first\n\ncour~ and went on filing successive appeals even if each court went on holding the notification ineffective.\n\nThe reverse is the position.\n\nThe Government went on succeeding and the courts went on upholding the notification.\n\nTltere was no alternative with the Government but to go E on ddcnding its action before the courts to which it was dragged by the icspondcnls alter their successive failures.\n\nIn this background the question was posed by the High Court : Can the Government then contend. when it 1s found to be wrong by the highest court in the land, that the delay in the exercise of the power under s. G occasioned by its own wrong slind should be regarded as reasonable? and answered by it by saying tiiat if the Government had not persisted in wrong! y asserting the validity of the first s. 6 notification and accepting its invalidity, had cancelled it, the delay in the effective exercise of the power under s. 6 could have been avoided.\n\nThis answer is unfortunately not borne out by the events succeeding the issuance of the first >. 6 notification.\n\nNot only the Government stand was not found to be wrong but by three courts it was found to be correct. It is this Court in the last appeal found s. 6 notificatior, invalid.\n\nCould the Government be expected to speculate in advance that ultimately it may fail to convince this Court though it had convinced three other courts and, :herefore, right at the time of institution of the suit in the: court. concede the contention of the respondents and cancel the first s. 6 notifi•:ation and issue a second one ? There was no guarantee that the second one would not have been challenged and obviously there was\n\nno assurance that some defect may not be found by some court even in the second s. 6 notification.\n\nThe Government cannot be put on the horns of a dilemma.\n\nTherefore, we find it difficult to agree with the High Court that having adopted a wrong stand and thus taken about 11 years the Government cannot now be permitted to urge that he delay so occasioned should not be regarded as unreasonable.\n\nIn fact the Government liad practically little or no option but to support the deci'.; ions of the Courts which were in its favour till this Court for the first time found some defect in its notification under s. 6.\n\nAny other view may leaci to a startling result that every iitigant before it can explain the elay on the ground of being led from court to court must foresee a possible error that the hierarchy of courts may at some stage notice and rectify its stand in advance. It would be nothing short of a speculative approach which may ill-suit any litigant and more so the Government.\n\nThe High Court was further of the opinion that even if there was some explanation for the delay from 14th August 1953 to 8th May 1963, there was no explanation for the delay in making the review application in the beginning of 1965 before the Supreme Court and that this period of one year and 9 months remains totally unexplained.\n\nIn this context it may be advantageous to state that the respondents in the earlier round of litigation had challenged both the notifications under ss. 4 and 6 and had lost before the first tl1ree courts.\n\nThis Court while allowing the appeal by its judgment dated 8th May 1963 passeJ the iir.al order as under :\n\n\"W c, therefore, allow the 2ppeals and decree the suits of the appellants with costs in all the Courts\".\n\nLiterally implemented, the dccretal portion would mean thru both s. 4 and s. 6 notifications were struck down. Reading the body of the judgment it clearly transpires that this Court upheld the validity of the notification under s. 4. When this inconsistency bdween the judgment and the decree came to the notice of the Government, Review Petitions Nos. 11 and 12 of 1965 appear to have been filed in the year 1965, and these petitions were allowed by this Court as per its order dated 13th September 1965 by deleting the decretal portion of the judgment as extracted hereinabove and substituting it in the followin:; words :\n\n\"and decree the suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding further with the land acquisition proceedings under the said notification issued under s. (i(l) of the Act with costs in all the courts\".\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that the Government took a long time of one year and 9 months in ascertaining this inconsistency between the decretal portion of the judgment and the main body of the judgment and there was delay in moving the review applications.\n\nIn this connection a reference to the affidavit of Mr. D. K. Motwani, Secretary to the Gujarat Sta•c Road Transport Corporation for whose benefit the acquisition was being made, as well as the affidavit of Shri S. It. Pradhan, Under Secre'ary to Government of Gujarat, would show that after the copy of the judgment was received and it was examined to ascertain what further steps were required to be taken to complete the process of acquisition consistent with the judgment of the\n\nSupreme Court, the error was discovered and then the learned advo-. cate was instructed to file review applications. This delay of a year and few months in the context of the facts in this case cannot be said to be unreasonable.\n\nThe third stage where the High Court found the delay in taking the follow up action was after the grant of review application and before the impugned notification dated 10th October 1967 was issued. This Court allowed the review applications on 13th September\n\n196S.\n\nThereafter the Government directed a fresh enquiry under s. SA.\n\nThis was done in fairness to the respondents, though Mr. D. V. Patel, learned counsel for the respondents was rather critical of this fairness of the Government inasmuch as he said that there was no necessity for a fresh enquiry. Earlier enquiry under s. SA was in 1952. By this time nearly 1S years had elapsed since the enquiry. If the Government in the backdrop of these facts considered it fair and just to order a fresh enquiry to give the respondenli; an opportunity to file fresh objections,\n\nti1e Gorermnent cannot be accused of dithering or whiling away pre1 cious time on what was described as a futile exercise. This second enquiry under s. 5A was held after giving an opportunity as per notice dated August 1, 1966, to file objections which in fact were filed on August 31, 1966, and then a notice dated 30th December 1966 was serveJ upon the respondents calling upon them to appear for personal hearing on 12th January 1967. The enquiry was adjourned at the requc't of the respondents 9 times as set out in the affidavit of Shri G S. R. Pradhan. The enquiry was over on 13th April 1967. During the\n\ncourse of personal hearing the respondents appeared through their advocates Sarvashri K. M. Vyas, A. L. Shah, V. R. Bhatt and N. D.\n\nPandey.\n\nThe last of the submissions appear to have been made on li!th April 1967. Thereafter the enquiry officer submitted his report and the Government took the prompt action of issuing the impugned noti- H' fication on 10th October 1967. Even here the High Court found a further unexplained delay after 13th September 1965 till 10th October\n\n1967 when the impugned notification was issued. The High Court possibly overlooked the aijidavit of Shri S. R. Pradhan when it observed that there was no satisfactory answer to the question posed by it, in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. With respect, it is not possible to subscribe to this view ()f the High Court in V, iew of the facts clearly set out hereinabove.\n\nIt, therefore, unmistakably transpires that in the facts and circumstances of this case there was no delay, though apparently there appears a time lag of nearly 15 years between s. 4 and s. 6 notifications because the events in the interregnum clearly made it impossible for the Government to issue a second s. 6 notification when it had already issued a first s. 6 notification within a period of Jess than one year from the date of the issue of the s. 4 notification and the validity n( which was beyond reproach till May 6, 1963.\n\nAssuming that the High Court was right in rejecting the explanation preferred by the Government for the delay in issuing the second s. 6 notification, would it still be fair to hold that there was an unreasonable delay in issuing the second s. 6 notification in view of the specific\n\nprovision contained in sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the 1967 Amendment Act which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub-s. ( 1), no declaration under s. 6 of the principal Act in respect of any land which has been notified before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Ordinance, 1967, under sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the principal Act, shall be rnade after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the Ordinance. The Ordinance came into force on 20th January 1967. Simultaneously a proviso was added to sub-s. (1) of s. 6 in the following terms :\n\n\"Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under s. 4,. sub-s. (I) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Ordinance, 1967, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication''.\n\nA combined reading of the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) of s. 4 with the one contained in the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 6 introduced by the Amendment Act would clearly put an end to the unsatisfactory situat; on which troubled the High Court in this case. In view of the 'tatu'ory provision noticed herein the Government would be precluded from making a declaration under s. 6 after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of the issue of a no•ification under s. 4 which may be issued after the Amendment Act came into force. And in respect of those s. 4 notifications which were issued prior to the\n\nt • •\n\n,. .. •\n\ncommencement of the Ordinance hereinabove noted on 20th January 1967 any notification which is required to be issued under s. 6 must be made within a period of two years whereafter as a necessary corollary all s. 4 notifications issued prior to 20th January 1967 would stand exhausted and would not provide either a source or reservoir for i<lsuing s. 6 notification. Consequently the mischief sought to be set at naught by the H:igh Court by reading by necessary implication in the •Cherne of ss. 4, SA and 6 the concept of exercise of statutory power within a reasonable time has been statutorily remedied. The apprehensions of the High Court that if not checkmated by implying that such statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable time to curb arbitrary exercise of power to the detriment of a citizen have been taken note of by the legislature and fully met. Absence of any decided case on the subject of which High Court took note could not permit an inference as has been done by the High Court that in the\n\nanee of a decided case the legislature woufd not remedy the possible mischief. Legislature often does take note of a possible abuse of power by the executive and proceed to nip it in the bud by appropriate legislation and that has been done in this case. There is now no more possibility of a gap of more than three years between s. 4 and s. 6 notifications because any declaration made after the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which s. 4 notification is issued would be invalid as being beyond the prescribed period.\n\nThese newly inserted provision5 were brought to the notice of the High Court. Now, as pointed out earlier, the Ordinance came into force on 20th January 1967. The notification under s. 4 in this case was prior to the commencement of the Ordinance. Therefore, the provision contained in sub-s. (2) s. 4 of the 1967 Amendment Act would\n\nbe directly attracted. The Government could, therefore, make a decla- F. ration within a period of two years from 20th January 1967.\n\nThe Government bas in fact issued the impugned notification under s. 6 on 10th October 1967, i.e. within the period prescribed by the •tatute .\n\nThe question then is : when a statute confers power and pres- G cribes time within which it can be exercised, could it ever he said that even though the power is exercised within the statutory period yet the Court can examine the question of delay and record a finding that there was an unreasonable delay in exercise of the power and, therefore, the exercise of power is bad ? This approach would defeat the very purpose for prescribing a sort of a period of limitation on exercise H of power. When a period is prescribed for exercise of power it manifest~ the legislative intention that the authority exercising the power\n\nII'\n\n~18\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COGRT REPORTS\n\n[ 1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nithin the prescribed time could not at least be accused of inaction or dithering and, therefore, such exercise of power could not be said to be bad or invalid on the only ground that there was unreasonable delay in the exercise of the power. The very prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume at least that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable and, therefore, exercise of power within that time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay. Therefore, in this case it is difficult to agree with tl:e High Court that there was an unreasonable delay in exercise of power and hence the exercise was either had or invalid.\n\nThe High Court by implication read a fetter on the power of the Government to issue s. 6 notification within a reasonable time after the issue of s. 4 notification after observing that there was no express provision that such power ought to be exercised within a reasonable time.\n\nIn raising this implication the High Court took into account the postulate that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably and a reasonable exercise of power implies its exercise within a reasonable time. Coupled with it two other factors were taken into consideration such as the effect of issuing a s. 4 notification on the rights and obligations of the owner of the land whose land is proposed to be acquired; the right of the Government to unilaterally cancel s. 4 notification in the event of falling prices; history .of legislation; and delayed issue of s. 6 notification would deny adequate compensation to the owner. But by the time the High Court examined this matter the legislature had already introduced a provision by which the power to issue s. 6 notification was to be exercised within the prescribed period of time. At that stage there hardly arose a question of a search of the fetter on the power of the Government ignoring to some extent the express statutory provision. Therefore, while appreciating the anxiety of the High Court we are of the opinion that once the legislature stepped in and prescribed a sort of period of limitation within which power to issue notification under s. 6 could be exercised it was not necessary to go in search of a further fetter on the power of the Government by raising the implication.\n\nIt thus appears to be satisfactorily established that the impugned s. 6 notification was issued within the prescribed period introduced by the 1967 Amendment Act and, therefore, could not be struck down on B the only ground that the power to issue second s. 6 notification was exercised after an unreasonable and unexplained delay. This being the only infirmity found by the High Court to which we are not able to\n\n.subscribe, it must be held that the second s. 6 notification dated 10th A October 1967 is valid and legal.\n\nAccordingly both these appeals succeed and are allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside aud Special Civil Application No. 729 /68 filed by the respondents 1s dismissed but in the circum- stances of the case, with no order as to costs.\n\nS.R .\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 201, "entities": [{"text": "GUJARAT STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GUJARAT STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V ALJI MULJI SONEJI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VALJI MULJI SONEJI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 337, "end_char": 346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 778, "end_char": 822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule", "statute": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1074, "end_char": 1083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule", "statute": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule"}}, {"text": "28-1-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Transport-was dismissed\n\nby the Trial Court on 28-1-1959."}}, {"text": "Valii Bliai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1438, "end_char": 1449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This c:ourt in its decision E inter partes, Valii Bliai's case struck down Section 6 notification on the ground that the acquisition being for the benefit of a Corporation, though for a _ryublic purpose was bad because no part of the compensation was to come out of the public revenue and the provisions of Part VII of the Act had not been complied with."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1469, "end_char": 1478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule", "statute": "Jlaking an application under Order XXII Rule"}}, {"text": "Part VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1701, "end_char": 1720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1798, "end_char": 1804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bombay, the land acquisition p proceedings came within the cognizance of Gujarat State."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bombay, the land acquisition p proceedings came within the cognizance of Gujarat State."}}, {"text": "Section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "1-8-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice dated 1-8-1966 inti~ mating to the respandents that if they so desired they might submit their further\n\nG ."}}, {"text": "16-8-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2398, "end_char": 2407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "objections on or before 16-8-1966."}}, {"text": "31-8-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2485, "end_char": 2494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Complying with this notice, the respondents submitted further objections on 31-8-1966 and they were also given a personal hearing."}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examining the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 6 on 10-10-1967."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2663, "end_char": 2672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "10-10-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examining the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 6 on 10-10-1967."}}, {"text": "14-2-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents questioned the validity and legality of this notification in the writ petition filed by them on 14-2-1968 on the only ground that it was H: issued more than 15 years after the date of Section 4 notification."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2994, "end_char": 3004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3226, "end_char": 3235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3283, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the two appeiils one by the State of Gujarat and the other by the Ciujarat S:ate Road\n\nTranport Corporation."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3439, "end_char": 3448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-1-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4073, "end_char": 4082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A combined reading of the prov1s1ons contained in sub-section (2) of Se<:tion 4 with the one contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Sectioe 6 introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and ValidatioR) Act, (Central Act 13 of 1967) with effect from 20-1-1967 would make it clear that the Government would be prcluded from making a declaration under section D 6 after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of issue of a notif 1 - cation under Section 4 which may be issued after the Amendment Act can1e into force."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4628, "end_char": 4632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4774, "end_char": 4778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4917, "end_char": 4922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5801, "end_char": 5805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th January 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6234, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government could, therefore, make a declaration within a period of two years from 20th January 1967."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6319, "end_char": 6328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th October 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government has in fact issued the impugned notification under section 6 on 10th October 1967 i.e. within the period prescribed by the Statute. 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Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A R.H. Dhebar and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in C.A. 2316/69,\n\nD. V. Patel, M. V. Goswami and Ambrish Kumar for RR 1-S ill C.A. 2316/69 and RR."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9836, "end_char": 9848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A R.H. Dhebar and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in C.A. 2316/69,\n\nD. V. Patel, M. V. Goswami and Ambrish Kumar for RR 1-S ill C.A. 2316/69 and RR."}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9886, "end_char": 9897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A R.H. Dhebar and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in C.A. 2316/69,\n\nD. V. Patel, M. V. Goswami and Ambrish Kumar for RR 1-S ill C.A. 2316/69 and RR.", "canonical_name": "D. V.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "M. V. 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Goswami and Ambrish Kumar for RR 1-S ill C.A. 2316/69 and RR."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10037, "end_char": 10042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-These two appeals by certificate under article 133(l)(c} of the Constitution arise from a judgment rendered by the Gnjarat High Court in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "Gnjarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10162, "end_char": 10180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-These two appeals by certificate under article 133(l)(c} of the Constitution arise from a judgment rendered by the Gnjarat High Court in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Transport Corporation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10520, "end_char": 10555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Gujarat State Transport Corporation, and the cognate Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "GUJARAT STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ETC"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10857, "end_char": 10861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th October 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10922, "end_char": 10939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification under s. 4 of the Act was issued by the former Government of Bombay on 10th October 1952 notifying that final plots 41, 42 and 43 \\\\ere likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Court of Civil Judge, Second Division, Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11303, "end_char": 11351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1262/53 in the Court of Civil Judge, Second Division, Ahmedabad, for a declaration that the notification under s. 4 was illegal and uUr,."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11399, "end_char": 11403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11614, "end_char": 11634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During tho pendency of this suit the then Government of Bombay, after considering the report submitted under s. SA, made a declaration under s. 6 as per the notification dated 14th August 1953 declaring, inter alia, that final plots 41, 42 and 43 were required for the purpose of State Transport."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11713, "end_char": 11717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th August 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11748, "end_char": 11764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During tho pendency of this suit the then Government of Bombay, after considering the report submitted under s. SA, made a declaration under s. 6 as per the notification dated 14th August 1953 declaring, inter alia, that final plots 41, 42 and 43 were required for the purpose of State Transport."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11958, "end_char": 11962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12379, "end_char": 12390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964) 3 S. C. R. 68", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12432, "end_char": 12452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12533, "end_char": 12537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th September 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13012, "end_char": 13031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court granted the applications and modified the decree on 13th September 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13115, "end_char": 13119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part VIl of the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13344, "end_char": 13380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "22nd August 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13443, "end_char": 13459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government taking its clue from the judgment of this Court which invalidated s. 6 notification on the ground that the acquisition having been made for the benefit of a Corporation, though for public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of the public revenue and provisions of Part VIl of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with, decided as per its lettet< dated 22nd August 1966 to contribute Re. !/-,"}}, {"text": "1st August 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government, however, felt tl1at as long time has elapsed since the earlier report under s. SA was submitted by the Collector, a fresh enquiry should be made Accordingly the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice dated 1st August 1966 intimating to the respondents that if they so desired they may submit their further objections by or before 16th August 1966."}}, {"text": "16th August 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13926, "end_char": 13942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government, however, felt tl1at as long time has elapsed since the earlier report under s. SA was submitted by the Collector, a fresh enquiry should be made Accordingly the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice dated 1st August 1966 intimating to the respondents that if they so desired they may submit their further objections by or before 16th August 1966."}}, {"text": "31st August 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14019, "end_char": 14035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Complying with this notice the respondents submitted further objections on 31st August 1966 and they were also given a personal hearing .. After examining the report submitted by the enquiry officer the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under s. 6 on 10th October, 1967."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14197, "end_char": 14201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VIl of the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Part VIl of the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "10th October, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14205, "end_char": 14223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Complying with this notice the respondents submitted further objections on 31st August 1966 and they were also given a personal hearing .. After examining the report submitted by the enquiry officer the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under s. 6 on 10th October, 1967."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14407, "end_char": 14411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14500, "end_char": 14504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14843, "end_char": 14847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14903, "end_char": 14907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15151, "end_char": 15155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15288, "end_char": 15293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15470, "end_char": 15474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15591, "end_char": 15598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15880, "end_char": 15884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16514, "end_char": 16518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16633, "end_char": 16637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16760, "end_char": 16769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16903, "end_char": 16907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17086, "end_char": 17090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17216, "end_char": 17219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17304, "end_char": 17308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17413, "end_char": 17417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramesh Ramjibhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Appeals as \"Ramesh Ramjibhai, Manager, Ramesh Restaurant, a joint hindu family business\", died on 8th March 1970."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Restaurant", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17981, "end_char": 17998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Appeals as \"Ramesh Ramjibhai, Manager, Ramesh Restaurant, a joint hindu family business\", died on 8th March 1970."}}, {"text": "Order 22, Rule 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18173, "end_char": 18196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Krishnakant Ramjibhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18216, "end_char": 18237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What\n\nappears to have happened thereafter is that applications were made by the appellants under Order 22, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, for br:nging Shri Krishnakant Ramjibhai, :V1anage, r of Ramesh Restaurant, a joint hindu family business, on record in place of deceased respondent 5."}}, {"text": "order 22, rule 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18620, "end_char": 18637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. V.\n\nPatel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18742, "end_char": 18754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. D. V.\n\nPatel took serious exception to the procedure adopted by the appellants and there is some merit in this criticism.", "canonical_name": "D. V.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19886, "end_char": 19891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Patel is right in saying that this was a device but in any event if proper applications were made under 0."}}, {"text": "Valjibhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20436, "end_char": 20445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a <lccision inter partcs, Valjibhai's case, (supra) this Court struck down the first section 6 notification issued on 14th August 1953 on the ground that the acquisition being for the benefit of a Corporation."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20495, "end_char": 20504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20755, "end_char": 20774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21012, "end_char": 21016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "4th August 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21044, "end_char": 21059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear thats. 4 notification was issued on 10th October 1952 and within less tban one year, after .completing the enquiry under s. SA and the\n\nexamination of the report by the appropriate Government, s. 6 notification was issued on 4th August 1953."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21207, "end_char": 21211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21254, "end_char": 21258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21348, "end_char": 21352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21694, "end_char": 21698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21773, "end_char": 21777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21901, "end_char": 21905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21952, "end_char": 21967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1262/53 challenging the notification under s. 4 and sought an injunction restraining the then State of Bombay from proceeding with the acquisition of the lands in possession of the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22149, "end_char": 22153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22551, "end_char": 22555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th September 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22965, "end_char": 22984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents carried the matter in appeal to the District Court and this appeal was dismissed by the first appellate court as per its judgment dated 28th September 1959."}}, {"text": "1st August\n\n1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23157, "end_char": 23173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents preferred second appeal to the High Court but failed to carry conviction with the High Court, with the result that the appeal failed and was dismissed on 1st August\n\n1960."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23317, "end_char": 23328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th May 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23450, "end_char": 23462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal of the respondents by special leave succeeded as per judgment rendered by this Court on 8th May 1963."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23636, "end_char": 23640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23768, "end_char": 23772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23815, "end_char": 23819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24526, "end_char": 24530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24674, "end_char": 24685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24818, "end_char": 24822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24879, "end_char": 24883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25940, "end_char": 25944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26061, "end_char": 26065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26352, "end_char": 26356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26671, "end_char": 26675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26894, "end_char": 26898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27422, "end_char": 27426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28048, "end_char": 28061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was further of the opinion that even if there was some explanation for the delay from 14th August 1953 to 8th May 1963, there was no explanation for the delay in making the review application in the beginning of 1965 before the Supreme Court and that this period of one year and 9 months remains totally unexplained."}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28286, "end_char": 28297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28623, "end_char": 28627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28632, "end_char": 28636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28786, "end_char": 28790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. K. Motwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29734, "end_char": 29747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection a reference to the affidavit of Mr. D. K. Motwani, Secretary to the Gujarat Sta•c Road Transport Corporation for whose benefit the acquisition was being made, as well as the affidavit of Shri S. It."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Sta•c Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29766, "end_char": 29806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection a reference to the affidavit of Mr. D. K. Motwani, Secretary to the Gujarat Sta•c Road Transport Corporation for whose benefit the acquisition was being made, as well as the affidavit of Shri S. It."}}, {"text": "S. It. Pradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29890, "end_char": 29904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection a reference to the affidavit of Mr. D. K. Motwani, Secretary to the Gujarat Sta•c Road Transport Corporation for whose benefit the acquisition was being made, as well as the affidavit of Shri S. It.", "canonical_name": "S. It. Pradhan"}}, {"text": "13th September\n\n196S.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30637, "end_char": 30658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court allowed the review applications on 13th September\n\n196S.\n\nThereafter the Government directed a fresh enquiry under s. SA."}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30782, "end_char": 30793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was done in fairness to the respondents, though Mr. D. V. Patel, learned counsel for the respondents was rather critical of this fairness of the Government inasmuch as he said that there was no necessity for a fresh enquiry.", "canonical_name": "D. V.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "Gorermnent", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31230, "end_char": 31240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Government in the backdrop of these facts considered it fair and just to order a fresh enquiry to give the respondenli; an opportunity to file fresh objections,\n\nti1e Gorermnent cannot be accused of dithering or whiling away pre1 cious time on what was described as a futile exercise."}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31374, "end_char": 31379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G S. R. Pradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31767, "end_char": 31782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The enquiry was adjourned at the requc't of the respondents 9 times as set out in the affidavit of Shri G S. R. Pradhan."}}, {"text": "Sarvashri K. M. Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31913, "end_char": 31933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the\n\ncourse of personal hearing the respondents appeared through their advocates Sarvashri K. M. Vyas, A. L. Shah, V. R. Bhatt and N. D.\n\nPandey."}}, {"text": "A. L. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31935, "end_char": 31945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the\n\ncourse of personal hearing the respondents appeared through their advocates Sarvashri K. M. Vyas, A. L. Shah, V. R. Bhatt and N. D.\n\nPandey."}}, {"text": "V. R. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31947, "end_char": 31958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the\n\ncourse of personal hearing the respondents appeared through their advocates Sarvashri K. M. Vyas, A. L. Shah, V. R. Bhatt and N. D.\n\nPandey."}}, {"text": "N. D.\n\nPandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31963, "end_char": 31976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the\n\ncourse of personal hearing the respondents appeared through their advocates Sarvashri K. M. Vyas, A. L. Shah, V. R. Bhatt and N. D.\n\nPandey."}}, {"text": "10th October\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32301, "end_char": 32319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even here the High Court found a further unexplained delay after 13th September 1965 till 10th October\n\n1967 when the impugned notification was issued."}}, {"text": "S. R. Pradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32420, "end_char": 32433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court possibly overlooked the aijidavit of Shri S. R. Pradhan when it observed that there was no satisfactory answer to the question posed by it, in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. It. Pradhan"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32880, "end_char": 32884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32889, "end_char": 32893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33010, "end_char": 33014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33063, "end_char": 33067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33153, "end_char": 33157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 6, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33222, "end_char": 33233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, therefore, unmistakably transpires that in the facts and circumstances of this case there was no delay, though apparently there appears a time lag of nearly 15 years between s. 4 and s. 6 notifications because the events in the interregnum clearly made it impossible for the Government to issue a second s. 6 notification when it had already issued a first s. 6 notification within a period of Jess than one year from the date of the issue of the s. 4 notification and the validity n( which was beyond reproach till May 6, 1963."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33368, "end_char": 33372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33477, "end_char": 33481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33557, "end_char": 33561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33694, "end_char": 33698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33877, "end_char": 33881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34093, "end_char": 34097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34220, "end_char": 34224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34485, "end_char": 34489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34545, "end_char": 34549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34800, "end_char": 34804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34900, "end_char": 34904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34990, "end_char": 34994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35180, "end_char": 35184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35267, "end_char": 35271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35406, "end_char": 35410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35551, "end_char": 35556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36411, "end_char": 36415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36420, "end_char": 36424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36535, "end_char": 36539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36802, "end_char": 36806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36917, "end_char": 36921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37155, "end_char": 37159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38744, "end_char": 38748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38806, "end_char": 38810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39250, "end_char": 39254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39413, "end_char": 39417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39509, "end_char": 39513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39705, "end_char": 39709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40151, "end_char": 40155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40359, "end_char": 40363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40547, "end_char": 40551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40751, "end_char": 40755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th A October 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40775, "end_char": 40794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This being the only infirmity found by the High Court to which we are not able to\n\n.subscribe, it must be held that the second s. 6 notification dated 10th A October 1967 is valid and legal."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_920_927_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK, MADRAS\n\nCHEMICAL CONstRUCTION COMPANY & ORS.\n\nMay 3, 1979\n\n[R, S. SARKARIA AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nCode of Civil Procedurt, 1908-S. 25 as amended in 1976-Scope rf- Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to transfer d suit from one court to arwt11\"'- Explai11ed.\n\nThe first respondent entered into a contract with the second respondent for C the erection of a factory in a place named Seoni in Madhya Pradesh. Under the Scheme for re-discounting of bills, the first respondent discounted with its Banker\n\n(petitioner), the Bills of Exchange in respect of sale of machinery. When the second respondent failed to honour the Bills, the drawees of the Bills filed a suit\n\nin the District Court, Seoni against the petitioner Bank and others seeking certaia reliefs. The petitioner-Bank on the other hand filed a suit in the Madras High Court against the first respondent and others. In a petition under s. 25 of the D Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended in 1976) the petitioDfr sought ti'lllllfer of the suit filed in Seoni to the file of the Madras High Court.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : 1. Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916 empowers the Supreme Court to direct that any suit, appeal or other proceeding E be transferred from a High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State, if it is satisfied that such an order ls expedient in the ends of justice. [925A)\n\n2. The principle governing the general power of transfer and withdrawal under s. 24 of the Code is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and as such entitled to institute his suit in any forum which the law allows him. The F Court should not lightly change that forum and compel him to go to another Court with consequent increase in inconvenience and expense of prosecuting his suit. The mere balance of convenience in favour of proceedings ia another Court albeit a material considemtion, may not always be a true criterion justifying the transfer. The power of transfer of a civil proceedint;\n\nto another Court conferred under the new Section 25 C.P.C. on the Supreme Court is far wider and so is the amplitude of the expression \"expedient in the G interests of justice\" which furnishes a general guideline for the exercise of the power. [925E-F]\n\n3. One of the broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer of a civil suit from one court to another is that where two suits raising common questions of facts and law between parties, common to both the suits are pending in two different Courts, it is generally in the interests of justice to transfer one of these suits to the other forum to be tried by the same Court with consequent avoidance of multiplicity in the trial of the\n\nsame issues and the risk of conflicting decisions thereon. [925H]\n\nI •\n\n' r\n\n,.,\n\nI ..\n\nI t i\n\nl I\n\nOV!lSUS J4NIC v. CHIWIUL COII!TJ.UCTX>N CO. :Sarkarla, 1.) 921-\n\n• • -4. Ia tht illltta.at Clti, • COiDJ&rativ• atudy ct tho -.uc. ia the two suita lboWI dlat the principal common queatioll ariJina in c:a.ch of theM suits is whether the a\"<nd re$pondent and the fourth respondent were bonnd to make payment!!. The m:tivinl patty in both the tuitt 'ffii the \"'titioner.\n\nAcoordin1 to the .nteationa in the petition, the Billl of Exchanae were drawn\n\nin Madra, an ddiscounted in lfadrae and al80 rediscounted with the Indw trial Bank end payments were to be made expressly in Madru. Both tho parties were the aame .nd the material issuea in both ot them were common or interdepende11.t. It the two euifa ue allowed to continue in their origillal forums, there is a pos!ibility of c:on11.ictina findings on tho question of liabi Iity. The evidel'lce in both the euits would m011tly bo common and is locally available at Madras. Transfer of the Seoni enit to tho Madral! High Court will avoid multiplicity in the Trial of the common iS!ues and obviate the ri!k of conilictinr deci!ioru. In the circ\\IIMtances it is manifestly expedient, in the\n\ninterests of justice that both the euits mould be tried by the Madraa Hiah\n\nCourt on itl!l ori; inal side by the same Judge or Judge•. [926CF]\n\n5. The second respondent's apprehenaion that the tranafer of the Seoni auit to Madras would cause an increa, e in expenses of litigation and incon venience to them is not well founded.\n\nBoth the suits are more or leS8 at the same etaae.\n\nCommon evidence is to be found locally in Madrae.\n\nThe fourth respondents who were the guarantors, had no objection to the tramfe. of the Seoni suit to Madras. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the Seoni euit being transferred to the Madral! High Court which is a\n\nauperior forum than the District Court at S; eoni.\n\n[927CD]\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Transfer Petition No. 26 of 1978.\n\nS. T. Desai, K. layaram and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner.\n\nT. S. Vishwanatha Rao and A. T. M.\n\nSainpath for Respondent No. 1\n\nB. D. B11l and MrJ. JayaJhree Wad for Respondent No.2\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This is a petition under Section 25 of the Civil Procedure •Code 1908, as amended by Act 104 of 1976 for transfer\n\nof suit IB of 1972 instituted in the Court of District Judge, Senoi, Madhya Pradesh by the !iecond respondent herein, against the petitioner and respondents 1, 3 & 4 to the file of the High Court of Madras G (Original Side). The facts material to this petition are as under:\n\n. The first respondent, M/s. Chemical Construction Company, is a regiStered partnership having its registered office at No. 14, Milestone Mathura Road, Faridabad, Haryana and Head Offise at Madras. It is represe:nttd by its partners Shri T. V. P. Nrunbiar, Shri 0. P. Nam- H 'biar, Shri 0. V. Nambiar, Smt. Uela Nambiat and Smt. Nlrmala\n\nNambiar. 3-409 SCij79\n\n. 922 .\n\nSUPREME COURT' R.E.POUS\n\n[1979]. 3 S.C.R .\n\nThe second respondent, Rajadhiraj. Industries Pvt. Ltd.,· has - its registered office at Seoni, Madhya Pradesh. It -is represented by its Managing Director,· Shri Harishchandra Singhania.\n\nThe third respondent, Industrial Development Bank of India Ud. has its registered office at Bombay and branch offices at other placet,\n\nincluding one at Madras. . ·\n\nThe fourth respondent is Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation, incorporated under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1957, hav\n\nint~; its registered office in Indore, Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe first respondent (manufacturer) entered into a contract on November 11, 1969 with the second respondent to erect a plant for manufacture of hydrogenated vegetable oil. There was a supplement&ry agreement between them on Jan'Uary 24, 1970. The cost of the plant was Rs. 25,00,000/-. The third respondent (for short called the Industrial Bank), agreed to finance the manufacturer (first res- _pondent) under a Scheme called the \"Bills Rediscounting. Scheme\".\n\nUnder that Scheme the manufacturer would obtain in convenient mutually agreed instalments the value of the machinery supplied within !!. few days of its delivery by discounting with his banter the bi~ of exchange arising out of the sale of the machinery, either before dr\n\nafter acceptance by the second respondent (purchaser).\n\nThe bankers E of the manufacturer/seller would tAke up the discounted bills and get them :i-ediscounted by the Industrial BanJc, prior to their due dates, thus reimbursing themselves with the amounts paid to the manufacturer.\n\nThe discounting bank would be liable to pay to the Industrial Bank the amounts under the bills on their due dates.\n\nThe discounting bank would normally requires the econd respondent to accept the bills/promissory notes, aer the payment had beeli guaranteed on his behalf by its banker or the fourth repondent (thi- State Financial Corporation) etc. •\n\nThe petitioners, it is alleged, acted as discounting bank under the Scheme.\n\nThe first respondent and the second respondent took advaJJ~ tage of the Scheme, and pursuant to an agreement for supply of materials between the first and second respondents, the fourth respondenl executed an irrevocable guarantee on November 3, 1970 and a suP\" plementary guarantee_ on February 18, 1971 in favour of the petitioner . on, behalf of second respondent.\n\nIt is further alleged that in pW'!uance of the independent agr~ tnent, the petitioner bad discounted a total of 9 Usance Bills to tM\n\noitent of Rs. 9.42 lacs which were drawn by the first rest:>ondent lllld\n\nOVE~SEAS BANK V. CHEMI(; AL <; ONS!RU<?TI<?~. c; o. (Sarkaria, J.) 92_ J:, ~\n\naccepted by the. S.econd. respPitdent. _The_ fir$t .eight of thes~ b.ills were rediscounted by the petitioner with the third respondent. (the lndust..;. .\n\nrial Bank) for a total sum of Rs. ~6.99 lacs, which am01W, t was ilUQ&e-. quently P!!:id over to the 'third respondent by the petitioner but none of these eight bills was paid by the second respondent to the petitioners on the due dates.\n\nThe remaining bill for Rs. 2,43,376/,. was not rediscounted by the petitioner with the third respondent.\n\nIn September 1972, the drwees of the bills (second respondent) filed suit No. IB/1972 in the District Court, Seoni against the :etltioner and the respondents 1, 3 & 4, seeki, ng a decree for (a) one 1ac of rupees against the first respondent on account of damages for breach of contract; (b) directing the petitioners (Indian Overseas Bank) and repondents 1 & 3 jointly and severally to deliver up the guarantee deeds dated November 3, 1970 and February 18, 1971 and the 9 Usance Bills and for cancellation of the same by the Court; (c) permane1it injunction restraining the petitioner Bank and respondents 1 & 3 from enforcing the aforesaid guarantee and the 9 Usance Bills;\n\n(d) permanently restraining the guarantor (fouith respondent) from discharging any liability under the aforesaid guarantees, dated November 3, 1970 and February 18, 1971. It ws alleged in the plaint by the second respondent that acceptance of the bills was vitiated by false\n\nrepresentation made by the agent of the petitioner Bank. The defendants in the Sooni suit (petitioner and respondent 1 herein) filed their written statements denying the allegations and claim made in the plaint In March 1978, the District Judge, Seoni framed issues in that suit.\n\nIn the Seoni Suit, the second respondent made an application for interim. injunction restraining the petitionr from enforCing the right8 in respect of the Usance Bills accepted by the second respondent and\n\nregarding the guarantees furnished by the fourth respondent. The District Judge dismissed that application; but on appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh granted the interim injunCtion a~ prayed for.\n\nOn appeal by the petitioner, this Court by it~ order, dated March 20, 1974, set aside the High Court's order and vacated the interim injunction as regards the petitioner and the fourth respondent subject to the petitioner undertaking to reimburse the fourth respon.. dent in accordance with the directions of the Court' depending upon the resl~ of the Seoni Sit. As a result the irppedime:\"t in the way of\n\nthe pehhOnet: for enforcmg its rights was removed. · · · . ' . . .. The petitio?er bank filed suit C.~.-No. -143/75 in the High Coqrt of Madras agamst respondents 1& 4 herein (as also :five other. d.efen-\n\nSUPREME COURT U:PORTS [1979] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nA dants, who e partners of the first respondent two of whom had furnished collateral securities by way of equitable mortgages. In this\n\nMadras sui!, the petitioner herein, has prayed for the followiiig reliefs :\n\n(i) Directing the respondents, herein, (except respondent 3), jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiff-petitioner the swp. of Rs. 10,62,364.57 under the Bills Purchase Acco.unt together With interest OQ. the said nine Usance Bills.\n\n(ii) Directing the first respondent herein, and their partners to pay to the plaintiff-petitioner the sum of R~. 1,28,154.57 under the overdraft account of the first defendant firm together with interest.\n\nPss ing of a mortgage preliminary decree a_gains~ efendants S and 6 ere in, (two of the par!IJ.ers of the first respondent, herein).\n\nIt is note-wDrthy that respondents 1, 2 and 4 herein, have filed their written statements in tht suit before the Madras High Court, which on November 2, 1977, framed 12 issues.\n\nIssues 1 and 6 run as follows:\n\n(1) Whether the defendant (first respondent, herein) is liable to pay the suit claim under the Bills purchase account ?\n\n{6) Whether the defendant (second respondent, herein) is not E liable for the suit claim as an acceptor under the Bills Purchase Account.\n\nA comparative study of the issues framed in the two suits, one at Seoni and the other at M_adras, shows that the principal common ques\n\ntion arising in each of these two suits, is : whether the second responde!lt and the fourth resJLondent, herein, are bound to make payment, the second respondent as acceptor of the bills of exchange and the fourth respondent as guarantors for due payment thereunder. The receiving party in both the suits is the petitioner, herein. According to the allegation~ in the present petition, the bills of excillinge were drawn in Madras and discounted in Madras and also rc~:discounted with the Industrial Bank and payments were to be made expressly in Madras.\n\nUnder an interim order dated April 9, 1976 passed by the High Court of Madras in the said suit, the fourth respondent has deposited with the petitioner herein, a sum of Rs. 10 lacs as and by way of deposit. Apart from a claim for damages of Rs. 1 lac against the first respondent herein, (the .manufacturers), no money claim has been made against the petitioner in the Seoni Suit. Nor has the petitiner\n\nmade any counter-claim in the Senoi Suit.\n\nOVI!I.SBAS BANK v. CHEMICAL CONSTI.UCTION CO. (Sarkaria, J.) g 25\n\nW c are of opinion, this petition must succeed. Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure as u,.b&tituted for the former section by the\n\nCode of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, empowen this Court to direct that any suit, appeal or other . proceeding be transfer rod from a igh Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any dther State, if it is satisfied that such an order is \"expedient in the ends of justice\". The former Secti~ 25 empowered the State Government to transfer, on receiving a report from the Judge concerned of the High Court to transfer suits or pro- • 1'_..._ _ ceedings in certain circumstances from one High Court to another\n\n- ~- High Court.\n\nThe scope of the former Section was very restricted as it provided only for transfer of any proceeding pending iri a High Court\n\npresided by a Single Judge.\n\nIt was thought that the State Government was not the appropriate agency for exercising this power of transfer, obviously because such exercis~ is a judicial function. For these reasons, the new Section 25 which has beeri substituted for the former one, confers on this Court very wide poers of transfer which are as extensive as its powers under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n\nThe principle governing the general power of transfer and withdrawal under Section 24 of the Code is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and, as such, entitled to institute his suit in any forum which the\n\nlaw allows him.\n\nThe Court should not lightly change that forum and compel him t~ go to another Court, with consequent increase in inconvenience and expense of prosecuting his suit.\n\nA mere balance of convenience in favour of proceedings in another Court, albeit ii material consideration may not always be a sure criterion justifying transfer.\n\nAs compared with Section 24, the power of transfer of a civil proceeding to anther Court, conferred under. the new Section 25 on the\n\nSupx:eme Court, far wider.\n\nAnd, so is the amplitude of the expression, \"expedient in the interest of justice\" which furnishe~ a general guideline for the exercise of the power.\n\nWhether it is expedient or desirable in the interest of justice to transfer a proceeding to another G Court is a question which depends on the circumstances of the particular case.\n\nAlthough the exercise of this discretionary power cim not be imprisont:d within them 8traight jacket of any cast iron formula uniformly\n\napp1icable to all situations; yetj certain broad propositions as to what H may constitute a ground for ttansfel' ean be deduced from judicial deei&ions.\n\nOne of them is that where two suit's raising common ques-\n\n...\n\n. 926 .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979) 3 S.C.R.\n\ntions :.of -acts 'and laws between parties common to both the suits,\n\n=ae pending iri two -different courts, it i~ generally in the intere!lt of\n\njustice to transfer one of those suits to the other forum to be tried by the _ s; im~ Court, with consequent voidance of ll!ultiplicity in the trial of the same issues and !_he risk of conflicting decisions thereon. The instant case falls squarely within this category.\n\n Here, in the twosuits, one in the District Court, Seoni, Madhya Pradesh, and the other 1iled by the petitioner in the High Court of Madras, the parties are the same except that in the Madras suit five __ .,.Y\n\n• other persons who are alleged to be partners of the first respondent, ~\n\nherein and two of whom furnished collateral securities, have also been joined as defendants.\n\nFurther, the material issues in both the suits are common or interdependent.\n\nFor instance, issue No. 14 in the Seoni Suit is substantially the same as issue No. 7 framed by the Madra9 High Court in the suit filed there by the petitioner.\n\nThe questiOiii ivolved, inter alia, in issues 9, 10, 12, 18, 19 and 20 in the Seori Suit have a substantial bearing on the decision of issues 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 framed in the Madras Suit.\n\nThe basic question commonly arising in each of the two suits concerns the liability of the second respondent and the fourth respondent to make payment as the acceptor of the bills of exchange and the guarantors, respectively, for due payment under those bills. If the two suits are allowed .to continue in their original forums there is a possibility of conflicting findings on the question of liability under the Usance Bills and lllider the gu_rantees. It is not disputed (we are told)•that the payment of the bills were to be made to the petitioner bank at MadrM.\n\nThe evidence in both the suits would mostly be common and locally available at Madras.\n\nTransfer of the Seoni suit to Madras High Court will avoid multiplicity in the trial of the common issues and obviate the risk of conflicting decisions.\n\nUnder the circumstances, it is manifestly \"expedient in the interest of justice\" that both the suits should be tried by the Madra9 High Court on i!s Original Side by the same Judge/Judges.\n\nMr. Bal appearing for the second respondent, opposed thil'l petition for transfer.\n\nLearned counsel submitted that for a small company like respondent 2 it will simply be impossible to fight the litigation at Madras, and the extra expenditure that will have to be incurred by his clients in undertaking frequent visitl'l to Madra~ which is about 1000 miles from Seoni, may prove too heavy a financial burden for it. . Another apprehension expresed by the counsel was that the objection as to want of territorial jurid'iction in the Madras Court\n\noVERSEAS BANK V. CHEMICAL CONST.RUCTION co. (Sar!\"Jria, 1.) 92\"1:\n\ntil-ken by the second respondent, will, in effect, be rendered sterile b the proposed transfer of Seoni suit to Madras. Counsel suggested thi the proper course is to stay the subsequently instituted &uit at Mad!f under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure tin tho disposal f the suit !it Seoni by the District Judge. -\n\nWe are unable to accept any of these arguments. Both the suits at Madras and Sconi are more or less at the same stage.\n\nEvidence has not yet commenced i.r). either o! the suits.. The defendants in both the suits have filed their written st'!tments. The second respondent\n\nhas appeared in the Madras High Court and joined issue with the petitioner-plaintiff there. It seellls that the common evidence, which will mostly be documentary, is to be found locally at Madras. The fourth respondents who arc the guarantors, have no objection to the transfer of the Seoni suit to Madras. The second respondents' apprehensions, therefore, about the transfer causing extraordiriary increase in expe.nses of litigation and inconvenience to them, are much too exaggerated.\n\nRather, the balance o! <; onvenience i~ iii favour ol the Seoni suit being t.:ransferred to the Madras High Court which i~ a superior forum than the District Court, Seoni. · ·\n\nAs regards the second submis:oion of Mr. Bal, we make it clear tknt the transfer o[ the Seoni suit to Madras will be without prejudice\n\nto the objection raised by the second respondent, herein, ns to the Madras High Court's jurisdiction to try the suit, already instituted there E by the petitioner.. . .\n\nMr. Bal's argument founded. on Sectio~ 10 of the Code _of Civil Procedure c.Joc!' not arise in this transfer petition, and we express no opinion on it.\n\nFor the forecoing reasons. we allow this ptition and. t.ransfer suit F No. m of t97£ filed by the second respondent l; CTein in the Co_urt of. the District Judge, St:oni, ~!adhya Pradesh; to the file. of the H1h\n\nCourt of judicature at .Madras (Original Side). · ' ·\n\n' I •\n\nP.B.R. . Ptitio11 allowtd.\n\n. .. . ..\n\n.i\n\n' I ; ..\n\n~-i,", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHEMICAL CONstRUCTION COMPANY & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHEMICAL CONstRUCTION COMPANY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 3, 1979\n\n[R, S. SARKARIA AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedurt, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedurt, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedurt, 1908"}}, {"text": "District Court, Seoni", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the second respondent failed to honour the Bills, the drawees of the Bills filed a suit\n\nin the District Court, Seoni against the petitioner Bank and others seeking certaia reliefs."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 830, "end_char": 847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner-Bank on the other hand filed a suit in the Madras High Court against the first respondent and others."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 909, "end_char": 914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedurt, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedurt, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seoni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1030, "end_char": 1035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a petition under s. 25 of the D Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended in 1976) the petitioDfr sought ti'lllllfer of the suit filed in Seoni to the file of the Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1127, "end_char": 1169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916 empowers the Supreme Court to direct that any suit, appeal or other proceeding E be transferred from a High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State, if it is satisfied that such an order ls expedient in the ends of justice. ["}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1536, "end_char": 1541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098, "end_char": 2108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1916"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madru", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acoordin1 to the .nteationa in the petition, the Billl of Exchanae were drawn\n\nin Madra, an ddiscounted in lfadrae and al80 rediscounted with the Indw trial Bank end payments were to be made expressly in Madru."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3783, "end_char": 3789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidel'lce in both the euits would m011tly bo common and is locally available at Madras."}}, {"text": "Madraa Hiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4070, "end_char": 4081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circ\\IIMtances it is manifestly expedient, in the\n\ninterests of justice that both the euits mould be tried by the Madraa Hiah\n\nCourt on itl!l ori; inal side by the same Judge or Judge•. [926CF]\n\n5."}}, {"text": "Madrae", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Common evidence is to be found locally in Madrae."}}, {"text": "Madral! High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The balance of convenience is also in favour of the Seoni euit being transferred to the Madral!"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, K. layaram and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. layaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, K. layaram and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. Ramkumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4816, "end_char": 4827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, K. layaram and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "T. S. Vishwanatha Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Vishwanatha Rao and A. T. M.\n\nSainpath for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. T. M.\n\nSainpath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Vishwanatha Rao and A. T. M.\n\nSainpath for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. D. B11l", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4916, "end_char": 4926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nB. D. B11l and MrJ. JayaJhree Wad for Respondent No.2\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This is a petition under Section 25 of the Civil Procedure •Code 1908, as amended by Act 104 of 1976 for transfer\n\nof suit IB of 1972 instituted in the Court of District Judge, Senoi, Madhya Pradesh by the !"}}, {"text": "MrJ. JayaJhree Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nB. D. B11l and MrJ. JayaJhree Wad for Respondent No.2\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This is a petition under Section 25 of the Civil Procedure •Code 1908, as amended by Act 104 of 1976 for transfer\n\nof suit IB of 1972 instituted in the Court of District Judge, Senoi, Madhya Pradesh by the !"}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nB. D. B11l and MrJ. JayaJhree Wad for Respondent No.2\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This is a petition under Section 25 of the Civil Procedure •Code 1908, as amended by Act 104 of 1976 for transfer\n\nof suit IB of 1972 instituted in the Court of District Judge, Senoi, Madhya Pradesh by the !", "canonical_name": "S. SARKARIA"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chemical Construction Company", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent, M/s. Chemical Construction Company, is a regiStered partnership having its registered office at No.", "canonical_name": "CHEMICAL CONstRUCTION COMPANY & ORS"}}, {"text": "T. V. P. Nrunbiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5656, "end_char": 5673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is represe:nttd by its partners Shri T. V. P. Nrunbiar, Shri 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Nam- H 'biar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is represe:nttd by its partners Shri T. V. P. Nrunbiar, Shri 0."}}, {"text": ". V. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5706, "end_char": 5718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Nam- H 'biar, Shri 0."}}, {"text": "Uela Nambiat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uela Nambiat and Smt."}}, {"text": "Nlrmala\n\nNambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5747, "end_char": 5763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nlrmala\n\nNambiar."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT' R.E.POUS\n\n[1979]. 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5788, "end_char": 5828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT' R.E.POUS\n\n[1979]."}}, {"text": "Rajadhiraj. Industries Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second respondent, Rajadhiraj."}}, {"text": "Harishchandra Singhania", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5995, "end_char": 6018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It -is represented by its Managing Director,· Shri Harishchandra Singhania."}}, {"text": "Industrial Development Bank of India Ud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6043, "end_char": 6082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third respondent, Industrial Development Bank of India Ud."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth respondent is Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation, incorporated under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1957, hav\n\nint~; its registered office in Indore, Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State Financial Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6348, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth respondent is Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation, incorporated under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1957, hav\n\nint~; its registered office in Indore, Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6356, "end_char": 6370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth respondent is Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation, incorporated under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1957, hav\n\nint~; its registered office in Indore, Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "November 11, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6436, "end_char": 6453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent (manufacturer) entered into a contract on November 11, 1969 with the second respondent to erect a plant for manufacture of hydrogenated vegetable oil."}}, {"text": "Jan'Uary 24, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6597, "end_char": 6614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a supplement&ry agreement between them on Jan'Uary 24, 1970."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent and the second respondent took advaJJ~ tage of the Scheme, and pursuant to an agreement for supply of materials between the first and second respondents, the fourth respondenl executed an irrevocable guarantee on November 3, 1970 and a suP\" plementary guarantee_ on February 18, 1971 in favour of the petitioner ."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9.42 lacs which were drawn by the first rest:>ondent lllld\n\nOVE~SEAS BANK V. CHEMI(; AL <; ONS!RU<?TI<?~. c; o. (Sarkaria, J.) 92_ J:, ~\n\naccepted by the.", "canonical_name": "S. SARKARIA"}}, {"text": "Indian Overseas Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9295, "end_char": 9315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IB/1972 in the District Court, Seoni against the :etltioner and the respondents 1, 3 & 4, seeki, ng a decree for (a) one 1ac of rupees against the first respondent on account of damages for breach of contract; (b) directing the petitioners (Indian Overseas Bank) and repondents 1 & 3 jointly and severally to deliver up the guarantee deeds dated November 3, 1970 and February 18, 1971 and the 9 Usance Bills and for cancellation of the same by the Court; (c) permane1it injunction restraining the petitioner Bank and respondents 1 & 3 from enforcing the aforesaid guarantee and the 9 Usance Bills;\n\n(d) permanently restraining the guarantor (fouith respondent) from discharging any liability under the aforesaid guarantees, dated November 3, 1970 and February 18, 1971."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Seoni", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10159, "end_char": 10180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants in the Sooni suit (petitioner and respondent 1 herein) filed their written statements denying the allegations and claim made in the plaint In March 1978, the District Judge, Seoni framed issues in that suit."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10544, "end_char": 10572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge dismissed that application; but on appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh granted the interim injunCtion a~ prayed for."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12205, "end_char": 12221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is note-wDrthy that respondents 1, 2 and 4 herein, have filed their written statements in tht suit before the Madras High Court, which on November 2, 1977, framed 12 issues."}}, {"text": "April 9, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13255, "end_char": 13268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under an interim order dated April 9, 1976 passed by the High Court of Madras in the said suit, the fourth respondent has deposited with the petitioner herein, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13283, "end_char": 13303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under an interim order dated April 9, 1976 passed by the High Court of Madras in the said suit, the fourth respondent has deposited with the petitioner herein, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13829, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13877, "end_char": 13900, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14802, "end_char": 14812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14954, "end_char": 14965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 15005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15083, "end_char": 15093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15581, "end_char": 15591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15679, "end_char": 15689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "District Court, Seoni, Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16915, "end_char": 16952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here, in the twosuits, one in the District Court, Seoni, Madhya Pradesh, and the other 1iled by the petitioner in the High Court of Madras, the parties are the same except that in the Madras suit five  .,."}}, {"text": "Madra9 High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17438, "end_char": 17455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 framed by the Madra9 High Court in the suit filed there by the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Bal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bal appearing for the second respondent, opposed thil'l petition for transfer."}}, {"text": "Madra~", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19015, "end_char": 19021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel submitted that for a small company like respondent 2 it will simply be impossible to fight the litigation at Madras, and the extra expenditure that will have to be incurred by his clients in undertaking frequent visitl'l to Madra~ which is about 1000 miles from Seoni, may prove too heavy a financial burden for it. ."}}, {"text": "Seoni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19053, "end_char": 19058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel submitted that for a small company like respondent 2 it will simply be impossible to fight the litigation at Madras, and the extra expenditure that will have to be incurred by his clients in undertaking frequent visitl'l to Madra~ which is about 1000 miles from Seoni, may prove too heavy a financial burden for it. ."}}, {"text": "Madras Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19223, "end_char": 19235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another apprehension expresed by the counsel was that the objection as to want of territorial jurid'iction in the Madras Court\n\noVERSEAS BANK V. CHEMICAL CONST.RUCTION co. (Sar!\"Jria, 1.)"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19523, "end_char": 19533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19537, "end_char": 19564, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sconi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19706, "end_char": 19711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the suits at Madras and Sconi are more or less at the same stage."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_928_936_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU\n\nV. KRISHNNASW AMI NAIDU & ANR.\n\nMay 3~ 1979\n\n[S. Muli.TAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nCriminal I.Dw (A.mtnclmtnt) Act, 1952 (66 of 1952)-Sptclal ludge- W'htthi!r can txtrdu powtr undtr S. 167 Cr. P. C. to aurhorist dtttntion of an Grcust4 /11 polict cu8tody.\n\nThe Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (66 of 1952) was enacted on 28-7-52 to further amend the Indian Penal Code, 1860 nnd tbe Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and to provide for a more speedy trial of offence. Section\n\n(f of the Act enables the State Government by notification in the official gazette to appoint Special Judges to try offences punishable under Sections 161-165Aof tbe Indian Penal Code or Section S of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.\n\nThe Special Judge thus appointed ahall not be qualified for appointment aa a\n\nSpecial Judge under the Act unless he ia or hal been a Sessions Judge or an Add!. Sessions Judge or an Asstt. Sessions Tudgc under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Section 7 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898 or in any other law, the offence specified in Sub-eection 1 of Section 6 ehnll be triable by a Special Judge only. By Section S the Special Tudge is empowered to take cogn.iz.ance of en ofl'ence without the accused being commit~ to him for trial and in trying the accused persons he il required to follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Proce dure In the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. Section 8(A) empowers the Special Judge to try \"rt.ain offenoet in a aummary way end the rrovisions of Section 262 to 265 o( the Crimlntl Procedure Code arc m11de applic&ble so far u they may apply.\n\nTbc rccponc!ents were lllTeeted by the Vi&ilance end Anti-Corruption Unit of the StAte Government for alleged otfenco under tho Prevention of Corruption.\n\nAct. They were produced before the Spe<:ia.l Judge on the following day. 'I11•\n\nrc.tpondents• application for enlu1ement on bail wu dismis3ed by the Special 1\\ldae. Tho Police moved the SP\"ial Jud&e for committing tho respondl!ni.J to\n\npollee c:w; tody for 1$ daye. Tho1•gh the arplication wn' rejected another one wa. med.\n\nThe rpondcnts there upor~ moved the Jllgh Court for ( 1) a direction. tbat ey ahould bo kePt ln judicial custody pe11ding inYestiptlon of the crime anJ (.) tor qua.h!.ng au: llppllcatlon before the Special Judge by the pollee tor comm!ttlnt thtm to pollee cuetody: contendtns that Special Judge I• not ,. Magistrate u dftn~ In the Crimlnal Proc:.e4ure Code an<! u euch not empowered to\n\nfact er Secuoo 167 or the Criminal Procedure Code llnd to place tho accued\n\nJl fO•ICO CIUtody,\n\n~ w, b Court accepted tht contention and Jranted relit(.\n\n}.lto•llll the •PP\"l. \\.\n\nl ! '!\n\nI , . . 1\n\n~ • , . f\"•\n\nI •\n\nTAMIL NADU v. V. K. NAIDU i21\n\nHELD: 1. Th• Special. Jud~ notified ullder 1. 6 the Criminal Law (Amend- A llltDI) Act 1952 can exen:lllc tho power conferred on a Macistrato under 1. 167 of tb• Criminal Procedure Code to a11thorise detention of the accused ill. the cm1odY of th• polico. [936Cj\n\n2. Section 8 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, apccifica!ly empowefl tbe Special Judge to take COi!lizance of the offence without the accused bei~ committed to him for trial. In taking: cognizance o! an offence without the B accuKd being committed to him he is not a S=iona Judge for Section 193 Cr. P.C. provides that no Court of Sessiona Judge shall t:k:e cognizance for any otlence ; u a Court of original jurisdiction unless the ca!e has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Strictly he it not a Se..sions Judge for no\n\nSe&iollll Judlle can take coinizance u a Court of Session• without committnt.\n\n[934CDl C\n\n3. The Criminal Law (Amendment} Act being on amending Act the provi sio111 are intended to provide for a 1peedy trial o! certain offences. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act ia not intended to be a complete Code relating to procedure. The provisions of the Cr.P.C. are not excluded unless they are incontillent with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act Thus read there can be no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Procedure Code il D\n\napplie<ble when there is no conflict with the provision' of the Criminal Lnw ( . .O.mendment) Act. [934 EJ\n\n4. If a Special Judge who is empowered to take cognizance without com mittal is not empowered to exercise powers of remanding an accused person produced before him or release him on bail, it will lead to an anomalous situa lion. A Magistrate other than a Magistrate having jurisdiction cannot keep him E in Cllltody for more than IS da}'! and after the expiry of the period if the Magis tnte havin~~: jurisdiction to try the case does not include Special Judge, it would mean that he would bawe no authority to extend the period of remand or to relcase him on bail. So also if the Specilll Judge is not held to bo a Magistrate bnilla juriadiction, a charge sheet under a. 173 cannot be submitted to him.\n\n[934F-Gl\n\n5. The General Clausea Act, •· 32 defin~ a 'Magistr:lto' as including eYery penon excrcisine all or any of the powers of a Magistr:lte under the Code of Orirninul Procedure for the time being in force. Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code proYides that any reference without any qualying ords: to a\n\nhaiatrate, aholl be construed unk&t the context otherwl3e requares m the manner alated In the aub-ectlns. If the conte:u otherwise require• the word, 'Marilltrate may include Magistrates who are not apecified in the section. Read alooa with the definition, of Magislrntc in the General .clauses Act there can be 110 diniculty in construina the Special Judge u a Magtstrate for the purposo of\n\n1 167. [934H-93SB1\n\n6. The Hiah Court wu In error in applying the decision of ti:is Court in l.{qjo, E. G. Basudev v. State of Bombay, (1962] 2 SCR 195 re!Btrng to Ru!c 3 which is framed under •· '49 of the Crimiool Procedure Code. The MalS\n\nlrat~ wntemplated under rule l ;. a Magistrate who it empowered to inqull'e Wft\\ a \"~\"' to commltt; aJ whicll cannot appiJ' to a Speci•l Judae. [9J6Bl\n\n,1 I/ /\n\n93o.\n\n[1979} 3 S.C.R.\n\nCRIMiNAL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTIO~ (Criminal Appeal No. '-292 of\" 19.76.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated -22·4~1976 of the Mad.rcis High Court in Criminal M.P. No. 1592 and 1605/76. ,\n\nV. P. Raman, Adv. Geni. and A. V. Rangam for the Appella.ilt.\n\nB Hanjev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered , bY\n\nKAILASAM, J. The question that arises in this appeal is whetitu the Special Judge under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 can exercise the power conferred on a Magistrate under section 167 of c the Criminal Procedure Code to authorise detention of the accused in the custody of the poice.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu against an Order of the Madras High Court in C.M.Ps. Nos. 1582 and\n\n1605 of 197 6 dated 22-4-197 6.\n\nD The first respondent V. Krishnaswami Naidu is the lion of the second respondent L. Venkataswami Naidu. The first respondent was the Gazetted Personal Assistant to the former Minister for Health,\n\nState of Tamil Nadu. He and the second respondent were arrested by the Vigiance and Anti-corruption unit of the Tamil Nadu Police on April 2, 1976 for alleged offence under the Prevention of Corruption E Act. They were produced before the Special Judge on the next day i.e. 3-4-1976. The respondent~ moved Special Judge for enlargement of bail.\n\nThe petition was dismissed.\n\nThe inspector of police (Vigilance) moved the Special Judge for committing the respondents to police custody for a period of 15 days. That application was also\n\nrjected.\n\nInpite of the rejection of this application the police filed F Cr. M.P. No. 617 of 1976 before the Special Judge for directing the\n\nrepondent~ to be placed under the police custody for. a period of 1 5 days.\n\nThe respondents moved before the High Court Cr.M.P. No. 1587 of 1976 for a direction that the respondent should be kept in judicial custody pending investigation of the crime.\n\nThe respondents also filed another Cr. M.P. No. 1605 of 1976 for quashing the applica- G tion Cr. M.P .. No. 617 of 1976 before the Special Judge by the Police\n\nfo~ coitini the respondents .to po-lice custody on the ground. . that\n\nth~ Special Judge is not a Magitrate as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and as such not empowered to act under section 167 of the\n\nCr:iiniilal Procedure Code and to place the accused irt police -custody. . . . H ·.Jn order to appreciate the contntio~ -raised in this appeal it is nocessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law\n\nAmendment Act of 1952 and the relevant provisions of the Criminal\n\n.,.\n\nTAMIL NAim v. V. K. NAIDU (Kailasam, ].)\n\n9!H\n\nPr6cedure Code Act of 1974. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 6 6 of 19 52 was enacted on 28-7-19 52 to further amend - the Ittditn Penal Code ana the Criminal Procedure Code i 89S and to provide for a more ipeedy trial o~ offences. It may be noted that the Act\"is in the nature of an Amending Act in respect of the indian Penal Code and the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898. Section 6 of the Act enables the Stato Government by notification in the official gazette to appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areaa li may be ipecified in the notification to try offences punishable. under section 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or 165A of the Indian Penal Code or Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and alio in conspiracy to commit or in attempt to commit or in abetment of tny of the offences specified.\n\nThe Special Judge thus appOinted o try the offences mentioned shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under the Act unless he)s or lias been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Section 7 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898. or in any other law the offence specified in sub-section. 1 of Section 6 ihall be triable by a Special Judge only.\n\nBy section 7(1), therefore, the jurisdiction to try offences mentioned in Section 6(1) HI conferred on the Special Judge only.\n\nSection 8 is important for the purpose of our discussion and may be extracted in full.\n\nThe Special Judge is empowered under this section :\n\n(i) to take cognizance of offence without the accused being\n\ncommitted to him for trial; and\n\n(ii) in trying the accused persons he is required to follow the\n\nprocedure prescribed by the Code of Criminai Procedure in the trial of warrant cses-by Magistrates.\n\nIt may be noted that 'the Special Judge is not a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure though no perscirt can be appointed as a Special Judge unless -he is or has been either a Sessions Judge or an G Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge. The SiJe~ cial'Judge is empowered to take cognizances of the offences without the\n\naccued being committed to him fcir trial. . The jurisdiction to try the offence by a Sessions Judge is only after committal to him.\n\nFurther the.' Sessions Juoge does not follow the procedure for 'the . trial of warrant cses by Magistrates.\n\nThe Special Judge is deemed to be a 11 Court of Sesions only for certain purposes as mentioned. in Section\n\n~(3} of the Act while the first part of stib section 3. provides 'that\n\nSUPUME COUJ.T REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nexcept u provided in sub sectiohs (1) and (2) of Section 8 the provisiotul of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proeeedinp before die Special Judge, The sub-section further provides that \"for the purpose of the said provi!ions, the Courrof the Special Judge shall be deemed to be 1 Court of session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a prosecution before a special judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor\". The deemed provisions haS to be confined for the pulJ)O!es mentioned m the sub section. Section 8(2) enables the Special Judge to tender a pardon to a person with a view to obtaining evidence supposed to have been concerned for the commission of an offence and the pardon so tendered was for the purposes ofJSection 339 and 339(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. This sub section was enacted because Special Judge not being a Court to which a commitment has been made can\n\nnot tender pardon under the provisions of Section 338 and so this section is introduced to enable the Special Judge to tender a pardon.\n\nSub-section 3 (a) has made !}le provisions of section 350 and 549 applicable to proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purposes of the said provisions a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. Section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enable~\n\na succeeding Special Judge to act on the evidence recorded by his prea decessor or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself. Section 549 empowers a Magistrate when any person is brought before him charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried by a Court to which this Court applies or by a Court-martial, the Magistrate shall deliver him to the Commanding Officer of 'the Regiment for the purpose of being tried by the Court-martial. This\n\nprovision also is made specifically applicable to the Special Judge.\n\nSection 8(A) empowers the Special Judge to try certain offences in a summary way and the provisions of section 262 to 265 of the Criminal Procedure Code is made applicable so far ls they may apply.\n\nIt will be thus seen that section 8(1) empowers the Special Judge to take cognizance of offence without committal and directs that in trying the accused persons it hall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section 3 deems a special judge to be a Court of Sessions for certain purposes while sub-section (2) empowers the Special Judge to grant a tender of pardon. Sub-section\n\n3(a) makes the provisions of Section 350 and 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to the Special Judge and for the purposes of those provisions the Judge is deemed to be a Magistrate.\n\nUnder section 8(A) the Special Judge is empowered to try cases summarily\n\nTAMIL NADU V. V. K. NAJDU (Kdilalam, ].) 933\n\nwhich are triable by the Magistrate.\n\nThe Special Judge in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act .i& thus for aome purposes deemed to be a &Jsions Judge and for some other purposes deemed to be a Magistrate\n\nand some powers exercised by the Magistrate are conferred on him.\n\nIt is necessary to note that Special Judge is empowered to take cognizance without the accused being committed and in trying the accused\n\npersons he is required to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate. Under section 8 (3) except as regards the provisions in sub-section ( 1) and (2) tho provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure is made applicable in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. This taken alongwith the fact that the Criminal Law (Amendment) is an Amending Act so far as a\n\nCriminal Procedure Codo and Indian Penal Code is concerned the pro- . visions of Cr. P.C. should be considered to be in force unless there are certain provisions in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nWe will now examine the provisions of Section 167 of the D Criminal Procedure Code. Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires that whoneve.r any person is arrested and detained in custody and when it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within a period of 24 hours the polico officer is required to forward the accused to the Magistrate. The Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded if he is not the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case may authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit for a: term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. If he has no jurisdiction to try the case and if he considers that further detention is necessary he. may order the accused to be forwarded to any Magistrate having jurisdiction.\n\nThe Magistrate having jurisdiction may authorise the detention of the ccused person otherwise than in custody of the polico beyond the period of 15 days but for a total period not exceeding 60 days.\n\nIn the present c~ tbe accused were produced before the Special Judge who admittedly is the person who has jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nThe contention which found favour with the High Court is that the words 'Magistrate having jurisdiction' cannot apply to a Special Judge having jurisdiction to try the case. No doubt the word 'Special Judge' is not mentioned in section 167 but the question is whether that would exclude the Special Judge from being a MagiStrate having jurisdiction to try the case. The provisions of chapter XII Cr.P.C. relate to the infonnation to tlie police and their powers of investigation. It is seen that there are certain sections which require the police to take directions from\n\n.. SUPR~ME _CO'!JRT REPORTS\n\n\nthe Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nSection 155 (2) requires thatno police shaH take _up non-cognizable case without a~ order of the Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.. Again Section 157 requires that when the police officer. has reason to SUSpect the COmllliMion Of an offence which is empower~. ed under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report. Section 173 requires that on the com-- pletion of every im;.estigation under the Chapter the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence a police report as required in tl1e form prescribed.\n\nSection 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act sped- , fically empowers the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence without the accused being committed to him.\n\nIn taking cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to him he is not a Sessions Judge for section 193 Cr.P.C. provides that no Court af.\n\nSessions Judge shaH take cognizance for any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Strictly he is not a Sessions Judge for no Sessions Judge can take cognizance as a Court of Session without committal. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act being an amend~.\n\ning Act the provisions are intended to provide for a speedy tri31 of certain offences.\n\nThe Criminal Law (Amendment) Act is not intended to be a complete code relating to procedure. The provisions of the Cr.P.C. are not excluded unless they are inconsistent with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.\n\nThus read there could be ne difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Cr.P.C. is applicable when there is no conflict with the provisions of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. If a' Special Judge who is empowered to take cognizance without committal is not empowered to exercise powers of remandint an accused person produced before him or relese him on bail it will lead to an anomalous situation. A Magistrate other than a Magistrate having jurisdiction cannot keep him in custOt.ly for more than l 5 rln~ and after the expiring of the period it the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case does not include the Special Judge, it would mea• that he would have no authority to extend the period of remand or to release him on bail.\n\nSo also if the Special Judge is not held to be a Magistrate having jurisdiction, a charl!e sheet under section 173 cannot be submitted to him.\n\nIt is relevant to note that the General Oauses Act section 32 defines a Magistrate as including every perso• exercising all or any of the powers of a Majzistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force. Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that any reference without aey\n\n• ...\n\n.'. ·: ·,: ' ~-. ;_TAMIL NAIHJ. }1 • .V. K. NAJDJ_J_ (Kaisam, ],) 9 3§\n\nqualifying_words, -- to a Magistrat~, shall be construed, unle!s the con~ text otherwise requires. in _the ma, nner stated in the .aub:s_ections. If the\n\ncootxt otherwise requires the word 'Magistrate' may include Ma.giiil-\n\nQ:!ltea who are_ not specified in the Section. Read alongith the defi~\n\nnition_ o~ the Magistrate in the General Cla1.1ses Act Jh.ere can be. no difficulty in construing the Special Judge as a Magistrate for the pur- _ B\n\nl po111es of Section 167.\n\nJn coming to the conclusion that the Special Judge is not a Magistrate the High Court strongly relied on a decision o• this Court reported in fl962J 2 S.C.R. page 195 Major E. G. Basudev Ters'us State of Bombay. This Court in construing rule 3 made under section 549 of the Criminal Procedure Code held that the rule was applicable to only a Magistrate and not to a Special Judge who is not a Magistrate within the meaning of rule 3. Section 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Central Government to make rules as to easel to which persons subject to military, naval or air-force shall be tried by the ourt to which this Code applies, or by a Court-martial. The Centr_al Government made rules in xercise of the powers conferred on it under this section. Rule 3 which is considered by the Court l'UJl8\n\n.a11 follows :-\n\n\"Where a person subject to military, naval or ail'-force law js brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried by a Court-martial, such Magistrate shall not proceed to try such person or to inquire with a view to his commitment for trial by the Court of Sessions or . the High Court for any offence triable by\n\nsuch Court, unless,\n\n(a) he is of opinion, for reasons to be recorded that h~ should so proceed without being moved thereto by competent military, naval or air-force authority; or\n\n(b) he is moved thereto by such authority.\"\n\nRule 3 it will be seen provides that the Magistrate hall not proc\n\nceed to try such persons or inquire with a view to his commitment G fa trial by the Court of Sessions Judge unless he is of opinion that ho should so proceed without being moved thereto by such authority.\n\nThe sub-section, therefore, contemplates a Magistrate who can try the\n\noffence himself or inquire with a view to commitment. This part of\n\nthe section is not applicable to a Special Judge as he cannot inquire with a view to his commitment.\n\nTherefore, the Magistrate referred./ 11 to under rule (3) cannot include a Special Judge. This Court observed\n\ntbat Section 549 is not one cA. the sections in chapter 21 of the Code\n\nt36 SUPJ.nU COUIY :J.EPOllTS [1979) l S.C.t.\n\nA of Criminal Procedure and that it does not empower to Cen!nt Government to modify the warrant proctdure and tlut ru!e 3 wcm~\n\nnot be applicable 2lld .farther it cannot be sald th.tt by r~ f!l tb procedure to be Cofiowed by a Special Jg: l:e would be a\n\ngi!trate empowered to try roch a person v.11hin the meanm, of role 3. Relying on thi5 decision the learned Jud~ held that the same B ratio would govern the facts of the present case. The learned Ittdge\n\nwas in error in applying the decision of this Court relating to rule 3 which is Iramtd under section 549 to section 167 o! the Cr.P.C.\n\nThe Magistrate contemplated under rule 3 is a Magistrate who is empowered to inquire with a view to committal which cannot apply C to a special judge.\n\nIn the result on consideration of the relevant proV1~11ons of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and the Cr.P.C. we have no hesitation m coming to a conclusion that a Special Judge would be a M, agistrate empowered to try a case under section 167 ot the Cr. P.C: The Special Judge will proceed to exercise the powers that are conferred upon a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n-.----..\n\nI I\n\n,..", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. KRISHNNASW AMI NAIDU & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. KRISHNNASWAMI NAIDU & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 3~ 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 3~ 1979\n\n[S. Muli."}}, {"text": "S. Muli.TAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28-7-52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (66 of 1952) was enacted on 28-7-52 to further amend the Indian Penal Code, 1860 nnd tbe Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and to provide for a more speedy trial of offence."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 418, "end_char": 447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Aof tbe Indian Penal Code or Section S of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 666, "end_char": 746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sessions Tudgc under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 995, "end_char": 1004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sessions Tudgc under the Code", "statute": "Sessions Tudgc under the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Prdure 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 8(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 262 to 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Prdure 1898"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2978, "end_char": 3001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3083, "end_char": 3092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3968, "end_char": 3974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5189, "end_char": 5198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1962] 2 SCR 195", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5819, "end_char": 5835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CRIMiNAL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTIO~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6110, "end_char": 6141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1979} 3 S.C.R.\n\nCRIMiNAL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTIO~ (Criminal Appeal No. '"}}, {"text": "V. P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6295, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. P. Raman, Adv."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6323, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and A. V. Rangam for the Appella.ilt."}}, {"text": "B Hanjev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6358, "end_char": 6372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Hanjev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6377, "end_char": 6388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Hanjev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "bY\n\nKAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6452, "end_char": 6464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered , bY\n\nKAILASAM, J. The question that arises in this appeal is whetitu the Special Judge under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 can exercise the power conferred on a Magistrate under section 167 of c the Criminal Procedure Code to authorise detention of the accused in the custody of the poice."}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal by certificate is preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu against an Order of the Madras High Court in C.M.Ps."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6842, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal by certificate is preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu against an Order of the Madras High Court in C.M.Ps."}}, {"text": "22-4-197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6906, "end_char": 6914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1582 and\n\n1605 of 197 6 dated 22-4-197 6."}}, {"text": "L. Venkataswami Naidu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7001, "end_char": 7022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The first respondent V. Krishnaswami Naidu is the lion of the second respondent L. Venkataswami Naidu."}}, {"text": "Special Judge is not a Magitrate as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8285, "end_char": 8359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8399, "end_char": 8410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge is not a Magitrate as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Special Judge is not a Magitrate as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8785, "end_char": 8811, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "28-7-19 52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8840, "end_char": 8850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Criminal Law Amendment Act 6 6 of 19 52 was enacted on 28-7-19 52 to further amend - the Ittditn Penal Code ana the Criminal Procedure Code i 89S and to provide for a more ipeedy trial o~ offences."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8882, "end_char": 8892, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9066, "end_char": 9083, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9092, "end_char": 9126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9128, "end_char": 9137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 161, 162, 163, 164, 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9369, "end_char": 9400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9416, "end_char": 9433, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9437, "end_char": 9446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criffiinal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9454, "end_char": 9488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9758, "end_char": 9850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9879, "end_char": 9888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code", "statute": "Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9956, "end_char": 9982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10054, "end_char": 10063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10110, "end_char": 10122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898"}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10181, "end_char": 10193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10235, "end_char": 10244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10701, "end_char": 10772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11444, "end_char": 11453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code", "statute": "Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11560, "end_char": 11569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Additional Sessions Judge or an 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"gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15255, "end_char": 15272, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15538, "end_char": 15549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15559, "end_char": 15582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15584, "end_char": 15595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16843, "end_char": 16854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17011, "end_char": 17017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17271, "end_char": 17282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17446, "end_char": 17457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17577, "end_char": 17588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17733, "end_char": 17744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17994, "end_char": 18003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18011, "end_char": 18037, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18269, "end_char": 18280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18281, "end_char": 18287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18852, "end_char": 18858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19022, "end_char": 19028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19790, "end_char": 19801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19882, "end_char": 19892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20003, "end_char": 20029, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20059, "end_char": 20068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "TAMIL NAIHJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20167, "end_char": 20178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TAMIL NAIHJ. }"}}, {"text": "Section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20680, "end_char": 20691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 549", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20949, "end_char": 20960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 549", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21128, "end_char": 21139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21147, "end_char": 21173, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21187, "end_char": 21205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Central Government to make rules as to easel to which persons subject to military, naval or air-force shall be tried by the ourt to which this Code applies, or by a Court-martial."}}, {"text": "Section 549", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22739, "end_char": 22750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 549", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23403, "end_char": 23414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23418, "end_char": 23429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23437, "end_char": 23443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23701, "end_char": 23707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23831, "end_char": 23842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24053, "end_char": 24059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_937_951_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• .. •\n\n• • .\n\n'~\n\n• l\n\n.. :'\n\nD37\n\n•.:\n\nB. N. NAGARAJAN AND ORS.\n\nv. '···\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC.\n\nMay 3, 1959\n\n{\\>'. R. KRISHNA !YER, P. S. KAILASAM AND A:. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nMysore Government Servants (Seniority) Rules 1957 Rule 2 rf:ad H'ith Rule 2 f, th.e Mysore Government Servants (Probation) Rules \\957-Scnpe of .\n\nco-,,, m.itution of India, Art. 226-Whether the scope of the fVrit Petition be limited to the prayer portion alone?\n\nIn the new State of Mysore (Now Karnatalro:) which came into existence on € 1-ll-56 as a result of integration of the areas which formed part of crtwhile States of M:ysore, Madras, Coorg, Bomb<tf and Hyderabad, the Government on 6-2-58, 7-2-58 and 2-12-60 respectively promulgated the following Ru!es (a\\\n\n. fnriled uv-der Article 309 of the Constitution) namely, \"The fySore Govern\n\nment Servants (Probation) Rules 1957, \"The Mysore Government Servanh; (Sea_iority) Rules 1957 and \"The Mysore Public Works Engineering Departn1ent Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1960\" The recruitment.Rules envisaged 3ppoint..\n\nD ment of Assistant Engineers in the Public Works Departn1ent by direct recruitment to the extent of 40% and by promotion for the rest viz. 50% fron1 the cadre of JuiJ.ior Engineers and 10% from the cadre of supervisors. T'he .dre of Assistant Engineers was to consist of 344 permanent and 345 temporary posts.\n\nPrior to 1-11-56 in the merged Stt:ttes, there was a non gazetted class designated a~ graduate supervisors in Mysore State, as Junior Engineers in the Madras State and as supervisors in the States of Bombay and Hyderabad. The claim of the graduate supervisors who were given charge of subdivisions prior to 1-11-56 and continued to hold the san1e eyen thereafter. for equation of their posts with those of Assistant Engineers, was rejected by the Central Government. However, on 15-11-58. 167 of them (including 107 graduate supervisors from Mysore) and between the period 2nd Dec. 1958 and 13th October '60, 299 more persons of the same class were promoted as officiat ing Assistant Engineers. With reference to three notifications of the Mysore Public Service Commission dt. 1-10-58, 4-5-59 and 1-4-61, eighty eight candidates were appointed on 31st Oct.' 61i i.e. 8 days after the amendment of the Recruitment Rules giving them retrospective effect from 1st March 1958, as Probationary Assistant E.ngineers by direct recruitment. The challenge to their appointment was ultimately rejected by this Court in B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 'I>· 682 holding thltt their appointment although made after the Recruitment Rules had come is.to force, were valid, as the process of direct recruitment had been set in motion by the State Government in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India well before the Recruitment Rules were promulgated and that ilese appointments were therefore, \"outside the Recruitment Rules\".\n\nIn the year 1971 various orders were passed promoting some of the direct II\n\nr~9ruitsto the posts of Executive Engineers and those orders 'R1ere challenged by\n\n4-409 SCI /79\n\nthe promotees on' the ground th; lt they had been given promotions \"on regular basis\" which amounted to substantive appOintments and that therefore they should rank senior to the direct recruits. Subsequent to the issue on 4.9.73 of arevised seniority list superseding the list (G) prepared on 28·9·72 fM.rther writ petitions were filed by the promotees. AU the petitions were heard together by the High Court and allowed with the following directions :\n\n(i) Promotees other than those covered by direction (ii) and direct recruits, would not be governed by the quota system as envisaged in the Recruitment Rules.\n\n(ii) Prornotees who were appointed to posts of Assistant Engineers with effect from Ist of }.larch 1958, or later dates, would be governed by the quota system as envisaged in the Recruitment Rules.\n\n(iii) Promotees appointed as Assistant Engineers prior to 31st October 1961 would rank senior to the direct recruits whose appointments \\Vere made on that date.\n\n(iv) The claim of each of the promotees to the next higher post shall be considered with effect from a day prior to that on which. any officer found junior to him was promoted\n\nAllowilig the appeals by special leavei the Court\n\nHELD:\n\n1. The scope of the writ petition was not limited to the question of promotion of Assistant Engineers as Executive Engineers. The. attack on the seniority list dated 4th Sept. 1973 was inherent in the case set up by the pron1otees, of E which it formed an integral plart. Though no prayer had been made by the promotees to quash or rectify the seniority list dated 4th September 1973, their hole case was based on the coll.t, ntion that they had been promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineers in a substantive capacity prior to the appointment of direct recruits, that they would take precedence over direct recruits in the matter of seniority and regular absorption in the cadre of Assistant Engineers and that it was on that account that the promoion of F direct recruits to the posts of Executive Engineers without consideration of the case of the promotees for such promotion was illegal.\n\n[946E~G]\n\n2. No exception is or can be taken on behalf of the promotees to the finding arrived at by the High Court that the appointment of direct recruits to the posts of Assistant Engineers was in order, in view of the judgment of this Court in B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, [1966) 3 SCR p. 682.\n\nNor can it be urged with any plausibility on behalf of direct recruits that the appointment of the promotees as Assistant Engineers prior to the enforceilent of the Recruitment Rules ltly outside the powers of the Government or was otherwise illegal. [946G-\n\nH, 947AJ\n\nV. B. Badami and Ors. v. State of Mysore ond Ors .. [1976] 1 SCR 815 and B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore and Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 682; followed.\n\n3. A combined reading of Rule 2 'of the Seniority Rules and the definition of the -words \"appf>inted on probation\" and\n\n1'Probationer\" in Rule 2 of the 'Probation Rules, makes it clear that tbe direct recruits were appointed as 'ASsistant ''r.\n\n• y\n\nB. N. l\\AGARAJAN V. KARNATAKA 939\n\nEngineers, \"substantively in clear vacancies\" as envisaged by clause (a) of rule A 2_ of the Seniority Rules. If any of the promotees also satisfied that requirement at any time ea:; lier to the 31st of October 1961, he would be bracketed with the 8.irect recruiis under that clause and his seniority vis-a-vis those recruits \\VOuld\n\nthen be governed by clause (b) of the rule i.e., on the basis of his and their respective dates of confirmation. If, on the other hand, none of the promotees can be said to have been appointed substantively in a clear vacancy, clause (a) aforesaid would.have no application to them and all direct recruits would rank B senior to them.\n\n[947G-H, 948A-B]\n\n4. In the instant case, all through the relevant period the promotees held appointn1cnts as Assistant Engineers in nonsubstantive capacity, i.e., either on an officiating or a temporary basis. This being the position, they would all rank junior to the direct recruits who, from the very start, held appointments made \"substantively in clear vacancies\".\n\n[950H, 951~]\n\n(a) The language employed fa the first order dated 15th November 1958 {Ex.A) appointing promotees as Assistant Engineers makes it clear that the promolion of the 167 officers was not substantively made, the tenure being specifically stated to be either \"officiating'' or \"purely temporary\" and \"subject\n\n10 review after the finalisation of th~ inter se seniority list of supervi.Sors and the\n\nF..ecruitm.ent Rules\", which expressions clearly militate against a substantive D appointment.\n\n[948E-G]\n\n(b) Orders made by the State Government later on right upto the 31st October, 1961 when the direct recruits '\\\\'ere appointed as Assistant Engineers did not improve the position of any of the promotees in any manner. These orders \\Vere either silent on the point of the nature of the tenure of the promotees as Assistant Engineers, or stn-ted in no uncertain terms that the promotees would hold the posts of Assistant Engineers on a temporary or officiating basis. [948G-\n\nH, 949AJ\n\n(c) The two Notifications dated 27th Febmary 1962, and order Exhibit (D), dated 6th October 1962-the combined effect of which was to promote the said\n\n107 officers es Assistant Engineers \\Vith effect from 1st of November 1956 \"on a reg\"l'l.1ar basis\" do not give it the colour of permanence to the appointments of tke promotees as Assistant Engineers which cannot therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st of November 1956 for two reasons; Firstly, the words \"regular'' or \"regularisation\" do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. Secondly, when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force, , no regularisation is permissible in exercise of the -executive powers of the Government under Article 162 thereof in contravention of the Rules. The regularisation order was made Jong after the Probation Rules, the Seniority Rules and the Recruitment Rules were promulgated and could not therefore direct something which would do violence to any of the provisions thereof.\n\nRegularisation in the present case, if it meant permanence operative from the 1st of November, 1956 would have the effect of giving seniority to promotees over the direct recruits '\\\\'ho, in the absence of such regularisation. would rank senior to the forn1er because of the Seniority Rules read with the Pr9bation Rules and may in consequence also confer on the p.romotees a right of priority in the matter of sharing the quota under the Recruitment Rules. Jn\n\nother words, the regularisation order, in colouring the appointments of prorootees as Assistant Engineers with permanence would run counte-r to the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. What could not be done under the three sets of Rules as they stood, would thus be achieved by an executive fiat.\n\nAnd such a course is not permissible because an act done in the e\"ercise of the executive power of the Government, cannot override rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. [949B-D, 950D-GJ\n\nState of Mysore and A.nr. v. S. V. Naraynaswami, [1967] 1 SCR 128 and R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Tlummia/i, [1972] 2 SCR 799; applied.\n\n[The Court m::ide it clear (a) \"that this order does not cover such officers es were holding the posts of Assistant Engineers on a substantive basis prior to the 1st of November, 1956 when the new State of Mysore nO\\V kno\\vn as Karnataka came into being, and the case of any Ai; istant Engineer \\\\ho acquired a substantive status prior to the promulgation of the Rec111itrnent Rules and the appointment of the direct recruits; (b) that persoos falling within these two categories will first have to be accommodated in the clear vacancies available ; i.nd only the remaining vacancies will have to be utilised for fitting in the direct recruits and the Assistant Engineers \\\\'ho have disputed their claim in these proceedings; and (c) that the quota rule will not stand in the way of the Government giving effect to this arrangement which has been taken care of in the amendment (promulgated on the 23rd of October 1961 \\ to the Recruitment Rules\"].\n\nClvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2329 of 1977.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-11-1976 of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No 2307/71.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2330-2350/77\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-11-1976 of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos. 2307/71. 796/72, and 462-467,. 553-560, 943, 944, 1033, 1027 and 1032/ 73; and\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2351-2370/77\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-11-1976 of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos. 462-467, 553- 560, 796. 943, 944. 1027, 1033/73.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and S.S. Javali for the Appellant in CA 2329/77.\n\nF. S. Nariman, B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in C.A. Nos. 2351-2370/77.\n\nL. N. Sinha and Narayan Nettar for the AppeUants in C.A. 2330 to 2370/77.\n\nA. K. Sen, , Afuralidhar Rao and P. R. Ramasesh f,1r RR. 2, 3, 5, and 7 in C.A. 2329/77.\n\nP. R. Ramasesh for RR/Promotees in CA 2330c2350/77 and RR in C.A. 2352-2370/77,\n\nl ,\n\nY. S. Chitale, M. Muralidhar Rao, P. R. Ramasesh and S. S.\n\nKliinduja, for the RR in C.A. 2351/77.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-By this judgment we shall dispose of 42 appeals by special leave, namely, Civil Appeals Nos. 2329 to 2370 of 1977, all of which are directed against a judgment dated the 30th November, 1976 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 2329 and 2351 to 2370 of 1977 have been filed by different persons who were appointed Assistant Engineers in the Karnataka State on 31st October, 1961, by way of direct recruitment while the other 21 appeals have been filed by that State.\n\n2. The facts giving rise to the impugned judgment may be ' set down in some detail.\n\nA new State came into existence on the 1st of November, 1956 as a result of integration of the areas which formed part of the erstwhile States of Mysore, Madras, Coorg, Bombay and Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the Merged States).\n\nIt was then given the name of one of its constituents, namely, the State of Mysore, which was later changed to that of the Karnataka State. In the Public Works Departments of the Merged States there was a class of non-gazetted officers ranking below Assistant Engineers.\n\nThe class was designated as Graduate Supervisors in the Merged State of Mysore, as Junior Engineers in the Merged State of Madras and as Supervisors in the Merged States of Hyderabad and Bombay.\n\nThe Graduate Supervisors were paid a fixed salary of Rs. 225 /- per mensem which was lower by Rs. 25 /- per mensem as compared to the starting salary of Assistant Engineers, who, in the normal course, were expected to head sub-divisions.\n\nTo the post of Assistant Engineer a Graduate Supervisor was appointed only on promotion.\n\nPrior to the 1st of November, 1956, quite a few Graduate Supervisors were given charge of sub-divisions and designated as Subr:iivisional Officers in order to meet the exigencies of service and they continued to act as such after the merger when they claimed equation of their posts with those of Assistant Engineers in the matter of integration of services.\n\nTo begin with their claiJJ.1 was turned down by the Central Government who equated the posts of Graduate Supervisors with the posts of Junior Engineers of the Merged State of Madras and the posts of Supervisors of the Merged States of Hyderabad and Bombay.\n\nBy a notification dated the 6th of February, 1958, the Government of Karnataka (then known as the Government of Mysore)\n\npromulgated the Mysore Government Servants (Probation) Rules .• 1957 (hereinafter called the Probation Rules) and on the next day came into force the Mysore Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Seniority Rules), both havin!'; been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India.\n\nOn the 1st of October, 1958, the Karnataka Public Service Com mission invited applications from candidates for appointment to tile\n\nposts of Assistant Engineers by direct recruitment.\n\nIn the meantime Graduate Supervisors and Government employees holding equivalent posts had continued to press their claim for the equation of their posts with the posts of Assistant Engineers and they succeeded partially when, on the 15th of November, 1958, th• Karnataka Government promoted 167 of them (including 107 Graduate Supervisors who had been working as suc:h in the Merged State of Mysore) as officiating Assistant Engineers with immediate effect.\n\nThe promotion was notified in the State Gazette dated the 20th of November, 1958 (Exhibit A) the relevant portion whereof may be reproduced for facility of reference :\n\n\" ... The following supervisors of Public Works Department are promoted as officiating Assistant Engineers with immediate effect and until further orders against the existing vacancies subject to review after the finali- E sation of the Inter-Se Seniority List of Supervisor> and the Cadre and Recruitment Rules of Public Works Department. The promotion of officers from S.I. No. 74 to 167 against existing vacancies will be purely on a temporary basis pending filling up of the vacancies by Direct Recruitment as per rules.\n\nThe Seniority inter se of tbc Promotees will be provisional according to the order .civen below : ................ \".\n\n299 more persons of the same class were promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineers by eight notifications puhlished during the period from 22nd of December, 1958 to the 13th of October, 1960.\n\nG On the 21st (31st?) of August, 1960, the State Government passed an order in regard to the 107 Graduate Supervisors from the Merged State of Mysore and mentioned above. directing that they be treated as Assistant Engineers and be paid the pre-revision scale of pay of Rs. 250-25-450 from the 1st of November, 1956 fo the 31st of December, 1956 and the revised scale of pay of Rs. 250- B 25-450-30-600 from the 1st of January, 1957 onwards.\n\nThe order further directed that the said 107 officers shall be placed in the inter-se seniority list below the Assistant Engineers.\n\n• • ..\n\n• ' 'l)l_.\n\nB. N. NAGARAJAN v. KAR'<ATAKA (Kasha/, J.) 943\n\nOn the 3rd of December, 1960, the Karnataka Government promulgated the Mysore Public Works Engineering Department Services (Recrnitment) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Recruitment Rules) under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, which envisaged appointment of Assistant Engineers in the Public Works Departµient by direct recruitment to the extent of 40 per cent and by promotion for the rest, viz., 50 per cent from the cadre of Junior Engineers and 10 per cent from the cadre of Supervisors.\n\nThe cadre of Assistant Engineers was stated in the Rules to consist of 344 permanent and 345 temporary posts.\n\nOn the 23rd of October, 1961, thd Recruitment Rules were amended so as to be. operative retrospectively i.e., with efkct fron: the 1st of March, 1958.\n\nOn the 31st of October, 1961, 88 candidates were appointed as Probationary Assistant Engineers by direct recruitment.\n\nTwo notifications were issued by the State Government on the\n\n27th of February, 1962. By each one of them 231 Junior Engineers D were given \"regular promotions\" as Assistant Engineers with effect from specified dates falling within the period 15th of November, 1958 to the 10th of November, 1960. The first of these notifications stated inter alia :\n\n\" .... However, the promotions are subject to revie'v after finalisation of the interse Seniority List of Junior Engineers .... \".\n\nThe second ofi the notifications issued on the 27th of February. 1962, mentioned that the officers named therein would be deemed to be temporarily promoted and pemitted to continne to officiate as Assistant Engineers on a provisional basis and until further orders.\n\nThe case of the said 107 officers received further consideration at the hands of the State Government, who, on the 6th of October, 1962, issued another order (Exhibit D) superseding the one dated the 31st of August, 1960, and promoting them as Assistant Engineers with effect from the 1st of November, 1956.\n\nBy the 24th of September, 1966. the number of Probationary Ass.istant Engineers appointed through direct recruitment (hereinafter called direct recruits) had fallen to 85 for reasons which need not be stated.\n\nOn that day the State Government passed an order that\n\nthey had all completed their period of probation satisfactorily and H stood absorbed against substantive vacancies with effect from the 1st of November, 1962.\n\n! n 1971 various orders were pa'5ed promoting some of the direct recruits to the posts of Executive Engineers and those orders were challenged in a writ petition dated the 15th of September, 1971, by the promotees to the posts of Assistant Enginc\"rs (hereinafter referred to as the promotees).\n\nOn the 28th of September, 1972 .• a list (Exhibit G) of Assistant Engineers indicating their seniority inter se as ou the I st of November, 1959, was prepared by the State Government ... In that list the pro; notc.?s \\Vere accorded seniority to their satisfaction. However, that !i&t was superseded by another list dated the 4th of September, 1973, in which the seniority inter se of all Assistant Engineers functioning in the State Public Works Department as on 1st of January, 1973 was declared.\n\nThe new list purported to have be.on framed in accordance with the Recruitment Rules.\n\nObjections to the list were invited and were submitte~ by various officers.\n\nDuring the year 1973 more writ petitions challeuging the promo- .tion of direct recruits to the posts of Executive Engineers were instituted by the promotees on whose hehalf two c)aims were made before the High Court, namely :\n\nr 1) that they had been regularly promoted as Assistant\n\nE.ngineers against substantive vacancies with retrospective effect and rightly so; and\n\n(2) that in the case of those of them whose promotion\n\nwas made effe.ctiw from a date prior to the lst of March, 1958, the Recruitment Rules, especially the quota rule, could not affect them adveP<ely.\n\nBoth these claims were accepted by the High Court, thr first on the basis of the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Khanna &: Others\n\nv. S. A. F. Abbas(') coupled with the pleadings of the parties and the various orders i.-sued by the State Government and mentioned abow, and the second on the authority of another decision of this Court in V. B. Budami & Others v. State of Mysore & Others(') /The High Court accordingly held that the quota rule would not be atwicted to the case of those promolees who had been appointed to ti)~ pas.ts of A\"istant Engineers with effect from a date prior to t!1ll 'ist of March, 1958. By way of a 'clarification' the High Court further ruled that the promotion of the 107 officers working in tl1e Merged.State of\n\n(!) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2350.\n\n(2) [1976] I S. C. R. 815.\n\n)'vlysore was made to substantive posts of Assistant Engineers with effect\n\nfrom the 1st of November, 1956, and that the State Government or the direct recruits could not be alk>wed to urge to the contrary. According to the High Court such promotion was subject to review only if the course was warranted and necessitated by the final inter se seniority list o! Junior Engineers, the right to review having bee11 reserved by the Government in its orders dated the 27th o! February, 1962. Ill relation to the direct recruits the High Court made a reference to the judgment of th; s Court in B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore & Others(') wherein it was held that their appointments, although made after the Recruitment Rules had come into force, were valid, as the process of direct recruitment had been set in motion by the State Government in exercise of its executive powers under article 162 of the Constitution of India well before the Recruitment Rules were promulgated and that those appointments were therefore \"outside the Recruitment Rules\".\n\nThe High Court consequently held that the direct recruits were also not subject to the quota rule which\n\ncould not, according to it, affect them adversely.\n\nSumming np, the High Court gave the following directions (I) Promotees other than those covered by direction ( 2) and direct recruits would not be governed by the quota system as envisaged in the Recruitment Rules.\n\n(2) Promotees who were appointed to posts of Assistant Engineers with effect from the 1st of March, 1958, or later dates, would be governed by the quota system as envisaged in the Recruitment Rules.\n\n(3) Promotees appointed Assistant Engineers prior to the 31st of October, 1961, would rank senior to the direct recruits whose appointments were made on that date.\n\n( 4) The claim of each of the promotees to the next higher post shall be considered with effect from a day prior to that on which any officer found junior to him was promoted. ·\n\n3. The first contention we would like to deal with is one raised by Mr. F. S. Nariman appearing for the direct recruits.\n\nHe argued that the scope of the writ petitions instituted by the promotees was limited to the question of promotion of Assistant Engineers as Executive Engineers and that no challenge to the seniority list dated the 4th of September, 1973 could be entertained. In this connection\n\nii) [1966] 3 S. C. R. 682.\n\nrefereace was made to the prayer clause appeariug in Writ l'etitio\" No. 462 of 1973 which is in the following terms :\n\n\"In this writ petition, it is prayed that this Court may lie pleased to :\n\n(1) quash the promotion of respondents 2 to 31 to the\n\ncadre of Executive Engineers made \"' per order dated 3-2-1973;\n\n(2) direct the respondent 1 to consider the case of the\n\npetitioner for promotion to the cadre of Executiv0 Engineers with effect from 3-2-1973 on which date respondents 2 to 31 were promoted; and\n\n(3) pass an interim order, restraining the respondent l from making further promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers without considering the case of the petitioner for such promotion, pending disposal ef this writ petition.\"\n\n(It was assumed at the hearing of the appca ls that the prayer made in the other writ petitions is to a similar effect).\n\nIt is true that no prayer has been made by the promotees tcY quash or rectify the seniority list dated the 4th of September, 1973, but then their whole case is based on the contention that they llad beeli. promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineers in a substantive capacity prior to the appointment of the direct recruits, that they would take precedence over direct recruits in the matter of seniority and regi.1lar absorption in the cadre of Assistant Engineers and that it was on that account that the promotion of direct recruits to the posts of Executive Engineers without consideraion of the case of the pro motees for such promotion was illegal.\n\nThe attack on the said seniority list therefore is inherent in the case set up by the promctees,.\n\nof which it forms an integral part.\n\nIn this view of the mattoc we cannot agree with Mr. Nariman that the scope of the writ petitions is limited as stated by him.\n\n4. No exception is or can be taken on behalf of the promotees to the finding arrived at by the High Court that the appointment of direct recruits to the posts of Assistant Engineers was in order, in H view of the judgment of this Court in B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore(supra). Nor can it be urged with any plausibility on behalf of direct recruits that the appointment of the promotees as Assistant\n\n' r\n\n.J''\n\n• \"\n\nB. N. NAGARAJAN v. KARNATAKA (Kasha/, .T.) 947\n\nEngineers prior to the enforcement of the Recruitment Rules lay outsWe the powers of the Government or was otherwise illegal.\n\nThe real di>pute between the direct recruits and the promotees revolves round the quality of the tenure held by the latter immediately prior to the enforcement of the Recruitment Rules and that is so because of thE language employed in rule 2 of the Seniority Rules.\n\nThe relevant portion of that rule is extracted below :\n\n\"2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, the , eniority of a person in a particular cadre of service or class of post shall be determined as follows :\n\n(a) Officers appointed substantively in clear vacancies C shall be senior to all persons appointed on officiating or any\n\no:her basis in the same cadre of service or class of post;\n\n(b) The seniority inter se of officers who are confirmed sl!all be determined according to dates of confirmation, but where the date of confirmation of any two officers is the \"ame, their relative seniority will be determined by their seniority inter se while officiating in the same post and if not, by their seniority inter se in the lower cadre;\n\n( c) Seniority inter se of persons appointed on temporary basis will be determined by the dates of their conti- E nuous officiation in that grade and where the period of officiation is the satne the seniority ; nter se in the lov.rer grade shall prevail.\n\nExplanation ...\n\n(d) .... ' ... ' ' ............................ \" Now ire w far as the direct recruits arc concerned they were appointed as PrPfKltionary Assistant Engineers, i.e.. Assistant Engineers \"appointed on probation\" which term is defined in rule 2 of the Probation R:iles.\n\nThat rule states :\n\n\"'.:. For the purpose of these rules :--·\n\n( 1) \"Appointed on Probation\" means appointed on trial in or against a substantive vacancy.\n\nt 2) \"Probationer\" means a Government servant appointed on probation.\n\nA Government servant so H appointed (and continuing in service) remain a probationer until he is confirmed.\"\n\nIn view of these definitions it cannot be gainsaid that the direct recruits were appointed Assistant Engineers \"substantively in clear vacancies\" as envisaged by clause (a) of rule 2 of the Seniority Rules. If any of the promotees also satisfied that requirement at any tiJ:ne earlier to the 31st of October, I 96L be would be bracketed with the direct recruits under that clause and his seniority vis-a-vis those recruits would then be governed by clause (b) of the ::ule, i.e .. on the basis of his and their respective dates of confirmation. If, on the other hand, none of the promotees can be said to have been appointed substantively in a clear vacancy. clause (a) aforesaid would have no application to them and all direct rccruib would ra.nk senior to them; and it is in the light of the said clauses , a) and\n\n(b) therefore that learned counsel for the State a,1d the direct recruits have challenged the finding of the High Court that the promotion of the 1 07 officers working in the Merged State of Mysore was made to substantive posts of Assistant Engineers with effect from the Jst of November, 1956 and that the State Government er the direct recruits could not be allowed to urge to the contrary. The controversy has to .be resolved in the light of the orders passed by the State Government from time to time in relation to those officers and\n\nlthcrs simiJarlv situated.\n\n5. The first order appointing promotees as Ass; stant Engineers '' E dated the 15th of November, 1958 (Exhibit A).\n\nThat order made it clear that all the promotees covered by it were appohted ofjicia1i11g\n\nAssistant Engineers and were to hold office until further orders. The promotion was also made suh.iect to review after the finalisation of the inter se seniority list of Supervisors and the Recruitment Rules.\n\nThe not; fication went on to state that in the case of 94 of the officers promoted under it, their appointment as Assistant Engineers was being made on a purely temporary basis inasmuch hs they would have to vacate the posts against which they were befog fitted, as soon as candidates \\Vere available through a process of direct recruitment.\n\nThe language employed leaves no doubt that the promotion of the :l 67\n\nofficers was not substantively made, the tenure being specifica!ly stated to he either uofficiating\" or \"purely temporary\" \\Vhich expressions cle:1!'.ly militate against a suhstantive appointment\n\nOrdec made by the State Government later on and right upto the J !st of October, 1961 when the direct recruits were appointed Assis- H tan! Engineers did not improve the position of any of the promoters in any manner.\n\nThose orders were either silent on the point of the natrn\"' of the tenure of the rromotees as Assistant Engineers. er stated\n\n.. ..\n\nin no uncertain terms that the promotees would hold the posts of Assistant Engineers on a temporary or officiating basis. That is why Dr. Chitalcy and Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the promotees, mainly placed their reliance on the two notifications dated the 27th of February, 1962, and order exhibit D dated the 6th of October, 1962, the combined effect of which was to promote the said 107 ofticers as AS!ristant Engineers. with effect from the 1st of November, 1956 \"on a regular basis\". It was argued that the regularisation of the promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointments of the promotees as Assistant Engineers must therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st of November, 1956. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons.\n\nFirstly the wordt: \"regular\" or \"regularisation\" do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments.\n\nThey cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments. In\n\nthis connection reference may with advantage be made to State of Mysore and Another v. s. V. Narayanappa(') and R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thiliilniah and A not her(\"). In the former this Court observed :\n\n\"Before we proceed to consider the construction placed by tho High Court on the provisions of the said order we may mention that in the High Court both the parties appear to have proceeded on an assumption that regularisation meant permanence.\n\nConsequently it was never contended before tbe High Court that the effect of the application of the said order would mean only regularising the appointment and no more and that regularisation would not ipean that the appointment would have to l;>e considered to be permanent as an appointment to be permanent would still require confirmation.\n\nIt seems that. on account of this assumption on the part of botl1 the parties the High Court equated regularisation with permanence.\"\n\nIn Nanj1mdappa's case also the question of regularisation of an appointment arose and this Court dealt with it thus :\n\n\" ...... Courisel on behalf of the resp0t1dent contended that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf\n\n(I) [1967] I S. CR. 128.\n\n(2) [1972] 2 S. C. R. 799.\n\nI B\n\n; c\n\n:A of the State contended that regularisation did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularisation of the rules under Article 309.\n\nBoth the contentions are fallacious. It the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality\n\ncannot be regularised.\n\nRatification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been sollle non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment.\n\nRegularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment.\n\nTo accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.\"\n\nApart from repelling the contention that regularisation connotes permanence, these observations furnish the second reason for rejection of the argument advanced on behalf of the promotees and that reason is that when rules framed under article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force, no regularisation is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under article 162 thereof in contravention of the rnles.\n\nThe regularisation order was made long after the Probation Rules, the Seniority Rules and the Recruitment Rules were promulgated and could not therefore direct something which would do violence to any of the provisions thereof.\n\nRegularisation in the present case, if it meant permanence operative from the 1st of November, 1956, would have the effect of giving seniority to promotees over the direct recruits who, in the absence of such regularisation, would rank senior to the former because of the Seniority Rules read with the Probation Rules and may in consequence lliso confer on the promotees a right of priority in the matter of sharing the quota under the Recruitment Rules.\n\nIn other words, the regularisation order, in colouring the appointments of promotees as Assistant Engineers with permanence would run counter to the rules framed under article 309 of the Constitution of India.\n\nWhat could not be done under the three sets of Rules as they stood, would thus be achiel\"-\n\ned by an executive fiat.\n\nAnd such a course is not permissible because an act done in the exercise of the executive power of the Government &s already stated, cannot override rules framed under Article\n\n309 of the Constitution.\n\nThe case has, for both the above reasons, to be decided on the ii footirig that all through the relevant period the promotees held appointments as Assistant Engineers in a non-substantive capacity, i,~., either on an officiating or a temporary basis.\n\nThis bein~ the :iosition,\n\n~·\n\n,.,\n\nthey would all rank junior to the direct recruits who, from the very\n\n£tart, held appointments made \"substantively in clear vacancies.\"\n\n6. We may here make it clear that this order does not cover such officers as were holding the posts of Assistant Engineers on a substantive basis prior to the 1st of November, 1956 when the new State of Mysore now known as Karnataka came into being. Nor would it adversely affect the case of any Assistant Engineer who acquired a\n\nsubstative status prior to the promulgation of the Recruitment Rules and the appointme11t of the direct recruits. Persons falling within these two categories will first have to be accommodated in the clear vacancies available and only the remaining vacancies will have to be :utilised for fitting in the direct recruits and the Assistant Engineers who have disputed their claim in these proceedings. It may also be\n\nmentioned that the quota rule will not stand in the way of the Government giving effect to this arrangement which has been taken care of in the amendme11t (promulgated on the 23rd of October, 1961) to the Recruitment Rules. The relevant portion of tliat amendment is contained in item 3 thereof which is reproduced below :\n\n\"3. To rule 2 of the following proviso shall be added and shall be deemed always to have been added, namely-\n\n\"Provided that in respect of direct recruitment of Assistant Engineers for the first time under these rules the percentages relating to direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion specified in colu1!1_n 2 of the Schedule shall not be applicable and the minimum qualifications and the period of production shall be the following, namely-\n\n\"Qualifications : .................. \".\n\nIt is common ground between the parties that the posts comprised in the cadre of Assistant Engineers coi:i_stituted by the Recruitment Rules have yet to be filled in for the first time.\n\nThe proviso extracted above therefore will apply fully to the utilization of those vacancies as stated above. It goes without saying that all questions of seniority shall be decided in accordance with the Seriiority Rules and that the Recruitrnent__Rules, as amended from time to tiine, shall be fully implemented as from the date of their enforcement, i.e., 1st of March, 1958.\n\n7. In the result we accept the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and decide the dispute between the prties in accord- !nce with the observations made in paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof.\n\nV.D~K.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "B. N. NAGARAJAN AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. N. NAGARAJAN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A:. D. KOSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 182, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 469, "end_char": 475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the new State of Mysore (Now Karnatalro:) which came into existence on € 1-ll-56 as a result of integration of the areas which formed part of crtwhile States of M:ysore, Madras, Coorg, Bomb<tf and Hyderabad, the Government on 6-2-58, 7-2-58 and 2-12-60 respectively promulgated the following Ru!es (a\\\n\n."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the new State of Mysore (Now Karnatalro:) which came into existence on € 1-ll-56 as a result of integration of the areas which formed part of crtwhile States of M:ysore, Madras, Coorg, Bomb<tf and Hyderabad, the Government on 6-2-58, 7-2-58 and 2-12-60 respectively promulgated the following Ru!es (a\\\n\n."}}, {"text": "Coorg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 630, "end_char": 635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the new State of Mysore (Now Karnatalro:) which came into existence on € 1-ll-56 as a result of integration of the areas which formed part of crtwhile States of M:ysore, Madras, Coorg, Bomb<tf and Hyderabad, the Government on 6-2-58, 7-2-58 and 2-12-60 respectively promulgated the following Ru!es (a\\\n\n."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 649, "end_char": 658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the new State of Mysore (Now Karnatalro:) which came into existence on € 1-ll-56 as a result of integration of the areas which formed part of crtwhile States of M:ysore, Madras, Coorg, Bomb<tf and Hyderabad, the Government on 6-2-58, 7-2-58 and 2-12-60 respectively promulgated the following Ru!es (a\\\n\n."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 772, "end_char": 783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1-11-56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1-11-56 in the merged Stt:ttes, there was a non gazetted class designated a~ graduate supervisors in Mysore State, as Junior Engineers in the Madras State and as supervisors in the States of Bombay and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Mysore State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1481, "end_char": 1493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1-11-56 in the merged Stt:ttes, there was a non gazetted class designated a~ graduate supervisors in Mysore State, as Junior Engineers in the Madras State and as supervisors in the States of Bombay and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Madras State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1522, "end_char": 1534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1-11-56 in the merged Stt:ttes, there was a non gazetted class designated a~ graduate supervisors in Mysore State, as Junior Engineers in the Madras State and as supervisors in the States of Bombay and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1-11-56 in the merged Stt:ttes, there was a non gazetted class designated a~ graduate supervisors in Mysore State, as Junior Engineers in the Madras State and as supervisors in the States of Bombay and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1818, "end_char": 1836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for equation of their posts with those of Assistant Engineers, was rejected by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "15-11-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1850, "end_char": 1858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on 15-11-58."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1913, "end_char": 1919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 of them (including 107 graduate supervisors from Mysore) and between the period 2nd Dec. 1958 and 13th October '60, 299 more persons of the same class were promoted as officiat ing Assistant Engineers."}}, {"text": "2nd Dec. 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 of them (including 107 graduate supervisors from Mysore) and between the period 2nd Dec. 1958 and 13th October '60, 299 more persons of the same class were promoted as officiat ing Assistant Engineers."}}, {"text": "13th October '", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1962, "end_char": 1976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 of them (including 107 graduate supervisors from Mysore) and between the period 2nd Dec. 1958 and 13th October '60, 299 more persons of the same class were promoted as officiat ing Assistant Engineers."}}, {"text": "Mysore Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2111, "end_char": 2143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to three notifications of the Mysore Public Service Commission dt."}}, {"text": "dt. 1-10-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2144, "end_char": 2155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to three notifications of the Mysore Public Service Commission dt."}}, {"text": "4-5-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2157, "end_char": 2163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-10-58, 4-5-59 and 1-4-61, eighty eight candidates were appointed on 31st Oct.' 61i i.e. 8 days after the amendment of the Recruitment Rules giving them retrospective effect from 1st March 1958, as Probationary Assistant E.ngineers by direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "1-4-61", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-10-58, 4-5-59 and 1-4-61, eighty eight candidates were appointed on 31st Oct.' 61i i.e. 8 days after the amendment of the Recruitment Rules giving them retrospective effect from 1st March 1958, as Probationary Assistant E.ngineers by direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "31st Oct.' 61i", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2218, "end_char": 2232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-10-58, 4-5-59 and 1-4-61, eighty eight candidates were appointed on 31st Oct.' 61i i.e. 8 days after the amendment of the Recruitment Rules giving them retrospective effect from 1st March 1958, as Probationary Assistant E.ngineers by direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "1st March 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2328, "end_char": 2342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-10-58, 4-5-59 and 1-4-61, eighty eight candidates were appointed on 31st Oct.' 61i i.e. 8 days after the amendment of the Recruitment Rules giving them retrospective effect from 1st March 1958, as Probationary Assistant E.ngineers by direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2800, "end_char": 2821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4.9.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent to the issue on 4.9.73 of arevised seniority list superseding the list (G) prepared on 28·9·72 fM.rther writ petitions were filed by the promotees."}}, {"text": "28·9·72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3420, "end_char": 3427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent to the issue on 4.9.73 of arevised seniority list superseding the list (G) prepared on 28·9·72 fM.rther writ petitions were filed by the promotees."}}, {"text": "31st October 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) Promotees appointed as Assistant Engineers prior to 31st October 1961 would rank senior to the direct recruits whose appointments \\Vere made on that date."}}, {"text": "[1976] 1 SCR 815", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5860, "end_char": 5876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. N. l\\AGARAJAN V. KARNATAKA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6205, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A combined reading of Rule 2 'of the Seniority Rules and the definition of the -words \"appf>inted on probation\" and\n\n1'Probationer\" in Rule 2 of the 'Probation Rules, makes it clear that tbe direct recruits were appointed as 'ASsistant ''r.\n\n• y\n\nB. N. l\\AGARAJAN V. KARNATAKA 939\n\nEngineers, \"substantively in clear vacancies\" as envisaged by clause (a) of rule A 2_ of the Seniority Rules."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7859, "end_char": 7877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[948E-G]\n\n(b) Orders made by the State Government later on right upto the 31st October, 1961 when the direct recruits '\\\\'ere appointed as Assistant Engineers did not improve the position of any of the promotees in any manner."}}, {"text": "1st of November 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8483, "end_char": 8503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "948G-\n\nH, 949AJ\n\n(c) The two Notifications dated 27th Febmary 1962, and order Exhibit (D), dated 6th October 1962-the combined effect of which was to promote the said\n\n107 officers es Assistant Engineers \\Vith effect from 1st of November 1956 \"on a reg\"l'l.1ar basis\" do not give it the colour of permanence to the appointments of tke promotees as Assistant Engineers which cannot therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st of November 1956 for two reasons; Firstly, the words \"regular'' or \"regularisation\" do not connote permanence."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9192, "end_char": 9203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1st of November, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regularisation in the present case, if it meant permanence operative from the 1st of November, 1956 would have the effect of giving seniority to promotees over the direct recruits '\\\\'ho, in the absence of such regularisation."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10101, "end_char": 10112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10120, "end_char": 10141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR 128", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10507, "end_char": 10523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 SCR 799", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10563, "end_char": 10579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd of October 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[The Court m::ide it clear (a) \"that this order does not cover such officers es were holding the posts of Assistant Engineers on a substantive basis prior to the 1st of November, 1956 when the new State of Mysore nO\\V kno\\vn as Karnataka came into being, and the case of any Ai; istant Engineer \\\\ho acquired a substantive status prior to the promulgation of the Rec111itrnent Rules and the appointment of the direct recruits; (b) that persoos falling within these two categories will first have to be accommodated in the clear vacancies available ; i.nd only the remaining vacancies will have to be utilised for fitting in the direct recruits and the Assistant Engineers \\\\'ho have disputed their claim in these proceedings; and (c) that the quota rule will not stand in the way of the Government giving effect to this arrangement which has been taken care of in the amendment (promulgated on the 23rd of October 1961 \\ to the Recruitment Rules\"]."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12138, "end_char": 12150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and S.S. Javali for the Appellant in CA 2329/77."}}, {"text": "S.S. Javali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12155, "end_char": 12166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and S.S. Javali for the Appellant in CA 2329/77."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in C.A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "F. S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12216, "end_char": 12227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "A. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12232, "end_char": 12248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12296, "end_char": 12307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha and Narayan Nettar for the AppeUants in C.A. 2330 to 2370/77."}}, {"text": "Narayan Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12312, "end_char": 12326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha and Narayan Nettar for the AppeUants in C.A. 2330 to 2370/77."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12371, "end_char": 12380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, , Afuralidhar Rao and P. R. Ramasesh f,1r RR."}}, {"text": "Afuralidhar Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12384, "end_char": 12399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, , Afuralidhar Rao and P. R. Ramasesh f,1r RR."}}, {"text": "P. R. Ramasesh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12404, "end_char": 12418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, , Afuralidhar Rao and P. R. Ramasesh f,1r RR."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12547, "end_char": 12560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Ramasesh for RR/Promotees in CA 2330c2350/77 and RR in C.A. 2352-2370/77,\n\nl ,\n\nY. S. Chitale, M. Muralidhar Rao, P. R. Ramasesh and S. S.\n\nKliinduja, for the RR in C.A. 2351/77."}}, {"text": "M. Muralidhar Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12562, "end_char": 12579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Ramasesh for RR/Promotees in CA 2330c2350/77 and RR in C.A. 2352-2370/77,\n\nl ,\n\nY. S. Chitale, M. Muralidhar Rao, P. R. Ramasesh and S. S.\n\nKliinduja, for the RR in C.A. 2351/77."}}, {"text": "S. S.\n\nKliinduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12600, "end_char": 12616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Ramasesh for RR/Promotees in CA 2330c2350/77 and RR in C.A. 2352-2370/77,\n\nl ,\n\nY. S. Chitale, M. Muralidhar Rao, P. R. Ramasesh and S. S.\n\nKliinduja, for the RR in C.A. 2351/77."}}, {"text": "High Court of Karnataka", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12919, "end_char": 12942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2329 to 2370 of 1977, all of which are directed against a judgment dated the 30th November, 1976 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13595, "end_char": 13610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then given the name of one of its constituents, namely, the State of Mysore, which was later changed to that of the Karnataka State."}}, {"text": "Karnataka State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13651, "end_char": 13666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then given the name of one of its constituents, namely, the State of Mysore, which was later changed to that of the Karnataka State."}}, {"text": "6th of February, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14971, "end_char": 14992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 6th of February, 1958, the Government of Karnataka (then known as the Government of Mysore)\n\npromulgated the Mysore Government Servants (Probation) Rules .• 1957 (hereinafter called the Probation Rules) and on the next day came into force the Mysore Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Seniority Rules), both havin!';"}}, {"text": "Government of Karnataka", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14998, "end_char": 15021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 6th of February, 1958, the Government of Karnataka (then known as the Government of Mysore)\n\npromulgated the Mysore Government Servants (Probation) Rules .• 1957 (hereinafter called the Probation Rules) and on the next day came into force the Mysore Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Seniority Rules), both havin!';"}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15041, "end_char": 15061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 6th of February, 1958, the Government of Karnataka (then known as the Government of Mysore)\n\npromulgated the Mysore Government Servants (Probation) Rules .• 1957 (hereinafter called the Probation Rules) and on the next day came into force the Mysore Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Seniority Rules), both havin!';"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15347, "end_char": 15358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15366, "end_char": 15387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st of October, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15397, "end_char": 15417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st of October, 1958, the Karnataka Public Service Com mission invited applications from candidates for appointment to tile\n\nposts of Assistant Engineers by direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "15th of November, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15809, "end_char": 15831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Graduate Supervisors and Government employees holding equivalent posts had continued to press their claim for the equation of their posts with the posts of Assistant Engineers and they succeeded partially when, on the 15th of November, 1958, th• Karnataka Government promoted 167 of them (including 107 Graduate Supervisors who had been working as suc:h in the Merged State of Mysore) as officiating Assistant Engineers with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "Karnataka Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15837, "end_char": 15857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Graduate Supervisors and Government employees holding equivalent posts had continued to press their claim for the equation of their posts with the posts of Assistant Engineers and they succeeded partially when, on the 15th of November, 1958, th• Karnataka Government promoted 167 of them (including 107 Graduate Supervisors who had been working as suc:h in the Merged State of Mysore) as officiating Assistant Engineers with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "20th of November, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16093, "end_char": 16115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The promotion was notified in the State Gazette dated the 20th of November, 1958 (Exhibit A) the relevant portion whereof may be reproduced for facility of reference :\n\n\" ... The following supervisors of Public Works Department are promoted as officiating Assistant Engineers with immediate effect and until further orders against the existing vacancies subject to review after the finali- E sation of the Inter-Se Seniority List of Supervisor> and the Cadre and Recruitment Rules of Public Works Department."}}, {"text": "22nd of December, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16990, "end_char": 17012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "299 more persons of the same class were promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineers by eight notifications puhlished during the period from 22nd of December, 1958 to the 13th of October, 1960."}}, {"text": "13th of October, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17020, "end_char": 17041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "299 more persons of the same class were promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineers by eight notifications puhlished during the period from 22nd of December, 1958 to the 13th of October, 1960."}}, {"text": "21st (31st?) of August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17053, "end_char": 17081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G On the 21st (31st?)"}}, {"text": "31st of December, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17367, "end_char": 17389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "250-25-450 from the 1st of November, 1956 fo the 31st of December, 1956 and the revised scale of pay of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st of January, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17456, "end_char": 17476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "250- B 25-450-30-600 from the 1st of January, 1957 onwards."}}, {"text": "3rd of December, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17695, "end_char": 17716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. NAGARAJAN v. KAR'<ATAKA (Kasha/, J.) 943\n\nOn the 3rd of December, 1960, the Karnataka Government promulgated the Mysore Public Works Engineering Department Services (Recrnitment) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Recruitment Rules) under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, which envisaged appointment of Assistant Engineers in the Public Works Departµient by direct recruitment to the extent of 40 per cent and by promotion for the rest, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17894, "end_char": 17905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17913, "end_char": 17934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd of October, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18320, "end_char": 18341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd of October, 1961, thd Recruitment Rules were amended so as to be."}}, {"text": "1st of March, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18444, "end_char": 18462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "operative retrospectively i.e., with efkct fron: the 1st of March, 1958."}}, {"text": "31st of October, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18472, "end_char": 18493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 31st of October, 1961, 88 candidates were appointed as Probationary Assistant Engineers by direct recruitment."}}, {"text": "27th of February. 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19114, "end_char": 19136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second ofi the notifications issued on the 27th of February."}}, {"text": "6th of October, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19449, "end_char": 19469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the said 107 officers received further consideration at the hands of the State Government, who, on the 6th of October, 1962, issued another order (Exhibit D) superseding the one dated the 31st of August, 1960, and promoting them as Assistant Engineers with effect from the 1st of November, 1956."}}, {"text": "31st of August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19534, "end_char": 19554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the said 107 officers received further consideration at the hands of the State Government, who, on the 6th of October, 1962, issued another order (Exhibit D) superseding the one dated the 31st of August, 1960, and promoting them as Assistant Engineers with effect from the 1st of November, 1956."}}, {"text": "24th of September, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19650, "end_char": 19673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the 24th of September, 1966."}}, {"text": "1st of November, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20044, "end_char": 20065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that day the State Government passed an order that\n\nthey had all completed their period of probation satisfactorily and H stood absorbed against substantive vacancies with effect from the 1st of November, 1962."}}, {"text": "15th of September, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20240, "end_char": 20263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n 1971 various orders were pa'5ed promoting some of the direct recruits to the posts of Executive Engineers and those orders were challenged in a writ petition dated the 15th of September, 1971, by the promotees to the posts of Assistant Enginc\"rs (hereinafter referred to as the promotees)."}}, {"text": "28th of September, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20370, "end_char": 20393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th of September, 1972 .• a list (Exhibit G) of Assistant Engineers indicating their seniority inter se as ou the I st of November, 1959, was prepared by the State Government ... In that list the pro; notc.?s \\Vere accorded seniority to their satisfaction."}}, {"text": "4th of September, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20688, "end_char": 20710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i&t was superseded by another list dated the 4th of September, 1973, in which the seniority inter se of all Assistant Engineers functioning in the State Public Works Department as on 1st of January, 1973 was declared."}}, {"text": "1st of January, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20826, "end_char": 20846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i&t was superseded by another list dated the 4th of September, 1973, in which the seniority inter se of all Assistant Engineers functioning in the State Public Works Department as on 1st of January, 1973 was declared."}}, {"text": "vlysore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22415, "end_char": 22422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ")'vlysore was made to substantive posts of Assistant Engineers with effect\n\nfrom the 1st of November, 1956, and that the State Government or the direct recruits could not be alk>wed to urge to the contrary."}}, {"text": "27th o! February, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22877, "end_char": 22899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Junior Engineers, the right to review having bee11 reserved by the Government in its orders dated the 27th o!"}}, {"text": "article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23296, "end_char": 23307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23315, "end_char": 23336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention we would like to deal with is one raised by Mr. F. S. Nariman appearing for the direct recruits.", "canonical_name": "F. S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S. C. R. 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24789, "end_char": 24810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26522, "end_char": 26529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the mattoc we cannot agree with Mr. Nariman that the scope of the writ petitions is limited as stated by him."}}, {"text": "Engineers prior to the enforcement of the Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27066, "end_char": 27125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st of October, I 96L", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29383, "end_char": 29405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If any of the promotees also satisfied that requirement at any tiJ:ne earlier to the 31st of October, I 96L be would be bracketed with the direct recruits under that clause and his seniority vis-a-vis those recruits would then be governed by clause (b) of the ::ule, i.e .. on the basis of his and their respective dates of confirmation."}}, {"text": "Supervisors and the Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30853, "end_char": 30890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J !st of October, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31567, "end_char": 31589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The language employed leaves no doubt that the promotion of the :l 67\n\nofficers was not substantively made, the tenure being specifica!ly stated to he either uofficiating\" or \"purely temporary\" \\Vhich expressions cle:1!'.ly militate against a suhstantive appointment\n\nOrdec made by the State Government later on and right upto the J !"}}, {"text": "Chitalcy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31994, "end_char": 32002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why Dr. Chitalcy and Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the promotees, mainly placed their reliance on the two notifications dated the 27th of February, 1962, and order exhibit D dated the 6th of October, 1962, the combined effect of which was to promote the said 107 ofticers as AS!ristant Engineers."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32011, "end_char": 32014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why Dr. Chitalcy and Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the promotees, mainly placed their reliance on the two notifications dated the 27th of February, 1962, and order exhibit D dated the 6th of October, 1962, the combined effect of which was to promote the said 107 ofticers as AS!ristant Engineers."}}, {"text": "27th of February, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32115, "end_char": 32137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why Dr. Chitalcy and Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the promotees, mainly placed their reliance on the two notifications dated the 27th of February, 1962, and order exhibit D dated the 6th of October, 1962, the combined effect of which was to promote the said 107 ofticers as AS!ristant Engineers."}}, {"text": "Nanj1mdappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33940, "end_char": 33951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nanj1mdappa's case also the question of regularisation of an appointment arose and this Court dealt with it thus :\n\n\" ...... Courisel on behalf of the resp0t1dent contended that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf\n\n(I) [1967] I S. CR."}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 S. C. R. 799", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34257, "end_char": 34278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34421, "end_char": 34432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35310, "end_char": 35321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35329, "end_char": 35350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35458, "end_char": 35469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36363, "end_char": 36374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36382, "end_char": 36403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article\n\n309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36692, "end_char": 36704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37375, "end_char": 37384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may here make it clear that this order does not cover such officers as were holding the posts of Assistant Engineers on a substantive basis prior to the 1st of November, 1956 when the new State of Mysore now known as Karnataka came into being."}}, {"text": "substative status prior to the promulgation of the Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37483, "end_char": 37551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_952_971_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "BABU RAM JAGDISH KUMAR & CO., ETC., ETC.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS., ETC., ETC.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nPuttjab Sales Tax Act, Legislatutc. If could delegate in Schedules to the A.ct.\n\n1948-S. 31-Constitutional validity of-. po1ver to executire to add or delete anything\n\nWords &: Phrases \"Taxable ee1u\" 1uui \"taxablt person''- ,\\leaning of.\n\nS<ction 5(1) of the Punjab Sales Tax Act, 1948 authorises the Stato Government to deternline the rates of tax payable on ihe taxable .turnover of a dealer not exceeding the limit prescribed therein.\n\nSub-section (2) lays down the principles governing the Jetermination of the taxable turnover.\n\nSchedule 'C' -of the r\\ct refers to goods, the tun1over of which is subject to purchase tax. Section 31 of the Act \\Vhich gives specific power to the State Government to amend Schedule '(:' provides that afler giving by notification, not less than three months' notice of its intention so to d•J the State Govern ment may add to or delete from Schedule 'C' any goods and thereupon Schedule 'C' shall be deemed to be an1ended accordingly.\n\nBy a notification dated January 15. 1968 the- State Government added in Schedule 'C', \"paddy\" and \"rice\" as items on which purchase tax could' be levied. .As a result of thi.:; notification turnover relating to the purchase of paddy and rice became exigible to purchase tax in the hands of the purchasers with effect from that date.\n\nTn.e appellants who are dealers in paddy, buy paddy ln the first instance and sell rice after converting paddy into rice.\n\nThey filed writ petitions in the High Court questioning the validity of s. 31 of the i\\ct and the notifica tion issued thereunder and their liability to payment of purchase tax.\n\nT-be High Court dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that s. 31 of the Act which authorised the State Government to vary Schedule 'C' by adding certain goods \\Vh06e turnover was not liable to payment of sales tax earlier, suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legistatiYe power.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD: l(a) The delegation of po-wer to the State (iovernment to determine whether any class of goods should be included or excluded from Schedule 'C: to the Act cannot be considered as unconstitutio:aal. [967 G].\n\n(b) The case in so far as s. 31 of the Act which is an integral part of a single enactment and which authorises the Stat~ Government to . amend Schedu1e 'C' to the Act cannot be different from the case which was dealt\n\n• ' 1\n\n1, j\n\n\" \"\n\nl .. , . ))..._\n\n... \" •\n\nwith by the Constitution Bench, in Pt. Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P., .\\ [1959] SCR 427. If it is permissible for the Legislature to authorise the State Government to convert tax free goods into taxable ones, there is hardly any justification for holding that the State Government cannot be entrusted with the power to include goods in Schedule 'C' n1aking their purchase turnover taxable. [968 D-Fl.\n\n(c) It is well established that the delegation of power by the legislature hl a local authority or to the executive Government to vary or modify an existing Jaw would not be unconstitutional so long as such delegation does not involve the abdication of essential legislative power by the 'legislature.\n\nSuch delegations of legislative powers have been upheld by this Court on several varied and diverse grounds such as the scheme and policy of the statute under which the power is delegated, the presence of guidelines in the statute regarding the exercise of delegated power, the lack of time for the legislature to make provision with regard to all the details involved in the adm:nistration of law, the incapacity of the legislature to foresee future events, the nature of the subject matter of the legislation and the nature of the:. donee of power etc.\n\nEven in matters relhting to taxation laws, it has been consistently held that the legislature can. delegate the power to fix rates of tax provided there are necessary guidelines regarding such fixation on the ground that in a ntodern society, taxation is one of the methods by which economic and social goals of State can be achieved and the power to tax should be flexible and capable of being easily altered to meet the exigencies of circumstances. Such delegation has been held to be not amounting to delegation of essential legislative function.\n\n[959A-DJ.\n\nPt. Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P. &: Ors., {1959] SCR 427; /l;!unicipal Corp. of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 251; Corporation of Calcutta & Anr. v.\n\nT/Je Liberty Cinema, [1965] 2 SCR 477; Sita Rain Bisha1nbar Dayal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 141; Hirata/ Rattan/al etc., etc. v.\n\nState of U.P & Anr. Pfc., etc. [1973] 2 SCR 502; referred to.\n\ni(a) The argument that even though s. 31 was not unconstitutional the\n\naotiffcaton was not enforceable against the appellants has no force.\n\nIn Pt.\n\nBanarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P. it has been held that it is open to the Legislature to delegate the power to withdra\\v the exemption which has been given by the Legislature in respect of certain transactions specified, 1n the Act under consideration in that case.\n\nIt cannot be said that the principal object 'of the Act is to encourage manufacturing industry.\n\nThe Act is a fiscal legislation and its object is to collect revenue for the purpose of n1eeting the expenditure of the Government.\n\nIt is true that while levying tax under the Act, the Legislature may grant exemptions in certain cases and may decline to grant exemption in other.\n\nThe question whether such exeniption should be given or not is only incidental or ancillary to the principal object viz., the object of levying tax for the purpose of collecting revenue.\n\nJt cannot be said that wJlen certain goods are sold in favour of a manufacturer, the seller is always entitled to deduct such sales turnover from the grosl! turnover. He can do so only when such goods are specified in the certificate of registration obtained by the purchaser and they are used by him in the\n\n5-409 SCI /79\n\nmanufacture in the State of any goods other than goods declared tn. free under s. 6 of the Act for sale in the State. Transactions in paddy cannot be considered as having been generally exempted from payment of tax under the Act. Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act grants exe!Ilj>tion from payment of sales tax on the turnover of goods sold in favour of a manufacturer under the circumstances mentioned therein only to the seller and not to the boyer even though indirectly the buyer may be benefited thereby. [970A-F]\n\n(b) 1be terms \"taxable goods\", \"taxable event\" and \"taxable person'' are three distinct concepts. In the instant case the \"'taxable event\" is the pur chase of paddy and not its sale which alone attracts s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Acl ''Taxable person\" i.e. the person liable to pay tax is the purchaser and not the seller. The appellants cannot complain that any e-xem.ption graated to them by the Act has been taken away. Even though the liability to pay purchase tax may be on the appellants, it is bound to, have repercussions on the price at which they buy paddy and the price at which rice manufactured by them out of that padey is sold by them.\n\nThe tax payable under the Act being an indirect ta\"\"\\, the tax burden would ordinarily fall on the consumer of rice and not on any of the intermediaries including the appellants.\n\nThe iinpugned notification cannot therefore, be treated as one issued against the policy of the statute. [970G-H, 971A-B]\n\nState of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswanii, etc., itc., [1976] 1 SCR 38; referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRiso1cTJON : Civil Appeal No. 1028 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8-3-1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 354/75.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1029-1032 OF 1976\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8-3-1976 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 564 and 582/75 and C.W.P. Nos. 1988 and 2000/76 respectively.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1033 OF 1976 Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 31-5-1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W. Petition No. 2580/76.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1034 OF 11976 o Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 10-6-1976 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2890/76.\n\ni •\n\n) •\n\nBABU RAM JAGDISI! & co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, J.) 955\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1035 OF 1976\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28-6-1976 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction No. 3216 of 1976.\n\nM. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in '\n\nCA 1031/76).\n\n:~ Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. Genl. ' ).._ Singh for the Respondents. (In CA 1028/76), Hardev\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-In these appeals by special leave, we are called upon to pronounce on the validity of section 31 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the Notification dated the 13th January, 1968 issued thereunder by the Government of Punjab and the liability of the appellants to pay purchase tax under the Act in respect of the turnover relating to the purchases of paddy made by them during the relevant period.\n\nThe appellants are dealers in paddy and engaged in the business of millers in the State of Punjab. They buy paddy from growers or katcha adatias, convert it into rice and sell rice. Most of the rice manufactured by them is purchased by the State Government under food procurement orders.\n\nA brief history of the relevant provisions of the Act is as follows :-\n\nUnder the Act as it was originally enacted, there was no provision levying tax on the purchase turnover of the goods dealt with by a dealer as defined in the Act.\n\nThe Act was amended by Punjab Act No. 7 of 1958 which received the assent of the Governor on April 18, 1~58 and the amending Act came into force at once. The amending Act brought about the following changes in the Act :-\n\nIn the long title of the Act, after the word \"sale\" the wo d \" ch \" d , r s or pur ase were mserte . Clause ( d) of section 2 of the Act whi h defined the expression 'dealer' was amended so as to bring withn the scope of that expression a person who purchased any goods the course of trade or business. The turnover relating to purchas~~ ?1ade by a deal~ subsequent to the commencement of the amendmg Act of certam goods was made liable to pa}'lllent of tax.\n\nThe\n\nA word 'pm chase' was defined by clause (ff) of section 2 whih was introduced by the amending Act as follows :- \"-\n\n\"2. (ff) 'purchase' wilih all its grnmmatical or cognate expressions, means the acquisition of goods other than sugarcane, foodgrains, and pulses for nse in the manufacture of goods for sale for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration otherwise than under a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge.\". . . . . . . . (The rest of the clause is not necessary for the purpose of these cases).\n\n<, Section 4 of the Act was amended by imposing tx on pur r.· chases also subject to sections 5 and 6 of the Act. It is, however,_,.( •. seen from clause (ff) of section 2 that the purchase of foodgrains c\n\nwas not covered by the definition and remained unaffected by the above amending Act.\n\nThe Act was further amended by Punjab Act No. 13 of 1959 which deleted the words \"other than sugarcane, foodgrains and pulses\" in clause (ff) of section 2.\n\nSection 6 of the Act was repealed and substituted by a new section which read as follows :-\n\n\"6. Tax free goods.-(!) No tax shall be payable on the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule C subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof and no dealer shall charge sales tax or purchase tax on the sale or purchase, as the case may be, of goods which are declared tax free from time to time under this section.\n\n(2) The State Government after giving by notification not less than three months' notice of its intention so to do may by like notification add to or delete from Schedule B or Schedule C and thereupon Schedule B or Schedule C, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.''\n\nIt is seen from the above provision that the turnover relating to G the sale of goods mentioned in the first column of Schedule 'C' to the Act subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof was exempted from payment of tax.\n\nBy Punjab Act No. 24 of 1959, the above section 6 was substituted by a new section which read as follows :--\n\n\"6. Tax free goods.-(1) No tax shall be payable on the sale of goods SJ'.>ified in the first column of Schedule B.\n\nsubject to the couditious and exceptiou, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereo~ and no dealer shall charge sale tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax-free from time to time under this section.\n\n(2) The State Government after giving by notification not Jess than three months' notice of its intention so to do, may by like notification add to or delete from Schedule B and thereupon Schedule B shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.\"\n\nBy Punjab Act No. 18 of 1960, clause (ff) of section 2 of the Act which had undergone some alteration when Punjab Act No. 24 of 1959 came into force was snbstituted by a new clause which read :\n\n\"2. (ff) 'purchase', wtth all its grammatical or cognate expressions, means the acquisition of goods specified in Schedule C for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration otherwise than under a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge.\"\n\nThe effect of the said amendment was that the turnover relating to the purchase of goods mentioned in Schedule 'C' to the Act became liable to tax subject to the other provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 4 of the Act was also amended by the introduction of subsection (2-A) providing that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 4 of the Act, no tax on the sale of any goods should be levied if a tax on their purchase was payable under the Act.\n\nOriginally seven items of goods had been specified by the State Legislature in Schedule 'C' to the Act.\n\nBy the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Punjab Act No. 28 of 1965) section 31 was inserted in the Act authorising the State Government to amend Schedule 'C'. It read as follows . _\n\n\"31. Power to amend Schedule C-The State Government, after giving by notification not less than three months' notice of its intention so to do, may by notification add to, or delete from, Schedule C any goods, and therepon Schedule C shall be deemed to be amended accordmgly.\"\n\nThe words 'three months' 1\"n the b a ave sect10n were substituted by 'twenty days' by Punjab Act No. 7 of 1967.\n\nIn exercise of the power conferred by the above provision, the State Government issued the Notification on the 15th January, 1968 adding paddy and rice as items (8) and (9) in Schedule 'C'.\n\nThe result was that the turnover relating to the purchase of paddy and rice became exigible to payment of purchase tax under the Act in the hands of the purchasers with effect from the 15th January, 1968.\n\nAggrieved by the said notification, the appellants who became liable to payment of purchase tax on the turnover relating to the purchases of Paddy made by them filed petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution on the file of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana questioning the validity of section 31 of the Act, the Notification dated the 15th January, 1968 issued thereunder and their liability to payment of purchase tax.\n\nThe principal contentions urged by the appellants before the High Court were (1) that section 31 of the Act which authorised the State Government to amend Schedule 'C' to the Act by adding certain items making the turnover relating to their purchases liable to tax was void on the ground that it suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and therefore the notification issued thereunder was also void and (2) that the appellants who were carrying on the business of manufacturers of rice could not be denied the benefit of section 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act which authorised the deduction from the gross turnover die turnover relating to the sales of paddy effected in their favour notwithstanding the inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act.\n\nThe High Court rejected both the contentions of the appellants and dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nHence these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nIn this Court also, the very same contentions which were urged before the High Court were urged in support of the appeals with some slight variations.\n\nThe first contention urged by Mr. M. C.\n\nBhandare, learned counsel for the appellants was that section 31 of the Act which authorised the State Government to vary Schedule 'C' to the Act by adding certain goods whose turnover was not liable to payment of sales tax before suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and in the alternative he submitted that even if the said provision was otherwise valid, it could not be interpreted as including within its scope the power to issue a notification which would run counter to the express legislative policy of the Act contained in section 5(2)(a)(ii) thereof which had been enacted with the avowed purpose of giving assistance to manufacturing industries.\n\nI i\n\n~)..\n\nA review of the decisions of this Conrt to some of which we will presently refer shows that the delegation of power by the legislature to a'. local authority or to the Executive Government to vary or modify an existing law would not be unconstitutional so long as such delegation does not involve the abdication of essential legislativ~ power by the legislature.\n\nSuch delegations of legislative power have been upheld by this Court on several varied and diverse grounds such as the scheme and policy of the statute under which the power is delegated, the presence of guidelines in the statute regarding the exercise of delegated power, the lack of time for the Legislature to make provision with regard to all the details involved in the administration of the law, the incapacity of the Legislature to foresee all future events, the nature of the subject matter of legislation and the nature of the douee of power etc.\n\nEven in matters relating to taxation law, it has been consistently held that the Legislature can delegate the power to fix rates of tax provided there are necessary guidelines regarding such fixation on the ground that in a modern society, taxation is one of the methods by which economic and social goals of the State can be achieved and the power to tax, therefore, should be a flexible power and capable of being easily altered to meet the exigencies of circumstances. Such delegation has been held to be not amounting to delegation of essential legislative function.\n\nIn Powell v. Appollo Candle Company Limited(') the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was called upon to decide whether section 133 of the Customs Regulation Act of 1879 of New South Wales which conferred the power on the Governor to impose tax on certain articles of import was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers.\n\nIn holding that it was not unconstitutional the Privy Council observed : '\n\n\"It is argued that the tax in question has been imposed by the Governor and not by the Legislature who alone had power to impose it.\n\nBut the duties levied under the 0rder-in-Council are really levied by the authority of the Act under which the Order is issued.\n\nThe Legislature has not parted with its perfect control over the Governor and has the power, of course, at any moment, of withdrwing\n\nor altering the power which, they have entrusted to him.\n\nIn these circumstances, their Lordships are of opinion that\n\nthe judgment of the Supreme Court was wrong in declar-\n\n(1) [1885] 10 A.C. 282.\n\ning Section 133 of the Customs Regulation Act of 1879 to be beyond the power of the Legislature.\"\n\nIn J. W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. United States(') the validity of the action of the President to make changes in the rates provided in the Tariff Act, 1922 under the power delegated by the Congress arose for consideration. That was challenged as a forbidden delegation of legislative power to executive authority.\n\nThe challenge was negatived by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that the Congress bad laid down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person authorised to fix the rate of customs duties on imported merchandise was to conform.\n\nThe principle enunciated in the above two decisions has been substantially adopted and followed by this Court in two cases- ( 1) Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of M1dhya Pradesh & Ors.(') und (2) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.\n\nBir/a Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr.( 3) to which we shall D refer hereafter.\n\nIn Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Comndttee, Pdtna and Another(4 ) where an earnest atternpt was made to analyse and explain the judgment of this Court in re. The Delhi Laws Act, 1912('). Bose, J. after referring in detail to the observations E made by the learned Judges in the latter case observed at page 301 :-\n\n\"In our opinion, the majority view was that an executive authority can be authorised to modify either existing or future laws but not in any essential feature.\n\nExactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, and there was some divergence of view abont this in the former case, but this much is clear 'from the opinions set out above : it cannot include a change of policy.\"\n\nIn Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra) where this Court was called upon to decide whether section 6 (2) of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 which authorised the State Government after giving by notification riot less than one month's notice of its intention so to do by a notification\n\n(1) 276 U.S. 394.\n\n(2) [1959] S. C. R. 427.\n\n(3) [!968]3 SC. R. 251.\n\n(4) [1955] S. C.R. 290.\n\n(5) [!95!] S. C.R. 747.\n\nafter the expiry of the period of notice mentioned in the first notification to amend Schedule II to that Act was constitutional, it was held that it was not unconstitutional for the Legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of the taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax was to be laid, the rates at whlch it was to be charged in respect of different classes of goods and the like and that the power conferred on the State Government by section 6(2) of that Act to amend the Schedule relating to exemption was in consonance with the accepted\n\nlegislative practice relating to the topic.\n\nIn that connection at page 435, this Court observed :\n\n\"Now, the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of\n\ndifferent classes of goods, and the like.\" D\n\nThe next case to which reference may be made is Corporotion of Calcutta & Anr. v. The Liberty Cinema(') where the majority upheld the fixation of a tax on cinema shows by the Corporation of Calcutta even though the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951 prescribed no limits to which the tax could go. In that case, reliance was placed on the case of Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra) and it was held that the fixation of rate of tax could be left to a non-legislative body provided the Legislature gave necessary guidance for such fixation. This Court in that case found guidance in the various provisions of the statute including the fact that the body which had been authorised to levy the rate was a municipal body whose fiscal requirements were restricted by the nature and area of its jurisdiction.\n\nIn Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr. (supra) Hidayatullah, J. (as he then\n\nwas) upholding the imposition of a tax by the Delhi Municipal Cor- G poration in exercise of the power granted to it under !lie Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 observed at page 2'87 as follows :-\n\n\"The doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its powers, therefore, must be understood in a limited way. It __ o~1!- ~ans that the legislature must not efface itself but\n\n(1) [1965] 2 S. C.R. 477.\n\nmust give the !egisltive sanction to the imposition of tile tax and must keep the control in its own hands.\n\nThere is no specific provision in the Constitution which says that the Parliament cannot delegate to certain specified instrumentalities the power to effectuate its own will.\n\nThe question always is whether the legislative will has been exercised or not.\n\nOnce it is established that the legislature itself haS willed that a particular thing be done and has merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted with its control) there can be no question of excessive delegation. If the delega_te acts contrary to the wishes of the legislature the legislature can undo what the delegate has done.\"\n\nIn Devi Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.(') the validity of section 5 of the Act (as originally enacted) which conferred on the Government power to levy tax at such rates as the Government might fix arose for consideration.\n\nThis Court held that such conferment of power on the Government to levy tax at the rates determined by it without any statutory limitation or guidance was void.\n\nThis Court, however, held that af!er section 5 was amended by Punjab Act No. 19 of 1952 by imposing the restriction that the rates determined by the State Government should not exceed two paise in a rupee was valid as the Legislature bad delegated the power to the Government to determine the rates subject to the restriction mentioned above.\n\nIn the course of the above decision, Subba Rao, C.J., dealing with the decision of this Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema (supra) observed :\n\n\"If this decision is an authority for the position that the Legislature can delegate its power to a statutory anthority to levy taxes and fix the rates in regard thereto, it is equally an authority for the position that the said statute to be valid must give a guidance to the said authority for fixing the said rates and that guidance cannot be judged by stereotyped rules but would depend upon the provisions of a particular Act To that extent this judgment is binding on us.\n\nBut we cannot go further and hold, as the learned counsel for the respondents asked us to do, that whenever a statute defines the purpose or purposes for which a statutory authority is constituted and empowers it to levy a tax that statute necessarily contains a guidance to fix the rates : it depends upon the provisions of each statute.\"\n\n'. 1) [1967] 3 S. C. R. 557.\n\nIn Sita Ram Bishambher Dayal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.(') the validity of section 3D(l) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 which authorised the levy of a tax on the turnover of first purchases made by a dealer or through a dealer acting as a purchasing agent in respect of such goods or class of goods, and at such rates, not exceeding two paise per rupee in the case of foodgrains, including cereals and pulses, and five paise per rupee in the case of other goods and' with effect from such date, as may, from time to time, be notified by the State Government in that behalE was questioned on the ground that the delegation of power to the State Government to determine\n\nthe goods or class of goods whose purchase turnover would be liable to tax and the rates of purchase tax subject to the reslriction imposed in that regard by that section suffered from the vice of excessive delegation.\n\nRepelling the above contention and upholding the said provision, Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed thus :-\n\n\"It is true that the power to fix the rate of a tax is a legislative power but if the legislature lays down the legislative policy and provides the necessary guidelines, tnat power can be delegated to the executive.\n\nThough a tax is levied primarily for the purpose of gathering revenue, in selecting the objects to be taxed and In determining the rate of tax, various economic and social aspects, such as the availability of the goods, administrative convenience, the extent of evasion, the impact of tax levied on the various sections of the society etc. have to be considered.\n\nIn a modern society taxation iS an instrument of planning.\n\nIt can be used to achieve the e'conomic and social , goals of the State.\n\nFor that reason the power to tax must be a flexible power. It must be capable of being 1t10dulated to meet the exigencies of the sitnation. In a Cabinet form of Government, the executive is expected to reflect the views of the legislatures.\n\nIn fact in most matters it gives the lead to the legislature.\n\nHowever, much one might deplore the \"New Despotism\" of the executive, the very complexity of the modern society and the demand it makes on its Government have set in motion forces which have made it absolutely necessary for the legislatnres to entrust more and more powers to the executive.\n\nTextbook doctrines evolved in the 19th Century have become out of date.\n\nPresent position as regards delegation of legislative power\n\n(I) [1972] 2 S. C.R. 141.\n\nmay not be ideal, but in the absence of any better allernative, there is no escape from it.\n\nThe legislatures have neither the time, nor the required detailed information nor even t@ mobility to deal fn detail with the innumerable problems arising time and again. In certain matters they can only lay down the policy and guidelines in as clear a manner as possible.\"\n\nWhen the validity of section 3-D of U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 was again challenged before this Court in Hira Lal Rattan Lal etc. etc., v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc., e:c. Cl on the very same ground, it was agair; upheld by this Court with the following observations :-\n\n\"The only remaining wntcntion is that the delegation made to the executive under s. 3-D is an excessive delegation. It is true that the legislature cannot delegate its legislative functions to any other body.\n\nBut subject to that qualificaltion, it is permissible for the legislature to delegate the power to select the persons on whom the tax is to be levied or the goods or the transactions on which the tax is to be levied.\n\nIn the Act, under s. 3 the legislature has sought to impose multi-point tax on all sales and purchases.\n\nAfter having done that it has given power to the executive, a high authority and which is presumed to command the majority support in the legislature, to select for special treatment dealings in certain class of goods. In the very nature of things, it is impossible for the legislature to enumerate goods, dealings in which Sales tax or purchase tax should be imposed. It is also impossible for the legislature to select the goods which should be subjected to a single point sales or purchase tax.\n\nBefore making such selections several aspects such as the impact of the levy on the society, economic consequences and the administrative convenience will have to be considered.\n\nThese factors may change from time to time. Hence in the very nature of things, these details have got to be left to the executive.\"\n\nWe shall now proceed to examine the validity of section 31 of the Act in the light of the decisions referred to above.\n\nThe expression 'dealer' is defined in section 2( d) of the Act as \"any person including H a Department of Government who in the normal course of trade sells or purchases any goods, in the State of Punjab.\" Section 2(ff) of the\n\n(1) [1973] 2 S. C. R. 502.\n\n\\ .r,\n\nAct defines the expression 'pnrchase' as \"acquisition of goods specified in Schedule 'C' for cash or deferred payment.\" The word 'sale' is defined in section 2(h) of the Act as meaning \"any transfer of property in goods other than goods specified in Schedule 'C' for cash or deferred payment.\" Sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act which is the charging section provides that \"subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6, every dealer (except one dealing exclusively in goods declared tax-free under section ( 6) whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding the commencement of the Act exceeded the taxable quantum shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on all sales effected after the coming into force of the Act and purchases made after the commencement of East Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1958.\" Section 5(1) of the Act authorises the State Government to determine the rates of tax payable on the taxable turnover of a dealer not exceeding the limit prescribed therein.\n\nSubsection (2) of section 5 of the Act lays down the principles governing the determination of \"taxable turnover\".\n\nDuring the relevant period, sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act read as follows :-\n\n\"5. (2) In this Act the expression \"taxable turnover\" means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom-\n\n(a) his turnover during that period on-\n\n(i) the sale of goods declared tax-free under seci tion 6;\n\n(ii) sales to a registered dealer of goods other than sales of goods liable to tax at the first stage under sub-section (1-A); declared by him in a prescribed form as being intended for resale in the State of Punjab or sale in the course of inter-Siate trade or commerce or sale in the conrse of export of goods out of the territory of India, or of goods specified in his certificate of registration or use by him in the manufactnre in Punjab of any goods, other than goods declared tax-free under section 6, for sale in Puniab and on sales to a registered dealer of containers or other materials for the packing of such goods :\n\nProvided that in case of such sales, l\\ declaration duly filled up and signed by the registered dealer\n\n(ii)\n\n(iii)\n\nto whom the goods arc sold and containing prc<- cribed particulars on a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority is furnished by the dealer who sells the goods\n\n(iv) sales to any und 1ertaking supplying electric<!! energy to the public under a licence or sanction granted or deemed to have been granted under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, of goods for use by it in the generation or distribution cf such energy;\n\n( v) sales or purchases of goods falling under section\n\n29;\n\n(vi) the purchase of goods which are sold not later than six monts after the close of the year, to a registered dealer, or in the course of interstate trade or commerce, or in the course of export out of the territory of India;\n\nProvided that in the case of such a sale to a registered dealer, a declaration, in the prescribed form and duly filled up and signed by the registered dealer to whom the goods are sold, is furnished by the dealer claiming deduction.\n\n(vii) Such other sales or purchases as may be prescribed;\n\n(b) the amount of sales tax included in the gross turnover.''\n\nSection 6 of the Act during the relevant period read as imbstituted by Punjab Act No. 24 of 1959 with the modification made by Punjab Act No. 7 of 1967 which substituted the words \"twenty days\" in the place of \"three months\" in sub-section (2) thereof.\n\nSchedule 'A' to the Act specified certain goods which were considered as luxury goods for purposes of levy of tax at the rates prescribed by the State Government under the first proviso to section 5 (1), Schedule 'B' to the Act referred to the items of goods which were treated as tax-free goods under section 6 and Schedule 'C' during the relevant period referred to the goods the turnover of which was subject to purchase tax.\n\nThe State Government was, however, given power to amend all the three Schedules.\n\nBABU RAM JAGDISH & co. v. PUNJAB (Venkdtaramiah, J.) 967\n\nIt is seen from the provisions of the Act referred to above that the Legislature while directing that the tax shall be levied on the tum- -0ver of sales and purchases of goods under section 4 left the rates of tax payable to be determined by the State Government under section 5 ( 1) of the Act subject to the limits prescribed therein. The Legislature after specifying the goods which should be treated as luxury goods, tax-free goods and goods whose purchase turnover is liable to tax in Schedule 'A', Schedule 'B' and Schedule 'C' respectively has delegated the power to the State Government to amend Schedule 'A' under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 5, Schedule 'B' under sub-section (2) of section 6 and Schedule 'C' under section 31 .of the Act. In each of these cases, the State Government can make the amendment only after giving previous publicity to its intention to do so thus giving an opportunity to interested parties to make representatioru;, if any. In the case of a democratic Government, this itself\n\nacts as a check on arbitrary exercise of power. At this stage it is necessary to refer to sub-section (2A) of section 4 of the Act and that provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections\n\n(1) and (2) of section 4, no tax on the sale of any goods shall be levied if a tax on their purchase is payable under the Act. The Act also contains the machinery for assessment and collection of tax. It follows from the scheme of the Act that no tax is payable on the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule 'B' subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof and no dealer shall charge sales tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax-free. In so far as goods included in Schedule 'C' to the Act are concerned, tax can be levied only on their purchase turnover. In the case of all other goods, tax is levied on their sales turnover subject to section 5 and other provisions of the Act. When the State Government in exercise of its power under section 6(2) of the Act deletes any goods from Schedule 'B', they cease to be tax-free goods and their sales turnover would become liable to payment of tax.\n\nWhen the State Government in exercise of its power under sectiou 31 of the Act includes any goods in Schedule 'C', their sales turnover would become exempt from payment of tax but their purchase turnover would become liable for payment of tax. We are of the view that the delegation of power to the State Government to determine whether any class of goods should be included or excluded from Schedule 'C' to the Act cannot be considered as unconstitutional in view of the decisions of this Court referred to above and in particular the decision in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra) where section 6(2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 corres-\n\nA ponding to section 6(2) of the Act was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court. The Constitution Bench while rejecting the challenge of section 6(2) observed thns :-\n\n\"The contention of the appellant that the notification in question is ultra vires inust, in our opinion, fail on another ground.\n\nThe basic assumption on which the arg; ument of the appellant proceeds is that the power to amend the Schedule conferred on the Government under s. 6(2) 1s wholly independent of the grant of exemption under s. 6 (1) of the Act, and that in consequence, while an exemption under s. 6 ( 1) w.ould stand, an amendment thereof by a notification under s. 6(2) might be bad. But that, in our opinion, is not the correct interpretation of the section. The two sub-sections together form integral parts of a single enactment, the object of which is to grant exemption from taxation in respect of such goods and to such extent as may from time to time be determined by the State Government.\n\nSection 6 (1), therefore, cannot have an operation independent of s. 6(2), and an exemption granted thereunder is conditional and subject to any modification that might be issued under s. 6(2). In this view, the impugned notification is intra vires and not open to challenge.\"\n\n/ E We are of the view that the case in so far as section 31 of the Act which is also an integral part of a single enactment and which authorises the State Government to amend Schedule 'C' to the Act cannot be different from the case which was dealt with by the Constitution Bench. If it is permissible for the Legislature to authorise the State Government to convert tax free goods into taxable ones, there F is hardly any justification for holding that the State Government cannot be entrusted with the power to include goods in Schedule 'C' making their purchase turnover taxable.\n\nIt was, however, argued by Mr. M. C. Bhandare that in the instant case, the inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act was against the policy underlying the Act and, therefore, even though section 31 of the Act might be constitutionally valid, the notification issued by the State Government directing inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' should be held to be outside the scope of section 31 of the Act. In other words, he contended that having regard to the scheme of the Act, it was necessary for us to read section 31 of the Act as not delegating the power to the State Government to include paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act. The argument of the learned counsel was that the appellants were purchasing paddy either from agriculturists who had grown it on their land or from katcha adatias for purposes of manufacture of rice in the circumstances mentioned in soction 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act. In either case no sales tax was being levied on the turnover relating to the sales in their favour by reason of item 39 of Schedule 'B' to the Act which declared that agricultural or horticultural produce sold by a person or a member of his family grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest whether as owner or usufructuary mortgage tenant or otherwise were tax free goods or of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act which required the turnover relating to sales to a registered dealer of goods specified in his certificate of registration for .1so by him in the manufacture in Punjab of any goods other than !}Xlds declared tax-free under section 6 for sale in Punjab to be deducted from the gross turnover of any dealer in order to arrive at 'taxable turnover'. It was argued that the tax payable under the Act w.as an indirect tax and since no sales tax was leviable, the appellants could purchase paddy before the issue of the impugned notification witho•Jt being saddled with the liability of payment of sales tax. The policy underlying section 5(2)(a) (ii) of the Act was that manufacturers of goods specified in the certificate of registration obtained by them should be able to acquire raw material for their industry without incurring the extra liability of sales tax.\n\nThis exemption which the appellants were enjoying was taken away indirectly by the State Government by including paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act resulting in the imposition of purchase tax in respect of its turnover on them.\n\nRelying upon the decision of the High Court of Madras in Syed Mohamed & Co. v. The State of Madras(') it was argued that sales tax was in effect tax on the transaction of sale of goods by one person to another and that it was unreasonable to assume that the Legislature contemplated different categories of transactions dej>Cnding upon the point at which the tax was levied. In support of this contention, our attention was also drawn to the observation made at page 571 in Devi Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. T. State of Punjab & Ors. (supra) and in State of Assam v. Ramesh Chandra Dey & Ors.(2). The learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the exemption from payment of sales tax accorded by the Legislature under item 39 of Schedule 'B' and under section 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act was in respect of the transaction of sale, it was not open to the Executive Government to take away the exemption by including paddy in Schedule 'C' and since such inclusion was contrary to the express policy of the statute, section 31 of the Act must be so interpreted as not delegating the power to\n\n(I) [1952] 3 S. T. c, 367 r\n\n(2) {1962] l S. C. R. 986 at p. 991. 6-409SCl/79\n\ninclude paddy purchased by the appellants in Schedule 'C'.\n\nWe arc, therefore. asked to hold that even though section 31 was not unconstitutional, the notification was not enforceable against the appellants ..\n\nThe abovG argument is no doubt quite attractive but we do not find any substance in it since it overlooks the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pandit Banarasi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra) where it has been held that it is open to the Legislature to delegate the power to withdraw the exemption which has been given by the Legislature in respect of ce:rtain transactions specified in Schedule II to the C.P. and Bcrar Sales Tax Act,\n\n1947. Moreover it cannot be said that the principal object of the Act is to encourage manufacturing industry. The Act is a fiscal legislation and its object is to collect revenue for the purpose of meeting the expenditure of the Government. It is no doubt true that while levying tax under the Act, the Legislature may grant exemptions in certain cases and may decline to grant exemptions in other cases. 'The question whether such exemption should be given or not is only incidental or ancillary to the principal object viz. the object of levying tax for the purpose of collecting revenue. It cannot also be said that when certain goods are sold in favour of manufacturer, the seller is always entitled to deduct such sales turnover from the gross turnover. He can do so only when such goods are specified in the certificate of registration obtained by the purchaser and they are used by him in the manufacture in Punjab of any goods other than goods declared tax-free under s~:ction 6 of the Act for sale in Punjab.\n\nTransaction in paddy cannot, therefore, be considered as having been generally exempted from payment of tax under the Act.\n\nIt is also to be seen that section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act grants exemption from payment of sales tax on the turnover of goods sold in favour of a manufacturer under the circumstances mentioned therein only to the seller and not to the buyer even though indirectly the buyer may be benefited thereby. If the observation made by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K.\n\nKandaswami etc., etc.(') that 'taxable goods', 'taxable event' and 'taxable person' arc three distinct concepts is borne in mind, there will be no room foc any confusion. In the instant case, the taxable event is the purchase of paddy and not its sale which alone attracts section 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act and taxable person, that is person liable to pay tax, is the purchaser and not the seller. The appellants cannot, therefore, complain that any exemption granted to them by the Act has been taken away. Even though the liability to pay purchase tax may be on appellants, it is bound to have repercussions on the price at which they buy paddy and\n\n(I) [1976! I S. C.R. 38.\n\n,..\n\nthe price at which rice manufactured by them out of that paddy is sold by them. The tax payable under the Act admittedly being an indirect tax the tax burden would ordinarily fall on the consumer of rice and not on any of the intermediaries including the appellants. The impugned notification cannot, therefore, be treated as one issued against the policy of the statute.\n\n~ Jn view of the foregoing, we hold that section 31 of the Act and\n\nthe Notification issned thereunder do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power.\n\nWe may at this stage refer to one other subsidiary argument urged on behalf of the appellants. It is argued that because paddy and rice are not different kinds of gqocls but one and the same, inclusion of both paddy and rice in Schedule 'C' to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act. There is no merit in this contention also because the assumption that paddy and rice are one and the same is erroneous. In Ganesh Trading Co., Karna/ v. State of Haryana & Anr.(1) arising under the Act, this Court has held that although rice is produced outof paddy, it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking; that rice and paddy are two different things in ordinary parlance and therefore, when paddy is dehusked and rice produced, there is a change in the identity of the goods. Tile above decision follows the principle enunciated by this Court in State of Punjab v. Chandu Lal Kishori Lal(') in which it was held that cotton seeds when separated from cotton constituted distinct commercial goods different from cotton. The above contention has, therefore, to be rejected.\n\nIn the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed. The pa11ies shall, however, bear their own costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeals dismissed .\n\n, I) 32 S. T. C. 62.l.\n\n(2) [1969] 3 S.C R. 840.\n\nA ., ..", "total_entities": 150, "entities": [{"text": "BABU RAM JAGDISH KUMAR & CO., ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABU RAM JAGDISH KUMAR & CO., ETC., ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ETC.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS., ETC.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS., ETC., ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. 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C. IJhandare", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8719, "end_char": 8734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in '\n\nCA 1031/76).", "canonical_name": "M. C. IJhandare"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8736, "end_char": 8745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in '\n\nCA 1031/76)."}}, {"text": "Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8769, "end_char": 8801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in '\n\nCA 1031/76)."}}, {"text": "Malini Poduval", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8808, "end_char": 8822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in '\n\nCA 1031/76)."}}, {"text": "G. R. Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8827, "end_char": 8838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in '\n\nCA 1031/76)."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8863, "end_char": 8879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":~ Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9001, "end_char": 9014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In CA 1028/76), Hardev\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-In these appeals by special leave, we are called upon to pronounce on the validity of section 31 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the Notification dated the 13th January, 1968 issued thereunder by the Government of Punjab and the liability of the appellants to pay purchase tax under the Act in respect of the turnover relating to the purchases of paddy made by them during the relevant period."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9105, "end_char": 9115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13th January, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In CA 1028/76), Hardev\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-In these appeals by special leave, we are called upon to pronounce on the validity of section 31 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the Notification dated the 13th January, 1968 issued thereunder by the Government of Punjab and the liability of the appellants to pay purchase tax under the Act in respect of the turnover relating to the purchases of paddy made by them during the relevant period."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9269, "end_char": 9289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In CA 1028/76), Hardev\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-In these appeals by special leave, we are called upon to pronounce on the validity of section 31 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the Notification dated the 13th January, 1968 issued thereunder by the Government of Punjab and the liability of the appellants to pay purchase tax under the Act in respect of the turnover relating to the purchases of paddy made by them during the relevant period."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9555, "end_char": 9561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are dealers in paddy and engaged in the business of millers in the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1~58 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10082, "end_char": 10100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of 1958 which received the assent of the Governor on April 18, 1~58 and the amending Act came into force at once."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10327, "end_char": 10336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10724, "end_char": 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C.\n\nBhandare", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17001, "end_char": 17016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention urged by Mr. M. C.\n\nBhandare, learned counsel for the appellants was that section 31 of the Act which authorised the State Government to vary Schedule 'C' to the Act by adding certain goods whose turnover was not liable to payment of sales tax before suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and in the alternative he submitted that even if the said provision was otherwise valid, it could not be interpreted as including within its scope the power to issue a notification which would run counter to the express legislative policy of the Act contained in section 5(2)(a)(ii) thereof which had been enacted with the avowed purpose of giving assistance to manufacturing industries.", "canonical_name": "M. C. 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The Liberty Cinema(') where the majority upheld the fixation of a tax on cinema shows by the Corporation of Calcutta even though the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951 prescribed no limits to which the tax could go."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24419, "end_char": 24431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) Hidayatullah, J. (as he then\n\nwas) upholding the imposition of a tax by the Delhi Municipal Cor- G poration in exercise of the power granted to it under !"}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24577, "end_char": 24608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24676, "end_char": 24686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lie Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 observed at page 2'87 as follows :-\n\n\"The doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its powers, therefore, must be understood in a limited way."}}, {"text": "[1965] 2 S. C.R. 477", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24833, "end_char": 24853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25682, "end_char": 25691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26046, "end_char": 26055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26390, "end_char": 26399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the above decision, Subba Rao, C.J., dealing with the decision of this Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema (supra) observed :\n\n\"If this decision is an authority for the position that the Legislature can delegate its power to a statutory anthority to levy taxes and fix the rates in regard thereto, it is equally an authority for the position that the said statute to be valid must give a guidance to the said authority for fixing the said rates and that guidance cannot be judged by stereotyped rules but would depend upon the provisions of a particular Act To that extent this judgment is binding on us."}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 S. C. R. 557", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27338, "end_char": 27359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27441, "end_char": 27454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27467, "end_char": 27486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28321, "end_char": 28326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Repelling the above contention and upholding the said provision, Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed thus :-\n\n\"It is true that the power to fix the rate of a tax is a legislative power but if the legislature lays down the legislative policy and provides the necessary guidelines, tnat power can be delegated to the executive."}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 S. C.R. 141", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29822, "end_char": 29842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30234, "end_char": 30243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30254, "end_char": 30273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30562, "end_char": 30566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30927, "end_char": 30931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31874, "end_char": 31884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31984, "end_char": 31997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(ff)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32152, "end_char": 32165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1973] 2 S. C. R. 502", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32178, "end_char": 32199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32359, "end_char": 32371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32522, "end_char": 32531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32617, "end_char": 32633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33043, "end_char": 33055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33236, "end_char": 33245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33381, "end_char": 33390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34018, "end_char": 34023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) In this Act the expression \"taxable turnover\" means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom-\n\n(a) his turnover during that period on-\n\n(i) the sale of goods declared tax-free under seci tion 6;\n\n(ii) sales to a registered dealer of goods other than sales of goods liable to tax at the first stage under sub-section (1-A); declared by him in a prescribed form as being intended for resale in the State of Punjab or sale in the course of inter-Siate trade or commerce or sale in the conrse of export of goods out of the territory of India, or of goods specified in his certificate of registration or use by him in the manufactnre in Punjab of any goods, other than goods declared tax-free under section 6, for sale in Puniab and on sales to a registered dealer of containers or other materials for the packing of such goods :\n\nProvided that in case of such sales, l\\ declaration duly filled up and signed by the registered dealer\n\n(ii)\n\n(iii)\n\nto whom the goods arc sold and containing prc<- cribed particulars on a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority is furnished by the dealer who sells the goods\n\n(iv) sales to any und 1ertaking supplying electric<!!"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34180, "end_char": 34189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Puniab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34203, "end_char": 34209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) In this Act the expression \"taxable turnover\" means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom-\n\n(a) his turnover during that period on-\n\n(i) the sale of goods declared tax-free under seci tion 6;\n\n(ii) sales to a registered dealer of goods other than sales of goods liable to tax at the first stage under sub-section (1-A); declared by him in a prescribed form as being intended for resale in the State of Punjab or sale in the course of inter-Siate trade or commerce or sale in the conrse of export of goods out of the territory of India, or of goods specified in his certificate of registration or use by him in the manufactnre in Punjab of any goods, other than goods declared tax-free under section 6, for sale in Puniab and on sales to a registered dealer of containers or other materials for the packing of such goods :\n\nProvided that in case of such sales, l\\ declaration duly filled up and signed by the registered dealer\n\n(ii)\n\n(iii)\n\nto whom the goods arc sold and containing prc<- cribed particulars on a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority is furnished by the dealer who sells the goods\n\n(iv) sales to any und 1ertaking supplying electric<!!"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34756, "end_char": 34784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section\n\n29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34907, "end_char": 34918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35506, "end_char": 35515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35949, "end_char": 35958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36062, "end_char": 36071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36512, "end_char": 36521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36599, "end_char": 36608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36993, "end_char": 37002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37042, "end_char": 37051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37075, "end_char": 37085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37476, "end_char": 37485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37587, "end_char": 37596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38304, "end_char": 38313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38404, "end_char": 38416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39188, "end_char": 39200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39208, "end_char": 39255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39278, "end_char": 39290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39356, "end_char": 39374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution Bench while rejecting the challenge of section 6(2) observed thns :-\n\n\"The contention of the appellant that the notification in question is ultra vires inust, in our opinion, fail on another ground."}}, {"text": "section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39408, "end_char": 39420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39714, "end_char": 39721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39776, "end_char": 39780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39847, "end_char": 39851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39916, "end_char": 39923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40252, "end_char": 40261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40318, "end_char": 40325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40437, "end_char": 40444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40580, "end_char": 40590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41146, "end_char": 41160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, argued by Mr. M. C. Bhandare that in the instant case, the inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act was against the policy underlying the Act and, therefore, even though section 31 of the Act might be constitutionally valid, the notification issued by the State Government directing inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' should be held to be outside the scope of section 31 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "M. C. IJhandare"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41307, "end_char": 41317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41497, "end_char": 41507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41626, "end_char": 41636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42466, "end_char": 42475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42710, "end_char": 42719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43112, "end_char": 43127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43609, "end_char": 43629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon the decision of the High Court of Madras in Syed Mohamed & Co. v. The State of Madras(') it was argued that sales tax was in effect tax on the transaction of sale of goods by one person to another and that it was unreasonable to assume that the Legislature contemplated different categories of transactions dej>Cnding upon the point at which the tax was levied."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44338, "end_char": 44350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44596, "end_char": 44606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44862, "end_char": 44872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45393, "end_char": 45404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bcrar Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45421, "end_char": 45440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46613, "end_char": 46622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47233, "end_char": 47245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48056, "end_char": 48066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 S.C R. 840", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 49482, "end_char": 49501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_972_983_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HARGOVIND PANT\n\nDR. RAGHUKUL TILAK & ORS.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWAU, I,\n\nS. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950-Art. 319(d)-Scope of-G<>Vernor-11 an \"t'niployee\" of the Governn1ent of J11dia-If could be regarded as \"fmployed under the Government of India\"-Employed-Meaning of.\n\nArticle 319fd) of the Constitution provides that on ceasing to hold otliet: a member, other than the Chairman of a State Public Service commission, shall be eligible for appointment as the Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Service Commission or as the Chairman of that or any other State Public Service Commission but not for any other employment either under the Go'Jernment of India or under the Government of a State.\n\nThe first respondent, who we.s a member of the Rajasthan State Public Service Commission during the years 1958-59, was later appointed as Governor of the State of Rajasthan. The petitioner contended that by virtue of Art. 319 ( d) of the Constitution the respondent was ineligible to be appointed as Governor of a State because he W&S a member of' the State Public Service Commission earlier.\n\nOn the question whether, by reason of Art. 319 (d) the respondent was ineligible for employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State and whether the office of Governor was an employn1ent under the Government of India.\n\nHELD : 1. The office of Governor of a State is not an employment under tho Government of India and it does not therefore come with.in the prohibition of cl.(d) of Art. 319. The appointment of the first respondent as Governor of Raiasthan could not be held to be invalid. [982 F).\n\n2. Howsoever wide and expansive a meaning one may give to the words \"employment under the Government of India\" the office of Governor cannot come within that term. [978 F).\n\n3. The word \"employment\" is not a word with a. single fixed meaning bur bas many connotations. If the term 0 employment\" is construed in the narrow senile of employer employee relationship the office of Gove1nor would not be an employment within the meaning of Art. 319(d) because 1he Governor of a State is not an employee or servant of anyone. He occupie:s a high constitutional office with important constitutional functions and duHes. The executjve\n\npower of the State is vested in him and every executive action of the Government is required to be expressed to be taken in his name. lie contitutes an integral part of the legislature of the State though not in the ful1est sense and is also vested with the legislative power to promulgate ordinances while the Ho:1ses of the Legislature are not in session. He also exercises the sovereign power to grant pardons, reprieves, respite etc. He is vested with the power to summon (972)\n\n1 •\n\nI . ,).._\n\nHARGOVIND v. R. TILAK 973\n\neach House of the Legislature, or to prorogue either House or to dissolve the A legislative assembly and this power may be exercised by him from time to time.\n\nNo bill passed by the Houses of the Legislature can become law untes., it is a&sented to by him and before assenting to the bill he may return the bill, (provided it is not a money bill) to the Houses of Legislature for reconsideration.\n\nHe has the power to reserve for consideration of the President any bill which in. his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by the ConstitutioR B designed to fill. Another important function of his is to make a report to the President where he finds that a situation bas arisen in which the Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is the Governor's report which generaily forms the basis for the President taking action under Art. 356, of the Constitution. These powers and func\n\ntions of the Governor make it clear that he is not an employeeor servant in any sense of the term. [978 H; 979 A-B].\n\n4. Though the Governor is appointed by the President, which means in effect and substance the Government of India, it does not make him an employee or\n\nservant of the Government of India. Every person appointed by the President is not necessarily an employee of the Government of India. [979 G].\n\n5. The fact that the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the PrC8ident does not make the Government of India l'l.Il employer of the Governor.\n\nIt is only a constitutional provision for determination of the term of oftlce of the Governor. The Governor is the bead of the State and bold! a high constitutional office which carries with it important constitutional functions and duties and be cannot be regarded as tlll employee or servant of the Government of\n\nIndia. If the word \"employment\" were construed to mean relationship of E employer and employee, the office of Governor would not be an \"employment\"\n\nwithin the meaning of cl.(d) of Art. 319. [979JI].\n\n6. An employment can be said to be under the Government of India if the holder or incumbent of the employment is under the control of the Govera.ment of India vis-a-vi.Y such employment. If this test is applied to the office of Governor, it is impossible to hold that the Governor is under the control of the Government of India. His office is not subordinate or subservient to the Government of India. He is not amenable to the directions of the Government of India, nor is he accountable to them for the manner in which he carries out\n\nhli: functions and duties. His is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the Government of India.\n\nHe is constitutionally the head of the State in whom is vested the executive power of the State ud without whose assent there can be no legislation in exercise of the legislatiYe power of the State. There can be no doubt that the office of Governor is not an employment under the Government of India and it does not come within the prohibition of Art. 319(d). [981 A-BJ.\n\nPradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Calwtt• Hih Court, [1955] 2 SCR 1331; Baldev Raj Guliani & Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana B High Court & Ors., [1977] I SCR 425; Union of lndla v. S. H. Sheth le Anr., [l 978) I SCR 423; referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil)- No. 1596 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 8·11·1977 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 311/77.\n\nSonmath Chatterjee, Dilip Sinha and K. R. Nambiar for the Petitioner.\n\nF. S. Narima11, (for R. 1), Soli !. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. Genl. (for RR 5 and 6) Dr. S. K. Tewari, S. M. Jain and S. K. Jain for Respondent 1, 5 and 6.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, C. M. Math11r. Manaj Swarup and Miss La/ita Kohli for Respondents 3 and 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J., This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order made by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside an order of reversion passed against him by the 4th re~ pondent in his capacity as the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Rajasthan. The order of reversion was challenged on several grounds, but they were all negatived by the Full Bench and the writ petition was dismissed on a preliminary hearing. The petitioner has raised the same grounds of challenge in this special leave petition, but barring one ground, which calls for a reasoned judgment, we do not think there are any other grounds which require detailed consideration and we reject them in limine. The only ground which needs to be considered . and which we propose to dispose of by this judgment is a constitutional one, namely, whether the appointment of the !st respondent as Governor of Rajasthan is valid. This question becomes material because if it is found that the !st respondent could not be validly appointed as Governor of Rajasthan and his appointment as Governor is invalid, he would not be the Chancellor of the Rajasthan\n\nUniversity and he would have no authority to appoint the 4th respondent as Acting Vice-Chancellor under section 12, sub-section {7) of the University of Rajasthan Act and if the appointment of the 4th respondent as Acting Vice-Chancellor is invalid, the impugned order of reversion made by him would fall. We are, therefore, called upon to consider in this special leave petition whether the appointment of the ht respondent as Governor of Rajasthan is valid. The only ground on which the validity of the appointment has been assailed is that the !st respondent was a member of the Rajasthan Public Service\n\nCommission during 1958-59 and he was, therefore, by reason of Article 319, clause (d) of the Constitution, ineligible for any employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State and since the office of Governor is an employment under the Government of India, the 1st respondent could not validly be appointed to that office.\n\nThis ground raises a question of considerable importance relating to the applicability of Article 319, clause (d) to the office of Governor.\n\nWe shall have to consider the true nature of the office of Governor in order to determine whether it is an employment under the Government of India, but before we do so, we may first have a look at Article 319.\n\nThis Article consists of clauses (a) to (d) and these\n\nclause~. on a combined reading, impose prohibition on holding of any employment under the Government of India or the Government of a\n\nSrate by the Chairman or member of the Union Public Service Commission or a State Public Service Commission on his ceasing to be such Chairman or member.\n\nThis prohibition has been enacted in public interest with a view to ensuring that no allurement is held out to the Chairman or members of the Union Public Service Commission or a State Public Service Commission which would deflect them from the path of rectitude and duly. The Union and State Public Service Commissions are charged inter alia with the duty of advising the Government on various matters relating to civil services and civil posts such as methods of recruitment, appointments, promotions and transfers and disciplinary matters and it is of utmost importance for the efficiency and integrity of the civil services that this duty should be pedormed by the Union and State Public Service Commissions objectively, impartially and without being influenced by any extraneous considerations. The Union and Stile Public Service Commission have vast powers of recruitment to an immense and increasing host of C'JOvernment posts and in a country with considerable unemployment, these powers may l:>e prone to be abused if the office of Chairman and member of the Union and Srate Public Service Commissions is exposed to executive or political pressures.\n\nThe prospect and peril of the executiw or the politician trying to influence overtly or covertly the\n\nChairman and members of the Union and Stte Public Service Commissions by dangling the carrot or holding out the possibility of employment under the Government after the expiry of their term of office may corrupt the integrity of the institution of the Union and State Public Service Commissions. It is true that by and large the Chairman and members of the Union and State Public Service Commissions would be men of proven merit and intergrity and no allurement, howsoever attractive, would deflect them !ram doing their duty without fear\n\nor favour,, but even so, the possibility of obtaining employment under the Government in future may consciously or unconsciously induce them to fall in line with the wishes of the executive or the politician.\n\nThe office of the Chairman and member of the Union and the State Public Service Commissions must, therefore, be zealously kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.\n\nIt was pointed out as far back as 1924 by the Royal Commission on Superior Services in India, popularly called the Lee Commission :\n\n\"Wherever democratic institutions exist, experi1rnce has shown that to secure an efficient civil 'service it is essential to protect it as far as possible from political or personal influence and give it that position of stability and security which is vital to its successful working as the impartial and efficient instrument by which governmentS, of whatever political complexion, may give effect to their policies.\n\nIn countries where this principle has been neglected, and where the 'spoils system' has taken its place, an inefficient and disorganised civil service has been the inevitable result and corrnption has been rampant.\"\n\nIt was as a result of this recommendation that Public Service Com-- missions were set up in the country with the objective outlined by the Lee Commission.\n\nWhen Article 285(3) of the Draft Constitution providing for ineligibility of the Chairman and members of L'le Union and the S•ate Public Service Commissions for future employment under the Government was being debated in the Constituent ASsembly, Dr. Ambedkar pointed out the raison d'etre of that provision in the following words:\n\n\"Now I come to the other important matter relating to the employment or eligibility for employment of the members of the Public Services Commission both the Union and State Public Services Commissions. Members will see that according to Article 285, clause (3), we have made both the Chairman and the Members of the Central Public Services Commission as welJ as the Chairman of the State, Commission and the members of the State Commission, ineligible for reappointment to the same posts : that is to say, once a term of office of a Chairman and Member is over, whether he is a Chair'1lan of the Union Commission or the Chairman of a State Commis- H sion, we have said that he shall not be reappointed.\n\nI think that is a very salutary provision, because any hope that might be held out for reappointment, or continuation in the same\n\n( j\n\n• J ~~ ''>-\n\nappointment, may act as a sort of temptation which may induce the Member not to act with the same impartiality that he is expected to act in discharging his duties.\n\nTherefore, that is a fundamental bar which bas been provided in the draft article.\"\n\nShri H. V. Karnath also spoke in the same strain while adverting to this topic :\n\n\"It is agreed on all hands that the permanent services play an important role in the administration of any country. With the independence of our country the responsil;?ilities of the services have become more onerons. They may make or mar the efficiency of the machinery of administration call it steel frame or what you will-a machinery which is so vital for the peace and progress of the country.\"\n\nx x x\n\n\"If a Member of the Public Service Commission is under the impression that by serving and kotowing to those in power he could get an office of profit under the Government of India or in the Government of a State, then I am sure he\n\nwould not be able to discharge his. functions impartially E or with integrity.\"\n\nx x x x\n\n\"The public here have sometimes been made to feel that family or group interests have been promoted at the expense of the national; and to protect the Ministers against such a charge, it is necessary that the Public Service Commissions mu.•t be kept completely independent of the executive .... \"\n\nIt is, therefore, clw that the Constitntion makers were anxious to insulate the Chairman and members of the Union and State Public Service Commissions from executive or political pressures or influences and to place them beyond the reach of any allurement or temptation which may cloud their judgment and deflect them from doing their duty. The Constitution makers were keen to ensure that the Chairmen and members of the Union and State Public Service Commissions were above reproach, free from coercion and political influence and they could, if necessary, stand up against the executive and defy any political pressure.\n\nIt was with this end in view that the Constitution makers enacted\n\nclauses (a) to (d) of Article 319 prohibiting future employment under the Government of India or under the Government of a State for the Chairmen and members of the Union and State Public Service Commissions.\n\nWe are concerned in this special leave petition only with clause ( d) of Article 319 since the 1st respondent was a member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and it is on account of that fact that it is claimed that he was ineligible to be appointed Governor of Rajasthan.\n\nOause (d) of Article 319 provides : \"On ceasing to hold office---a member other than the Chairman of a State Public Senrice Commission c shall he eligible for appointment as the Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Service Commission or as the Chairman of thot or any other State Public Service Commission, but not for any other employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State\". It is, therefore, obvious that the !st respondent could be appointed Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Sero vice Commission or Chairman of the Rajasthan or any other State\n\nPublic Service Commission, but he was ineligible for any other employment either under the Government of India or under th<e Government of a State. Now, it was not the case of the petitioner that the office of Governor was an employment under the Government of a State and the only question which, therefore, requires to he considered is whether E the office of Governor can he said to be an employment under the\n\nGovernment of India. If it is, then undoubtedly the 1st respondent could not be appointed Governor of Rajasthan and hi\"s appointment would he invalid.\n\nBut we are of the view that howsoever wide and expansive a meaning we may give to the words \"employment . . under the Government of India\",. the office of Governor cannot come within it.\n\nThe tirst question that arises on the applicability of the words \"employment. .. under the Government of India\" is whether the office of Governor is an 'employment' within the meaning of that expression in G clause (d) of Article 319. What is the sense in which that word has been used in this Article ?\n\nSemantically, !he word 'employment' is not a word with a single fixed meaning but it has many connotations. On the one side it may bear the narrow meaning of relationship of employer and employee and on the other, it may mean in its widest connotation any engagement or any work in which one is engaged. If the former be H the 11ense in which the word 'employment' is used in clause (d) of Article 319, the office of Governor would certainly not be an employment,\n\nbecause the Governor of a State is not an employee or servant of any\n\n. .J.\n\n...\n\nHARGOV!ND v. R. T!LAK (Bhagwati, J.) 979\n\none.\n\nHe occupies a high constitutional office with important constitutional functions and duties.\n\nThe executive power of the State is vested in him and every executive action of the Government is required to be expressed to be taken in his name. He constitutes an integral part of the legislature of the State though not in the fullest sense, and is also\n\nvested with the legislative power to promulgate ordinances while the Houses of the Legislature are not in session.\n\nHe also exercises the sovereign power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.\n\nHe is vested with the power to summon each House of the Legislature or to prorogue either House or to dissolve the legislative assembly and this power may be exercised by him from time to time. He is also entitled to address either House of the Legislature or both Houses assembled together and he may send messages to the House or Houses of the Legislature with respect to a bill the~ pending in the legislature or otherwise. No bill passed by the Houses of the Legislature can become law unless it is assented to by him and before assenting to the bill he may return the bill, provided it is not a money bill to the Houses of the Legi'slature for reconsideration. He has also the power to reserve for consideration of the President any bill which in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that court is by the Constitution designed to fill. There is also one highly significant role which he has to play under the Constitution and that is of making a report where he finds that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is the Governor's report which generally fonns the basis for the President taking action under Article 356 of the Constitution. It will be seen from this enumeration of the constitutional powers and functions of the Governor that he is not an employee or servant in any sense of the term.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the Governor is appointed by the President which means in effect and substance the Government of India, but that is only a mode of appointment and it does not make the Governor an employee or servant of the Government of India.\n\nEvery person appointed by the President is not necessarily an employee of the Government of India.\n\nSo also it is not material that the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President : it is a constitutional provision for determination of the term of office of the Governor and it does not make the Government of India an employer of the Goverc\n\nnor. The Governor is the head of the State and holds a high constitu- H tional office which carries with it important constitutional functions and duties and he cannot, therefore, even by stretching the language\n\nto a breaking point, be regarded as an employee or servant of the Government of India. If, therefore, the word 'employment' were construed to mean relationship of employer and employee, the office of Governor would certainly not be an 'employment' within the meaning of clause (d) of Article 319.\n\nBut if we accept the wider meaning of the word 'employment' \"' conn_oting any engagement or any work in which one is engaged, as in the expression 'self-employment'. the office of Governor would clearly be an 'employment' within the meaning of clause (d) of Art. 319. That, however, would not be enough to attract the applicability of this provision. There is a further requirement which is necessary and that is that the employment must be under the Government of India. Now, what is the meaning of this expression \"under the Government of India\"? Fortunately, there are two decisions of this Court which throw some light on this question.\n\nThe first is the decision in Pradyat Kumar Bose v The Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court(') where the question was as to whether the officers and members of the staff of the High Court could be said to be persons \"serving under the Govcrmnent of India or the Government of a State. in a civil capacity\" so as to be within the scope of Article 320(3) (c) which requires consu!tation with the appropriate Public Service Commission in disciplinary matter.s. This Court speaking through Jagannadhadas, J., pointed om : \"the phrase 'a person' serving under the Government of India or the Government of 'a State' it seems to have reference to such persons in respect cf whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Govern .. ments functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor or Olf a Rajpramukh. The officers and staff of the High Court cannot be said to fall within the scope of the above phrase because in respect of them the administrative control is clearly vested in the Chief Justice-\". The question which arose in the other decision in Baldev Raj Guliani & Ors.\n\nv. The Punjab & Haryana High Court & Ors.(') was a similar one and it related to the applicability of Article 320(3) ( c) to Judicial Officern in the State.\n\nHere in this case also the Court took the same view anc, after referring to the earlier decision in Pradyat Kumar Bose's case wit'1 nppiovo?, held ti1at \"just as the High Court staff are rot strving under the Government of the State, the Judicial Officers are al'so not serving under the State Government\", because they arc \"entirely under the jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of control and discipline\".\n\nIt will,\n\n(t) [1955] 2 S. C.R. 1)1!.\n\n(21 [1977] I S. C. R. 425.\n\n• }\n\ntherefore, be seen that the employment can be said to be under the Go- A•\n\nvernmnt of India if the holder or incumbent of the employment is under the control of the Government of India vis-a-vis such employment. Now, if one applies this test to the office of Governor, it is impo'ssible to hold that the Governor is under the control of the Government of India.\n\nHis office is not subordinate or subservient to the Government of India.\n\nB He is not amenable to the directions of the Government of India, nor is he acoountable to them for the manner in which he carries out his functions and duties. His is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the Government of India. He is constitutionally the head of the State in whom is vested the executivt' power of the State and without whose assent there can be no legislation in exercise of the legislative power of the State.\n\nThere can,, therefore, be no doubt that the ollice of Governor is not an employment under the Government of India and it does not come within the prohibition of clause (d) of Article 319.\n\nD We may point out that the Governor of a State is not the only coni; titutional functionary whose employment is not under the Government.\n\nThere are under the Constitution many other high functionaries, such as Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, who do not hold any employment under the Government of India, although they exercise State power.\n\nThis Court, while examining the constitutional position of a High Court Judge, pointed out in the Union of India v. S. H. Sheth & Anr.(') that a High Court Judge is not a Government servant: there is no relationship Of employee and employer subsisting between him and the Government.\n\nHe is a holder of a constitutional office which has important constitutional functions and duties.\n\nOne of us (Bhagwati, J.) pointed out in that case at page 463 of the Report that a High Court Judge :\n\n\" .... is as much part of the State as the executive Government.\n\nThe State has in fact three organs, one exercising executive power, another exercising legislative power and the third exercising judicial power.\n\nEach is independent and supreme within its allotted sphere and it is not possible to say that one• is superior to the other.\n\nThe High Court, constituted of the Chief Justice and other Judges, exercising the judicial power of the State and is coordinate in position and status with the Governor aided and advised by the council of Ministers,\n\n(l) [1978] l S. C.R. 423.\n\nwho exercises the executive power and the Lgislative Assembly together with the Legislative Council, if any, which exercises the legislative power of the State.\n\nPlainly and unquestionably, therefore, a High Court Judge is not subordinate either to the executive or to the legislature..\n\nIt would, indeed, be a constitutional heresy to so regard him. He has a constitutional function to discharge,, \"hich includes adjudication of the question whether the executive or the legislature has overstepped the limits of its power under the Constitution. No doUbt Article 217, cl. ( 1) provides for appointment of a person to the office of a_ High Court Judge by the President, which means in effect and substance the Central Government, but that is only laying down a mode of appointment and it does not make the Central Government an employer of a High Court Judge.\n\nIn fact a High Court Judge has no employer : he occupies a high constitutional office which is coordinate with the executive and the legislative.\"\n\nThese observations apply equally to the office of a J uclge of the Supreme Court.\n\nWe are mentioning this merely to bring home, through comparable constitutional functionaries, the validity of the proposition that holders of high constitutional offices exercising State power and drawing salaries from State coffers may nevertheless be not employes or servants or holders of employment under the Government.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that the office of Govemor of a State is not an employment under the Government of India and it does not, therefore, come within the prohibition of clause (d) of Article 319 and oo this view, the appointment of the 1st respondent as the Governor of Rajasthan cannot be held to be invalid.\n\nWe may point out that in the course of the argument there was much discussion about the paramount public Jx.>licy underlying the need to ban appointment of holders of public offices after retirement to higher office3 and posts under the Government. We do not wish to expand on this policy or to say more on the merits of this contention, but we think it would be appropriate to sound a note of caution that Ceaser's wife must be above suspicion, that purity of public officr:s of high status is a constitutional value in itself, that nothing should be done which may create an impression that a holder of a public office can look forward to a higher appointment after retirement if he pleases the Government of the day and that no appointments should be made which may lend support to the criticism of favourtism or patronage and consequential A weakening of credibility. The confidence of the community in the key instrumentalities is of considerable significance in the maintenance of the rule of law.\n\nThese were the reasons for which we made our order dated 23rd November, 1978 rejecting the special leave petition and confirming the B • order passed by the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court.\n\n' ~\n\n~ ... r-\n\nP.B.R .", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "HARGOVIND PANT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARGOVIND PANT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUKUL TILAK & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUKUL TILAK & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 4, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWAU, I,\n\nS. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 319(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 319fd) of the Constitution provides that on ceasing to hold otliet: a member, other than the Chairman of a State Public Service commission, shall be eligible for appointment as the Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Service Commission or as the Chairman of that or any other State Public Service Commission but not for any other employment either under the Go'Jernment of India or under the Government of a State."}}, {"text": "Go'Jernment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 735, "end_char": 755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 319fd) of the Constitution provides that on ceasing to hold otliet: a member, other than the Chairman of a State Public Service commission, shall be eligible for appointment as the Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Service Commission or as the Chairman of that or any other State Public Service Commission but not for any other employment either under the Go'Jernment of India or under the Government of a State."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan State Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent, who we.s a member of the Rajasthan State Public Service Commission during the years 1958-59, was later appointed as Governor of the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 947, "end_char": 965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent, who we.s a member of the Rajasthan State Public Service Commission during the years 1958-59, was later appointed as Governor of the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Art. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1010, "end_char": 1018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raiasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1669, "end_char": 1678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointment of the first respondent as Governor of Raiasthan could not be held to be invalid. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 319(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2157, "end_char": 2168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4116, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the Governor is appointed by the President, which means in effect and substance the Government of India, it does not make him an employee or\n\nservant of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of\n\nIndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4772, "end_char": 4792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a high constitutional office which carries with it important constitutional functions and duties and be cannot be regarded as tlll employee or servant of the Government of\n\nIndia."}}, {"text": "Art. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4968, "end_char": 4976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 319(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 SCR 1331", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6108, "end_char": 6125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 8·11·1977 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Sonmath Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6483, "end_char": 6501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sonmath Chatterjee, Dilip Sinha and K. R. Nambiar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Dilip Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6503, "end_char": 6514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sonmath Chatterjee, Dilip Sinha and K. R. Nambiar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6519, "end_char": 6532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sonmath Chatterjee, Dilip Sinha and K. R. Nambiar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "F. S. Narima11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6554, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Narima11, (for R. 1), Soli !."}}, {"text": "Soli !. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6582, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Narima11, (for R. 1), Soli !."}}, {"text": "S. K. Tewari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for RR 5 and 6) Dr. S. K. Tewari, S. M. Jain and S. K. Jain for Respondent 1, 5 and 6."}}, {"text": "S. M. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for RR 5 and 6) Dr. S. K. Tewari, S. M. Jain and S. K. Jain for Respondent 1, 5 and 6.", "canonical_name": "S. M. Jain"}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for RR 5 and 6) Dr. S. K. Tewari, S. M. Jain and S. K. Jain for Respondent 1, 5 and 6.", "canonical_name": "S. M. Jain"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6706, "end_char": 6720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, C. M. Math11r."}}, {"text": "C. M. Math11r. Manaj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, C. M. Math11r."}}, {"text": "La/ita Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6759, "end_char": 6771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manaj Swarup and Miss La/ita Kohli for Respondents 3 and 4."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6842, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J., This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order made by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside an order of reversion passed against him by the 4th re~ pondent in his capacity as the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Rajasthan.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "University of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7177, "end_char": 7200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J., This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order made by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside an order of reversion passed against him by the 4th re~ pondent in his capacity as the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7821, "end_char": 7830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent as Governor of Rajasthan is valid."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan\n\nUniversity", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent could not be validly appointed as Governor of Rajasthan and his appointment as Governor is invalid, he would not be the Chancellor of the Rajasthan\n\nUniversity and he would have no authority to appoint the 4th respondent as Acting Vice-Chancellor under section 12, sub-section {7) of the University of Rajasthan Act and if the appointment of the 4th respondent as Acting Vice-Chancellor is invalid, the impugned order of reversion made by him would fall."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8172, "end_char": 8182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Public Service\n\nCommission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8650, "end_char": 8686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent was a member of the Rajasthan Public Service\n\nCommission during 1958-59 and he was, therefore, by reason of Article 319, clause (d) of the Constitution, ineligible for any employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State and since the office of Governor is an employment under the Government of India, the 1st respondent could not validly be appointed to that office."}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8738, "end_char": 8749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9373, "end_char": 9384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stile Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10545, "end_char": 10576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union and Stile Public Service Commission have vast powers of recruitment to an immense and increasing host of C'JOvernment posts and in a country with considerable unemployment, these powers may l:>e prone to be abused if the office of Chairman and member of the Union and Srate Public Service Commissions is exposed to executive or political pressures."}}, {"text": "Royal Commission on Superior Services in India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 12000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out as far back as 1924 by the Royal Commission on Superior Services in India, popularly called the Lee Commission :\n\n\"Wherever democratic institutions exist, experi1rnce has shown that to secure an efficient civil 'service it is essential to protect it as far as possible from political or personal influence and give it that position of stability and security which is vital to its successful working as the impartial and efficient instrument by which governmentS, of whatever political complexion, may give effect to their policies."}}, {"text": "Lee Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12816, "end_char": 12830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was as a result of this recommendation that Public Service Com-- missions were set up in the country with the objective outlined by the Lee Commission."}}, {"text": "Article 285(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12838, "end_char": 12852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ambedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13084, "end_char": 13092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Article 285(3) of the Draft Constitution providing for ineligibility of the Chairman and members of L'le Union and the S•ate Public Service Commissions for future employment under the Government was being debated in the Constituent ASsembly, Dr. Ambedkar pointed out the raison d'etre of that provision in the following words:\n\n\"Now I come to the other important matter relating to the employment or eligibility for employment of the members of the Public Services Commission both the Union and State Public Services Commissions."}}, {"text": "Article 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13403, "end_char": 13414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Public Services Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13482, "end_char": 13516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Members will see that according to Article 285, clause (3), we have made both the Chairman and the Members of the Central Public Services Commission as welJ as the Chairman of the State, Commission and the members of the State Commission, ineligible for reappointment to the same posts : that is to say, once a term of office of a Chairman and Member is over, whether he is a Chair'1lan of the Union Commission or the Chairman of a State Commis- H sion, we have said that he shall not be reappointed."}}, {"text": "H. V. Karnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14275, "end_char": 14288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri H. V. Karnath also spoke in the same strain while adverting to this topic :\n\n\"It is agreed on all hands that the permanent services play an important role in the administration of any country."}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16093, "end_char": 16104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16354, "end_char": 16365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16411, "end_char": 16446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned in this special leave petition only with clause ( d) of Article 319 since the 1st respondent was a member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and it is on account of that fact that it is claimed that he was ineligible to be appointed Governor of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16576, "end_char": 16587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Public Sero vice Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17094, "end_char": 17127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent could be appointed Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Sero vice Commission or Chairman of the Rajasthan or any other State\n\nPublic Service Commission, but he was ineligible for any other employment either under the Government of India or under th<e Government of a State."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan or any other State\n\nPublic Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent could be appointed Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Sero vice Commission or Chairman of the Rajasthan or any other State\n\nPublic Service Commission, but he was ineligible for any other employment either under the Government of India or under th<e Government of a State."}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18153, "end_char": 18164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18626, "end_char": 18637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20868, "end_char": 20879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22172, "end_char": 22183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22444, "end_char": 22452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23177, "end_char": 23191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23325, "end_char": 23338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court speaking through Jagannadhadas, J., pointed om : \"the phrase 'a person' serving under the Government of India or the Government of 'a State' it seems to have reference to such persons in respect cf whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Govern .. ments functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor or Olf a Rajpramukh."}}, {"text": "a Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23659, "end_char": 23671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court speaking through Jagannadhadas, J., pointed om : \"the phrase 'a person' serving under the Government of India or the Government of 'a State' it seems to have reference to such persons in respect cf whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Govern .. ments functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor or Olf a Rajpramukh."}}, {"text": "Article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24049, "end_char": 24063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pradyat Kumar Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24205, "end_char": 24223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here in this case also the Court took the same view anc, after referring to the earlier decision in Pradyat Kumar Bose's case wit'1 nppiovo?,"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S. C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24539, "end_char": 24557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25680, "end_char": 25691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25920, "end_char": 25933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are under the Constitution many other high functionaries, such as Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, who do not hold any employment under the Government of India, although they exercise State power."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26450, "end_char": 26458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us (Bhagwati, J.) pointed out in that case at page 463 of the Report that a High Court Judge :\n\n\" .... is as much part of the State as the executive Government.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27682, "end_char": 27693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27836, "end_char": 27854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) provides for appointment of a person to the office of a_ High Court Judge by the President, which means in effect and substance the Central Government, but that is only laying down a mode of appointment and it does not make the Central Government an employer of a High Court Judge."}}, {"text": "Article 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28737, "end_char": 28748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ceaser", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29272, "end_char": 29278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not wish to expand on this policy or to say more on the merits of this contention, but we think it would be appropriate to sound a note of caution that Ceaser's wife must be above suspicion, that purity of public officr:s of high status is a constitutional value in itself, that nothing should be done which may create an impression that a holder of a public office can look forward to a higher appointment after retirement if he pleases the Government of the day and that no appointments should be made which may lend support to the criticism of favourtism or patronage and consequential A weakening of credibility."}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29927, "end_char": 29946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These were the reasons for which we made our order dated 23rd November, 1978 rejecting the special leave petition and confirming the B • order passed by the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_984_1006_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "CLOTH TRADERS (P) LTD., ETC .\n\nADDL. COMMR. OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT-I, ETC.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\nll [P. N. BHAGWATI, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL. JJ.]\n\nlncome Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961)-Sections 85A & SOM-Whether rebate of income tax admissible on the amount of dividend received bJ the assessee company from an Indian company or whether confined onl}' to divideml income as computed under the Act after making lhe deduction on the interest paid on borrowings for making the investmentJ.\n\nThe earliest provision granting exemption Of super-tax in respect of in.tercorporate dividends was made aB far back as 9th December, 1933 in a Notification issued by the Governor General in Council and it provided as follows :\n\n'The Governor General in Council is plea<:ed to exempt from super-tax.\n\n(i) so much of the income of any investment trust company as is derived from dividend paid by any other company which hm; paid or will pay super-tax in respect of the profits. out of wliich such dividends are paid.\"\n\nThis Notification was followed by a provision of a similar kind granting exemption from super-tax in respect of certain specified categories of inter- E corporate dividends introduced as s. 56A in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nWhen this Act was repealed mid the present Act enacted with effect from 1st April, 1962 s. 99, sub-section (1) was introduced in the present Act exempting\n\ncrtain categories of income from super-tax and one of such catet..-rics was that set out in cl. (iv). Section 99, sub-section (i) cl. (iv) read as follows:\n\n\"99(1) Super Tax shall not be payable by any asse~!lsee in respect of the following amounts which are included in his total income-\n\n(iv) if the assessee is a company, any dividend received by it from an Indian Company, subject to the provi5ions contained in the Fifth Schedule.\"\n\nThis provision continued to be in force upto 31st March, 1965 subject to a minor inconsequentiaJ amendment made by Finance Act, 1964, but by an amendment made by Finance Act 10 of 1965, the provision was omitted and Chapter VI-A and s. 85A were introduced in the present .A.ct with effect from\n\n!st April, 1965. Chapter VIA comprised ss. 80A to SOD providing for certain specified deductions to be made in computing total incomf) while s. 85A pro- I vided for deduction of tax on inter-corporate dividends.\n\nThe original Chapter VIA and certain other sections ind.uding s. 85A were deleted from the present Act by Finance (No, 2) Act, 1967 with effect from !st April, 1968 and replaced by a new Chapter VIA which contains a fasciculus of soctions from s. 80A to s. 80VV. Section 80A, sub-sectioa (!) provides that\n\n(984)\n\n...\n\nCLOTH TRADERS V. C.I.T. 985\n\nin computing the total income of an assessee there shall be allowed from his A gross total income, in occordance with and subject to the provisions of Chapter\n\nVIA, the deductions specified in s. BOC to s. SOVV and sub-section (2) of that section imposes a ceiling on slich deductions by enacting that the aggregate. amount of such deductions shall not, in any case, exceed the gross total income of the essessee. The expression \"gross total income\" is defined in cl. (5) of s.\n\nSOB to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter , VJA or -under s. 280. 0 B Section SOM is the new section which corresponds to the repealed s. 85A and it provides for deduction in respect of certain categories of inter-corporate dividends. There were several amendments made subsequently in this section but they relate primarily to the percentage of the income to be allowed as a deduction.\n\nOne amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968, was that the words C \"received by it\" occurring in sub-section ( l) of s. SOM \\vere omitted with effect from 1st April, 1968. The Finance Act of 1968 also provided in sub-section\n\n(2) and (3) of s. 31 that notwithstanding the omission of s. 99, sub-section (I),\n\ncl. (iv) and s. 85.A, the provisions of these sections shall have and be deemed always to have effect, subject to the modification that the words \"received by it\" in the opening part of these sections were deleted.\n\nThe net effect of these amendments was that the words ''received by it\" following upon the words )) \"'dividend\" were omitted with retrospective effect from s. 99 sub-section (1), cl.\n\n(iv) and s. 85A and s. SOM was to be read as if the words \"received by it\" were not in the opening part of that section.\n\nThe Gujarat High Court having taken a view against the assessees (appellants), appeals were preferred against the judgment relating to the ruisessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when s. 85A was in force.\n\nIn view of the conflict of opinion between the view of the Gujarat High Court, and the view taken by the Bombay, Madras and Calcutta High Courts, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, referred similar matters under s. 257 of the Act to this Court.\n\nIn the appeals and references before this Court, the question was whether\n\non a true interpretation of Sections 85A and SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961, rebate of incme tax is admissible on the actual amount of dividend recetved F by nu nssessee, being a company, from an Indian company, or it is confined only to the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is after making the deductions specified in s. 57 including deductions of the interest paid on borrowings fOr making the investments.\n\nAllowing the appeals and answering the questions referred by the Tribunal in favour of the assessees :\n\nHELD :\n\n1. The assessees are entitled to relief under s. SSA for the assess- G meat years 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68 and under s. 80M for the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 in respect of the entire amount of dividend income without deductions of interest paid on borrowings for acquiring the shares. . .\n\n[1006 BJ\n\n2. Sections 85A and SOM were not written by the Legislature on a clean s!ate,. nor were they the outcome of any new or innovative exercise of legislative Judgment: but they were preceded by similar provisions granting rebate of H supertax or income tax on inter-corporate dividends and these provisions as\n\n7-409SCI/79 : l ·:'''\n\nA interpreted by the Courts throw light on the true meaning and content on ss. SSA and SOM. [991 F].\n\n3. It is clear from the Notes on cl. 31 which subsequently became s. 31 of the Finance Act. 1968, that the amendments retrospectively deleting the words \"received by it'' from the opening part of s. 99, subsection (1), cl. (iv) and s. 85A were made with a view to widening the scope of the relief granted under these sections, as it was felt that the presence of these words might render these sections inapplicable in cases where the shares to which the divi 4 dend relates are registered in the name of a person other than the asscssee and the dividend is, there.fore, received strictly speaking, by such other person and not by the assessee. The object of introducing these am1ndments was to widen the scope of the tax relief provided under s. 99, sub-section (1). cl. (iv) and s. 85A by making it available to the assessee even though the shares tc> which the dividend related were registered in the name of a person other than the assessee and not to narrow it down by restricting it to n~:t dividend computed after making deductions allowable under the provisions Qf the Act.\n\n[99S-&GJ.\n\n4. Even after the deletion. of the words \"received by it\", the~ expressions \"any dividend from an Indian company\" and \"e.ny income by way of dividends from an Indian company\" occurring in the opening part of these sections continue to mean the same thing, namely, the full amount of dividend derived or obtained from an Indian company. The decisions of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts interpreting these sections cannot, therefore, be said to be\n\ndisplaced by the retrospective omission of the words \"received by it.\" (998 H-\n\n999 BJ.\n\nS. It is clear on a plain natural construction of the language of s. 99 subaection (1), cl. (iv), tbe.t it grants exemption from super-tax in respect of\n\n•any dividend from an Indian company\" and these last mentioned words cannot mean anything else than the full amount of dividend derived from an Indian company. They cannot obviously mean dividend fron1 an Indian company minus any expenses incurred in earning it, or less any other deduction allowable under the Act. [999 C-D].\n\n6. The words, \"the following amounts which are included in his total in- J! come\", in the opening part of s. 99, sub-section (1) do not have any limitative effect so as to restrict \"dividend from an Indian Company\" in respect of which 'llo.. exemption from super-tax is granted to dividend computed i11 accordance with • the provisions of the Act and forming part of the total income. The exemption from supertax granted under s. 99 sub-section (1) is not only in respect of \"dividend from an Indian company\" referred to in cl. (iv), but also in respect of other items of income mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) and (v).\n\nG m\n\n7. The legislature clearly wanted to provide that the different categories of income mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) should be eligible for exemption from super-tax, only if they are included in the total income and the Legislature could have made such a provision separately in respect of each category cf income in the opening part of s. 99 sub-section (1), but instead of adopting such legislative device, which would have been both inapt and inelegant, the Legislature chose to use an omnibus expression, \"the follow.ing amounts which are included in his total incomen, which would cover. all the~ different items of income dealt with in clauses (i) to (v). [999 F-G].\n\nCLOTH TRADERS v. C.I.T. 987 .. ' S. It would, therefore, seem that though the exemption from super-tax ,. -granted under clause (iv) of sub-section (i) of s. 99 would be applicable oilly 1f the particular item of income namely, \"dividend from an In_dian company\" is .included in total income, what is exempted is \"dividend from an Indian company\" which can only mean the full amount of dividend received from an Indian company. [1000 BJ.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Kera/a v. South India Bank Ltd., 59 ITR a 763; referred to .\n\n9. Section 85A in its opening part by using the words \"where the tolal income of an asessee . . . . includes any income by way of dividends, from an Indian Company\", lays down a condition for its applicability, which is that the total income must include income by way of divdend from an Indian company. It is only if this category of income forms a component part of total C income that the provisions enacted in the section is attracted and the assessee becomes entitled to rebate on income calculated with reference to the \"income so inc!nded\".\n\n[1001 FJ.\n\n10. The meaning of the section would become clear if the words \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\", are substituted for the words \"income so included.\" Then it would be obvious that the rebate on income D tax is to be calculated by applying the average rate of tnx to the \"income by\n\nway of dividends from an Indian company\" which can only mean the full amount of dividend received from an Indian company, [1002 B-C].\n\n_J.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Indian Guarantee & General Insurance Co.\n\nLtd., 903 ITR 348 approved.\n\n11. There is a close similarity between s. SSA and s. SOM so far as the E opening part of the two sections is concerned, but in the latter part, there is a difference inasmuch as s. 85A provides for calculation of rebate of income tax on ~'income so included\", whiles. SOM provides-for deduction of the whole or part of \"such income by way of dividends\". The language employed by the legislature in s. SOM leaves no doubt that the deduction, whether whole or 60 per cent, is to be calculated with reference to the entire amount of income by way of dividends. [1002 D-E].\n\n12. Section SOM occurs in Chapter VIA which is headed \"Deduction to be made in. computing total income\". The marginal note to the section, indicates, that it provides for deduction in respect of certain inter-corporate dividends. [1002 F, 1003C] .\n\n13. Section 80A sub-section (1) provides that in computing the total income of an aascssee, the deductions specified in s. SOC to SOVV shall be made from his gross total income, and gross total income, according to the definition in s. SOB, cl. (5) means the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter VIA or under s.\n\n2SO.O. What s. SOA, sub-section (I) requires is that first the total income of 1he assessee must be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act without taking into account the deductions required to be made under Chapter VIA or under s. 280.0 and then from the gross total income thus computed, the deductions specified in s. SOC to SOVV must be made in order to arrive 'at the total income. But sub-section (2) of s. SOA provides that the aggregate\n\nA amount of the deductions required to be made under Chapter VIA shall not exceed the gross total income of the assessee so that the total income arrived ait \"\"!--\n\n1.E\n\nafter making the deductions specified in s. SOC to 80VV frorr.t the grOM total income can never be a minus or. negative figure.\n\nThis provision imposing a ceiling on the deductions which may be made under sections SOC lo 80VV clearly postulates that in a given case the aggregate amount of these deductions may exceed the gross total income. [1002 0·1003 B].\n\n14. The words \"where the gross total income of an assesse~: .... includes any income by way of dividends from a domesti.; company\" are intended only to provide that a particular category of income, namely, income by way of dt~1i-·\n\ndends from a domestic company should form a component part of the gros~1 total income. These words merely prescribe a condition for the applicability ef the section namely, that the gross total income must includ~~ the ootegory of income described by the words \"Income by way of dividends from a domestic company\". If the gross total income includes this particular category of income, whatever be the quantum of such income included, the condition would be satisfied and the assessee would be eligible for deduction of the whole or 60 per cent of \"such income\".\n\n[1003 F-G].\n\n15. The words \"such income\" as a matter of plain grammar must be substituted by the words \"income by way of dividends from a do.mestic company\", in order to arrive at a proper construction of the section and if that is done, it would be obvious that the deduction is to be in respect of the whole or 60 per cent of the \"income by way of dividends from a domestic companyn which &an only mean the full amount of dividends received from a domestic compe.ny.\n\nThe deduction permissible under the section is, therefore, to be calculated with\n\nreference to the full amount of dividends received from a domestic company and not with reference to the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after making deductions provided under the Act.\n\n[1004 BC].\n\n16. If the Legislature was of the view that the deduction should not be in respect of the full amount of dividends received from a domestic compan:y, ll but it should only be in respect of the amount of dividend computed after deducting a1!owable expenditnre, the legislatnre would have undoubtedly amCitded s. SOM, sub-section (!) and made its intention quite clea!C. (1005 CJ.\n\n17. The legislature in fact amended s. 80M several tirnes in respect of other ttK1.tters subsequent to the decision of the Bombay lligh Court in the New Great Insurance Co.'s case and the decision of the M'adras High Court in the Madras Auto Service's case, but it did not choose to amend the language employed in s. 80M, subRsection (1) for the purpose of overriding tl1e interpretation placed by the courts. This indicates legislative recognition of the interpretation placed by the Courts on s. S5A and s. SOM. (1005 DEJ.\n\nIS. Section SOK read with rule 20, s. SOMM, s. SON and s. S0.0 which occur_ in the same group of sections as s. &OM, use the same legislative formula as s. SOM and open with the identical words \"where the gross total income Of an assessee-includes any income:· It appears on a plain reading of these sections that the deduction admissible is in respect of the whole of the income\n\nCLOTH TRADERS V. C.I.T. 989\n\nre.ceived by the assessee and not. in respect of the income computed after making the deductio!'s provided under the Act. [1005 F-G]\n\nMadras Auto Service v. Income Tax Officer, 101 ITR 589; approved.\n\nClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 117-118 of 1975. (From the Judgment and Order dated 28-11-1973 of the Gujarat High Court in I.T.R. No. 21 of 1972).\n\nTAX REFERENCE NO. 2 OF 1975\n\n(From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Tribunal Ahmedabad against its order dated 7-7-1973 in LT.A. No. 643\n\n(AHD) /71-72).\n\nTAX REFERENCE NOS. 6-9 OF 1975\n\n(Fr~ the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Tribunal Ahmedabad in R.A.\n\nNos. 103-106/AHD/74-75 arising out of I.T.A. Nos. 946-949iAHD/72-73 for Assessing years 1966-67 to\n\n1969-70). p\n\nTAX REFERENCE NO. 16 OF 1975\n\n(From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Tribunal Ahmcdabad in Refe.rence Application No. 62/ AHD/74-75 arising out of LT.A. No. 580/AHD/72-73).\n\nTAX REFERENCE NO. 18 OF 1975 (From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench in R.A. No. 271/AHD/74-75 arising out of I.T.A. No. 2431/AHD/72-73 decided on 29-7-74 assessment year 1969-70).\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 117-118/75 For the Appellant : Mr. B. Sen, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar .\n\nFor the Respondent : S. N. Kacker, Sol. Gen., B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini .\n\nFor the Interveners: (1) Ramakrishna Sons Ltd. : S. P. Mehta,\n\nT. A. Ramachandran and M/s. J. Ramachandran, (2) M/s. Jardine G Henderson Ltd. : Dr. Debi Pal and D. N. Gupta, . (3) Indore Exporting & Importing Co. Ltd. : Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Prneen Kumar, and ( 4) Keto Investments (P) Ltd. : S. T. Desai, Mrs. A. K. Verma and J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John and Shri Narain.\n\nTAX REFERENCE NO. 2 OF 1975 R \" For the Appellant: S. N. Kacker, Sol. Gen!, S. P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini.\n\nA For the Respondent : F. S. Nariman, I. N. Shroff, and\n\nH. S.\n\nParihar.\n\nFor the Interveners : (1) M/s. Jardine Henderson Ltd.\n\nDr.\n\nDebi Pal and D. N. Gupta, (2) Indore Exporling & Imporling Co.\n\nLtd. : Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar, and B\n\n(3) M/s. Ajay Inv!estment Co. : Praveen Kumar and Miss Bina Gupta.\n\nTAX REFERENCE NOS. 6-9 OF 1975 For the Appellant : F. S. Nariman, I. N. Shroff, and H. S. Parihar.\n\nFor tlze Respondent : S. N. Kacker, Solicitor General, S. P. Nayar 0 and Miss A. Subhashini.\n\nFor the Intervener Central India Industries : Dr. Debi Pal, Miss.\n\nBina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar. •\n\nTAX REFERENCE NO. 16 OF 1975 For the Appellant : Mrs. A. K. Vemm and J. B. Dadachanji, K. J.\n\nD John and Shri Narain.\n\nFor the Respondent : S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl. and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini.\n\nFor the lnterveners-Central India Industries : Dr. Debi Pal, Miss.\n\nBina Gupta and Mr. Paveen Kumar.\n\nTAX REFERENCE NO. 18 OF 1975 For the Appellant : S. P. Mehta, K. C. Patel, Shri Narain, J. B.\n\nDadachanji, Mrs. A. K. Verma and Miss Arti Mehta.\n\nFor the Respondent : Miss A. Subhashini.\n\nFor the Intervener-Central India Industries Ltd : Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This group of appeals and References raises ashort question of construction of sections 85A and SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the present Act).\n\nThe question is whether on a true interpretation of these sections, rebate of income tax is admissible on the actual amount of divident received by an assessee, being a company, from an Indian company, or it is confined only to the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after making the deductions specified H in section 57 including deduction of the interest paid on borrowings for making the investments.\n\nThe Gujarat High Court has taken a view against the assessee while a different view has been taken by the\n\nBombay, Madras and Calcutta High Courts.\n\nThe appeals are preferred by the assessee, namely, Cloth Traders (P) Ltd. against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and they relate to the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when section 85A was in force.\n\nThe Reference before us have been made directly by the Tribunal under section 257 of the Act in view of the conflict of opinion amongst the High Courts.\n\nOut of these References, three are at the instance of the assessees, namely, C. V. Mehta (P) Ltd., M/s. Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd., and H. K. (Investment) Co. Pvt. Ltd. and one is at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat. They relate to different assessment years : assessment year 1969-70 in case of C. V. Mehta (P) Ltd. and Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. and assessment years 1965-66 to 1969-70 in case of H. K. (Investment) Co. Pvt. Ltd.\n\nTI1e interpretation of both sections 85A and 80M is involved in these References since section 85A with some minor alterations made in it from time to time was in force during the assessment years 1965-66 to 1967-68 and section 80M followed upon it with effect from the commencement of the assessment year 1968-69 as part of Chapter IV A.\n\nThough the language of sections 85A and 80M is almost identical, there are some verbal dissimilarities, but as we shall presently point out, they do not make any difference in interpretation so far as the present question is concerned.\n\nWe are concerned in these appeals and References only with the interpretation of sections 85A and 80M but in order to arrive at the true interpretation of these sections, it is necessary to refer briefly to the history of the legislation enacted in these sections, since these sections were not written by the Legislature on a clean slate, nor were they the out come of any new or innovative exercise of legislative judgment, but they were preceded by similar provisions granting rebate of super tax or income tax on inter-corporate dividends and these provisions as interpreted by the courts throw light on the true meaning and content of sections 85A and SOM .\n\nThe earliest provision granting exemption of super-tax in respect of inter-corporate dividends was made as far back as 9th December 1933 in a Notification issued by the Governor General in Council and it provided as follows :\n\n\"The Governor General in Council is pleased to exempt from snper-tax-\n\n(i) s? muh of the income of any investment trust company as 1s derived from dividend paid by any other company\n\nG '\n\nwhich has paid or will pay super-tax in respect of the profits out of which such dividends are paid.\"\n\nThis provision came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of Income Tax v.\n\nIndustrial Investment Trust Co. Ltd. (1) and the question was whether the dividend income exempted from super-tax was the entire income\n\nby way of dividend received by an investment trust company or the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of !be Act, that is, after deducting the expenses incurred in earning it.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay held that the \"dividend income which was exempted under the notification would be the dividend income received by the assessee and not the said income less any further amounts\", because ''the notification must be regarded as a self-contained one and not controlled by any .other provisions of the Act\" and there was \"no\n\nwarrant to construe the word 'Income' in the notification as total income, nor to qualify the dividend income specified in the said notifi cation as the dividend income computed under section 12 of the Act\".\n\nIt was thus held that the entire amount of dividend received by an investment trust company would be exempt from super-tax and not the amount of dividend minus the expenses incurred in earning it. This Notification was followed by a provision of a similar kind granting exemption from super-tax in respect of certain specified categories of inter-corporate dividends introduced as section 56A in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Old Act) by Finance Act, 1953. It is not necessary to make any detailed reference to this provision since there is no decided case which has considered this provision or expressed an opinion upon it.\n\nWhen the old Act was repealed and the present Act enacted with eM'ect from 1st April, 1962, section 99, sub-section (1) was introduced in the present Act exempting certain categories of income from super-tax and one of such categories was that set out in clause (iv).\n\nSection 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) read as follows :\n\n\"99(1) Super-tax shall not payable by an assessee in respect of the following amounts which are included in his total income.\n\n(iv) if the assessee is a company, any dividend received by it from an Indian company, subject to the provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule\".\n\n(I) 67 l. T. R. 436.\n\n'(-\n\nThis provision continued to be in force upto 31st March, 1965 :subject to a minor inconsequential amendment made by Finance Act,\n\n1964. Now a question arose before the High Court of Bombay, in Commissiuner of Income Tax v. Indian Guarantee & General Insurance Co. Ltd. (1) whether the exemption granted under this provision was in regard to the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian company or it was limited to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of total income.\n\nThe argument of the assessee based on the words 'any dividend received by it from an Indian company' was that it was the full amount of dividend received by the assessee which was exempt from super-tax, while the Revenue relying on the words \"amounts which are included in his total income\" contended that it was only the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of total income which was entitled to the benefit cf exemption under this provision. The High Court accepted the contention of the assessee and pointed out that on a plain reading of sub-clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 99 it was clear that the, exemption from super-tax was granted in respect of \"any dividend received by it from an Indian company\" and these last words, according to their plain grammatical construction, could mean only one thing, uamely, the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian company and nothing less. The High Court emphasised the word \"received\" following immediately upon the word 'dividend' and observed that the use of this word also showed that the exemption was in regard to the dividend received and not in regard to the \"dividend received minus the expenses\". Th.e High Court pointed -out that the words \"amounts which are included in his total income\"\n\nin the opening part of section 99 sub-section ( 1) did not have any !imitative effect, but they were used merely as a convenient mode of describing the different items of income set out in clauses (i) to (v) .of that sub-section. Clanses (i) to (v) referred to different items of -\n\nincome which were sought to be exempted from super-tax under subsection (1) of section 99 and it was only if these items of income were included in the total income of the assessee that the question of exemption from super-tax would arise and hence the legislature used the general words \"amounts which are included in his total income\" in the opening part of sub-section ( 1) of section 99 as an omnibus formula to cover these different items. These words according to the High Court wefe descriptive of the items of income included in the .::omputation of the total income and were not indicative of the qnantum\n\n(!) 90 I. T. R. 348.\n\nof the amounts of the different items included in such computation and they did not, therefore, have the effect of cutting down the plain. natural meaning of the words \"any dividend received by it from an.\n\nIndian company\" which represented the quantum of income in respect of which exemption from super-tax was granted under tbe section.\n\nThis view, observed the High Court, not only followed logically and inevitably from the words used in the statutory provision, but was also in consonance with the object of the legislation, which was to prevent donble taxation of the amount of dividend with the view to encouraging investment by companies in the share capital of other companies. It may be pointed out that the same view in regard t0< the construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 99 was. taken by the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v ..\n\nDarbhanga Marketing Co.('')· and it was held that under tbat provision, exemption from super-tax was granted to an assessee in respect of \"any dividend received by it\" which meant the full amount of dividend received by tl1e asscssee and not \"dividend received minus the amount of interest on monies borrowed for earning the same\".\n\nThe Calcutta High Court observed : \"The expressions 'which are included' in his total income' in sub-section ( 1) of section 99 and 'incomes forming part of total income' in the heading are descriptive of tbe items included in the computation of the total income and not indicative of the quantum of the amounts included under the diffe-rent items in the computation of total income.\n\nSuch a construction of these expressions would be in harmony with the obvious meaning of the expression 'dividend received' \".\n\nThe decision of the Bombay High Court in Industrial Investment Trust Co's case\n\n(supra) was. strongly relied upon by the Calcutta High Court in coming to this decision and the view taken by the Calcutta High. Court was noted with approval by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance Co's case (supra).\n\nThe same view was also taken by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madras Motor and General' lnsutance Co. Ltd.(') and it was approved in later decision of the same Court in Madras Auto Service v. Income-tax Officer( 8). It would, thus, be seen that notwithstanding the words \"amounts which are included in bis total income\" in the opening part of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 99, all the three High Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras took the view that the entire amount of dividend' received by the assessee from an Indian Company was exempt from:\n\n(!) 80 L T. R. 723,\n\n(2) 99 I. T, R. 243.\n\n(3) IOI I. T. R, 589.\n\nsuper-tax and the exemptiou was not limited to dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the total income.\n\nSection 99, sub-section (1) however remained in force only upto the close of the assessment year 1964-65 and by an amendment made by Finance Act 10 of 1965, section 99, sub-section (1) was omitted and Chapter VI-A and section 85A were introduced in the present Act with effect from 1st April, 1965. Chapter VI-A comprised sections 80A and 80D providing for certain specified deductions to be made in computing total income while section 85A, in so far as material, provides as follows :\n\n\"85A. DEDUCTION OF TAX ON INTER-CORPO- RATE DIVIDENDS :-Where the total income of an assessee being a company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from an Indian company or a company wbich has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment of dividends (including dividends on preference shares) within India, the assessee shall be entitled to a deduction from the income-tax with which it is chargeable on its total income for any assessment year of so much of the amount of income-tax calculated at the average rate of income-fax on the income so included (other than any such income on which no income-tax is payable under the provisions of this Act) as exceeds an amount of twenty-five per cent thereon; .......... \"\n\nThere were some amendments made in section 85A by Finance Act, F 1966 but they are not material for our present purpose and we need not refer to them.\n\nSection SSA also came to be considered by the Bombay High Court in the New Great l11sura11ce Co's case (supra) because two of the assessment years with which the Bombay High Court was concerned in that case were assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when section 85A was in force.\n\nThe Bombay High Court\n\nG', pointed out that except for some minor verbal changes section 85A was almost in the same terms as section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv), the only real differences being that the exemption granted under section 99, sub-section (!). clause (iv) was in regerd to super-tax, while the deduction allowed under section 85A was in regard to income-tax.\n\nThe same interpretation was, therefore, placed on section HI 85A as in the case of section 99 sub-section ( 1), clause (iv) and it was held that under section 85A, the assessee would be entitled to deduction of income-tax in respect of the whole of the dividend received from an Indian company.\n\nThe expression \"where the total income ........ includes any income by way of dividends\" in the opening part of section SSA was construed as referring to the category of income by way of dividends received from an Indian company so that if this particular category of income is included in the computation of total income, the assessee would be entitled to a deduction of so much of the amount of income tax calculated at the verage rate of incometax ou the \"income so included\" as exceeds an amount of twenty-five per cent of such income.\n\nThe words \"income so included\" were read to mean not the quantum of the \"income by way of dividends\" included in the total income but the income falling within the category of \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\" included in the total income.\n\nThus the view taken by the Bombay High Court was that under Section SSA also, the deduction admissible was in respect of the entire dividend received by the assessee from an Indian 'company and not in respect of dividend income minus deductions allowable under tl1e provisions of the Act in computing the tot;,! incom.e.\n\nThe original Chapter VI-A and certain other sections including section 85A were deleted from the present Act by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967 with effect from !st April, 196S and replaced by a new Chapter VI-A which contains a fasciculous of sections from section SOA to section 80VV. Section SOA, sub-section ( 1) provides that in computing the total income of an assessee there shall be allowed from bis gross total income, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A, the deduction specified in section SOC to section 80VV and sub-section (2) of tba~ _section imposes a ceiling on such deductions by enacting that the aggregate amount of such deductions shall not, in any case, exceed tbe gross total income of the assessee.\n\nThe exl'ression \"gross total income\" is defined in clause (5) of section SOB to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter VI-A or under section 280.0. Section 80M is the new section which corresponds to the repealed section 85A and it provides for deduction in respect of certain categories of inter-corporate dividends. It is the ir.terpretation of this section which constitutes the subject matter of controversy between the parties and hence it would be desirable to set it out in extenso.\n\nThis section has undergone changes from time to time since the date of its enactment and we will, therefore, reproduce it in the form in which it was during the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 being the assessment years with which we are concerned in these cases :\n\n• ), ~'\n\n\"SOM. DEDUCTION IN RESPECT OF\n\nCERTAIN\n\nINTER-CORPORATE DIVIDENDS:\n\n(1) Where the gross total income of an assessee being a company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from a domestic company, there shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the section, be allowed, in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such income by way of dividends of an amount equal to-\n\n(a) where the assessee is a foreign company-\n\n(i) in respeet of such income by way of ends\n\nreceived by it from an Indian company which is not such a company as is referred to in section 1 OB and which is mainly engaged in a priority industry .......... 80% of such income\n\n(ii) in respect of such income by way of dividends other than the dividends referred to in subclause (i) .......... 65% of such income.\n\n(b) where the assessee is domestic company in respect of any such income. by way of dividends ........ 60% of such income.\"\n\nThere were several amendments made subsequently in this section but they relate primarily to the percentage of the income to be allowed as a deduction nd do not hav~ ny bearing on the question of interpretation posed before us. , One amendment is, however, material and that was made by Finance Act 1968 by which the words \"received by it\" occurring in sub-section (1) of section SOM were omitted with effect from 1st April, 1968. The Finance Act of 1968 also provided in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 31 that notwithstanding the omission of section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) and section 85A, the provisions of those sections shall have and be deemed always to have effect, subject to the modification that the words \"received by it\" in the opening part of those sections were deleted.\n\nThe net effect of these amendments was that the words \"received by it\" following upon the word \"dividend\" were omitted with retrospective effect from section 99, sub-section (1), clause {iv) and section 85A and section\n\nSOM wa& to be read as if the words \"received by it\" were not in the opening part of that section.\n\nWe shall presently consider the language of section SOM for the purpose of arriving at its true interpretation, but before we do so, we must refer to an ari:ument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that whatever might have been the interpretation placed on section 99, subsection (1), clause (iv) by the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts and on section 85A by the Bombay High Court, it cannot hold good any more in view of the retrospective deletion of the words' \"received by it\" in the opening part of these sections. The argument was that the decisions of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts\n\nupholding~ view that !he exemption from super-tax under section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) and the deduction of income-tax under section 85A were admissible i'n re<>pect of the entire amount of dividend received by an asses&\"e without any deduction, were based on the words \"received by it\" and since these words were retrospectively omitted, these decisions could no longer be regarded as valid.\n\nWe do not think this contention of the Revenue can be sustained if we have regard to the object a'nd purpose for which the words ''received by it\" were deleted.\n\nIt is clear from the Notes on clause 31 which subsequently became section 31 of the Finance Act, 1968 that the amendments retrospectively deleting the words \"received by it\" from the opening part of section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) and section 85A were made with a view to widening scope of the relief granted under these sections, as it was felt that the presence of these words might render those sections inapplicable in cases where the shares to which the dividend relates are registered in the name of a person other than the assessee and the dividend is, therefore, received, strictly speaking, by such other person and not by the assessee. The object of introducing these amendments was to widen the scope of the tax relief provided under section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) and section 85A by making it available to the assessee even though the shares to which the dividend related were registered in the name of a person other than the assessee and not to narrow it down by restricting it to not dividend computed after making deductions allowed under the provisions of the Act. The omission of the words \"received by it\" does not, therefore, make any difference in the interpretation of section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) and section SSA so far as the present question is concerned. Even after the deletion of the words \"received by it\", the expressions \"a'ny dividend from an Indian company\" and \"any income by way of dividends from an Indian company\"\n\noccurring in the opening part of these sections continue to mean the\n\n• ' <\n\ni '-'} •\n\n• •\n\nCLOTH TRADERS v. C.I.T. (Bhagwati, J.) 999 ' :same thing, namely the full amount of dividend derived or moving A •from an Indian company.\n\nThe decisions of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts interpreting these sections cannot, therefore, be said to be displaced by the retrospective omission of the words ·\"received by it\".\n\nSo far as section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) is concerned, we have no doubt that the interpretation placed cm this provision by the Bombay, CaJcutta and Madras High Courts is correct. The .reasoning given by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance\n\nCo.'s case (supra) is unexceptionable and we find ourselves in agreement with it.\n\nIt is clear on a plain natural construction of the language of this provision that it grants exemption from super-tax iu Tespect of \"any dividend from the Indian company\" and these last mentioned words can'not mean anything else than the full amount of -dividend derived from an Indian company. They cannot obviously\n\nmean dividend from au Indian company minus any expenses incurred in earning it, or less any other deduction allowable under the Act.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the opening part of section 99, sub-section (1) -contains the words \"the following amounts which are included in his total income\", but these words do not have any !imitative effect so as to restrict \"dividend from an Indian company\" in respect of which exemption from super-tax is granted to net dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the total income.. It may be noticed that the ememption from supr-tax granted under section 99, sub-section (1) is not only in respect of \"dividend from an Indian company\" is not referred to in clause (iv), but also in respect of other items of income mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) and (v). The Legislature clearly and understandably wanted to provide that the different categories of income mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) should be eligible for exemption from super-tax only if they are included in the total income and the Legislature could have made such a provision separately in respect of each category of income in the opening part of section 99, sub-section (1), but instead of adopting such legislative device, which would have been both inapt and inelegant, the Legislature chose to use an omnibus expression \"the following amounts which are included in his total income\", which would cover all the different items of income dealt with in clause (i) to (v). These words were introd?ced mere!! to provide that the category of income in respect of which exemption from super-tax is claimed must be included in the total ncome .and they. were not intended to refer to the quantum of\n\nsue~ mcome mclude~ the to:al incom~ for exempting it from supertax. they were descriptive of items of mcome included in the total\n\nincome and were not indicative of the quantum of the amounts included under different items in the computation of the total income.\n\nIt would, therefore, seem that though the exemption from super-tax granted under clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 99 would be applicable only if the particular item of income, namely, \"dividend from an Indian company\" is included in the total income, what is exempted is \"dividend from an Indian company\" which can only mean the full amount of dividend received from an Indian company.\n\nThis view which we are taking is clearly supported by the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. South Indian Bank Ltd.(') where the question was so as to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under section 60A of the old Act which was in the following terms :\n\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by a'n assessee on the interest receivab1e on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Travancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies.\n\nSuch interest shall, however, be included in the total income of the assessee for the purposes of section 16 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\"\n\nThe argument of the Revenue was that the exemption from income tax granted under this notificatio'n was in respect of interest receivable on securities minus the expenses incurred in earning it and not in respect of the entire amount of interest because it was only that amount of interest arrived at after computation in accordance with section 8 of the old Act which was includible in the total income and liable to bear tax and the exemption from tax could, therefore, only be in respect of such amount.\n\nThis argument was negatived by the Court and it was pointed out by Subba Rao, J., that : \"this notification does not refer to the provisions of section 8 of the Income-tax Act at all. It gives a total exemption from income-tax to an assessee in respect of the interest receivable on income-tax free loans mentioned therein. It gives that exemption subject to two conditions, namely, (i) that the interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin, and (ii) that it is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories.\n\nIt includes the said exempted interest in the total\n\n(I) 59 I. T R. 763.\n\n• ).. ) ., ' -\"'- . j\n\n...J.\n\nI • r\n\nJ,.__\n\n., •\n\nincome of the assessee for the purpose of section 16 of the Income1-tax Act Shortly stated, the notification is a self-contained one; it provides an exemption from income-tax payable by an assessee on a particular class of income subject to specified conditions.\n\nTherefore, there is no scope for controlling the provisions of the notification with reference to section 8 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nThe expression \"interest receivable on income-tax free loans\" is clear a'nd unambiguous.\n\nThough the point of time from which the exemption works is when it is received within the territories of the State of Travancore-Cochin, what is exempted is the interest receivable. \"Interest receivable\" ca:n only mean the amount of interest calculated as per the terms of the securities.\n\nIt cannot obvious; y mean i'nterest receivable minus the amount spent in receiving the same.\" It may be noted that the last part of this notification provided for inclusion \"of such interest\", that is, interest in respect of which exemption from tax was granted, in the total income of the assessee and obviously this would have to be done after computation in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of the old Act.\n\nBut even so, it was hdd that the exemption from tax was in respect of the entire amount of interest received on the securities.\n\nThe rea , saning adopted in this decision clearly supports the view we are taking in regard to the construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 99 and we-must hold that the decisions of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts lay down the correct law on the interpretation of this provision.\n\nTu,, next provision we must consider is section 85A which came in the wake of S'ection 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv).\n\nThis section lays down a condition for its applicability in its opening part by using the words \"whc; e the total income of an assessee-i'ncludes any in•\n\ncome by way of dividend from an Indian company\".\n\nThe condition is that the total income must include income by way of dividends from an Indian company.\n\nIt is .only if this category of income from a compo'nent part of total income that the provision enacted in the section is attracted and the ass•, ssee becomes entitled to rebate on income calculated with reference to the \"income so included\". The argument of the Revenue was that the words \"income so included\" must mean the quantum of the income included in the to.ta! income and therefore reba.te. on income tax granted ndcr section 85A can only in respec; of dlVldend mcome computed m accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the total income and not in respect of the full\n\namoun~ ?f dividcn? received by the assessee.\n\nThis argument is, in our opm10n, fallac10us.\n\nIt 1s based on a misreading of the words \"mcome so included\" and ignores the context in which the~ words occur. If the ope'ning part of the section refers to inclusio f th\n\n8-409 SC!/79 n o e\n\nparticular category of income denoted by the words \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\", the words \"so included\" cannot have reference to the quantum of the income included, but they must be held to r::fer only to the category of income included, that is, income by way of dividends from an Indian company.\n\nThe meaning of the section would become clear if we substitute the words \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\" for the words \"income so inclucl; d''.\n\nThen it would be obvious-indeed it would need no argument to hold-that the rebate on income tax is to be calcuiated by applying the average rate of tax to the \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\" which can only mean the full amount of dividend reo;, ived from an Indian company.\n\nThis was the view taken by thz Bombay High Court iu the New Great Insurance Co.'s case and we find ourselves in agreement with it.\n\nWe must now turn to consider section SOM for the purpose of arriving at its true interpretation. There is a close similarity between section SSA and section SOM so far as the opening part of the two\n\nctions is concerned, but when we come to the latter part, we find that there is a difference, inasmuch as section SSA provides for calculation of rebate of income tax on \"income so included\", while section\n\nSOM provides for deduction of the whole or part of \"such incom~ by way of dividends\": Even if there by any doubt or ambiguity in regard to the meaning of the words \"income so included\" in section SSA, though we do 'not think that thre is any scope for such doubt or ambiguity, the language employed by the Legislature in section SOM is much clearer and leaves no doubt that deduction, whether whole or 60 pr cent, is to be calculated with reference to the entire amount of\n\n' income by way of dividends received from a domestic company. Section SOM occurs in Chapter VI-A which is headed \"Deduction to be\n\nmade in computing total income\".\n\nSection SOA, sub-section ( 1) provides that in computing the total income of an assessee, the deductions specified in sections SO C to SO VV shal! be made from his gross total income and gross total income, according to the definition in section SOB, clause (5), means the iota! income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter VI A or under section 280.0. What section SO A, sub-section ( 1) requires is that first the total income of the assessee must be com.puled in accordance with the provisions of the Act without taking into account the deductio'ns required to be made under Chapter VI-A or under section 2SO.O and then from the gross total income thus computed, the deductions specified in sections SO C to\n\nSO W must be made in order to arrive at the total income. But sub-\n\n.\\...\n\n.·~ -t _,, ·~\n\nsection (2) of section 80 A provides that the aggregate amount of the deductions required to be made under Chapter VI-A shall not exceed\n\nth~ gross total' income of the asscssee so that the total income arrived at after making the deductions specified in sections 80 C to 80 VV from the gross total income can never be a minus or negative figure.\n\nThis provision imposing a ceiling on the deductions which may be made under sections 80 C to 80 VV clearly postulate that in a given case the aggregate amount of these deductions may exceed the gross total income.\n\nIt is in the context of this background that we have to determine the true interpPtation of section 80 M, which, as the marginal note indicates, provides for deduction in respect of certain intercorporate dividends.\n\nSection 80 M, sub-section ( 1) opens with the words \"Where the gross total income of an assesseeincludes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company\". and proceeds to say that in such a case there shall be allowed in computing the total income of the assessee a deduction \"from such income by way of dividends\" of an amount equal to the whole of such income or 60 per cent of such income, as the case may he, depending on the nature of the domestic company from which the income by way of dividends is received.\n\nNow the words \"such income by way of dividends'\" must . be referable to the income by way of dividends mentioned earlier and that would be income by way of dividends from a domestic company which is included in the gross total income. The whole of such income that is, income by way of dividends from domestic company or 60\n\nper cent of such income, as the case may be, would be deductible from the gross total income for arriving at the total income of the assessee. The words \"where the gross total income of an assessee .... includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" are intended only to provide that a particular category of income, namely, income by way of dividends from a domestic company, should form a component part of the gross total income.\n\nThese words merely prescribe a condition !or the applicability of the section, namely, that the gross total i\"ncome must include the category of income described by the words \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company.\" I! .the gross total income includes this particular category of income, whatever be the quantum of such income included, the codition would be satisfied and the assessee would be eligible for deduction of the whole or 60 per cent of \"such income\".\n\nNow ii the words \"where the groos total income of an assessee-include~ any income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" in the\n\nopning part of the section refer only to tl1e inclusion of the category of mco.me denote~, by the words \"income by way of dividends from a domesttc company and not to the quantum of the income so included ,\n\nthe words \"such income\" yannot have reference to the quantum of the income included, but they must be held referable only to the category of the income included, that is, income by way of dividends from a domestic company.\n\nThe words \"such income'' as a matter of plain grammar must be substituted by the words \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" in order to arrive at a proper construction of the section and if that is done, it would be obvious that the deduction is to be in respect of the whole or 60 per cent of the \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" which can only mean the full amount of dividends received from a domestic company.\n\nThe deduction permissible under the section is, therefore, to be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividends received from a domestic company and not with reference .to the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after making deductions provided under the Act.\n\nThis was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Madras Auto Service v. Income-tax Officer, Madras(') and it meets with our approval. It is true that the Gujarat High Court has taken a contrary view in Cloth Traders Pvt.\n\nLtd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, Gujarat, which is the subject matter of Civil Appeals Nos. 117 and 118 of 1975, but we think it proceeds on an erroneous interpretation of the language of section 80M, sul>Csection ( 1 ) .\n\nTt wrongly construes the words \"such income\" to be referable to the quantum of income includible in the gross total income, overlooking the fact that the opening words in the section, namely, \"where the gross total income of an assessee-includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" refer only to the inclusion of the category of income by way of dividend from a domestic company and they are not indicative of the quantum of the income included in the gross total income. It is true that on this view the deduction in respect of the income by way of dividends from a company falling within cl. (a) of sub-section ( 1) of s. 80M may exceed the quantum of such income included in the gross total income, but that possibility is indeed contemplated and taken care of by section 80A, sub-section (2) which provides that the aggregate amount of the deductions shall not in any case exceed the gross total income of the assessee.\n\nWe may point out that even though the consistent view taken by the Bombay, Madras and Calcutta High Courts in regard to the interpretation of section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) was that the exemption from super-tax under that provision was admissible in respect of\n\n(I) IOI J. T. R. 589.\n\nthe full amount of dividends received from an Indian company and was not limited to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of total income and the same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the New Gredt Insurance Co. case, (supra) in regard to the interpretation of s. SSA which contained the opening words \"where the total income of an assessee--includes any income by way of dividends from an Indian company\", similar to the opening words in sub-section (1) of section SOM and the Madras High Court aiso placed the same interpretation on section SOM, sub-section\n\n( 1) in Madras Auto Service case (supra), the legislature did not choose to make any amendment in the language of 'section SOM, sub-section ( 1) with a view to setting at naught this judicial interpretation. If the legislature was of the view that the deduction should not be in respect of the full aniount of dividends received from a domestic company, bnt it should only be in respect of the amCYU11t of dividends computed after deducting allowable expenditure, we have no doubt that the legislature would have amended section SOM, sub-section ( 1) and made its intention quite clear.\n\nThe legislature in fact amended 'section\n\nSOM several times in respect of other matters subsequent to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the New Great Insurance Co.'s case and the dedsion of the Madras High Court in the Madras Auto Service's case, but it did not choose to amend the language employed in s. SOM, sub-s. ( 1) for the purpose of overriding the interpretation placed by the courts.\n\nThis would seem to indicate legislative recognition of the interpretation placed by the courts on s. SSA and s. SOM and it is a circumstance, though not of much weight, which lends support to the view we are, taking iri regard to the interpretation of s. SOM.\n\nWe may also in this connection refer to section SOK read with Rule 20, section SO MM, section SO N and section 80 0 which occur in the same group of sections as section SO-M.\n\nThese sections use the same legislative formula as section SO-M and open with the identical words\n\n\"where the gross total income of an assessee ........ includes any income ...... \". It appears on a plain reading of , these sec ions that the deduction admissible is in respect of the whole of the income re- <:eived by the assessee and not in respect of the income computed after making the deductions provided under the Act.\n\nVide Madras Auto Service case (supra) and_ Additional Commissioner qf Income Tax v.\n\nIsthmian India Maritime P. Ltd. (1').\n\nWe derive considerable support for our view from the analogy of these sections.\n\n(I) (1978) 113 I. T. R. 570 (Mc.d.)\n\nWe, therefore, allow Civil Appeals Nos. 117 and 118 of 1975 and answer the question referred to the Tribunal in those appeals in favour of the assessee and against the Re'venue.\n\nThe questions referred by the Tribunal in Tax Reforences Nos. 2, 6 to 9, 16 and 18 of 1975 are also answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.\n\nWe hold that the assessees in these appeals and References are entitled to relief under section 85A for the assessment years 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68 under section SOM for the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 in respect of the entire amount of the dividend income without deduction of interest paid on borJ\"owings for acquiring the shares.\n\nThe Commissioner will pay the costs of the appeals and the references to the respective assessees.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 231, "entities": [{"text": "CLOTH TRADERS (P) LTD.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CLOTH TRADERS (P) LTD., ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ADDL. COMMR. OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT-I, ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ADDL. COMMR. OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT-I, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 87, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 4, 1979\n\nll [P. N. BHAGWATI, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "9th December, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lncome Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961)-Sections 85A & SOM-Whether rebate of income tax admissible on the amount of dividend received bJ the assessee company from an Indian company or whether confined onl}' to divideml income as computed under the Act after making lhe deduction on the interest paid on borrowings for making the investmentJ.\n\nThe earliest provision granting exemption Of super-tax in respect of in.tercorporate dividends was made aB far back as 9th December, 1933 in a Notification issued by the Governor General in Council and it provided as follows :\n\n'The Governor General in Council is plea<:ed to exempt from super-tax."}}, {"text": "s. 56A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1200, "end_char": 1227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st April, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1302, "end_char": 1317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this Act was repealed mid the present Act enacted with effect from 1st April, 1962 s. 99, sub-section (1) was introduced in the present Act exempting\n\ncrtain categories of income from super-tax and one of such catet..-rics was that set out in cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1318, "end_char": 1323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1488, "end_char": 1498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Fifth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1806, "end_char": 1820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1869, "end_char": 1885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision continued to be in force upto 31st March, 1965 subject to a minor inconsequentiaJ amendment made by Finance Act, 1964, but by an amendment made by Finance Act 10 of 1965, the provision was omitted and Chapter VI-A and s. 85A were introduced in the present .A.ct with effect from\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1939, "end_char": 1956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2057, "end_char": 2063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "ss. 80A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2260, "end_char": 2266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2394, "end_char": 2400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "s. 80A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2576, "end_char": 2582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "s. 80V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "Section 80A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2595, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1964", "statute": "Finance Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "s. 280", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3300, "end_char": 3306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3377, "end_char": 3383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st April, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3789, "end_char": 3804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968, was that the words C \"received by it\" occurring in sub-section ( l) of s. SOM \\vere omitted with effect from 1st April, 1968."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3875, "end_char": 3880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3918, "end_char": 3923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3956, "end_char": 3961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gujarat High Court having taken a view against the assessees (appellants), appeals were preferred against the judgment relating to the ruisessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when s. 85A was in force."}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "One amendment that was made by Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "Bombay, Madras and Calcutta High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4774, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the conflict of opinion between the view of the Gujarat High Court, and the view taken by the Bombay, Madras and Calcutta High Courts, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, referred similar matters under s. 257 of the Act to this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5035, "end_char": 5066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5356, "end_char": 5361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Sections 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6538, "end_char": 6544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7050, "end_char": 7055, "source": "regex", 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Verma and Miss Arti Mehta."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19569, "end_char": 19577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This group of appeals and References raises ashort question of construction of sections 85A and SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the present Act)."}}, {"text": "sections 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19661, "end_char": 19673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19678, "end_char": 19709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20115, "end_char": 20125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Cloth Traders (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20410, "end_char": 20432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are preferred by the assessee, namely, Cloth Traders (P) Ltd. against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and they relate to the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when section 85A was in force."}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20545, "end_char": 20556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20642, "end_char": 20653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "SOM of the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "C. 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Pvt."}}, {"text": "sections 85A and 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21220, "end_char": 21240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21279, "end_char": 21290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21412, "end_char": 21423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 85A and 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 85A and 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21850, "end_char": 21870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22409, "end_char": 22421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th December 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22552, "end_char": 22569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest provision granting exemption of super-tax in respect of inter-corporate dividends was made as far back as 9th December 1933 in a Notification issued by the Governor General in Council and it provided as follows :\n\n\"The Governor General in Council is pleased to exempt from snper-tax-\n\n(i) s?"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23023, "end_char": 23043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of Income Tax v.\n\nIndustrial Investment Trust Co. Ltd. (1) and the question was whether the dividend income exempted from super-tax was the entire income\n\nby way of dividend received by an investment trust company or the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of !"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23948, "end_char": 23958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24354, "end_char": 24365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24373, "end_char": 24400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24445, "end_char": 24462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1953", "statute": "Finance Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24903, "end_char": 24913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1953", "statute": "Finance Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Fifth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25220, "end_char": 25234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1953", "statute": "Finance Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25381, "end_char": 25392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27173, "end_char": 27183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27512, "end_char": 27522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27813, "end_char": 27823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28866, "end_char": 28876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28895, "end_char": 28914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "taken by the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v ..\n\nDarbhanga Marketing Co.('')· and it was held that under tbat provision, exemption from super-tax was granted to an assessee in respect of \"any dividend received by it\" which meant the full amount of dividend received by tl1e asscssee and not \"dividend received minus the amount of interest on monies borrowed for earning the same\"."}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29401, "end_char": 29411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29817, "end_char": 29834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Bombay High Court in Industrial Investment Trust Co's case\n\n(supra) was."}}, {"text": "Industrial Investment Trust Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29838, "end_char": 29868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Bombay High Court in Industrial Investment Trust Co's case\n\n(supra) was."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29991, "end_char": 30005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "strongly relied upon by the Calcutta High Court in coming to this decision and the view taken by the Calcutta High."}}, {"text": "New Great Insurance Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30064, "end_char": 30086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was noted with approval by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance Co's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30140, "end_char": 30157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was also taken by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madras Motor and General' lnsutance Co. Ltd.(') and it was approved in later decision of the same Court in Madras Auto Service v. Income-tax Officer( 8)."}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30492, "end_char": 30502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30539, "end_char": 30545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would, thus, be seen that notwithstanding the words \"amounts which are included in bis total income\" in the opening part of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 99, all the three High Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras took the view that the entire amount of dividend' received by the assessee from an Indian Company was exempt from:\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30547, "end_char": 30555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would, thus, be seen that notwithstanding the words \"amounts which are included in bis total income\" in the opening part of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 99, all the three High Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras took the view that the entire amount of dividend' received by the assessee from an Indian Company was exempt from:\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30560, "end_char": 30566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would, thus, be seen that notwithstanding the words \"amounts which are included in bis total income\" in the opening part of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 99, all the three High Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras took the view that the entire amount of dividend' received by the assessee from an Indian Company was exempt from:\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30905, "end_char": 30915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31062, "end_char": 31072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31123, "end_char": 31134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31187, "end_char": 31202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 99, sub-section (1) however remained in force only upto the close of the assessment year 1964-65 and by an amendment made by Finance Act 10 of 1965, section 99, sub-section (1) was omitted and Chapter VI-A and section 85A were introduced in the present Act with effect from 1st April, 1965."}}, {"text": "sections 80A and 80D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31227, "end_char": 31247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31334, "end_char": 31345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31732, "end_char": 31737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter VI-A comprised sections 80A and 80D providing for certain specified deductions to be made in computing total income while section 85A, in so far as material, provides as follows :\n\n\"85A. DEDUCTION OF TAX ON INTER-CORPO- RATE DIVIDENDS :-Where the total income of an assessee being a company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from an Indian company or a company wbich has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment of dividends (including dividends on preference shares) within India, the assessee shall be entitled to a deduction from the income-tax with which it is chargeable on its total income for any assessment year of so much of the amount of income-tax calculated at the average rate of income-fax on the income so included (other than any such income on which no income-tax is payable under the provisions of this Act) as exceeds an amount of twenty-five per cent thereon; .......... \"\n\nThere were some amendments made in section 85A by Finance Act, F 1966 but they are not material for our present purpose and we need not refer to them."}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32186, "end_char": 32197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32557, "end_char": 32568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32665, "end_char": 32676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32709, "end_char": 32719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32816, "end_char": 32826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32919, "end_char": 32930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33044, "end_char": 33054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33112, "end_char": 33123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34442, "end_char": 34453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April, 196S", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34538, "end_char": 34549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April, 196S and replaced by a new Chapter VI-A which contains a fasciculous of sections from section SOA to section 80VV."}}, {"text": "section 80V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34646, "end_char": 34657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34909, "end_char": 34920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 280", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35337, "end_char": 35348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35352, "end_char": 35363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35417, "end_char": 35428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36576, "end_char": 36585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37220, "end_char": 37236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37433, "end_char": 37443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act 1968", "statute": "Finance Act 1968"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37481, "end_char": 37491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act 1968", "statute": "Finance Act 1968"}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37526, "end_char": 37537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act 1968", "statute": "Finance Act 1968"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37883, "end_char": 37893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act 1968", "statute": "Finance Act 1968"}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37928, "end_char": 37939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act 1968", "statute": "Finance Act 1968"}}, {"text": "SOM", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37953, "end_char": 37956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The net effect of these amendments was that the words \"received by it\" following upon the word \"dividend\" were omitted with retrospective effect from section 99, sub-section (1), clause {iv) and section 85A and section\n\nSOM wa& to be read as if the words \"received by it\" were not in the opening part of that section."}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38308, "end_char": 38318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38402, "end_char": 38413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38717, "end_char": 38727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38796, "end_char": 38807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39257, "end_char": 39266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39293, "end_char": 39303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39311, "end_char": 39328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39426, "end_char": 39436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39471, "end_char": 39482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39981, "end_char": 39991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40026, "end_char": 40037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1968", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40437, "end_char": 40447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41146, "end_char": 41156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay, CaJcutta and Madras High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41274, "end_char": 41313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as section 99, sub-section (1), clause (iv) is concerned, we have no doubt that the interpretation placed cm this provision by the Bombay, CaJcutta and Madras High Courts is correct."}}, {"text": "New Great Insurance\n\nCo.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41375, "end_char": 41399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .reasoning given by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance\n\nCo.'s case (supra) is unexceptionable and we find ourselves in agreement with it."}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41976, "end_char": 41986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42420, "end_char": 42430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42983, "end_char": 42993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43911, "end_char": 43921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44428, "end_char": 44446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view which we are taking is clearly supported by the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. South Indian Bank Ltd.(') where the question was so as to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under section 60A of the old Act which was in the following terms :\n\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by a'n assessee on the interest receivab1e on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Travancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies."}}, {"text": "section 60A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44453, "end_char": 44464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44665, "end_char": 44675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view which we are taking is clearly supported by the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. South Indian Bank Ltd.(') where the question was so as to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under section 60A of the old Act which was in the following terms :\n\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by a'n assessee on the interest receivab1e on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Travancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44707, "end_char": 44713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view which we are taking is clearly supported by the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. South Indian Bank Ltd.(') where the question was so as to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under section 60A of the old Act which was in the following terms :\n\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by a'n assessee on the interest receivab1e on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Travancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies."}}, {"text": "Travancore- Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44794, "end_char": 44812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view which we are taking is clearly supported by the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. South Indian Bank Ltd.(') where the question was so as to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under section 60A of the old Act which was in the following terms :\n\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by a'n assessee on the interest receivab1e on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Travancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45009, "end_char": 45019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45027, "end_char": 45054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45396, "end_char": 45405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45633, "end_char": 45642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument was negatived by the Court and it was pointed out by Subba Rao, J., that : \"this notification does not refer to the provisions of section 8 of the Income-tax Act at all."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45710, "end_char": 45719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45727, "end_char": 45741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Travancore- Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46013, "end_char": 46040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It gives that exemption subject to two conditions, namely, (i) that the interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore- Cochin, and (ii) that it is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46289, "end_char": 46299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46609, "end_char": 46618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46626, "end_char": 46640, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46851, "end_char": 46868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the point of time from which the exemption works is when it is received within the territories of the State of Travancore-Cochin, what is exempted is the interest receivable. \""}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47418, "end_char": 47427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47723, "end_char": 47733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47924, "end_char": 47935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48743, "end_char": 48754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 280", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51558, "end_char": 51569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51820, "end_char": 51830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52037, "end_char": 52047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52277, "end_char": 52288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52446, "end_char": 52457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52677, "end_char": 52687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52802, "end_char": 52812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56328, "end_char": 56339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 80M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57004, "end_char": 57010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57150, "end_char": 57161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57450, "end_char": 57460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "New Gredt Insurance Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57854, "end_char": 57877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the full amount of dividends received from an Indian company and was not limited to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of total income and the same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the New Gredt Insurance Co. case, (supra) in regard to the interpretation of s. SSA which contained the opening words \"where the total income of an assessee--includes any income by way of dividends from an Indian company\", similar to the opening words in sub-section (1) of section SOM and the Madras High Court aiso placed the same interpretation on section SOM, sub-section\n\n( 1) in Madras Auto Service case (supra), the legislature did not choose to make any amendment in the language of 'section SOM, sub-section ( 1) with a view to setting at naught this judicial interpretation."}}, {"text": "may also in this connection refer to section SOK read with Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59481, "end_char": 59544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59581, "end_char": 59591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We may also in this connection refer to section SOK read with Rule", "statute": "We may also in this connection refer to section SOK read with Rule"}}, {"text": "Vide Madras Auto Service", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60081, "end_char": 60105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Madras Auto Service case (supra) and_ Additional Commissioner qf Income Tax v.\n\nIsthmian India Maritime P. Ltd. (1')."}}, {"text": "Isthmian India Maritime P. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60166, "end_char": 60197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Madras Auto Service case (supra) and_ Additional Commissioner qf Income Tax v.\n\nIsthmian India Maritime P. Ltd. (1')."}}, {"text": "section 85A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60751, "end_char": 60762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1002_1006_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "UNION OF INDIA v.\n\nSURJIT SINGH ATWAL\n\nJanuary 18, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKAR!A AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nFfear-Plea of 11on-con1plia11ce with the prvvi_\\i,_ins of Section 175\\3) of the Govt. of India Act, 1935 is a n1ixed plea of fact and law-A plea not having hf'f.12 so pleaded in the. writtl'll state111ent and any i.1.11u' not having been so rai.1cd with regard to it, cannot be allowed later.\n\nPleadings-Denial of a contract-Civil I'rocedure Code, 1908 (Act V of 1908), Order VI Rule 8 and Order Vl/l Rule 2 scope of.\n\nThe respondent-plaintifI undertook the construction of a hard Runway, taxi tracks and dispersal roads at Dalbhumghar Aerodrome, pursuant to a formal \\Vritten agreement with appellant.\n\nThe respondent completed the work.\n\nAt a subsequent conference, it \\Vas agreed that the total amount of the final bill prepared in accordance \\vi th the agreed rates less a sum of Rs. 50,000 /- should be paid forthwith and the balance of Rs. 50,000/- should be paid two weeks thereafter.\n\nOn the appella.nt's failur'e to make the payme\\1t of Rs. 50,000/-, the respondent filed a suit on the original side of the High Court of Calcutta to recover the said sum together with interest.\n\nThe suit was dismissr-0 by a single judge but on appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.\n\nE Dismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court,\n\nHELD: 1. A plea of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 175(3} of the GoverTJment of India Act, 1935 is a mixed plea of fact and law. [1006 B]\n\n2. The plea of illegality of an agreement. not having been so pleaded in the \\vrilten statement and no issue having been raised \\Vith regard to it cannot be allowed lf,1ter.\n\nTo permit such a plea to be raised several years after the institution of the suit would greatly prejudice the plaintiff.\n\nIf such a plea had been raised, in the instant case, at th'e appropriate stage, the respondent-plaintiff might have come out with a suitable answer.\n\nHe might have had his ov.rn pleadings amended either by seeking to rest his case on the original agreement or under Section 65 or 70 of the Contract 1\\ct. f1005 G-H, 1006 A]\n\n3. The illegality of a contract must be specifically pleaded as much as the denial of a contract.\n\nUnder Order VJ, Rule 8 of C.P.C., where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the nrn~ by the opposite party hall ba construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract alleged or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied, and not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract.\n\nAnd, under Order VTIJ, Rule 2 C.P.C., the defendant must raise by the pleading all matters which show the suit not to be maintainable or that the transaction is either void or voidable ; n noint of law. [1006 B-Dl\n\nKalyanpur Lhne Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Anr. [1954] S.C.R. 958: referred lo.\n\n• • •\n\n• •\n\nUNION v. s. s. ATWAL (Chinnuppa Reddy, J.) 1003\n\nCtVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2053 of 1969.\n\nFrom th,, Judgment and Decree dated 16-7-68 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 199-A of 1964.\n\nR. B. Bhatt, E. C. Agarwala and Girish Chandra for the Appellant.\n\nH. B. Datar and Ashok Grover for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of. the Court :was delivered by\n\nCHINKAPPA REDDY, J.-Not content with raising a false plea, the appellant, Union of India has preferred this appeal on a technical ground.\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff undertook the construction of a hard Runway, Taxi tracks and dispersal roads at Dalbhumghar Aerodrome. There was a formal written agreement between the parties (Agreement No : A-Vll/96 of 1944-45).\n\nThe respondent completed the work in 1945.\n\nThe agreement provided for the work to be done \"with stone at site\".\n\nAs no stone was available at the site, stone had to be obtained by blast• ing a rock in a hillock. The rates stipulated in the agreement were on the basis that stone was available at site and not on the basis that stone had to be obtained by blasting rock.\n\nSome of the rates, therefore, required revision.\n\nThere was a conference between the parties in November, 194 7.\n\nOn the side of the Government the Superintending Engineer, the Executive Engineer and the Deputy Accountant General were present. In respect of fourteen items of work the old rates were not altered.\n\nIn respect of ten items of work only the rates were altered.\n\nOut of these ten items, rates were substantially increased for nine items but slightly decreased lot one item.\n\nThe rates agreed between the parties at the conference were the very rates which had been previously fixed by a Government Engineer named Ramani Roy and 'suggested to the plaintiff by the Superintending Engineer for his acceptance.\n\nThe plaintiff initially objected to the rates but withdrew his objections at the conference.\n\nIt was agreed that the total amount of the final bill prepared in accordance with the agreed rates, less a sum of Rs. 50,000/-, should be paid forthwith and the balance of Rs. 50,000 / should be paid two weeks thereafter.\n\nAs agreed the amount of the final bill, less Rs. 50,000/-, was paid but not the sumo( Rs. 50,000/-.\n\nThe sum of Rs. 50,000/- was not paid despite repeated demands by the plaintiff.\n\nThe plaintiff therefore, filed suit No. 531 of 1951 on the original side of the High Court of Calcutta on 24th January, 1951 to .recover the sum of Rs. 50,000/- together with interest.\n\nIn the plaint, as filed originally, the plaintiff stated that it was agreed that the work should be done by the plaintiff on the terms and conditions\n\nmentiGned in certain letters that passed between the parties.\n\nNo re. ference to the written agreement was initially made in the plaint but by a later amendment reference was also made to the agreement No. A-VII/ 96. 1 he plaintiff further state<) in the plaint that after the completion of the work there was a conference in November, 1947 at Calcutta and an agreement was arrived at between the parties regarding the ra 'es at which the plaintiff was to be paid for the work executed by him.\n\nHe claimed that in accordance with the terms of the agreement arrived at in November, 1947, he had yet to be paid a sum of Rs. 50\"000/-.\n\nAs we said earlier, the 'suit was filed on 24th January, 1951.\n\nThe defendant, Union of India, filed a written statement on 1st February, 1956, five years after the filing of the suit.\n\nThe contract for the execution of the work was admitted.\n\nThe completion of the work was admitted.\n\nThe conference alleged by the plaintiff to have been held in November 1947 was denied.\n\nThe agreement said to have been arrived at the conference was also denied.\n\nThese denials have been found to be false by the Courts below and the learned Counsel for the appellant had to admit before, us that the denial was 'unfortunate'.\n\nIt is u matter not merely of surprise but of shock to us that such a blatant false plea should have been raised by a Government in solemn proceedings before Court of law.\n\nFar from setting an example as an ideal litigant, we notice that such false and untenable pleas are often raised on behalf of the Government.\n\nThis is a matter which needs looking into by the authorities that are concerned with it and we earnestly hope that some suitable remedial action will be taken to avoid such pleas.\n\nTo continue the story, no plea was taken in the written statement that the contract between the parties was hit by any failure to comply with the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Governmeut of India Act, 1935.\n\nMore than a dozen years after the institution of the suit and eight years after the filing of the written statement, an application for amendment of the written statement was filed on 25th April, 1964, to enable the defendant to raise the plea that the contract was hit by the failure to comply with the provisions of Section !75(31 of the Govt. of India Act. J 935.\n\nThe application was dismissed on 1st May, l 964, but it was observed that the defendant was entitled to raise the plea sought to be raised by the amendment even without an amendment. Thereafter the suit proceeded to trial. Mr. Justice Mallick who tried the case decided in favour of the plaintiff on the several questions of fact which were raised.\n\nA question regarding compliance with the provisions of Section 80 Civil Procedure Code was also decided in favour of the plaintiff. He, however, held that the suit was based not on Agreement\n\n• •\n\n' ..\n\nUNION v. s. s. ATWAL (Chinnappa Reddy, I.)\n\nI 005\n\nNo. A-VII/96 of 1944-45 but on the agreement arrived at between the parties in November, 1947, that this agreement was bad for non compli1nce wit!: the requirements of Section 17 5 ( 3) of the Govt. of India Act 1935, and that the suit had, therefore, to be dismissed. On the basis of the finding that the 1947 agreement .-ms bad for non compliance with the requirements of Section 175(3) o: the Govt. of India Act, l 935, the learned Judge also held that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit wai accordingly dismissed.\n\nOn appeal, a Division Bench of the Calcutta Bigh Co•irt consisting uf A. N. Ray and S. K. Mukherjee, JJ., held that the defendant not having pleaded in the written statement that the cont\"act contravened the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act there being no issue with regard to Section 175(3), the learned Single Judge was wrong in entertaining such a plea, at that belated stage. It was observed that the request for amendment of the written statement was made thirteen years after the institution or the suit and that the plaintiff was greatly prejudiced by such a plea being entertained. ft was also held by the Division Ber.ch that there was no new egreement in November i947.\n\nAll lrat was done in November 1947 was to settle the rates for \"additional or substituted work\" as provided in clauses 12 and 12-A of the original agreement.\n\nIn view of their conclusion that the plea regarding the invalidity of the agreement should not have been entertained by the learned single Judge, !he Division Bench ldd that the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suil.\n\nThe appeal was allowed a11d a decree was granted for Rs. 50,000/- with interest from the date of judgment.\n\nThe Union of India has preferred this appeal pursuant to a certificate granted under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution of India (as it stood prior to the 30th amendment) .\n\n5hri Bhatt, learned Counsel for the appella'nt submitted that the suit was bscd on the agreement of N ovemkr, 194 7 and that this agre-ement was void as the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Govt. of India Act, 1935, were not complied with. We do not prima facie agree\n\nth\"t the suit was based on any agr2ement arrived at in November 1947.\n\nG We do not, however, desire to go into the question as we are satisfied that the Appellate Court was right in holdi'ng that the defendant wa,> not entitkd to raise the plea of illegality of the agreement, not having so pleaded in the written statement and not having raised anv issue with regard to it.\n\nWe agree with the learned Judges of the calcutta High Court that to permit such a plea to be raised several years after H the institution of the suit would greatly prejudice the plaintiff. If such a pleJ had been raised at the appropriate stage, the plaintiff might have\n\ncome 0ut with a suitable a\"nswer.\n\nHo might have had his own pleadings amended either by seeking to rest his case on the original agreement or under Section 65 or Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. W•\" do not wish to speculate on the possible alternate cases which the plaintiff might have put forward had the plea be•en raised.\n\nWe only wish to observe that the plea that the provisions of Sectio\"n 175(3) of the Govt. of India Act had not been complied with is a mixed plea of fact and law.\n\nWe furth•cr agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court that the illiega:ity of a contrct must be specifically pleaded as much as the denial of a contract.\n\nOrder VI, Rule 8 provides that where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the oppooite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract all•cged or of the matters of fact from which the same may be imp:ied, a\"nd not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract. Order VIII, Rulo 2 Civil Procedure Code pn:scribes that the defendant must raise by his pleading all matters which show the suit not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law. In Kalyar, pur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Anr.,(') the Supreme Court reverned the judgment of the High Court on the grou\"nd that the High Court was not justified in allowing to be raised at the time of argument the question whether there was a contravention of Section 30 of the Govt. of India Act 1915. Reliance was placed upon Ord•cr VI, Rule 8 and Order VIII, Rule 2 of the Civil1 Procedure Code 1908. We are, therefore, of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court wa' right in holding that the lear'ned single Judge was not justified in per mitting the defendant to take up the plea that the contract was hit by the failure to comply with the requirements of Section 175(3) of lhc Govt. o: lndia Act. In the result the appal is dismissed with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed,\n\n(1) [1954] S.C.R. 958.\n\n...", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SURJIT SINGH ATWAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURJIT SINGH ATWAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 18, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA v.\n\nSURJIT SINGH ATWAL\n\nJanuary 18, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKAR!A AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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Mukherjee, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9273, "end_char": 9287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act 1935", "statute": "India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9355, "end_char": 9369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act 1935", "statute": "India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10096, "end_char": 10115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Division Bench ldd that the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suil."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10269, "end_char": 10283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India has preferred this appeal pursuant to a certificate granted under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution of India (as it stood prior to the 30th amendment) ."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10350, "end_char": 10364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10376, "end_char": 10397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhatt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5hri Bhatt, learned Counsel for the appella'nt submitted that the suit was bscd on the agreement of N ovemkr, 194 7 and that this agre-ement was void as the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Govt."}}, {"text": "Section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10614, "end_char": 10628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10645, "end_char": 10660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11131, "end_char": 11150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the learned Judges of the calcutta High Court that to permit such a plea to be raised several years after H the institution of the suit would greatly prejudice the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11512, "end_char": 11522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12412, "end_char": 12432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12680, "end_char": 12693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Supreme Court reverned the judgment of the High Court on the grou\"nd that the High Court was not justified in allowing to be raised at the time of argument the question whether there was a contravention of Section 30 of the Govt."}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12886, "end_char": 12896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "India Act 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12913, "end_char": 12927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Procedure Code 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13009, "end_char": 13028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13298, "end_char": 13312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Procedure Code 1908", "statute": "Procedure Code 1908"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1007_1011_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• ,\n\n' '\n\nMOHD. IQBAL AHMAD v.\n\nST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nJanuary 18, 1979 r.s. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nPrevention of Corruption Act, s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1) (d)-Case irrstuuieo 'k.'fthnut proper sallc/ion-Efiect of-Proof of valfd sanction--Ilow could be established-Sanction-Its importance in prosecution9--Facts coming into existence subsequently-If could be rele1ant-Pres11n1ptio11 that sanctioning\n\naurhurity \"H-'as satisfied that the accused received bribc-JVhen could arise- If prosecution could be given a chance at appellate stage to prove that the sanctioning authori!Y had applied its 1nind before giving the sanction.\n\nThe appellant who was charged with an offence under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was acquitted by the SpeCial Judge.\n\nBut !he I-ligh Court oq. appeal by the State, reversed the judgment of t'he Special Judge and convicted him.\n\nln appt-:i1 to this Court it v, ras contended on behalf of tht~ appellant that there was no evidence to show on what materials the sanctioning authority applied its mind before granting the sanction under s. 6 of the Act. The entire proceedings are void ab initiv.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD: 1 (a). The prosecution of the appellunt was without valid sanction and, therefore, cognizance taken by the Special Judge was \\Vithout juris- E diet.on. [1011 GJ\n\n(b) Any case instituted without proper sanction must fail because this being a n1anifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio.\n\nIt is incumbent on the prosecuticn to prove that a va.lid sanction had been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case had been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways: either (i) by producing the original sanction which itself contains J' the. facts constituting the offence arid the grounds of t:tisfaction or (ii) bY adducing evidence aliunde shov,.:ing the facts placed before the authority and the sa1isfn:.:ticn arrived at by it. f1010 B-D]\n\nIn the present case no evidence, either pri1nary or secondary, had been led to rrcve the contents of the note placed bef(1re the sanctioning authority nor were the witnesses examined in a position to state the contents of the note .\n\n2(a). The grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sa<:rosanct act whiclz affords protection to governnzent .rer; a1u.~ aga!nsr frivolou1\n\nprosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any pr(')SCCD. tion could be launched against public servan!s. [lOIOGJ\n\n(b) There is no force in the argument of the State that the Court should presume the facts on the basis of evidence given by one of the wittleSleS and B the onJcr implementing the sanction mentioning those factl'i.\n\nWhat the Court\n\n8-119 SC!/7J\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS l 1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nhas to see is whclher or not the sanctioning authority at the time o[ giving the sanction was aware of the facts nstituting the offence and applied its mind for the srune.\n\nAny subsequent f3.ct coming into existence after the resolution t.ad been pat:cd is wholly irrelevant. [1010 F]\n\n(c) 'fhcrc is equally no force in the S'::ate's contention that even if no fact& Vi'Crc mentioned in the resolution it must be presumed that the sanctioninc: authority was satisfied that the accused had received a bribe. There is no :.!iuestion vf a presumption being available to the sanctioning authority because\n\nat that itace the occasion for drawing a presumption never arises since there is no case in the Court. flOll Bl\n\n(d) The presumption does not arise automatically but onJy on proof of certn.in circumstances that is to say, where it is proved by evidence in Court that the money said to have been paid to the accused was actually recovered from his possession. It is only then that the Court may presume the amount received would be deemed to be an illegal gratification. The question of sanction ariies before the proceedings come to the Court and the qnestion of drawing a presumption does not arise n•t this stage. [1011 Cl\n\n(e) The prosecution cannot be given a cince to produce any material before the court at the appellate stage to satisfy that the sanctioning authority had duly applied its mind before giving the sanction. The prosecution bad been afforded a full and complete opportunity at the trial stage to produce whatever material it liked and it had chosen to examine two witne~; but for reasons best known to it, it did not produce the note which formed the subji:-Ct rriattcr of resolution of the sanctioning authority. [1011 E.]\n\n(f) In a criminal case this Court would not \"ordinarily direct fresh evidence to fill up a lacuna deliberately left by the prosecution. The liberty of the subject v.as in jeopardy and it cannot be allowed to put in jeopardy again a1 . the instance of the prosecution which failed to avail of the opportunity aft'ordcd\n\nto it. [lOll I']\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\": Criminal Appeal No. 194 of 1973.\n\n~··\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-4-1973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 703/71.\n\nA. N. Mui/a and A. Subba Rho for the Appellant.\n\nG. Narayana Rao for the Respondent.\n\nTh~ Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL ALI, J.-In this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted under section 161 I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced tO rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 250/- on\n\neach count.\n\n• • • •\n\nMOHD. IQBAL v. A. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nThe appellant had been convicted by Special Judge but on appeal .by the State to the High Court the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant as indicated above. According to the prosecution the appellant is said to have struck a bargain for\n\ntaking a bribe of Rs. 125/- which he received on the 15th of July, 1968 in the presence of P.Ws. 1 and 3.\n\nOn receiving the signal the raiding party appeared on the scene and the hand of the accused was dipped in water containing phenopthelien solution which showed that he touched the notes.\n\nThe defence of the appellant was that he never demanded any bribe and that the notes were thrust into his pocket. It is not necessary for us to dwell on the merits of the case because, in our opinion, the appeal must succeed on a short point of law, raised by Mr. A. N. Mulla, learned counsel for the appellant.\n\nIt was argued that the sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act produced in this case does not reveal the facts constituting the offence and, therefore, there is no evidence to show on what materials the sanctioning authority applied its mind and granted the sanction.\n\nThe Resolution of the Standing Committee granting the sanction is Exh. P-16 and is dated 31-3-1969, and runs as follows :\n\n\"As per note of the Commissioner, M.C.H. the Standing Committee nnanimously accords sanction for prosecution of Sri Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (in the scale of 110-180) Section Officer of Town Planning Section (Under suspension) in a competent Court for the offence mentioned in the note of the Commissioner M.C.H., dated 18-1-1969 so as to enable the Commissioner to sign the 'prosecution order and send it to the Director, AntiCorruption Bureau for taking further action at the earliest\".\n\nA perusal of the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority clearly shows that no facts Gil the basis of which the prosecution was to be sanctioned against the appellant are mentioned in the sanction nor does this document contain any ground on which the satisfaction of the Sanctioning Authority was based and its mind applied.\n\nThis document merely mentions that the sanction has been given on the basis of a note of the Commissioner, Mimicipal Corporation which appears to have been placed before the Committee.\n\nIt is obvious, therefore, that this note, if any, must have come into existence _either on 31-3-1969 or at any date prior to this.\n\nThe, prosecution could have proved the facts constituting the offence which were placed befor,,. the Sanctioning Authority by producing the noteat\n\n1010 SUPREME COURT REPORl S [I '179] 2 s.c.a.\n\nthe trial.\n\nBut no such thing has been done.\n\nWhat the prosecution did was merely to examine two witnesses P.Ws. 2 and 7.\n\nP.W. 2 has produced the order implementing the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority which is Exhibit P-10 1mc; I is dated 21st April, 1969, that is to say after the sanction was given. This document no doubt contains the facts constituting the offence but that does not solve the legal issues that arise in this case. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should oo done in two ways; either ( 1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and\n\n(2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. It is well settled that any , case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest di!liculty in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab i11itio.\n\nIn the instant case no evidence has been led either primary or secondary to prove as to what were the contents of the note mentioned in Exhibit P-16 which was placed before the Sanctioning Authority.\n\nThe evidence of P.W. 2 or P.W. 7 is wholly irrelevant because they were not in a position to say as to what were the contents of the note which formed the subject matter of the sanction by the Standing Committee of the Corporation.\n\nThe note referred to above was the only primary evidence for this purpose.\n\nMr. Rao vehemently argued that although the Resolution, Exh. p-16 docs not mention the facts, the Court. should presume the facts on the basis of the evidence given by P.W. 2 and the order implementing sanction which mentions these facts.\n\nThis argument is wholly untenable because what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority\" at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and any sub sequent fact which may come into existence after the resolution granting sanction has been passed, is wholly irrelevant.\n\nThe grant of 5anction is not an idle formality or an acritnonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned. ·\n\nH II was next contended by Mr. Rao that in view of the presumption which is to be drawn under section 4 of the Prevention -0f Corruption Act, even if, no facts are mentioned in the Resolution of\n\n.. 4.\n\n~.\n\nMOllll. IQBAi. V, A. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 1011\n\nthe Sanctioning Authority it must be pPsumed that the Sanctioning Authority was satisfied that the prosecution against the. appellant should be launched on the basis of the presump:ion that the accused had received bribe.\n\nWith due respects to the learned counsel, this argument seems to be wholly mis-conceived.\n\nIn the first plaoe, there is no question of the presumption being available to the Sanctioning Authority because at that stage the occasion for drawing a presump- 1ion nCver arises since there is no case in the Court.\n\nSecondly, the\n\npresu1npiicn docs not arise automatically but only on proof of cert::iri -circumstances, that is to say, where it is proved by evidence in the Court that the money said to have been paid to the accused was actually recovered from his possession, It is only then that the Court may presume the amount received would be deemed to be an illegal gratification.\n\nSo far as the question of sanction is concerned this arises before the proceedings come to the Court and the question of drawing the presumption, therefore, docs not arise at this stage.\n\nLastly, it was submitted by Mr. Rao that he should be given a <:hance to produce the materials before the Court to satisfy that the Sanctioning Authority had duly applied its mind to the facts constituting the offence.\n\nWe are, however, unable to accede to this prayer which has been made at a very late s:agc.\n\nThe prosecution had been afforded a full and complete opportunity at the trial stage to produce whatever material it liked and it had chosen to examine two witnesses but for reasons best known to it did not produce the note which formed the subject matter of the Resolution of the Sanc-\n\n1 ioning Authority-Exh. P-16.\n\nIt is well settled that in a criminal case this Court or for that matter any court should not ordinarily direct fresh evidence to fill up a lacuna delibratcly left by the prosecution. The lib\"rty of the subject was put in jeopardy and it cannot be allowed to put in jeopardy again at the instance of the prosecution which failed to avai] of the opportunity afforded to it\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the present prosecu•ion was launched without any valid sanction and, therefore, the cogni?an::\"c taken by the Special Judge \\.Vas con1pletely without juriSdiction.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court is set aside and convictions and sentences passed on the appellant are quashed.\n\nThe appellant will now be discharged from his bail bonds.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "MOHD. IQBAL AHMAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. IQBAL AHMAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1979 r.s. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 720, "end_char": 727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 767, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1120, "end_char": 1124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "A. N. Mui", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5150, "end_char": 5159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a and A. Subba Rho for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mulla"}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rho", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a and A. Subba Rho for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. Narayana Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Narayana Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAzAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL ALI, J.-In this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted under section 161 I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced tO rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "FAzAL ALI"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5365, "end_char": 5376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5411, "end_char": 5420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5438, "end_char": 5466, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5597, "end_char": 5606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IQBAL v. A. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nThe appellant had been convicted by Special Judge but on appeal .by the State to the High Court the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant as indicated above.", "canonical_name": "FAzAL ALI"}}, {"text": "15th of July, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "125/- which he received on the 15th of July, 1968 in the presence of P.Ws."}}, {"text": "A. N. Mulla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6446, "end_char": 6457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary for us to dwell on the merits of the case because, in our opinion, the appeal must succeed on a short point of law, raised by Mr. A. N. Mulla, learned counsel for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mulla"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6550, "end_char": 6578, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "31-3-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6874, "end_char": 6883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-16 and is dated 31-3-1969, and runs as follows :\n\n\"As per note of the Commissioner, M.C.H. the Standing Committee nnanimously accords sanction for prosecution of Sri Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7024, "end_char": 7041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-16 and is dated 31-3-1969, and runs as follows :\n\n\"As per note of the Commissioner, M.C.H. the Standing Committee nnanimously accords sanction for prosecution of Sri Mohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. IQBAL AHMAD"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORl S [I '179] 2 s.c.a.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8189, "end_char": 8229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Sanctioning Authority by producing the noteat\n\n1010 SUPREME COURT REPORl S [I '179] 2 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "21st April, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 2 has produced the order implementing the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority which is Exhibit P-10 1mc; I is dated 21st April, 1969, that is to say after the sanction was given."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9899, "end_char": 9902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rao vehemently argued that although the Resolution, Exh."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10900, "end_char": 10909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MOllll. IQBAi. V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11013, "end_char": 11029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~.\n\nMOllll."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1012_1018_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "MAHANT AMAR PARKASH & ORS.\n\nPARKASHA NAND & ORS.\n\nJanuary 19, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nl/indu Luw-Successio11 to Mahan! of a Dera.--lvlal!a!J.f rcsig11i11g du.1i11g ili5 life ti111e ar.d installing his successor-Notfce of 1Ytal1ant~' intention.<; to the\n\n~; tntrt..l a.stmbly of Mahants and confirmation by it-S11cccsJor frenf(d as 'Sadaq Chela'-Validity of appointment.\n\nIn his suit for declaration that he was the Mahant of a Dera, the plaintiff\n\n(respondent) claimed that the late Mahant who had previously executed the po, vcr of rittorncy in favour of the defendant (appellant) cancelled it and summoned the General Assen1bly of the Udasi Bhekh which was attended by other Mahants of the Udasi Bhekh and tendered his resignation on the grf'und of old age and ill hea.Jth, that the late J\\fahant treated him as Sadaq Chela and that he made him a Mahant by applying Tilak and performing the Pagri ceremony at the Udtasi Bhekh. The defendant on the other hand claimed that it was he who was the chela of the late Mahant who, before his passing away executed two wills appointing him as the successor to the gaddi and that the proceedings making the plaintiff as Mahant were the result of fraud and undue influence exercised by the plaintiff over the late Mahant.\n\nDecreeing the suit the Subordinate Judge held that neither party referred to any parti.; ular usage or custom of appointing a Mahant, that upto 1948 the E practice was for the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Nabha to appoint a Mahant, but that in this case the plaintiff was duly and validly installed as the Mahant in the presence of and with the approval of the Udasi Bhekh and that no fraud or undue influence alleged by the defendant \\vas established.\n\nThe Jligh Court confirmed all the findings of the trial court.\n\nOn further appeal to this Court the defendant (appellant) contended that\n\n(1) the late Mahant was coerced into appointing the plaintiff as his successor and (2) the appointment of plaintiff was invalid in that he \\\\iJs not a che1a of the late Mahan!.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHEW : 1 (a) On the question whether the late Mahant was subjected to G any pressure to tappoint. the plaintiff as Mahant, both the courts have concurrently found that he was subjected to no such pressure. There is no reason for interference with a concurrent finding of fact by the h'lo courts hclow. [!017 ABJ\n\n(b) The submission that the High. Court did not consider the complaint said to have been made by the lare Mahant that he had been coerced into appointing the plaintiff as Mahant is without basis.\n\nThe High Court did refer to the complaint.\n\nIt confirmed tiie finding of the trial court that the late Mahant who was previously under the influence of the appellant had naain come under his influence when he made the complaint. 1'he presence\n\n'MAHA1':t Al'JAR V, PARKASHA (Chinnappa Reddy, J,) i.0.13:\n\nof the police at the installation ceremony far from advancing the appellanfs A case, destroys the case that the Mahant acted under coercion.\n\n[1017 C-D]\n\n2(a) In the matter of succession to the office of Mahant the custon1 prevalent in various institutions is that in order to entitle a chela to succeed,\n\nhe must be appointed or nominated by the reigning Mahant during his life time or shortly before his death and this may be done either by a written declaration or some sort of testamentary document.\n\nEven where a Mahant B has the po••cr to appoint his suceeBsor, it is custon1a<y in viriou~ Mutbi that such appointment should be confirmed or recognised by the members of the religious fraternity to which the late Mahant belonged. When a Mahant re.signs during his life time and installs his successor, on the gaddi the fraternity is made aware of the proposed vacancy in the office a•Jd ii given an oppo1tunity of confirming or refusing to coniirrn the nominee. [1016 _D, E, G] c t >(\n\n}!;!. the instant case the document executed by the late Mahant on the date of the installation of the plaintiff as Mahant was attested by all the visitins Mahants of the Udasi Bhekh who assembled at the Dera .. The plaintiff was described as Srdaq Ch'ela of the late Mahant. This document showed that the late Mahant accepted the plaintiff as chela and appointed him as his\n\nsuccessor. (1017 E-1018 Al\n\n(b) The Subordinate Judge found that none of the three earlier Mahants of the Dera who succeeded to the gaddi was a chela of each of bis predecessors. [1018 Bl\n\nMaltanl Satnan1 Singh v. Bawan Bhagwart Singh, AIR 1938 PC 216; re fcrrcd to.\n\nMukhcrjea's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts (Third Edition) E referred to.\n\n, ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2153 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated\n\n..j 12-8·69 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.FA. No. 357 F\n\nof 1963. ·\n\nHmdayal Hardy, P. Ii. Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. Mudgal for the Appellants.\n\nM. N. Phadke, Mohan Behari Lal for Respondent No. L\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming that of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Nabha.\n\nThe respondent plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he was the Mahant of Dera Baba Khiali Das, Khansura, Tehsil Nabha, District Patiala, that he H was entitled to manage the properties of the Dera and that the alienations made by Mahan! Krishan Das and Amar Parkash were not\n\nbinding on him.\n\nIt was alleged by the plaintiff that Amar Parkash who held power of attorney from Mahant Krishan Das, the previous Mahan! of the Dera, had mismanaged the properties and had granted leases of lands belonging to the Dern to his m:stress and his brother-in-law.\n\nMahant Krishan Das came to know about the mismanagement by Amar Parkash and cancelled the power of attorney which he had previously cxccucd in favour of Amar Parkash. Mahan!\n\nKrishan Das summoned the general assembly of the Udasi Ghekh and held a meeting, with the help of the Deputy Commissioner, Paiiala and the Police, on 23rd July 1961.\n\nThe mcetine, was attended by other Mahants of Udasi Bhekh.\n\nIn the general assembly of the Udasi Bhekh, Mahant Krishan Das tendered resignation of office of Mahant on the ground of old age and ill health and appointed the plaintiff as his successor Mahant.\n\nThis was accep'.ed by all the Mahants of Udasi Bhekh.\n\nMahant Krishan Das, treating the plaintiff as his Sadaq Chela, applied Tilak, performed Pagri ceremony with his own hand and duly installed the plaintifI as the Mahant.\n\nThe visiting Mahants also performed the Pagri ceremony.\n\nDespite the installation of the plaintiff as Mahant of the Dera, Amar Parkash continued his activitks and started obstrncting the plaintiff from discharging his obligations as Mahant.\n\nThe plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for a declaration that he was the Mahant of the Dera and for other reliefs.\n\nThe defendant Amar Parkash raised the pica that he was the chela of Muhant Krishun Das and that Mahant Krishan Das who died on 30th December, 1961, had executed two Wills on 17th July, 1955 and 24th September, 1961, appointing him as the Mahan! to succeed him. It was alleged that the proceedings which took place on 23rd July 1961 were the result of fraud and undue influence exercised over Mahan! Krishan Das.\n\nOn the plead in gs of the parties the primary question which aros; o for consideration was whether the plaintiff was validly appointed as Mahan! of Dcra Buba Khiali Das.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge, Nabha framed two principal issues.\n\nIssue No. 1 was :\n\n\"What was the particular custom or usage prevailing in the Dera in dispute for the appointment of a Mahan! on the relevant date ?\"\n\nJue No. I-A was :\n\n\"whether the plaintiff was ;\"alidly appointed the Mahant of the Dera in accordance with the prevalent custom ?\"\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge noticed that neither party pleaded or\n\nreferred to any particular usage or custom for appointing a Mahant ·~\n\n._i..\n\nMAHAlff AMAR v. PARKASHA (Chimiappa Reddy, J.) 1015\n\nfor the disputed Dern.\n\nHe also noticed that the documentary evidence showed that the final appointment of Mahants for Deras in the Nabba State Was required to be approved by the Ruler of the State.\n\nLeaving the matter there, the learned Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiff was duly and validly installed as Mahant of the Dern by Mahant Krishan Das in the presence of and with the approval of Udasi Bhekh.\n\nHe held that the plea of fraud and undue influence raised by the deicndant was not established.\n\nOn those findings the suit Was decreed.\n\nThe first defendant Amar Parkash preferred an appeal to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal the plaintiff sought an amendment of the plaint in order to enable him to expressly plead the particular custom relating to succession to the office of the Mahant of Dera Baba Khiali Das.\n\nThe amendment was allowed and the High Court directed the Subordinate Judge to record additional evidence and submit a report giving his finding on the question whether the custom pleaded by the plain•ifl' was established and if so, whther the plaif!tiff was appointed in accordance with such custom.\n\nAfter recording additional evidence the learned Subordinate Judge submitted a report to the effect that the custom al1eged by the plaintiff was not established and that upto 1948 the practice was for the Ruler of Nabha State to appoint the Mahan!.\n\nAfter receiving the report of the learned Subordinate Judge,. the High Court heard the appeal.\n\nIt was conceded by the learned Counsel for the appellant before the High Court that in view of the report of the learned Subordinate Judge, the appeal should be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Trial Court prior to the order of the High Court calling for a report from the Trial Court.\n\nOn that basis the learned Counsel for the appellant attacked the finding on issue No. 1-A only and did not assail the findings on the other issues.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the finding of the Trial Court that there was no undue influence exercised over Mahant Krishan Das and that the plaintiff was validly appointed and installed as Mahant of the Dera.\n\nIn the first instance Shri Hardayal Hardy, learned Counsel for G the appellant invited us to explore the evidence and the case 'law to find out the custom relating to succession to the office of Mahant of Deras in Nabha State in general and Dera Baba Khiali Das in particular.\n\nUltimately, however, he conceded that if the plaintiff was shown to have been validly appointed and installed as Mahant by iate Mahant Krishan Das at the ceremony held on 23rd July 1961, ff the plaintiff was entitled to succeed.\n\nHe argued that late Mahan!\n\nKrishan Das was covered into appointing and installing the plaintiff\n\nas Mahant and therefore, the appointment of the plaintiff as Maha.at of the Dera. was invalid.\n\nHe also argued that the plaintiff wa11 nol a chela of Mahan! Krishan Das and, therefore, he could not have boen validly appointed as Mahant of the Dera in question.\n\nAs pointed out in Mukhe1jea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Third Edition), sucoession to the office of Mahan! is a matter of some complexity and the custom varies greatly from institution to institution.\n\nGenerally speaking, it is pointed out, Mutts may be divided into three classes : Mourasi, Panchayati and Hakimi. \"In the first, the office of the Mohunt is hereditary and devolves upon the chief disciple of the existing Mohunt who moreover usually nominates him as his successor; in the second, the office is electi•e, the presiding Mohunt being selected by an assembly of Mohunt11. In the third, the appointment of the presiding Mohunt is vested in the ruling power or in the party who has endowed the temple\". It is also said \"In various institutions the custom is that in order to entitle a chela to succeed, he must be appointed or nominated by the reigning Mohunt during his life time or shortly before his death and this may be done either by a written declaration or some sort of testamentary document\". It is further said \"Even where the Mohunt has the power to appoint his successor, it is customary in various Mutts that such appointment should be confirmed or recognised by the members of the religious fraternity to whicli the deceased belonged\".\n\nIn Mahant Satnam Singh v. Bawan Bhagwan Singh('). the Privy Council while noticing that succession to the office of Mahant was to be regulated by the particular custom of the Math, observed as follows : \"In the normal case of the death of a Mahan!, the members of the fraternity will be fully aware of the vacancy in the office, and the usual practice will be for the installation of his successor usually nominated by him, to take, place on the seventeenth day after the death.\n\nOn the other hand, when the Mahan! resigns during his life and installs his successor on the gaddi, it is obvious that the fraternity should be made aware of lhe proposed vacancy in the office and should be given the opportunity of confirming or refusing to confirm the nominee\". It is unnecessary for us to make any further investigation into the custom relating to the appointment of Mahan! since, in the light of the submissions made before us, two questions alone arise for consideration namely whether Mahant Krishan Das was coerced into appointing tl1e plaintiff as his successor Mahant and whether the appointmel!t of the plaintiff was inv'.1\\ict on the ground llf his not being a Chela of Mahant Krishan Das.\n\n(l) A.l.R. 1938 P.C. 216.\n\nMAHANT AMAR v. PARKASHA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\nI 017\n\nOn the question whether late Mahant Krishan Das was subjected to any pressure to appoint the plaintiff as Mahan!, both the Courts below have concurrently found that he was subjected to no such pressure.\n\nThe finding is one of fact and we are unable to see any :round justifying our interference with a concurrent finding of fact.\n\nShri Hardyal Hardy submitted that the High Court failed to consider the complaint said to have been made by late Mahant Krishan Das a few days after the installation of the plaintiff as Mahant in which he stated that he had been coerced into appointing the plaintiff as Mahant. Shri Hardyal Hardy also submitted that the evidence showed that the ervices of the Police had been requisitioned to pressurise late Mahan! Krishan Das.\n\nThe submission that the High Court did not consider the complaint said to have been made by late Mahan!\n\nKrishan Das is without basis since we find that the High Court did refer to the complaint. The High Court confirmed the finding of the Trial Court that late Mahant Krishan Das who was previously under the influence of Amar Parkash had again come under the influence of Amar Parkash when he made the complaint.\n\nWith regard to the presence of the Police at the installation ceremony we are of the view that the presence of the police, at the ceremony, far from advancing the appellant's case, destroys the case that Mahant Krishan Das acted under coercion.\n\nThe question that remains for consideration is whether the plaintiff was the Chela of Mahant Krishan Das and whether he could be validly appointed, if he was not the Chela.\n\nIn Exhibit P-7 dated 23rd July 1961 which was executed by Mahant Krishan Das and attested by all visiting Mahants the plaintiff Parkasha Nand was described as 'Sadaq Chela' of Mahant Krishan Das.\n\nThe ceremony which took place on 23rd July 1961 was described by Parkasha Nand in the following words :\n\n\"The congregation sat on the durries on the first floor of the Dera. About 25 Mahants and about 30 villagers sat on those durries. Mahant Krishan Das offered a Tilak on my forehead.\n\nMahan! Bikram Dass collected turbans from the Mahants who were present there and tied five turbans on my head. Mahant Som Parkash offered me a Doshala and sugar-cakes were distributed.\n\nAll these proceedings were gone through with the free and voluntary consent of late Mahant Krishan Das and no pressure was brought to bear on him.\n\nMahant Krishan Das was not confined.\n\nExhibits P6 to PS were written at that time and the people who\n\n1018 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1979) 2 S.C.R.\n\nwere present had affixed their signatures and thumbimpressions thereon''.\n\nWe are satisfied that late Mahant Krishan Das accepted the plaintiff as his Chela and appointed him as his successor Mahan!.\n\nWe may also mention here that the learned Subordinate Judge in his report B mentioned that Pandit Bhagtanand who was previously a Mahant of the Dern was not a Chela of his predecessor Mahan! Sunder Das and that Mahan! Krishan Das himself was not a Chc:la of his predecessor Mahan! Bhagtanand.\n\nWe arc unable to see any ground for inteference and the appeal is c accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "MAHANT AMAR PARKASH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHANT AMAR PARKASH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PARKASHA NAND & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PARKASHA NAND & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 19, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 337, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Udasi Bhekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his suit for declaration that he was the Mahant of a Dera, the plaintiff\n\n(respondent) claimed that the late Mahant who had previously executed the po, vcr of rittorncy in favour of the defendant (appellant) cancelled it and summoned the General Assen1bly of the Udasi Bhekh which was attended by other Mahants of the Udasi Bhekh and tendered his resignation on the grf'und of old age and ill hea."}}, {"text": "Mahant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant on the other hand claimed that it was he who was the chela of the late Mahant who, before his passing away executed two wills appointing him as the successor to the gaddi and that the proceedings making the plaintiff as Mahant were the result of fraud and undue influence exercised by the plaintiff over the late Mahant.", "canonical_name": "Mahants"}}, {"text": "Nabha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ular usage or custom of appointing a Mahant, that upto 1948 the E practice was for the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Nabha to appoint a Mahant, but that in this case the plaintiff was duly and validly installed as the Mahant in the presence of and with the approval of the Udasi Bhekh and that no fraud or undue influence alleged by the defendant \\vas established."}}, {"text": "Al'JAR V, PARKASHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2853, "end_char": 2871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'he presence\n\n'MAHA1':t Al'JAR V, PARKASHA (Chinnappa Reddy, J,) i.0.13:\n\nof the police at the installation ceremony far from advancing the appellanfs A case, destroys the case that the Mahant acted under coercion."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2873, "end_char": 2888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'he presence\n\n'MAHA1':t Al'JAR V, PARKASHA (Chinnappa Reddy, J,) i.0.13:\n\nof the police at the installation ceremony far from advancing the appellanfs A case, destroys the case that the Mahant acted under coercion.", "canonical_name": "G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Mukhcrjea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4539, "end_char": 4548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhcrjea's Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts (Third Edition) E referred to."}}, {"text": "Hmdayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hmdayal Hardy, P. Ii.", "canonical_name": "Hardayal Hardy"}}, {"text": "C. B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4862, "end_char": 4873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. Mudgal for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M. Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. Mudgal for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4909, "end_char": 4921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, Mohan Behari Lal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4923, "end_char": 4939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, Mohan Behari Lal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5005, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming that of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Nabha.", "canonical_name": "G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5080, "end_char": 5112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming that of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Nabha."}}, {"text": "Mahan! Krishan Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he was the Mahant of Dera Baba Khiali Das, Khansura, Tehsil Nabha, District Patiala, that he H was entitled to manage the properties of the Dera and that the alienations made by Mahan!", "canonical_name": "Mahan! Krishan Das"}}, {"text": "Amar Parkash", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishan Das and Amar Parkash were not\n\nbinding on him.", "canonical_name": "Amar Parkash. Mahan"}}, {"text": "Amar Parkash", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5512, "end_char": 5524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the plaintiff that Amar Parkash who held power of attorney from Mahant Krishan Das, the previous Mahan!", "canonical_name": "Amar Parkash. Mahan"}}, {"text": "Mahant Krishan Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the plaintiff that Amar Parkash who held power of attorney from Mahant Krishan Das, the previous Mahan!", "canonical_name": "Mahan! Krishan Das"}}, {"text": "Amar Parkash. Mahan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5888, "end_char": 5907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Krishan Das came to know about the mismanagement by Amar Parkash and cancelled the power of attorney which he had previously cxccucd in favour of Amar Parkash.", "canonical_name": "Amar Parkash. Mahan"}}, {"text": "Krishan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishan Das summoned the general assembly of the Udasi Ghekh and held a meeting, with the help of the Deputy Commissioner, Paiiala and the Police, on 23rd July 1961."}}, {"text": "Paiiala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6033, "end_char": 6040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishan Das summoned the general assembly of the Udasi Ghekh and held a meeting, with the help of the Deputy Commissioner, Paiiala and the Police, on 23rd July 1961."}}, {"text": "23rd July 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6060, "end_char": 6074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishan Das summoned the general assembly of the Udasi Ghekh and held a meeting, with the help of the Deputy Commissioner, Paiiala and the Police, on 23rd July 1961."}}, {"text": "Mahant Krishan Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6390, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Krishan Das, treating the plaintiff as his Sadaq Chela, applied Tilak, performed Pagri ceremony with his own hand and duly installed the plaintifI as the Mahant.", "canonical_name": "Mahan! Krishan Das"}}, {"text": "Muhant Krishun Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 7006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant Amar Parkash raised the pica that he was the chela of Muhant Krishun Das and that Mahant Krishan Das who died on 30th December, 1961, had executed two Wills on 17th July, 1955 and 24th September, 1961, appointing him as the Mahan!"}}, {"text": "Dcra Buba Khiali Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7481, "end_char": 7501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Dcra Buba Khiali Das."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Nabha", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Subordinate Judge, Nabha framed two principal issues."}}, {"text": "Chimiappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8027, "end_char": 8042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Subordinate Judge noticed that neither party pleaded or\n\nreferred to any particular usage or custom for appointing a Mahant ·~\n\n._i..\n\nMAHAlff AMAR v. PARKASHA (Chimiappa Reddy, J.) 1015\n\nfor the disputed Dern.", "canonical_name": "G\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Mahants", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8161, "end_char": 8168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also noticed that the documentary evidence showed that the final appointment of Mahants for Deras in the Nabba State Was required to be approved by the Ruler of the State.", "canonical_name": "Mahants"}}, {"text": "Nabha State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9439, "end_char": 9450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording additional evidence the learned Subordinate Judge submitted a report to the effect that the custom al1eged by the plaintiff was not established and that upto 1948 the practice was for the Ruler of Nabha State to appoint the Mahan!."}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first instance Shri Hardayal Hardy, learned Counsel for G the appellant invited us to explore the evidence and the case 'law to find out the custom relating to succession to the office of Mahant of Deras in Nabha State in general and Dera Baba Khiali Das in particular.", "canonical_name": "Hardayal Hardy"}}, {"text": "Dera Baba Khiali Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10478, "end_char": 10498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first instance Shri Hardayal Hardy, learned Counsel for G the appellant invited us to explore the evidence and the case 'law to find out the custom relating to succession to the office of Mahant of Deras in Nabha State in general and Dera Baba Khiali Das in particular."}}, {"text": "Mukhe1jea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11123, "end_char": 11132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out in Mukhe1jea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Third Edition), sucoession to the office of Mahan!"}}, {"text": "Mahan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13253, "end_char": 13258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary for us to make any further investigation into the custom relating to the appointment of Mahan!", "canonical_name": "Mahants"}}, {"text": "Hardyal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14002, "end_char": 14015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardyal Hardy submitted that the High Court failed to consider the complaint said to have been made by late Mahant Krishan Das a few days after the installation of the plaintiff as Mahant in which he stated that he had been coerced into appointing the plaintiff as Mahant.", "canonical_name": "Hardayal Hardy"}}, {"text": "Parkasha Nand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15392, "end_char": 15405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Exhibit P-7 dated 23rd July 1961 which was executed by Mahant Krishan Das and attested by all visiting Mahants the plaintiff Parkasha Nand was described as 'Sadaq Chela' of Mahant Krishan Das.", "canonical_name": "PARKASHA NAND & ORS"}}, {"text": "Parkasha Nand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15526, "end_char": 15539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ceremony which took place on 23rd July 1961 was described by Parkasha Nand in the following words :\n\n\"The congregation sat on the durries on the first floor of the Dera.", "canonical_name": "PARKASHA NAND & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bikram Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15756, "end_char": 15767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bikram Dass collected turbans from the Mahants who were present there and tied five turbans on my head."}}, {"text": "Mahant Som Parkash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15860, "end_char": 15878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Som Parkash offered me a Doshala and sugar-cakes were distributed."}}, {"text": "Pandit Bhagtanand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16523, "end_char": 16540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also mention here that the learned Subordinate Judge in his report B mentioned that Pandit Bhagtanand who was previously a Mahant of the Dern was not a Chela of his predecessor Mahan!"}}, {"text": "Mahan! Sunder Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16616, "end_char": 16633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also mention here that the learned Subordinate Judge in his report B mentioned that Pandit Bhagtanand who was previously a Mahant of the Dern was not a Chela of his predecessor Mahan!"}}, {"text": "Mahan! Bhagtanand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16706, "end_char": 16723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishan Das himself was not a Chc:la of his predecessor Mahan!"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16829, "end_char": 16835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1019_1022_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "LlNGARI OBULAMMA\n\nv •\n\nL. VENKATA REDDY & ORS .\n\n.Tan1tary 19, 1979\n\n.[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSllAL, JJ.J\n\n1(119\n\nPenal l'ode-S. 494-Scope of-Essential co11ditio11s to be Sl1tiJfied for application of the section.\n\n1 he appellant waK the husbaJ!d of respondent No. 1. Relations between the husband and wife ht; wing been strained for some years they lived separately.\n\nOn the husband's complaint that his wife had married another person during the subsistence of their n1arriage, she and accused no. 4 were convicted under s. 494 !PC.\n\nAllowing the wife's revision petition the High Court held the marriage to ¥ be void on lhe ground that there was no evidence to prove that the essential ceremonies required to be performed in a Hindu marriage, namely Dutta Homa and Saptapa<li had been performed.\n\nIn apptal to this Court the husband contended that under the custom followed by the community to which the parties belonged Saptapadi was not\n\nan essential requiren1ent to constitute a valid rr11..1rrriage but that tying a yarn thread round th~ bride's neck at the time of marrirge wi.; s sufficient to make a va1id n1arriage Und this having been done, the second marriage was va1id and the wife \\Vas guilty of the offence under s. 494 lPC.\n\nDismissing the appeal.\n\nHELD : The prosecution failed to prove that the second n1arriage was a valid marriage and, therefore, the High Court was justified in tacquitting the respondents. [1022 F]\n\nBefore a conviction can be recorded under s. 494 IPC the following ingre~ clients must be satisfied :-\n\n(1) that the cornplainant had been married to the accused;\n\n(2) that the accused contracted a socond marri~.ge while the first marriage was still subsisting; and\n\n(3) that both the marriages were va1id and strictly according to law governing the parties. [1022 BJ\n\nIn the instant case th'ere wa& no evidence to show that there was any custom among the parties out weighing the .written text of Jaw.\n\nSecondly, the husband had not clearly mentioned that the parties were governed by custom m erogation of Hindu Law. The priest who performed the marriage bd shO\\vn co1nplete ignorance as tO whether or not the parties were governed by custom. The witness was, therefore, incompetent to depcse about the exist cnce of any custom in the family of the parties.\n\nWhen the priest said that there .was no custom of .sacred fire and Saptapadi what he meant MlS that in the econd inarriage these two coremonies had not he.en performed. [102·2 CD &:\n\nIQ21 0-HJ\n\n•I0.20\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C. R.\n\nA £11 rr: (Jo/go111i Ragliava Reddy & Anr., AIR 1968 (AP) 117 held inapplicable.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JUR!Sl)JCT!ON : Criminal Appeal No. 339 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-3-1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 16/74 (Criminal Revision Petition No. 12/74).\n\nP. Parmeshwara Rao, T. V. S. N. Chari and R. Nagarathn11111 for the Appellant. ·\n\nA. V. V. Nair for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave has been filed by lhe complainant against the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court acquitting the respondents, who had been convicted by the trial court Magistrate and the Sessions Judge under Section 494 I. P. C. {!nd sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/- as modified by the Sessions Judge.\n\nThe appellant had filed a complaint against the respondent No. 1 on the ground that he was her husband and while the first marriage was subsisting he had contracted a second marriage and was, therefore, guilty of the offence of bigamy as enshrined in Section 494 of\n\n.I. P. C.\n\nAccording to the prosecution the first marriage of respondent No. 1 with appellant took place on 22-4-68.\n\nAfter about 3 years of the first marriage the relations between the husband and wife became strained and they separated, but there was no divorce.\n\nOn 1-4-1972 the respondent No. 1 married accused No. 4 and the other accused who were relations of the respondent participated in the marriage.\n\nOn knowing this fact the appellant filed a complaint on 26-4-1972 on the basis of which the respondents were prosecuted and ultimately convicted under Section 494 of J. P. C.\n\nThe case went up in revision to the High Court which accepted the revision and acquitted the accused on the ground that there. was no proof of a. valid marriage having been contracted between accused No. 4 and accused No. 1.\n\nAgainst this order the appellant filed a petition for special leave and after obtaining special leave, the appeal has beeri placed before us for hearing.\n\nTbe short point involved in this appeal is as to whether or not the second marriage contracted by respondent No. 1 (A-l) with respondent No. 4(A-4) was a legally valid marriage.\n\nThe High Court pointe-0 out that under the Hindu Law, two essential ceremonies of ·\n\nUNGAR! OBULAMMA v. VENKATA REDDY (fazal Ali, J.) 102;1\n\na valid marriage arc Datta Homa and Saptapadi i.e. taking seven\n\nstqis around the sacred fire.\n\nThe High Court found that there. was absolutely no evidence to prove that any of these two essential ceremonies had been performed, and, therefore, the marriage was void in the eye of law.\n\nIn this view of the matter the High Conrt held that the conviction under Section 494 I. P. C. could not be sustained .\n\nIn support of the appeal Mr. Rao has submitted that the High Court has taken a wrong view of law and has overlooked the fact that in the instant case, the parties belonged to the Reddy Community and were therefore governed by custom and under the custom the\n\ntwo ceremonies mentioned by the High Court were not necessary at G all to constitute a valid marriage.\n\nThe other ceremonies which were necessary under the custom had been performed according to Purohit\n\n(P.W.l).\n\nUnfortunately, however, in the state of evidence in the present case it is impossible for us to hold that the second marriage . was a valid one.\n\nIn the first place it has not been clearly mentioned 0 in the complaint as to whether the parties were governed by custom in derogation of Hindu Law.\n\nSecondly, P.W. l stated thus :-\n\n\"Among Kapus, according to their customs each community will perform the marriage. Some Kapus have only 'Yarn Thread' instead of Mangala Sutram.\n\nI do not know what is the custom (Acharam) of the accused.\n\nThere was no custom of putting sacred fire.\n\nThere was no 'Agni Gundam' (Sacred fire and no going round 7 times by the bride and bridegroom).\n\nI do not know whether that is true Of a secret marriage'_'.\n\nIt would appear from the aforesaid statement of P.W. 1 that he had clearly stated that he does not know what is the custom of the accused.\n\nHa, ving shown complete ignorance of the fact as to whether or not the accused was governed by custom the witness goes on to state that there was no custom of sacred fire and Saptapadi.\n\nWhat the witness really means is that in the second marriage which was contracted by respondent No. 1, these two ceremonies were not performed by him. Mr. Rao, however, vehemently contended that this witness proves that in the Reddy Community the custom of Saptapadi was not prevalent and it was sufficient to put the 'Yam Thread' instead of Mangal Sutril'. In our opinion when witness has frankly admitted that he does not know the custom of the accused he was incompetent to depose about the existence of any custom in the family\n\n1022 SUPREMl!COURTRl!PORTS l.19'79J 2 S.C; R.\n\n. A of the accused.\n\nIt is well settled that before a conviction can be recorded under section 494 the following ingredients must be proved :-\n\n( 1) That the complainant had been married to the accused ;\n\n(2) That the accused contracted a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting ;\n\n( 3) That both the marriges were valid and strictly according to law governing the parties.\n\nIn the instant case there was no evidence to show that tl1ere was any custom amongst the Reddys which, outweighed the written text of law. The evidence of P. W. 1, clearly falls short of the standard to prove this fact.\n\nMr. Rao, however, strongly relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in some other case to show that among the Reddy Community oE Telangana area the two ceremonies mentioned above were not necessary.\n\nIn the first place the decision referred to above in the ca•e of re: Dolgonti Raghava Reddy and Another(') clearly shows that the Court in that case was concerned only with the Reddy Community of Telangana alone.\n\nThe trial cour: has pointed out in its judgment that so far as accused is concerned he belongs to the Reddy Community not of Tclangana area, but that of Rayalaseema area.\n\nIn these circumstances the Judgment of the High Court cannot be of any avail to the appellant.\n\nMoreover, as the existence of the custom was neither mentioned in the complaint nor proved in the evidence it would be difficult for this Court to rely on the decision of the High Court which was based on the evidence, facts and circumstances of the case before it.\n\nIn these circum11tances we agree with the High Court that the prosecution bad failed to prove that the second marriage contracted by respondent No. 1 with respondent No. 4 was a valid marriage and, therefore, the High Court was fully justified in acquitting the respondents.\n\nThe UP.peal is without any substance and is accordingly dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 117\n\nI I.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "LlNGARI OBULAMMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LlNGARI OBULAMMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. VENKATA REDDY & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "L. VENKATA REDDY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 533, "end_char": 539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1239, "end_char": 1245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1491, "end_char": 1497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1498, "end_char": 1501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Saptapadi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the priest said that there .was no custom of .sacred fire and Saptapadi what he meant MlS that in the econd inarriage these two coremonies had not he.en performed. ["}}, {"text": "P. Parmeshwara Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2882, "end_char": 2900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Parmeshwara Rao, T. V. S. N. Chari and R. Nagarathn11111 for the Appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "T. V. S. N. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2902, "end_char": 2919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Parmeshwara Rao, T. V. S. N. Chari and R. Nagarathn11111 for the Appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "R. Nagarathn11111", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Parmeshwara Rao, T. V. S. N. Chari and R. Nagarathn11111 for the Appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "A. V. V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2964, "end_char": 2977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. V. Nair for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3043, "end_char": 3052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave has been filed by lhe complainant against the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court acquitting the respondents, who had been convicted by the trial court Magistrate and the Sessions Judge under Section 494 I. P. C. {!", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave has been filed by lhe complainant against the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court acquitting the respondents, who had been convicted by the trial court Magistrate and the Sessions Judge under Section 494 I. P. C. {!"}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3282, "end_char": 3293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3665, "end_char": 3676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22-4-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3789, "end_char": 3796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 with appellant took place on 22-4-68."}}, {"text": "1-4-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1-4-1972 the respondent No."}}, {"text": "26-4-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On knowing this fact the appellant filed a complaint on 26-4-1972 on the basis of which the respondents were prosecuted and ultimately convicted under Section 494 of J. P. C.\n\nThe case went up in revision to the High Court which accepted the revision and acquitted the accused on the ground that there."}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4243, "end_char": 4254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4947, "end_char": 4956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OBULAMMA v. VENKATA REDDY (fazal Ali, J.) 102;1\n\na valid marriage arc Datta Homa and Saptapadi i.e. taking seven\n\nstqis around the sacred fire.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5328, "end_char": 5339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5404, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the appeal Mr. Rao has submitted that the High Court has taken a wrong view of law and has overlooked the fact that in the instant case, the parties belonged to the Reddy Community and were therefore governed by custom and under the custom the\n\ntwo ceremonies mentioned by the High Court were not necessary at G all to constitute a valid marriage."}}, {"text": "Purohit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5829, "end_char": 5836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other ceremonies which were necessary under the custom had been performed according to Purohit\n\n(P.W.l)."}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7582, "end_char": 7593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dolgonti Raghava Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8395, "end_char": 8417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place the decision referred to above in the ca•e of re: Dolgonti Raghava Reddy and Another(') clearly shows that the Court in that case was concerned only with the Reddy Community of Telangana alone."}}, {"text": "Telangana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place the decision referred to above in the ca•e of re: Dolgonti Raghava Reddy and Another(') clearly shows that the Court in that case was concerned only with the Reddy Community of Telangana alone."}}, {"text": "Tclangana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8665, "end_char": 8674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial cour: has pointed out in its judgment that so far as accused is concerned he belongs to the Reddy Community not of Tclangana area, but that of Rayalaseema area."}}, {"text": "Rayalaseema", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8693, "end_char": 8704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial cour: has pointed out in its judgment that so far as accused is concerned he belongs to the Reddy Community not of Tclangana area, but that of Rayalaseema area."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1023_1037_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "GUJARAT STATE COOPERATIVE LAND DEVELOPMENT\n\nBANK LTD. .\n\nP. R. MANDED AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 23, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nNew piea, entertainments of-Not permissible at the appellate level.\n\nBombay Co-op<rative Sociea,. Act, 1925, (Bombay Act Vll of 1925) Section 54 and Section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961...:....\n\nScope of the words \"any dispute touching the business of the society\" Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947) Section 2(4) notification under, read with s. 166(1) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act,\n\n1961, effect of.\n\nTheappellant Bank was a. society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 and with the coming into force ftom May 1, 1962 of the Gujtairat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, it came to be governed by\n\nthe said Act.\n\nBy Notification No. BIR-1362·5H dated March 2, 1963, the Government of Gujarat directed under s. 2(4) of the Bombay Industrial Rela\".' D lions Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947) that ell the provisions of the said Act shall apply with effect from March 15, 1963 to the business of banking\n\nby Ccroperative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutch areas of the State, regis~ tered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Co-operativ'e Societies, Act, 1961.\n\nThe second respondent, Babu Bhai Negracha who was working as am E additional supervisor in the Dasada Branch of the appellant Bank and whose se:r:vices were terminated by an order dated February 21, 1962, by giving him\n\none month's pay in lieu of notice under Staff RegQ]ation No. 15, filed an applic:ition in the Utbour Court Rajkot, alleging that his services had been illegally and maliciously terminated as an act of victimisation on account of ,.ilr-- his trade union activities and praying for setting aside the -order of his termina tion of service and for reinstatement with full back wages.\n\nThe Labour Court by its order dated June 11, 1963, overruled the preli mi nary objection raised by the appellant Bank, namely, that \"the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 Under which the application Was made by the respondent was not applicable to its ca:se, as it was a co.operative society\n\ngoVerned by the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, unde'r which only the Reg5trar or his nominee had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and the Labour G Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application\".\n\nThe appellant Bank's writ petition challenging the said order of the Labour Court OOs dismissed by the Gujarat High Court by its judgment dated August 25, 1967 .\n\nDismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. No new plea can be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, as a matter of right. In the instant case, the new plea that • 1the appellant is not doing banking business\" \\V3S not enterta.ined for the reasons\n\n9-119SCIJ79\n\n___ ,__\n\nA namely (i)-it was much too belated; (ii) it stood in direct contradiction to the position taken by the appellant in i~ \\\\'Tit petition and the affidavit in support thereof in the High Court wherein it had been clearly admitted tb:i.t \"the society i~ engaged 'in the business of banking\" and (iii) it was not a purely legal _plea but a mixed plea of law and fact and could not be detern1incd on the basis of material already on the record. [1027 F-01\n\n1. 1be e.xpression \"any dispute'' referred to in Section 54 of the Bombav\n\nCooperative Societies Act, 1925 and in Section 96 of the Gujarat Cooperativ~ Societies Act, does not cover a dispute of the kind raised by respondent 2 .;1gainst the appellant-bank. [1034 C]\n\n(a) It is clea.r from the object and the schcn1e of th'e AcL'i of 1925 anil J.961 that the legis-laiurc never intended lo give such a wide scope to the 'expression \"any dispute\" so as to cover u classes of disputes whatever be their nature a11 the prefix \"any\" to \"dispute\" appears to give.\n\nThe tern1 \"dispute\" means a controversy ha.ving both positive and negati\\e aspects.\n\nJt postulates the .assertion of a claim by one party and its denial by the other.\n\n[1031 C-Dl\n\n(b) The expression \"any dispute\"' has not been defined in the Acts of 1925 and 1961.\n\nThis expression has been used in a narrower scn.'ie limited t.J confested claims of a civil nature, which could have been decided by civil or revenue courts, but for the provisioru with regard to compulsory arbitration by the Registrar or hi9' nominee foimd in Section 54 of the Bombay Act of i925 and in Section 96 of the Gujarat Act. 1961.\n\nThe words ·\"as if th; dispute were a suit and the R'egistrar as Civil Court\" occurring in sub-6ection\n\n(t} of Section 97 of the Gujarat Act, nlso make this poition clear. [1031 C, D.\n\nE, G]\n\n(c) The compulsory arbitration by the Registrar on rcfercni..--c under s. 96 is only a substitute for adjudication of disputes of a civil nature normally tri'ed by the Civil Court. It is incumbent, under sub-section (2) of s. 96 of the 1961 Act, on the Registrar to decide as a preliminary issue, whethef the dispute is of a kind under sub-section ( t) of s. 96 falling within his jurisdiction.\n\nTf thi9 peJirninary issue is found in the negative he will hav'e no further jurisdiction to deal with the matter. [1031 F, G-1032 Fl\n\n(d) Thus considered, a dispute raised against the Society by its discharged se:rvant daiming reliefs, such as, reinstatcrnnt in service with back wages, which are not enforceable in a civil court, is outside the scope of the expre8sion \"touching the management of the Society\" userl ins. 96(1) of the Act of 1961, ant1 the Re:gistra-r has not jurisdiction to deal \\vith and determine it. What has been directly bidden \"out-of-bounds'' for the Registmor. by the very scheme and object of the Act, cannot be directly inducted by widening the connotation cf\n\n'management'. Such a dispute squarely fa1ls within the jurisdiction of the l .abour Ct'urt under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. [1036 E-G]\n\n3. The law of Tndu9'tria1 disputes or Industrial Relations is a special law dealing With rights and obligations specially created by it.\n\nThe provisions in s. 54 of the Bomba.y Act and in s. 96 of the Gujarat Act being: general provisions ii, :1ccordance with the maxim gl'11c1 alia spcciafi/Jus non dfro{!ant. nothing in these general provisions can Jerogatc from Bombay Industrial Relation!! Act, -and itbe Cooperative Societies .A.ct must yield to the i;:pecial provi-\n\n.f >\n\nI J\n\n'C00P.ERA1U¥£ :SANK v. P. R. MANDl?D 1025\n\n\"Soions in the Bombay :Industrial Rclalions Act, whcn'ever a. dispute clearly\n\nA . .comes within the .language of the latter Act. Section 166(1) of the Gujarat Act, in terms, bars the jurisdiction only of Civil or Revenue Court, and not of the Labour Court or any Industrial 'Tribunal constituted under the. Bombay Industrial Relations Act or Industrial Disputes Act. The legislature never inte:\"lded to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to determine claims and industrial dispute5 which cannot be adjudicated by\n\nthe 01dinaiy Civil Court. [1032 H, 1033 A, 1034 A-BJ B\n\nIn the instant case :\n\n(a) The Labour Court is con1petent to grant the relief of reinstat.ement while in view of s. 21(b) of the Specific Relief Act, then in force, the Civil .Court was not competent to grant that relief. If a Court is incapable of granting the relief claimed, normally the :; roper construction \\Vl!ltld be thnt C jf is incornpttent to deal \\vith the n1attcr. [.1033 F, H]\n\n(b) The dispute was raised by the second respondent by writing an approach k:Uer to his employee, the appeUnnt, as required by the Bom'f?ay Industrial Relations Act. Jn substance, it was no industrial dispute. It was .not reshicted to a daim under the contract or ngn.:'cn1cnt of (.; ffiployn1ent. 1_1033\n\nF-G]\n\n(c) The rights and reliefs claimed by the scOO\\ld respondent could not be , determined and granted by a Civil Court in a suit. lfis allegation was that his crvices vie-re terminated unfairly and vind.ictlvcly bccau$el of his legitimate 1rade union activities, s an act of victimisation. The relief claimed is rein.statemep.t in services \\Vith back wages.\n\nThe rights claimed are those which .are conferred on workmen and employees under the Bombay Industrial Re1a- tions Act to ensure social justice.\n\nSuch rights which do not stem from the .contra-:t of employment can be enforced only in the Labour Court constitukd .under B, l.R. Act. [1033 B-FJ\n\nJullundur Transport Cooperath1e Sacieties Ltd. v. Punjab State, AIR 1959 \"Puo. 34; approved.\n\nRohtos Industries Ltd. v. Brij1w11do11 Pandey, [1956] SCR 800; referred to.\n\n(d) Neither the Registrar nor his nominee will be competent to grant the relief of requiring change in the1 service cOndtions of the employee.\n\nSuch a relief could be granted by the JndustriaJ Tribunal \\Vhich under the .Industrial Disputes Act, has the jurisdiction even to vary contracts of service bctl';'ecn .:in employer and c_rnpJoyees. (1037 C-DJ\n\nCo-operative Central Rnnk .Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Hydera- .bnd [1970] I SCR 205; applied.\n\nFarkhundali 'J:i.lnunhay v. V. R. Potdar, AIR 1962 Born. 362 overruied.\n\nCrvrL ;'\\PPEU.ATE Ju1usmcnoN : Civil Appeal No. 236 of 1969.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated 24/25th August 1967 , of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 585/63.\n\nS. K. Dholnkia and R. C. 'Rhatia for th' Appellant.\n\nP. Ram Reddy, Amicus Curiae for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThe appellant is the Gujarat Sfate Cooperative Land ' Development Bank Ltd. (hereafter referred to as \"the Bank). It is a Society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, B B£ applicable to the erstwhile State of Saurashtra.\n\nAccording to the appellant's writ petition, it is doing banking business. It has 127 Branches spread 1!11 over the State of Gujarat.\n\nOne of its Branches is in Dasada, Surendranagar District.\n\nThe Head Office of the Bank is at Ahmedabad.\n\nC The second respondent, Babu Bhai Negracha, was serving as an. . ~- Additional Supervisor in the Dasada Branch of the Bank.\n\nHis services were terminated by an order, dated February 2r, t962, by giving him\n\none month's pay in lieu of notice under Staff Regulation No. 15.\n\nThe Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, came into force from D May 1, 1962, and the appellant-Bank, being a Society, under the Cooperative Societies Act, came to be governed by the said Act.\n\nBy Notification No. BIR-1362-5-H, dated March 2, 1963, pub- J1shed in the Gujarat Gazette in March 1963, the Government of Gujarat directed under Section 2 ( 4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947) that all the provisions ot the said Act shall apply with cifoct from March 15, 1963 to the• business of banking by Cooperative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutcn -, reas of the State, registered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. ' Aggrieved by the termination of his service, the second respqndent approached the appellant's Dasada's Branch by a letter, dated August 20, 1962, stating that since his services were terminated illegally by way of victimisation, he should be reinstated in the service.\n\nThereafter, the second respondent filed an application in the Labour Court at Rajkot, alleging that his service had been illegally and maliciously terminated as an act of victimisation on account of his trade union activities. He prayed for setting aside the order of his termination of service and for reinstatement with full back wages.\n\nThe Bank filed a written statement, raising a preliminary objection that the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, under which the H application was made by the respondent, was not applicable to its. case as it was a Cooperative Society governed by the Gujarat Coope:ative Societies Act, under which only the Registrar or his nominee•\n\nhad jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applica\\ion of the second respondent.\n\nBy its Order, dated June 11, 1963, the Labour Court overruled .this objection and held that it had jurisdiction to hear the application.\n\nThe Bank then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of \\be Con- 'Stitution in the High Court to challenge the Order of the Labour Court. The High Court by a common judgment dated August 25, 1967 dismissed the writ petition, but in view of the importance of the question of law involved, granted a certificate of fitness for appeal to\n\n; this Court.\n\n.On the strength of that certificate, the Bank has come in appe~ 'before us against the aforesaid judgment of the High Court.\n\nIn this Court on January 22, 1969, the Bank made an application for leave to urge as additional ground, namely, that the Bank is not D doing banking business, i.e. accepting for the purpose of lending or investment of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawable by cheque, draft, order or otherwise as .defined in Section 5, Clauses (b) and (c) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949; and that this being the true position, the Notification No.\n\nDIR-1362-IV-H dated March 2, 1963, published in the Gujarat Gov- E emment Gazette dated March 7, 1963, under Section 2(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act XI of 1947) is not applicable to the appellant.\n\nThis application was strenuously opposed by Shri Ram Reddy, who is assisting the Court as amicus curia{; on behalf of respondent 2, who has not been able to appear and defend ; himself in this appeal.\n\nWe have declined permission to raise this new plea for the first time in this Court, for these reasons : (i) It is much too belated; (ii) It stands in clirect contradiction to the position taken by the appellant in its writ petition and the affidavit in support thereof filed in the High Court.\n\nTherein, the appellant had categorically pleaded : \"The petitioner is a Society registered under the Bombay Cooperative .Societies Act, 1925 (Bombay Act VII of 1925) ..... . and is engaged\n\nin the business of banking.\" (iii) It is not a purely legal plea but a mixed plea of .law and fact, and cannot be determined on the basis , of material already on the record.\n\nWe, therefore, take it that the appellant is a Cooperative Society , engaged .in Jlw J>y§iness of banking and, as such, the Bombay Industrial\n\n'.~,\n\n- -\n\nA Reations Act,_ 1946 is applicable to it by virtue of th~ aforesaid Notification dated March 2, J 963, issued by the State G<}vernment uii<ler Section 2 ( 4) of that Act.\n\nThe arunients of Mr. Dholakia, appearing for the appellant, may be summansed as follows :\n\n(i) The case is governed by the Gujarat Cooperative Societicc, Act, l 961 (hereafter called the Act of 1961) and not by the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 (hereafter referred to as the Act of 1925).\n\n(ii) The phrase \"any dispute touching ...... the businci; s of the Society\", particularly the word \"touching'' the.rein, is of very \\vid~ amplitude. It would comprehend any matter which relates to, or concerns or affects the business of the Society. Every society, ex-necessitiate employs SOillle servants for the purpose of carrying on its business.\n\nThat being so, the payment of wages, appointment and removal of its , servants under law is a part of the business or \"touches\" the business D of, the Society. (Reliance for this argument bas been placed on\n\nFarkhundali Naunhay v. V. B. Potdar (').\n\n(iii) Even if contention (ii) is not accepted, the dispute raised by the respondent, Babu Bhai Negracha is one \"touching th~ managen1ent of the society''.\n\nThe expression 'management' takes in the entire ' ' ' staff or establishment of servants which run the affairs of tl1c Society.\n\n(iv) Once it is held that the dispute between the Society and its past servant, Babu Bhai Negracha, touches the \"business\" or the \"management\" of the Society, or both, within the meaning of Sectiofr 96, the Registrar or his nominee, alone, shall have jurisdiction to p adjudicate such dispute by compulsory arbitration; and the non-obstante clanse in the Section shall bar the determination of that dispute hv <' Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.\n\nAs against the above, Mr. Rama Reddy, amicus rnriae, submitted as under:\n\n(i) Since the se.rvices of the second respondent were terminated on February 21, 1962, before the Act of 1961 came into force, the Act relevant for\" this discussion is the Act of 1925.\n\n(ii) Irrespective of whether the Act of 1925 or the Act of 1961 governs the appellant-Society, the expression \"any dispute\" commonly occurring in Section 54 of the Act of 1925 and Section 96 of the'.\n\n(I) AJ.R. 1962 Born. 162.\n\nr\"'\"•\n\nAct of 1961, is restricted in its scope to a dispute of a, civil nature which is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee, and does not take in an industrial dispute between the Society and its workmen which under the B.l.R. Act is triable by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunals, only.\n\n(iii) B.I.R. Act is a special law, dealing with the special subject of industrial disputes, which in their nature arc essentially different from ordinary Civil disputes between an employer and his employee governed by the Law of Contract, , B.I.R. Act provides for a special machinery for adjudication of industrial disputes.\n\nAs against this, the Cooperative Societies Act of 1925/or of 1961 is a general enactment and it must yield to the B.IR. Act whenever the provisions of the latter by their language are clearly applicable to a dispute.\n\nReference has been made to Jul/undur Transport Cooperative Society\n\nUd. v. Punjab State(').\n\n(iv) The scope of the expression \"any dispute touching the business of the Society\", occurring in Section 54 of the Act of 1925/or Section 96 of the Act of 1961 is limited to disputes directly relatillg to the actual trading or commercial activities of the Society.\n\nThis expression does not take in a dispute between the Society and its employee relating to. tl1e conditions of his employment, which will include the termination of his employment.\n\nThis point is concluded by the decision of this Court in Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v.\n\nA dditic>nul Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad('), which follows the ratio of its earlier decision in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v.\n\nJ)alichand lungraj Jain(').\n\nIn view of these decisions, the ratio of Farkhundali's case (ibid) decided by the Bombay High Court, is no longer good law.\n\n( v) The expression \"management\" in Section 96 oE the Act of 1961, means \"the Board of Directors\", or \"the Board of Trustee~\". or the \"Managing Committee\" or \"'Executive Bcxiy'' which. has the overall control of the affairs and business of the Society, and it does not include the individual workers or employees, individual workmen , or employees of the Society who carry on the day-to-day administra•\n\ntion of the Society; nor will it take in matters touching the service conditions of tl1e servants of the Society such as their appointment to service or their discharge, removal from service and their wag~.\n\nA dispute of the kind raised by the second . respondent, therefore,\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 34.\n\n(2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 205.\n\n(3) [1969] l S.C.R. 885.\n\nIt. will not fall within the purview of the phrase \"any dispute touching the management of the Society'' used in Section 96.\n\nBefore appreciating the contentions canvassed on both sides, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the Act of 1925 and • the Act of 1961.\n\nThe relevant part of Section 54 of the Act of 1925, reads thus :\n\n\"(1) (a) If any dispute touching the constitution or business of Society arises between members or past members of the Society or persons claimir g through a member or a past member or between members or past members or persons so claiming and any o; ffice.r, agent or servant of the Society or its Committee, and any officer, agent, member or servant of the Society past or present, it shall be referred to the Registrar for decision by himself or his nominee ...... \"\n\nThe corresponding Section 96 of the Act of 1961 lays down : D \"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other\n\nlaw for the time' being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a Society shall be referred in e prescribed form . . . . if the parties thereto are from amongst the follo\\\\ng :-\n\n(a) a Society, its Committee, any past Committee, any past or present officer, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or nominee, hci.r or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agenl:\n\nor deceased servant of the Society, or the Liquidatoc of the Society .... \"\n\nA comparison between the portions of the two Sections, extracted above, brings out two points of difference.\n\nFirstly, in Sectioa 54, there is no non-<Jbstante clause, while Section 96( 1) begins with the words \"Notwithstanding anything contaiped in any other law for the time being in force\".\n\nSecondly, while in Section 54, the word 'management' does not occur, in the corresponding Section 96(1) of the. 1961 Act, the word 'management' has been inserted in-between the words 'constitution' and 'business'.\n\nIt is significant to note that the phrase \"any dispute touching the constitution. . . . or business of the Society\" is a common feature of both the aforesaid Sections. We emphasise this fact, because it is thls common feature, rather than the points of difference between the two Sections, that holds the key to a correct solution of the problem before us.\n\n.i..\n\nFrom a conspectus of the decisions cited at. the Bar, we may devise two broad tests to determine the points in controversy in the instant case: First, whether the expression \"any dispute\" spoken of in Section 54 of the Act of 1925, and Section 96 of the Act of 1961, is one which is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nonrinee under the relevant Cooperative Societies Act ? Second, whe- ther a dispute raised by a servant against his employer, the Cooperative Society, for setting aside his removal from service on the ground that it was an act of victinrisation and for reinstatement in service with back wages, is one \"touching the management or business of the Society\" within the contemplation of the said provisions ?\n\nAs regards the first test, it is to be noted that the expression \"any dispute\" has not been defined in the Acts of 1925 and 1961.\n\nThe term \"dispute\" means a controversy having both positive and negative aspects.\n\nIt postulates the assertion of a claim by one party ana itS denial by the other.\n\nThe word \"any\" prefixed to \"dispute\" may at first glance, appear to give the expression \"any dispute\" a very wide amplitude covering all classes of disputes, whatever be their nature.\n\nBut the context of these provisions, the object and scheme of the Acts of 1925/1961 show that the Legislatures never intended to give such a wide scope to this expression. The related provisions and tlie scheme of the Acts unerringly indicate that the expression. \"any dispute\" has been used in a narrower sense limited to contested claims of a civil nature, which could have been decided by civil or revenue courts, but\n\nfor the provisions with regard to compulsory arbitration by the Registrar or his nominee, found in Section 54 of the Act of 1925 /96 of the Act Of 1961. The 'first indication of this being the right construction, is discernible in sub-section (2) of Section 96 which states that when , any question arises whether for the purposes of sub-section (1) a matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not, the question sha1! \\be considered by the Registrar, whose decision shall be final.\n\nThis means, it is incumbent on the Registrar to decide as a prelinrinary issue, whether the dispute is of a kind under sub-section ( 1) of Section 96 falling within his jurisdiction. Ji this preliminary issue is found in the negative, he will have no further jurisdiction to deal with the matter.\n\nA further clue to the interpretation of \"any dispute\" used in 'Section 96(1) is available in Section 97(1) which prescribes periods of linritation for disputes of the kind specified in its clauses (a) and (b), referred to the Registrar under Section 96.\n\nSub-section (2) of 'Section 97 which is in the nature of a residuary provision, states that the period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in sub-section (1) which are required to be referred to the\n\nRegistrar under Section 96, shall be regulated by the provisions of the lndian Limitation Act, \"as if the dispute were a suit, and the Registrar as Civil Court\". The last clause M sub-section (2) which has been underlined, unmistakably shows that only disputes of a civil nature which could be the subject of civil suits triable by ordinary civil courts, will fall within the scope of the expression \"any dispute\" used in Section 96 (1 l- '\n\nAnother definite pointer to the above being the right construction ~\n\nof \"any dispute\" is available in sub-section (3) of Section 98 which provides: _ ).\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 96, the Registrar may, if he thinks fit. suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute, if the question at issue between a society and a clain1ant or between different claimants 1 is one irivolving complicated question of Jaw or fact, until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the parties or by the society. If any such suil is not instituted within two\n\nmonths from the Registrar's order suspending proceedings,. the Registrar shall take action as is provided in sub-section\n\n(1) .\"\n\nIt is 110teworthy that this sub-section is substantially in the sam<:· Etem1s as the proviso to sub-section ( 1) of Section 54 of the Act of J 925, extracted earlier.\n\nThe proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 54 of the Act of 1925 corresponding to sub-section (3) of Section 98 of the Act of 1961,. unmistakably shows that the compulsory arbitration by the Registr&r, on a reference under Section 96. is only a substitute for adjudicatiouof disputes of a civil nature normally tried by civil courts.\n\nFurther indication regarding the nature of disputes which the Registrar may determine, is furnished by Selion 166(1) which pro-·\n\nvides:\n\n\"166(1). Bar of jurisdiction of Courts : Save as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of-\n\n(a)\n\n(b) any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar, or his norrUnee, or board of nominees, for decision.\"\n\nIt will be seen that Section 166, in terms, bars the jurisdiction only of Civil or Revenue Court, and 1101 of the Labour Court or any\n\nIndustrial Tribunal constituted under the B.I.R. Act or Industrial Disputes Act to adjudicate industrial disputes. It is clear that the Legislature never intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to determine claims and industr.ial disputes which cannot be adjudicated by the ordinary Civil Courts.\n\nNow. let us turn to the nature of the dispute raised by the second respondent.\n\nIs it a dispute relating to a right which he could establish by filing a suit in a Civil Court? -assuming for the moment that nothing in the relevant Cooperative Societies Act is a bar to such a• suit.\n\nThe answer must be in the negative.\n\nThe respondent is not claiming a civil right arising from the contract of employment with the appellant-Bank.\n\nWhat he is claiming is not enforcement of any term of the contract of his employment on the part of his employer.\n\nHe is alleging that his services have been ter111inated unfairly and vindictively becansc of his legitimate trade union activities, as an act of victimisation.\n\nThe relief claimed by him is of rcinstarement in service with back wages.\n\nThe rights and reliefs which he is claiming could not be determined and granted by a Civil Court in a suit.\n\nAs Luding Teller puts it,. \"a Court of Law proceeds on the footing that I no power exists in the Courts to make contracts for people and the parties must make their own contracts.\n\nThe Courts reach their limit of power when they enforce contracts which the parties had made.\"\n\n(Quoted with approval in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v.\n\nBrijnandan Pandey.(') The rights claimed by the second respondent are those which are conferred on workmen and employees under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, to ensure social justice.\n\nSuch rights which do not stem froni the contract of employment can be enforced only in the Labour Court constituted under the B.J.R. Act.\n\nThe Labour Court is competent to grant the relief o[ reinstatement claimed by the respondent, while in view of Section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief AQ.,\n\nthen in force, the Civil Court was not competent to grant that relief.\n\nThe dispute was raised by the second respondent by writing an approach letter to his employer, the appellant, as required by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.\n\nIn substance, it was an industrial dispute. It was not restricted to a claim under the contract or agreement of employment.\n\nThe Civil Court cannot grant the reliefs claimed by the second respondent.\n\nAs rightly submitted by Mr. Rama Reddy, if a Court is incapable of granting the relief claimed, normally, the proper construction would be that it is incompetent to deal with the matter.\n\n(I) [19561 S.C..R. 800.\n\nThe matter can be looked at from another angle, also.\n\nThe law of industrial disputes or industrial relations is a special law dealing with rights and obligations specially created by it.\n\nAs against this, the provision in Section 54 of the Act of 1925/Section 96 of the Act of 196.1 is a general provision.\n\nIn accordance with the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, therefore, nothing in these general provisions can derogate from B.I.R. Act and the Cooperative Society 6ct must yield to the special provisions in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, whenever a dispute clearly comes within the language • of the latter Act.\n\nIn the light of the above discussion, the conclusion is inescapable that the expression \"any dispute\" referred to in Section 54 of the 1925 Act/Section 96 of the 1961 Act, does not cover a dispute of the kind raised by respondent 2 against the appellant-Bank.\n\nComing now to the second test, it may be observed that to a part of it, the pronouncement of this Court in Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad (ibid), furnishes a complete ariswer, wherein the interpretation of this very phrase \"touching° the business of the - Society\" occurring in Section 61 of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, which largely corresponds to Section 96 of the Gujarat Act, 1961, came up for interpretation.\n\nThe subject-matter of the dispute was divided into three issues.\n\nThe first issue comprised a number of service conditions including inter alla salary, scales and adjustment or dearne.s allowance, conveyance charges, provident fund and grataity, etc.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the Bank that the effect of Section 61 and other provisions of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act was to exclude the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to deal with such disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nAfter noticing a number of decisions and after referring to the previous decision of this Court in Deccan Cooperative Bank, tl1c Court negatived the contention with these observations:\n\n\"The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmeri which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute.\n\nThe Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed nnder this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself. . . .\n\nThe word \"business\" is\n\nuated with the actaal trading or commercial or other\n\nii:\n\nsimilar business activity of the society, and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employee, can be said to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society ..... Thus it is clear that in respect of the dispute regarding the alteration of various conditions of service, . the Registrar or other person dealing with it under Section 62 of the Act is not competent to grant the relief claimed by the workmen at all.\n\nOn the principle laid down by this Court in the case of the Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd., Civil Appeal No.· 358 of 1967 dated 29-8-68, AIR 1969 SC 1320 (supra) therefore, it must be held that this dispute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of Section 61 of the Act.\n\nSuch a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with under Section 62 of the Act and must therefore, be held to be outside the scope of Section 61.\"\n\nThe observations quoted above, negate contention (ii) advanced by Mr. Dholakia.\n\nIt however, remains to be considered whether the dispute raised by the second respondent in the present case, comes within the purview of the expression \"touching the management of the Society\" used in Section 96(c) of the Act of 1961. ·\n\nIn this connection, it may be noticed that just as in Section 96(1), in Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Corporation Societies' Act, 1964, also, which came up for consideration in Cooperative\n\nCentral Banks' case before this Court, the term management does occur in the collocation of words \"constitution, management or business\". But no specific argument seems to have been then raised that a dispute between the Society and its former servants relating to the conditions of service, comes within the purview of the expression 'touching the management of the Society'.\n\nPerhaps, it was taken for granted that if the dispute was not comprehended by the expression \"business of the Society\", it would not be covered by the words \"management of the Society'', either.\n\nAlthough there is little discussion in the jdgment about the ambit and import of the expression \"management\", yet in conclusion, it was clearly and emphatically held\n\n-A that the dispute in that case was \"outside the scope of SectioJl 61.\"\n\nWe will now, focus attention on the expression \"n1anagement of the Society\" used in Section 96(1) of the Act of 1961.\n\nGrammatically, one meaning of the term 'management' is: 'the Board of Directors' or 'the apex body' or Executive Committee at the helm which guides, regulates, supervises, directs and controls the affair.s of the Society'. fo this sense, it may not include the individnals who under the over-all control of that governing body or Cominittee, run the dayto-day business of the Society. (see Words and phrases, by West Publishing Co. Permanent Edition, Vol. 26, page 357, citing, Warner & Swasey Co. v. Rusterholz D. C. Minn.('). Another meaning of the\n\nt\\:rm 'management', may be: 'U1e act or acts of managing or governing by direction, guidance, superintendence, regulation and control the affairs of a Society.'\n\nA still wider meaning of the term which will encompass the entire staff of. servants and workmen of the Society, has been canvass_ed for by Mr. Dholakia. The use of the term 'management' in such a wide sense In Section 96 ( l) appears to us, to be very doubtful.\n\nBe that as it may, what has been directly bidden \"out-of-bounds\"\n\nfor the Registrar by lh0 very scheme and object of the Act, can.not be indirectly inducted by widening the connotation of 'management'. A construction free from contexual constraints, having the effect of smuggling into the circumscribed limits of the expression \"any dispute\", a dispute which from its very nature is incapable of being resolved by the Registrar, has to be eschewed.\n\nThus considered, a dispute raised against the Society by its discharged servant claiming . , reliefs, such , as reinstatement in service with back wages, which are -, not enforceable in a Civil Court, is outside the scope of the expression \"touching th~ management. of the Society\" used .in Section 960) .of ._.. the Act of 1961, and the Registrar has no .iurisdiction to deal with\n\nand determine it.\n\nSuch a dispute squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under tl1e .BJ.R. Act. .\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant tried to argue as a last resqrt that the relief sought by the second respondent could be granted ~'r/.Y )he Registrar by relaxing or moulding the StaffRgulations and By, e7)aws which lay down conditions of scryicc governing the cmploycs , of_, thc\n\nSociety. It is pointed , out that.under the Act of 1961. the Jlegistrar .has the power. \\o amend or modify .such Regulations .and Bye-la,),'l'S.\n\n'(1)41 F. Supp. 398, 505.\n\nWr;. find no merit in this contention, also.\n\nA similar argument was advanced before tbis Court in Coopera- . tire Central Bank's Case; ibid, and was repelled inter alia, with the reasoning that the bye-laws of the Bank, containing the conditions of service were in the nature of a contract between the Bank and its . employees and a change of such bye-Jaws, embodying the conditions of employ111c11t, \"could not possibly be directed by the Registrar where, under s. 62 (4) of the (ANDHRA) Act, be is specifically required to decide the dispute referred to him iu accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws\". It was further observed that a dispute. referred to the Registrar can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been invested with powers iu that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator. But neither the Registrar nor bis nominee will be competent to grant the relief requiring a change in the service conditions of the employees, under section 62 of the Andhra Act. Such a relief could be granted only by the Industrial Tribunal which under the Industrial Disputes Act, has the jurisdiction even to vary contracts of service between au employer and employees. This reasoning is applicable mutatis mutandis to the instant case.\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Ju token of our gratitude for the valuable assistance\n\nrendered to us by Shri Rama Reddy as amicus curiae, we direct that E an honorarium of Rs. 1500/- be paid to him, which shall be taxed as costs awarded against the appellant.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 145, "entities": [{"text": "GUJARAT STATE COOPERATIVE LAND DEVELOPMENT\n\nBANK LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Gujarat Sfate Cooperative Land ' Development Bank Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. R. MANDED AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. R. MANDED AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 96, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 23, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 311, "end_char": 351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 662, "end_char": 701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gujtairat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 757, "end_char": 799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIR-1362·5H dated March 2, 1963, the Government of Gujarat directed under s. 2(4) of the Bombay Industrial Rela\".'"}}, {"text": "s. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gujtairat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961", "statute": "the Gujtairat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Utbour Court Rajkot", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1612, "end_char": 1631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15, filed an applic:ition in the Utbour Court Rajkot, alleging that his services had been illegally and maliciously terminated as an act of victimisation on account of ,.ilr-- his trade union activities and praying for setting aside the -order of his termina tion of service and for reinstatement with full back wages."}}, {"text": "June 11, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Court by its order dated June 11, 1963, overruled the preli mi nary objection raised by the appellant Bank, namely, that \"the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 Under which the application Was made by the respondent was not applicable to its ca:se, as it was a co.operative society\n\ngoVerned by the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, unde'r which only the Reg5trar or his nominee had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and the Labour G Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application\"."}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Verned by the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2523, "end_char": 2541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Bank's writ petition challenging the said order of the Labour Court OOs dismissed by the Gujarat High Court by its judgment dated August 25, 1967 ."}}, {"text": "August 25, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2564, "end_char": 2579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Bank's writ petition challenging the said order of the Labour Court OOs dismissed by the Gujarat High Court by its judgment dated August 25, 1967 ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No new plea can be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, as a matter of right."}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3381, "end_char": 3391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombav\n\nCooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombav\n\nCooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4418, "end_char": 4428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombav\n\nCooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombav\n\nCooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4762, "end_char": 4767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4914, "end_char": 4919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5047, "end_char": 5052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6079, "end_char": 6084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Rclalions Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6473, "end_char": 6497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Rclalions Act", "statute": "Industrial Rclalions Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act or Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6758, "end_char": 6816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7168, "end_char": 7176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act or Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act or Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7184, "end_char": 7203, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Relations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7587, "end_char": 7611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8800, "end_char": 8823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholnkia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9286, "end_char": 9300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dholnkia and R. C. 'Rhatia for th' Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. 'Rhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9305, "end_char": 9318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dholnkia and R. C. 'Rhatia for th' Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9339, "end_char": 9351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy, Amicus Curiae for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9434, "end_char": 9442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThe appellant is the Gujarat Sfate Cooperative Land ' Development Bank Ltd. (hereafter referred to as \"the Bank)."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Sfate Cooperative Land ' Development Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9469, "end_char": 9523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThe appellant is the Gujarat Sfate Cooperative Land ' Development Bank Ltd. (hereafter referred to as \"the Bank).", "canonical_name": "Gujarat Sfate Cooperative Land ' Development Bank Ltd."}}, {"text": "is a Society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9565, "end_char": 9637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has 127 Branches spread 1!11 over the State of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Dasada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9854, "end_char": 9860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of its Branches is in Dasada, Surendranagar District."}}, {"text": "Surendranagar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9862, "end_char": 9884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of its Branches is in Dasada, Surendranagar District."}}, {"text": "February 2r, t962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His services were terminated by an order, dated February 2r, t962, by giving him\n\none month's pay in lieu of notice under Staff Regulation No."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 2, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10444, "end_char": 10457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIR-1362-5-H, dated March 2, 1963, pub- J1shed in the Gujarat Gazette in March 1963, the Government of Gujarat directed under Section 2 ( 4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947) that all the provisions ot the said Act shall apply with cifoct from March 15, 1963 to the• business of banking by Cooperative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutcn -, reas of the State, registered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. '"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10550, "end_char": 10559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961", "statute": "The Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10572, "end_char": 10609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 15, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10703, "end_char": 10717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIR-1362-5-H, dated March 2, 1963, pub- J1shed in the Gujarat Gazette in March 1963, the Government of Gujarat directed under Section 2 ( 4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947) that all the provisions ot the said Act shall apply with cifoct from March 15, 1963 to the• business of banking by Cooperative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutcn -, reas of the State, registered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. '"}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10774, "end_char": 10784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIR-1362-5-H, dated March 2, 1963, pub- J1shed in the Gujarat Gazette in March 1963, the Government of Gujarat directed under Section 2 ( 4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947) that all the provisions ot the said Act shall apply with cifoct from March 15, 1963 to the• business of banking by Cooperative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutcn -, reas of the State, registered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. '"}}, {"text": "Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10866, "end_char": 10905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 20, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11038, "end_char": 11053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by the termination of his service, the second respqndent approached the appellant's Dasada's Branch by a letter, dated August 20, 1962, stating that since his services were terminated illegally by way of victimisation, he should be reinstated in the service."}}, {"text": "Labour Court at Rajkot", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11241, "end_char": 11263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the second respondent filed an application in the Labour Court at Rajkot, alleging that his service had been illegally and maliciously terminated as an act of victimisation on account of his trade union activities."}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12184, "end_char": 12195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "January 22, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12638, "end_char": 12654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this Court on January 22, 1969, the Bank made an application for leave to urge as additional ground, namely, that the Bank is not D doing banking business, i.e. accepting for the purpose of lending or investment of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawable by cheque, draft, order or otherwise as .defined in Section 5, Clauses (b) and (c) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949; and that this being the true position, the Notification No."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12977, "end_char": 12986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banking Companies Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13015, "end_char": 13042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 7, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13193, "end_char": 13206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DIR-1362-IV-H dated March 2, 1963, published in the Gujarat Gov- E emment Gazette dated March 7, 1963, under Section 2(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act XI of 1947) is not applicable to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13214, "end_char": 13226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13234, "end_char": 13271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XI of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13273, "end_char": 13294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13382, "end_char": 13391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was strenuously opposed by Shri Ram Reddy, who is assisting the Court as amicus curia{; on behalf of respondent 2, who has not been able to appear and defend ; himself in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Rama Reddy"}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13952, "end_char": 13971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13973, "end_char": 13995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14495, "end_char": 14504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act VII of 1925", "statute": "Bombay Act VII of 1925"}}, {"text": "Dholakia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arunients of Mr. Dholakia, appearing for the appellant, may be summansed as follows :\n\n(i) The case is governed by the Gujarat Cooperative Societicc, Act, l 961 (hereafter called the Act of 1961) and not by the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 (hereafter referred to as the Act of 1925)."}}, {"text": "Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14739, "end_char": 14777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Babu Bhai Negracha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15790, "end_char": 15808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iv) Once it is held that the dispute between the Society and its past servant, Babu Bhai Negracha, touches the \"business\" or the \"management\" of the Society, or both, within the meaning of Sectiofr 96, the Registrar or his nominee, alone, shall have jurisdiction to p adjudicate such dispute by compulsory arbitration; and the non-obstante clanse in the Section shall bar the determination of that dispute hv <' Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16123, "end_char": 16204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rama Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16233, "end_char": 16243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against the above, Mr. Rama Reddy, amicus rnriae, submitted as under:\n\n(i) Since the se.rvices of the second respondent were terminated on February 21, 1962, before the Act of 1961 came into force, the Act relevant for\" this discussion is the Act of 1925.", "canonical_name": "Rama Reddy"}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16647, "end_char": 16657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17744, "end_char": 17754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17777, "end_char": 17787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Farkhundali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18399, "end_char": 18410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these decisions, the ratio of Farkhundali's case (ibid) decided by the Bombay High Court, is no longer good law."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18440, "end_char": 18457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these decisions, the ratio of Farkhundali's case (ibid) decided by the Bombay High Court, is no longer good law."}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18519, "end_char": 18529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 1 S.C.R. 205", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19195, "end_char": 19214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19356, "end_char": 19366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19544, "end_char": 19554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20078, "end_char": 20088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20859, "end_char": 20873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20999, "end_char": 21009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21070, "end_char": 21083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21760, "end_char": 21770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21795, "end_char": 21805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23300, "end_char": 23310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23451, "end_char": 23461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23829, "end_char": 23839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24051, "end_char": 24064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 97(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24081, "end_char": 24094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24230, "end_char": 24240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24263, "end_char": 24273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24491, "end_char": 24501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24554, "end_char": 24568, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24897, "end_char": 24907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25039, "end_char": 25049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25111, "end_char": 25121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25750, "end_char": 25760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25836, "end_char": 25846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25902, "end_char": 25912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26024, "end_char": 26034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26564, "end_char": 26575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act or Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26727, "end_char": 26757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27247, "end_char": 27272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Luding Teller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27911, "end_char": 27924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Luding Teller puts it,. \""}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28678, "end_char": 28688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rama Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29186, "end_char": 29196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As rightly submitted by Mr. Rama Reddy, if a Court is incapable of granting the relief claimed, normally, the proper construction would be that it is incompetent to deal with the matter.", "canonical_name": "Rama Reddy"}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29594, "end_char": 29604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29624, "end_char": 29634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30122, "end_char": 30132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30149, "end_char": 30159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30588, "end_char": 30598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30602, "end_char": 30648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30679, "end_char": 30689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "Gujarat Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30697, "end_char": 30714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31055, "end_char": 31065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gujarat Act, 1961", "statute": "the Gujarat Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31227, "end_char": 31250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Deccan Cooperative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31352, "end_char": 31375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After noticing a number of decisions and after referring to the previous decision of this Court in Deccan Cooperative Bank, tl1c Court negatived the contention with these observations:\n\n\"The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmeri which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute."}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32591, "end_char": 32601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32742, "end_char": 32780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the principle laid down by this Court in the case of the Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd., Civil Appeal No.·"}}, {"text": "29-8-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32818, "end_char": 32825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "358 of 1967 dated 29-8-68, AIR 1969 SC 1320 (supra) therefore, it must be held that this dispute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of Section 61 of the Act."}}, {"text": "AIR 1969 SC 1320", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32827, "end_char": 32843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32943, "end_char": 32953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33025, "end_char": 33035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33102, "end_char": 33112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33399, "end_char": 33412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33490, "end_char": 33503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33508, "end_char": 33518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative\n\nCentral Banks", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33616, "end_char": 33642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, it may be noticed that just as in Section 96(1), in Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Corporation Societies' Act, 1964, also, which came up for consideration in Cooperative\n\nCentral Banks' case before this Court, the term management does occur in the collocation of words \"constitution, management or business\"."}}, {"text": "Section 96(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34528, "end_char": 34541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35488, "end_char": 35498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 960", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36283, "end_char": 36294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37414, "end_char": 37419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37932, "end_char": 37942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38041, "end_char": 38064, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38531, "end_char": 38537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1038_1084_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "if-;.\n\nMAHINDRA & MAIDNDRA LTD~\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ANR.\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, JASWANT SINGH AND A. P. SEN, JJ.j\n\nMonopolies & Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969-S. 13(2) and .55- Scope of-Nature of order passed under s. 13(2).\n\nMonopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Commission-If shr!dd give reasons for its order even in exparte orders.\n\nC Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements-~Obligations under the Act ____j_ when presenting an application alleging restrictive trade practices in an agreement.\n\nl.Maerpretation of statutes-Reference and incorporation of one enactment in llnother-D1Jtinction between-Substantial que:;1io11 of law-Meaning of.\n\nD SectiOn lO(a) (iii) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 empowers the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to enquire into any restrictive trade practices upon an application made to it by th~ Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements.\n\nSection 13 (2) provides that \"any order made by the Commission _may be amended or revoked at any time i11 the manner in which it was made.\" Section 55 provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Central Government or the E Commission under s. 13 or s. 37 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds specified in s. 100, Code of Civil Procedure~\n\n1908.\n\nOn the date on which the Act came into force s. 100 C.P.C. specified three grounds on which a second appeal could lie to the High Court one of them being that the decision appealed against was contrary to law. By an F amendment made in 1976 s. 100 was substituted by la new section which provides that a second appeal shall lie to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question, of law.\n\nThe appellant, who wns a manufacturer of jeep motor vehides, their spare parts and accessories, submitted for registration to the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements, standard distributorship agreements entered into by it with its distributors. After registering the agreements, in his application to the Commission, the Registrar alleged that certain clauses in the agreement related to restrictive trade practices and that some of them were prejudicial to public interest.\n\nThe appellant, in reply to the Commission's notice, stated that it did not wish to be heard in the proceedings before the Commission, pointing out at the same time that there was nothing in the impugned clauses of the agree~ ment which could be said to constitute restrictive trade practices the reasons whereof had_ alreadv been explained in itS reply.\n\n. I\n\n. i-\n\nI• '\n\n. \"\"'\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION 1039\n\nThe Reg; r; trar flied before the Commission an alfidavit in support of his A .application but that too did not contain any further or additional material J:han ~'hat \\Vas set out in his application. No other evidence, oral or docu mentary, \\Vas produced by him before the Commission in support of the al1eg<1tion that the agreement constituted a restrictive trade practice.\n\nBy its order dated May 14, 1976 the Comn1ission declared certain clauses , of the appellanfs distributorship agreement to be void.\n\nWhile correspondence B was going on between the Registrar and the appellant on the submissiori of a revised distr; brnorship agrecn1cnt, this Court in Tata Enghwcting & l.ocon1oti1e Co. Ltd. v. REgistrar of Restrictive Trade Practices, [1977] 2 SCR 685 gave its interpretation on the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nThereupon the appel~ Jant made an application to the Comn1ission p0inting out that it did not contest the enquiry proceedings under s. 37 in 1he first instance because the Commission's decision in the Telco case \\Va~ directly applicable; but now C that that decision had been reversed by the Supreme Court in appeal, its order dated May 14, 1976 needed amendn1cr.i:/modification.\n\nAn ::ipplication under s. 13(2) read V.'ith regulation 85 \\vas accordingly 1nade for revocation, amendment or modification of the Con1mission's order of May 14, 1976.\n\nThe Commission rejected this application by an order dated 28th February 1978.\n\nIn its appeal under s. 55 of the Act itnp1igning the Comn1ission\"s order dl3..ted 28th February 1978 the appellant contended that (1) the Registrar's application alleging restrictive trade pn1cticcs did not set out any facts sho\\1/~\n\ning hov.' the appellant's trade practices were restrictive in nature and that the Registrar's application not having been made in accordance with the Jaw laid do\\vn by this Court in Telco case the impugned order of the Commis sion \\vas liable to be revoked or n1odified under s. 13(2); (2) the order did .not give any reasons for its decision and so was vitiated; afld (3) the order was a continuing order because it required the appellant not 1nerely to cease bnt also desist from the restrictiYe: lrad~ practices set out in the order and was, therefore required to be continual1y justifiable and since it was, contrary to the law. laid down in Tc!co case it \\vas liable to be revoked .or amended; in any event the decision of this Court beini subsequent to the making of the Commission's order, there was enough justillcation for revoking or modifying the order under s. 13 (2) of the Act.\n\nThe respondent, on the other hand, contended that (l) on an application of the n.de of interpfetation enacted in s. 8(1j or the General Clauses Act, reference in s. 55 to s. 100 C.P.C. must be construed as a reference to the new s. 100, C.P.C. and so constn1ed an appeal to the Supreme Court \\vould tie only if the case involved \"a substantial question of Ja\\v\" and not otherwise and since in this case no such question :nas involved, the appeal was not\n\nmaintainable~ (2) s.13(2) could not be used by the appeliant as a substitute ior s. 55; and (3) by reason of its subsequent conduct in acquiescing in the Commission's order and unconditionally accepting it, the appe11ant \\Vas pre- cfud.ed from raising any contention against its validity in appeal to thi:r. -Court.\n\nAJ!owing the r, ppcal,\n\nHELD : The appeal is maintainable under s. 55 of the Act. [1064 CJ 1 (a) On a proper interpretation of s. 55 it n1ust be held that the grounds i; pcci~ 1O-J19SCl/7'\n\nfied in the then existing s. 100 CPC were incorporated ins. 55 and the substitution of the ne\\v s. 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated in s. 55. . In l; ny event, the present appool raises substa-ntia) questions of law, and so is mainlainable. [1064 C]\n\n(b) There is a distinction bet\\veen a mere reference to or citation of one statute in another and an incorporation. Where there is a mere reference to or citation of one _enactment in another without incorporation, s. 8(1) of the (Jeneral Clause Act applies and th~· repeal and re-i!nactment of the provision referred to or cited has the effect set out in that section and the reference to the provision repealed is required to be construed as reference to the provision as re-enacted. But ¥.'here a provision of one statute is incorporatf'.d in another, the repeal or amendment of the former does not affect the latter.\n\nThe effect of incorporation is as if the provision incorporated were \\Vritten\n\nout in the incorporting statute and were -part of it.\n\nOnce the incorporation is n1ade, the provision incorporated becomes an integral 'part of the statute in which it is transposed and thereafter there is no need to refer to the statute from which the incorpora'tion is made and any subsequent amendn1ent made in il has no effect on the incorporating st:1tute. [1060 C-01\n\nCollector of Custonu, Madras, v. Nathe/la Sa1npathu Clietty & Ant., [1962] 3 SCR 786; Ne1v Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & Ors., [1971] 2 SCR 92; Clarke v. Bradlaug1i, [1881] 8 QBD 63 at 69; Council v. Hind11S<tan Co-operative Insurance Society f, td., 58 I.A. 259, Ra111swarup v. Munshi & Ors. [l963J 3 SCR 858; Bolani Ores Ltd. v. 'state of Orissa, [1975] 2 SCR 138: t!'.'ferred to.\n\n( c) Section 55 is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference.\n\nIn enacting s. 55 the legislature did not want to confer an unlim:ted right of appeal but wanted to restrict it.\n\nIt found that the grounds set out. in the then existing s. 100 CPC were appropriate for restricting the right of appeal and hence incorporated them in s. 55.\n\nThe legislature could never have intended to limit the right of appeal to any ground or grounds which might from time to time find place in s. 100 without knowing what those A1ounds were. rt063 B~DJ\n\nl'..'d) Seco!ldly, the Act is a self-contained code and it is not possible to believe that the legislature could have made the right of appeal under such a. code depr.n•lenl on the viscititudes of a qection in another statute. [1063 F]\n\n(e) That apart, an indissoluble Jink between s. 55 and s. 100, CPC would lead to a startling result. If, for example, s. 100 were repealed, s. 55 would be reduced 'to futility and the right of appeal under the Act would be wholly gone. It would be absurd to place on the language of s. 55 an interpretation, which might in a given situation result in denial of the right of appeal altogether and thus defeat the plain object and purpose of the section. [1063 1-I]\n\n(f) Even assuming that the right of appeal under s.55 is restricted to the ground speCified in .the new s. 100 CPC: the present appeal would still be\n\n1naintainable because it involves a substant1<1l question of la\\V relating to the inter1lrelation of s. 13(2) of the Act. [1064 D]\n\n• \" .\n\n.-L J\n\n' I\n\n• , i\n\nI 1t\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION 1041\n\n(g), The test for determining whether a question of law raised in an A appeal is a substantial question of law is to see whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly or substantially affects the rights of parties and if so whether it is .an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or call for discussion of alternative views.\n\n[1064 El r B\n\n• '\n\nSir Ch::ni/al V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Th::. C'er!fury Spi1111in<.; and Ntanufac~ turing Co. Ltd., [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 549; referred to.\n\nJn the present case the appeal clearly involves a substantial question of law within the meaning of the Act, becau~::! the interpretation of s. l3t2) directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and is not finally settled by this Court.\n\n2(a) The words \"in the manner in which it was made\" occurring in s. 13(2) have no bearing on the content or the scope and ambit of the power but merely indicate the procedure to be followed by the Commission n an1end:ng or revoking an order made by it. :1064 H]\n\n(b) The power conferred under s. 13 (2) is •of the widest amptitude and in this respect it j5 unlike s. 22 of the Enish Act. This power is intended to ensure that the order passed is and continues to be in conformity with the requirements of the Act, and the trade practice condemned by the order is really and truly a restrictive trade practices and it must therefore, be construed in a wide c.nse so a~ to effectuate the object and purpose of the grant of the powec. [1065 BJ\n\n(c) The powers under s. 13(2) land s. 55 are distinct and independent powers and one cannot be read as subject to the other. The scope and appli- E cability of s. 13 (2) is not cut down by the provision for appeal under s. 55.\n\nIt is perhaps bedause the right of appeal given under s. 55 is limited to a question of law that a wide and unfettered power is conferred on the Comm_i:, siC•il to cin1end or revoke an order in app.:opriate cases. [1066 A]\n\n(d) 'fl1e conferment of such wide and unusual power under s. 13(2) was necessary to ensure that an erroneous order is capable of being corrected.\n\nF An order made under s. 37 or under any other provision of the Act may affect not only the parties before the Commission but also others such as the whole net-work of distributors or dealers who were not before the Com7 mission. Jt may also b:tr\"ect the entire trade in the product. There may be some facts or circumstances having a crucial bearing on the determination of the enquiry which, if taken into account, may result in a different order being made or some fact or circumstance may aris~ which may expose the G invtalidity of the order or render it bad. There may be a material change in the relevant c:1cnmstances subsequent to the making of the order.\n\nThere fore, by its very nature, the order of the Commission is transient or proten1ro1 e nnd must be liable to be altered or revolced according as there is inaterial ch:'lnge in the relevant economic facts and circumstanccs. [1066 B-E]\n\n(e) But howsoever large may be the power under s. 13(2), it ctannot be construet; to be so wide as to permit a rehearing on the satn~ n:ate.ial without H anythir:g niore with a view to showing that the 1)rder 'vas wrong on facts. [lOf17\n\n(f) When Regulation 85 says that the prov1s1ons of s. 114 and 0. XLVII, r. 1 CPC shall as far as may, be applied to the proceedings under s. 13(2) it cannot be read to mean that an application under s.13(2) can be maintained only on the grounds set out in s. 114 and 0. XLVJI r. 1. This regulation does not in any manner limit the width and amplitude of the power under s.13(2).\n\n~;),· good part of it is procedural in nature and has nothing to do with the grounds on which an application under s. 13(2) may be maintained. The words \"as far as may\" occurring in its last part do not indicate that an ttpplication under s. 13(2) can be maintainell only on the grounds set out in s. 114 and 0. XLVII, r. 1, CPC.\n\nAll that they indicate is that the provisions of s.114 and 0. XLVIl, r. 1 are to be invoked only to the extent applicable,\n\nand if in a given case they are not applicable they may be igriored; but that does not mean that the power conferred under s. j 3 (2) would, not be exercisable in such a ce.\n\nThe reference to the provisions of s. 114 and 0. XLVII, r. 1 does not limit the grounds on which an application may be made under s. 13'(2). Clearly, therefore, even if a case does not fall within s. 114 and 0. XLVII, r.1, the Comn1ission would have poWer in an appropriate case to amend or revoke an order made by it in the exercise of its power under s. 13(2). [1067 EH]\n\n3(a) The Power of the Co1nn1ission under s.13(2) was exercisable in the\n\n-\"'\n\nD present case and the ofder dated 14th May 1976 \\Vas liable to be revoked.\n\n[1077 B]\n\n(b) The subn1ission of the distributorship agreement for registration under s. 33 cannot be construed as ndn1ission on the '0:ppellant's part that the clauses in the agreement constituted restrictive trade practices.\n\nThe appellant. had possibly sbmitted the agreement for registfation on the erroneous view (which was also the view of the Commission in the Telco case) that the moment an agreement contains a trade practice falling within any of the clauses. of s. 33(1) -the trade practice must, irrespective of Whether it falls within the definition of s. 2(o) or not, be regarded as a restrictive trade practice and the agreement n1ust be registered. The question whether a particular trade prac~ tice is restrictive or not is essentita.Uy a question of law based on the applica- .... ~. tion of !he definition _in s. 2(o) to the\" facts of a given case and no adn1is- - sion on a question of law can ever be used, in evidence against the make of F the admission. Therefore, even assuming that there was an admission in ~- submitting the agreement for registration it could not be used as evidence ag,; iinst the appellant in the enquiry under s. 37. [i075 CG]\n\n( c) There was nothing in the conduct of the appellant which would amount to acquiescence or raise an estoppel against it.\n\nThe appellant did :qot, at any time, l; i.-c; cep\"\"t the impugned order knowing that it •vas erroneous.\n\nThere G can be no acquiescence without knowledge of the right to repudiate or challenee. l'J 068 H1\n\n(d) Neither did the failure of the bppellant to prefer an appeal amount to acquiescence on -its part because an application under s. 13 (2). which is tin alternative ;:iud a more effective remedy, w;:i,~ available to it. [1069 G]\n\n(e) The fact that the appellant did not implement the by' entering into revised distributorship agreements with its showed that there was no acquiescen, ce on it5 part so far as 14th Mriy 1.976 'vas concerned. [1070 C]\n\nimpugned order distributors also the order dated\n\n•'\n\n~· ' I•\"f\n\n' •\n\nI •\n\nMAHIND~ LTD. V. UNION' 1043\n\n(f) Estoppel can arise only if a party to a proceeding had altered bis .\\j position on the faith of a represent&tion or promise made by another. In the instant case there is nothing to show that the Registrar had altered his position on the basis of the application for extension of time made by the appellant. [1070 D~\n\n4(a). The order of the Commission was bad oecause it was bed on no material an<l, could not possibly have been mde by the Com1nission. [1076 A-B] B\n\n(b) The definition of restrictive trade practice in the Act is, to some extent, based on the rule of reason evolved by American courts while interpreting •a similla,1r provision in the Sherman Act.\n\nThe rule of reason normally requires ascertainment of facts or features peculiar to the particular business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the\n\nresraint .ind !ts effect, actual or probable, the history of the restraint and the C evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular restraint and the purpose sought to be attained. It is only on a consideration of these factors that it can be decided whether a particular la.ct, contract or agreement imposing the restraint is unduly restrictive of competition so as to constitute restraint of trade. Certain restraint of trade are unreasoable per se because of their pervicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue; they ere conclusively. presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, illegal , without , D elaborate enquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business execuse for their use. In such cases illegality does not depend on a showing of the unreasonableness of the practice and it is unnecessary to have a trial to show the nature, extent and degree of its market effect. [1074 A, B; 1075 A-BJ\n\n(c) It is now settled law that every trade practice which is in restraint; of trade is not necessarily restrictive trade practice .. If a trade practice F'.'.::!::e- E ly regulates and thereby promotes competition it would not fall within the definition even if it is to some extent in restraint of trade. Therefore, the question whether ft trade practice is a restrictive trade practice or not has t~ be decided not on any theoretical or a priori reasoning, but by inqu1n~ whether it las or ma-y have the effect of preventing distorting or restrictir),,. comretition. The peculiar facts and atures of the trade would be very mu~n relevant in determining this question. [1072 HJ F\n\n(d) In the Telco case this Court laid down that an application by the.\n\nRegistrla:r under s. lO(a) (iii) must, contain facts \\Vhich in his opinion constitute restrictive trade practice and show or establish, as to hoW the alleged clauses constitute restrictive trade practice in the context of the facts.\n\nBut even if the application does not set out any facts or features showing how the trade practices complained of by the Registrar are restrictive pt1actices, G the Registrar can still, at the hearing of the enquiry, in the absence of any demand for particulars being made by the opposite party produce material before the Commission disclosing facts or features which go to establish the restrictive tivture of the trade practice complained of and if that is done, the defect in the application would not be of much consequence. [1070 G-Hl\n\nIn the instant case the burden of producing the necessary material that the impugned trade practices had the actual or porbab!e effect _of diminishing or H destroying competition and were therefore restrictive trade practices was on the Registrar who made 1an application before the Commission. No material\n\nA . beyond reproducing the impugne~ clauses of the agreement and the words of the relevant sections having been prouced, the application of the Registrar was contrary to the law laid down by this Court. Therefore, the Commission had no basis for making it-s order dated 14th May 1976.\n\n( e) The argument that the trade practices referred to in the offending clauses \\Vere per se restrictive trade practices and in any event, even if any B supporting material was necessary, it was to 1 be found in the admission of the appellant contained in its letter submitting the distributorship agreement for registration was without any force.\n\n5(n.). When the issue before the court is whctht'r a pa•rticular trade p;.:.ctice set out in_ an agreement has or may have the effect of preventing, distorting\n\nohr restricting combpebti 1 tionffso as to constitute a. restrictive trade practic~, it is\n\n_ _L\n\nc t e actual or pro a e e ect of the trade practice which has to be Judged and there is no question of contradict, ing, varying, adding to or substracting from the terms of the agreement by admitting extraneous evidence. The various factors stlated earlier are 1equired to be taken into account only for the purpose of determining the actual or probable effect of the trade practice referred t0 in the particular clause.\n\nIn such a case it is not right to shutout oral evidence to determine the actual or probable effect of the trade D practico. [10'/8 D-E]\n\nJb) It is not s. 33(1) which invalidlates a clause in an agreement relating to a trade practice but it is the restrictive nature of the trade practice as set out in s. 2(0) which makes it void. [1079 E]\n\n(c) When a question of restrictive trade practice arises in relation to a clause in an agreen1ent it is the trade pr\\lctice in the clause that ha~ to be E examined for determining its actual or probable effect on competition. A clause in an agreement may proprio vigore impose a restraint. \\Vhere uch restraint produces or is reasonably likely to produce the prohibited statutory effect it would clearly constitute a restrictive trade practice and the clause would be bad. [1080 D-El\n\nTata Engineering & Loco1notive Co. Ltd., Bombay,, v. The Registrar of F the Restrictive Trade Agreenient New Delhi, rt977] 2 SCR 685, applied.\n\nObservations in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. 'Af.R. T.P., [1977] 3 SCR 455; disapproved.\n\n( d) In a clase where a cl a use in agreement does not by itself impose any\n\nretraint but empowers the mMluf.acturer or supplier to take son1e action which may be restrictive of competition, the mere possibility of action being taken, which tnay be restrictive of competition, would not in all cases affect the legality of the clause. What is required to be considered for determining the legality of the clause is whether there is a real probability that the presence of the daue itself would be likely to restrict competition. This is basically a question of market effect and cannot be determined by adopting a doctrRin ... aire approach. Each case would have to be examined on its own facts from a business and commonsense point of view. It cannot, therefore, be said that in every case where the cJause is theoretically capable of being so utilised as to unjustifiably restrict competition it would constitute a restrictive trade practice. f1081 E-Hl\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1045\n\n6(a). The order dated 14th May 1976 was clearly vitiated by an error of A Jaw apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as it contained only the final and operative order without giving: any reasons in support of it. [1083 E.]\n\n(b) 1be two conditions precedent before the Commission can pass a cease and desist order are ( i) it must be found that the trade practice complained of is a restrictive trade practice and (ii) where such a finding is reached the Commission must be satisfied that none of the \"gateways\" pleaded in answer B to the complaint exists. [1082 D-El\n\n( c) In the instant case the appellant did not appear before the Commission and no \"gateways\" were pleaded and therefore the question of the Commission arriving at 'at satisfaction in regard to \"gateways\" did not arise. .. etheless the Commission was required to be satisfied that the trade prac- - 1ices complained of were restrictive trade practices. The order dated 14th C May 1976 did not contain any discussion showing that the Commission had reached the requisite satisfaction. It gtl'Ve merely bald directions without any reasons. The ex-parte character of the order did not absolve the Commission from the obligation to give reasons in support of the order because the appellant would have been entitled to prefer an appeal even against on ex-parte order and in the absence of reasons, the appellant would not be in a pos1ti0n to attack the order in appeal.\n\nTt is well established that every D quasi-judicial order must bei supported by reasons. [1082 E-H1\n\nN. M. Desai v. Textiles Ltd.; C.A. 245 of 1970, dee, on 17th Dec., 1975; Simons Engineering Co. v. Union of India, [1976] Supp. SCR 489; followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 860 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 28-2-1978 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in R.T.P, Enquiry No. 91 of 1975.\n\nAshok H. Desai, B. H. Wani, Ravinder Narain, Talat Ansari, A. N. Haksar and Shri Narain for the Appellant.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. Genl., R. B. Datar and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBnAGWATI, J<-This appeal under section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to G as the Act) raises interesting questions of law relating to the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the Act.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal are for the most part undisputed and they may be briefly slated as fo11ows :\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company engaged in manufac- H ture and sale of jeep motor vehicles and their spare parts and accessories.\n\nSince 1947 the appellant was marketing and distributing jeep motor vehicles and it ha.d set up a large and complell' net work of dealers, who were described as distributors, for marketing and after sale service of such vehicles.\n\nIn or about 1956 the appellant started manufacturing its own jeep motor vehicles and since then it has been manufacturing such vehicles and distributing and marketing the same through its net work of distributors.\n\nThee appellant hae appointed these distributors for marketing and salec of jeep motor vehicles on certain terms and conditions contained in a standard distributorship agreement.\n\nThe material clauses of this. agreement read as follows :\n\n\"Section (3) : TERRITORY OF DISTRIBUTOR:- .r The Company grants to Distributor the non-exclusive privilege (except as hereinafter provided) of selling at retail and the right (except hereinafter provided) to appoint in writing by forms of agreements approved by the Company, Dealers to sell at retail the products enumerated in Section 2 of this agreement, within the following territory and also demarcated in the map attached hereto and which forms a part of this agreement.\n\nDistributor accepts the above retail setting privileges and agrees to develop with diligence the sales of sale pro\n\nducts in said territory in accordance with this agreement and E undertakes to achieve the quantum of sales in the territory as may be fixect by the Company from time to time.\n\nSection (4):\n\nLIMITATIONS ON\n\nTERRITORIAL RIGHTS :-(i) Distributor agrees not to solicit outside of the territory described in Section 3-the purchase of any products.\n\n* * • • •\n\nSection (6) PRICE AND PAYMENT :-Distributor will pay for products the Company's established Distributor net prices in effect on date on despatch. Price lists will be furnished to Distributor by the Company, but t_he\n\nCompany reserves the right to change prices at any time without notice.\n\n* * * •\n\nH Section (11) : PR/CB CHANGES :-If the Company reduces its published suggested retail list price, for any current model of 'Jeep' motor vehicles, the company will\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nmake an allowance to Distributor as hereinafter provided.\n\nThe allowance shall be made in respect of new and nnused 'Jeep' Motor Vehicles of the t)len current model in respect of which the price change has been made which !have been purchased by Distributor from the Company within a period of 30 (thirty) days prior to the effective date of such decrease in suggested list price, and which distributor shall have in his unsold stock on such effective idate. The allowance shall be equal to the difference between the net amount paid to the Company for such 'Jeep' Motor Vehicle (less all allowance thereto granted), and the net amount which would have beeu paid had such 'Jeep' motor vehicles\n\nbeen purchased at the reduced price. No allowance, however, shall be made unless there is a reduction in the RETAIL tist price and increases in discounts, bonuses and the like shall in no event be considered as a reduction in price.\n\n* * * *\n\nI 047\n\nSection (17) : CARE OF OWNER AND CUSTOMER\n\nRELATIONS :-Distributor agrees-\n\n• • • •\n\n(a) To refrain from selling or offering for sale any competing product. The Company shall be the sole judge as to whether a product is competing or not\".\n\nThe appellant by its letter dated 27th Januafy, 1971 submitted to the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Registrar) certified' copies of agreements entered into by the appellant with the Distributors for registration, since in the opinion of the appellant, they were registrable under the provisions of Ch.\n\nV of the Act.\n\nThe appellant also submitted to the Registrar along with its letter dated 19th May, 1972 four copies of the standard distributorship agreement for registration in terms of cl. (ii) of Rule 12 of the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and the standard distributorship agreement was registered by the Registrar under section 35 of the Act.\n\n' r\n\n, On 17th December, 1975 the Registrar made an application to H the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (here• inafter referred to as the Commission) under section lO(a) (iii) of\n\nthe Act pointing out to the Commission that the standard distribntorship agreement entered into by the appellant with the distributors was filed by the appellant for registration in the office of the Registrar and the same had been duly registered under section 35 of the Act.\n\nThe Registrar drew the attention of the Commission to clauses (3), (4), (5), (6), (11), (13), (14), (17) and (20) of the standard distributorship agreement and claimed that the provisions contained in these clauses related \"to restrictive trade practices relating to imposing restrictions on persons and classes of persons to whom goods are sold and from whom goods are bought tie-up sales/full-line forcing; exclusive dealing; granting or allowing concessions; discounts, over-riding commission, etc. in connection with or by reason of dealings; resale price maintenance; and allocation of area/market for disposal of products covered under the agrnement, respectively attracting clauses (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) of section 33(1) and/ or section 2 ( o) of the Act\" and that these restrictive trade practices had and rllight have the effect of preventing, distorting and restricting competition and tended to bring about monopolisation of prices and conditions of delivery and to affect the flow of supplies in the market relating to goods covered under the standard distributorship agreement in such manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs and restrictions and the same were prejudicial to public interest.\n\nThe Registrar prayed on the basis of these allegations that the Commission be pleased to inquire into the restrictive trade practices indulged in by the appellant, under section 3 7 of the Act and pass such •orders as it might deem fit and proper.\n\nThe Commission, on receipt of this application, decided, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under sections !O(a) and 37 of the Act, to hold inquiry into the F restrictive trade practices complained of by the Registrar and issued notice dated 2nd January, 1976 under Regulation 53 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission Regulations, 1974\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) to the appellant that if the appellant wished to be heard in the proceedings before the Commission, it should comply with the requirements of Regulations 65 and 67 failing which the Commission would proceed with the inquiry in the absence of respondent.\n\nThe appellant, by its letter dated 3rd February, 1976, acknowledged receipt of the notice and intimated to the Commission that it did not wish to be heard in the proceedings before the Commission but put forward its submissions in regard to the restrictive trade practices alleged by the Registrar in his application. The appellant pointed out that the clauses of the standard distributionship agreement complained of by the Registrar did not constitute restrictive trade practices, for the reasons explained in the letter\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1049\n\nand requested the Deputy Secretary to place their submissions before the Commission at . the enquiry to be held by it. The letter was purported to be submitted iu terms of Regulations 36 ( 3), but the reference to this Regulation was obviously under some misapprehension because this Regulation occurred in Chapter V which provided the procedure for reference. under Chapter III and IV and it had no application in case of an inquiry under section 3 7 of the Act.\n\nThe Joint Secretary (Legal) of the Commission pointed out to the appellant by his letter dated I Ith February, 197 6 that if the appellant wished to be heard in the proceedings, the appellant should comply\n\n' with the requirements of Regulations 65 and 67 and it is only if the appellant did so, that it could file a reply in answer to the application of the Registrar and moreover, the reply had to be properly drawn and. duly verified and declared as provided in those Regulations. The Joint Secretary (Legal) made it clear that in view of this legal position obtaining under Regulations 65 and 67, it was not possible to take note of contents of the letter addressed by the appellant setting 'Out the explanation for the various clauses impugood in the application of the Registrar.\n\nThough this position in law was specifically pointed out by the Joint Secretary (Legal) on behalf of the Commission, the appellant did . not comply with the procedure set out in Regulations 65 and 67 with the result that the Commission decided to proceed ex-parte against the appellant. The Registrar filed an affidavit of the Assistant Registrar dated 10th May, 1976 in support of the allegations contained in the application but this affidavit surprisingly did not contain any further or other material than that set out in the appliclltion.\n\nNo other evidence, oral or documentary, was produced . by the Registrar and the Commission proceeded to decide the issues\n\narising in the enquiry on the basis of the application'. supported by the affidavit of the Assistant Registrar.\n\nThe Commission, after going through the application and the affidavit of the Assistant Registrar and hearing the Registrar, made an order dated 14th May, 1976, the •operative part of which was in the following terms :\n\n\" (I) The Respondent is hereby restrained and prohibited by any agreement with any distributor to restrict by any method the persons or classes or persons to whom the goods ar\" sold wh.ether such person be retail purchaser or a dealer.\n\n(2) The Respondent is hereby restraiood and prohibited from restricting in any manner, any purchaser whether a dealer or otherwise in the course of its trade from acquir-\n\n.ng or otherwise dealing in any goods other than those of the Respondent or the goods of any other person.\n\n(3) The Respondent is hereby restrained and prohibited from selling any goods to any distributor, dealer or otherwise on the condition that the prices to be charged on resale by the purchaser shall be the prices stipulated by the respondent unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those prices may be charged.\n\nThe Respondent is hereby directed that in all future price lists it must state on the cover or on the front page that the prices if any indicated therein as resale prices are maximum prices and that the prices lower than those price may be charged.\n\n( 4) The Respondent is hereby restrained and prohibited from allocating any area or market to any distributor or dealer for the disposal of the Respondent's goods ..\n\n(5) The Respondent is hereby restrained and prohibited from preventing any distributor from appointing any dealer of its own choice on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon between distributors and dealers in cases where the Respondent does not undertake any obligation, liability or responsibility in respect of the dealers.\n\n(6) The clauses in the agreements relating to the above restrictive trade practices are hereby declared to be void.\n\nThe practices arising therefore, shall be discontinued and shall not be repeated.\n\n(7) The Respondent shall within 3 months from the date of service of this order on it make and file an affidavit before the Commission setting out the manner in which this order has been given effect to.\n\nA copy of the said affidavit shall simultaneously be furnished to the Registrar.\n\n(8) There will be no order as to costs.\"\n\nSince the appellant was required to file an affidavit of compliance within three months as directed by cl. (7) of the Order, the appeliant filed an affidavit dated 10th September. 1976 stating that the appell; mt had fully implemented in practice the directions contained in Paragraphs (l) and ( 5) of the Order and refrained from enforcing against the distribqtors any of the clauses which had been declared void by the Commission.\n\nThe appellant also pointed out that a draft of \"'\n\n• '\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1051\n\nnew distributorship agreement was being finalised by the appellant with a view to giving effect to the \"restrictions and prohibitions\" contained in the Order.\n\nThe Registrar filed an affidavit of the Deputy Registrar dated 27th September, 1976 seeking particulars from the .appellant showing how the appellant had implemented the directions contained in the Order.\n\nThe appellant by its reply dated 11th November, 1976 pointed out that since the date of receipt of the Order, the appellant had not given effect to the trade practices covered by paragraphs ( 1) to ( 5) of the Order nor required any of the distributors to abide by the clauses of the standard distributorship agreement relating to those trade practices and on the contrary, intimated to the distributors that the old distributorship agreement would have to be substituted by a new revised agreement.\n\nThe appellant submitted that since the clauses of the standard distributorship agreement declared void by the Commission were not enforceable in law by the .appellant, it . did not make any difference whether or not they were deleted from the existing distributorship agreement and in view of the fact that a new revised agreement was being prepared which would comply with the directions contained in the Order, it was not necessarv to effect ariy amendments in the existing distributorship agreement. It i; eems that there was a hearing before the Commission on this issue as regards compliance with the direction~ contained in the Order and the draft of the revised distributorship agreement 'prepared by the .appellant was considered and pursuant to the suggestion made by the Commission, the appellant agreed to amend two clauses in the draft and the Commission by its Order dated 7th December, 1976 directed that the revised distributorship agreement should be filed by the appellant by 31st March, 1977.\n\nNow, it appears that subsequent to the Order of the Commission dated 7th December, 1976 an important decision was given by this Court in Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., Bombay v. The Registrar of the Restrictive Trade Agreement, New Delhi(') relating to the interpretation of some of the relevant provisions. of the Act bearing on restrictive trade practices.\n\nThis decision was given in an appeal preferred by Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Tclco) against an order made by the Commision i!l an enquiry under section 3 7 and it reversed the view taken by the Commission in several important respects.\n\nThough this decision was given on 21st January, 1977, it was not fully reported until March 1977 and on reading it, the appellant felt that the order of the Commission dated 14th May, 1976 required reconsideration, as it was ----\n\n(!) [1977) 2 S.C.R. 685 .\n\ncontrary to the Jaw laid down in this decision.\n\nThe appellant accordingly made an application to the Commission on 31st March. 1977 where, besides asking for extension of time for filing a copy of the revised distributorship agreement on the ground that the dealers were spread out all over India and it would take considerable time for execution of the revised distributorship agreement by them, the appellant pointed out that it had not contested the enquiry proceedings nnder section 37. in the first instance because the decision given by the commission in the Telco case was directly applicable, but since that decision of the Commission was reversed by this Court in appeal, the apnellant was advised to move a suitable application for amendment and/or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and that was also an additional reason why the time for filing the revised distri butorship agreement shoulcj be extended, so that the revised distributorship agreement could be in accordance with the di.rections, if any, which might be given by the Commission on the proposed application.\n\nThe Commission acceded to the request contained in this application and extended the time for filing the revised distributorship agreement upto 4th June, 1977.\n\nThe appellant thereafter made an application dated 30th May, 1977 under section 13 (2) of the Act read with Regulation 85 for revocation, amendment or modification of the Order of the Commission dated 14th May, 1976.\n\nThe appellant set out in this application various facts and features relating to its trade of manufacture and sale\n\nof Jeep motor vehicles and their spare parts and accessories and enumerated a number of grounds on which the order of the Commission dated 14th May, 1976 deserved to be revised, revoked,. amended or otherwise modified.\n\nThe application was opposed by the Registrar by filing a reply dated 17th August, 1977.\n\nThe prties were thereafter heard by the Commission on 26th August, 1977 and pursuant to the directions given by the Commission, affidavits of documents were filed and evidence was recorded on both sides.\n\nIt appears that in the course of the evidence the appellant came to know that in November 1977 Hindustan Motors Ltd. had introduced in the G market diesel trekker which was clearly a competing vehicle and the appellant thereupon applied to the Commission on 30th January, 1978 for amendment of the application by adding a plea that the fact that since November 1977 Hindustan Motor Ltd. had started manufacturing and selling diesel trekker which was a highly competitive\n\nH product was another material change in the relevant circumstances which justified the revocation, amendment or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976.\n\nThis application for amendment was opposed by the Registrar on the ground that it was made at a very\n\n~ ..\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. V. UNION (Bhagwati,_ J.) 1053\n\nlate stage of the proceeding.\n\nThe Commission did not pass . any order on this application for amendment and kept it pending and proceeded to dispose of the main application by an Order dated 28th February, 1978 by which it rejected the main application with costs and added a short order on the same day stating that in view of the order on the main application, there would be no order on .the application for amendment.\n\nThe appellant thereupon preferred the present appeal in this Court under section 55 challenging the validity of the order made by the Commission rejecting the application of the appellant.\n\nBefore we set out the rival contentions of the parties in the appeal, C it would be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations.\n\nSection 2 is the definition section and clause ( u) of this section defines 'trade practice' to mean \"any\n\npractice relating to the carrying on of any trade, and includes-(i) anything done by any person which controls or affects the price charged by, or the method of trading of, any trader or any class of traders, D\n\n(ii) a single or isolated action of any person in relation to any trade\". 'Restrictive trade practice' is defined in section 2, clause ( o) to mean \"a trade practice which has, or may have, the effect of preventing distorting .or restricting competition in any manner and in particular,-\n\n(i) which tends to obstruct the flow of capital or resources into the stream of production, or (ii) which tends to bring about manipula- E lion of prices, or conditions of delivery or to affect the flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or services in such manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or restrictions.\" Section 5, subsection ( 1) provides for the establishment of the Commission which .is to consist of a Chairman and not less than two and not more than F eight other members to be appointed by the Central Government and sub-section (2) of section 5 lays down that the Chairman shall be a person who is or has been or is qualified to be a .indge of the Supreme Conrt or of a High Conrt. It is obvious from these two sub-sections of section 5 that the Legislature clearly contemplated that the Commission must have a Chairman who would provide the judicial element G and there must be at least two other members who would provide expertise in subjects like economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration, so that there could be a really high-powered expert commission competent and adequate to deal with the various problems which come before it.\n\nIt, however, appears thatl the Central Government paid scant regard to this legislative require- H ment and though the office of Chairman fell vacant as far back as 9.th August, 1~76, it failed to make appointment of Chairman until\n\n24th February, 1978.\n\nOf tl1e two other members of the Commission one had already resigned earlier and his vacancy was also not filled with the result that the Commission continued with only one member for a period of about 18 months.\n\nThis was a most unfortunate state of affairs, for it betrayed total lack of concern for the proper constitution and functioning of the Commission and complete neglect of its statutory obligation by the Central Government.\n\nWe fail to see any reason why the Central Government could not make the necessary appointments and properly constitute the Commission in accordance with the requirements of the Act.\n\nIt is difficult to believe that legal and judicial talent in the country had become so impoverished that the Central Government could not find a suitable person to fill the vacancy of Chairman for a year and a half.\n\nMoreover it must be remembered that the appointments, after all, have to be made from whatever legal and judicial talent is available and the situation is 1iot going to improve by waiting for a year or two: a new star is not going to appear in ilie legal firmament within such a short time and the appointments cannot be held up indefinitely.\n\nIndeed, it is highly undesirable that important quasi-judicial or administrative posts should remain vacant for long periods of time, because apart from impairing the efficiency 9f the functioning of the statutory authority of the administration, inexplicable delay may shake the confidence of the public in the integrity of the appointments when made.\n\nTurning back to the provisions of the Act, we find that section lO(a) (iii) empowers the Commission to inquire into any restrictive trade practice upon an application made to it by the Registrar.\n\nThe powers of the Commission while holding an enquiry under the Act are enumerated in section 12 and section 13, sub-section (2) provides that \"any order made by ilie Commission may be amended or revoked at any ti1ne in the manner in which it was made\".\n\nThen follow sections 1A to 19 which deal inter alia with the procedure to be followed by the Commission.\n\nWe are not concerned with Sections 20 to 32 which occur in Chapters III and IV because they deal with topics oilier than restrictive trade practices.\n\nChapter V relates to registration of agreements relating to restrictive trade practices and it consists of sections 33 to 36 of which only sections 33 and 35 are material.\n\nSub-section (I) of section 33 provides that any agreement relatil)g to a restrictive trade pratice falling within one or more of ilie categories specified there shall be subject to registration in accordance with the provisions of Ch. V and proceeds to enumerate the categories of restrictive trade practices covered by th\"t provision and section 35 lays down the time within which an agreement falling within section 33, sub-section (1) shall be registered and the procedure to be followed for effectuating such registration.\n\nSections 3 7\n\n~\n\n\\-~-~\n\nI •\n\n-..-·, I\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\n<· < ' ,•\n\nt ' ,,\n\nMAlllNDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, !.) 1055\n\n.and 38 are the next important sections and they occur in Ch. V headed\n\n\"control of certain restrictive trade practices\".\n\nSub-section (1) of section 37 provides that \"the Commission may inquire into any restrictive trade practice, whether the agreement, if any, relating thereto has been registered under section 35 or not, which may come before it for inquiry and, if after such inquiry it is of opinion that the practice is prejudicial to the public interest, the Commission may, by order, direct that-(a) the practice shall be discontinued or shall not be repeated, (b) the agreement relating thereto shall be void in respect of such restrictive trade practice or shall stand modified in respect thereof in such mancr as may be specified in the order\". Section 38, sub-section\n\n(1) enacts that for the purposes of any proceedings before the Commission under section 37, a restrictive trade practice shall bo deemed to be prejudicial to the public interest unless the Commission is satisfied of any one or more of the circumstances set out in that subsection and is further satisfied, after balancing the competing considerations, that the restriction is not unreasonable.\n\nThese circumstances specified in sub-section (I) of section 38 render a trade practice permissible even though it is restrictive and provide what have been picturesquely described in the English law as \"gateways\" out of the prohibition of restrictive trade practices.\n\nSection 55 is the next relevant section and it provides that any person aggrieved by any order made by the Central Government under Ch. III or Ch. IV or as the case may be, of the Commission under section 13 or section 37 may, within 60 days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on \"one or more of the grounds specified in section\n\n100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908\".\n\nThis is the seCtion under which the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant.\n\nThe last section to which we must refer is section 66 which confers power on the Commi<<iori. to make Regulations for the efficient performance of its funcl!ons under the Act.\n\nThe Commission has, in exercise of the power conferred by this section, made the Regulations of which three are material. namely, Regulations 65, 67 and 85.\n\nThese Regulations, in so far as material, read as follows\n\n\"Section 65 : APPEARANCE OF PARTIES: Every respondent who wishes to be heard in the proceedings shall within 14 days of the service upon him of the copy of the notice of enquiry, enter an appearance in the office of the Commission by delivering to the Secretary six copies of a memorandum stating that the respondent wishes to be heard in the proceedings and containing the name of his advocate having an office in Delhi or New Delhi and duly authorised ro accept service of processes and the Secretary II 119SCl/79\n\nshall send one copy of the memorandum to the Registrar in case where proceedings are initiated under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 10, and in all other cases to the Director of Investigation.\"\n\n\"Section 67: REPLY TO THE NOTICE: Every respondent who has entered an appearance shall within four weeks of his entering appearance deliver to the Secretary a reply to the notice (5 copies) which shall include:-\n\n( a) particulars of each of the provisions of section 3 8 of\n\nthe Act on which he intends to rely; and\n\n(b) particulars of the facts and matters alleged by him to entitle him to rely on such provisions.\"\n\n\"Section 85: AMENDMENT OR REVOCATION OF ORDER ETC.: An application under sub-section\n\n(2) of section 13 of the Act for amendment or revocation of any order made by the O:>mmission in any proceedings shall be supported by evidence on affidavit of the material change in the relevant circumstances or any other fact or circumstances on which the applicant relies.\n\nUnless the Commission otherwise directs notice of the application together with copies of the affidavits in support thereof, shall be served on every party who appeared at the hearing of the previous proceedings and every such party shall be entitled to be heard on the application and the provisions of section 114 and Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall as far as may, be applied to these F proceedings.\"\n\nIt is against the background of these provisions of the Act and the Regulations that we have to determine the question arising for consideration in the appeal.\n\nThe contention of the appellant in support of the appeal was that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 suffered from various infirmities and was liable to be revoked or in any event modified under section 13 (2) of the Act. It was said that the application of the Registrar on which the Order dated 14th May, 197.6 was made did not set out any facts or features showing how the trade practices referred to in the aJ>l>lication were restrictive of competition so as to constitute rcsttictivii trade practices and merely contained a bald recital of the impugned clauses and mechanical reproduction of the language of the relevant\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, !.) 1057\n\nsections without anything more.\n\nThe application of the Registrar was thus not in accordance with the law laid down in the decision of this Court in the Telco case and no order could be made upon it by the Comm1ss10n.\n\nIt was also urged that there was 110 material placed before the Commission by the Registrar on the basis of which the Commission could possibly come to the conclusion that the trade practices referred to in the application were restrictive trade practices.\n\nEven if the Commission was justified in proceeding exparte against the appellant, the highest that could be assumed in favour of the Registrar was that the facts set out in the application and the supporting affidavit of the Assistant Registrar would be deemed to be admitted, but, apart from the impugned clauses, no other facts were set out either in the application or in the affidavit of the Assistant Registrar and there was accordingly no evidence on which the order dated 14th May, 1976 could be made by the Commission.\n\nIt was also contended that the Ordoc dated 14th May, 1976 did not set out any facts peculiar to the trade of the appellant or the conditions before and after the imposition o[ the restraint or the actual or probable effect of the restraint nor did it indicate as to how the trade practices referred to in the impugned clauses constituted restrictive trade practices; it was a non-speaking order which did not give any reasons at all for holding that the trade practices complained of were restrictive trade practices and hence it was vitiated by a legal infirmity.\n\nThe appellant further urged that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was a continuing order as it required the appellant not merely to cease but also to desist from the restric'.ive tiade practices set out in the order and it was, therefore, required to be continually justifiable and since the facts and featurc 0 • of the trade set out in the application of the appellant clearly established that the trade practices referred to in the impugned clauses did not constitute restrictive trade practices, the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was not justified and in any event could not be continued and it was accordingly liable to be revoked or amended under section 13(2). It was submitted that in any event the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was contrary to the law declared by this Court in the Telco case and since the decision in the Telco case was a fact or circumstance subsequent to the making of the Order, it justified the invocation of the power under section 13(2) for revoking or modifying the Order .\n\nLastly, it was contended that in any view of the matter there was a material change in the relevant circumstances subsequent to the making of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 in that Hindustan Motor Ltd. started manufacturing and marketing competing utility vehicles since June 1976 and this was sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the Order under section 13(2). The respondents raised a preliminary\n\n1058 SlJPRL_vtC COL:RT REPORTS\n\n[1979J2 >.C.R\n\ncjection against the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that. under section 55 read with the newly substituted section l 00 of the Code o[ Civil Procedure, 1908, an appeal could lie to this Court only on a substantial question of law and since the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant did not raise any substantial question of law. the appeal was not maintainable.\n\nThe respondents also urged that on a proper construction of section 13(2) read with Regulation 85, the Commission could revoke or amend the Order dated 14th May. 1976 only if there was a material change in the relevant circumstances since the making of the Order or any of the grounds specified in Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was available tD tlic appellant.\n\nThe second and third grounds specified in Order XL VII, rule 1 obviously did not exist in the present case and the claim of the appellant for exercise of the power under section 13(2) could, if at all, rest only on the first ground, namely error of law app'1rent on the face of the record. But, said the respondents, there was no error of law apparent on the face of the record so far as the Ord\"· dated 14th May, 1976 was concerned, nor was there any m1terial change in the relevant circumstances subsequent to the making of the order and hence section 13 (2) was not attracted.\n\nThe respondent< contended that what the appellant was seeking to achieve by the application under section 13 (2) was reconsideration of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 which was clearly impermissible. since section 13 (2) could not be used as a substitute, for section 55 and that too, without\n\nthe restrictive condition of that section. It was also urged on behalf of the respondents that, in any event, the appellant was precluded ' from challenging the Order dated 14th May, 1976 by an application - under Section 13 ( 2) by reason of its subsequent conduct in cquiesc\n\ning in the Order and unconditionally accepting the same.\n\nThe appellant clearly waived the defects or infirmities, if any in the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and was precluded from raising any contention against the validity of that Order. The respondents disputed validity of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and urged that in any event even if any of these defects or infirmities were present. they did not render the Order void as being without jurisdiction and hence ihe validity of the Order could not be challenged in the coliaternl proceedings under section 13 (2). The respondents also contended that in any view of the matter the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was justified inusmuch as the trade practices complained of by the Registrar were restrictive trade practices. These were the rival contc11t; on'\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1059\n\nurged on behalf of the P\"1ties and we shall now proceed to examine them.\n\nThe first question that arises for considemtion on the preliminary objection of the respondents is as to what is the true scope and ambit of an appool under section 55.\n\nThat section provides inter alia that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Commission under section 13 may prefer an appeal to this Court on \"one or more of the grounds specified in section 1 00 of the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908\".\n\nNow at the date when section 55 was enacted, namely, 27th December, 1969, being the date of comlng into force of the Act, section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure specified three grounds on which a second appeal could be brought to the High Court oand one of these grounds was that the decision appealed against was contrary to law.\n\nIt was sufficient under section 100 as it stood then that there should be a question of law in order to attract the jurisdiction of the High. Court in second appeal and, therefore, if the reference in section 55 were to the grounds set out in the then existing section 100, there can be no doubt that an appeal would lie to this Court under section 55 on a question of law.\n\nBut subsequent to the enactment of section 55, section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was substituted by a new section by section 3 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1st February, I Q77 and the new section I 00 provided that a second appeal shall lie to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.\n\nThe three grounds on which a second appeal could lie under the former section 100 were abrogated anti in their place only one ground was substituted which was a highly stringent ground, namciy, that there should be a substantial question of lw.\n\nThis was the new section l 00 which was in force on the date when the present appeal was prclerrc<l by the appe11ant and the argument of the respondents was that the maintainability of the appeal was, therefore, required to be judged by reference to the ground spcitied in the new section I 00 and the appeal could be entertained only if thero was a substantial question of law.\n\nThe respondents leaned heavily on section 8 (I) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which provides :\n\n\"8 ( I ) Where this Act, or any Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shoall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted.\"\n\nand contended that the substitution of the new section l 00 amounted to rercal and re-enactment of the former section 100 and, therefore. on an application of the rule of interpretation enacted in section 8 ( 1 ) , the reference in section 55 to section 100 must be construed as reference to the new section 100 and the appeal could be maintained only on the ground specified in the new section 100, that is, on a substantial question of law.\n\nWe do not think this contention is well founded.\n\nIt ignores the distinction between a mere reference to or citation ol one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means bodily lefting a provision of one enactment and making it a part of another.\n\nWhere there is mere reference to or citation of one enactment in another without incorporation, section 8 (I) applies and the repeal and re-enactment of the provision referred to or cited has the effect set out in that section and the reference to the provision repealed is required to be construed as reference to the provision as re-enacted.\n\nSuch was the case in the Collector of Customs, Madras v. Na1he/la Sampathu Chetty & Anr. C) and the New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd.\n\nv. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & Oro.(\").\n\nBut where a provision of one statute is incorporated in another, the repeal or amendment of the former does not affect the latter.\n\nThe effect of incorporation is as if the provision were written out in the incorporating statute and were a part of it.\n\nLegislation by incorporation is a common legislative device employed by the legislature, where the legislature for convenience of drafting incorporates provisions from an existing statute by reference to that statute instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it desires to adopt.\n\nOnce the incorporation is made, the provision incorporated bccomc:s an integral part of the statute in which it is transposed and thereafter there is no need to refer to the statute from which the incorporation is made and any subsequent amendment made in it has no effect on the incorporating statute.\n\nLord Esher, M.R., while dealing with legislation in incorporation in In re. Wood's Estate ( 1886) 3 l Ch.D. 607 pointed out at page 615 :\n\n\"Jf a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the clauses of n former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act\n\n(1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 786.\n\n\nMAIIJNDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\njust as if they had been actually wTitten in it with the pen, or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all.\"\n\nLord Justice Brett, also observed to. the same effect in Clark v .\n\nBradlaugh (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 63 at 69:\n\n\". . . . . . there is oa rule of construction that, where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third statute does no affect the second.\"\n\nThis was the rule applied by the Judicial Committee of the Privy C Council in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindustan Cooperative lmwance Society Ltd.(1). The Judicial Committee pointed out in this rnse that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 having been incorporated in the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911 and become an integral part of it, the subsequent amendment of the Land Acquisition Act, 189-+ by the addition of sub-section (2) D in section 26 had no effect on the Calcutta Land Improvement Trust Act, 1911 and could not be read into it.\n\nSir George Lowndes delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee observed at puge 267 :\n\n\"In this country it is accept\\!d that \\\\l'here a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of E the first statute does not affect the second : see the cases collected in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd edn. pp. 349, 350.\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x The independent existence of the two Acts is, therefore, recognized; despite the death of the parent Act, its offspring survives in the incorporating Act. x x x\n\nIt seems to be no less logiC'al to hold that where certain\n\nprovsions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is pmsible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition.\"\n\nSo also in Ramswarup v. Munshi & Ors.( 2 ), it was held by this Conrt that since the definition o[ \"agricultural land' in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 was bodily incorporated in the Punjab H\n\n(1) 58 L A. 259.\n\n\nPre-emption Act, 1913, the repeal of the former Act had no effect on the continued operation of the latter.\n\nRajagopala Ayyangar, J ., speaking for the Court observed at pages 868-869 of the Report :\n\n\"Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has, in general, no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated.\n\nx x x x\n\nIn the circumstances, therefore, the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 has no effect on the continued operation of the Pre-emption Act and the expression 'agricultural land' in the latter Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodHy transposed into it.\"\n\nThe decision of this Court in Boiani Ores Ltd. v. Sta!e of Orissa (') also proceeded on the same principle.\n\nThere the question arose in regard to the interpretation of section 2 ( c) of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as the Taxation Act). This section when enacted adopted the definition of 'motor vehicle' contained in section 2(18) of the Mo:or Vehicles Act,\n\n1939. Subsequently, section 2(18) was amended by Act 100 o[ 1956 but no corresponding amendment was made in the definition contained in section 2(c) of the Taxation Act.\n\nThe argument advanced before the Court was that the definition in section 2(c) of the Taxation Act was not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by reference and the meaning of 'motor vehicle' in section 2 ( c I must, therefore, be taken to be the same as defined from time to time in section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.\n\nThis argument was negati1ed by the Court and it was held that this was a case of incorporation and not reference and the definition in section 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as then existing was incorpcration in section 2(c) of the Taxation Act and neither repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 nor any amendment in it would affect the definition of 'motor vehicle' in section 2(c) of the Taxation Act. It is, therefore, clear that if the.re is mere reference to a provision of one statute in another without incorporation, then, unless a different intention clearly appears, section 8 ( 1) would apply and the reference would be construed 11s a reference to the provision as may be in force from time to time in the former statute.\n\nBut if a provision of one statute is incorporated in another, any subsequent amendment in the former\n\n(1) [19751 2 S.C.R. 138.\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1063\n\nstatute or even its total repeal would not e!Iect the provision as incorporated in the latter statute.\n\nThe question is to which category the present case belongs.\n\nWe have no doubt that section 55 is \\111 instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference.\n\nSection 55 provides for an appeal to this Court on ''one or more of the grounds specified in section IOU\".\n\nIt is obvious that the legislature did not want to confer an unlimited right of appeal, but wanted to restrict it and turning to section 100, it found that the grounds there set out were appropriate for restricting the right of appeal and hence it incorporated them in Section 55.\n\nThe right of appeal was clearly intended to be limited to the grounds set out in the existing section 100.\n\nThose were the grounds which were before the Legislature and to which the Legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the Legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. The Legislature could never have intended to limit the right of appeal to any ground or grounds which might from time to time find place in section 100 without knowing what those grounds were. The grounds specified in section 100 might be changed from time to time having regard to the legislative policy relating to second appeals and it is difficult to sec any valid reason why the Legislature §hould have thought it necessary that these changes should also be reflected in section 55 which deals with the right of appeal in a totally different context. We fail to appreciate what relevance the legislative policy in regard to second appeals has to the right of appeal under section 55 so that section 55 should be inseparably linked or yoked to section 100 and whatever changes take place in section 100 must be automatically read into section 55. It must be remembered that the Act is a se!fcontained Code dealing with monopolies and restrictive trade practices snd it is not possible to believe that the Legislature could have made the right of appeal under such a code dependent on the vicissitudes through which a soction in another statute might pass from time to time.\n\nThe scope and ambit of the appeal could not have been intended to fluctuate or vary with every change in the grounds set out in section\n\n100. Apart from the absence of ar; y rational justification for doing so, such an indissoluble linking of section 55 with section 100 could conceivably lead to a rather absurd and startling result.\n\nTake for example a situation where section 100 might be repealed altogether by the Legislaturea situation which cannot be regarded as wholly unthinkable. It the construction contended for on behalf of the respondents were accepted,\n\nsection 55 would in such a case be reduced to futility and the right J of appeal would be wholly gone, because then there would be no grounds on which an appeal could lie.\n\nCould such a consequence ever have been contemplated by the Legislature ? The Legislature clearly intended that there should be a right of appeal, though on r. limited grounds, and it would be absurd to place on the language of • section 55 an interpretation which might, in a given situation, result in denial of the right of appeal allogcther and thus defeat the plain object and purpose of the section.\n\nWe must, therefore, hold that on a proper interpretation the grounds specified in the then ex1stlilg section 100 were incorporated in section 55 and the substitution of the new 'ection 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as incor- _,( porated and since the pre, ent appeal admittedly raises questions or law, it is clearly maintainable under section 55.\n\nWe may point out that even if the right of appeal under section. 55 were restricted to Lhc ground specified in the new section JOO, the present appeal would still be mainrainable, since it involves a substantial question of Jaw reloting to the interpretation of section 13(2).\n\nWhat shou!J be the test for determining whether a question of law raised in an appeal is substantial has been laid down by this Court in Sir Chuni/al V. fvi<hta and Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and ManuJacturing Co. Ltd.( 1) and iJ has been held that the proper test would be whether the \"q11cstion of law is of general public importance or whether it directly or subs ..\n\nE tantially affects the rights of the parties, and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the FcJcral Court or is net free !rem difficulty or c>alls for discussion of alternative views\".\n\nThe question of interpretation of section 13 (2) which arises in the present apper.l directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and it is an\n\nopen question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court and it is, therefore, clearly a substantial question of law within the meaning of this test.\n\nWe must, therefore, reject the preliminary objection raised on behalf o! the repond:::nts agains~ the rruint::inab!1i :y of the present appeal.\n\nThat takes us to a considerat; on of the mer!ts o' the \"PPe:ll \"'1d the first question that arises on the merits is as to the true scope um! magnitude of the curial power conferred on the Commi\"ion UilL~: section 13 (2). That section provides that \"any order made by the Commissio!l may be amended or revoked at any time in the manner in which it was made\".\n\nThe words \"in the manner in \\\\· J-:dch it \\\\'a~ made\" merely indicate the procedure to be followed by the Commission\n\n(!) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 549.\n\n' •\n\nMAll!NDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1065\n\n111 amending or revoking an order.\n\nThey haYe no b:aring on the content of the power granted under section 13 (2) or on its scoF and ambit.\n\nThat has to be determined on an interpretation of section 13(2) in the light of the context or setting in which it occurs aw having regard to the object and purpose of its enactment.\n\nNow, one thing is clear tlrat the power conferred under section 13 ( 2) is a corrective or rcctificatory power and it is conferred in '\"rms of widest amplitude.\n\nThere are no fetters placed by the Legislature to inhibit the width and amplitude of the power and in this respect it is unlike section 22 of the English Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956 which limits the power of the Court under that section to discharge a previous order made by it by providing in terms clear and explicit that leave to make an application for discharging the previous order shall not be granted except on prima facie evidence of material change in the relevant circumstances.\n\nThis provision is markedly absent in section 13 ( 2) and no express limitation is placed on the power cc,.· !erred under that section. It is left to the discretion of the Commission whether the power should be exercised in a given case and i[ rn. to what extent.\n\nBut it must be remembered that this discretion being a judicial or in any event a quasi judicial discretion, cannot be 'arbitrary, vague or fanciful', it must be guided by relevant considerations.\n\nIt is not possible to enumerate exhaustively, the various relevant considerations which lll'ay legitimately weigh with the Commission in exercising its discretion, nor would it be prudent or wise to do so, s; nce the teeming multiplicity of circumstances and situations which may arise from time to time in this kalisdozoopic world cannot be cast in any Jefinite or rigid mould or be imprisoned in any straightjackct formula.\n\nEvery case of an application under section 13 r 0 • would have to be decided on its own distinctive facts and the Comm; s<ion would have to find whether it is a proper case in which, having regard to the relevant consideration, the order made by it should be amended or revoked.\n\nThe fact that an appeal lies against the order under section 55 but has not been preferred, would be no ground for refusing to exercise the power under section 13(2). The power conferred on the Commission under section 13(2) is an independent power which has nothing to do with the •appellate power under section 55. It is not correct to say that the power under section 13 (2) cannot be exercised to correct an order which could have been set right in appeal under section 55.\n\nThe argument of the respondents that, if such a view is taken, it would permit section 13 ( 2) to De used as a substitute for section 55 and that too, without its restrictive condition has no force and does not appeal to us.\n\nThere is no question of using section 13 (2) as a substitute for section 55.\n\nBoth are distinct and independent powers and one cannot be read as subject to the other.\n\nThe scope and applicability of section 13(2) is not cut down by the provision for appeal under section 55. It is perhaps because the right of appeal given under section 55 is limited to a question of law that a wide and unfettered power is conferred on the Commission to amend or revoke an order in appropriate cases.\n\nAn order under section 3 7 or for the matter of that, under. any other provision of the Act, is not an order made in a mere interparties proceeding having e!Iect limited only to the parties to the proceeding.\n\nNot only in its radiating potencies, but also by its express terms, it affects other parties such as the whole network of distributors or dealers who are not before the Commission.\n\nIt also affects the entire trade in the product including consumers, dealers and manufacturers in the same line.\n\nThe provisions of the Act are infected with public interest and considerations of public interest permeate every proceeding under the Act. Hence it is necessary to ensure that if, by reason of inaptitude or negligence of a party to the proceeding or on account of any other reason, an erroneous order has been made, it should be possible to correct it, lest it may, instead of promoting competition, produce an anti-competitive effect or may turn out to be prejudicial to public interest. It is also possible that there may be some fact or circumstance which may not have been brought to the attention of the Commission, though having a crucial bearing on the determination of the inquiry, and which, if taken into account. may result in a different order being made, or some fact or circumstance may arise which may expose the invalidity of the order or render it bad and in such cases\n\ntoo, some provision has to be made for correcting or rect; fying the order.\n\nSo also, there may be a material change in the relevant circumstances subsequent to the making of the order which may affect the essential reasoning on which the order is based and this too may necessitate a reconsideration of the order.\n\nAfter all, an order under section 37 is made in a given constellation of economic facts anJ circumstances and if that constellation undergoes material change, the order would have to be reviewed in the light of the changed economic situation.\n\nNo order under section 37 can be immutable. It is bv its very nature transient or pro-tempore and must be liable to be altered or revoked according as there is material change in the relevant economic facts and circumstances.\n\nIt is obviously for this reason that such a wide and unusual power is conferred on the Commission unc\\cr section 13 (2) to. mend or revoke an order at any time.\n\nIt is a curial power intended to ensure that the Order passed by the Commission is and continues to be in confirmity with the requirements of the Act and the trade practice condemned by the order is really and truly a restric-\n\nMAU!NDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1067\n\ntive trade practice and it must, therefore, be construed in a wide sense , o as to e!Tectuate to the object and purpose of the grant of the power .\n\nBut howsoever large may be the amplitude of this power, it must be pointed out that it cannot be construed to be so wide as to permit rehearing on the same material without anything more, with a view to sowing that the order is wrong on facts.\n\nThis is the only limitation we would read in section 13 (2).\n\nOutside of that, the power of the Commission is large and ample and the Commission may, in the exercise of such power, amend or revoke an order in an appropriate case.\n\nThe respondents relied strongly on Regulation 85 but we fail to sec how that Regulation a<Sists the respondents in limiting the width and amplitude of the power under section 13(2). Regulation 85 does not say that an application under section 13 (2) shall be entertained only on certain specific grounds.\n\nIt is true that it is open to a statutory authority to lay down broad parameters for the exercise of the power conferred upon it, so long as those parameters are not based on arbitrary or irrational considerations and do not exclude altogether scope for exercise of residuary discretion in exceptional cases.\n\nBut we do not think that even broad parameters for exercise of the power under section 13(2) are laid down in Regulation 85.\n\nThat Regulation is in two parts.\n\nThe first part provides that an application under section 13(2} \"shall be supported by evidence on affidavit of the material change in the relevant circun1stanccs or any other fact or circumstances on which the applicant relies.\" This is a procedural provision which prescribes that if the applicant relics on any material change in the relevant circumstances or on any other facts or circumstances in support of the application, he must produce the necessary evidence in proof of the same by affidavits. This provision merely lays down a rule of procedure and it has nothing to do with the grounds on which an apphcation under >ection 13 (2) may be maintained and it is difficult to see how it can be pressed into •crvice on behalf of the respondents.\n\nThe second part states that unless the Commission otherwise directs \"notice of the application together with copies of the affidavits in support thereof, shall be served on every party who appeared at the hearing of the previous proceedings and every such party sl1all he entitled to be heard on the application and the provisions of section 114 and Order XL VII rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall as far as may, be applied to these proceedings\".\n\nThis part first deals with the question as to which parties shall be served with the notice of the application and who shall be entitled to appear at the hearing of the application.\n\nThis is purely\n\nA procedural in nature and does not throw any light on the issue before us.\n\nBut this part then proceeds to add that the provisions of section 114 and Order XLVII rule I shall, as far as may, be applied to the proceedings in the application.\n\nCan this provision be read to mean that an application under section 13 (2) can be maintained only on\n\nthe grounds set out in section 114 and Order XL VII, rule 1?\n\nThe answer must obviously be in the negative.\n\nThe words \"as far as may\" occurring in this provision are very significant.\n\nThey indicate that the provisions of section 114 and Order XLVII, rule 1 are to be invoked only to the extent they are applicable and if, in a given case, they are not applicable,, they may be ignored but that does not mean that the power conferred nnder section 13(2) would not be exerciseable in such a case.\n\nThe reference to the provisions of section 114 and Order XL VII, rule I does not limit the grounds on which an application may be made nnder section 13 (2). In fact, the respondents themselves conceded that the gronnds set out in section 114 and Order XLVII, rule 1 were not the only gronnds available in an application under section 13 (2) and that the application could be maintained on other grounds such as material change in the relevant circnmstances.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear to our mind that even if a case does not fall within section 114 and Order XLVII, rule I, the Commission would have power, in an appropriate case, to amend or revoke an order made by it.\n\nIf, for example, a strong case is made out E showing that an order made under section 37 is plainly erroneous in law or that some vital fact or feature which would tilt the decision the other way has escaped the attention of the Commission in making the order or that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing at the hearing of the inquiry resulting in the order being\n\npassed exparte, the Commission would be entitled to interfere in the exercise of its power under section 13(2). These examples given by us are merely illustrative and they serve to show that Regulation 85 does not in any manner limit the power under section 13(2).\n\nBefore we proceed to consider whether any case has been made out by the appellant for the exercise of the power under section 13 (2), we may briefly dispose of the contention of the respondents based on acquiescence and estoppel.\n\nThe argument of the respondents was that the appellant, by his subsequent conduct, acquiesced in the making of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and was, in any event, estopped from challenging the same.\n\nWe find it difficult to appreciate this argument.\n\nWe do not see anything in the conduct of the appellant which would amount to acquiescence or raise any estoppel against it.\n\nIt is obvious that the appellant did not wish to be heard in the proceeding before\n\n• •\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nI 069\n\nthe Commission because the decision of the Commission in the Telco case held the field at that time and it was directly against the appellant.\n\nOtherwise, there is no reason why the appellant should not have entered an appearance under Regulation 65 and filed a proper reply us provided in Regulation 67 and appeared at the hearing of the inquiry\n\nto oppose the application of the Registrar.\n\nThe appellant did make its submissions in writing by its letter dated 3rd February, 1976, but since the appellant did not enter an appearance as required by Regulation 65, it was precluded from filing a reply under Regulation 67 and the Commission was legally justified in refusing to look at the submissions contained in the letter of the appellant, though we may observe that it would have been more consonant with justice if the Commission had, instead of adopting a technical and legalistic approach, considered the submissions of the appellant before making the Order dated 14th May, ; 976. Be that as it may, the Commission declined to consider the submissions of the appellant and proceeded to make the order dated 14th May, 1976 exparte in the absence of the appellant. Now, once the order dated 14th May, 1976 was made, it was the bounden duty of the appellant to obey it, until it might be set aside in an appropriate proceeding. The appellant, therefore, sta.rted preparing a dra[t of the revised distributorship agreement in conformity with the terms of the Oeder dated 14th May, 1976 and since the preparation of the draft was likely to take some time, the appellant applied for extension of time which was granted upto 31st March, 1977. However, before the extended date was due to expire, this Court reversed the decision of the Commission in the Telco case and as soon as this new fact or circumstance came to its knowledge, the appellant made an application dated\n\nJ'- 31st March, 1977 stating that in view of the decision given by this Court in the Telco case, the applicant was advised to move a suitable application for amendment and/or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and the time for filing the revised distributorship agreement should, therefore, be further extended and on this application, the Commission granted further extension of time upto 4th June, J 977.\n\nIt is diftlcult to see how any acquiescence or estoppel could be spelt out from this conduct of the appellant. It is true that the appellant did not prefer an appeal against the Order dated 14th May, 1976, bnt the application under section 13(2) being an alternative and perhaps a more effective remedy available to it, the failure of the appellant to !'refer an appeal can not be construed as acquiescence on its part.\n\nJ'he appellant undoubtedly asked for extension of time from the Commission for the purpose of implementing the Order dated 14th May, 1976 but that also cannot amount to acquiescence, because until the decision of the Commission in the Telco case was reversed in appeal\n\nby this Court, the appellant had no reason to believe that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was erroneous and as soon as the appellant came to know about the decision of this Court reversing the view taken by the Commission, the appellant immediately pointed out to the Commission that it was moving an application for amendment or revocation of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 under section 13(2). The appellant did not at any time accept the Order dated 14th May. 1976 knowing that it was erroneous and it is elementary that there can be no acquiescence without knowledge of the right to repudiate or challenge.\n\nMoreover, it may be noted that the appellant did not, right upto the time it made the application under section 13 (2), implement the\n\nOrder dated 14th May, 1976 by entering into revised distributorship agreement with the distributors. There was, therefore, no acquiesence on the part of the appellant so far as the Order dated 14th May, 1976 is concerned.\n\nNor could there be any estoppel against the appellant precluding it from challenging the Order by an application under section 13(2), for estoppel can arise only if a party to a proceeding has altered his position on the faith of a representation or promise made by another and here there is nothing to show that the Registrar had altered his position on the basis of the application for extension of time made by the appellant.\n\nBoth the contentions, one based on acquiescence and the other on estoppel, must, therefore, be rejected.\n\nThat takes u• straight to the consideration of the question whether the appellant has made out any case for the exercise of the power of the Commission under section 13(2). The first ground canvassed by the appellant was that the application on which the Order daten\n\n14th May, 1976 was made was not in accordance with law inasmucJ1 as it did not set out any facts or features which would show that the trade practices complained of by the Registrar were restrictive trade practices.\n\nNow, it is true, as laid down by this Court in the Tclco case, that an application by the Registrar under section JO(a) (iii) \"must contain facts which, in the Registrar's opinion, constitu, te re•- trictive trade practice\" and it is not sufficient to make \"mere reference~\n\nto clauses of the agreement and bald allegations that the clauses constitute restrictive trade practice\".\n\nThe application must set out fact~ or featutes \"to show or establish as to how the alleged clauses constitute restrictive trade practice in the context of facts\".\n\nThe application of the Registrar in the precnt case was, therefore, clearly contrary to the Jaw laid down by this Court in the Telco case, but on that account alone it cannot be said that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was vitiated by a legal infirmilv.\n\nEven if the application did\n\n, '\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. \\!NION (Bhagwati, J.) l 07 I\n\nnot set out any facts or features showing how the trade practices complained of by the Registrar were restrictive trade practices, the Registrar could still at the hearing of the inquiry, in the absence of any demand for particulars being made by the appellant, produce material before the Commission disclosing facts or featnres which would go to establish the restrictive nature of the trade practices complained of by him and if the Registrar did so, the defect in the application would not be of much consequence. But unfortunately in the present case the only material produced by the Registrar was the affidavit of the Assistant Registrar which did nothing more than just reproduce the impugned clauses of the distributorship agreement and the words cf the relevant sections of the Act.\n\nThere was no material at all produced by the Registrar before the Commission which would show how, having regard te the facts or features of the trade of the appellant, the trade practices set out in the offending clauses of the distribu)orship agreement were restrictive trade practices.\n\nThe Order dated 14th May, 197 6 was, therefore, in the submission of the appellant, based on no material at all and was accordingly vitiated by an error of law.\n\nThe respondents, however, contended that it was not necessary to produce any material before the Commission in support of the claim of the Registrar, because the trade practices referred to in the offending clauses were per se restrictive trade practices and in any event. even if any supporting material was necessary, it was to be found in the admission of the appellant contained in its letter submitting the distributorship agreement for registration under section 33.\n\nWe do not think there is any force in this contention of the respondents and the Order dated 14th May, 1976 must be held to be bad on the ground that it was based on no material and could\n\nnot possibly have been made by the Commission.\n\nIt is now settled law as a result of the decision of this Court iu the Telco case that every trade practice which is in restraint of trade is not necessarily a restrictive trade practice. The definition of restrictive trade practice given in section 2(o) is a pragmatic and resultoriented definition. It defines 'restrictive trade practice' to mean a\n\ntrade practice which has or may have the effected of preventing, distort- G ing or restricting competition in any manner and in clauses (i) and (ii), particularises two specific instances of trade practices which fall within the category of restrictive trade practice. It is clear from the definition that it is only where a trade practice has the effect, actual or probable, of restricting, lessening or destroying competition that it is liable to he regarded as a restrictive trade practice. If a trade practice H merely regulates and thereby promotes competition, it would not fall\n\n12-Jl9SCl/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.G.lt\n\nwithin the definition of restrictive trade practice, even though it may be, to some extent, in restraint of trade.\n\nWhenever, therefore, a question arises before the Commission or the Court as to whether a certain trade practice is restrictive or not, it has to be decided not on any theoretical or a priori reasoning, but by inquiring whether the trade practice has or may have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition. This inquiry obviously cannot be in vacuo but it must depend on the existing constellation of economic facts and circumstances relating to the particular trade.\n\nThe peculiar facts and features of the trade would, be very much relevant in determining whether a particular trade practice has the actual or probable effect of diminishing or preventing competition and in the absence of any material showing these facts or features, it is difficult to see how a decision can be reached by the Commission that the particular trade practice is a restrictive trade practice.\n\nIt is true that on the subject of restrictive trade, practices, the law in the United States has to be approached with great caution, but it is interesting to note that the definition of \"restrictive trade practice\" in our Act echoes to some extent the 'rule of reason' evolved by the American Courts while interpreting section 1 of the Sherman Act.\n\nThat section provides that \"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared to be illegal\" and literally applied, it would out law every conceivable contract which could be made concerning trade or commerce or the subjei:ts of such commerce. The Supreme Court of United States, therefore, read a 'rule of reason' in this section in the leading decision in Standard Oil Company v. United Stales(').\n\nIt was held by the Coun as a 'rule of reason' that the term \"restraint\n\nof trade\" means that it meant at common law and in the law of the United States when the Sherman Act was passed and it covered only those acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which prejudice public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which injuriously restrain trade either because of their inherent nature of effect or because of their evident purpose.Vi.de also United States v. American Tobacco Co.('). It was pointed out that the 'rule of reason' does not freeze the meaning of \"restraint of trade\" to what it meant at the date when the Shennan Act was passed and it prohibits not only those acts deemed to be undue restraints of trade at common law but also those acts which new times and economic conditions make unreasonable.\n\nThis 'rule\n\n(I) 221 U.S. 106; 55 L. ed. 609.\n\n(2) 221 U.S. 106; 55 L. ed. 663,\n\n• \\\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1073\n\nof reason' evolved by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Company's case and the American Tobacco Co's case has governed the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act since then and though it does not furnish an absolute and unvarying standard and has been applied, sometimes more broadly and some times more narrowly, to\n\nB the different problems coming before the courts at different times, it has held the field and, as pointed out by Mr.\n\nJustice Reed in the United States v. E.I. Du Pont(1), the Supreme\n\nCourt has not receded from its position on this rule. The 'rule of reason' has, to quote again the words of the same learned Judge \"given a workable content to anti-trust legislation''. Mr. Justice Brandeis applied the 'rule of reason' in Board of Trade v. United c States(\") for holding that a rule prohibiting offers to purchase during the period between the close of the call and the opening of the session on the next business day for sales of wheat, corn, oats or rye at a price other than at the closing bid, was not in \"restraint of trade\" within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act.\n\nThe learned Judge pointed out in a passage which has become classical : D \"Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.\n\nThe true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.\n\nTo determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable.\n\nThe history of the restraint the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting 'the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.\n\nThis is not because a good intention will save an otherwiSe objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.\"\n\nIt '_Viii thus fbehseefn that thfe 'rule of reson' nothrmally requires ap G. ascertamment o t e acts or eatures peculiar to e particular business; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable; the history of the restraint and the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular restraint and the purpose or end sought to be attained and it is only on a consideration of these factors that it can be decided whether a particular act, contract or agreement, impos- H\n\n(I) 100 L. Ed. 1269.\n\n(2) 61 L. Ed. 683.\n\ning the restraint is unduly restrictive of competition so as to constitute 'restraint of trade'.\n\nThe language of the definition of \"restrictive trade practice\" in our Act suggests, that in enacting the definition, our legislature drew upon the concept and rationale underlying the 'rule of reason'.\n\nThat is why this Court pointed out in the Telco case in words almost bodily lifted from the judgment of Mr. Justice Brandeis :\n\n\"The decision whether trade practice is restrictive or not has to be arrived at by applying the rule of reason and not on that doctrine that any restriction as to area or price will per se be a restrictive trade practice. Every trade agreemnt restrains or binds persons or places or prices.\n\nThe question is whether the restraint is such as regulates and thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.\n\nTo determine this question three matters are to be considered.\n\nFirst, what facts are peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied.\n\nSecond, what was the condition before and after the restraint is imposed.\n\nThird, what is the nature of the restraint and what is its actual and probable effect.\" These various facts and features set out in the Judgment of Mr.\n\nJustice Brandeis and reiterated in the decision of this Court in the Telco case would; therefore, have to be considered before a decision can be reached whether a particular trade practice is restrictive or not. It is possible that a trade practice which may prevent or diminish competition in a given constellation of economic facts and circumstances may, in a different constellation of economic facts and circumstances, be found to promote competition. It cannot be said that every restraint imposed by a trade practice necessarily prevents, distorts or restricts competition and is, therefore, a restrictive trade practice.\n\nWhether it is so or not would depend upon the various considerations to which we have just referred. Of course, it must be pointed out that there may be trade practices which are such that by their inherent nature and inevitable effect they necessarily impair competition and in case of such trade practices, it would not be necessary to consider any other facts or circumstances, for they would be per se restrictive trade practices.\n\nSuch would be the position in case of those trade practices which of necessity produce the prohibited effect in such an overwhelming proportion of cases that minute inquiry in every instance would be wasteful of judicial and administrative resources. Even in the United States a similar doctrine of per se illegality has been evolved in the interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and it has been held that certain restraints of trade are\n\nMAilINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 107 5\n\nunreasonable per se and \"because of their pernicious effect on com petition and lack of any redeeming virtue\" they are \"conclusively pre sumed to be unreasonable, and, therefore; illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use\". In such cases \"illegality does not depend on a showing of the unreasonableness of the practice and it is unnecessary to B have a trial to show the nature, extent and degree of its market effect\" Vide American Jurisprudence 2d. volume 54, p. 687, Art. 32. We are concerned in the present appeal with clauses of the distributorship agreement imposing restriction as to territory, area or market and providing for exclusive dealership and according to the decision of this Court in the Telco case, such trade practices are not per se res- 0 trictive trade practices.\n\nWhether such trade practices constitute restrictive trade practices or not in a given case would depend on the particular facts aqd features of the trade and other relevant consi\n\nderations discussed above which would show the actual or probable effect of such trade practices on competition. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to produce the necessary material before tho D Commission to show that the impugned trade practices had the actual or probable effect of diminishing or destroying competition and were therefore, restrictive trade practices.\n\nThe burden was clearly on the Registrar for it was the Registrar who wanted the Commission to strike down these trade practices as restrictive. The Registrar, however, did not produce any material at all before the Commission and the Order dated 14th May, 1976 had no basis at all on which it could be sustained.\n\nThere is no doubt that the appellant by its letter dated 19th May, 1972 submitted the distributorship agreement to the Registrar for registration under section 33, but we do not see how this act of the appellant or the letter forwarding the distributorship agreement for registration can be construed. as admission on the part of the appellant that the trade practices referred to in the offending clauses of the distributorship agreement constituted restrictive trade practices. In the first place, the question whether a trade practice is restrictive trade practice or not is essentially a question of law based on the application of the definition in section 2( o) to the facts of a given case and no admission on a question of law can ever be used in evidence against the maker of the admission.\n\nTherefore, even if there was any admission involved in submitting the distributorship agreement for registration, it could not be used as evidence against the appellant in the inquiry under section 37. Moreover, we do not think that in submitting the distributorship agreement for registration, the appellant\n\n! I\n\nmade an admission that any particular clause of the distributorship agreement constituted restrictive trade practices.\n\nThere is nothing in the letter of the appellant to show which were the particular cla.uses of the distributorship agreement regarded by the appellant as restrictive trade prachc&s on the basis of which it made the application for registration. It is possible that the appellant might have taken tqc same view which the Commission did in the Telco case, namely, that the moment an agreement contains a trade practice falling within any of the clauses of section 33 (1), the trade practice must irrespective of whether it falls within the definition in section 2(o) or not, be regarded as a restrictive trade practice and the agreement m11st be registered and on that view, the appellant might have submitted tbe diStributorship agreement for registration. The submission of the distributorship agreement for registration cannot, therefore, possibly be construed as admission on the part of the appellant that the particular clauses of the distributorship agreement faulted by the Commission con; tituted restrictive trade practices. There was, accordingly, no admission of the appellant on which the Commission could rely for the purpose of making the Order dated 14th May, 1976.\n\nWe must, in the circumstances, hold that, since there was no material at all on the basis of which the Commission could find that the trade practices referred in the offending clauses of the distributorship agreement were restrictive trade practices, the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was contrary to law. 'rhis clearly attracted the exercise of the power of the Commission under section 13(2). The decision of this Court in the Telco case exposed the invalidity of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and showed that it was bad as being based on no material\n\nwhatoever. When the commission passed the Order dated 14th May, 1976, the decision of the Commission in the Telco case held the field and according to hat decision, any trade practice which fall within one of the clauses of section 33(1) would be a restrictive trade practice and that is perhaps the reason why the Registrar did not produce any material before the Commission and even though there was no material before it, the .Commission proceeded to invalidate the trade practices referred to in the offending clauses as restrictive trade practices, since they fel(within one or the other clauses of section 33(1). But this view was reversed in appeal and it was held by this Court that a trade practice 'which does not fall within the definition in section 2(o) cannot become restrictive trade practice merely because it is covered by one or the other of the clauses of section 33(1) : what section 33(1) requires as the condition for registration is that the agreement must\n\nMAHINDRA LTD, v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1077\n\nrelate to a trade practice which is restrictive trade practice within the meaning of section 2(o) and sncb restrictive trade practice must additionally fall within one or more of the categories specified in that section. It was because of this decision in the Telco case that the necessity for production of material to show that the trade practicei; complainetl of were restrictive trade practices became evident and it came to be realisetl that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was bad. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the power of the Commission under section 13 (2) was exerciseable in the present case and the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was liable to be revoked.\n\n'Bt:oore we part With this aspect of the case, we must rerer le one other decision of this Court which was relied upon on behalf of the rel!pondents and that is the crecision in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v.\n\nM.R.T.P. (') The Judgment in this case was delivered by Beg, C.J., speaking on behalf of himself and Gupta, J. and though Beg, C.J., was also a party to the judgment in the Telco case, this judgment seem to sttill:e a slightly different note and hence it is necessary to examine it in some detail. Two clauses of the Redistribuiion Stockists' Agreement were assailed in this case as constituting restrictive trade practiees. 0ne was clause 5 which in its last portion providetl that the re• dlatribution stockism shall pmehase and accept from the company\n\nsuh stock as company shall at its discretion send to the redistribution stockist for fulfilling its obligations under the agreemellt and the o!her was clause 9 which imposed a restriction as to area or market by providing that the redistribution stockist shall not rebodk or in any way convey transport or despatch parts of stocks of the products rcceiv>:ld by him outside the town for which he was appointed redistribution stockist.\n\nThe Commffision held, following the view taken by it eatlier in !he Telco case, that the last part of clause 5 as well as cl11Use 9 constituted restrictive trade practices and declared them void.\n\nThis view was affirmed by Beg, C.J., in the appeal preferred by Hindustan Lever Ltd.\n\nWe are not concerned with the merits of the question whether the last part of clause 5 and clause 9 were on the facts of tbt case rightly held to be restrictive trade practices, but certain observations made by the learned Chief Justice in that judgment call for consideration, since they seem to 'be inconsistellt with\n\nwhat was laid down by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in the Telco Case.\n\nln the first place, the learned Chief Justice distinguished the judgment in the Telco case by observing that the agreement in that case could not be understood without reference to the actual facts to which \"'----·----- ti)\n\n1977] 3 S.C.R 455.\n\nA it was sought to be applied and extraneous evidence in regard lo those facts for explaining \"the nature of the special agreement for restricting or distribution of areas\" was, therefore, admissible under section 92, clause 6 of the Evidence Act, but in the Hindustan Lever case_ the meanillg of the impugned clauses was plain and certain and the principle of section 92, clause 6 was clearly inapplicable to let in B extraneous evidence and hence no oral evidence could be led to deduce their meaning or vary it in view of the provisions of sections 91 and\n\n92. It was on this view that the learned Chief Justice held that oral evidellce for the purpose of showing that the trade practices in the impugned clauses were not restrictive was shut out and all that was c\n\nnecessary for the court to do was to interpret the impugned clauses.\n\nNow, this view taken by the learned Chief Justice does not and we say so with the utmost respect appear to be correct. We do not sie how sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act come into the picture at all when we are considering whether a particular trade practice set out ih an agreement has or may have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition so as to constitute a restrictive trade practice. It is the actual or probable effect of the trade practice which has to be judged in the light of the various considerations ad- Vl\":rted to by us and there is no question of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the agreement by admitting any extraneous evidence.\n\nThe meaning of the ticular clause of the agreement is not sought to be altered or varied by rererence lo the various factors which we have discussed above, but these factors are .required to be taken into account only for the purpose of determining the actual or probable effect of the trade practice referred to in the particular clause.\n\nThe reliance placed by the learned Chief Justice on sections .91 and 92 was, therefore, quite inappropriate and unjustified and we do not think that the learned Chief Justiee was right in shutting out oral evidence to dermine the actual or probable effect of the trade practices impugw..-0 in the case before him. It may be pointed out that the decision in the Telco case did not proceed on ah application of the principle embodied in section 92, clause ( 6) of the .Evidence Act aud with the greatest respect, the learned Chief Justice was in error in distinguishing that decision ou the ground that extra- . neous evidence was considered in that case in view of the principle underlying section 92, clause 6, while in the case before him that principle was uot applicable and hence extraneous evidence was not admissible.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice was' bound by the ratio of the decision in the Telco case.\n\nSecondly, the learned Chief Justice seemed to take the view in hls judgment at page 465 of the Report that if a clause in an agreement\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bluigwati, J.)\n\nI 079\n\nrelates to a trade practice which infring~ any of the clauses of section 33 (1), it would be bad and it would be unnecessary to inquirt whether the trade practice falls within the definition of 'restrictive\n\ntraue practice' in section 2 ( o). There were two places in the judgment where the learned Chief Justice used expressions indicating this view.\n\nHe said at oue place : \"The last part of clause ( 5)-would be struck by section 33(1) (b)'', and at another place \"inasmuch as clauses (5)-expressly gives the stockist the discretion to sell at lower than maximum retail prices stipulated, the agreement was not struck by section 33(1) (b)\". This view is plainly and again we say so with the greatest respect, contrary to the law laid down by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in the Telco case. We have already pointed out that, according to the decision in the Telco case, a trade practice does not become a restrictive trade practice merely because it falls within one or the other clause of section 33(1), bnt it mnst also satisfy the definition of 'restrictive trade practice' contained in section 2 ( o) and it is only then that the agreement relating to it would require to be registered under section 33 (1). It is with the greatest respect to the learned Chief Justice, not correct to say that a particular clause in an agreement is struck by one or the other clause of section. 33(1). It is not section 33(1) which invalidates a clause in anagreement relating to a trade practice, but it is the restrictive nature_ of the trade practice as set out in section 2(o) which makes it void. The view taken by the learned Chief Justice on this point cannot, therefore, be accepted.\n\nLastly, the learned Chief Justice held that the introduction of a clause in an agreement itself constitutes a trade practice and if such clause confers power which can be used so as to unjustifiably restrict trade it would constitute a restrictive trade practice.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice pointed out that the uefinition of trade practice is wide enough to include any practice relating to the carrying on of any trade and observed that \"it cannot be argued that the introduction of the clauses complained of does not amount to an action which relates to the carrying on of a trade. If the result of that action or what could reasonably flow from it is to restrict trade in the manner indicated, it will, undoubtedly, be struck by the provisions of the Act\". The interpretation plao;:d by the learned Chief Justice was that if a clause in an agreement is capable of being used to prevent, distort or restrict <:ompetition in any manner, it would be liable to be struck down as a\n\nrestrictive trade practice, regardless of what is actually done under it, for it is not the action taken under a clause, but the clause itself which permits action to be taken which is unduly restrictive of competition,\n\nthat is material for determining whether there is a restrictive trade practice.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice emphasised that if a clause in an agreement confers power to act i'n a manner which would unduly restrict trade, the clause would be illegal and it would be no answer to say that tbe clause is in fact being implemented in a lawful manner.\n\nThis view taken by the learned Chief Justice cannot, with the utmost respect, be accepted as wholly correct.\n\nIt is true that a clause in an agreement may embody a trade practice and such trade practice may have the actual or probable effect of TC$trlcting, lessening or destroying competition and hence it may co11stitute a restrictive trade practice and the clause may be voided, but it is difficult to see how the introduction of such a clause in the agreement, as distinguished from the trade practice embodied in the clauoe itself, can be a restrictive trade practice. It is not the introduction of such a clause, but the trade practice embodied i'n the clause, which has or is reasonably likely to have the prescribed anti-competitive effect.\n\nTherefore, whenever a question of restrictive trade practice arises in relation to a clause in an agreement it is the trade practice embodied in the clause that has to be examined for the purpose of determining its actual or probable effect on competition.\n\nNow a clause in an agreement may proprio vigore on its oW'n terms, impose a restraint such as allocating a territory, area or market to a dealer or prohibiting a dealer from using machinery or selling goods of any other manufacturer or supplier or requiring the dealer to pnrchase whatever machinery or goods in the particular line of business are needed by him from the manufacturer or supplier entering into the agreement.\n\nWhere such restraint produces or is reaonably likely to produce the prohibited statutory effect-and that would depend on the various considerations referred to by us earlier-it would clearly constitute a\n\nres.trictive trade practice and the clause would be bad. In such a case it would be no a:nswer to say that the clause is not being enforced by the manufacturer or supplier. The very presence of the clause would have a restraini'ng influence on the dealer, for the dealer would be\n\nexpected to carry ont his obligations under the clause and he would not know that the clause is not going to be enforced against him. This is precisely what was pointed out by Mr. Justice Day in United Slwe\n\nMachinery Corporation v.\n\nUllited States(I) where the question was whether the restrictive-use, exclusive-use and additional-machinery clauses in certain lease agreements of shoe-machinery were struck by lhe provisions of section 3 of the Clayton Act : \"The power to enforce them\", that is, the impugned clauses \"is omnipresent and their\n\n(I) 258 U.S. 708: 66 L. ed. 451.\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1081\n\nre{ltraining influence coOBtahtly operates upon competitors and Jess~~3.\n\nThe fact that the lessor, in many instances, forbore to enforce these provisions, does not make them any Jess agreements within the con demnation of the Clayton Act\". There would be ho difficulty in such a case in applying the definition of Tcstrictivc trade practice in accordance with the Jaw laid down in the Telco case as explained by us in this ju<lent.\n\n( B Then there may be a clalll5e which may be perfectly innocent and innocuous such as a clau&~ providing that the dealer will carry out all dil; cctions given by the manufacturer or supplier .from time to time.\n\nS\\lCh a broad and general clause cannot be faulted as restricyive of cQltlpetition, for it cannot be aumcd that the manufacturer or sp r will abuse the power conferred by the claui; e by giving directions uu<lply restricting trade. So m11ch indeed was conceded by the learn e4 dditional Solicitor General appel!fing on behalf of the respondents. But a genuine difficulty may ari.se w]\\ere a clause in an a(lfee-\n\n1t d~ not by iiself impose any restraint but empowers the manufl\\Cf.w; er or supplier to take some action which may be restrictive of\n\nctition. Ordinarily, in such a case, it may not be possible to say thl\\t th, e mere presence of such a clause, apa'rt from any action which\n\n11}11-Y e .ta!cen u:nd.er it, has or m\\J.Y have the prohibited anti-competitive\n\neft_~. The manufacturer or supplier may take action under the clause o.r may not, and even if he takes action, it may be in conformity wi, fb the provisions of the Act and may not be restrictive of competitiqu.\n\nThe mere possibility of action being taken which may be restrictive of competition would not in all cases effect the legality of the clause. In fact, a consistent course of conduct adopted by the manut; acturcr or supplier in acting under the clause in a lawful manner Jl\\llY ten.d to show that the clan&~ is not reai; onably likely to produce prohibited statutory effect. What is required to be considered for d*rmininjl the legality of the clause is \\1ot mere theoretical possibility that the clause may be utilised for taking action which is restrictive of competitim, for it does not necessarily follow from the existence of such possibility that the actual or probable effect of the clause wauld be anti-<:ompetitive.\n\nThe materia1 question to coDBider is whethi:r there is a real probability that the presence of the clause itself would be likely to restrict competition. This is basically a question of market effect and it cannot be determined by adopting a doctrinaire approach. There can be no hard and fast rule and each case would have to be examined on its own facts from a business ad commonsense point of view for the purpose of determining whether the clause has the actual or probable effect of unduly rel; tricting com• petition. We cannot accept the proposition that in every case where\n\nA the clause is theoretically capable of being so utilised as to unjustifiably restrict competition, it would constitute a restrictive trade practice.\n\nThere is also anothr infirmity invalidating the Order dated 14th B May, 1976. We have alieady pointed out and that is clear from the decision of this Court in the Telco case that in an inquiry under s. 3 7 the Commission has first to be satisfied that the trade practice complained of in the application is a restrictive trade practice within the meaning of that expression as defined in section 2 ( o) and it is only after the Commission is so satisfied, that it can proceed to consider C whether any of the 'gateways' provided in section 38(1) exists so that the trade practice, though found restrictive, is deemed not to be prejudicial to the public interest and if no such 'gateways' are establishe.d, then only it can proceed to make an order directing that the trade practice complained of shall be discontinued or shall not be rep.oatcd.\n\nThere are thus two conditions precedent which must be satisfied before a cease and desist order can be made by the Commission in regard to any trade practice complained of before it.\n\nOne is that the Commission must find that the trade practice complained of is a restrictive trade practice and the other is that where such finding is reached, the Commission must further be satisfied that none of the gateways pleaded in answer to the complaint exists. Herc in the present case the aIJI'2l: !ant did not appear at the hearing of the inquiry and no 'gateways' were pleaded by it in the manner provickd in the Regulations and hence the question of the Commission arriving at a satisfaction in regard to the 'gateways' did not arise.\n\nBut the Commission was certainly required to be satisfied that the trade practices complained of by the Registrar were restrictive trade practices before it could validly make a cease and desist order. The Order dated 14th May, 1976 did not contain any discussion or recital showing that the Commission had reached the requisite satisfaction in regard to the offending trade practices.\n\nBut w~ can legitimately presume that the Commission must have applied its mind to the offending cl, lrnses of the distributorship agreement and come to the conclusion that the trade practices referred to in those clauses were restrictive trade practices before it made the.\n\nOrder dated 14th May, 1976. There is in fact inherent evidence t-0 show that the Commission did apply its mind to the clauses impugned in the application of the Registrar, because it struck down only a few out of those clauses and did not invalidate the rest.\n\nThis circumstance clearly shows that the Commission considered with reference to each impugned clause whether it related to restrictive trade practice nnd made th~ Order dated 14th May, 1976 only in respect of those\n\n• '\n\nMAHINDRA LTD. v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1083\n\nclauses where it was satisfied that the trade practices were restrictive.\n\nThe charg; i that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 suffered from nonapplication of mind on the part of the Commission cannot, therefore, be sustained. But the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was clearly bad inasmuch as it did not disclose the reasons which weighed with the Commission in directing the appellant to cease and desist from the trade practices set out in the order. The Order dated 14th May, 1976 was a non-s;:>eaking order. It consisted merely of bald directions given by the Commission and did not set out any reasons whatsoe\\•er why the Commission had decided to issue those directions. It had a sphy'nx-like face, which goes ill with the judicial process. It is true that the Order dated 14th May, 1976 was an exparte order, but the exparte character of the order did not absolve the Commission from the obligation to give reasons in support of the order. Even though\n\nthe Order dated 14th May, 1976 was exparte, the appellant would have been entitled to prefer an appeal against it under section 55 and it is dcf!icult to see how the appellant could have possibly attacked the\n\norder in the appeal when the order did not disclose the reasons on which it was based. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi judicial function, it must record its reasons in supp011 of the order it makes.\n\nEvery quasi judicial order must be supported by reasons.\n\nThat is the minimal requirement of law laid down by a Jong line of decisions of this Court ending with N. M. Desai v. Textiles Ltd.(') and Simens Engineering Co. v.\n\nUnion of India('). The Order dated 14th May, 1976 was, therefore, clearly vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as it contained only the final and operative order made by the Commission and did not record any reasons whatsoever in support of it and the appellant was, in the circumstances, entitled to claim that the Order should be revoked by the Commission.\n\nThis view taken by us renders it unnecessary to consider whether there was any material change in the relevant circumstances justifying invocation of the power under section 13 (2) and hence we do not propose to deal with the same. The Commission has devoted a part\n\nof the order impugned in the present appeal 'to a consideration of this question and taken the view that there was no material change in the relevant circumstances subsequent to the making of the Order dated 14th May, 1976. We do not wish to express any opinion on the correctness of this view taken by the Commission, since we are setting aside the impugned order made by the Commission and also revoking\n\n(1) C. A. 245of1970, dee. on 17th Dec., 1975,\n\n(2) [!976] Supp. S.C.R. 489.\n\nthe Order dated 14th May, 1976 and sending the matter back so that the application of the Registrar under section 10(a) (iii) may be disposed of afresh.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Commission rejecting the application of the appellant under section 13 (2), revoke the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and remit the case to the Commission so that the Collllllission may dispose of the application of the Registrar under section lO(a) (iii) in the light of the observations contaii1ed in this judgment. The Commission will give an opportunity to the appellant to file a proper reply in conformity with the requirements of the Regulations and after taking such relevant evidence as may be produced by both parties, proceed to dispose of the application of the Registrar on merits in accordan~ with law.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs of the appeal.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 414, "entities": [{"text": "MAHINDRA & MAIDNDRA LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 24, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, JASWANT SINGH AND A. P. SEN, JJ.j\n\nMonopolies & Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969-S. 13(2) and .55- Scope of-Nature of order passed under s. 13(2)."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JASWANT SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JASWANT SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "Restrictiv-e Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 700, "end_char": 752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 766, "end_char": 819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D SectiOn lO(a) (iii) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 empowers the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to enquire into any restrictive trade practices upon an application made to it by th~ Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 950, "end_char": 960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090, "end_char": 1100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 55 provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Central Government or the E Commission under s. 13 or s. 37 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds specified in s. 100, Code of Civil Procedure~\n\n1908."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1205, "end_char": 1210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1214, "end_char": 1219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1248, "end_char": 1261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 55 provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Central Government or the E Commission under s. 13 or s. 37 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds specified in s. 100, Code of Civil Procedure~\n\n1908."}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1305, "end_char": 1311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1313, "end_char": 1336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1391, "end_char": 1397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "statute": "the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1398, "end_char": 1403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1587, "end_char": 1593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "May 14, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its order dated May 14, 1976 the Comn1ission declared certain clauses , of the appellanfs distributorship agreement to be void."}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 SCR 685", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3520, "end_char": 3524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appel~ Jant made an application to the Comn1ission p0inting out that it did not contest the enquiry proceedings under s. 37 in 1he first instance because the Commission's decision in the Telco case \\Va~ directly applicable; but now C that that decision had been reversed by the Supreme Court in appeal, its order dated May 14, 1976 needed amendn1cr.i:/modification."}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Telco", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4544, "end_char": 4549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant's trade practices were restrictive in nature and that the Registrar's application not having been made in accordance with the Jaw laid do\\vn by this Court in Telco case the impugned order of the Commis sion \\vas liable to be revoked or n1odified under s. 13(2); (2) the order did .not give any reasons for its decision and so was vitiated; afld (3) the order was a continuing order because it required the appellant not 1nerely to cease bnt also desist from the restrictiYe: lrad~ practices set out in the order and was, therefore required to be continual1y justifiable and since it was, contrary to the law."}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5383, "end_char": 5402, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C.P.C.", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5439, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C.P.C.", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.13(2)", "label": 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13478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13594, "end_char": 13602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 114 and 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13653, "end_char": 13665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13680, "end_char": 13683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.114 and 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13735, "end_char": 13746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 114 and 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14020, "end_char": 14032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil 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"end_char": 14995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15080, "end_char": 15087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15343, "end_char": 15350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15671, "end_char": 15676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16149, "end_char": 16154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th May 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20488, "end_char": 20501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the Commission had no basis for making it-s order dated 14th May 1976."}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21685, "end_char": 21693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(0)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21836, "end_char": 21843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 SCR 455", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22557, "end_char": 22573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th C May 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24533, "end_char": 24548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated 14th C May 1976 did not contain any discussion showing that the Commission had reached the requisite satisfaction."}}, {"text": "28-2-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25374, "end_char": 25383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 28-2-1978 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in R.T.P, Enquiry No."}}, {"text": "Ashok H. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25480, "end_char": 25494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok H. Desai, B. H. Wani, Ravinder Narain, Talat Ansari, A. N. Haksar and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. H. Wani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25496, "end_char": 25506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok H. Desai, B. H. Wani, Ravinder Narain, Talat Ansari, A. N. Haksar and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25508, "end_char": 25523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok H. Desai, B. H. Wani, Ravinder Narain, Talat Ansari, A. N. Haksar and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Talat Ansari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25525, "end_char": 25537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok H. Desai, B. H. Wani, Ravinder Narain, Talat Ansari, A. N. Haksar and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Haksar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25539, "end_char": 25551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok H. Desai, B. H. Wani, Ravinder Narain, Talat Ansari, A. N. Haksar and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25588, "end_char": 25604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi."}}, {"text": "Addi. Sol. Genl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25606, "end_char": 25621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25624, "end_char": 25635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar and Girish Chandra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25640, "end_char": 25654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar and Girish Chandra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "BnAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25722, "end_char": 25730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBnAGWATI, J<-This appeal under section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to G as the Act) raises interesting questions of law relating to the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25753, "end_char": 25763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25771, "end_char": 25823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27247, "end_char": 27256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27816, "end_char": 27825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th Januafy, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29590, "end_char": 29608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant by its letter dated 27th Januafy, 1971 submitted to the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Registrar) certified' copies of agreements entered into by the appellant with the Distributors for registration, since in the opinion of the appellant, they were registrable under the provisions of Ch."}}, {"text": "19th May, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29991, "end_char": 30005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also submitted to the Registrar along with its letter dated 19th May, 1972 four copies of the standard distributorship agreement for registration in terms of cl. ("}}, {"text": "Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30116, "end_char": 30166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30287, "end_char": 30297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "17th December, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30321, "end_char": 30340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' r\n\n, On 17th December, 1975 the Registrar made an application to H the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (here• inafter referred to as the Commission) under section lO(a) (iii) of\n\nthe Act pointing out to the Commission that the standard distribntorship agreement entered into by the appellant with the distributors was filed by the appellant for registration in the office of the Registrar and the same had been duly registered under section 35 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Restrictive Trade Practices Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30399, "end_char": 30437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' r\n\n, On 17th December, 1975 the Registrar made an application to H the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (here• inafter referred to as the Commission) under section lO(a) (iii) of\n\nthe Act pointing out to the Commission that the standard distribntorship agreement entered into by the appellant with the distributors was filed by the appellant for registration in the office of the Registrar and the same had been duly registered under section 35 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30768, "end_char": 30778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31516, "end_char": 31529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31538, "end_char": 31547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32193, "end_char": 32202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd January, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32523, "end_char": 32540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O(a) and 37 of the Act, to hold inquiry into the F restrictive trade practices complained of by the Registrar and issued notice dated 2nd January, 1976 under Regulation 53 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission Regulations, 1974\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) to the appellant that if the appellant wished to be heard in the proceedings before the Commission, it should comply with the requirements of Regulations 65 and 67 failing which the Commission would proceed with the inquiry in the absence of respondent."}}, {"text": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission Regulations, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32568, "end_char": 32639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3rd February, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32976, "end_char": 32994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, by its letter dated 3rd February, 1976, acknowledged receipt of the notice and intimated to the Commission that it did not wish to be heard in the proceedings before the Commission but put forward its submissions in regard to the restrictive trade practices alleged by the Registrar in his application."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33949, "end_char": 33958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th May, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35114, "end_char": 35128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Registrar filed an affidavit of the Assistant Registrar dated 10th May, 1976 in support of the allegations contained in the application but this affidavit surprisingly did not contain any further or other material than that set out in the appliclltion."}}, {"text": "14th May, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35686, "end_char": 35700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission, after going through the application and the affidavit of the Assistant Registrar and hearing the Registrar, made an order dated 14th May, 1976, the •operative part of which was in the following terms :\n\n\" (I) The Respondent is hereby restrained and prohibited by any agreement with any distributor to restrict by any method the persons or classes or persons to whom the goods ar\" sold wh.ether such person be retail purchaser or a dealer."}}, {"text": "10th September.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38056, "end_char": 38071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7) of the Order, the appeliant filed an affidavit dated 10th September."}}, {"text": "7th December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40179, "end_char": 40197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It i; eems that there was a hearing before the Commission on this issue as regards compliance with the direction~ contained in the Order and the draft of the revised distributorship agreement 'prepared by the .appellant was considered and pursuant to the suggestion made by the Commission, the appellant agreed to amend two clauses in the draft and the Commission by its Order dated 7th December, 1976 directed that the revised distributorship agreement should be filed by the appellant by 31st March, 1977."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40286, "end_char": 40302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It i; eems that there was a hearing before the Commission on this issue as regards compliance with the direction~ contained in the Order and the draft of the revised distributorship agreement 'prepared by the .appellant was considered and pursuant to the suggestion made by the Commission, the appellant agreed to amend two clauses in the draft and the Commission by its Order dated 7th December, 1976 directed that the revised distributorship agreement should be filed by the appellant by 31st March, 1977."}}, {"text": "Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40724, "end_char": 40760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was given in an appeal preferred by Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Tclco) against an order made by the Commision i!l an enquiry under section 3 7 and it reversed the view taken by the Commission in several important respects."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40860, "end_char": 40869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "21st January, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40987, "end_char": 41005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though this decision was given on 21st January, 1977, it was not fully reported until March 1977 and on reading it, the appellant felt that the order of the Commission dated 14th May, 1976 required reconsideration, as it was ----\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "[1977) 2 S.C.R. 685", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41188, "end_char": 41207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st March. 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41327, "end_char": 41343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant accordingly made an application to the Commission on 31st March."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41503, "end_char": 41508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1977 where, besides asking for extension of time for filing a copy of the revised distributorship agreement on the ground that the dealers were spread out all over India and it would take considerable time for execution of the revised distributorship agreement by them, the appellant pointed out that it had not contested the enquiry proceedings nnder section 37."}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41691, "end_char": 41701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th June, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42453, "end_char": 42467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission acceded to the request contained in this application and extended the time for filing the revised distributorship agreement upto 4th June, 1977."}}, {"text": "30th May, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42521, "end_char": 42535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter made an application dated 30th May, 1977 under section 13 (2) of the Act read with Regulation 85 for revocation, amendment or modification of the Order of the Commission dated 14th May, 1976."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42542, "end_char": 42552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th August, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43093, "end_char": 43110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was opposed by the Registrar by filing a reply dated 17th August, 1977."}}, {"text": "26th August, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43167, "end_char": 43184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prties were thereafter heard by the Commission on 26th August, 1977 and pursuant to the directions given by the Commission, affidavits of documents were filed and evidence was recorded on both sides."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Motors Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43413, "end_char": 43434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in the course of the evidence the appellant came to know that in November 1977 Hindustan Motors Ltd. had introduced in the G market diesel trekker which was clearly a competing vehicle and the appellant thereupon applied to the Commission on 30th January, 1978 for amendment of the application by adding a plea that the fact that since November 1977 Hindustan Motor Ltd. had started manufacturing and selling diesel trekker which was a highly competitive\n\nH product was another material change in the relevant circumstances which justified the revocation, amendment or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976."}}, {"text": "30th January, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43576, "end_char": 43594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in the course of the evidence the appellant came to know that in November 1977 Hindustan Motors Ltd. had introduced in the G market diesel trekker which was clearly a competing vehicle and the appellant thereupon applied to the Commission on 30th January, 1978 for amendment of the application by adding a plea that the fact that since November 1977 Hindustan Motor Ltd. had started manufacturing and selling diesel trekker which was a highly competitive\n\nH product was another material change in the relevant circumstances which justified the revocation, amendment or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Motor Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43684, "end_char": 43704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in the course of the evidence the appellant came to know that in November 1977 Hindustan Motors Ltd. had introduced in the G market diesel trekker which was clearly a competing vehicle and the appellant thereupon applied to the Commission on 30th January, 1978 for amendment of the application by adding a plea that the fact that since November 1977 Hindustan Motor Ltd. had started manufacturing and selling diesel trekker which was a highly competitive\n\nH product was another material change in the relevant circumstances which justified the revocation, amendment or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976."}}, {"text": "28th February, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44297, "end_char": 44316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "any order on this application for amendment and kept it pending and proceeded to dispose of the main application by an Order dated 28th February, 1978 by which it rejected the main application with costs and added a short order on the same day stating that in view of the order on the main application, there would be no order on .the application for amendment."}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44602, "end_char": 44612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44897, "end_char": 44906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45333, "end_char": 45342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45845, "end_char": 45854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46083, "end_char": 46092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Conrt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46196, "end_char": 46209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5, subsection ( 1) provides for the establishment of the Commission which .is to consist of a Chairman and not less than two and not more than F eight other members to be appointed by the Central Government and sub-section (2) of section 5 lays down that the Chairman shall be a person who is or has been or is qualified to be a .indge of the Supreme Conrt or of a High Conrt."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46275, "end_char": 46284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9.th August, 1~76,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46890, "end_char": 46908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, appears thatl the Central Government paid scant regard to this legislative require- H ment and though the office of Chairman fell vacant as far back as 9.th August, 1~76, it failed to make appointment of Chairman until\n\n24th February, 1978."}}, {"text": "24th February, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46958, "end_char": 46977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, appears thatl the Central Government paid scant regard to this legislative require- H ment and though the office of Chairman fell vacant as far back as 9.th August, 1~76, it failed to make appointment of Chairman until\n\n24th February, 1978."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48798, "end_char": 48808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48813, "end_char": 48823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 1A to 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48979, "end_char": 48996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 20 to 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49099, "end_char": 49116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 33 to 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49331, "end_char": 49348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 33 and 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49363, "end_char": 49381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49416, "end_char": 49426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49736, "end_char": 49746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49807, "end_char": 49817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49925, "end_char": 49935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50180, "end_char": 50190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50344, "end_char": 50354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50795, "end_char": 50805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50900, "end_char": 50910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51267, "end_char": 51277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51484, "end_char": 51494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51681, "end_char": 51691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51695, "end_char": 51705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51836, "end_char": 51848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51856, "end_char": 51884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52020, "end_char": 52030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure 1908"}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52372, "end_char": 52382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure 1908"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52786, "end_char": 52791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These Regulations, in so far as material, read as follows\n\n\"Section 65 : APPEARANCE OF PARTIES: Every respondent who wishes to be heard in the proceedings shall within 14 days of the service upon him of the copy of the notice of enquiry, enter an appearance in the office of the Commission by delivering to the Secretary six copies of a memorandum stating that the respondent wishes to be heard in the proceedings and containing the name of his advocate having an office in Delhi or New Delhi and duly authorised ro accept service of processes and the Secretary II 119SCl/79\n\nshall send one copy of the memorandum to the Registrar in case where proceedings are initiated under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 10, and in all other cases to the Director of Investigation.\""}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52795, "end_char": 52804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These Regulations, in so far as material, read as follows\n\n\"Section 65 : APPEARANCE OF PARTIES: Every respondent who wishes to be heard in the proceedings shall within 14 days of the service upon him of the copy of the notice of enquiry, enter an appearance in the office of the Commission by delivering to the Secretary six copies of a memorandum stating that the respondent wishes to be heard in the proceedings and containing the name of his advocate having an office in Delhi or New Delhi and duly authorised ro accept service of processes and the Secretary II 119SCl/79\n\nshall send one copy of the memorandum to the Registrar in case where proceedings are initiated under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 10, and in all other cases to the Director of Investigation.\""}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53023, "end_char": 53033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53095, "end_char": 53105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53353, "end_char": 53362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53513, "end_char": 53523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53605, "end_char": 53615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54179, "end_char": 54190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order XLVII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54195, "end_char": 54218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54667, "end_char": 54677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XLVII of the Code", "statute": "Order XLVII of the Code"}}, {"text": "14th May, 197.6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54769, "end_char": 54784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that the application of the Registrar on which the Order dated 14th May, 197.6 was made did not set out any facts or features showing how the trade practices referred to in the aJ>l>lication were restrictive of competition so as to constitute rcsttictivii trade practices and merely contained a bald recital of the impugned clauses and mechanical reproduction of the language of the relevant\n\nMAHINDRA LTD."}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57362, "end_char": 57375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57662, "end_char": 57675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58066, "end_char": 58079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58243, "end_char": 58253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58610, "end_char": 58623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th May. 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58702, "end_char": 58716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents also urged that on a proper construction of section 13(2) read with Regulation 85, the Commission could revoke or amend the Order dated 14th May. 1976 only if there was a material change in the relevant circumstances since the making of the Order or any of the grounds specified in Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was available tD tlic appellant."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58874, "end_char": 58903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59108, "end_char": 59121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59484, "end_char": 59494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59617, "end_char": 59627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59725, "end_char": 59735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59779, "end_char": 59789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60027, "end_char": 60037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60663, "end_char": 60673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61194, "end_char": 61204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61307, "end_char": 61317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61397, "end_char": 61406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61417, "end_char": 61440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61472, "end_char": 61482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "27th December, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61504, "end_char": 61523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now at the date when section 55 was enacted, namely, 27th December, 1969, being the date of comlng into force of the Act, section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure specified three grounds on which a second appeal could be brought to the High Court oand one of these grounds was that the decision appealed against was contrary to law."}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61573, "end_char": 61584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61588, "end_char": 61615, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61811, "end_char": 61822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61988, "end_char": 61998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62048, "end_char": 62059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62128, "end_char": 62138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62197, "end_char": 62207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62209, "end_char": 62220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62224, "end_char": 62251, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62288, "end_char": 62297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62303, "end_char": 62330, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1st February, I Q77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62370, "end_char": 62389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But subsequent to the enactment of section 55, section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was substituted by a new section by section 3 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1st February, I Q77 and the new section I 00 provided that a second appeal shall lie to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law."}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62634, "end_char": 62645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63224, "end_char": 63233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63245, "end_char": 63270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63321, "end_char": 63386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63784, "end_char": 63795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63871, "end_char": 63880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63906, "end_char": 63916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63920, "end_char": 63931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63974, "end_char": 63985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64061, "end_char": 64072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Central Act ur Regulation made after the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64478, "end_char": 64487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65794, "end_char": 65799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Esher, M.R., while dealing with legislation in incorporation in In re."}}, {"text": "Jf a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the clauses of n former Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65929, "end_char": 66016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R. 786", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 66117, "end_char": 66136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Brett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66388, "end_char": 66393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Justice Brett, also observed to."}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee of the Privy C Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66713, "end_char": 66754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the rule applied by the Judicial Committee of the Privy C Council in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindustan Cooperative lmwance Society Ltd.(1)."}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee pointed out in this rnse that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66852, "end_char": 66949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66982, "end_char": 67018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67154, "end_char": 67164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911", "statute": "the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Land Improvement Trust Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67186, "end_char": 67227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "George Lowndes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67264, "end_char": 67278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir George Lowndes delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee observed at puge 267 :\n\n\"In this country it is accept\\!d that \\\\l'here a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of E the first statute does not affect the second : see the cases collected in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd edn."}}, {"text": "Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68273, "end_char": 68308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pre-emption Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68369, "end_char": 68390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68478, "end_char": 68497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajagopala Ayyangar, J .,"}}, {"text": "Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69011, "end_char": 69080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69287, "end_char": 69296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act", "statute": "Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69309, "end_char": 69359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69488, "end_char": 69501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930", "statute": "the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69515, "end_char": 69527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69550, "end_char": 69563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939", "statute": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939"}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69666, "end_char": 69678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939", "statute": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939"}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69767, "end_char": 69779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939", "statute": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69911, "end_char": 69920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939", "statute": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939"}}, {"text": "section 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70000, "end_char": 70013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939", "statute": "Vehicles Act,\n\n1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70021, "end_char": 70045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70183, "end_char": 70192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70205, "end_char": 70229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70268, "end_char": 70280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Taxation Act and neither repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70288, "end_char": 70351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70426, "end_char": 70438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Taxation Act and neither repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Taxation Act and neither repeal of 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76318, "end_char": 76328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76771, "end_char": 76781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76863, "end_char": 76876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77053, "end_char": 77063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77287, "end_char": 77297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "English Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77305, "end_char": 77350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77697, "end_char": 77707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956", "statute": "the English 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{"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79387, "end_char": 79397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79434, "end_char": 79444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79564, "end_char": 79574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79599, "end_char": 79609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79733, "end_char": 79746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79797, "end_char": 79807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79863, "end_char": 79873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80036, "end_char": 80045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81757, "end_char": 81767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81990, "end_char": 82000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82307, "end_char": 82317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83075, "end_char": 83085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83428, "end_char": 83441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83496, "end_char": 83506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83956, "end_char": 83969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85125, "end_char": 85136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85141, "end_char": 85172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85588, "end_char": 85599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code", "statute": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85757, "end_char": 85767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code", "statute": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85822, "end_char": 85833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code", "statute": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86022, "end_char": 86033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code", "statute": "Order XL VII rule I of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86240, "end_char": 86253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86332, "end_char": 86343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86438, "end_char": 86448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86527, "end_char": 86538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86623, "end_char": 86633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86833, "end_char": 86844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87046, "end_char": 87056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87456, "end_char": 87469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87609, "end_char": 87622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87743, "end_char": 87753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th May, ; 976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 89341, "end_char": 89356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant did make its submissions in writing by its letter dated 3rd February, 1976, but since the appellant did not enter an appearance as required by Regulation 65, it was precluded from filing a reply under Regulation 67 and the Commission was legally justified in refusing to look at the submissions contained in the letter of the appellant, though we may observe that it would have been more consonant with justice if the Commission had, instead of adopting a technical and legalistic approach, considered the submissions of the appellant before making the Order dated 14th May, ; 976."}}, {"text": "4th June, J 977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 90646, "end_char": 90661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, before the extended date was due to expire, this Court reversed the decision of the Commission in the Telco case and as soon as this new fact or circumstance came to its knowledge, the appellant made an application dated\n\nJ'- 31st March, 1977 stating that in view of the decision given by this Court in the Telco case, the applicant was advised to move a suitable application for amendment and/or modification of the Order dated 14th May, 1976 and the time for filing the revised distributorship agreement should, therefore, be further extended and on this application, the Commission granted further extension of time upto 4th June, J 977."}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90896, "end_char": 90909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91736, "end_char": 91749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92071, "end_char": 92081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92444, "end_char": 92457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93019, "end_char": 93032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95935, "end_char": 95945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96427, "end_char": 96439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.G.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 97137, "end_char": 97174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If a trade practice H merely regulates and thereby promotes competition, it would not fall\n\n12-Jl9SCl/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.G.lt\n\nwithin the definition of restrictive trade practice, even though it may be, to some extent, in restraint of trade."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 98269, "end_char": 98282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that on the subject of restrictive trade, practices, the law in the United States has to be approached with great caution, but it is interesting to note that the definition of \"restrictive trade practice\" in our Act echoes to some extent the 'rule of reason' evolved by the American Courts while interpreting section 1 of the Sherman Act."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98510, "end_char": 98519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 98870, "end_char": 98900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court of United States, therefore, read a 'rule of reason' in this section in the leading decision in Standard Oil Company v. United Stales(')."}}, {"text": "S. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99918, "end_char": 99924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99952, "end_char": 99958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Standard Oil Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100072, "end_char": 100092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1073\n\nof reason' evolved by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Company's case and the American Tobacco Co's case has governed the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act since then and though it does not furnish an absolute and unvarying standard and has been applied, sometimes more broadly and some times more narrowly, to\n\nB the different problems coming before the courts at different times, it has held the field and, as pointed out by Mr.\n\nJustice Reed in the United States v. E.I. Du Pont(1), the Supreme\n\nCourt has not receded from its position on this rule."}}, {"text": "American Tobacco Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100108, "end_char": 100127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1073\n\nof reason' evolved by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Company's case and the American Tobacco Co's case has governed the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act since then and though it does not furnish an absolute and unvarying standard and has been applied, sometimes more broadly and some times more narrowly, to\n\nB the different problems coming before the courts at different times, it has held the field and, as pointed out by Mr.\n\nJustice Reed in the United States v. E.I. Du Pont(1), the Supreme\n\nCourt has not receded from its position on this rule."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100167, "end_char": 100176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100480, "end_char": 100484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1073\n\nof reason' evolved by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Company's case and the American Tobacco Co's case has governed the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act since then and though it does not furnish an absolute and unvarying standard and has been applied, sometimes more broadly and some times more narrowly, to\n\nB the different problems coming before the courts at different times, it has held the field and, as pointed out by Mr.\n\nJustice Reed in the United States v. E.I. Du Pont(1), the Supreme\n\nCourt has not receded from its position on this rule."}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 100530, "end_char": 100544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 1073\n\nof reason' evolved by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Company's case and the American Tobacco Co's case has governed the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act since then and though it does not furnish an absolute and unvarying standard and has been applied, sometimes more broadly and some times more narrowly, to\n\nB the different problems coming before the courts at different times, it has held the field and, as pointed out by Mr.\n\nJustice Reed in the United States v. E.I. Du Pont(1), the Supreme\n\nCourt has not receded from its position on this rule."}}, {"text": "Brandeis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100737, "end_char": 100745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Brandeis applied the 'rule of reason' in Board of Trade v. United c States(\") for holding that a rule prohibiting offers to purchase during the period between the close of the call and the opening of the session on the next business day for sales of wheat, corn, oats or rye at a price other than at the closing bid, was not in \"restraint of trade\" within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101108, "end_char": 101117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105441, "end_char": 105450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106113, "end_char": 106120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107456, "end_char": 107466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107958, "end_char": 107971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108295, "end_char": 108305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108993, "end_char": 109003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109091, "end_char": 109103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110097, "end_char": 110110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110496, "end_char": 110509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110876, "end_char": 110889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111026, "end_char": 111038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111147, "end_char": 111160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111168, "end_char": 111181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111382, "end_char": 111394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111865, "end_char": 111875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112238, "end_char": 112241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bt:oore we part With this aspect of the case, we must rerer le one other decision of this Court which was relied upon on behalf of the rel!pondents and that is the crecision in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v.\n\nM.R.T.P. (') The Judgment in this case was delivered by Beg, C.J., speaking on behalf of himself and Gupta, J. and though Beg, C.J., was also a party to the judgment in the Telco case, this judgment seem to sttill:e a slightly different note and hence it is necessary to examine it in some detail."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112283, "end_char": 112288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bt:oore we part With this aspect of the case, we must rerer le one other decision of this Court which was relied upon on behalf of the rel!pondents and that is the crecision in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v.\n\nM.R.T.P. (') The Judgment in this case was delivered by Beg, C.J., speaking on behalf of himself and Gupta, J. and though Beg, C.J., was also a party to the judgment in the Telco case, this judgment seem to sttill:e a slightly different note and hence it is necessary to examine it in some detail."}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112615, "end_char": 112623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112889, "end_char": 112897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113275, "end_char": 113283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl11U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113295, "end_char": 113300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Lever Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 113434, "end_char": 113454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was affirmed by Beg, C.J., in the appeal preferred by Hindustan Lever Ltd.\n\nWe are not concerned with the merits of the question whether the last part of clause 5 and clause 9 were on the facts of tbt case rightly held to be restrictive trade practices, but certain observations made by the learned Chief Justice in that judgment call for consideration, since they seem to 'be inconsistellt with\n\nwhat was laid down by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in the Telco Case."}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113534, "end_char": 113542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113547, "end_char": 113555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Telco", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 113937, "end_char": 113942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln the first place, the learned Chief Justice distinguished the judgment in the Telco case by observing that the agreement in that case could not be understood without reference to the actual facts to which \"'----·----- ti)\n\n1977] 3 S.C.R 455."}}, {"text": "1977] 3 S.C.R 455", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 114082, "end_char": 114099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114308, "end_char": 114318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114320, "end_char": 114328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Lever", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 114361, "end_char": 114376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A it was sought to be applied and extraneous evidence in regard lo those facts for explaining \"the nature of the special agreement for restricting or distribution of areas\" was, therefore, admissible under section 92, clause 6 of the Evidence Act, but in the Hindustan Lever case_ the meanillg of the impugned clauses was plain and certain and the principle of section 92, clause 6 was clearly inapplicable to let in B extraneous evidence and hence no oral evidence could be led to deduce their meaning or vary it in view of the provisions of sections 91 and\n\n92."}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114463, "end_char": 114473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114475, "end_char": 114483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 91 and\n\n92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114645, "end_char": 114664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 91 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115079, "end_char": 115097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116430, "end_char": 116440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116684, "end_char": 116694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116696, "end_char": 116704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117154, "end_char": 117164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117316, "end_char": 117325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117514, "end_char": 117527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117713, "end_char": 117726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118090, "end_char": 118103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118190, "end_char": 118199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118296, "end_char": 118306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118500, "end_char": 118513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118656, "end_char": 118668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Day", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122439, "end_char": 122442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is precisely what was pointed out by Mr. Justice Day in United Slwe\n\nMachinery Corporation v.\n\nUllited States(I) where the question was whether the restrictive-use, exclusive-use and additional-machinery clauses in certain lease agreements of shoe-machinery were struck by lhe provisions of section 3 of the Clayton Act : \"The power to enforce them\", that is, the impugned clauses \"is omnipresent and their\n\n(I) 258 U.S. 708: 66 L. ed."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122681, "end_char": 122690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 708", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122808, "end_char": 122814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jess agreements within the con demnation of the Clayton Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 123055, "end_char": 123114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th B May, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126024, "end_char": 126040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also anothr infirmity invalidating the Order dated 14th B May, 1976."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126163, "end_char": 126167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126352, "end_char": 126361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126496, "end_char": 126509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129806, "end_char": 129816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130933, "end_char": 130943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131624, "end_char": 131637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131792, "end_char": 131802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1085_1125_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "' '\n\nSIT A RAM & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n(V. R. K!lISl!NA IYER, P. N. SHINGHAL, P. S. KAILASAM, D. A. DESAI B AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nSupreme Comt Rules, 1966, Order XXL, Rule 15(J)(c), Constitution of Indt'a, 1950. Articles 134, 136, 145, Criminol Procedure Code, 1898, s. 384 and Supreme Court (Enlargement of Crim/no/ Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, J. 2(a)-Procedure of the Supreme Court hearing appeals in criminal .•nattrrs tll th1~ ad1ni.ssion stage exparte-Whetlu:r ultra vires.\n\n1¥ords &. Fhrases-'Appeal' and procedure-Meaning of.\n\nRule 15(1) (c) of Order XX! of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 envisages that the petition of appeal under sub-clause (al or sub-cl•use (b) of clause\n\n(1) of Art. 134 of the Constitution or under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdictioo) Act, 1970 or under s. 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, on being registered shall be put up for hearing D ex-parte before the court which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to au necessary parties or make such orders, as the circumstances of the case me.y require.\n\nThe appellants in the appeal who were acquitted by the Sessions Court had been convicted and sentenced by the High Court and a\\varded life im prisonment under s. 302 read with s. 149 !PC.\n\nWhen their appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 was listed for preliminary hearing under Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XX! of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 it was contended ( 1) that the said provision empowering the court to dismiss the appeal summarily was ultra vires the Enlargement Act, 1970, (2) the power of the Supreme Court to frame rules under Art. 145 of the Constitution cannot be extended to annul the rights conferred under an Act of Parliament nnd (3) that an appeal under the Enlargement Act, 1970 cannot be dismissed summarily without calling for the records, ordering notice to the State and without giving reasons.\n\nHELD:\n\n(Per Krishna Iyer. Shinghal & Desai, IJ.)\n\nl. Article 134(1) (c) spells a measure of seriousness because the High Court which has heard the case certifies that it involves questions of such moment that the Supreme Court itself must resolve them. To dispose of such a m2Uer by a preliminary hearing is to i:ast n refiect!on on the High Court's capacity to understand the seriousness of a certification. [109S D-E]\n\n2. ritcle 136 vests a plenary discretion in the Supreme Court to deign H or decline to grant leave to appeaJ against any conviction or sentence. Before deoiding to grant or reject such leave the court accords an oral hearing afttr\n\nperusing all the papers produced. Once leave is granted, the appeal is heard, after r.:oricc to the state, in full panoply. .-\\.Ur leave, the appeal is bom.\n\nThen it ripens .into fullness and is disposed of when both sides are present.\n\nNo appeal after leave, is dismissed summarily or ex-parte. If Art. 136 gives a discretionary power to grant leave to appeal or to dismiss in limine, after an cx-parte hearing (or efter issue of notice if the court so chooses), Art. 134 which gives a constitutional right to appeal as it were, must stand on a higher footing lest the Constitution makers be held to have essayed in super ercgation. [1095G-1096A]\n\n3. There is much more 'hearing' content in an absolute appeliate right than in a precarious 'special leave' motion. Jurisprudentially, a right is larger than a permission. Art 134 puts the momentous class of cases covered by it beyond the discretionary compass of Art. 136 and within the compulsory area of full hearing such as would follow upon leave being granted unde1 Art. 135(1). A full hearing may not obligJle Jragging the opposite side to court involving expense and delay. Fullness of hearing of the proponent is not incompatible with nonhearing of the opponent when after appreciating all that could be urged in support of the cause there is no need felt to call upon the other side, as where the proposition is groundless, frivolous or not prima facie statable.\n\n[1096BD]\n\n4. Article 134(2) empowers Parliament tO expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertajn criminal appeals. In exercise of this power, Parliament enacted the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 in its grave concern for long incarceration being subject to great scrutiny at the highest level if first inflicted, by the High Court. A right of appeal to the Supreme Court was granted when the High Court has, for the first time sentenced an accused to life imprisonment or to a term of or above ten years of rigorous imprisonment and equated it with that granted under Art. 134(1)(a) and (b). ft097G-1098D]\n\n5. The n<'rlure of the appeal process cannot be cast in a rigid mould as it varies with jurisdiction and systems of jurisprudence. Whatever the protean forms the appellate process may take, the goal is justice so that a disgruntle<l litigant cannot convert his right of appeal into breaking down the court system by sufferance of interminable submission after several tribunal9 have screened his case and found it fruitless. The signification of the right of appeal under Aft. 134 is a part of the procedure established by law for the protection of life and personal liberty. Nothing which will render this right illusory or its fortune chancy can square wjth the mandate of Art. 21. [llOOH--llOlA, !102F. 11030, 1104H-1105AJ\n\n6. When the High Court trying a case sentences a man to death a higher court must examine the merits to satisfy that human life shall not be haltered without an appellnte review. A single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in the con\n\nception that men are fallible, that Judges are men and that making assurance doubly sure before irrevocable deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, e fu11scale reexamination of the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundaCi1eniaJ fairness o_r procedure. [1105C, E]\n\n7. The life of the law is not perfection of theory but realisation of justice in the roncrete situation of a given system. It is common knowledge that\n\nSITA RAM V. U.l'. STATE 108 7\n\n; a jail appeal or an appeal filed through an advocate does not contain an .exhaustive accompaniment of all the evjdentiary material or record of proceed .. ings lttying bare legal er!ors in the judicial steps. It is not unusual that a ·-fatal flaw has been discovered by the appellate judges leading to a total . .acquittal. Such a high jurisdiction tl.s is vested by Art. 134 calls for an active\n\ncexan1ination by the judges and such a process will be an ineffectual essay in ; the absence of the whole record.\n\nA preliminary hearing is hardly of any 'USC bearing in n1ind that whtlt is being dealt with is an affirmation of death sentence for the first tin1e. Section 366 of the Code requires the Court of Session which passes a sentence of death to submit the proceedings to the High Court and rulings insist on an independent appellate consideration of the n1attcr and. an eAamination of all relevant nrnterial evidence. The Supreme Court's position is analogous, and independent examination of n1aterials is impossible whhout the entire records being available.\n\nSo il is rrasonable -that before hearing the appeal under Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXl, ordinarily the records are sent for and are available.\n\nCounsel's assistance apart, the ccuri itself must apply its mind, the stakes being grave enough. llio.tF--1106BJ\n\n8. The recording of reasons is usually regarded as a necessary requirement ·Of fair decision. The obligatiofl to give reasons for decision ¥then consequence of wrong Judgment is forfeiture of life or personal liberty for long periods\n\nneeds no emphasis, especially when it is a first appeal following upon a heavy D sentence imposed for the first time. The constnint to record reasons secures in black and white what the Judge has in mind and gives satisfaction to him who is condemned that what he has had to say has not only been 'heard' but considered and recorded. Art. 21 is a bindng. n1andate against blind justice.\n\nIn the narrow categories of cases covered by Art. 134(l)(a) and (b) and s. 2(a) of the Enlargement Act, the subject matter is of sufficient g1tl'Vity as to justify the recording of reasons in the ultimate order. [l160E-G, I 106H- E\n\n1107 A]\n\n9. Protection at the third deck by calling for the records or launching on long rati6cination is a waste of judicial time.\n\nOur Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for dismissal at the third level without assigning written reasons, not beoa'llse there are no reasons, but because the tardy need to document\n\n, jll> them hampers the hearing of the n1any cas,;:5 in the queuC' lhat press upon the It\"' time of the court at that. level.\n\n[1107F]\n\n10. Order XXI, Rule 15(1) (c) of the Rules in an enabling provision not a compulsive one.\n\nHaimonious construction of Art. 134 and Art. 145 'leads to the. conclusion that the contemplated rules are mere machinery provisions. The sequence is simple. The fonnaltlCS for entertaining certain types of appeal are covered by Art. 145(l)(d) the manner of hearing and disposal is governed by Art. 145(1)(b) and the substantive sweep of the appeal as a G method of redressal is found in Art. 134. [I !070-H, ll08D, 1109Al\n\n11. It is daily experience to see judges on the high bench differ. and a -fortiori so in the field of sentence. This r<.\"ality is projected in the context of full freedom for the first appe1tate decider of facts to reach his own finding On offence and sentence, only to highlight how momentous it is--for the appellant to have his case considered by the highest court when the Constitu- .11 tion and Parliament have conferred a full right of appeal. Summary disnlisal, save in glaring cases, may spell gra.ve jco1'ardy to lifegi\\'ing just!('(, 13-l 19SCI/79\n\n. . A\n\nThat is why Order XX! Rule 15(1) (c) while it survives to weed out worthless appeals, shall remain sheathed in extra-ordinary cases where facts on, guilt or the ~'ider range of considerations on sentence are involved. [11090l !IOB]\n\n12. Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XX! is general and covers all conceivable OOses under Art. 134(1). It operates in certain situations, not in every appeal.\n\nIt merely removes an apprehended disability of the court in summarily dismissing a glaring case where its compulsive continuance, dragging the opposite party, calling up prolix records and expanding on the reasons for the decision, will stall the work of the court (which is an institutional injury to social justice) wi1h no gain to anyone, including lhe appellant to keep \\Vhom in agcnising suspense for long is itself an injusitce.\n\n]11110.D[\n\n13. If every appeal under Art. !34(l)(a) and (b) or s. 2(a) of the Jinlargemcnt Act, where questions of law or fact are raised, is set down for preliminary hearing and summary disposal, the meaningful difference between Art. 134 'and Art. 136 may be judicially eroded and Parliament stultified.\n\nThe minimum processual price of deprivation of precious life or prolonged loss of liLeHy is a single comprehensive appco!.\n\nTo be peevel by this need is to <.•ft'end against the fair play of the Constitution. [111lfl--lll2B]\n\n14. llpholding the vires of Order XX! Ruic 15(1)(c) of the Supremo Court Rules and also s. 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code the majority however held that in their application both the provisions shall be reStricted by the criteria set out hereunder tis a permissible exercise in constitutionalisation of the provisions. fll 12H]\n\n15. Order XX! Rules 15(1)(c) in action does not mean that all appeals falling within its fold shall be , routinely disposed of. Such a course obliterates the difference between Articles 134 and 136, between right and leave. The rule in cases of appeals under Art. 134(1)(a) Qnd (b) and s. 2(a) is notice, records and reasons, but the exception is preliminary hearing on all such materials as may be placed by the appellant iand brief grounds for dismissaJ.\n\nThis exceptional category is where, in all conscience, there is -4/, no point at all. Jn cases of real doubt the benefit of doubt goes to the appellant and notice goes to the adversary even if the chances of allowance o.f tile appeal be not bright. [113A-C] --t'\n\n[With a view to invest clarity and avoid ambiguity, Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c) may be suitably modified.]\n\nG Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] I SCC 248; Presidential Ref.\n\nNo. 1 of 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476; Wiseman v. Barneman, [1971] AC 297; Russel\n\nv. Duke of Norfolk. [1949] I All. ER 109; Ponnamma v. Arumogam, [1905]AC at p. 390; Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, [1905] AC 369; Newman v.\n\nKlausner, [1922] I KB 228; referred to.\n\nBlack's Law Dictionary 4th Edn. p. 1368, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary. 41 H 3rd Edn. Vol. I, pp. 160-161; Current Legal Problems 1958 Vol. II p. 194, Lav1 Quarterly Review Vol. 71, 1955 p. 410-1 L \"fh0 Judicial Process by Henry J. Abra.J:iam. 1962 pp. 159-160; referred to.\n\nSITA RAM V. U.P. STATE 1089\n\nPer Kailasam & Koslw.l, JI. (dissenting) A\n\n1. Article 145 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court subje'ct to the provisions of any law made by Parliament with the approval of the President to make rules from time to time for regula.ting generaJly the practice and vrocedure of the court. [1116Bl\n\n2. Article 134 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme \\::ourt inc regard to criminal matters, and while an unrestricted right of appeal is provid-\n\n, B cd to the Suprome Court under clauses (a) and (b) an appeal nnder suDclause (c) is provided only when the case is certified by the High Court as a fit one for appeal. Further, an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may b, made in that behalf under clause (!) of Art. 145 and to such conditions as the High Court rnay establish or require, [1 l16D- J l 17B]\n\n3. The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 has conferred on the Supreme Court further power to entertain and hear appeals than conferred on it under Art. 134(1)(a) and (b) as provided for in Art. 134(2) of the Constitution. [!117C]\n\n4. Article 145(1) (b) enables tlie Supreme Court to frame rules as to prcredure for hearing appeals. Rule 15 of Order XXI provides for the procedure for hearing appeals and is valid so far as to the procedure of hearing appeals. [1117D-E, 1118C]\n\n5. While s. 374 confers a right of appeal, s. 375 and s. 376 restrict such a right. Section 384 prescribes the procedure for hearing appeals enabling the court to dismiss certain appeals summarily and to deal with others under s. 385 if they are not summarily dismissed. The right of appeal conferred can be curtailed by procedure as envisaged in s. 384 Cr.P.C. or Rule 15 Order XXI\n\n(lf the Supreme Court Rules. [1120D] E\n\n6. An Oppeal to the Supreme Court under s. 374 Cr.P.C. is restricted by the provisions of s. 375 and s. 376 and could be dealt with summarily under s. 384 Cr. P.C. An appeal to the Supreme Court is subject to the severai provisions of the Cr. P.C. including the provisions relating to summary dis . po, aJ of 1he appeals. [1120E-F, GJ\n\n~~-\n\n7. The powers and the jurisdiction of the appellate court as prescribe:a by the Criminal Procedure Code and the rule Clannot be said to deny a right of hearing to the appellant. The right to be heard in an appeal is regulated h¥ statute. After a full trial the judgment is rendered by a High_ Judicial Officer such as a Sessions Judge or a High Court Judge. The appellate court has before it the Judgment of the lower court and the petition for appeal. At the preliminary hearing the appellant or his pleader is heard before the court decides to dismiss the appeal summarily. The power to summarily dismiss an appeal is conferred under the Criminal Procedure Code. when the cour_t is satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering with the judgment appealed against. This decision is taken by the appellate court being the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court of Sessions, the High Court or be Supreme Court. In Jht: case of the Chief Judicial Magi:-1trate and Court of Sessions, reasnns should be recorded for summary dismissal. The lfigh Court and the Supreme Court need not record reasons for summarily dismissing the app:al. It is\n\nnecessary that the Supreme Court or the High Court should be satisfied that there are net sufficient ground for interfering. The conclusion is arrived at after heflring the ll.ppelJant, examining the judgment and the petition for appeal. The appellate court is discharging an onerous duty in dismissing a case summarily.\n\nThe Code provides for calling for the records before disn1issing an appeal.\n\nIn cases where an appeUunt is sentenced to death, in1prisonment for life or long tenn of imprisonment, it is the bounden duty of the appellate court to hear the appellant, examine the petition of appeal and copy of the judgment\n\nppealed agair1st. If it feels necessary to call for the records of the case, it is\n\nits duty to call for the records and examine them, before coming to the conclusion that there are not sufficient grounds for interfering.\n\nIt is the responsibility of the appellate authority to order notice and hear the other side if it is not satisfied that there ln'fe no sufficient grounds for interfering.\n\nEqually it is the duty of the appellate court to dismiss the appeal summarily if it is satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering. This duty is imposed for regulating the work of the courts for otherwise judicial tin1e y, culd he unnecessarily spent. Taking into account the f:tct that the duty to decide the question where_ there are no sa:fficient grounds for interfering is }-\n\nplacd on highly placed judicial officers after affording a due hearing, it cannot he stated that the very right of appeal has been ta-ken a\\vay.\n\n[1122E~F,\n\n1122H---1123F; . .-\n\n8. Th~ procedure contemplated in Rules 13, 14 and 15 of the Supreme Court Rules are almost similar to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to appeal. In an appeal sent by the appellant from jail he is entitled to send any written arguments which he may desire to advance in support of his appeal. The Court in proper cases in which it coo.siders it desirable would engage an advocate to present the case of the appellant in jail. The mere fact that the appellant in jail is not being heard in, person or through an advocate would not mean that the. appeal is not being heard.\n\nThe court peruses the judgment, petition of appeal and the written arguments, if any, before proceeding to take action under Rule 15. This Court l.iing the highest court is not required to give reasons but is expected to bestow the greatest . cre in exercising the power of sum1nary dismissal under Rule 15. [ 1124G--ll 25 A]\n\nP. K. Mittra v. State of West Bengal, [1959] Suppl. I SCR 63; Shankar Krrba Yadhav v.\n\nState of Maharashtra, [1970] 2 SC:R 227; Minakshi -~-~ Subramanya, 14 IA .168; Govinda Kadtuji Kadam v. State of Maharashtra, [1970] 1 sec 469; referred to.\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; distinguished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 264 of 1978.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated 31-3-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 597 /76.\n\nA. N. Mulla and S. K. Jain for the Appellant.\n\nO. P. Rana for the Respondent.\n\n..,\n\n' u The Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer, P. N. Shinghal and D. A.\n\nDesai JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.\n\nP. S. Kailasam, J. gave a discnting opinion on behalf of himself and A. D. Koshal, J.\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 1091\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Exordially speaking, the point for decision is short but its legal import and human portent are deep, sounding in constitutional values and meriting incisiv'e examination.\n\nWhere the question wears a simple look but its answer strikes at life and liberty we must proceed on the inarticulate major premise of human law as the solemn delivery system of human justice.\n\nIn formal terms, the problem to be resolved is the vires of Order XXI, Rt.le 15(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules (the Rules, for short), but in juristic terms it turns on the inflexible stages as against its ( facultative facets of an appellate hearing when it is a first appeal _ against a death sentence or life imprisonment.\n\nMore particularly, is an appeal to the Supreme Court falling within the scope of Art. 134(1) or the enlarged jurisdiction permitted by Art. 134(2) liable\n\n-+- to shorthand hearing and peril of summary dismissal? Brevi manu, the appellant urges that Art. 134 of the Constitution compels this Court to hear and dispose of criminal appeals of the grave categories covered by it, not ex parte as Order XXI Rule 15 ( 1 )( c) of the Rules permits but in extenso, and only after notice to the State and with the record of the case before it.\n\nTherefore, the Rule is D\n\nbad.\n\nAny legal issue of profound impact, if regarded by Judges literally and not creatively, may be given short shrift, especially if counsel is more assertive than explorative, produces more heat than light and the text to be interpreted lends itself to one 'ense on the surface and another in the deeper layers.\n\nBut when the consequences of the construction can be calamitous and r the subjec1-nrntter involv'es the right to life and long loss of liberty, a final court, like ours, must reflect on the meaning of meanings, the human values which illumine our legal system and \\)le ends of justice the means of law mnst serve. The heart and the bead interact and interpret.\n\nA thumb-nail sketch of the sequence of facts may be necessary\n\nto get a hang of the constitutional core of the case. Several persons, including the appellants, were accused of murder and other violent offences but were acquitted by the Sessions Judge.\n\nThe State cnr- G ried an appeal to the High Comt against the acquittal of all the 18 accused persons.\n\nIn an elaborate judgment the High Court found the case of the prosecution proved although it confirmed the acquittal of quite a few.\n\nThe convicted accused, 12 in number, were awarded life imprisonment under s. 302 read withs. 149, l.P.C. and lesser terms of imprisonment for other offences.\n\nThereupon .the convicted appol- H !ants preferred an appeal to this Court under s. 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970,\n\n(for short the Enlargement Act).\n\nThis appeal was listed for preliminary hearing ex parte under Rule 15 (1) (c) of the Rules (as amended in 1978). When the case was opened at the preliminarv hearing counsel for the appellants contended that, as an inalienabl~ incident of a statutory appeal, his clients were entitled to a fullfiedged hearing after notice to the State and not an abbreviated disposal in the shape of a preliminary hearing, however long that hearing might be.\n\nThereupon, the court passed the following order :\n\n\"The appellants have challenged the constitutional validity of clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of rule 15 of prder XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, which enables an appeal of the kind with which we are concerned.· to be placed for hearing ex parte 0efoe. the Court for admission.\n\nIn that view f the matter, we think that unless the question of the constitutional validity of the rule is decided, we cannot have a preliminary hearing of this appeal for admission.\n\nLet the records, therefore, be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for giving such directions 'as he may deem fit and proper.\"\n\nThis Bench has come to be seized of the case in the constitutional setting.\n\nSuch is the scenario, the last and most crucial stage of which is the hearing before this Constitution Bench.\n\nA little elucidation of the legal matrix which has given rise to -Oil the contentions may be useful.\n\nThis Court ha~ jurisdiction over a wide range and long reach of litigation under Art. 136 of the Constitution which includes the power to grant leave to appeal in criminal matters. But this is a discretionary jurisdiction with drastic selfimposed limitations rarely realised by the gambling litigant and has hardly any semblance of an absolute right of appeal necessarily followed by a full debate after notice to the adversary.\n\nBut a segment of criminal cases, sta.nding out as a deadly category is, however, dealt with separately by Art. 134.\n\nIn a short-hand form, sub-clause\n\n(1) clothes an accused person, who has been acquitted by the trial court but sentenced to death at the appellate level, or has been tried by the High Court by withdrawal of the case from any other court subordinate to it and in such trial has been visited with death 5\"ntence, or has secured a certificate that his case is of such great moment as to qualify for pronouncement by the Supreme Court, with a rightshall we say, a constitutional right-of appeal to this Court.\n\nMoreover, under clause (2) of this Article, Parliament may make law\n\n.--··-\n\n51TA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1093\n\nfor conferring a statutory right of appeal on other classes of convicts.\n\nPurouant to this power Parliament has enacted the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, whereby persons acquitted by the trial court but awarded imprisonment for life, or for ten year~ and more, •enjoy a statutory right of appeal.\n\nThe proviso to Article 134(1) enables this Court to make provisions subject to whic\\l appeals under sub-clause ( c) of Article 134 shall lie.\n\nThese provisions are to be made under clause. (1 )(d) of Alticle 145 which, in specific terms, deals with rules as to the entertainment of appeals under sub-clause ( c) of clause ( 1) of Article 134.\n\nWe are not concerned with these rules which relate to the\n\n-----..c,,,.ncc~1ca.,.,.1\"'.\"\"\"'.'-~£.-.i\\~ or provisions subject to which the. appeal may be mstituted and 'dolroh,.-w; llfil'on the right of appeal or the manner of hearing .. But Article 145(171.l>)--'°\"~- th1_ Supreme Court to make rules, mter alta, as to the procedure for hearing app-1 •. _ One such rule is Order XXI Rule 15 which warrants preliminary hearing and disposal of all categories of appeals covered by Article 134(2). The fate of the present appeal hun, g in the balance at such a preliminary hearing and counsel challenged the vires of the rule .itself.\n\nIn its wake has come the present hearing.\n\nThis sets the stage for a more comprehensive approach to the constitutional problems arising in the case.\n\nWe must make it clear E that we are not concerned with the merits of the appeal at all but are confmed to a consideration of the validity of the impugned rule. If \" - we hold that the said rule is ultra vires and further hold that there -shall be a regular, full-dress hearing of the appeal a preliminary hearing will be obviated and notice in the appeal will have. to go to the State.\n\nIt requires to be specifically mentioned, although there is no hint about its advertence at the earlier preliminary hearing that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has a fasciculus of provisions •elating to appeals, the manner of their hearing and the procedure for their disposal, which. is comprehensive enough to cover the present category embraced by Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c). Therefore, the effect of the Sections in the Code bearing on the issue under discussion may also have to be studied before. we finally pronounce on the legality of a preliminary hearing in a criminal appeal filed in exercise of .a constitutional or statutory right.\n\nOur consideration falls into two chapters as it were, the first and more important turning on the constitutional prov1s10ns vis-a-vis H -Order XXI Rule 15 ( 1 )( c) and the second turning on the construction and impact of s. 384, Cr.P.C.\n\nTaking up the constitutional\n\naspects first, we may proceed to state, right away, the complex of provisions relevant to the discussion and the perspective in which we must read their message.\n\nArt. 134 of the Constitution confers criminal appellate jurisdictiott on this Court :\n\n134. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters.-\n\n( I) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from\n\n- any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court-\n\n(a) has on appeal reversed an , WP'\"' or acquittal of an accused _p14sonAmd seb!enccd him to death; or\n\n_ 0 _ .,,, .-o~-------tnr'nas.withdrawn for trial before itself any case from\n\nany court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the, accused person and sentenced him to death; or\n\n(c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court;\n\nProvided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under clause ( 1) of Article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require.\n\n(2) Parliament may by Jaw confer on the Supreme Court any further powers to entertain and hear appeals from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such_ law.\n\nNo argument is needed to realise the gravity of the subject covered by the first two clauses of the artic'Je--Oeath sentence for the first time or in reversal of an acquittal.\n\nHuman life is too dear to be deprived of by a death sentence without so much as a single appeal after its award.\n\nOur founding faith in human rights is the only warrant for the entrustment of this appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court which is far removed from the trial court and is intercepted by the Higl1 Court, an elevated tribunal manned by judges of proven calibre.\n\nThe symbolic meaning is obvious.\n\nLife is no matter for easy despatch even by the judicial process and a serious second\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, .T.) 1095\n\nlook is the minimum that the State owes to the citizen before bis gallowed farewell.\n\nTo truncate the fullness of appellate scrutiny into ex parte disposals despite the deliberate insertion by the framers of the Constitution of an express provision, by a procedural knife, may often frustrate their profound concern.\n\nJudicial professionalism, at higher level, is particularly conscientious and careful; but all professionalism suffers, by custom, from scelerosis in practice. And so, full-scale hearing in a first appeal is the fair insistence of the Constitution when the risk is to precious life.\n\n~ We are aware that the disposal of appeals involving death penalty receives anxious concern and deep reflection on the part of judges.\n\nWe are conscious that the grave stakes jQJ; Pid-j.+.Jfi•rni., ing-·-,;------ ~-1¥ithout.\"'afafyinJ! . .lhagainst error. But human limitations, perfunctoriness of counsel, oversight of some material hardly highlighted in the judgment under appeal and the misfortune that ex parte examination dulls attention while debate at the bar sparks mental\n\n;,..-\n\nplugs-these too are realities.\n\nLikewise, Art. 134 ( 1) ( c) spells a measure of seriousness because the High Court which has heard the case certifies solemnly that it involves questions of such moment that the Supreme Court itself must resolve them.\n\nTo dispose of such a matter by a preliminary hearing is to cast a reflection on the High Court's capacity to understand the seriousness of a certification.\n\nNow it is relevant to read Art. 136 (I) .\n\n136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court--\n\n(!) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, dekrmination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or ; made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.\n\nA plenary discretion vests. in the Supreme Court to deign or G decline to grant leave to appeal against any conviction or sentence.\n\nBefore deciding to grant or reject such leave the court accords an oral hearing after perusing all the papers produced.\n\nOnce leave is granted, is heard, after notice to the State, in full panoply.\n\nAfter leave, the appeal is born. Then it ripens into fullness and is disposed of when both sides are present.\n\nNo appeal, after leave, is dismissed H summarily or ex parte.\n\nThe relevance of Art. 136 in an examination of Art. 134 is this.\n\nIf Art. 136 gives a discretionary power to gram\n\nleave to appeal or to dismiss in lirnine, after an ex parte hearing; (or after issue of notice if the court so chooses), Art. 134, which gives a constitutional right to appeal, as it were, must stand on a higher footing lest the Constitution-makers be held to have essayed ir. shpererogation. Surely, there is much more 'hearing' content in an absolute appellate right than in a precarious 'special leave' motion.\n\nJurisprudentially, a right is larger than a permission.\n\nWhat is irresistible is that Art. 134 puts the momentous class of cases covered by it beyond the discretionary compass of Art. 136 and within the compulsory area of full hearing such as would follow upon kave being granted under Art. 136(1). But this is not the end of the journey .\n\n. C For, a full hearing may not obligate dragging the opposite side to court involving expense a!1d. delay, FuT!nei; s of hearing of the proponent is not incompatible with non-hegii11g of th<> .OJlPoll\"\"~--...-11r1r · after appreciating all that could be urged in _support of the cause there\n\nis no need felt to call upon the other side, as where the proposition is groundless, frivolous or not prirna facie statable. The ambit of appellate hearing may have to be explored in the constitutional context to which we will advert later.\n\nThe next step necessitates setting out, as an integral part of the comprehensive picture, Art. 145 :\n\n145. Rules of Court. etc.-\n\n(1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time to time, with the approval of tl1e President, make rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court including :\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\n(c) (cc)\n\nrules as to the procedure for hearing appeals and other matters pertaining to appeals including the time within which appeals to the Court are to be entered;\n\n(d) rules as to the entertainment of appeals under s11h\n\nclause (c) of clause ( 1) of article f.'.l4\"\n\n(e)\n\n(f)\n\n(g)\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 097\n\n(h)\n\n(i) rules providing for the summary determination of appeal which appears to the Court to be frivolous or vexatious or brought for the purpose of delay;\n\n(j) ........\n\nThis Court has framed rules under this article. The pertinent rule, B which is impugned as ultra vires is Order XXI Rule 15 ( 1 )( c) which may usefully be read here :\n\n15. (1). The petition of appeal shall be registered and numbered as 'soon as it is lodged.\n\nEach of the following categories of appeals, on being registered, shall be put up C for hearing ex parte before the Court which may either dis- .• -·--·~ miss it summarily or direct issue of notice to .Ji].1-r\"•''\".srrf:f parties or may make such orders, as_msfances of the case may require, namell,._:.-<'.- ..---· ·\"\n\n(a) .... ·--\n\n(!.) ....•..•\n\n(c) an appeal under sub-clause (a) or suh-clause (b) of clause ( 1) of article 134 of the Constitution, or under the Supreme Court ·(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 (28 of 1970) or under section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).\n\nPlainly, this rule clothes the court with power to shorten the fife <Jf an appeal even under Article 134 by dismissing it ex-parte, summarily.\n\nIs this abbreviatory power absouent with the appellate scheme envisaged iu Art. 134 and, therefore, excessive or offensive and void ? Or is the rule valid because it does not bear upon the substantive right of appeal but relates to the procedure for hearing and fall squarely within Art. 145(1) (b)? This is tl1e main crux of the debate.\n\nIt would be noticed that Art. 134 (2) empowers Parliament to G expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain criminal appeals.\n\nParliament, in exercise of this power, enacted the Snpreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970\n\n(for short, the Enlargement Act).\n\nThe relevant section (sec. 2) ;; tates :\n\n2. Enlarged appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal malters.-Without prejudice to the powers •\n\nconferred on the. Supreme Court by clause (1) of Act 134 of the Constitution, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of\n\nndia if the High Court- {a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years;\n\n(b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for _a m:tiod. of not less than ten years.\n\nThus a right to appeal ro t))eSupremc Court is given to convicts whom the High Court has, for the -n.....tiip.e sentenced to life imprisonment or to a term of or above ten years 'ot ••$1Jous imprisonment.\n\nThere is no doubt that Parliament, in its grave concefin~ncar ceration being subject to great scrutiny at the highest level inflicted by the High Court, granted a right of appeal in such cases <~ and equated it with that granted under Art. 134 (1) (a) and (b). So ~- what applies to death sentence cases applies to life term cases too and this must be borne in mind in the interpretative process.\n\nThis emphatic import is clear once we excerpt the relevant part of the Objects and Reasons :\n\n\"Wliile sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution confer upon the accused an absolute right of appeal, clause ( c) confers upon the High Court a discretion to grJnt a certificate to the accused to appeal in cases not falljng under sub-clauses (a) and (b).\n\nThe grant of certificate under Art. 134 ( 1) ( c) is not a matter of course.\n\nThe certificate is granted only where there has been an infringement of the essential principles of justice or there is substantial question of law or principle involved; in short the certificate would not be granted unless there are exceptional and special circumstances. The Supreme Court has also held that the conditions pre-requisite for the exercise of the discretionary power to grant .a certificate under Art. 134 (I) ( c) cannot be precisely formulated but it should be exercised sparingly and not to convert the\n\nSupreme Court into an ordinary court of criminal • appeal.\n\n•! '\n\n....\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kris/ioa Iyer, J.) 1099\n\nAn accused person has no absolute right of appeai even in circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Art . 134(1) if the High Court sentences him to life imprisonment or imprisonment of 10 or more years. In such a case\n\nhis appeal would be admitted in spcial and exceptional cir- -cumstances only either under Art. 134(1) (c) or Art. 136 of the Constitution .\n\n• • • • It is therefore. proposed to enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court empowering it to entertain and hear appeals also in cases mentioned in sub-clauses (a) and\n\n(b) of clause (2) of the Bill.\" C\n\nWhat is created is an unconditional right of appeal, nothing less and wider than is enjoyed under Art. 136.\n\nWe have stated at the. outset that for satisfactory understanding -of the problem and its solution, certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which cover the same ground need to be dealt with.\n\nD We will advert to them briefly here conscious that the crucial issue is constitutional.\n\nThe Code cannot control or contradict the Contitution as the stream cannot rise higher than the source. 'The pm-\n\n\\isions of the Code, invaluable as canalising the exercis~. of the appellate power, must be informed by and be subservient to the normative import of the Supreme Lex !est they , run aground and E be wrecked.\n\nChapter XXIX dals with appeals.\n\nTaking cognizance of the Enlargement Act the Code has enacted Sec .. 374(1) and Sec. 379 which, perhaps, are redundant save for completeness. These are new provisions not found in the Code of 1898 and may be reproduced :\n\n374(1). Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Conrt in its extra-ordinary original criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\n379. Where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and Convicted him and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, he may appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nSection 384 is significant because it has a decisive bearing on the\n\nfate of appeals like the present. This Section is in part a mechanical H (or meaningful?) reproduction of the corresponding provision ( s. 421) in the vintage Code.\n\n. A casual . persual discloses that s. 384 is an omnibus provi-\n\n~10n .embracmg all appeals, big and small, grave and goofy, mvolvmg a petty fine or inflicting, for the first time, a hanging\n\nsntence. And regardless of the stakes, the appellate court is given the peras1ve po:ver to dismiss the appeal summarily, and worse, even w1thont callmg for the record of the case and without recording its reasons if the Court is higher than the Court of Session.\n\nAt first blush, a blanket power to dismiss summarily, ex parte, sans record of the case, sans record of reasons, even where an acquitted accused is sentenced to death for the first time by the High Court, is neither human law nor human justice if our jurisprudence is Sensitized by the humanity of the Preamble to the Constitution or responsive to the vibrant commitment to civilized values.\n\nPetrified print processed through the legislative mint becomes living Jaw when, and only when, its text is tuned to the humane note of the Constitution.\n\nWe will dwell on the harmonics of the Constitution first since the fundamental note must emanate from it.\n\nThe question then is whether a statutory right of appeal necessarily spells the full unfoldment of notice to the respondent, sending for the records and record of reasons by a speaking judgment. If the answer is in the affirmative the survival of Order XXI Rule 15 (1) ( ~) is perilous. Reaching the same result by resort to artificial respiration E from s. 384 may have to be considered.\n\nBut anticipating our conclusion to avoid suspense, we sustain both the provisions by reading down their scope, substance and intendment.\n\nThe appellants have an undeniable right of appeal; but what are the necessary components of a hearing when such a right is exercised ?\n\nCounsel for the appellant insisted that an absolute right of appeal, as he described it, casts an inflexible obligation on the court to send for the record of the case, to hear both parties, and to make a reasoned judgment.\n\nTherefore, to scuttle the appeal by. a summary hearing on a preliminary posting, absent record, ex-parte and absolved from giving reasons is to be. absolutist-a position absonant with the mandate of the Enlargement Act and, indeed, of the Constitution in Article 134 ( 1). Counsel's ipse dixit did not convince us but we have pondered over the issue in depth,, being disinclined summarily to dismiss.\n\nAt the threshold, we have to delineate the amplitude of an appeal, not in abstract terms but in the concrete, context of Article 134 read with Article 145 and Order XXI Rule 15 and s. 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.\n\nThe nature of the appeal process cannot be cast in\n\n• •\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1101\n\na rigid mould as it varies with jurisdictions and systems of jurisprudence.\n\nThis point has been brought out sharply in \"Final Appeal.\"(') The learned authors ask : ·\n\n\"But what does 'appeal' really mean : indeed, is it a meaningful term at all in any universal sense ?\n\nThe word is in fact merely a term of convenient usage, part of a system of linguistic shorthand which accepts the need for a penumbra of uncertainty in order to achieve universal comprehensibility at a very low level of exactitude.\n\nThus, while 'appeal' is a generic term broadly meaningful to all lawyers in describing a feature common to a wide range of legal systems, it would be misleading to impute' a precise meaning to the term, or to assume, on the groµnds that the word (or its translated equivalent) has international currency, that the concept of an appeal means the same thing in a wide range of systems.\n\nOn any orthodox definition, an appeal includes three basic D elements : a decision (usually the judgment of a court or the ruling of an administrative body) from which an appeal is made; a person or persons aggrieved by the decision (who is often, though by no means necessarily party to the original proceedings) and a reviewing body ready and willing to entertain the appeal.\" E\n\nThe elasticity of the idea is illumined by yet another passage which bears quotation :\n\n\" 'Appeals' can be arranged along a continuum of increasingly formalised procedure, ranging from a concerned man in supplication before his tribal chief to something as jurisprudentially sophisticated as appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.\n\nLike Aneurin Bevan's elephant an appeal can only be described when it walks through the court room door ...... The nature of a particular appellate process-indeed the character of an entire, legal systemdepends upon a multiplicity of interrelated though largely imponderable) factors operating within the system. The structure of the courts; the status and rule (both objectively and subjectively perceived) of judges and lawyers, the form of law itself-whether, for example it is derived from a code or\n\n1. Final Appeal-A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity by Louis Blom-Cooper Qc Claredon Press, Oxford, l 972 pp. 44-45.\n\nA from judicial precedent modified by statute; the attitude u[ the courts to the authority of _decided cases; the political anJ administrative structure of the country concerned-whether for example its internal sovereignty is limited by its allegience to a colonizing power. The list of possible factors is endless, and theu weight and function in the social equation defy precise analysis.\" B\n\nIn short, we agree in principfo with the sum-up of the concept made by the anthor :\n\n\"Appeal, as we have stressed, covers a multitude of jurisprudential ideas.\n\nThe layman's expectation of an appeal is very often quite different from that of the lawyer and many an ) aggrieved plaintiff denied his 'just' remedy by judge or jury has come upon the disturbing reality that in England a finding of fact can seldom, if ever, form the basis of an appea!.\n\nSimilarly,, a Fxenchman accustomed to a narrowly legalistic. appeal In cessation, subject to subsequent reargument in a court below, would find little familiarity in the ponderous fmality of the judgment of the Haus~ of Lords.\n\nAnd a seventeenth-century lawyer accustomed to a painstaking search for trivial mistakes in the court record, which formed the basis of the appeal by writ of error, would be bewildered by the great flexibility and increased sophistication of a jurisprudential argument which characterize a modern appeal.\" , ,,;.......\n\nWhatever the protean forms the appelfate process may take, the goal\\ is justice so that a disgruntled litigant cannot convert his right of appeal A into a bnll in a china s\\iop breaking down the court system by sufferance of interminable submissions after several tribunals have screened his case ancl found it fruitless.\n\nThis throws us back to a definitional evaluation of the precise contem of 'appeal' in the specific constitutional perspective and statutory setting.\n\nOnce we accept the liquidity of the appellate concept we are logically led into a study of the imperatives of 'appeal' within the meaning of Art. 134.\n\nSince the right conferred by the Enlargement Act has its source in Art. 134(2) it is fair to attribute common features to the constitutional and statutory rights of appeal in the criminal specialities covered by Order XXI Rule 15(1) (c).\n\nThe key question is whether a right of appeal casts an inexorable obligation on the Supreme Court not merely to hear the appellant at a preliminary stage but proceed invariably to issue notice to the opposite side and hear him too.\n\nAnother bone of contention turns on the compulsion to consider the appeal only\n\n• ' •\n\n,..\n\n~ • ...\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer,! .. ) 1103\n\nafter receiving the records in the case from the court below. The core controversy involves a third element, namely, the inevitable necessity to . state reason's for the conclusions, as distinguished from the extinguishment of the proceedings with the utmost verbal economy by the use of a single word 'dismissed'.\n\nThese triune facets cannot be judged in vacuo but informed by the grim realities surrounding the disposal. Human jurisprudence is not a brooding omnipotence in the sky, but a normative science and technology dealing with the work, wealth and happiness of mankind as well as ifs blood, toils, tears and sweat.\n\nThe higheathe consciousness of the law, especially constitutional law, the deeper the concern for the worth of the human person that our legal culture, since Independence, has manifested; and the gravity of the consequences of the decision in appeal on life itself invests the concept with some essential features.\n\nIt is just as well that we remind ourselves of a value-setter here. Life and liberty have been the cynosure of special constitutional attention in Art. 21, the faller implications whereof have been unrevelled in Maneka Gandhrs case('). When we read the signification of the right of appeal under Art. 134 we must remember that it is a part of the prOC'-edure established by law for the protection of life and personal liberty.\n\nSurely, law, in this setting, is a pregnant expression. Bhagwati, J. in Maneka\n\nGandhi (supra) stated the position emphatically and since then this Court has followed that prescription and even developed it in humane directions a striking example of which is the recent judgment in Presidential Reference No. 1 of 1978.(') \"Is the prescription of some sort of proredure enough or must the procedure comply with any particular requirements ?\" asks Bhagwafi, J. in the leading opinion, and answers : \"Obviously, the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable\" .... \"The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Art. 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Art. 14.\n\nIt must be \"right and just and fair\" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Arf .21 would not be satisfied.\" Holding that natural justice was part of Indian Constitutional jurisprudence the learned Judge quoted Lord Morris of Borth-y-Oest in Wisemsn v. Barneman : ~'>\n\n(I) (1978] I S.C.C. 248.\n\n(2) [1979] 2 S.c.R. 476 .\n\n(3) [1971] A.C. 297 : [!969] All ll.R. 275. 14-ll9SCin9\n\n\" .... that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law.\"\n\nBhagwati, J, brought out the essence of the concept of natural justice B as part of reasonable procedure when he observed :\n\n\"The core of, it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a. genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.\n\nThat is why Tucker,, L.J., C emphasised in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk(') that \"whateer stwdard of natural justice is adopted, one essential i's that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case.\" What opportunity may be regarded as reascnabJe, would necessarily depend on the practical necessities of the situation.\n\nIt may be a sophisticated full-fledged D hearing or it may be a hearing which is very brief and minimal.\"\n\nOne of us (Krishna Iyer, J) emphasised the fundamental fairness required by Article 21 in every Jaw that abridges life or liberty :\n\n\"Procedure established by Jaw, with its lethal potentiality, will reduce life and liberty to a precarious plaything ff we do not ex nece.isitate import into those weighty words an adjectival ru1e of Jaw, civilised in its soul, fair in its heart and fixing those incperatives of procedural protection absent which the processual tail will wag the substantive head .... An enacted apparition is a constitutional illusion.\n\nProcessual justice is writ patently on Art. 21.\"\n\nWe have set out the sweep of Article 21 because the rule framed by this Court, namely Order XXI Rule lS(l)(c), cannot transcend this obligation, nor indeed can s. 384 of the Code.\n\nOn the contrary, as Bhagwati, J. has observed in Maneka Gandhi's case : (supra)\n\n\"It is a basic constitutional assumption underlying every statutory grant of power that the authority on which the power is conferred should act constitutionally and not in violation of any fundamental rights.\"\n\nWe have made these general remarks to set the in'erpretative tone\n\n' when translating the sense of the expression \"appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court\".\n\nNothing which will render thi's right illusory or\n\n(I) [194911 All E.R. 109.\n\n-,..\n\n,,. ..\n\n• '\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1105\n\nits fortune chancy can square with the mandate of Article 21.\n\nWhat A applies to the right of appeal under s. 2(a) of the Enlargement Act must apply to an appeal under Art. 134(1) (a) and (b) and, therefore, it is wiser to be assured of what comports with reasonableness and fairplay in cases covered by the latter category.\n\nWhen an accused is acquitted by the trial court, the initial presumption of innocence in his favour is reinforced by the factum of acquittal.\n\nIf this reinforced innocence is not only reversed in appeal but the extreme penalty of death is imposed on him by the High Court, it stands to reason that it requires thorough examination by the Supreme Court.\n\nA similar reasoning applies to cases falling under Art. 134(l)(b).\n\nWhen the High Court trying a case sentences a man to death a higher court must examine the merits to satisfy that a human life shall not be haltered without an appellate review.\n\nThe next step is whether a hearing that is to be extended or the review that has to be made by the Supreme Court in such circumstances can be narrowed down to a consideration, in a summary fashion, of the necessarily limited record then available before the Court and total dismissal of the appeal if on such a prima facie examination nothing flawsome is brought out by the appellant to the satisfaction of the Court.\n\nA single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in the conception that men are fallible,. that Judges are men and that making assurance doubly sure, before irrevocable. deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-scale re-examination of the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental fairness or procedure.\n\nA logical follow-up takes us to the reasonable insistence on the full record being made available for the activist play of the appellate judicial mind.\n\nThe life of the law is not perfection of theory but realisation of justice in the concrete situation of a given system.\n\nConsidered this way, it is common knowledge that a jail appeal or an appeal filed through an advocate does not contain an exhaustive accompaniment of all the evidentiary material or record of proceedings laying bare. legal errors in the judicial steps.\n\nIt is not unusual in the history of this or other countries that a fatal flaw has been discovered by appellate judges leading to a total acquittal, although even counsel might not have suspected any lurking lethal illegality.\n\nSuch a high jurisdiction as is vested by Article 134 calls for an active examination by the judges and such a process will be an ineffectual essay in the absence of the whole record.\n\nWe, therefore, think that a preliminary hearing is hardly of any use bearing in mind that what is being dealt with is an affirmation of death sentence for the first time. In this connection, we may notice thats. 366 of the Code\n\nrequires the Court of Session which passes a sentence of death to submit the proceedings to the High Conrt and rulings insist on an independent appellate consideration of the matter and an examination of all relevant material evidence.\n\nThe Supreme Court's position is analogous, and independent examination of the materials i's impossible without the entire records being available.\n\nSo it is reasonable to hold that before hearing the appeal under Rule 15(1) (c) of Order XXI, ordinarily the records are sent for and are available. Counsel's assistance apart, the: court itself must apply its mind, the stakes being grave enough.\n\nThe next ingredient contended for is the hearing of the oprsite party and notice to him in that behalf.\n\nThat iS to say, the appeal shall not be dismissed summarily or after a mere preliminary hearing even with the records on hand but only after notice' and debate at the bar. Speak• ing generally, our adversary system finds fulfilment when both sides present rival po'ints of view, unearth embedded infirmities and activate the proceeding with the sparks emanating from the clash of arms.\n\nSuch considerations may not loom large but for the fact that it is a first appeal we are dealing with and the risk is to life itself.\n\nTherefore, we hold that in the common run of cases the Court must issue 'notice to the opposite party, namely, the State and afford a hearing in the presence of both and with the rzcords on hand.\n\nThe vital aspects of natural justice have been carefully incorporated in our criminal jurisprudence. The recording of reasons is usually regarded as a '.necessary requirement of fair decision.\n\nThe obligation to give reasons for decision when consequence of wrong judgment is forfeiture of life or personal liberty for long periods ne•zds no emphasis, especially when it is a first appeal following upon a heavy sentence imposed for the first time.\n\nThe constraint to record reasons secures i'n black and white what the Judge has i'n mind and gives satisfaction to him who is condemned that what he had had to say has not only been 'heard' but considered and recorded.\n\nArt. 21 is a binding mandate against blilld justice.\n\nIt is interesting that in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) which dealt with a matter of mnch less significance the denial or impounding of a passport affecting freedom of movement was required to be decided after recording of reasons save in exceptional cases.\n\nFar more serious and indeed fatal is the outcome of an appeal under Article 134(1) (a) and\n\n(b) of the Constitution and the insistence on recording of reasons is a funadmental requisite of fairness. 'In this view, in the narrow category of cases covered by Article 134(1) (a) and (b) and s.2(a) of the Enlargement Act,. the subject-matter is of sufhcient gravity as to justify the\n\n• -.\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 110 7\n\nrecording of reasons in the ultimate order. The inscrutable face of A the sphinx and the unspeaking rejection by the judge are incompatible with fundamental fairness in the critical circumstances of death sentence and life sentence cases for the first time imposed by the court next below.\n\nIt is true that Judges of the Supreme1 Court act with utmost caution, consideration and consciousness and with full realisation that life and personal liberty cannot be forfeited without at least the trial tribunal and one higher have fully applied their minds.\n\nIt is unusual for judges at the highest level to be tempted into aflirmance of the judgment under appeal merely because, on the surface, there is copious evidence attractive reasoning and absence of injustice.\n\nThere is often more than meets the eye which is be'st left unsaid.\n\nAll in all, the necessity to put down reasons for decisions, in the special situations we are considering, is interlaced with the element of reasonableness emphasised in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra). ·\n\nWe hasten to obviate a misapprehension.\n\nWhere the subject matter is less momentous, where two courts have already assessed the evidence and given reasoned decisions, pragmati'sm and humanism legitimate., in appropriate cases, the passing of judgment at the third tier without giving reasons where the conclusion is one of aflirmance. Natural justice cannot be fixed on a rigid frame and fundamental fairness is not uuresponsive to circumstances.\n\nThe very fact that the subject matter is not fraught with loss of life or long incarceration and that the appellate or revisionary athority is a high tribunal which has examined the materials are an assurance of competent anc:I conscientious co'nsideration of the facts and the law.\n\nFurther protection at the third deck by calling for th.e records or launching on long ratiocination is a waste of judicial time.\n\nOur rules of criminal proceedure and those of other countries with mature systems of justice provide for dismissal at the third level without assigning written reasons, not because there are no reasons, but because the tardy need to document them hampers the hearing of the many cases in the queue that press upon the time of the court at that level.\n\nWe uphold Order XXI, Rule 15(1) (c) of the Rules because it does G not have play in certain situations.\n\nIt must be noted that that provision does not make it obligatory to dispose of all cases summarily or at a preliminary hearing.\n\nIt i's an enabling provision,- not a compulsive one.\n\nThe question is whether there is any situation where it can apply at all in the context of Art. 134(1) (a) and(b) and s. 2(a) of the Enlargement Act. If there is a room for operation, the provision can be sus- H tained although confined to such limited situations as a rule of prudence ripening into a rule of law.\n\nBefore discussing the categories where the rule will apply, let us get out of our way the view that the rule rs valid because Art. 146(1) (b)\n\nauthoriss 1t.\n\nProcedural invasion of substantive rights is impermissible, Art. 145 authorises only rules of procedure and procedure is\n\n\" - ... that which regulates the formal steps in an action or other judicial proceeding; a form,, manner, and order of conducting suits or pro'secutions ... \"\n\n\"This term is commonly opposed to the sum of legal_ principles constituting the substance of the Jaw, and denotes the body of rules, whether of practice or of pleading, whereby rights are effectuated through the successful application of the proper remedies.\"(')\n\nTo go beyond and cut into the flesh of the right it'self is ultra vires Art.\n\nD 145.\n\nLikewise, harmonious construction of Art. 134 and Art. 145 also leads to the conclusion that the contemplated rules are mere machinery provisions, not manacles on the right handcuffing its exercise.\n\nGoing to the basics, an appeal \"is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interpo'sition to redress the error of the court below .... An appeal, strictly so called, is one \"in which the question is, whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the materials which that court had before it\" (per Lord Davey, Ponnamma v. Arumogam, (1905) A.C. at p.390) .... A right of appeal, where it exists, is a matter of substance, and not of procedure (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369; Newman v.\n\nKlausner, (1922) 1 K.B. 228.\"(2)- Thus, the right of appeal is para mount, the procedure for hearing canalises so that extravagant prolixity or abuse of process can be avoided and a fair workability provided.\n\nAmputation is not procedure while.pruning may be.\n\nOf cour>e, procedure is within the Court's power but where it pares G down prejudicially the very right, carving the kernal out, it violates the provision creating the right.\n\nAppeal is a remedial right and if the remedy is reduced to a husk by procedural excess, the right became a casually.\n\nThat cannot be.\n\nSo we cannot cut down but may canalise the basic right by invoking H Article 145(1)(b).\n\n(I) Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p. 1368.\n\n(2) Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, JrdEdn. Vo'. I, pp. 160-161.\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kris/l/1U Iyer, J.)\n\nI I 09\n\nHarmoniously read, the sequence is simple.\n\nThe formalities for entertaining certain types of appeal are covered by Art. 145 ( 1) ( d), the manner of hearing and disposal is governed by Art. 145 Ql) (b) and the substantive sweep of the appeal as a method of redressal is found in Art. 134.\n\nAmputatim of this anatomy by procedural surgery is doing violence to the constitutional scheme.\n\nAn appeal is a re-hearing, and as Viscount Cave laid down,\n\n\"It was the duty of a court of appeal in an appeal from a judge sitting alone to make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed from and giving special weight to that judgment where the credibility of witnesses comes into question, but with full liberty to draw its own inferences from the facts proved or admitted, and to decide accordingly.\"(')\n\nProf. A. L. Goodhart, dealing with appeals on questions of fact in the English Law, wrote :\n\n\" ... it may be suggested, with all respect, that when the appellate judges are in agreement with the trial judge, they take the view that they are bound by his conclusions of fact,. but when they disagree with his conclusions then they do not hesitate to overrule them .... if an appellate court has full liberty to draw its own inferences from the facts proved, then appeals on so-called questions of fact will have a far greater chance of success.\n\nThe most highly trained judges may differ concerning the evaluation of facts, just as ordinary persons may.\n\nIt is here that conflict of opinion is most frequently found. What is regarded as reasonable by one man, whether judge or layman, may be regarded as unreasonable by another.\n\nIf, therefore, an appeal can be taken on the evaluation of facts, then there is always a chance that the appellant may succeed, even though the initial duty of showing that the judge below was in error may fall on him.\"(')\n\nRidding ourselves of finer nuances and philosophic speculations. and taking a realistic approach to a problem beset with hnman variables, it is daily experience to see judges on the high bench differ, and a fortiori\n\nso, in the field of sentence.\n\nWe project this reality in the context of full freedom for the first appellate decider of facts to ; reach his o\\vn finding on offence and sentence, only to highlight how momentous it isto be or not to be-for the appellant to have his case considered by\n\n(!) Current Legal Problems 1958, Vol. II, Ed.\n\nGeorge W. Keeton & George H Schwarzenberger, p. 194.\n\n(2) Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 71, 1955, pp. 410-11.\n\nthe highest court when the Constitution and Parliament have conferred a full right of appeal.\n\nSummary dismissal, save in glaring cases, may spell grave jeopardy to life-giving justice.\n\nThat is why Orde~ XX!\n\nRule 15 (1)( c) while it survives to weed out worthless appeals, shall remain sheathed in extra-ordinary cases where facts on guilt or the wider range of considerations on sentence are involved.\n\nWe must clarify that very right of appeal does not carry with it all the length of getting the record, hearing both sides and giving full reasons for decisions. Then the institutions of justice will come to a grinding halt. Those who feel otherwise may read with profit, et al, 0.rder 41, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code and the practice of so august a tribunal as the Supreme Court of the United States. Henry J. Abraham writes :\n\n\"Appeal.\n\nIn the instance of a writ of appeal, the aggrieved party has an absolute, statutorily granted right to carry a case to the United States Supreme Court, which in theory must review it.\n\nHowever, the High Tribunal retains the very considerable loophole of being empowered to reject such an appeal on the grounds that the federal question, otherwise validly raised, is \"substantial\".\n\nThis highly significant discretionary element in the area of the Court's so-called compulsory appellate jurisdiction caused it to dismiss 70 appeals in the 1955-56 tel11;1, for example.\n\nOf these 40 were rejected \"for want of a substantial federal question\", the balance on other jurisdictional grounds.\n\nIn the 59-.60 term, 63 of a total of 113 appeals were dismissed on the insubstantiality ground ! As a rule, fully 50 to 60 per cent of the writs of appeal are thus dismissed or the judgment below affirmed without printing the record or oral argument .... In effect, the appeal is hence used but sparingly-to date in approximately 9 per cent of all cases or controversies presented to the Court.\"(')\n\nNor are we charmed by some counsel sometimes asserting the importance of Oral Arguments Unlimited forgetting that prolixity is counter-productive and expensive and obstructive of case-flow.(') We\n\nG 0J The Judicial Process by Henry J. Abraham, Oxford University Press 1962, p.\n\n159-160.\n\n(2) An old poem was quoted by Lord Justice Cohen in a Lecture at Cambridge: .. Mr. Leach made a speech, Jurisprudence, Practice & Angry, nect but wrong.\n\nProcedure of the Court Mr. Hart, on the other part, of Appeal by Lord Justice Was heavy dull and Jong.\n\nCohen Lecture delivered Mr. Parker on 12th July 1950 Cam- H Madethecasedarker. bridge Law Journal. VoJ, Which w'< derk enough without.\n\nII, 1953. p. 4 Mr. Cook cited his book And the Ch?.ocellor said : \"I doubt\".\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1111\n\nnever deny the brightening of obscure points and the cross-pollination A of creative views promoted by an active process of oral argwnent.\n\nThe decision we make is confined to the criminal jurisdiction covered by Art. 134 and Art. 145(1) (b) and s. 384 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe compelling thought which has pressured our judgment in a matter of life and death in a first appeal to a final court B\n\nis best expressed by Edmund Cahn :\n\n\"For what gives justice its special savor of nobility?\n\nOnly the divine wrath that arises in us, girds us, and drives us to action whenever an instance of injustice affronts our sight.\"( 1)\n\nHaving stressed the appellant's right at great length, we still sustain rule 15(1) (c) of Order XXL This provision is general and covers all conceivable cases under Art. 134(1). It enables, not obligates. It operates in certain situations, not in every appeal. It merely removes an apprehended disability of the court in summarily\n\ndi; missing a glaring case where its compulsive continuance, dragging the opposite party, calling up prolix records and expanding on the. reasons for the decision, will stall the work of the court (which is an institutional injury to social justice) with no gain to anyone, including the appellant to keep whom in agonising suspense for long is itself an injustice.\n\nWhat arc those cases where a preliminary hearing is a worthwhile exercise ?\n\nWithout being exhaustive, we may instance some.\n\nWhere the only ground urged is a point of law which has been squarely covered by a ruling of this Court to keep the appeal lingering longer is survival after death.\n\nWhere the accused has pleaded guilty of murder and the High Court, on the evidence, is satisfied with the pleas and has awarded the lesser penalty a mere appeal ex mtJericordin is an exercise in futility.\n\nWhere a minor procedGrai irregularity, clearly curable under the Code, is all that the appellant has to urge the full panoply of an appellate bearing is an act of supererogation. Where the grounds, taken at their face value, are frivolous, vexatious, malicious wholly dilatory or blatantly mendacious, the prolongation of an appeal is a premium on abuse of the process of court.\n\nMaybe, other cases can be conceived {)f but we merely illustrate the functional relevance of Order XXI Rule 15 ( 1 )( c).\n\nOrdinarily, save where nothing is served by fuller hearing notice must go. If every app1eal under Art. 134(1) (a) and (b) or s. 2(a) H\n\n(1) Confronting Injustice-The Edmond Cahn Reader, p. ix.\n\nof the Enbrgement Act, where questions of law or fact are raised, is set down for preliminary hearing and summary disposal, the meaningful difference between Art. 134 and Art. 136 may be judicially eroded and Parliament stultified. Maybe, many of the appeals after fuller examination by this Court may fail.\n\nBut the minimum processual price of deprivation of precious life or prolonged loss of liberty is a\n\nsigle comprehensive appeal.\n\nTo be peeved by this need is to oficnd against the fair play of the Constitution.\n\nThe horizon of human rights jurisprudence after Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) has many hues.\n\nThe relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Code have already been quoted. Counsel for the appellant had obvious difficulty in overcoming the obstacle of s. 384. That section is sweeping. Any appellate court (which includes the Supreme Court under Art. 134}\n\nmay hear and dispose of an appeal summarily, without the records and recording no reasons for dismissal if it is the High Court or the Supreme Court.\n\nLiterally read. it sounds arbitrary, where death sentence, at the first appeal is involved.\n\nArticle 21, in its expansive incarnation, may fatally knock down any summary power of fatally knocking down an appellaht facing death penalty in first appeal by an unspeaking order.\n\nBut the generality of the provision if read down, may well be valid and rightly so. If the appeal is at the second or third tier, there is no reason to grumble. If the punishment is not of the dreadful species, there can be no constitutional consternation.\n\nAfter all, to have a giant's strength is not wrong 'but it is tyrannous to use it iike a giant' and judges do know this judicious caution. So we hold that the restrictions already indicated in applying Order XXI rule 15 ( 1) ( c) may legitimately be read into s1 384 of the Code. Words of wide import and expressions of expansionist potential may always\n\nbe canaiised and constitutionalised-a proposition too well established to be propred by precedents.\n\nThe common embankments applicable to Order XX! Ruic 15 (1) ( c) and s. 334 of the Code to prevent unconstitutional overflow m2.y now be concretised, not as rigid manacles but as guidelines for safe exercise.\n\nWe are hopeful that the Supreme Court will, if found necessary, make clarificatory rules in this behalf.\n\nTo conclude, we uphold the vires of Order XXI Rule 15 (1) ( c) of the Supreme Court Rules and also s. 384 of the Criminal Proce dure Code but hold that in their application both the provisions shall be restricted by certain criteria as a permissible exercise in constitutionalisation.\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1113\n\nOrde.r XXI Rule 15 ( 1) ( c) in action does not mean that all appeals falling within its fold shall be routinely disposed of, as far as possible, on a preliminary hearing.\n\nSuch a course, as earlier mentioned, obliterates the difference between Articles 134 and 136, between right and leave.\n\nThe rule, in cases of appeals under Art. 134\n\n(1) (a) and (b) and s. 2(a) is notice, records and reasons, but the exception i3 preliminary hearing on all such materials as may be placed by the appellant and brief grounds for dismissal.\n\nThis ex- . ceptional category is where, in all conscience, there is no point at all.\n\nIn cases of real doubt the benefit of doubt goes to the appellant and\n\nnotice goes to the adversary-even if the chances of allowance of the appeal be nor bright. We think it proper to suggest that with a view to im•est clarity and avoid ambiguity, Order XX! Rule 15(1) (c) may be suitably modified in conformity with this ruling.\n\nBefore we part with this case, it is right to register our view that too many appeals and revisions are a bane of the Indian Judicial System, involving as it does sterile expense and delay and fruitless chase of perfection. The Evershed Committee, a quarter of a century ago, expressed dissatisfaction with the system of multiple appeals what with the social cost of \\itigative prolongation, burden of precedents and heavy outlay-a luxury which a Third World country can illafford.\n\nToo many appeals are counter-productive as A.P. Herbert in 'Uncommon Law' has wittily driven home :\n\n\"The people may be taught to believe in one court of appeal; but where there are two they cannot be blamed if they believe in neither.\n\nWhen a man keeps two clocks which tell the time differently, his fellows will receive with suspicion his weightiest pronouncements upon the hour of the day, even if one of them happens to be right.\" Way back in 1832 it has been pointed out that-\n\n\"The only ground upon which a suitor ought to be allowed to bring the judgment of one court for examination before the members of another is the certainty or extreme probability qf finding in the latter tribunal more wisdom and learning. more maturity of deliberation, and a greater capacity of sound decisions than existed in the court from which the appeal is to proceed.\n\nBut as every appeal is of necessity attended with the two great and positive evils of expense and delay, it is the bounden duty of every wise and good government to take all possible care that the court of appellate jurisdiction shall possess those advantages, and that mperior capacity for wise and impartial adjudication,\n\nupon the presumption of possessing which, the public su]>- port and the confidence of individual suitors is given to the institution.\"(')\n\nWhat is important is the choice of mature minds for dispensation of justice according to law and not wasteful multiplication of hierarchical tribunals.\n\nKAILASAM, J.-I had the benefit of perusing the judgment prepared by Krishna Iyer J.\n\nI' regret I am unable to agree with it.\n\nThis appeal is preferred by the 12 appellants under section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with section 1 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the judgment dated 31st Mrach, 1978 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, at Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 597 of 1976.\n\nThe appellants were acquitted by the 1st Temporary Session' Judge, Pratapgarh in Sessions Case No. 16 of 1969 of all the charges and on an appeal preferred by the State, the order of acquittal was set aside by the High Court and the appellants found guilty. and convicted uader section 302 read with s. 149, I.P.C., and sentenced to life imprisonment.\n\nThe appeal was listed for preliminary hearing under Rule 15 (1)\n\n(c) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The appellants filed an application for adducing additional grounds in Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 1862 of 1978 whereiu it was pleaded that the provision under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal summarily is ultra vires being inconsistent with the provisions of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. !ft was submitted that the power of the Supreme Court to frame rules under Art. 145 of the Constitution canot be extended to annul the rights conferred under an Act of Parliament. It was further pleaded that an appeal under the Supreme Court' (Enlargement of Criminal Appellak Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, cannot be dismissed summarily without calling for the records ordering notice to the State and without giving reasons.\n\nWhen the Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 1862 of 1978 came up before this Court it was ordered:-\n\n\"The appellants have challenged the constitutional 'H validity of cl. (c) of sub-rule (1) of rule 15 of 0. XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, which enables an appeal of the\n\n(!) 3rd Edn. 1937, p. 259\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kailasam, !.) 1115\n\nkind with which we are concerned, to be placed for hearing ex parte before the Court for admission. In that view of the matter, we think that unless the question of tlie constitutional validity of the rule is decided, we cannot have a preliminary hearing of this appeal for admission.\n\nLet the records, therefore, be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for giving such directions as he may deem fit and proper.\"\n\nAs the constitutional validity of cl. (c) of rule 15(1) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules was challenged, the matter was placed before the Full Bench by the Chief Justice.\n\nRule 15 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 runs as follows:-\n\n\" 15. (1 ) The petition of appeal shall be registered and numbered as soon as it is lodged.\n\nEach of the following\n\ncategories of appeals, on bein\"g registered. shall be put up for ))' hearing ex parte before the Court which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all necessary parties,\n\nor may make such orders, as the circumstances of the case may require, namely:-\n\n(a) an appeal from any judgment, final orde:r or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court summarily dismissing the appeal or the matter, as the case may be before it;\n\n(b) an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court under Article 132 (1) and/or 134(1) (c) of the Constitution, or under any other provision of law if the High Court has not recorded the reasons or the grounds for\n\nl. granting the certificate.\n\n(c) an appeal under sub-clause {a) sub-clause (b) of clause ( 1) of Article 134 of the Constitution, or under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 (28 of 1970) or under section 379 of the Code of Criminal Prdcedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);\n\n(d) an appeal under section 476 B of the Code of Criminal'\n\nProcedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).\n\n( e) an appeal under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971).\"\n\nWe are concerned with sub-rule (c) in rule 15(1). The Supreme Court Rules were framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Art. 145 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling the Supreme Court to make rules. Art. 145 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament with the approval of the President to make rules frQm time to time for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court.\n\nTwo sub-articles arc relevant and they are sub-articles (b) and (d).\n\nWhile sub-article (b) empowers the Supreme Court to make rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals and other matters pertaining to appeals including the time within which appeals to the Court are to be entered, Sub-article (d) enables the Supreme Court to frame rules as to the entertainment of appeals under sub-clause (c) of clause\n\n(1) of article 134.\n\nArticle 134 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters:-\n\n\"134. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court-\n\n( a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death; or\n\n(b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the,, accused person and sentenced him to death; or\n\n( c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme\n\n' f\n\nCourt. F Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under clause (I) of article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require.\n\n(2) Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court any G further powers to entertain and hear appeals from any judgment, final order of sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such law.\"\n\nWhile an unrestricted right of appeal is provided to the Supreme B Court nnder clauses (a) and (b) i.e. where on appeal an order of acquittal is reversed by the High Court and an accused person is sentenced to death or when the High Court has withdrawn for trial\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kailasam, J.) 111 7\n\nbef<\\re itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death, an appeal under article 134(1) (c) is subject to certain restrictions.\n\nAn appeal under sub-clause (c) is provided only when the case is certified by the High Court as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nFurther an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in tliat behalf under clanse\n\n(1) of article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require.\n\nThe Supreme Court is empowered to prescribe mies regarding entertainment of appeals under article 134(1) (c) by Art. 145 (!), sub-article (d).\n\nSo far as procedure for hearing appeals generally rules can be framed by the Supreme Court under sub-article (b) of article 145(1).\n\nThe Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act 1970 has conferred on the Supreme Court further power to entertain and hear appeals than conferred on it under Art 134 (1) (a) and\n\n(b) as provided for in Art 134(2) of the Constitution. As Art. 145( l)\n\n(b) enables the Supreme Court to frame rules as to procedure for hearing appeals the procedure thus prescribed will apply to appeals under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act 1970. Ruic 15 o[ Order XXI is framed under article 145(1), sub-article (b).\n\nThe rules can provide for the procedure for hearing appeals.\n\nMr. Mulla, the !yarned counsel. submitted that the rule making power of the Supreme Court is confined only to the rules as to entertainment of appeals under sub-clause ( c) of clause (1) of article 134 and would not enable the Supreme Court to frame rules regarding appeals under any other provision.\n\nThe Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appella.te Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, confers right of appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order of sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court:\n\n(a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accus- G ed person and sentenced him to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years;\n\n(b) l1as withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to H imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a period of '!Jot less than ten years.\n\n.... ..\n\nThe result is that in addition to the right of appeal under Article 134 (1)\n\n(a) and (b) an appellant under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 has also a right to appeal unrestrieted by any of the provisions of Article 134\n\n(1) (c) or the rules framed by the Supreme Court under article 145\n\n(1) ( d). The submission of learned counsel fails to take note of Article 145 (1) (b) which empowers the Supreme Court to frame rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals which would include hearing of appeals under article 134 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution as well as appeals under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The rules therefore are properly made under Art. 145 (1) (b) and would be valid so far as to the procedure for hearing appeals.\n\nThe submission of the learned counsel is that when a right of apoeal is conferred on a person the appeal can only be disposed of by the Supreme Court after full hearing i.e. after calling for the D. records, issuing notice to the other side and hearing both the parties\n\nand giving reasons for its conclusion.\n\nJt was submitted that a summary dismissal .affects the substantive right of appeal and is not confined to procedure and is contrary to the provisions of the law made by Parliament and as such beyond the rule making powers conferred ,, , under article 145 ( 1) (b). As the Supreme Court (Enlargement \\.\n\nE of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, conferred a right of appeal any provision under the Supreme Court Rules restricting such appeal is submitted to be outside the scope of the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court.\n\nThe Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 confers a right of appeal but the procedure as to the hearing of appeal is not prescribed under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. Before referring to the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules relating to the procedure as to hearing of appeals it is useful to refer to the provisions of the law made by Parliament regulating the hearing of the appeal by all courts including the Supreme Court.\n\nChapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Act 2 of 1974, deals with appeals.\n\nSection 374 (1) provides that any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinarv orioinal criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nThis section confers a right of appeal against all convictions whatever the sentence may be on a tr; al held by the Hih Court in its extraordinarv original criminal iuP•dktion, and is thus wider than the rioht of ann~\"l conferred under art. 114(1)\n\n(a) and (b) or under the Supreme Court (Enlargement' of Criminal\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kailasam, !.) u 19\n\nAppellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. Section 375 provides that there will be no appeal where an accused person has pleaded guilty and convicted on such plea by the High Court.\n\nThis section thus excludes the appeal obviously to the Supreme Court against the conviction on a trial held by the High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction if the accused has pleaded gulity.\n\nSection 376 excludes appeals in petty cases, where the High Court passes only a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees.\n\nTims though section 374 confers a right of. appeal on any person convicted on a trial held by the High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, this right is restricted under sections 375 and 376 in that a person who pleads guilty and has been convicted on such plea by the High Court is barred from preferring an appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nSo also an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or of fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or of both is taken away under s. 376. Section 379 confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court where the High Court has, on apperu,\n\nreversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and convicted him and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a term of ten years or more. Section 379 gives effect to the provision of Art. 134 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution and sertion 2 of the Surreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The result of the passing of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 and section 379 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that they provide an appeal to the Supreme Court in addition to the right of appeal conferred under Article 134 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution.\n\nThe contention of Mr. Mnlla, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that rule 15 (1) ( c) of Order XXI not merely relates to the procedure bnt also deprives the substantive right of appeal conferred c;.:. the accused .under article 134 (1) (a) and (b) and the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,1970 and under s. 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nBy the impugned rule the appeal on being registered is put up for hearing ex parte before the court and the court is empowered either to dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all necessary parties or make such orders as the circumstances may require.\n\nSection 384 of the Code of Cr!. Procedure 1973 confers a right on the appellate court to dismiss the appeal summarily when it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering. The proviso to the section requires that no appeal pre3ented under section 3 82 by the appellant or his pleader\n\n15-119 SCI/79\n\nshall be dismissed unless the appellant. or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of his case.\n\nAn appeal from the appellant from jail cannot be dismissed except after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same, unless the Appellate Court considers that the appeal is frivolous or that the production of the accused in custody before the Court would involve such inconvenience as would be disproportionate in the circumstances of the case.\n\nSection 3 84 (2) provides that before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may\n\ncall for the record of the case.\n\nUnder sub-section (3) where the Appellate Court dismissing an appeal under sec. 3 84 is a Court of Sessions or of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, it shall record its reasons\n\n. .I. for doing so.\n\nSec. 385 prescribes the procedure for hearing appeals • ..J' not dismissed summarily.\n\nWhile sec. 3 7 4 confers a right of appeal,\n\nsec. 375 and sec. 376 restricts such a right.\n\nSection 384 prescribes the procedure for hearing, appeals enabfu\\g the Court to dismiss certain appeals summarily and !O deal with others under sec. 385 if they are not summarily dismissed.\n\nThe right of appeal conferred can be curtailed by procedure as envisaged in sec. 384 Cr!. Procedure Code or rule 15 Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules.\n\nWe are unable to accept the contention that a right of appeal would mean that before an appeal is disposed of the records should be E called for, notice ordered to the other side, the other side beard and reasons given for the disposal of the agpeal.\n\nThe provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which have been referred to show that an appeal to the Supreme Court under section 374 of the Criminal Proce- 1dure Code is restricted by the provisions of sec. 375 and sec. 376 and could be dealt with summarily under sec. 384 of the Criminal Proce- F <lure Co~ Mr. Mulla, the learned counsel submitted that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are not applicable to the Supreme\n\nCourt. But this plea does not bear scrutiny in view of the specific provisions making the procedure applicable to the Supreme Court.\n\nAn appeal to the Supreme Court is subject to the several provisions of the Cr!. Procedure Code, including the provisions relating to snrn- G . mary disposal of the appeals.\n\nThe plea of the learned counsel that the provisions of the impugned rule are contrary to any law made by Parliament is not maintainable.\n\nThe impugned rule 15 (1) (c), Order XXI, more or less incorporates the provisions found in the Crl Procedure Code.\n\nThe contention of the learned counsel that the right conferred on him under article 134 ( 1) (a) and (b) of the Consti- H tution and under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate .Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, is curtailed is therefore without\n\nsubtance. +\n\n> •\n\n.~ I\n\n' Ii\n\nIf,••\n\n.t:.-\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kailasam, J.) 1121\n\nIn the result, we find that the contention of the learned counsel, namely that the impugned rule is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under article 145 of the Constitution. cannot be accepted as article !45(1)(b) specifically enables the Supreme Court to\n\nframe rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals.\n\nThe contention, that the Rule is opposed to the provisions of laws made by Parliament and is thus beyond the scope of rule-making powers under article 145 .eannot also be upheld for the reasons stated.\n\nNeither in the Memorandum of Grounds nor in his arguments the learned counsel contended that a summary dismissal of an appeal under the provisions of the Cr!. Procedure Code would offend the C iJrovisions of Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the course of arguments it was submitied that if the impugned rule is construed as empowering the Court to dismiss an appeal summarily, it would -offend Art. 21 of the Constitution. When the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code enabling the Court to dismiss an appeal summarily is not challenged the impugned rule is equally unassailable.\n\nWe will now consider whether the impugned rule would in any way offend Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 of the Cortstitution reads as follows:-\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his right or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by E law.\"\n\nThe words 'Procedure established by law' have been construed by various decisions of this Court. In A. K. Gopalan's case (1950 SCR page 88) it has been held by a majority that the word 'law' in Article\n\n~ 1 had been used in the sense of 'State made' law and not in the \"!ense of law embodying the principles of natural justice.\n\nProcedure established by law means \"a Jaw made by Union Parliament or Legislature or State.\" According to Patanjali Sastri J, law in Article 21 did not mean jus 11aturale but means positive or state made Jaw.\n\nPro- -cedure established by law, according to the learned Judge, did not however mean any procedure which may be prescribed by a competent legislature, but the ordinary well-established criminal procedure, that is, those settled usages and normal modes of procedure sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code which are the general Jaw of criminal procedure in our country. If this test is applied, the procedure, that is challeged, being the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be assailed.\n\nLater decisions have pointed out that even though the procedure is prescribed by a competent !eg1slature, it may fail to satisfy the requirements of the article if the procedure prescribed is no procedure at all.\n\nWe cannot accept the plea that the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code is no procedure at all.\n\nThe main objection to the invoking of Article 21 for challenging the validity of the impugned rule is that a person convicted of an offence has no right of appeal unless such a right is conferred by the statute. If the statute does not confer a right of /appeal the person has no remedy. In P. K. Mittra v.\n\nState of West Bengal (') this Court held that a right of appeal is a statutory right which has got to be recognised by the Courts, and the right of appeal, where one exists, cannot be denied in exercise of the discretionary power even of the High Court. An appeal is a creature of the statute and the powers and the jurisdiction of the appellate court must be circumscribed by the words of the statute vide Shankar Kerba Yadhav 'v.\n\nState of Maharashtra.(') A right of appeal must be given by statute or by some authority equivalent to a statute or rules framed under a statute vide Minakshi v. Subramanya. (') The powers and the jurisdiction of the appellate Court as prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code and the rule cannot be said to deny a right of hearing to the appellant.\n\nThe plea that audi alteram partem has been vioilated has also no substance.\n\nThe right to be heard in an appeal is regulated by statute.\n\nIn the appeal with which we are concerned, the accused persons had the jlenefit of a full trial before a Sessions Court at the first instance or before the High Court After a full trial the judgment is rendered by a High Judicial Officer such as a Session Judge or a High Court Judge. The appellate court has before it the judgment of the lowe.r court and the petition for appeal.\n\nAt the preliminary hearing the appellant or his pleader is heard before the court decides to dismiss the appeal sununarily.\n\nThe impugned rule prescribes the procedure for hearing of the appeals. The Criminal Procedure Code provides that there shall be no right of appeal in cases where the accused is convicted by the High Court on a plea of gnilty or when the High Court passed a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.\n\nThe appellate court is empowered to dismiss the appeal summarily when there are no sufficient grounds for interfering.\n\nThe power to summarily dismiss an appeal is conferred under the Criminal Procedure Code when the court is satisfied that there are no sufficient p; rounds for interfering with the judgment appealed against. This decision is taken by the appellate court being the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court\n\n(1) [1959] Supp. I S.CR. 63.\n\n(2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 227.\n\n(3) 14 I.A. 160.\n\nSITA RAM v. U.P. STATE (Kailasam, !.) 1123\n\n-0f Session, the High Court or the Supreme Court. In the case of the Chief Judicial Magisrate and' Court of Session, reasons should be recorded for summary dismissal.\n\nThe High Court and the Supreme Court need not record reasons for summarily dismissing the appeal.\n\nIt is necessary that the Supreme Court or the High Court should be satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering.\n\nThe conclusion that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering is arrived by the High Court or the Supreme Court after hearing the appellant, examining the judgment and the petition for appeal. There Calli be no doubt that the appellate court is discharging an onerous duty in dismissirig a case summarily. It may be noted that the Code provides for calling for the records before dismissing an appeal.\n\nIn cases where the appellant is sentenced to death, imprisonment for life or long term of imprisonment, it is the bounden duty of the appellate 'Court to hear the appellant, examine the petition of appeal and copy of the judgment appealed against. If it feels necessary to call for the records of the case, it i~ its duty to call for the records and examine them, before coming to the conclusion that there are no sufficient -grounds for interfering. It is the responsibility of the appellate authority to ord.er notice and hear the other side if it is not satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering.\n\nEqually it is the duty <>f the appellate court to dismiss the appeal 'summarily if it satisfied\n\nthat there are no sufficient grounds for interefering.\n\nThis duty is imposed for regulating the work of the courts for otherwise judicial time would be unnecessarily spent.\n\nTaking into account the fact that the duty to decide the question where there are not sufficient grouuds for interfering is placed on highly placed judicial officers after affording a due hearing, it cannot be stated that the very right of appeal has been taken away.\n\nIt is not possible to accept the contention that the procedure prescribed is not in accordance with the law as the Criminal Procedure Code and the impugned rules are laws properly made.\n\nIt cannot also be said that the law is violative of the right confered under Article 21.\n\nThe decision of the Supreme Court rendered under sec. 421 of the Cr!. Procedure Code of 1898 which is similar to section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 may be referred to.\n\nIn Govinda Kadtuji Kadan1 v.\n\nState of Maharashtra(') the Snpreme -Court held that the appellate Court has full power under section 421 of the Cr!. Procedure Code to disntlss an appeal in limine even with- -0ut sending for the records if on perusal of the impugned order and\n\n(!) [1970] I S.l:'.C. 469.\n\nA i•'\n\nthe pethion of appeal it is satisfied with the comectness of the order 11ppealed against. It may be emphasised that the power of summary dismissal has to be exercised after perusing the petition of appeal and the copy of the order appealed against and after affording the appellant and his pleadoer a reasonable opportuhity of being heard in support of the appeal. The order summarily dismissing an appeal by the High Court by the word 'rejected' is not violative of any statutory provision.\n\nWhile holding that a summary rejection of the appeal by the High Court is not violative of any statutory provision, this Court pointed out that it is desirable that reasons are recorded by the High Court. when prima facie arguable issues have been raised as that would enable the Supreme Court to appreciate the reasons for rejection of the appeal by the High Court.\n\nThese observations are not applicable to the Supreme Court because the order of this Court is final.\n\nRule 15(1) of the Supreme Court Rules enables the Supreme Court after putting up the appeal for hearing ex-parte to dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all necessary parties or may make such orders as the circumstances of the case may require. Rule 13 prescribes that a memorandum of appeal shall be in the form of a petition stating succinctly and briefly as far as possible in chronological order, the principal steps in the proceedings from its commencement till its conclusion in the High Court. Sub-rule 2 of rule 13 p1escribes that the petition of appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed from, and in the case of an appeal on a certificate also of the certificate granted by the High Court, and of the order granting the said oertificate. Rule 14 prescribes that when the appellant is in jail, he may present his petition of appeal and the documents mentioned in rule 13 including any\n\n'\\\\~'itten argument which he may desire to advance to the Officer-incharge of the jail, who shall forthwith forward the same to the Registrar of this Court. The petition of appeal thu~ received under rule 13 and 14 is put up for heari'ng ex-parte before the Court which is empowered either to dismiss it summarily or to direct issue notice to I he necessary parties. Thus )t is to bo seen that the procedure contemplated in rules 13, 14 and 15 is almost similar to the provisions, of the Code of Criminal Procedure referred to above.\n\nIn an appeal sent by the appellant from jail he is entitled to and any written arguments which he may desire to advance i'n support of his apJJ\"al.\n\nThe Conr in proper cases in which it considers it desirable would engage an advocate to present the case of the appellant in jail.\n\nThe mere fact that the appellant in jail is not being heard in person or through an advocate would not mean that the appeal of the appellant in jail is not being heard.\n\nThe Court peruses the judgment, petition of appeal\n\nSITA RAM v. u, P. STATE (Kailasam, J.) 1125\n\nand the written arguments, if any, before proceeding to take action under rule 15. This Court being the )lighest Court is not requhied to give reasons but is exted to bestow the greatest care in exercising the power of summary dismissal under Rule 15. On a consideration of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the impugned rules, we are unable to accept any of the contentions raised by the . learned counsel.\n\n\nW~ are unable to accept the contention for the case referred to is one wherein an opportunity was not provided to a person before the passport was impounded. It has no application to an appeal as in the present case the appellant is properly heard in a trial and is also heard by the appellate court.\n\nWe feel that Maneka Gandhi's case has no application to the facts of the present case.\n\nIn the result we reject all the conte\"rrtions put forward by the learned connsel and hold that the impugned Rule is within the rule making power of the Supreme Conrt and answer the reference accordingly.\n\nORDER\n\nIn the light of the majority judgment, we uphold the vires of Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rhles and also S. 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code but hold that in their application both the provisions shall be governed by the criteria laid down in the majority Judgment.\n\nIn the appeal, above mentioned, we direct notice to the respondent.\n\nN.V.K.", "total_entities": 353, "entities": [{"text": "SIT A RAM & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SITA RAM & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n(V. 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{"document_id": "1979_2_1126_1130_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF. UTTAR PRADESH\n\nBHOOP SINGH VERMA\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n[JASWANT SINGH, R. S. PATHAK AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nTermination of simpUciter-No 1departmental enquiry is necessary under law in such cases.\n\nThe respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of police in a temporary pool in 1955.\n\nHe was discharged from service on July 13, 1957.\n\nA Writ Petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4, 1959 and consequently he was re-instated in service on December 15, 1959.\n\nThereafter, on January 21, 1960 his services were .terminated on the ground that they were no longer required by the State. A suit for declaration that the said order of termination was null and void was decreed in his favour by the trial court which was affirmed in. appeal and also by the High Court in second appeal.\n\nAllowing the State appead. by special leave the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The considerations which prevailed with tho High Court in reaching its findings on the application of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution nnd the bona {ides of the superior authority in making the impugned order of tern1ination simpliciter are not warranted in law.\n\n[1130D1\n\n2. The order terminating the services wa-; an order of termination simpliciter passed in accordance with the rules applicable to temporary Government servants.\n\nAfter the original , order of , discharge was quashed by the High Court, the respondent was reinstated, alJowed increment in pay and one month's salary in lieu of notice under the 'general rules for termination of services of temporary government serva-nts was also given.\n\n[1128F-G]\n\n3. It 1'1as open to the superior authority to terminate the respondent's services on the ground on which it did so. And the eyidence disclosed no personal motive had influenced the order or th&t it was passed by way of punishment. A departmenta) enquiry is not required under the law. Instead of instituting disciplinary proceedings against the government servant, the suitability for retention in service could be decided. [ll28H, 1129A, El\n\nState vf U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi', [1977] 1 SCR 462; Chan1pakTal Chimanlal SIFJh v. The Union of India, [1964] 5 SCR 190, Jagdis!z Mitter v.\n\nUnion of India, A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 449 and State of Puniab & Anr. v. Shri Sukh llai Bahadur, [1968] 3 SCR 234; referred to.\n\nUnion of India & Ors. v. R. S. Dhaba, (1969] 3 SCC 603, Stme df Bihar & Ors. v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra [1971] 2 SCR 191 and R. S. Sial v.\n\nTh• State of U.P. and Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 754; applied.\n\nThe State of Hihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, A.l.R. 1960\n\nSC 689 and . Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab, (1963] 3 SCR 716; distinguished.\n\n. _,._ -\n\n' \"\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 252 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-8-68 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Appeal No. 254/65.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant.\n\nS. C. Manchanda, S. C. Patel and Trilok Singh Arora for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliver, ed by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated August 19, 1968 dismissing a second appeal arising out of a suit for declaration.\n\nThe respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in a temporary post in 1955. He was discharged from service on July 13,\n\n1957. A writ petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4, 1959, a'nd accordingly on December 15, 1959 he was reinstated in service.\n\nThereafter, on January 21, 1960 his services were terminated by the Deputy lnspector General o[ Police, Agra Ran~, Agra.\n\nOn March 13, 1963 the respondent instituted a suit for a declaration that the order dated January 21, 1960 was illegal and void and\n\nthat he continued as Sub-Inspector of Police in the Uttar Pradesh Polio.e Service. It was alled that on a false complaint made against him in respect of the custody and detention of one Smt. Phoolmati, an enquiry bad been made in cohsequence of which the appellant had been arbitrarily and illegally discharged from service on July 13,\n\n1957. It was pleaded that although he was reinstated .on the success .of his writ petition in the High Court, his services were tenninated a mere five weeks later although no ground had arisen since for doing\n\nso. It was asserted that the order of January 21, 1960 was passed as a simple order of termination in order to avoid a departmental enquiry under section 7 of th~ Police Act, which enquiry if held would l)ave enabled him to expose the falsity of the alleg:ations levelled against him.\n\nThe suit was contested by the appellant, who maintaill\".,, d that the termination of the respondent's services was not by way of punishment nor motivated by malice, and that it was a simple termination of the services of a temporary government servant on the ground that they were no longer required by the State. The .suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Etah and the decree was affirmed in appeal and &xond appeal.\n\nThe High Court, in second appeal, took the view that whern ah enquiry was instituted by a superior authority into a misconduct alleged against a govemn1ent\n\nA servant, the resulting termination of servioe was by way of punishment because it attached a stigma or amouned to a reflection on the competence of the government servant and affected his future career.\n\nThe High Court held that the fi'ndings recorded during the enquiry on the original complaint against the respondent were nsponsible for the order terminating the respondent's services, and it affirmed that the B order was vitiated by mala fides.\n\nAttacking the findings of th;, High Court, learned counsel for the appellant contends that i:n the first place the order terminating the respondent's services had not been made by way of punishment, bu~ wa,; an order of termination simplicit•er passed in accordance with the rules applicable to temporary government servants.\n\nIn the second place, it is said, if the order is attributed to the complai'nt against the respondent concerning his. conduct relating to Smt. Phoolmati it was open to the Deputy Inspector General of Police to take the circumstances of the case into account for the purpose of considering the suitability of the respondent for continuing in service.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent points out that an enquiry had been originally instituted against the respondent which had resulted in an order terminating his services and, he urges, after the order of the High Court quashing his discharge on the ground of violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution it was obligatory on the superior authority, in case it prcr posed to terminate the respondent's services, to institute a proper and complee departmental enquiry, providing an opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence and be heard in his defence, and only thereafter could it make an order against the respond•ent.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the appellant is right on both counts.\n\nConsidered &s an order made without reference to the earlier proceeding against the respondent, the impugned order cannot be regarded as one of punishment.\n\nAfter the original order of discharge was quashed by the High Court, the respondent was reinstated in service.\n\nHe was even allowed an increment to his salary.\n\nThe Deputy Inspector General of Police made the impugned order subseqnently terminating his services on the gronnd that they were no longer required.\n\nThe services were terminated on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice under the \"general rules for termination of service of temporary government servants\".\n\nThe Deputy Inspector General of Police was examined as a witness in the suit, and throughout he maintained that he terminated the respondent's services because they were not required any more and that in making the order he did not intend to punish the respondent. The evidence also discloses that no personal motive had influenced the order. It was open to the superior authority to terminate the respondent's services on the ground on which it did so.\n\nAssuming, howe.ver, that the impugned order was made in the background of the allegations against the respondent concerning his behaviour with Smt. Phoolmati, we see no reason in law why a departmental enquiry should be necessary before the respondent's services could be terminated.\n\nIt appears from the material before. us that it was merely a preliminary enquiry which was made by the Superintendent of Police into the allegations made against the respondent's conduct concerning the woman.\n\nNo departmental enquiry by way of disciplinary proceedings was instituted, no charge was framed, and the formal procedure charactedsing a disciplinary proceeding was never adopted.\n\nThe Deputy Inspector General of Police passed the original order dated July 13, 1957 discharging the respondent from the police force on the ground that he had behaved in a reprehensible manner, was not likely to make a useful police officer and was nnfit for further retention in a disciplined force.\n\nThe original order plainly attached a stigma to the respondent's record of service, and it is because of the specific grounds set forth in the termination order that the High Court consiqered the respondent entitled to the benefit of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, and quashed the order.\n\nNow the order having been quashed, the position reverts to what it was when the Deputy Inspector General of Police received the report of the Superintendent of Police on the preliminary enquiry made by him.\n\nThere was nothing to pre.vent the Deputy Inspector General from deciding that instead of instituting disciplinary proceedings against the government servant he should consider whether the government servant was suitable for retention in service.\n\nThe case law on the point has been considered elaborately by one of us (\\Jaswant Singh, J.) in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi(') and reference has been made in this behalf IQ Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India('), Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India(') and State of Punjab & Anr. v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur('). It is apparent from the facts of this case that if the impugned order be considered as made in the light of foe allegations against the respondent concerning the woman, the conduct of the respondent constituted a motive merely for making the order and was not the foundation of that order.\n\nIn this connection what has been stated by this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. R. S. Dhaba.(') State o, I Bihar & Ors. v. Shive Bhikshuk Mishra(\") and R. S. Sial v. The S.We of V.P. & Ors. ( 7) appears relevant.\n\nThat it was not intended\n\n(l) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 462.\n\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449.\n\n\n(5) [1969[ 3 s.c.c. 603.\n\n(6) 11971] 2 S.C.R. 191.\n\n(7) [l.9'14) 3 S.C.R. 754.\n\n-----·-··-\n\nto take punitive action against the respondent for his misbehaviour with Smt. Phoolmati is evident from the circumstance that thereafter the rcspondent was allowed an increment to his salary and was regarded as in service for all purposes.\n\nThe High Court, it seems to us, did not have regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, and appears to have assumed that the respondent's services were terminated as a measure of punishment.\n\nThe High Court relied on The State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishor'e Prasad(') and Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab('). Both cases are distinguishable.\n\nIn theformer, the govermnent servant was discharged from service because he was found to be corrupt and the order terminating his services branded him a dishonest and incompetent officer.\n\nIn the latter, the government servant had been served with a charge-sheet that he had demanded and received illegal gratification and the Court found that the proceeding, consequent to which the termination order was made, was intended for the purpose of taking punitive action.\n\nWe are satisfied that the considerations which prevailed with the D High Court in reaching its findings on the application of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the bona fides of the superior authority in making the impugned order. are not warranted in law and on the material before\n\nus.\n\nAccordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court dated August 19, 1968 are set aside and the respondent's suit is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs .\n\nS. R.\n\n(!)A:l.R.. 1960 s.c. C-39.\n\n(2) (1963]3 S.C R. 71 •\n\n• 4 ppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF. UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHOOP SINGH VERMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHOOP SINGH VERMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UTTAR PRADESH\n\nBHOOP SINGH VERMA\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n[JASWANT SINGH, R. S. PATHAK AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "July 13, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 324, "end_char": 337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was discharged from service on July 13, 1957."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Writ Petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4, 1959 and consequently he was re-instated in service on December 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 477, "end_char": 494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Writ Petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4, 1959 and consequently he was re-instated in service on December 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 512, "end_char": 528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on January 21, 1960 his services were .terminated on the ground that they were no longer required by the State."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 SCR 462", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2088, "end_char": 2104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 5 SCR 190", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2157, "end_char": 2173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 SCR 234", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2286, "end_char": 2302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 SCR 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 SCR 754", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2484, "end_char": 2500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1963] 3 SCR 716", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2617, "end_char": 2633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2851, "end_char": 2864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2869, "end_char": 2882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2903, "end_char": 2918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, S. C. Patel and Trilok Singh Arora for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. C. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2920, "end_char": 2931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, S. C. Patel and Trilok Singh Arora for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Trilok Singh Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2936, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, S. C. Patel and Trilok Singh Arora for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3022, "end_char": 3028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deliver, ed by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated August 19, 1968 dismissing a second appeal arising out of a suit for declaration."}}, {"text": "July 13,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was discharged from service on July 13,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3431, "end_char": 3445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A writ petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4, 1959, a'nd accordingly on December 15, 1959 he was reinstated in service."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 13, 1963 the respondent instituted a suit for a declaration that the order dated January 21, 1960 was illegal and void and\n\nthat he continued as Sub-Inspector of Police in the Uttar Pradesh Polio.e Service."}}, {"text": "Phoolmati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Phoolmati, an enquiry bad been made in cohsequence of which the appellant had been arbitrarily and illegally discharged from service on July 13,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4464, "end_char": 4473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Etah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4963, "end_char": 4967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Etah and the decree was affirmed in appeal and &xond appeal."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9316, "end_char": 9327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "\\Jaswant Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9904, "end_char": 9918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case law on the point has been considered elaborately by one of us (\\Jaswant Singh, J.) in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi(') and reference has been made in this behalf IQ Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India('), Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India(') and State of Punjab & Anr."}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 S.C.R. 462", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10695, "end_char": 10714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1971] 2 S.C.R. 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10777, "end_char": 10795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12278, "end_char": 12293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court dated August 19, 1968 are set aside and the respondent's suit is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1131_1133_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "K. L. SUBBA YY A v.\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n[S. MtJRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nMsore Excise Act, s. 54, non-compliance of provisions under, if vitiate,\\' conviction-Sa. 53 and 54, purpose.\n\nTlie appellant was convicted under s. 34 of the l\\1ysore Excise Act and sentenced tu three months R.I. and a fine of lls. 100/- for being in possession of 48 bottles of liquor, recovered from the car being driven by him.\n\nIt was contended that the provisions of s. $'4 had not been complied with, and the search was made without jurisdiction. + Allowing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHEID : 1.. The Inspector who searched the car of the appellant had not made any record of any grou.Qd on the basis of \\Vhich he had a reasonable belief that an offence under the Act, was being committed, before proceeding D to search the car, and thus the provisions of s. 54 were not at all complied with, thereby rendering the entire s$rcb without jurisdiction and, as a logical corollary, vit; ating the conviction. [1132H, ! 133A-B]\n\n2. Both, Sections 53 and 54 contain valuable safeguards for the liberty of the citiz.en in order to protect them from ill founded or frivolous prosecution or harassment. [11338] E\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2?-11-1973 of the Kamataka High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 221/ 73.\n\nS. S. Javali and B. P. Singh for the Appellant.\n\nM. Veerappa and J. R. Dass for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-In this appeal by Special Leave the appellant has been convicted under section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/- for being\n\nin pcissession of 48 bottles of liquor which were recovered from a car which was being driven by the appellant.\n\nMr. Javali appearing for the appellant has raised a short point before us.\n\nHe has submitted that R the Inspector of Excise who searched the car along with the panchas had no jurisdiction to do so because he did so without complying with\n\n1132 SUPREME C'OURT REl'OR\"l S ll 9791 2 S.C'.R.\n\nA the provisions of section 54 of the. Excise Act.\n\nJn our opinion, the contention is well-founded and must prevail, Section 53 runs thus :\n\n\"If a Magistrate, upon information and after such inquiry (if any) as he thinks necessary, has reasons to believe that an offence under section 32, section 33, section 34, section 36 or section 37 has been, is being or is likely to be committed, he may issue a warrant-\n\n(a) for the search of any place in which he has reason to believe, that any intoxicant still, utensil, implement, apparatus or materials which are used for the commission of such off_ence .or in respect of which such has been, is being, or fo likely to be, committed, are kept or concealed, and\n\n(b) for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have been, to be, or to be lJkely to be engaged in the commission of any such offence.\"\n\nD Thus this section relates to a contingency where the Statute enjoins\n\nthat any inspector before searching a place must obtain a warrant from the magistrate.\n\nSection 54 is a special provision which arises in urgent cases where it may not be; possible for the officer concerned to get a warrant from the Magistrate.\n\nSection 54 runs thus :\n\n\"Whenever the Excise Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner or any police officer not below the rank of an officer incharge of a police station or any Excise pfficer not below such rank as may be prescribed has reason to believe that an offence under section 32, section 33, section 34, section 36, or section 37 has been, is being, or is likely to be committed, and that a search wq_rrant cannot be obtained without affording the offender an opportunity of escape or of concealing evidence of the offence;, he may after recording the grounds of his belief-\n\n(a) at any time by day or by night enter and search any place and seize anything found therein which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act; and\n\n(b) detain aud search and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person found in such place whom he has reason to believe to be guilty of such offence as aforesaid.\"\n\nIn the instant case, it is admitted that the inspector who searched the car of the appellant had net made any record of any ground on the basis\n\n. \"'!-·\n\n. .,\n\nK. L. SUBBAYYA v. KARNATAKA (Fazal Ali, J.) 1133\n\n<Jf which he had a reasonable belief that an offence under the Act, was A being committed before proceeding to search the car and thus the provisions of section 54 were not at all compiled with.·\n\nThis, therefore, renders the entire search without jurisdiction and as a logical corollary, vitiates the conviction. We feel that both sections 53 and 54 contain valuable safeguards for the liberty of the citizen in cirder to protect them from ill-founded or frivolous prosecution or harassment.\n\nThe point was taken before the High Court which appears to have brushed aside this legal lacuna without making any real attempt to analyse the effect of the provisions of section 53 and 54. The\n\nHih Court obl; erved that these two sections were wholly irrelavant.\n\nWith due respect, we are unable to approve of such a cryptic approach to a legal question which is of far reaching consequences.\n\nIt was, however,. suggested that the word \"place\" would not include the car, but the\n\ndefurition of the word \"place\" under the Act clearly includes vehicle which would include a car. Thus the ground on which the argument of . the petitioner bas been rejected by the High Court cannot be sustained by us.\n\nWe are satisfied that there has been a direct non-compliance of the provisions of section 54 which renders the search completely without jurisdiction.\n\nIn this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and.sentence pa'ssed on the appellant is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him.\n\nM.R.\n\nAppeal allowed .", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "K. L. SUBBA YY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. L. SUBBAYYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. SUBBA YY A v.\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nJanuary 24, 1979\n\n[S. MtJRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nMsore Excise Act, s. 54, non-compliance of provisions under, if vitiate,\\' conviction-Sa."}}, {"text": "S. MtJRTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Msore Excise Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Msore Excise Act", "statute": "Msore Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 252, "end_char": 257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Msore Excise Act", "statute": "Msore Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 865, "end_char": 870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Msore Excise Act", "statute": "Msore Excise Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Msore Excise Act", "statute": "Msore Excise Act"}}, {"text": "Kamataka High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2?-11-1973 of the Kamataka High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. S. Javali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1410, "end_char": 1422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Javali and B. P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1427, "end_char": 1438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Javali and B. P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1551, "end_char": 1560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-In this appeal by Special Leave the appellant has been convicted under section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Javali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1877, "end_char": 1883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Javali appearing for the appellant has raised a short point before us."}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2279, "end_char": 2289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2439, "end_char": 2449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2451, "end_char": 2461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2463, "end_char": 2473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475, "end_char": 2485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2489, "end_char": 2499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3629, "end_char": 3639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3653, "end_char": 3663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3668, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5748, "end_char": 5758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1134_1141_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "DILBAG SINGH\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nJanuary 25, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nSentence-Senteucing power under Section 248(2) and s. 235(2) of the CrimiMl .Procedune Code, 1973 (Act II uf 1974)-Ne.ed for non-imtilution alised sentendng and value of presentencin~ investfgation reports while exer~ cising the right to sentence-Guidelines to be l1:iid down--Purpose of s. 366 of Criminal Procedure Code highlighted.\n\nIn the ci!sc of a trial before a court of 5cssion, under s. 235(2) Criminal Procedure Code \"if the accused is convicted, the Judge sJlali, unlf'ss he pro-- ceedi in accordance with the provisions of s. 360, hear the acCUled on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.\" Similarly, in the case of trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, under s. 248(2) of the Code, ''where the Magistrate finds the accused guilty, but does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of s. 325 or s: 360, he shall after hearing the accused on the question of sentence, pass sentence upon him according to law.\"\n\nSection 361 of the Code mandates that \"where ia any case, the court could! have dealt with :-\n\n(a) an ac..cused person under s. 360 or under thC .Provisions of the Proba- E lion of Offenders' Act, 1958 (Act XX of 1958) or;\n\n(b) a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960 (Act LX of 1960)- or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not doneso, it shall record in its. judgment, the special reasons for not having done so.\" Thus, under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, recourse to the provisions of s. 360 is a must.\n\n• In a trial aogaint four persons charged by the Police with offences under ss. 302, 324, 323 IPC, including constructive liability under s. 34, two were, acquitted by the trial , court and two were convicted. The appellant was sen-· tenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 200 /- for causing simple injury to one Arjan Singh. He was held vicariously guilty under ss. 324/34 JPC and awarded two :, rears rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.' 1000/-. Jn addition he was convicted under s. 323 IPC, for causing hurt to the daughter of the deceased and on this count punished with RI. for one year together with a fine of Rs. 200/·.\n\nReleasing the appellant on probation, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. Enacted law is guilty of inaction; because its obscure presence on the statute book escapes the vigilance of the Bar. Where. even the Court ignores what is vital to the little man the guarantee of sentencia.g legality-- becomes a casualty. [1135H, 1\\36A]\n\n\\o jii .. ,_,\n\n, I •\n\n' I y\n\n' ,\n\nDILBAG SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna [er, J.) 1135\n\n2. To jail an accused is mechanical farewell to the finer sentencing sensi- A tivity of the Judge of salvaging lai redeemable man by non-institutionalised; treatment. If the judge has before him a complete and accurate pre-sentence; investigation report which sets forth the conditions, circumstances, background, and surrounding of the accused and the circumstances underlying the offence which has been committe~ the judge could then impose sentence with greater assurance that he has adopted the proper course. The purpose of s. 360 of the Code is pre<:isely this and the goal of s. 235(2) is just this.\n\n[1138H, B\n\n1140B-C]\n\n3. Sentencing legality is violated when the judge shirks. And the Bar is often alien to correcti9nal alternatives and concentrates its ammunition on culpab1Jity and extenuatory scaling down of h11prisonment.\n\n[1189F]\n\n4. Calling pre-sentence investigation reports, bestowal of intelligent care C on the choice between institutional and non-institutional disposition like probation, C'll!ditional release and such community .Jllethods must form part of innova1\"'e sentences.\n\nBut this should be based on careful study of the convict and his potentiality for reform; not guess-work, nor insensitive assessments. [1137B-El\n\nWilliams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249; quoted with approval.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeat No. 313 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-3-78 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal\n\nNo. 189/75.\n\nA. S. Sohal and S. K. Jain for the Appellant.\n\nHardev Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Every litigative, appeal has a docket number but beneath the paper lurks a human factor, often forgotten in the forensic pugil!istics but now and then brought to the lore, as in this criminal appeal limited to the issne of appropriate sentence.\n\nSurely, 'the law must keep its promises.' Justice Holmes expressed\n\nthe obvious when he said this, but the breach of promise by the law on delivering criminal justice is daily experience, from police arrest to G prison trauma. The locus in tWs case is on the sentencing alternatives in the Criminal Procedure Code; and the grievano.e pressed by counsel, when traditional grounds on the merits failed, was that the compassion of s. 360 professionally suffering benign neglect, be kindled and he be\n\nrelased. Enacted law is guilty of inaction, because its obscure presence on the statute book escapes the vigilance of the Bar.\n\nWhere H even the court ignores what is vital to the little man the guarantee of\n\n16-119 SCI/79\n\n;1 I A sentencing legality becomes a casualty.\n\nThis case is an mstance in point.\n\nNow the brief story which enlivens the 'sentencing' submissions.\n\nFour villagers of rural Punjab, of whom the appellant is one, set upon Arjau Singh, a small official, while on his way back home. The sound a and fury of the attack with sticks brought out the ill-starred, innocent Srimati Rakhi, Arjau Singh's brother's wife.\n\nHer daughter too came to the spot attracted by the fracas.\n\nArjan Singh received blows, being the angry target of the assailants. But poor Rakhi, who came in accidentally, was hit on the head with a takua by Jagir Singh, one of the accused. She eventually died; and her daughter and Arjan Singh were C hurt by the beating.\n\nI!'\n\nFour persons were charged by the police with offences under s. 302, 324 and 323 I.P.C. including constructive liability under s. 34. Two of them were acquitted by the trial court and the other two were convicted but appealed to the High Court. The man who dealt the fatal cut was Jagir Singh.\n\nHis conviction under s. 302 I.P.C. and award of life imprisonment by the Sessions Court was converted into one under s. 304 Part I, I.P .C. with a consequential reduction of sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisomnent.\n\nHis conviction on certain other counts was maintained but we are not concerned with him at all, since the appellant in this Court is the other accused Dilbag Singh. His role was lesser and related to causing simple injury to Arjan Singh for which he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 200/-. He was held vicariously guilty under ss. 324/34 I.P.C. and awarded two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In addition he was convicted under s. 323 I.P.C. for causing hurt to the daughter of the deceased and on this count punished with R.I. for one year together with a fine of Rs. 200/-.\n\nHaving declined leave on the question of guilt, we confine our attention to the contentious on the sentence. We proceed on the footing of the facts found and ask ourselves whether any basic flaw in sentencing technology affords appellate intervention and re-designing of reformatory treatment in the conspectus of circumstances present in the case.\n\nThe courts in our country consult the pu'nitive tariffs prescribed in the Penal Code, consult the prison period awarded in practice for sucb offences and with margina~ variations mechanise the process.\n\nJudged by that test, conviction under s. 324 I.P.C. read with s. 34 plus substantive guilt under s. 323 I.P.C. is visited with two years for the former and one year R.I. especially when the incident has ended in death. But penal humanitarinism, strategies of non-institutional rehabilitation and\n\n• •\n\n,( ..\n\na complex of other considerations in making an offender a non-offondcr have revolutioniz.ed the judicial repertory in re-socializing the criminal.\n\nThe sentence hearing for which the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 provides in s. 248(2) and 5. 235(2) has hardly received the seriou• concern of the Courts despite the International Probation Year and therapeutic accent in penological literature. 'If the criminal law as a whole is the Cinderella of jurisprudence, then the law of sentencing is Cinderella's illegitimate baby'.\n\nPre-sentence instigation reports, bestowal of intelligent care on the choice between institutional and no& institutional disposition and habitual neglect of new avenues open to the. court have constrained us to grant leave in the case so that guidelines may be laid down and probation and community-oriented methods lying in the legal limbs may be re-activated. Our prisons are overcrowded, our prisoners are subjected to iatrogenic incarceration, our penal drills are self-defeatingly callous to correctional measures and our jail budgets bu!ge without countervailing community benefits because the Bench and the Bar have dismissed as below judicial visibility such patterns as probation, conditional release.\n\nThe time has come for Courts to abandon the Monroe Doctrine towards penology and concern itself with innovative sentences.\n\nBut this involves careful study of the convict and his potentiality\n\nfor reform, not guess-work nor insensitiv0 assessments.\n\nTherefore, \\.ve directed, right at the start, the Chief Probation Officer, Punjab, to ma!<c E a report to this Court \"as to the social circumstances and other relevant factors bearing on the consideration of eligibility of the petitioner to probation.\" That report has been received and its contents mdicate competent advertence to pertinent criteria which we may briefly sum up.\n\nThe appellant is 32 years old. His behavioral attitude is stated to be \"obedient and law-respecting in nature\".\n\nThe officer goes on to state that the prisoner's character is fairly good, that he is upright, alert and interested in rural games. Of course, he seems to b, wrestle~ of the locality which is good if it is practised as a game but dangerous if he exercises his muscles on other people's flesh.\n\nMore importantly are the social ii1fluences that bear upon restraint and good behaviour.\n\nHe is a ptty farmer who left school in his teens, has ~'n acres of land belonging to the joint family of himself and five brothers and the mother. Being a cultivator and living in the joint family circumstances the officer finds no adverse remarks against him in the locality. On te other hand, the report refers to his great respect for the former Sarpanch of the village. His family circumstances evoke commiseration !>.:cause his father is dead having been murdered in 1960. His mother is alive\n\nand has !o be maintained by himself and his two brothers wiJ,1 ar•· truck drivers and the third a jawan. He has his own nuclear family to mai'ntain with a young wile and four children. A pitiable factor is that his elder daughter is paralytic from birth. His social position shows that he belongs to a lower middle class fami'.y, lives by agriculture, loves his mother and brothers and has earned the good-will of his neighbours who think that the occurrence was induced by an irritating land issue and temporary intoxication. A sense of remorse has overcome him according to the Probation Officerwho says that he is a first offender a'nd not a recidivist. It is a painful fact, as noted in the report that this criminal case has cost him a tidy sum, loss of prestige and even family separation. '\n\nIn the unrefined English of the Probation Officer we may summarise his assessment of the offender :\n\n\"It was met of an accident as offender-client Dilbag11 Singh s•eems to be law abiding and God fearing.\n\nHis one D weakness is wine and that is the route cause of the pre,; ent diviation, otherwise on the whole offender's behaviour is normal and adjustable. The offender is in curab'.e stage as crime has not gone deep into him- He can be adjustable amicably within his 'normal and natnral environmental factors.\n\nThe client can easily be reformed as he is neither professional II criminal nor exhibits any tendency to future deviation.\"\n\nThe social milieu, the domestic responsibilities, the respect for the former' Sarpanch he shows, the general goodwill he commands arc plus points. The tragic fact of his father's murder and the running misfortune of his young daughter's paralysed limbs are sour facets of his life.\n\nF The circumstance that he is gainfully employed as agriculturist and his brothers, though in diverse occupations, remain joint family members, are hopeful factors.\n\nThe aggressive episode which led to his conviction was induced by the company of his cousin who serves a seven year sentence and the inebriation due to drinking habit.\n\nThis simple villager responsible and gentle, sad and burdened, repentant and drained G of his little wealth by the criminal case, has a long way to go in lire being in his early thirtys. The drinks vice was the minus point. Many a peaceable person, on slight irritation, suffers bellicose switc\\1-over under alcoholic consumption.\n\nHow does judicial discretion operate in this skew of circumstances?\n\nH To jail him is mechanical farewell to the finer sentencing sensitivity of the judge of salvaging a redeemable man by non-institntionalised treatment.\n\nThe human consequences of the confinement process here will\n\n> ,\n\nbe no good to society and much injury to the miserable family and, above all, hardening a young man into bad behaviour, with prestige punctured, family injured, and society ill-served.\n\nNor was the crime such, so far as his part was involved, as to deserve Jong deterrent incarceration.\n\nOur prison system, until humane and purposeful reforms pervades, surely injures, never improves.\n\nPrison justice has promises to keep, and ethological changes geared to curative goals are still alien-from dress and bed, refusal of frequent parole and insistence of mechanical chores, bonded labour, nocturnal tensions, and no scheme to reform and many traditions to repress-such is the zoological institutional realism and rehabilitative bankruptcy which inflict social and financial costs upon the State.(') It is wasted sadism to lug this man into counter-productive imprisonment for one year.\n\nLong years ago, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a forward-looking speech on John Day, said :\n\n\"If the criminal's past history gives good reason to believe that he is not of the naturally criminal type, that he is capable of real reform and of becoming a useful citizen, there is no doubt that probation. viewed from the selfish standpoint of protection to society alone, is the most: efficient method that we have.\n\nAnd yet it is the least understood, the least developed, the least appreciated of all our efforts to rid society of the criminal.\"(')\n\nThe appellant has served a substantial part of his sentence in jail because of judicial innocence of the normae in the area of noninstitutional disposition. It is easy to imprison, hard to individualise punishment.\n\nSentencing legality is violated when the judge shirks.\n\nAnd the Bar is often alien to correctional alternatives and concentra- F tes its ammunition on culpability and extenuatory scaling down of imprisomnent.\n\nThe observations of the United States Supreme Court in Williams\n\nv. New York (337 U.S. 241, 249) lay the right stress on prc-sen(cnce\n\nreports: G\n\n\"have been given a high value by consienl ious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available informati0n rather than on guess-work and inadequate infor-\n\n(1) Report by K. F. Rustamji, Member, National Police Commission on the deplorable conditions in Indian Jails.\n\n(2) \"Sentencing and Probation -National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada pp. 337.\n\nmation.\n\nTo deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information would undermine modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation.\" -\n\nJudge F. Rayan Duffy has written :\n\n\"If the judge has before him a complete and accurate pre-sentence investigation report which sets forth the conditions, circumstances, background, and surroundings of the defendant, and the circumstances underlying the offense which has been committed, the judge can then impose sentence with greater assurane that he has adopted the proper course.\n\nHe can do so with much greater peace of mind.\"(')\n\nThe purpose of s. 360 of the Code is precisely this; the goal of s. 235 (2) is just this.\n\nAnd yet, the exacting art is more honoured in the breach than in the observance if we many wrongly use a D Shakespearean passage to drive home our point.\n\nWe stress the legal position so that subordinate courts may not treat conviction as the terminal point but the end of one chapter. We are mindful of the complexity and remove the impression that easy resort to s. 360 is right.\n\nNo; it is wrong.\n\nTwo quotes set the record straight.\n\n\"Imprisonment is the appropriate sentence when the offender must be isolated from the community in order to protect society or if he can learn to readjust his attitudes and patterns of behaviour only in a closely controlled environment.\"(')\n\n\"The consequences of a sentence are of the highest order. If too short or of the wrong type, it can deprive the law ol its effectiveness and result in the premature release of a dangerous criminal.\n\nIf too severe or improperly conceived, it can reinforce the criminal tendencies of the defendant and lead to a new offence by one who otherwise might not have offended •o •erionsly again. '\n\nThe decision which is presented at sentencing is also enormously complex. It properly is concerned, and often predominantly, with the future which can be predicted for the particular offender.\n\nBut auy single-valued approach to sentencing is misdirected.\n\nA seuteuce which is not in some ---\n\n(1) \"Sentence and Probation\" pp. 362, 363.\n\n(2) Senlcncing &.\n\nProbation 342.\n\nfashion limited in accordance with the particular offence can lead to a system of incomparable brutality.\n\nPer contra, a sentence or pattern of sentence which fails to take due account of the gravity of the offence can seriously undermine respect for law.\"(')\n\nIn this case, after perusal of the report of the Probation Officer, counsel for the State, Sri Hardev Singh, with fair candour and shared correctness, consented to a release of the prisoner under S. 360. We agi\"ee. But one fact needs emphasis. The close nexus between violence and alcohol is a call to the State in every criminal investigation to identify the role of alcohol in the commission of the offence and in every prisoner's treatment to provide for anti-alcoholic therapy.\n\nTo fail here is vicarious guilt of the State to Society. We direct release of the appellant forthwith.\n\nHe will enter into a bond before the trial court together with Shri Dilbag Singh S/ o Babu Singh as surety in the amount of Rs. 1000/- within two weeks of his release to keep the peace, be of good behaviour, to abjure alcohol and not to commit offence for a period of three years and to appear and receive sentence, if called upon in the meantime. The appeal is allowed with this direction which is the Q.E.D. of sentencing justice.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(!) Ibid 336.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "DILBAG SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DILBAG SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DILBAG SINGH\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nJanuary 25, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 248(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedune Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Procedune Code, 1973", "statute": "Procedune Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 401, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 506, "end_char": 529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 248(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 812, "end_char": 821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 942, "end_char": 948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1067, "end_char": 1078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1192, "end_char": 1198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Children Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1325, "end_char": 1343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1591, "end_char": 1620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1652, "end_char": 1658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "ss. 302, 324, 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1747, "end_char": 1764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1809, "end_char": 1814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Arjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 /- for causing simple injury to one Arjan Singh.", "canonical_name": "Arjan Singh"}}, {"text": "ss. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3253, "end_char": 3259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 241, 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. S. Sohal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4242, "end_char": 4253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Sohal and S. K. Jain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Sohal and S. K. Jain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4289, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Every litigative, appeal has a docket number but beneath the paper lurks a human factor, often forgotten in the forensic pugil!istics but now and then brought to the lore, as in this criminal appeal limited to the issne of appropriate sentence."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4680, "end_char": 4686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Holmes expressed\n\nthe obvious when he said this, but the breach of promise by the law on delivering criminal justice is daily experience, from police arrest to G prison trauma."}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5058, "end_char": 5064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5525, "end_char": 5531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four villagers of rural Punjab, of whom the appellant is one, set upon Arjau Singh, a small official, while on his way back home."}}, {"text": "Arjau Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5572, "end_char": 5583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four villagers of rural Punjab, of whom the appellant is one, set upon Arjau Singh, a small official, while on his way back home.", "canonical_name": "Arjan Singh"}}, {"text": "Srimati Rakhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5716, "end_char": 5729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sound a and fury of the attack with sticks brought out the ill-starred, innocent Srimati Rakhi, Arjau Singh's brother's wife."}}, {"text": "Rakhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5901, "end_char": 5906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But poor Rakhi, who came in accidentally, was hit on the head with a takua by Jagir Singh, one of the accused."}}, {"text": "Jagir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5970, "end_char": 5981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But poor Rakhi, who came in accidentally, was hit on the head with a takua by Jagir Singh, one of the accused."}}, {"text": "s. 302, 324 and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6171, "end_char": 6176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6217, "end_char": 6222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Dilbag Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6759, "end_char": 6771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His conviction on certain other counts was maintained but we are not concerned with him at all, since the appellant in this Court is the other accused Dilbag Singh.", "canonical_name": "DILBAG SINGH"}}, {"text": "ss. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6972, "end_char": 6979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6983, "end_char": 6988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7096, "end_char": 7102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7103, "end_char": 7108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7669, "end_char": 7679, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7836, "end_char": 7842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7860, "end_char": 7865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7895, "end_char": 7901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7902, "end_char": 7907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sentence hearing for which the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8259, "end_char": 8319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 248(2) and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8332, "end_char": 8347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The sentence hearing for which the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "The sentence hearing for which the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Dilbag11 Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11918, "end_char": 11932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the unrefined English of the Probation Officer we may summarise his assessment of the offender :\n\n\"It was met of an accident as offender-client Dilbag11 Singh s•eems to be law abiding and God fearing."}}, {"text": "Franklin D. Roosevelt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14549, "end_char": 14570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long years ago, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a forward-looking speech on John Day, said :\n\n\"If the criminal's past history gives good reason to believe that he is not of the naturally criminal type, that he is capable of real reform and of becoming a useful citizen, there is no doubt that probation."}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15528, "end_char": 15555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of the United States Supreme Court in Williams\n\nv. New York (337 U.S. 241, 249) lay the right stress on prc-sen(cnce\n\nreports: G\n\n\"have been given a high value by consienl ious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available informati0n rather than on guess-work and inadequate infor-\n\n(1) Report by K. F. Rustamji, Member, National Police Commission on the deplorable conditions in Indian Jails."}}, {"text": "S. 241, 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15588, "end_char": 15599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. F. Rustamji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15831, "end_char": 15845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of the United States Supreme Court in Williams\n\nv. New York (337 U.S. 241, 249) lay the right stress on prc-sen(cnce\n\nreports: G\n\n\"have been given a high value by consienl ious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available informati0n rather than on guess-work and inadequate infor-\n\n(1) Report by K. F. Rustamji, Member, National Police Commission on the deplorable conditions in Indian Jails."}}, {"text": "Sentencing and Probation -National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15934, "end_char": 16013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) \"Sentencing and Probation -National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada pp."}}, {"text": "F. Rayan Duffy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16260, "end_char": 16274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge F. Rayan Duffy has written :\n\n\"If the judge has before him a complete and accurate pre-sentence investigation report which sets forth the conditions, circumstances, background, and surroundings of the defendant, and the circumstances underlying the offense which has been committed, the judge can then impose sentence with greater assurane that he has adopted the proper course."}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16706, "end_char": 16712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16756, "end_char": 16762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18681, "end_char": 18687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Babu Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19158, "end_char": 19168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He will enter into a bond before the trial court together with Shri Dilbag Singh S/ o Babu Singh as surety in the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19506, "end_char": 19512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1142_1146_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "PRAKASH COTTON MILLS (P) LTD. v.\n\nB. SEN & ORS.\n\nJanuary 25, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0. A. DESAI, JJ.J\n\nCustoms Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) Ss. 14 & 15-cope of-Goods imported and stored in warehouse-Section amended increasing the rate of' duty-\n\nLl'V)' c, f duty whethe1 should be on the basi~ when goods were warehoused or when cleared.\n\nAs a result of devaluation of Indian Currency in June. 1966, Ss. 14 & 1.5 of the Customs Act were amended by the Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966--which was later replaced by an Act-with effect from July 7, 1966.\n\nSection 15(1) provides that the rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff valuation applicable to any imported goods shall be the rate and valuation in force . . . . . (b) in the case of goods cleared from a \\Va.rehouse under s. 68, on the date on which the goods were actually removed from the warehouse.\n\nD The appellant stored on December 22, 1965 in the Customs warehouse, goods imported by him under a licence, and cleared them on various dates between September I, 1966 and February 20, 1967.\n\nUnder protest, they paid customs duty nt the enhanced rates in accordance with the amended provisions.\n\nLater, they claimed rebate alleging that since the consignments had been received, stored and assessed to duty much before the promulgation of the Ordinance, they were liable to pay duty at the rate prevailing on the date of ware~ E housing,\n\nTheir appeals and revision were unsuccessful.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that the material change in s. 15 being only the substitution of the words \"the rate of duty, rate of exchange\" for the words \"the. rate of duty'' the customs authorities were not entitled to take into account the new rate of exchange at the appreciated value of currency in respect of the consignments stored in the warehouse prior to the coming into force \"'of the Ordinance.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The customs authorities were right in taking the view that the rate of duty applicable to the imported goods should be determined accordi11g to the law prevalent on the date they were actually removed from the warehouse.\n\nSection 15 ( 1) (b) clearly requires that the rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff valuation applicable to any imported goods shall be the rate and valuation in force on the date on which goods are actually removed from the warehouse. Under s. 49 an importer may apply to the Assistant Collector of Customs for permission to store the imported goods in a warehouse pending their clearance and he may be permitted to do so; and s. 68 provides that an importer of any warehoused goods may cloor them if the import duty leviableon them has been paid. That is why clause (b) of sub-section (,!) of s. 15 makes a reference to s. 68.\n\n[1!46D, 1145H--1146C]\n\nIn the instant case the goods were removed from the warehouse after the A Ordinance canie into force on July 7, 1966. [1146Dl\n\nClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Ci'vil Appeal Nos. 1997 and 2219 of 1969. 1992-\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from order dated 16-1-69 and 19-3-69 of the Govt. of India, Min. of Finance Dept. of Revenue in Orders Nos. 8637-8642/68 and 1408/69.\n\nY. S. Chitale, J. B. Dadachanji and D. N. Misra for the Appellant in all appeals.\n\nS. Markrmdeya and Girish Chandra for the Respondents in all the C appeals. '\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL J. These appeals by special leave arise out of an order of the Central Government dated Jannary 16, 1969 by which six revisional applications of the appellants were dismissed, and a similar order D dated March 19, 1969, in the remaining case. As the basic facts and the law governing them are quite similar, it will be sufficient to deal with the common point in controversy before us on the basis of the admitted facts, and to dispose of the appeals together.\n\nThe appellants obtainted licences for the import of 102 cases of 3,000 Kgs. of nylon yarn.\n\nThe yarn was shipped to Bombay on the basis of a letter of credit in favour of the foreign suppliers.\n\nWhen the shipment arrived, the appellants received the bill of lading and other documents of title from the bankers on or about August 23, 1965, and paid for the same.\n\nThey lodged the bill of entry the same day, and it has been claimed that the goods were assessed for duty by the customs authorities at a certain figure.\n\nThe appellants stored the goods in the warehouse on December 22, 1965.\n\nThey cleared 32 cases for \"home\" consumption on May 10, 1966, and there is no controversy in regard to it.\n\nThe currency was devalued on June 6, 1966, and the Customs (; Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, was promulgated on July 7, 1966, by which sections 14 and 15 of the Customs Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, were amended.\n\nThe Ordinance was replaced by the Customs (Amendment) Act, 1966. The appellants cleared 12 cases of the aforesaid consignment on or about September 1, 1966. Another 12 cases were cleared on October 10,\n\n1966, and 46 cases were cleared in two lots on or about December 30, 1966 and February 20, 1967.\n\nTheir grievance was that the cases were allowed to be cleared on payment of \"enchanced\" duty\n\n, ..\n\naccording to the amended provisions of the Act.\n\nThey paid the duty under protest and applied for refund of the excess payment on the ground that the amended law was not applicable as the consignments had been received, stored and assessed to duty before the promulgation of the Ordinance. The application~ of the appellants for refund were rejected by the customs authorities, and their appeals were dismissed by the Appellate Collector of Customs on the ground that the amended sections 14 and 15 of the Act were applicable to the consignments in question.\n\nThe appellants filed revision applications before the Central Government, but they were dismissed by the aforesaid common impugned order dated January 16, 1969. They have therefore approached this Court for a redress of their grievance.\n\nThe facts relating to Civil Appeal No. 2219 of 1969, are quite similar, except that the consignment in that case was of 63 cases of nylon yarn, which were stored in the warehouse on December 14, 1965, and were cleared on May 25, 1967. In that case also, the appellants paid the duty under the provisions of the amended se<:- , tions under protest, and unsuccessfully applied for refund of the socalled excess duty.\n\nThey failed in their appeals to the Appellate Collector of Customs and their application for revision was rejected by the Central Government on March 19, 1969.\n\nIt will thus appear that the controversy in these two sets of cases relates to the short question whether the customs authorities were justified in applying the rate of duty (to the imported goods in question) according to the rate prevalent on the date of their actual removal from the warehouse.\n\nIt will be recalled that the Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, was promulgated and came into force on July 7, 1966, and was replaced by the Customs (Amendment) Act, 1966. The amendments in question were by way of substitution of sections 14 and 15 of the Act by the new sections. It has been argned by Mr. Chitale for the appellants that the material change was that made in subsection ( 1) of section 15 of the Act by substituting the words \"The rate of duty, rate of exchange\" for the words \"The rate of duty\".\n\nHe has therefore argned that the customs authorities were not entitled to take the new \"rate of exchange\", at the depreciated value of the currency, into consideration in respect of the consignments in question as they had been shipped to Bombay and stored in the warehouse before the amended section 15 came into force.\n\nThe learned counsel tried to argue that the orders of assessment of the customs duty were also made before the amendment Ordinance\n\nwas promulgate<! on July 7, 1966, but he did not pursue that line of argument because he was not in a position to produce the so-called assessment orders. But, as we shall show, even if it were assumed that any such order or orders had been made before July 7, 1966, that could not possibly affect the correct rate of duty applicable to the imported goods.\n\nA reference to sections 14 and 15 of the Act will show that while section 14 deals with the valuation of goods for purposes of assessment, it is section 15 which specifies the date for determination of the rate of duty and tariff valuation of imported goods.\n\nThe amended section reads as follows,-\n\n\"15 (1) The rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any imported goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force,-\n\n(a) i'n the case of goods enterd for home consumption under section 46, on the date on which a bill of entry in respect of such goods is presented under that section;\n\n(b) in the case of goods cleared from a warehouse under section 68, on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse;\n\n( c) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty :\n\nProvided that if a bill of entry has been presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods are imported, the bill of entry shall be deemed to have. been presented on the date of such entry inwards.\n\n(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply to baggage and goods imported by post.\n\n(3) For the purpooes of section 14 and this section-\n\n( a) \"rate of exchange\" means the rate of exchange determined by the Central Government for the conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency or foreign currency into Indian currency;\n\n(b) \"foreign cuw, ncy\" and \"Indian currency\" have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.\"\n\nIt fa thus the clear requirement of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act that the rate of duty, rate of exchange and U1riff\n\nvaluation applicable to any imported goods shall be the rate and valuation in force on the date on which the warehoused goods are actually removed from the warehouse.\n\nA cross-reference to section 49 of the Act shows that an importer may apply to the Assistant Collector o!\n\nCustoms for permission to store the imported goods in a warehouse pending their clearance, and he may be permitted to do so. The other relevant provision is that contained in section 68 of the Act which provides that the importer of any warehoused goods may clear them for \"home consumption\" if, inter alia, the import duty leviable on them has been paid.\n\nThat is why clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 15 of the Act makes a reference to section 68. It is therefore quite clear that the rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff vaLuation shall be those in force on the date of actual removal of the warehoused goods from the warehouse. As it is not in dispute before us that the goods, which are the subject matt.or of the appeals before us, were removed from the warehouse after the amending Ordinance had come into force on July 7, 1966, the customs authorities and the D Central Government were quite right in taking the view that the rate of duty applicable to the imported goods had to be determined according to the law which was prevalent on the date they were actually removed from the warehouse, namely, tho amended sections 14 and 15 of the Act.\n\nThere is therefore no force in the argument that the requirement of the amended section 15 should have been ignored E simply because the goods were imported before it came into force, or that their bills of lading or bills of entry were lodged before that date.\n\nAs we find no force in these appeals, they are dismissed with costs.\n\nN. V. K.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "PRAKASH COTTON MILLS (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRAKASH COTTON MILLS (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. SEN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. SEN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 25, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. A. DESAI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 14 & 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Ss. 14 & 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 417, "end_char": 428, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 7, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 538, "end_char": 550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 & 1.5 of the Customs Act were amended by the Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966--which was later replaced by an Act-with effect from July 7, 1966."}}, {"text": "Section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 779, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "December 22, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 886, "end_char": 903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The appellant stored on December 22, 1965 in the Customs warehouse, goods imported by him under a licence, and cleared them on various dates between September I, 1966 and February 20, 1967."}}, {"text": "February 20, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1033, "end_char": 1050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The appellant stored on December 22, 1965 in the Customs warehouse, goods imported by him under a licence, and cleared them on various dates between September I, 1966 and February 20, 1967."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1516, "end_char": 1521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2120, "end_char": 2130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2366, "end_char": 2371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2552, "end_char": 2557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719, "end_char": 2724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2746, "end_char": 2751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3144, "end_char": 3157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, J. B. Dadachanji and D. N. Misra for the Appellant in all appeals."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3159, "end_char": 3175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, J. B. Dadachanji and D. N. Misra for the Appellant in all appeals."}}, {"text": "D. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, J. B. Dadachanji and D. N. Misra for the Appellant in all appeals."}}, {"text": "S. Markrmdeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markrmdeya and Girish Chandra for the Respondents in all the C appeals. '"}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3245, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markrmdeya and Girish Chandra for the Respondents in all the C appeals. '"}}, {"text": "SHINGHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL J. These appeals by special leave arise out of an order of the Central Government dated Jannary 16, 1969 by which six revisional applications of the appellants were dismissed, and a similar order D dated March 19, 1969, in the remaining case."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3936, "end_char": 3942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The yarn was shipped to Bombay on the basis of a letter of credit in favour of the foreign suppliers."}}, {"text": "August 23, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the shipment arrived, the appellants received the bill of lading and other documents of title from the bankers on or about August 23, 1965, and paid for the same."}}, {"text": "May 10, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4459, "end_char": 4471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They cleared 32 cases for \"home\" consumption on May 10, 1966, and there is no controversy in regard to it."}}, {"text": "June 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The currency was devalued on June 6, 1966, and the Customs (; Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, was promulgated on July 7, 1966, by which sections 14 and 15 of the Customs Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, were amended."}}, {"text": "sections 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4677, "end_char": 4688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants cleared 12 cases of the aforesaid consignment on or about September 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "October 10,\n\n1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another 12 cases were cleared on October 10,\n\n1966, and 46 cases were cleared in two lots on or about December 30, 1966 and February 20, 1967."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another 12 cases were cleared on October 10,\n\n1966, and 46 cases were cleared in two lots on or about December 30, 1966 and February 20, 1967."}}, {"text": "sections 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5622, "end_char": 5640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed revision applications before the Central Government, but they were dismissed by the aforesaid common impugned order dated January 16, 1969."}}, {"text": "January 16, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed revision applications before the Central Government, but they were dismissed by the aforesaid common impugned order dated January 16, 1969."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6122, "end_char": 6139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2219 of 1969, are quite similar, except that the consignment in that case was of 63 cases of nylon yarn, which were stored in the warehouse on December 14, 1965, and were cleared on May 25, 1967."}}, {"text": "May 25, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6161, "end_char": 6173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2219 of 1969, are quite similar, except that the consignment in that case was of 63 cases of nylon yarn, which were stored in the warehouse on December 14, 1965, and were cleared on May 25, 1967."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They failed in their appeals to the Appellate Collector of Customs and their application for revision was rejected by the Central Government on March 19, 1969."}}, {"text": "sections 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7125, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argned by Mr. Chitale for the appellants that the material change was that made in subsection ( 1) of section 15 of the Act by substituting the words \"The rate of duty, rate of exchange\" for the words \"The rate of duty\"."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7213, "end_char": 7223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7626, "end_char": 7636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8160, "end_char": 8178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8290, "end_char": 8300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8656, "end_char": 8666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8820, "end_char": 8830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9317, "end_char": 9327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9638, "end_char": 9675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9748, "end_char": 9758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10011, "end_char": 10021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10272, "end_char": 10282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10500, "end_char": 10510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10543, "end_char": 10553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "sections 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11231, "end_char": 11249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11343, "end_char": 11353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. V. K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. V. K.\n\nAppeals dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1147_1159_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n/{]Jluary 30, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J., V. 0. TuLZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN,\n\nJJ.]\n\nContract Act-Contract not completed within stipulated time. No term in contract making tin1e, the essence of contract-Tests for deciding if tin1e was of essence.\n\nThe appellant entered into a contract with the respondent for the execution of a work the essential term of which was that the contract should be com- C pleted in 12 months from the commencement of the work. On the ground that the appellant had not completed the work within the stipulated time the respondent rescinded the contract.\n\nIn his suit for damages for illegal and wrongful recision of the contract the appellant claimed that the date for commencement of the work was merely nominal and that in any case time was not of the essence of the contract. The D appellant also alleged that on account of several difficulties such as exce.ssive rains in the area, lack of proper road and means of approach to the site, rejec~ tion of materials on improper grounds by the Government officers, completion of the work was delayed, extension of time was wrongfully. refused by the officers of the Government, and that none of these factors had been taken into account by the Government while refusing to give extension of time, and in ultimately rescinding the contract.\n\nHolding that time was not of the essence of the contract the trial Court de.creed the suit, but disallowed certain claims of the appellant.\n\nOn appeal by both sides the High Court, without deciding the question whether time was of the essence of the contract, held thnt the recision of the contract was not arbitrary and unreasonable or unjustified.\n\nOn further appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that (i) the High Court was in error in not deciding the main question whether or not time was essence of the contract; and (ii) it was not the appellant's case that the recision was mala fide and that, therefore, the High Court erred in considering that question.\n\nAllowing the appeal, G\n\nHELD : The question whether or not time was of the essence of the contract would essentially be a question of the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract. Even where the parties he.ve expressly provided that time is of the essence of the contract such stipulation would have to be read alongwith other provisions of the contract and such other provisions may, on construction of the contract, exclude the inference H that the completion of the work by a particular date was intended to be fundamental.\n\nFor instance if the contract were to include clauses providing\n\nA for extension of time in certain contingencies or for payment of fine or penalty for every day or week the work undertaken remains unfinished on the expiry of the time provided in the contract such clause would be construed as rendering inefftctivc the express provision relating to the time being of the essence of the cont1act. fl155A-B]\n\nHalsbury', Laws of England, Vol. 4 p. 1174 referred to.\n\n(1) In the instant case, having regard to the terms of the car.tract particularly the clauses pertaining to the imposition of penalty and extension of time~ time was never intended by the parties to be of the essence of the contract The letter by which the contract was rescinded clearly waived the stipulation of 12 months' period, the contractor having been allo, ved to do some more work after th< expiry of the period. [1157B]\n\n(ii) The approach adopted by the respondent and upheld by the High Court\n\nWM not correct Long before the expiry of the period of 12 months the appellant bad requested for extension of the period of completion.\n\nEven if the grounds made out by the appellant were not agreeable to the Superintending Engineer some reasonable time making it the essence of the contract ought to have been granted.\n\nInstead of making time of the essence at some stage or the other, the respondent rescinded the contract which was clearly illegal and wrongful.\n\n[ 11 ~SC]\n\n(iii) It was never the case of the appellant that the recision of the contract was mala fide.\n\nThe various reasons given by the appellant for delay in executing the work were put forward merely for showing that the refusal to extend time by the Superintending Engineer was unreasonable or unjustified.\n\nThe question was not whether the recision of the contract was unreasonable and, E therefore, unjustified but whether the recision was wrongful and illegal.\n\nIf time was not of the essence or if the stipulation as to the time fixed for completion had, by reason of the waiver, ceased to be applicable then the only course open to the respondent was to fix some time making it the essence and if within the time 110 fixed the appellant had failed to complete the work, the Jt!rC'nden.t could have rescinded the contr.o:ict. [1 l57D-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 483 and 1769 of 1969.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Ord•or dated 9/10-9-1968 of the Bombay High Court in First App,; al Nos. 844 of 1961 and 245 ot 1962.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, J. S. Sinha and K. J. John for the Appellants.\n\nR. H. Dhebar, B. V. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay are directed against that Court's common judgment and decree dated September 9/10, 1968, passed in two cross appeals being First Appeal Nos. 245 of 1962 and 844 of 1961.\n\n• ,\n\nI j ol\n\n~ ,' ,.\n\nI!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA 114 9 (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nA contract for the construction of an aqueduct across the Alandi River at Mile No. 2 of the Nasik Left Bank Canal of the total value of Rs. 1,07 ,000 /- was granted to the appellant-plaintiff (originally a partnership but later a proprietary firm of contractors) by the respondent-defendant (the State of Maharashtra) after the farmer's tender was accepted on June 17, 1955.\n\nOn July 2, 1955 the Executive Engineer issned the work order to the appellant-plaintiff directing him to commence the work by July 5, 1955 intimatihg in clear terms that the stipulated date for starting the work would be reckoned from July 5, 1955. The formal vegular Contract in prescribed Form B-2/1 of 1955-56 (Ex. 34) containing the terms and conditions as well as the Schedules, specifications etc. was executed by the parties on July 12,\n\n1955. A security deposit of Rs. 4,936/- was kept by the appelJ, antplaintif! with the respondent-defendaht.\n\nThe period for completion of work was fiioed as 12 months from the date stipulated for commencement of the work, that is to say, it was expected to be completed on or before Ju; y 4, 1956.\n\nIt appears that on the ground that the appdlarrt-plaintif! had not completed the work as expected within the stipulated time the Executive Engineer by his letter dated August 27, 1956 (Ex. 78) rescinded the said contract with effect from August 16,\n\n1956. After serving a 'notice under s. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code the appellant-plaintiff filed a suit (being Special Civil Suit No. 23 of\n\n1959) on August 28, 1959 in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nasik making a claim for Rs. 65,000/- in the aggregate against the respondent-defendant alleging wrongful and illegal r~\n\ncisio'n of the contract on the part of the respondent-defendant. The appellant-plaintiff's case was that the initial fixation of July 5, 1955 as the date for commencement of the work was nominal, that the area where the work was to be done had usually heavy rainfall rendering it impossible to carry out any work from July to November and that, therefore, it was the practice of the Public Works Department to deduct the period of monsoon in case of such type of works and that the appella'nt-plaintif! had been orally informed that this period would be deducted or not taken into account for calculating the period of 12 months under the contract and that on this assurance he had commenced the work towards the end of December 1955. His case further was that in any event time was not of the essence of the contract, that oh account of several difficulties, snch as excessive rains, lack of proper road and means of approach to the site, rejection of materials on improper grounds by Govermnent Officers, etc., over which he had no control, the completion of the work was delayed and that the extension of the time which was permissible under the contract had been wrongfully refused by the officers of the respondent-defe'ndant.\n\nAc-\n\n1150 SUPREME COURT REPOR:fS [1979.1 2 s.c.R.\n\ncording to him none of these factors had been taken into account b} the Government while refusing the extension and the contract was wrongfu1ly rescinded a'nd, therefore, the respondent-defendant was liable in damages.\n\nThe total claim of Rs. 65,000/- comprised six items-(1) Rs. 4,936/- being the amount of security deposit wrongfully forfeited by the respondent-defendant, (2) Rs. 10,254/- being the amount due to him for the actual work done by him under Bill No. 1253 dated September 20, 1956 and which had not been paid for,\n\n(3) Rs. 7,3751being the value of the material collected by him on the site for work but which had ree'n rendered useless on account of wrongful recision, the 4th and 5th items sounded in damages, while the last item was interest from date of recision to the date of the suit.\n\nThe State of Maharashtra resisted the claim contending that time was of the essence of the contract, that the date fixed for commencement was real and not nominal and the 12 months period was fixed after all aspects of the matter had been taken into account, it was further contended that the appellant-plaintiff knew the situation of the site and the so-called difficulties, that there was no excuse for him for not doing the work during the months of July to November, that the appellant-plaintiff failed to carry out the proportionate work during the periods fixed in the contract and that since the appellant-plaintifl had rendered himself incompetent to complete the work in proper time it had to rescind the contract and the recision was proper a'nd fo1 adequate reasons; it was further contended that the State was entitled to forfeit the security deposit which it did on the date when the contract was rescinded.\n\nThe several items claimed by the appellantplaintiff were denied by the State. It was denied that the material of the value of Rs. 7,3751remained on the site or that it was responsible for its 'non-removal from the site. Regarding items 4 and 5 the State denied its liability to pay the same as it was the appellant-plaintiff who had committed the breach of the contract. As regards the amount due under Bill No. 1253 dated September 20, 1956 for the actual work done, it was contended that the State had to deduct the amount of penalty leviable under the contract and for th~ actual cement supplied to the appellant-plaintiff and after making deductions in that behalf only a sum of Rs. 700/- would be due to the appellant-plaintiff.\n\nOn a consideration of the documentary evidenee including the terms and conditions of the contract (Ex. 34) and the oral evidence ied by the parties, the learned trial Judge held that the date July 5, 1955 fixed as the date for commencement of the work was not nominal but that time was not of the essence of the contract between the\n\nc '\"'', -\n\nJ .\n\n• I ,\n\n__Jr.• -- .. l\n\n• _, if ' l .,\n\nIf(\n\n~ '\n\nHIND CONSTRUCTIO\"I CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA\n\n11 SI ( Tulzapurkar, J.) parties, that the respondent-defendant (State Government) had wrongfully rescinded the contract, that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to damages but that he had not established the two items claimed as damages and he was entitled to a nominal sum of Rs. 120/- as damages. He further hld that since the recisioil of the contract was wrongful the State was not entitled to forfeit the security deposit nor levy any penalty.\n\nHe accordingly decreed the appellant-plaintiff's claim m respect of refund of security deposits and as regards the amount of Bill No. 1253 dated September 20, 1956 for actual work done he held that a sum of Rs. 5,845/- only would be due to him after giving credit\n\nfor Rs. 4,409/- due from the appellant-plaintiff to the State.\n\nHe accordingly decreed the appellant-plaintiff's suit to the extent of C Rs. 10,901/- with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the date oL\n\nrecision till date of suit and allowed proportionate costs to him.\n\nTwo appeals wre preferred against the aforesaid decree of the trial court, one by the appellant-plaintiff in respect of the claims that had been disallowed (First Appeal No. 245 of 1962) and the other by the State in respect of the claims allowed against it (First App, al No. 844 of 1961). Cnriously enough the High Court did not decide the main issue that arose between the parties, namely, whether time was of the essence of the contract, as it took the view that a decision on that question was really unnecessary for disposal of the appeals.\n\nIl proceeded to decide the appeals on the assumption that time was not of the essence of the contract by considering the question whether the recision of the contract by the State could be regarded as ma!a fide or so unreasonable that it must in the place of the judgment of the officers concerned substitute its own judgment and hold that tho recision was wrongful. The High Court observed that even the appeLantplaintiff had not alleged any mala fide on the part of any of the officers of the State but had pressed into service five or six factors the non-consideration whereof by the rcspondent-defundant rendered !he recision of the contract arbitrary, unreasonable and, therefore, unjusti- fied.\n\nAfter discussing each one of those five or six factors the High Court held that some of them had not been proved by the appellantplaintiff while others did not head to the inference that the recision of the contraci was arbitrary, uilreasonable or unju&tified.\n\nIt found that by about July 21, 1956 (vide Ex. Engineer's letter Ex. 74) the appellant-plaintiff had done only 1/3rd of the contract work and that in the circumstances the appellant-plaintiff could not hav>~ completed the work even within the next three months and, therefore, the respondent's officers had rightly rescinded the contract and, therefore, it was the appellant-plaintiff and not the respondent-defendant who had committed a breach of the contract.\n\nHowever, the High Court took the\n\n17-119 SCI/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R .. ; icw that for such breach on the part of the appellant-plaintiff, the respondent-defendant, on a reading of the els. 2 and 3 of the Condi- , tions of Contract, was not entitled both to levy compensation and also to forfeit the security deposit.\n\nAccordingly, the High Court upheld the forfeiture of the S<Ccurity deposit made by the respondent-defendant and while modifying the trial court's decree it confirmed it only to the extent of Rs. 5,845/-, being the amount due to the appellant-plaintiff for the work actually done by him under BilI No. 1253 and which had not been paid.\n\nIn the result, the appellant-plaintiff's appeal was dismissed and that of the State was partly al1owd with appropriate order of proportionate costs.\n\nIn support of the present appeal counsd for the appellant-plaintifl raised two or three contentions. In the first place he contended that the High Court was in error in not deciding the main issue whether the time was of the essence of the contract or not ? He urged that the said issue could 'no' be avoided in the manner done by the High Court, for, if time was not of the essence of the contract then just before the expiry of the 12 months' period or immediately after its expiry it was up to the respondent-defendant to gtant some reasonable time to the appellant-plaintiff for completing the work undertaken and make U1e same the essence of the contract a'nd only if the work was not completed by the appellant-plaintiff within that time the contract could have beoen rescinded on the gtmrnd that the appel!ant-plaintifi had committed a breach of a contract. According to him such course of action on the part of the respondent-dcfe\"ndant was obligatory, when the initial period of 12 months was not of the essence, especially When the request of the appellant-plaintiff for extension of time was pending\n\nbefore the concerned officers of the Government since before the\n\n- fJ.___ expiry of the initial period.\n\nHe contended that instead of adopting\n\nthe aforesaid course ilie respondent-defendant had without making ,.- time of the essence of the contract rescinded the same with effect from August 16, 1956 by a letter dated Augnst 27, 1956 (Ex. 78), wluch ; ecision must be regarded as wrongful a'nd illegal.\n\nSecondly counsel contended that the High Court further erred in considering the question whether the recision of the contract by the State was either mala fide or wholly unreasonable and, therefore, unjustified.\n\nHe pointed out it was not the appellant-plaintiff's case that the recision was mala fide and, according to him, the question was not whether the recision of the contract on the part of the respondent-defendant was unreasonable, and, therefore, unjustified but whether the respondent-defendant was entitled in law to rescind the contract in the manner done when time was not of the essence of the contract. He further urge<d that the High Court had clearly erred in assuming that the appeUant-plaiBtHl\n\n, .. \"\"\n\nJ; ii\n\n... \\, ..\n\n\"\"' 'r .\n\n+ •\n\n~ (\n\nl!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA 1153 (Tulz.apurkar, !.) could no.t have completed the work even within the next three months and, therefore, the contract was rightly rescinded by the respondentdefendant. He, however, fairly stated that even if this Court held in his favour that the recision was wrongful and, therefore, the respondent-defendant had connnitted a breach he would merely press for th~\n\nrestoration of the decree passed by the trial Court and not press any other item forming the subject-matter of the original claim in the suit.\n\nOn the other hand, counsel for the respondent-defendant sought to support the judgment P.nd decree of the High Court on both the grounds first that time was of the essence of the contract having regard to the express provision contained in cl. (2) of the \"Conditions of Contract\" and, therefoP\", on appellant-plaintiff's failure to complete the san1e \\Vithin the stipulacJ thne the recision of the contract \\Vas legal and justified and secondly, that even if time was not of the essence of the contract, having regard to the circumstances the Hish Court rightly came to the conclusion that the recision of the contrnct by the respondent-defendant could not be regarded as unreasonable or unjustified and that, thernfore, the appellant-plaintiff being in breach the security deposit had been rightly forfeited.\n\nThe first question that arises for our consideration, therefore, is whether time was of the essence of the contract that was executed between the parties on July 12, 1955 (Ex. 34). It cannot be di•puted that question whether or not time was of the essence of the contract would essentially be a question of the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract. The contract in the instant case is for the construction of an aqueduct across the Alandi River at Mile No. 2 of the Nasik Left Bank Canal and unquestionably 12 months' period commencing from the date of the commencemrrt of the work had been specified within which the construction had to b~ completed by the appellant-plaintiff.\n\nIndisputably, in the work order dated July 2, 1955 the Executive Engineer had directed the appellantplaintiff to commence the work by July 5, 1955 intimating in clear terms that the stipulated date for starting the work would be reckoned !i:om July 5, 1955. Both the trial court as well as the High Court have found that mentioning of July 5, 1955 as the date for starting the work was not nominal but was real date intended to be acted upon by the parties.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that 12 months' period mentioned for the completion of the work was to expire on July 4, 1956.\n\nThe question is whether this period of 12 months so specified in the contract was of the essence of !he contract or not ? On the one hand, counsel for the a~JX'.llantplaintiff con~nded that the contract being analogous to a buildmg contract the period of 12 months would not\n\n\" . '\n\nordinarily be of the essence of the contract as the subject-matter there\n\nof was not such as to make completion to time essential, that an agreement to complete it within reasonable time would be implied and that reasonable time for completion would be allowed. On the other hand counsel for the respondent-defendant contended that time had been expressly made of the essence of the contract and in that behalf reliance was placed upon cl. (2) of the \"Conditions of Contract\" where not only time was stated to be of the essence of the contract on the part of the contractor but even for completion of proportionate works specific periods had been specified and, therefore, the appellantplaintiff's failure to complete the work within the stipulated period entitled the respondent-defendant to rescind it. In the latest 4th edn. of Halsbury's Laws of England in regard to building and engineering contracts the statement of law is to be found in Vol. 4, Para 1179, which runs thus :-\n\n\" 1179. Where time is of the essence of the contract.\n\nThe expression time is of the essence means that a breach of the condition as to the time for performance will entitle the innocent party to consider the breach as a repudiation of the contract. Exceptionally, the completion of the work by a specified date may be a condition precedent to the contractor's right to claim payment. The parties may expressly provide that time is of the essence of the contract and where there is power to determine the contract on a failure to complete by the specified date, the stipu1atio'n as to time will be fundamental.\n\nOther provisions of the contract may, on the construction of the contract, exclude an inference that the completion of the works by a particular date is fundamenta~\n\ntime is not of the essence where a sum is payable for each week that the work remains incomplete after the date fixed, nor where the parties contemplate a postponement of completion.\n\nWhere time has not been made of the essence of the contract or, by reason of waiver, the time fixed has ceased to be applicable, the employer may by notice fix a reasonable time for the completion of the work and dismiss the contractor on a failure to complete by the date so fixed.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nH It will be clear from the aforesaid statement of law that even where the parties have expressly provided that time is of the essence of the contract such a stipulation will have to be read along with other\n\nHIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS v. MAHARASHTRA 1155 (Tulzapurkar, J.) provisions of the contract and such other provisions ma.y, on construction of the contract, exclude the inference that the completion -0f the work by a particular date was intended to be fundamentJl, for instance, if the contract were to include causes providing for extension of time in certain contingencies or for payment of fine or penalty for every day or week the work undertaken rel!'ains unfinished on the expiry of the time provided in the contract suLh clauses would be construed as rendering inctiective the express pro~'sion relating to the time being of the essence of contract. The emphas1' 'd portion of the aforesaid statement of law is based on Lamprell v. Billericay\n\nUnion('), Webb v. Hughes(') and Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenheim (3 ). It is in light of the aforesaid position in law that we will have to consider the several clauses of the contract Ex. 34 in the case.\n\nThe material clauses in this behalf are els. 2 and 6 of the \"Conditions of Contract\" which run as follows :\n\n\"Clause 2 :-The time allowed for carrying out the work as entered in the tender shall be strictly observed by the contractor and shall be reckoned from the date on which the order to commence work is given to the contractor.\n\nThe work shall throughout the stipulated period of the contract be proceeded with, with all due diligence (time being deemed to be of the essence of the contract on the part of the contractor) and the contractor shall pay as compensation an amount equal to one per cent or such smaller amount as the Superintending Engineer (whose decision in writing shall be final) may decide, of the amount of the estimated cost of the whole work as shown by the tender for every day that the work remains uncommenced, or unfinished, after the proper dates.\n\nAnd further to ensure good progress during the execution of the work, the. contractor shall be bound, in all cases in which the time allowed for any work exceeds one month, to complete.\n\nt of the work in t of the, time t of the work in t of the time\n\nt of the work in t of the time\" .\n\n\"Cfause 6 :-If the contractor shall desire an extension of the time for completion of the work on the ground of his having been unavoidably hindered in its execution or\n\n(1) [184913 Exch 283 at 308.\n\n(2) [1870] L.R. 10 Eq 281.\n\n(3) [ 1950] l KB 616,\n\n' '\n\non any other ground, he shall apply in writing to the Executive Engineer before the expiry of period stipulated in the tender or before expiry of 30 days from the date on which he was hindered as aforesaid or on which the cause for asking for extension occurred, whichever is earlier and the Executive Engineer, may if in his opinion there arc reasonable grounds for granting an extension, grant such extension as he thinks necessary or proper. The decision of the Executive Engineer in this matter shall be final.\"\n\nTwo aspects emerge very clearly from the aforesaid two clauses, In the first place under cl. 6 power was conferred upon the Executive Engineer to grant extension of time for completion of\n\ne work on reasonable grounds on an application being made by the contractor (appellant•plaintifI) in that behalf; in other words, in certain contingencies parties had contemplated that extension of D time would be available to the contractor.\n\nSuch a provision would clearly be inconsistent with parties intending to treat the stipulated period of 12 months in cl. 2 as fundamental.\n\nSimilarly, in\n\ncl. 2 itself provision was made for levying and recovering penalty I compensation from the appellant-plaintiff at specified rates during the period the work shall remain unfinished after the expiry of the fixed E date.\n\nSuch provision also excludes the inference that time ( 12 months period) was intended to be of the essence of the contract.\n\nFurther with regard to the provision that is to be found in c!. 2 whereunder a time schedule for proportionate work had been set out (namely, t of the work in t of the time, t of the work in t of the time and ! of the work in i of the time ) , the evidence of the F Superintending Engineer Pandit (D.W. 1) is very eloquent. In para 13 of his deposition this is what he has stated :\n\n\"In the agreement (Ex. 3 ~) the rate of work is based on the valuation tth time mentioned means tth in 12 months.\n\nThe suit contract is for Rs. 1,07,000/-.\n\nHh work means the work of about Rs. 27,000/-.\n\nIL is not possible to do the work of Rs. 27,000/- in tth time as the days were rainy.\n\nThis was not reasonable.\"\n\nThe witness in para 12 of his deposition has also given the following , admission :- B \"It is not specifically mentioned in the agreement (Ex. 34), that the suit work was urgent and that it was to be completed within 12 months.\n\nIn this agreement (Ex. 34)\n\nHIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA\n\n1 I 5 7 (Tulzapurkar, l.) there are the clauses of imposing a penalty and extension A of time.\"\n\nHaving regard to the aforesaid material on recor;;, particularly the <:lauses in the agreement pertaining to imposition of penalty and extension of time it seems to us clear that time (12 months period) was never intended by the parties to be of the essence of the contract.\n\nFurther from the correspondence on the record, particularly, the letter (Ex. 78) by , which the contract was rescinded it does appear that the stipulation of 12 months' period was waived, the contractor having been allowed to do some more work after the expiry of the period, albeit at his risk, by making the recision effective from August 16, 1956.\n\nOnce either of the aforesaid conclusions is reached it would be difficult to accept the High Court's finding that the recision of the contract on the part of the respondent-defendant was proper and justified on the basis that the same was neither shown to be mala fide nor unreasonable.\n\nIt must be observed that it was never the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the recision of the contract on the part of the respondent-defendant was ma/a fide. Counsel for the appellantplaintiff further pointed out and, in our view, rightly that the five or six factors, namely, ( 1) the contract having been given at the threshold of monsoon, the period of monsoon ( 4 months) ought not to have been reckoned, (2) absence of proper road and approach to the work site during the rainy season and a couple of months there after, (3) unreasonable rejection by the Government Officers of material brought on the site, which material was later on allowed to be used, ( 4) difficulty in procuring labour due to malarious climate at the site, (5) delay in issuing quarry permit and (6) extra time taken for doing extra work that was entrusted ought to have been taken into account_:_were put forward by the appellant-plaintiff merely for the purpose of showing that the refusal to extend the time by the Superintending Engineer although recommended by the S.D.O. and Executive Engineer was unreasonable and not for showing that the recision of the contract was unreasonable or unjustified. In our view, the question would not be whether the recision of the contract was unreasonable and, therefore, unjustified but whether the recision of the contract in the circumstances of the case was wrongful and illegal.\n\nIf time was not of the essence of the contract or if the stipulation as to the time fixed for completion had, by reason of waiver, ceased to be applicable then the only course open to the, respondent'\n\ndefendant was to fix some time making it the essence and if within the' time so fixed the appellant-plaintiff had failed tr ~.omplete the\n\nSUPREME COURT RHPORT5\n\n[1979 I 2 S.C.R.\n\nwork the respondent-defendant could have rescinded the contract.\n\nThe High Court has taken the view that the contract was rightly rescinded by the. respondent-defendant because by about July 21, 1956 (vide letter Ex. 74). the appellant-plaintiff had done work of the value of Rs. 35,000/- as against the tender value of Rs. 1,07,000/-, that is to say, only I/3rd of the total work had been completed and, therefore, even though time was not of the essence of the contract, the appellant-plaintiff, in the circumstances, could not have completed the work even within the next three months.\n\nIn our view, this approach adopted by the respondent-defendant and upheld by the High Court is not correct.\n\nLong' before the expiry of the period of 12 months the appellant-plaintiff had by his letter dated June 6, 1956 (Ex. 68) requested for extension of period of completion up to the end of December, 1956; this request was repeated by another letter dated June 23, 1956 (Ex. 69). May be the reasons or grounds on which the request was made may not have appealed to the Superintending Engineer but some reasonable time making it the essence ought to have been granted. In this behalf it may be stated that the S.D.O. by his letter (Ex. 69) had recommended extension upto December 1956 as sought while by his letter dated June 23, 1956 (Ex. 70) addressed to the Superintending Engineer, the Executive Engineer had recommended that extension of time up to October 30, 1956 may be granted to the appellant-plaintiff with clear intimation that if he failed to complete the work by then, the maximum penalty allowable under\n\ncl. 2, namely, 10% of the cost of the work will be inflicted on him, but the recommendation did not receive approval of the Superintending Engineer. It appean; that the appellant-plaintiff had an interview with the Superintending Engineer on August 24, 1956 when a written representation (Ex. 99) was handed over and the whole position was sought to be explained to the Superintending Engineer but within three days of the interview by the letter dated August 27, 1956 (Ex.\n\n78) the contract was rescinded and the full security deposit was fof'- feited to Government.\n\nIt will thus appear clear that though time was not of the essence of the contract, the respondent-defendant did not fix any further period making time the essence directing the appellant-plaintiff to complete the work within such period; instead it nscinded the contract straightaway by letter dated August 27, 1956.\n\nSuch recision on the part of the respondent-defendant was clearly illegal and wrongful and thereby the respondent-defendant committed a breach of contract, with the result that there could be no forfeiture of the security deposit. In our view, therefore, the trial court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to a rdund of their full security deposit of Rs. 4,936/- as also\n\n' '\n\n.. _ .,_, HIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA • 1159 (Tulzapurkar, J.) to Rs. 5845/- being the balance of their Bill No. 1253 dated September 20, 1956 for work actually done by them and not paid for and nominal damages of Rs. 120/-. The appellant-plaintiff was also entitled to interest on the aforesaid sums and costs of suit as directed by the trial court.\n\nIn the result we allow the appeal, set aside the common judgment B and decree in F.A. No. 844 of 1961 passed by the High Court and rnstore that of the trial court. The appellant-plaintiff will get costs of this appeal as also costs of F.A. No. 844 of 1961. The High Court's decree dismissing F.A. No. 245 of 1962 is confirmed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "HIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. 0. TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN,\n\nJJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 l57D-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5116, "end_char": 5130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, J. S. Sinha and K. J. John for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "J. S. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, J. S. Sinha and K. J. John for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, J. S. Sinha and K. J. John for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, B. V. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "B. V. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5194, "end_char": 5205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, B. V. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5210, "end_char": 5222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, B. V. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay are directed against that Court's common judgment and decree dated September 9/10, 1968, passed in two cross appeals being First Appeal Nos.", "canonical_name": "TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5360, "end_char": 5394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay are directed against that Court's common judgment and decree dated September 9/10, 1968, passed in two cross appeals being First Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "I!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5588, "end_char": 5633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA 114 9 (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nA contract for the construction of an aqueduct across the Alandi River at Mile No.", "canonical_name": "I!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5641, "end_char": 5652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA 114 9 (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nA contract for the construction of an aqueduct across the Alandi River at Mile No.", "canonical_name": "TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5955, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,07 ,000 /- was granted to the appellant-plaintiff (originally a partnership but later a proprietary firm of contractors) by the respondent-defendant (the State of Maharashtra) after the farmer's tender was accepted on June 17, 1955."}}, {"text": "June 17, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6019, "end_char": 6032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,07 ,000 /- was granted to the appellant-plaintiff (originally a partnership but later a proprietary firm of contractors) by the respondent-defendant (the State of Maharashtra) after the farmer's tender was accepted on June 17, 1955."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6038, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1955 the Executive Engineer issned the work order to the appellant-plaintiff directing him to commence the work by July 5, 1955 intimatihg in clear terms that the stipulated date for starting the work would be reckoned from July 5, 1955."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6161, "end_char": 6173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1955 the Executive Engineer issned the work order to the appellant-plaintiff directing him to commence the work by July 5, 1955 intimatihg in clear terms that the stipulated date for starting the work would be reckoned from July 5, 1955."}}, {"text": "July 12,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was executed by the parties on July 12,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "August 16,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7017, "end_char": 7033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78) rescinded the said contract with effect from August 16,\n\n1956."}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7065, "end_char": 7070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7182, "end_char": 7197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 of\n\n1959) on August 28, 1959 in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nasik making a claim for Rs."}}, {"text": "Court of the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nasik", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 of\n\n1959) on August 28, 1959 in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nasik making a claim for Rs."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9472, "end_char": 9492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Maharashtra resisted the claim contending that time was of the essence of the contract, that the date fixed for commencement was real and not nominal and the 12 months period was fixed after all aspects of the matter had been taken into account, it was further contended that the appellant-plaintiff knew the situation of the site and the so-called difficulties, that there was no excuse for him for not doing the work during the months of July to November, that the appellant-plaintiff failed to carry out the proportionate work during the periods fixed in the contract and that since the appellant-plaintifl had rendered himself incompetent to complete the work in proper time it had to rescind the contract and the recision was proper a'nd fo1 adequate reasons; it was further contended that the State was entitled to forfeit the security deposit which it did on the date when the contract was rescinded."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10813, "end_char": 10831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1253 dated September 20, 1956 for the actual work done, it was contended that the State had to deduct the amount of penalty leviable under the contract and for th~ actual cement supplied to the appellant-plaintiff and after making deductions in that behalf only a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14098, "end_char": 14111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It found that by about July 21, 1956 (vide Ex."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19169, "end_char": 19182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first question that arises for our consideration, therefore, is whether time was of the essence of the contract that was executed between the parties on July 12, 1955 (Ex."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20290, "end_char": 20302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, clear that 12 months' period mentioned for the completion of the work was to expire on July 4, 1956."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21438, "end_char": 21445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Halsbury's Laws of England in regard to building and engineering contracts the statement of law is to be found in Vol."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24121, "end_char": 24129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26039, "end_char": 26044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26500, "end_char": 26505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26538, "end_char": 26543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pandit", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27173, "end_char": 27179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the work in i of the time ) , the evidence of the F Superintending Engineer Pandit (D.W. 1) is very eloquent."}}, {"text": "HIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27841, "end_char": 27885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34)\n\nHIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA\n\n1 I 5 7 (Tulzapurkar, l.) there are the clauses of imposing a penalty and extension A of time.\"", "canonical_name": "I!IND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27896, "end_char": 27907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34)\n\nHIND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS V. MAHARASHTRA\n\n1 I 5 7 (Tulzapurkar, l.) there are the clauses of imposing a penalty and extension A of time.\""}}, {"text": "August 16, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28594, "end_char": 28609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78) by , which the contract was rescinded it does appear that the stipulation of 12 months' period was waived, the contractor having been allowed to do some more work after the expiry of the period, albeit at his risk, by making the recision effective from August 16, 1956."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31642, "end_char": 31655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68) requested for extension of period of completion up to the end of December, 1956; this request was repeated by another letter dated June 23, 1956 (Ex."}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32305, "end_char": 32310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 24, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32547, "end_char": 32562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appean; that the appellant-plaintiff had an interview with the Superintending Engineer on August 24, 1956 when a written representation (Ex."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32758, "end_char": 32773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "99) was handed over and the whole position was sought to be explained to the Superintending Engineer but within three days of the interview by the letter dated August 27, 1956 (Ex."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1160_1170_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "I 160\n\nSEY ANTILAL KARSONDAS MODI\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANOTHER\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nEvidence Act 1872 (I of 1872)-S. 24--Accused alleged that ht wa• a5saufrl'd by Custo1::s Officials-No direct cvide1cc available-Surrounding circ111n.\\ttt1:ce'I-lj could be taken into accou11t--Cuu11ns Officials lvhether person in t111thori!y- -Confrssion made to customs official~· if adfnis.ibfe in evidence.\n\nOn receipt of information that smuggled gold was stored in it. a large num- C ber of senior officials of the Customs Department surrounded the flat belonging to the brother-in-la\\V of the appellant and started searching it.\n\nAccording to the prosecution, while the search was on, the appellant was found peeping from outside through the grille forming part of the flat, and started running away, on seeing that the search was being carried on in the flat.\n\nHe was chased by the Customs Staff and caught.\n\nLater his confession was recorded.\n\nAlong with the appe11ant several other' persons had also been tried for the D same offence.\n\nThetrial court convicted and ientenced the appellant of an offence under s. 120B !PC read with s. 135 (I )(a) of the Customs Act.\n\nOn appeal the High Court found that the charge under s.135(l)(a) and\n\n(b) of the Customs Act was not sustainable bl1t holding that the offence under other heads \\V<J~ proved, it upheld the appell:>nt's conviction and sentence.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appel1111t lhat the. confession \\Vas the result E of an asault on him by the Custon1s Officials, which not being voluntary. wa~ inadmissible in evidence under s. 24 of the Evidence Act\n\nA11owing the appeal.\n\nHELD : 1. (i) It is unsafe to regard the appellant's confession as voluntary ~ and therefore trustworthy.\n\nThe concerned Customs Officials were \"persons in authOrity\" wvithin the meaning of that expression used in s. 24 of the Evidence\n\nF Act.\n\nThe confession may well have been obtained in a manner which \\vould ..... bring it within the ambit of s. 24 of the Evidence Act.\n\nThe appellant has been able to prove the existence of circumstances which make it highly prob able that his confession is hit by the mand'.!te in section 24. [1169H-l 170A,\n\nI 166CJ\n\n(ii) Although there is no direct evidence that force was used on the appel- G lant to extract a confession the surrounding circumstances prevalent at the relevant tin1e in the Customs House where the statement was recorded indicate that all was not well with the manner in \\vhich the interrogation of variou, accused was being ca, rried on.\n\nThey indicate that the Customs Officials did not stick to ethical standards in the performance of their duties and exhibited nluch zeal in bringing the captives to book and had transgresed the limit sc1 bv low. fl I 66E, 116?Bl H\n\n(iii) One of the accused in this case was found to have seven injuries on his person. The stand of that accused that he was coerced into making a confession. received support from the testimony of the doctor who examined\n\nhim so that the probo.bility appears to be that the accused received his injuriel' on the hands of the Customs staff. In the absence of an explanation of the prosecution as to the situation in which he was beaten, it is reasoooble to presume that the stand taken by him was correct and that the injuries were inflicted a! a measure of coercion adopted to secure his confession. Taking these circumstances intc consideration, it is unsafe to re:gard the appellants confession too as voiuntnry.\n\n[1166F. 1168C, 1169G]\n\nBesides, the plea that he had been coerced into making the confession was taken at the earliest opportunity i.e. on the day following his release from custo<lv en 1.,.;]. fl 169Dl\n\n2. Being a close relation of the owner of the fl.at, the Clppellant was perhaps sharing the flat \\Vith him _and so had duplioote set of keys; his brother-in-law might have given the Bandi found on the appellant not for the purpose of carrying the gold but just for use as an ordinary raiment.\n\nIt is also possible that the appellant became nervous, that he thought that he would be implicated in the crime and therefore, might have started running away on seeing the Customs Officers in the house.\n\nTherefore, these factors on which the High Court relied for sustaining his conviction cannot be regarded as incriminating\n\ncircumstances. [l 165F-1166A]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 196 D of 1973.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 7-8 1973 of the Bombay High Court in Crimi\"nai Appeal No. 222 of 1970.\n\nS. B. Bhasme, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwi,/a for the Appel- E !ant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, M. N. Shroff, Mrs. Hemanlaika Wald for the Respondent No. 1.\n\nR. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosnAL, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 7th August 1973 of the Bombay High Court upholding the conviction of Scvantilal Karsondas Modi (the sole appellant be!ore us) for an offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal C.ode read with clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 135 cif the Customs Act 1962, and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a year recorded by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.\n\n2. The appellant was one of 30 accused persons against whom\n\n, the police initiated proceedings in the court of the trial Magisirate.\n\nOut of them, accused Nos. 28 to 30 were not tried as they had absconded and could not be apprehended.\n\nThe case against accused ff Nos. 18 and 19 was allowed to be withdrawn by the learned Magis- • trate on an application made by the Public Prosecutor under section\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [!9i''-JJ 2 s.c.it.\n\n494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accused Nos. 14, 24, 25, 26 and 27 were discharged by the learned Magistrate for want of evidence against them.\n\nCharges were framed by him on l 0 counts against the other 20 accused who were tried in consequence. At the trial, 266 witnesses were examined in support of the prosecution case and 6 in defence.\n\nAccused Nos. 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17 and 20 were acquitted as a result of the trial, while 13 of those charged were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.\n\nAll the 13 last mentioned went up in appeal to the High Court who acquitted accused Nos. 1, 21, 22 and 23.\n\nAccused No. 13 happens to be the\n\nappllant before us. He was convicted and sentenced by the learned Magistrate as aforesaid and also on a separate charge for an offence, under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 135 of the Customs Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months in consequence. His conviction on that charge, however, was set aside by the High Court, against whose judgment, as already stated, special leave to appeal was granted to him by this Court.\n\n3. The prosecution case in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this appeal may be briefly stated.\n\nV. K. Asthana, (P.W. 228) who was then the Deputy Director in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in the Department of Customs at Bombay and is hereinafter referred to as 'Asthana', received information in the first half of September 1966 to the effect that flat No. 2 forming part of the building known as Sagar Mandir and situated in that locality of Bombay which is called 'Shivaji Park' was being used for storage of smuggled gold\n\n' _}\n\nand disbursement thereof to its purchasers.\n\nAfter the fiat had been ...... kept under watch for a few days by some officials of the Department, a decision was taken by Asthana to raid the premises.\n\nThe raiding party which consisted of senior Customs officers, took positions in the vicinity of Sagar Mandir on the morning of 14th September 1966.\n\nThey included B.M. Sevalia, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 7 and hereinafter referred to as 'Sevalia'), G. N. Alreja, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 34 and hereinafter mentioned as 'Alreja), P. G. N. Ayengar, Appraiser in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (P.W. 144 and hereinafter called 'Ayengar') and D. G. Mugwe, Principal Appraiser in the said Directorate (P.W. 152 and hereinafter referred to as 'Mugwe'). Sevalia was deputed to watch the movements of persons entering the flat and to give a signal on the arrival of the suspects. At about 8.50 AM., accused No. 12 was seen entering the fiat and Sevlalia alerted the other members of the raiding party by giving the agreed signal.\n\nHalf an hour later, a car stopped at the entrance to the compound of the building and\n\n:il\n\n•\\ •• _,\n\naccused Nos. 5, G and 7 alighted therefrom.\n\nAccused No. 5 went towards the concerned flat but got suspicious on noticing the presence of strangers near the entrance.\n\nHe turned back and so did his two companions. All three of them took to their heels but were caught by the raiding party on a direction by Mugwe. Accused No. 12 was found inside the flat.\n\nThe person of each one of accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7 was searched and yielded 200 slabs of gold weighing 10 tolas each.\n\nAll the slabs bore foreign markings and were contained in jackets having long pockets and worn by each of the captives. Bunches of keys exhibits K-4, K-5 and K-6 and a diary containing accounts exhibit 'O' were found lying in the passage forrning part of the flat . .( Bandi exhibit J.-2 was secured from a room of the flat.\n\nA search of -4___ the person of accused No. 12 yielded keys exhibit K-2, which fitted the locks used in the fiat, and sheets of accounts exhibit 'S'.\n\nWhile the search was going on, accused No. 13 was found peeping from outside through a grille forming part of the fiat but started running away on seeing what was happening inside. He was chased and captured and two keys were seized from his person. One of them was found to fit the lock on the outer door of the flat and the other to fit the latch therein.\n\nHe was also found wearing a bandi similar to bandi exhibit J-2.\n\nAt his instance four slabs of gold and 10 gold bangles, each weighing 10 tolas, were recovered from underneath the mattress lying on a bed in the flat.\n\nAcc\\1Sed Nos. 5 to 7 and 13 were interrogated by the Customs officials. The statement of accused No. 13 exhibit Z.-383 was recorded by Ayengar on the 15th of September 1966. In that statement,\n\n- the appellant gave an exhaustive account of the circumstances in which he happened to come to Bombay and made his services avail- F + able to the principal accused named J. K. Shah. The long and short of the fitatement may be summarised thus :\n\nOne day J. K. Shah called accused No. 13, gave him some cloth and sent him in the company of one Goverdhan\n\n.,.\n\nDa~ to have the cloth tailored into bandis of a special type G having two wide and long pockets in the front.\n\nThe cloth supplied was thick and strong. A few days after the bandis\n\n~ were ready, accused No. 13 was taken to the flat in ques- ,, tion by his sister's husband, named Natwarlal (accused No.\n\n12) or by accused No. 15. Thereafter accused No. 13 visited the fiat several times when he would receive bandis R containing gold brought from outside and store them in the fiat or would remove such bandis from the fiat to other\n\nplaces in town. l K Shah had given him keys of the flat.\n\nWhatever gold was removed by him from the flat, was either deposited by him in a room on the second floor of a building situated in Modi Street or delivered to J. K Shah in the latter's office on the 3rd floor of building No. 111 situated in Tambakanta. The room in Modi Street had a telephone the number whereof was 262283 and a key of this room was supplied to him by J, K Shah.\n\nHe used to receive orders either from J, K Shah or from accused No. 15 to go to the flat in Sagar Mandir and receive the gold there.\n\nHe received gold in this way on the 12th and 13th of September 1966.\n\nOn the day of his capture he was in the room in Modi Street when he received a telephone call from J. K Shah at 11 or 11.15 AM. requiring him to to visit the flat in Sagar Mandir and find out if any trouble was brewing and that if that was so, J, K Shah was to be informed on the telephone.\n\nAccused No. 13 rushed to Sagar Mandir in a taxi and tried to find out from outside if there was anything wrong. For that purpose he looked through a broken ventilator.\n\nWhile he was coming towards the road on the beach nearby he was detained and was taken inside the building.\n\nWhile the above statement was being recorded, accused Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were identified by accused No. 13 as the persons from whom he used to receive gold at Sagar Mandir.\n\n4. The evidence relied upon by the prosecution against accused No. 13 may be split up under the following heads : _ ~\n\n(a) He was seen visiting the flat in Sagar Mandir on the 8th, 9th and 13th September 1966 by the Customs officials who were watching the premises under the orders of Mugwe.\n\n(b) He was peeping into flat No, 13 between 11 AM. and 12 noon on the 14th of September 1966.\n\n(c) When he found that the flat was under search by officers belonging -to the Customs Department, he tried to run away.\n\n(d) He was found in possession of keys fitting the locks of the flat\n\n(e) He was wearing a bandi similar to bandi exhibit J-2 which is a special type of bandi suitable for carrying gold slabs secretly.\n\ns. K. MOD! v. MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, J.) l l 65\n\n( f) 4 slabs of gold and 10 gold bangles were recov1rd from A underneath the mattress at his instance .\n\n(g) The confession made by him and contained in statement exhibit Z-383 .\n\nThe learned trial Magistrate found all the above heads to have been established and that is why he convicted and sentenced accused No.13 on two counts.\n\nThe High Court took a different view in relation to beads (a) and (f). It was of the opinion that the identification of accused No.13 by the Customs officials on the 8th, 9th and 13th of ( September 1966 could not safely be relied upon. as they had seen people ..__. coming into and going out the Sagar Mandir only from a distance and for very short periods of time so that their view of such people could p00>sibly be mere \"fleeting glances\". It farther held the alleged recovery of four gold slabs and I 0 gold bangles to be unreliable as the marginal witness to the recovery memo who was produced in court by the prosecution did not support it and stated that he had not seen accused No.13 pointing out the slabs and the bangles. The High Court concluded therefore that the charge under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 135 of the Customs Act was not sustainable.\n\nHowever it found the other heads ot evidence proved and\n\n-011 the basis thereof upheld the conviction and sentence in relation to the charge of conspiracy to commit the other offences just above described.\n\n5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length we find .ourselves unable to uphold the impugned judgment in so far as accus-\n\n-~- - ed No.13 is cOllcerned.\n\nThe circumstances that he was found peeping into the fiat. that he tried to run away on seeing the Customs officials searching the premises, that he was in possession of duplicate keys of the fiat and that he was found wearing a bandi similar to bandi exhibit J-2 are not incompatible with his innocence.\n\nHe was _a close relation of accused No.12 who has been found to be the person really incharge of the flat and it would thus be natural for him (accused No.13) to share the flat with the permission of accused No.12.\n\nIn so living with his brother-in-law he may have been given lo wear the bandi found on his person not for the purpose of carrying gold but just for use as ordinary raiment.\n\nAgain, in a city like Bombay it is not unusual for persons sharing a particular accommodation to be provided with separate sets of keys for each in order to facilitate ingress or egress at will.\n\nFurther, an innocent man finding his premises being watched by persons in authority may well feel funky at the prospect of a false implication on the basis of a mere\n\nsusp1c1on (which may or may not be well-founded and may try to make himself scarce.\n\nWithout more, the circumstances covered by heads (b), (c), (d), and (e), therefore, cannot be regarded as incriminating circumstances.\n\nSo the conviction really rests on the confession attributed to the appellant. If it is found to be voluntary and true it may receive some support from the four heads of evidence just above described.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the confession .appears to be either untrue in any material particular or having been caused by any inducement, threat or promise such as is described in section 24 of the Evidence Act, it must fall and with it fall the other heads of evidence, leaving no material to support the conviction.\n\nAs it is, we find that the appellant has been able to prove the existence of circumstances which make it highly probable that his confession is hit by the mandate in section 24 abovementioned.\n\nOur reasons for C9Jll.- ing to this conclusion follow.\n\n6. The case set up by accused No.13 in so far as his confession is concerned, mainly consists of a plea that it was the result of an assault on him by the Customs officers including Ayengar and Sevalia and that the latter had forced him into making an endorsement in his own hand-writing under the confessional statement to the effect that that statement was voluntary and had been explained to him by Sevalia.\n\nNaturally, the story of the assault has been stoutly denied by Ayengar and Sevalia; but then the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time in the Customs House where the statement was recorded definitely indicate that all was not well with the manner in which the interrogation of various accused was being carried on. In this connection the outstanding feature of the situation is the fact that accused No. 15 . when examffied by Dr. S. R. Joglekar (D.W.I.) on the 16th September 1966 at 6.15 P.M. was found to have on his person seven injuries which the doctor has described thus:\n\n\"(1) Ecchymosis below right eye, outer part, l/2\"Xl/3\",\n\nblackish colour.\n\n(2) Ecchymosis below left eye, middle, 1/4\"Xl/4\", blackish colour.\n\n(3) diffused contused area, 2t\"X3'', on right thigh, upper part.\n\n( 4) Contused area on right buttock, 3\" x 2\", lower part, wheal (?) marks seen.\n\n(5) Diffused contused area on left thigh, back and outer part,\n\n5\" X 2\", wheal (?) marks seen transverse.\n\n(6) Transverse wheal ('I) marks on back of left knee.\n\n(7) Contused area on back of left leg, 2\" X 1\".\n\nAccording to the doctor, these injuries appeared to have been caused two to four days earlier.\n\nAdmittedly accused No.15 was apprehended by the Customs staff on the 14th September 1966.\n\nNt> explaination whatsoever is offered for his injuries by the prosecution but the stand taken by accused No.15 himself in this behalf may be stated in his own words\n\n\"At that time, there were six Customs Officers around me.\n\nIn the gallery, I was again shown the 4 keys.\n\nI was again asked about the said keys and I had again given the same reply.\n\nThe said officers on hearing this, get enraged and began to say that I was stating falsehoods.\n\nOne of the officers then asked me to take out my clothes.\n\nI had then worn one under wear and a pant and one bush-coat and a ganji.\n\nI was then asked to remove -my pant as well as my undr.rwear by the said officer and I did so accordingly against my will. That officer then ordered me to sit in the position of \"a chair\".\n\nI was so asked to sit like a chair without the support of a wall even to my back.\n\nThe six officers were then standing around me at that time.\n\nAfter making me to sit in that chair position they began to ask me about the said keys.\n\nI had again °iven the same reply about the said keys.\n\nIf I moved a littk 'rom the position of achair given to me, I was kicked by 11 tJir offi.cers immediately. I was able to sit in that posifor for 4-5 minutes. I used to fall down thereafter.\n\nI used tr te kicked therefor, made to stand again and asked to resur• 'he same position.\n\nIn this way, I had fal!en and had bee,, . ulted again and again by the said officers for about an hour or so. While I.was\n\nso being questioned and made to sit in that position again and again, one of the officers had gone out and had returned with a ruler in hand having a round shape.\n\nAs I was made to sit in that position of a chair, I often used to move therefrom, the officers immediately used to assault me and I used to get up thereby.\n\nOut of the Custom Officers the officer who had the ruler in his hand used w assault me therewith and the other officers used to assault me with kicks.\n\nI had b_een assaulted with that ruler on my left buttock, on my nght buttoc~, on t_he back PNtion of the calf of my left, leg, on my nght thigh, 0n the backside of my both legs etc Js .... 119 SC!/79 .\n\nI had received injuries at all these places stateµ by me above and as a result of this assault on me, I could not even stand up.\n\nThroughout the assault; I was being questioned again and again about the said keys by all the said officer& and at every time I was stating that I did not know anything more about the same.\n\nThereafter I had fallen down on the ground with my face towards the ground.\n\nAll the said six officers then went away.\" This stand may not be devoid of exaggeration and embellishment but it receives great support from the testimony of Dr.\n\nJoglekar (D.W.I.) so that the probability appears to be that accused No.15 received his injuries at the hands of the Customs staff and there being no explaination on the part of prosecution as to the situation in which he was beaten, it is reasonable to presume that the stand taken by him is correct and that the injuries were inflicted on him as a measure of coercion adopted to secure his confession.\n\nIn coming to a contrary conclusion, the High Court was mainly influenced by the fact that although accused No.,15 had filed a complaint in court against the concerned officers of the Department of Customs, he did not prosecute it but had it dismissed for default. The High Court observed in this connection:\n\n\"The only explanation for this unusual attitud~ offered by him to the Court is that he was afraid of vindicative attitude from the officers.\n\nWe have not been able to conceive how officers could have adopted any vindicative attitude, when accused No.15 was not concerned with any offence ..\n\nBe that as it may, the fact remains that the complaint was not prosecuted and the evidence was recorded behind the back of the officers.\n\nIt is not possible to hold on the present material that assaulting by the officers was for the pur- . poses of extorting some confession and such assault alone was the cause of the injuries received by him.\n\nBeyond. therefore, creating a fog of suspicion, the injuries proved to have been caused to accused No. 15, cannot indicate that all the accused were subjected to torture, assault and pressure for giving statements to the liking of officers or compelling them to sign the prepared statements.\" We do not appreciate this approach to the determination of the voluntary nature of the confession of accused No.15.\n\nAs we have already pointed out, the time of infliction of injuries coincided with the day on which accused No.15 was apprehended and his confession was recorded.\n\nIn this situation it was the imperative duty of the\n\n.,, fli ' ,.\n\nI '\n\n~ • ' • \"\n\n.J- • • ->/\n\n~ 1-· ii\n\n... s. K. MODI v. MAHARASHTRA (Kosnal, J.) 1169\n\nprosecution to explain the circumstances in which it became necessary for force to be used by the Customs staff on the person of accused No. 15 and in the absence of any such explanation there is no reasoh why his plea should not be taken at its face value.\n\n7. We are of course not directly concerned with the voluntary nature of the confession of accused No.15 in this appeal butw the circumstances discussed in the last paragraph indicate that the Custom officials did not stick to ethical standards in the performance of their .duties and, on the other hand, exhibited such a zeal in bringing the ' . --\".captives to book as transgressed the limits set thereon by law.\n\nWe llave already alluded to the fact that tl1e High Court itself did not regard the recovery of four gold slabs and 10 gold bangles alleged to\n\nlfhave been made at the instance of accused _No.13 to be trustworthy.\n\nBesides, the plea of accused No.13 that he was coerced into making the confession was taken at the earliest opportunity, i.e., on the 20th of September 1966 which was the day next to that of his release from custody on bail.\n\nThat plea is contained in letter exhibit 29 addressed by him on that date to the Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay, which contained the following averments:-\n\n\"From the 14th instant at 12 noon till about 3 p.m. I was locked up along in one room with some Customs Officers wjjp continuously interrogated me, threatened and physically ... uited me to make and sign a statement prepared by them after ascertaining a few personal questions from me pertaining to my family and myself.\n\nI was not allowed to sleep during the entire night of the 14th/15th and was not allowed to see any person.\n\nThe statement was written out by the officers themselves in English language and it was not explained to me and my signature was obtained which I have signed in Gujarathi.\n\nAs a result of this threat, coercion and complete exhaustion, I had no alternative but to sign the statement after which only I was allowed\n\n(o rest.\"\n\nTaking note of these circumstances we would consider it extremely\n\n.i unsafe to regard the confession exhibit Z-383 signed by the appellant as having been made by him voluntarily and therefore trustworthy.\n\nThe appellant, in our opinion, has shown the existence of circumstan- H ces which make it appear to the Court that the confession may well \" have been obtained in a manner which would bring it within the ambit\n\nA of section 24 of the Evidence Act, it being undisputed that the concerned officers of the Department of Customs were \"persons in authrity\" within the meaning of that expression as used in the section.\n\n8. In the result the appeal succeeds and is accepted.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court is reversed, the conviction recorded against B and the sentence imposed upon the appellant by the learned trial Magi'\\frate and upheld by the High Court are set aside and he is 2cauitted of the charge in i, s enlirely.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal a.Uowed.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "160\n\nSEY ANTILAL KARSONDAS MODI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SEVANTILAL KARSONDAS MODI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 160\n\nSEY ANTILAL KARSONDAS MODI\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANOTHER\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Evidence Act 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1149, "end_char": 1156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1171, "end_char": 1177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1193, "end_char": 1204, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.135(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1260, "end_char": 1271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1288, "end_char": 1299, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1891, "end_char": 1896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2025, "end_char": 2030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. B. Bhasme", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4582, "end_char": 4594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Bhasme, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwi,/a for the Appel- E !"}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4596, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Bhasme, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwi,/a for the Appel- E !"}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwi,/a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4614, "end_char": 4629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Bhasme, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwi,/a for the Appel- E !"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, M. N. Shroff, Mrs. Hemanlaika Wald for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4672, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, M. N. Shroff, Mrs. Hemanlaika Wald for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hemanlaika Wald", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, M. N. Shroff, Mrs. Hemanlaika Wald for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4734, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KosnAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4816, "end_char": 4822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosnAL, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 7th August 1973 of the Bombay High Court upholding the conviction of Scvantilal Karsondas Modi (the sole appellant be!ore us) for an offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal C.ode read with clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 135 cif the Customs Act 1962, and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a year recorded by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Scvantilal Karsondas Modi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosnAL, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 7th August 1973 of the Bombay High Court upholding the conviction of Scvantilal Karsondas Modi (the sole appellant be!ore us) for an offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal C.ode read with clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 135 cif the Customs Act 1962, and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a year recorded by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5154, "end_char": 5170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5733, "end_char": 5759, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6600, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V. K. Asthana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6953, "end_char": 6966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. Asthana, (P.W. 228) who was then the Deputy Director in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in the Department of Customs at Bombay and is hereinafter referred to as 'Asthana', received information in the first half of September 1966 to the effect that flat No."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. Asthana, (P.W. 228) who was then the Deputy Director in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in the Department of Customs at Bombay and is hereinafter referred to as 'Asthana', received information in the first half of September 1966 to the effect that flat No."}}, {"text": "Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7568, "end_char": 7575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the fiat had been ...... kept under watch for a few days by some officials of the Department, a decision was taken by Asthana to raid the premises."}}, {"text": "14th September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7726, "end_char": 7745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The raiding party which consisted of senior Customs officers, took positions in the vicinity of Sagar Mandir on the morning of 14th September 1966."}}, {"text": "B.M. Sevalia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They included B.M. Sevalia, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 7 and hereinafter referred to as 'Sevalia'), G. N. Alreja, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 34 and hereinafter mentioned as 'Alreja), P. G. N. Ayengar, Appraiser in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (P.W. 144 and hereinafter called 'Ayengar') and D. G. Mugwe, Principal Appraiser in the said Directorate (P.W. 152 and hereinafter referred to as 'Mugwe')."}}, {"text": "G. N. Alreja", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7862, "end_char": 7874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They included B.M. Sevalia, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 7 and hereinafter referred to as 'Sevalia'), G. N. Alreja, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 34 and hereinafter mentioned as 'Alreja), P. G. N. Ayengar, Appraiser in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (P.W. 144 and hereinafter called 'Ayengar') and D. G. Mugwe, Principal Appraiser in the said Directorate (P.W. 152 and hereinafter referred to as 'Mugwe')."}}, {"text": "P. G. N. Ayengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7959, "end_char": 7975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They included B.M. Sevalia, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 7 and hereinafter referred to as 'Sevalia'), G. N. Alreja, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 34 and hereinafter mentioned as 'Alreja), P. G. N. Ayengar, Appraiser in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (P.W. 144 and hereinafter called 'Ayengar') and D. G. Mugwe, Principal Appraiser in the said Directorate (P.W. 152 and hereinafter referred to as 'Mugwe')."}}, {"text": "Directorate of Revenue Intelligence", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 8029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They included B.M. Sevalia, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 7 and hereinafter referred to as 'Sevalia'), G. N. Alreja, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 34 and hereinafter mentioned as 'Alreja), P. G. N. Ayengar, Appraiser in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (P.W. 144 and hereinafter called 'Ayengar') and D. G. Mugwe, Principal Appraiser in the said Directorate (P.W. 152 and hereinafter referred to as 'Mugwe')."}}, {"text": "D. G. Mugwe", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8078, "end_char": 8089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They included B.M. Sevalia, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 7 and hereinafter referred to as 'Sevalia'), G. N. Alreja, Preventive Officer, Bombay Customs (P.W. 34 and hereinafter mentioned as 'Alreja), P. G. N. Ayengar, Appraiser in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (P.W. 144 and hereinafter called 'Ayengar') and D. G. Mugwe, Principal Appraiser in the said Directorate (P.W. 152 and hereinafter referred to as 'Mugwe')."}}, {"text": "Sevalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sevalia was deputed to watch the movements of persons entering the flat and to give a signal on the arrival of the suspects.", "canonical_name": "Sevlalia"}}, {"text": "Sevlalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8376, "end_char": 8384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 was seen entering the fiat and Sevlalia alerted the other members of the raiding party by giving the agreed signal.", "canonical_name": "Sevlalia"}}, {"text": "Mugwe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8871, "end_char": 8876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three of them took to their heels but were caught by the raiding party on a direction by Mugwe."}}, {"text": "Ayengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 exhibit Z.-383 was recorded by Ayengar on the 15th of September 1966."}}, {"text": "15th of September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10243, "end_char": 10265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 exhibit Z.-383 was recorded by Ayengar on the 15th of September 1966."}}, {"text": "J. K. Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10459, "end_char": 10469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that statement,\nthe appellant gave an exhaustive account of the circumstances in which he happened to come to Bombay and made his services avail- F + able to the principal accused named J. K. Shah.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Shah"}}, {"text": "Goverdhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10631, "end_char": 10640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13, gave him some cloth and sent him in the company of one Goverdhan\n\n.,."}}, {"text": "Natwarlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10927, "end_char": 10936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 was taken to the flat in ques- ,, tion by his sister's husband, named Natwarlal (accused No."}}, {"text": "l K Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11197, "end_char": 11205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l K Shah had given him keys of the flat."}}, {"text": "J. K Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11399, "end_char": 11408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever gold was removed by him from the flat, was either deposited by him in a room on the second floor of a building situated in Modi Street or delivered to J. K Shah in the latter's office on the 3rd floor of building No.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Shah"}}, {"text": "Tambakanta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11481, "end_char": 11491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111 situated in Tambakanta."}}, {"text": "J, K Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11609, "end_char": 11618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The room in Modi Street had a telephone the number whereof was 262283 and a key of this room was supplied to him by J, K Shah.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Shah"}}, {"text": "12th and 13th of September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11791, "end_char": 11822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He received gold in this way on the 12th and 13th of September 1966."}}, {"text": "8th, 9th and 13th September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 may be split up under the following heads : _ ~\n\n(a) He was seen visiting the flat in Sagar Mandir on the 8th, 9th and 13th September 1966 by the Customs officials who were watching the premises under the orders of Mugwe."}}, {"text": "14th of September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12935, "end_char": 12957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 12 noon on the 14th of September 1966."}}, {"text": "8th, 9th and 13th of ( September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13831, "end_char": 13868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was of the opinion that the identification of accused No.13 by the Customs officials on the 8th, 9th and 13th of ( September 1966 could not safely be relied upon."}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14497, "end_char": 14508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14516, "end_char": 14527, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16584, "end_char": 16594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16889, "end_char": 16899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. R. Joglekar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17824, "end_char": 17838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when examffied by Dr. S. R. Joglekar (D.W.I.) on the 16th September 1966 at 6.15 P.M. was found to have on his person seven injuries which the doctor has described thus:\n\n\"(1) Ecchymosis below right eye, outer part, l/2\"Xl/3\",\n\nblackish colour."}}, {"text": "16th September 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17855, "end_char": 17874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when examffied by Dr. S. R. Joglekar (D.W.I.) on the 16th September 1966 at 6.15 P.M. was found to have on his person seven injuries which the doctor has described thus:\n\n\"(1) Ecchymosis below right eye, outer part, l/2\"Xl/3\",\n\nblackish colour."}}, {"text": "Joglekar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21359, "end_char": 21367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This stand may not be devoid of exaggeration and embellishment but it receives great support from the testimony of Dr.\n\nJoglekar (D.W.I.) so that the probability appears to be that accused No.15 received his injuries at the hands of the Customs staff and there being no explaination on the part of prosecution as to the situation in which he was beaten, it is reasonable to presume that the stand taken by him is correct and that the injuries were inflicted on him as a measure of coercion adopted to secure his confession."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25897, "end_char": 25907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26402, "end_char": 26408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal a.Uowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1171_1176_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "GOPALLAL\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nBigamy, offence of under section 494 f.P.C.-Ad1nission and legal evidence of actual 1narriage by custom of nata marriage attracts the provisions of sectio11 494 l.P.C.\n\n~ Nata 1narriage by customs and therefore void under section 17 of the lfindu -,., Jarriage Act, 1955-Whether voidness of a marriage under section 17 of the C H.M.A., 1955 disattracts the applicability of the provisions of section 494 .-'f l.P.C.\n\nAfter having fallen out and parted comp:lny \"With his wife Kanchan in the year 1963, the appellant, belonging to Telli communiLy contracted a second marriage prevalent amongst his community with Gopi on 20th March 1969. A complaint filed by his first wife ended in his conviction under se.ction 494 D I.P.C. and sentence of two years RJ. and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, the conviction and sentence having been upheld by the Raiasth&n lligh Court.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The second marriage was a valid marriage according to the custom of the nata marriage prevalent in the Telli community which requires the following two essential ceremonies:-\n\n). - -\n\n(a) that the husband should take a pitcher full of weter from the head\n\n;:of the prospective wife, and\n\n(b) that the wife should wear chura by the husband.\n\n'*\" The prosecution through PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 having proved that these cere- F monies have been duly performed, that there was such a custom which requires the said ceremonies having been admitted by the defence witnesses 3 and 5 and the validity of the first marriage not having been disputed, Section 494 I.P.C. applies in terms and the appellant must be held to have con1nutted the c, f!ence of Bigamy as contemplated by section 494 I.P.C.\n\n[1'176A-EJ\n\n2. The combined effect of section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act and section G 494 I.P.C. is that when a person contracts a second ntarriage afler the coming • into force of the said Act 1vhile the first niarriage is subsistinf?, such a person coQunits the offence of bigamy. [1174 El\n\nSection 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 makes it absolutely clear that the provi5icn has to be read in harmony and conjunction with the provisions of section 494 I.P.C., the essential ingredients of which are : (i) tlmt the accused spouse must have contracted the first maniage (ii) that while the first marriage H was subsisting the spouse conc-erned must have contracted a second marriage, and (iii) that both the marriages must be v..alid in the sense that the necessary\n\nA ceremonies required by the personal law governing the parties had been duly performed and (iv) the second marriage must have become void by VlflUe of\n\nthe fact that it had taken place in the !ifo timo of one of the ; pauses. [ll 73F-B.,\n\nJl74ACl\n\n3. Where a spouse contracts n second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting the spouse would be guilty of bigamy under section 494, l.P.C.\n\nif it is proved that the second marriage v.1as a valid one in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by law or by custom have been actually per- formed.\n\nThe voidness of the marriage under section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in fact one of the cssentia1 ingredients of section 494 because the second 1narriage wilJ became void only because of tho provisions of section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, the contention that the second marriage being void section 494 I.P.C. will have no applicatio11 is not correct.\n\n[1175F-G]\n\nBhaurao Shankar Lokhande and Anr. v. State of Maltarashtra and Ors.; [1965]2 S.C.R. 837; Kanwal Rani and Ors. v. The Hbnachal Pradesh Adn1inistratio11, [1966],1 S.C.R. 539 and Priya Bala Ghosh v.\n\nSuresh Chandra Ghosh; [1973] 3 S.C.R. 961 applied.\n\n[Bigamy being a serious offence for which the maximum punishn1ent 1.3 seven years, the Court while maintaining the conviction reduced the sentcn;; e to one year.]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 255 of 1973. ·\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16-7-73 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Cr!. Revn. No. 309/73.\n\nA. N. Mui/a and B. P. Singh for the Appellant.\n\nSobhag Mal Jain and S. K. Jain for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court by which the conviction of the appellant under Section 494 I.P.C. and sentence of two years rigorous impri.sonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- have been upheld.\n\nThe facts of this case have been detailed in the judgments of the courts below and it is not necessary to repeat them.\n\nSuffice it to say that the accused Gopal Lal married the complainant Kanchan sometime in the year, 1963 and a child was born out of this wedlock.\n\nSoon thereafter the parties appeared to have fallen out and parted company.\n\nWhile the first marriage was subsisting Gopal Lal contracted a second marriage which according to the custom prevalent amongst Tellis is a valid marriage commonly known as nata marriage.\n\nThis marriage was contracted on 20th of March, 1969.\n\nThe complainant Kanchan, the first wife having come to know about this marriage filed a complaint on the 22nd March, 1969, on the basis of\n\nwhich appellant was prosecuted and ultimately convicted as mentioned above.\n\nMr. A. N. Mulla, learned counsel for the appellant, had submitted two points before us.\n\nIn the first place it was contended that in view of the provisions of. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the second marriage being a void marriage, the provisions of Section 494 I.P.C. are not attracted at all.\n\nWe have given our anxious consideration to this argument but we are of the opinion that the argument is wholly untenable.\n\nSection 494 runs thus :\n\n\"Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the lifo of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.\n\nException-This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shalt before s.uch marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge\".\n\nThe essential ingredients of this offence are :\n\n( 1) that the accused spouse must have first marriage. contracted the\n\n(2) that while the first marriage was subsisting the • spouse concerned must have contracted a second marriage and\n\n( 3) that both the marriages must be valid in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by the personal law governing the parties bad been duly perforaned.\n\nIt may also be noticed that Section 494 I.P.C. would come into play only if the second marriage beomes void by virtue of the fact\n\nthat it had taken place in the life time of one of the spouses.\n\nThus, it is not possible to accede to the contention of Mr. Mulla that merely because the second marriage was void under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act hence Section 494 I.P.C. would not be attracted. Section 1 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act runs thus\n\n\"Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of this Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living; and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code shall apply accordingly\".\n\nWhat Section 17 contemplates is that the second marriage must be according to\" the ceremonies required by law.\n\nIf the marriage is void its voidness would only lead to civil consequences arising from such marriage.\n\nSection 17 makes it absolutely clear that the provision has to be read in harmony and conjunction with the provisions of Section 494 of the Penal Code which has been extracted above.\n\nSection 17 clearly provides that provisions of Sections 494 and 495 of the Penal Code shall apply accordingly.\n\nIn other words though the marriage may be void under Section 17, by reason of the fact that it was contracted while the first marriage was subsisting the case squarely falls within the four corners of Section 494 and by contracting the second marriage the accused incurs the penalty imposed by the said statute.\n\nThus the combined effect of Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494 I.P.C. is that when a person contracts a second marriage after the coming into force of the said Act, while the first marriage is subsisting he commits the offence of bigamy. (Emphasis ours).\n\nThis matter no longer res integra as. it co'ncluded by a decision of this Court in Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.('). This Court while considering the question of bigamy qua th~ provisions of Section 1 7 observed as follows :\n\n• \"Section 17 provides that any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of the Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living, and that the provisions of ss. 494 and 495 I.P.C. shall apply accordingly.\n\nThe marriage between two Hindus is void H in view of s. 17 if two conditions are satisfied :\n\n(i) the marriage is solemnized after the commencement of the Act;\n\n(1) [19651 2 S.C.R. 837.\n\n( -*\\_\n\n(ii) at the date of such marriage, either party had a spouse living. If the marriage which took place between the apellant and Kamlabai in February 1962 cannot be said to be 'solemnized', that marriage will not be void by virtue of s. 17 of the Act and s. 494 l.P.C. will not apply to such parties to the marriage as had a spouse Jiving\".\n\nThe word 'solemnize' means, in connection with a marriage, 'to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form', according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. It follows, therefore, that unless the marriage is 'celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and in due form' it cannot be said to be 'solemnized'. It is therefore essential, for the purpose of s. 17 of the Act that the marriage to which s. 494 I.P.C. applies on account of the provisions of the Act should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form\".\n\nIt was thus pointed out by this Court that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act requires that the marriage must be properly solemnized in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by Jaw or by custom must be duly performed.\n\nOnce these ceremonies are proved to have been performed the marriage become properly solemnized and if contracted while the first marriage is still subsisting the provisions of Section 494 will apply automatically.\n\nIn a decision of this Court in Kanwal Ram & Ors. v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration(') the earlier case was noticed by the Court and relied .-> upon.\n\nThe matter has ; i.!so been fully discussed in Priya Bala Ghosh\n\nv. Suresh Chandra Ghos'1f. (') In view of the authorities of this Court, therefore, the following position emerges : where a spouse contracts a second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting the spouse would be guilty of bigamy nnder Section 494 if it is proved that the second marriage wa.s a valid one in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required J1y law or by custom l].av, e been actually performed.\n\nThe voidness oT the marriage under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in fact one of. !he essential ingredients of Section 494 because the second marriage will be<'.:ome void only because of the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mulla that the second marriage being void Section 494 win .have no application.\n\nIt was next ontended by Mr .. Mulla that there is no legal evidence to show th!!t the second marriage which is said to\n\n(I) [1966] l S.C.R. 539.\n\n(2) [1971]3 S.C.R. 961.\n\nA be a nata .marriage was actually performed. We are afraid, we are unable to go into this question because three courts have concurrently found as a fact that the parties were governed by custom of nata marriage and the two essential ceremonies of this marriage are : (\n\n(1) that the husband should take a pitcher full of water from the head of the prospective wife;\n\n(2) that the wife should wear churn by the husband.\n\nThere is evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 4 and 5 who have proved fact that these ceremonies had been duly performed in their preience. l That there was such a custom which requires these ceremonie~ was_/\" admitted by D.Ws. 3 and 5 who were examined by the appellant.\n\nThe evidence Jed by the prosecution has been accepted by the High Court and the courts below and after perusing the evidence we are not in a position to hold that the finding of facts arrived by the courts below are wrong in law or perverse.\n\nFrom the evidence led by the prosecution, therefore, it has been clearly established that the second marriage which was performed by the appellant Gopal Lal with Gopi was a valid-marriage according to the custom ofthe nata marriage prevalent in the Telli commuhity to which the appellant belonged.\n\nThis being so and the validity of the first .marriage not having been disputed, Section 494 LP.C. applies in terms and the appellant must be held to have committed the offence of bigamy as contemplated by Section 494 I.P.C.\n\nLastly, Mr. Mulla pressed this appeal on the question of sentence.\n\nBigamy is a serious offence and the maximum punishment under Section 494 is seven years.\n\nTherefore, where the offence of bigamy is 1roved the Court cannot -\"' take a very lenient view.\n\nIn the instant case the appellant was sentenced to two years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.\n\nIt appears that the appellant has already paid a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, we feel that 'the ends of justice will be met by reducing the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year but maintaining the .sentence of fine.\n\nWi~ this modification the appeal is dismissed.\n\nThe appellal)t will now surrender and serve out the remaining portion of the sentence.\n\nS.R- Appeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "GOPALLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Gopal Lal", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOPALLAL\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jarriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401, "end_char": 411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jarriage Act, 1955", "statute": "Jarriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jarriage Act, 1955", "statute": "Jarriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Gopi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 705, "end_char": 709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jarriage Act, 1955-Whether voidness of a marriage under section 17 of the C H.M.A., 1955 disattracts the applicability of the provisions of section 494 .-'f l.P.C.\n\nAfter having fallen out and parted comp:lny \"With his wife Kanchan in the year 1963, the appellant, belonging to Telli communiLy contracted a second marriage prevalent amongst his community with Gopi on 20th March 1969."}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1652, "end_char": 1663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781, "end_char": 1792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1793, "end_char": 1798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1839, "end_char": 1849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1857, "end_char": 1875, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1894, "end_char": 1899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2115, "end_char": 2139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2250, "end_char": 2261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2262, "end_char": 2267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2958, "end_char": 2969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3196, "end_char": 3214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3262, "end_char": 3273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3454, "end_char": 3465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3466, "end_char": 3471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 S.C.R. 961", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. N. Mui", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4136, "end_char": 4145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a and B. P. Singh for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mulla"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4152, "end_char": 4163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a and B. P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4184, "end_char": 4199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhag Mal Jain and S. K. Jain for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhag Mal Jain and S. K. Jain for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAzAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court by which the conviction of the appellant under Section 494 I.P.C. and sentence of two years rigorous impri.sonment and fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4360, "end_char": 4380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court by which the conviction of the appellant under Section 494 I.P.C. and sentence of two years rigorous impri.sonment and fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4440, "end_char": 4445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gopal Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4694, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suffice it to say that the accused Gopal Lal married the complainant Kanchan sometime in the year, 1963 and a child was born out of this wedlock.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Lal"}}, {"text": "Kanchan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suffice it to say that the accused Gopal Lal married the complainant Kanchan sometime in the year, 1963 and a child was born out of this wedlock."}}, {"text": "20th of March, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5103, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This marriage was contracted on 20th of March, 1969."}}, {"text": "22nd March, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5230, "end_char": 5246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant Kanchan, the first wife having come to know about this marriage filed a complaint on the 22nd March, 1969, on the basis of\n\nwhich appellant was prosecuted and ultimately convicted as mentioned above."}}, {"text": "A. N. Mulla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5346, "end_char": 5357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. N. Mulla, learned counsel for the appellant, had submitted two points before us.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mulla"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5520, "end_char": 5538, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5601, "end_char": 5612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5613, "end_char": 5618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5770, "end_char": 5781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7242, "end_char": 7247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7458, "end_char": 7463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, it is not possible to accede to the contention of Mr. Mulla that merely because the second marriage was void under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act hence Section 494 I.P.C. would not be attracted."}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7519, "end_char": 7529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7537, "end_char": 7555, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7562, "end_char": 7573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 10437, "end_char": 10442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10481, "end_char": 10487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10656, "end_char": 10666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10692, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11022, "end_char": 11033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11529, "end_char": 11540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11742, "end_char": 11752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11760, "end_char": 11778, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11921, "end_char": 11931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11939, "end_char": 11957, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12083, "end_char": 12094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopal Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13365, "end_char": 13374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the evidence led by the prosecution, therefore, it has been clearly established that the second marriage which was performed by the appellant Gopal Lal with Gopi was a valid-marriage according to the custom ofthe nata marriage prevalent in the Telli commuhity to which the appellant belonged.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Lal"}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13597, "end_char": 13608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13722, "end_char": 13733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", 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{"document_id": "1979_2_1177_1183_EN", "year": 1979, "text": ".Ji. ...\n\nJ .,\n\nM. V. RAMASUBBJER AND OTHERS\n\nMANICKA NARASIMHACHARI AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n[P. N. SmNGIIAL AND p. S. KArLASAM, JJ.]\n\nTrusts Act-Ss. 49, 51 and 52-Scope of-Managing Trustee purchased property for the trust sold it to his son for lesser price than offered by others- Sale if valid-Duty of trustee.\n\nPleintiffi and defendants \\Vere descendants of a common ancestor who was the founder of a trust. Defendani no. 1, at the relevant time, was the managing trustee of the trust.\n\nOn partition and sale of family properties a house, C which was the suit property, was purchased for the trust.\n\nSoon thereafter defendant no. 1 sold it to his son.\n\nBefore the sale, however, the tenant of lhe house who was a man of substance, offered a much higher price than what was paid by the son but the defendant sold it to his son.\n\nIn the plaintiffs' suit challenging sale of the trust property to the managing trustee's son for a lesser consideration the defendant claimed that the property D had to be sold because his son who was the owner of adjacent property raised a dispute claiming easementary rights over the property.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the trial court but on appeal the High Court held that the consideration was adequate and fair, that the sale was bona fide and that no ulterior motive could be attributed to the defendant .no. 1 in the sale.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, dismissed the suit.\n\nAllowing appeal,\n\n1-~LD : (a) The sale had to be viewed with suspicion The High C0urt committed an error of law in ignoring important aspects of law which bad a direct bearing on the controversy before it. [ll8l1\\]\n\n(b) It is well recognised that a person in a fiduciary position like a trustee F is not entitled to make a profit for himself or a member of his family.\n\nI:-Ic is not allowed to put himself in a position in which a conflict may arise between his duty as a trustee and his personal interest.\n\n[1180E]\n\n( c) The control of the trustee's discretionary power prescribed by s. 49 of the Trusts Act and the prohibition contained in s. 51 that the trustee may not use or deal with the trust property for his own profit or for any other purpose G unconnected with the trust and the equally important prohibition in s. 52 that the trustee may not directly or indirectly buy the .trust property on his own account or as an agent for a third person, cast a heavy responsibility upon hin1 in the matter of discharge of his duties as trustee.\n\nThe rule prescribed by these sections connot be evaded by making a sale in the name of the trustee's partner or son, for that would, in fact and substance, indirectly benefit the trustee.\n\n[11 BOF-G] H\n\n(d) Where a trustee makes the sale of a property belonging to the trust, without any compc1Iing reason in favour of his son, without obtaining the\n\nA permission of the court concerned, it is the duty of the court to examine w-hether the trustee has acted rCasonably and in good faith or whether he bas committed a breach of the trust by benefiting himself from the transaction in\n\n::in indirect n1anner. f 1180H1\n\n(i) In the instant case defendant no. 1 was the tiustee of the property. It was his duty to be faithful to the trust and execute it with reasonable diligence Ill the manner in which an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own affairs. He could not occasion any loss to the trust and it was his duty to sell the property, if that was so necessary to sell, to the best advantage of the trust. fl l 80D]\n\n(ii) l'he I-ligh Court was wrong in blaming the plaintiffs _that they had brought the suit on account of persona] grouse and spite. Assuming that they \\Vere so actuated, their action was eminently for the advantage of the tru.o;.t created by their ancestor in which they had a substantial and direct interest. [l 18lD]\n\n(iii) Defendant no. 1 was not able to explain how the sale was beneficial to the trust. Income by way of rent which the property was fetching Was fa!:' more than interest which the sale proceeds fetched when they were invested in fixed deposits in a Bank. He was therefore unable to explain how he acted as D a rru:1n of cndinary prudence in slashing do\\vn the income of the trn'i+ by mating the rn!e. [l 181GJ\n\n(iv) When defendant no. 1 sold the trust property to his son at a le1Mer price than was otherwise available, he did not act in accordance with law in the discharge of his fiduciary relationship with the trust.\n\nHe_ sold the property to his son in disregard of his statutory duty which no man of ordinary pru- E denoe would tave done. [ll82C]\n\n(v) Assuming that defendant no. 1 made a gesture of goodwill in favour of the trust when he allowed the sale of the family property to the trust, he could not possibly absolve himself from what he did in selling it off to his &on at a lesser price than was offered by another person. [ 1l82F] -\"-,\n\n(vi) Assuming that there was sume diffi.:ulty in respect of rights of easement F between the trust and the defendant's son who was the immediate neighbour of the property, that could have been a lever in the hands of the trustee to make a bargain for higher consideration from his son . who was equally interested in the property.\n\nA man of prudence would not have sold his property for a considerably lesser amount than that offered to him by another person and agreed to sell it just becauSc a co-sharer was causing trouble and offering\n\na few lesser price. fll83A-Bl G\n\nCtvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1584 of 1969.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 20-2-1969 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 104 of 1963.\n\nG. L. Sanghi and Vineet Kumar for the Appellants.\n\nVepa P. Sarathy and Mrs. S.\n\nGopalakrishnan for Respondent No. I.\n\nRAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI (Shing/uil, J.) 1179\n\nK. Jaypram for Respondents 2-5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHA L, J .-This appeal by a certificate of the Madras High Court is directed against its judgment and decree dated February 20,\n\n1969.\n\nOne Manikka Sankaranarayana Iyer, father of defendants 1 and 3 and grandfather of plaintiffs 1 to 5 and defendants 2, 4 and 5 and father-in-law of plaintiff No. 6 constituted an Annadanam Trust and he and his sons executed a registered deed of settlement for that purpose on June 3, 1908.\n\nBy that document Sankaranarayana Iyer I became the first trustee for life, and it wa& provided that after him the senior-most member would be the trustee, by turns.\n\nSankara- . narayana died and defendant No. 1 became the managing trustee of the trust.\n\nThere was a suit for partition of the family properties including house No. 48A, and it was settled by a compromise under which a preliminary decree dated September 12, 1956 was drawn up for the sale of the properties amongst the members of the family.\n\nDefendant No. 1 purchased the suit property for Rs. 21,500/- for the aforesaid frust on April 19, 1959.\n\nA final decree was drawn up on November 29, 19\"59 in which house No. 48A was shown as the property of the trust.\n\nDefendant No. 1 however sold that property soon after, to his son defendant No. 2 on July 14, 1960, for Rs. 25,000/- under sale deed Ex. B. 13.\n\nChithambaram Chettiar (P.W. 2), who was a tenant of that property from 1949 onwanjs, came to know of the intended sale and sent a registered notice to defendant No. 1 cin July 21, 1960, offering to purchase it for Rs. 35,000/-.\n\nDefendant No. 1 however we.nt ahead with the sale of the property to his son and registered the sale deed on July 22,\n\n1960.\n\nThe plaintiffs thereupon filed the present suit on September 15, 1%0, challenging that' sale and asking for its restorati.on to the trust.\n\nThe defendants resisted the claim in the suit on the ground that the sale price was fair and adequate and that the sale had to be made because of the disputes which had arisen between the second defendant as the owner of the adjacent house and the trust in regard to the asementary rights of drainage, light and air etc.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge of Madurai on September 10,\n\n1962.\n\nThe High Court of Madras however allowed the appeal against that judgment and decree and dismissed the suit with costs of both the courts holding that Rs. 25,000/- was \"quite adequate and fair\" price for the suit proper-ty and that defendant No. 1 acted w'th \"perfect bona tides and no ulterior motive can be attributed to him.\" That is why the plaintiffs have come up in appeal to this Court.\n\nIt is not indisputc before us thai the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, hereinafter referred to as the Act, applied to the trust in question and that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that defendant No. 1 did not exercise his discretionary power of selling the suit property \"reasonably and in good faith\" and that he indirectly purchased it for himself, in the name of his son (defendant No. 2), within the meaning of section 49 and 52 of the Act.\n\nThere is some controversy on the question whether defendant No. 1 made an outright purchase of the suit property for and on behalf of the trust for Rs. 21 ,500/- on April 19, 1959, or whether he intended to purchase it for himself and then decided to pass it on I to the trust, for defendants have led their evidence to show that the property was allowed to be sold for Rs. 21,500/-, which was less than its market value, as it was meant for use by the trust and that defendant No. 1 was not acting honestly when he palmed of the property to his son soon after by the aforesaid sale deed Ex. B. 13 dated July 14, 1960.\n\nThe fact however remains that defendant No. 1 was the trustee of the property, and it was his duty to be faithful to the trust and to execute it with reasonable diligence in the manner an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own affairs.\n\nHe could not therefore occasion any loss to the trust and it was his duty to sell the property, if at .all that was necessary, to best advantage.\n\nIt has in fact been well recognised as an inflexible rule that a person in a fiduciary position like a trustee is not entitled to make a profit for himself or a member of his family.\n\nIt can also not be gainsaid that he is not allowed to put himself in any such position in which a conflict may arise between his duty and personal interest, and so the control of the trustee's discretionary power prescribed by seetion 49 of the Act and the prohibition contained in section 51 that the trustee may not use or deal with the trust property for his own profit or for any other purpose unconnected with the trust, and the equally important prohibition in section 52 that the trustee may not, directly or indirectly, buy the trust property on his own account or as an agent for a third person, cast a heavy responsibility upon him in the matter of discharge of his duties as the trustee. It does not require much argument to proceed to the inevitable further codclusion that the rule prescribed by the aforesaid sections of the Act cannot be evaded by making a sale in the name of the trustee's partner or rnn, for that would. in fact arid substance, indirectly benefit the trustee.\n\nWhere therefore a trustee makes the sale of a property belonging to the trust, without any compelling reason, in favour of his son, without obtaining the permission of the court concerned, it is the duty of the court, in which the sale is challenged, to examine whether\n\n• •\n\nRAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI (Shinghal, J.) 1181\n\nthe trustee has acted reasonably and in good faith or whether he has committed a breach of the trust by benefitting himself from the transaction in an indirect manner.\n\nThe sale in question has therefore to be viewed with suspicion and the High Court committed an error of law in ignoring this important aspect of the law although it had a direct bearing on the controversy before it:\n\nThe High Court in fact proceeded to examine the case on the assumption that the plaintiffs had instituted the suit not so much out of a genuine desire to redress an\"y wrong done to the trust, as out of\n\n\"ulterior motives and ill-will against the first and second defendants.\" r This shows that instead of examining the case according to the\n\n.)(iterian mentioned above, the High Court based its decision on an extraneous consideration and blamed the plaintiffs for raising the suit on account of \"personal grouse\" and \"personal spite\". We have\n\n~ not been referred to any evidence which could justify the High Court's view that there was any such grouse or spite.\n\nBut even if it were assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had any such motive for raising the suit, the fact remains that their action was eminently one for the advantage of the trust which had been created by their ancestor and in which they had a substantial and a direct interest.\n\nSome important facts stand out from the evidence on the record which are directly in point.\n\nThe suit property belonged to the family which had created the trust.\n\nIt was purchased by defendant No. 1, in his capacity as the trustee of the Annandanam Trust for Rs. 21,500/- on April 19, 1959, at a family sale.\n\nIt appears from\n\n.~ the statement of defendant No. 2 that the property was capable of, or could fetch a rent of about Rs. 190/- per mensem, amounting to Rs. 2,280/- per annum.\n\nIt has also been admitted that the sum of •Rs. 25,000/- was not utilised by the trustee (defendant No. 1) for purchasing any other better property, but was invested in fixed deposit with a bank at 3! per cent interest per annum.\n\nThat could yield an income of only Rs. 875/- per annum, The trust therefore lost heavily in the bargain. What is worse, defendant No. 1 has not been able to explain how the sale could be said to be beneficial to the trust and how he could possibly contend that he acted as a man of ordinary prudence in slashing down the income of the trust by making the sale .\n\nThe further fact that stands out from the evidence on the record H is that when Chithambaram Chettiar (P.W. 2), who was a tenant in the suit property from 1949 onwards, learnt about the intended sale,\n\nhe sent a notice to defendants Nos. 1 and 3 offering to purchase it for Rs. 35,000/-. That notice was issued on July 21, 1960.\n\nThe receipt of the notice has been admitted by defendant No. 1 in his statement in the trial court, and he has further admitted that Chithambaram Chettiar offered to purchase the property for Rs. 35,000/- and that he sold it to his son for Rs. 25,000/- without even informing him that he had received the offer of Rs. 35,000/-. Defendant No. 1 in fact proceeded to register the sale deed of the property in favour cf :. ~,0!1, the second defendant, on July 22, 1960.\n\nIt is therefore quite clear that he did not care to act in accordance with the law in the discharge of his fiduciary relationship with the trust and executed the sale deed in his son's favour in disregard. of his statuto~ duty, ) for no man of ordmary prudence would possibly have sold his pro-_,~ perty for Rs. 25,000/- when he had an offer of Rs. 35,000/-. That offer could not be said to be from a man of no substance because Chithambaram Chettiar (P.W. 2) who made it, was known to the. defendants and he has stated that he was a man of means and was worth rupees four lakhs. It may be that the son-in-law of plaintiff.\n\nNo. 2 was employed in his shop, but that could not detract from the basic fact that a much higher offer had been made by a man of subslance.\n\nIustead of examining the appeal with due regard to the above- E mentioned evidence, the High Court was obsessed by a consideration of the evidence which had been led for the purpose of showing that while defendant No. 1 had purchased the property for himself on April 19, 1959, for Rs. 21,500/-, he gave up that advantage in favour -':lit-' of the trust.\n\nThe evidence on the point is not unequivocal, for it may well be that defendant No. 1 did not want to obtain a sale deed\n\n, J,\n\nF in his own name for other reasons, but even if it were assumed that he made a gesture of goodwill in favour of the trust on April 19, 1959, he could not possibly absolve himself from what he did in • selling it off, after it had become the property of the trust, to his own son a few months thereafter for Rs. 25,000/- when he had a genuine offer of Rs. 35,000/-.\n\nG Another consideration which prevailed with the High Court in setting aside the finding of fact of the trial court was that, according to it, the evidence on the record showed that some difficulties had cropped up after the property had been purchased as his son, defendant No. 2, began to \"give trouble\" and that he resolved that H trouble on the advice of his family lawyer Shri V. Rajagopala Iyengar (D. W. 3) by selling the property to his son. This view was obviously incorrect, for even it were assumed that there was some\n\n...\n\nI •\n\n• ' •\n\n'°1\n\nRAMASUBB!ER v. NARASIMHACHARI (Shingfwl, J.) I jgj\n\ndifficulty in respect of some common rights of easement, that could A well have been a lever in the hands of the trustee to make a bargain for Rs. 35,000/- or more with his son who was equally interested in those easementary rights.\n\nA man of prudence would not have sold his property for a considerably lesser amount than that offered to hini by another person and agreed to sell it just because a co-sharer in . g the easementary right Was causing trouble and was offering a far lesser price.\n\nWe have gone through the statement of V. Rajagopala Iyengar (D. W. 3) on whose advice defendant No. 1 claims to have sold the property for Rs. 25,000/-. He has admitted in his statement that he had not even seen the suit property, and he knew nothing about C the so called trouble in regard to the easementary rights between defendant No; 1 and his son.\n\nOn the other hand, we find that he was indebted to the family of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and he did not even care to asce1tain what rent the suit property was fetching when he advised its sale for Rs. 25,000/- to the son of defendant No. 1.\n\nThe High Court therefore did not even read the evidence D correctly while placing reliance on his test1mony.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, we have no doubt that the High Court did not examine the controversy in its proper legal perspective and with due regard to the salient facts wl1ich had been established by the evidence mi the record and it was not therefore justi- E fied in setting aside the finding of the trial court.\n\nThe appeal is allowed.\n\nThe impugned judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored with costs throughout.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal 111/owed.\n\n19-119 SCI 79", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "M. V. RAMASUBBJER AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. V. RAMASUBBIER AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MANICKA NARASIMHACHARI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANICKA NARASIMHACHARI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 97, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. RAMASUBBJER AND OTHERS\n\nMANICKA NARASIMHACHARI AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n[P. N. SmNGIIAL AND p. S. KArLASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Ss. 49, 51 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2002, "end_char": 2007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2059, "end_char": 2064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5612, "end_char": 5624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and Vineet Kumar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5629, "end_char": 5641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and Vineet Kumar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Vepa P. Sarathy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vepa P. Sarathy and Mrs. S.\n\nGopalakrishnan for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nGopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vepa P. Sarathy and Mrs. S.\n\nGopalakrishnan for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "RAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nRAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI (Shing/uil, J.) 1179\n\nK. Jaypram for Respondents 2-5.", "canonical_name": "RAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI"}}, {"text": "K. Jaypram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nRAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI (Shing/uil, J.) 1179\n\nK. Jaypram for Respondents 2-5."}}, {"text": "SHINGHA L", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5859, "end_char": 5868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHA L, J .-This appeal by a certificate of the Madras High Court is directed against its judgment and decree dated February 20,\n\n1969.", "canonical_name": "SHINGHA L"}}, {"text": "Manikka Sankaranarayana Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6003, "end_char": 6031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Manikka Sankaranarayana Iyer, father of defendants 1 and 3 and grandfather of plaintiffs 1 to 5 and defendants 2, 4 and 5 and father-in-law of plaintiff No."}}, {"text": "June 3, 1908", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6274, "end_char": 6286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 constituted an Annadanam Trust and he and his sons executed a registered deed of settlement for that purpose on June 3, 1908."}}, {"text": "Sankaranarayana Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6306, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that document Sankaranarayana Iyer I became the first trustee for life, and it wa& provided that after him the senior-most member would be the trustee, by turns."}}, {"text": "September 12, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6698, "end_char": 6716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48A, and it was settled by a compromise under which a preliminary decree dated September 12, 1956 was drawn up for the sale of the properties amongst the members of the family."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21,500/- for the aforesaid frust on April 19, 1959."}}, {"text": "29, 19\"59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6942, "end_char": 6951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A final decree was drawn up on November 29, 19\"59 in which house No."}}, {"text": "Chithambaram Chettiar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7161, "end_char": 7182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chithambaram Chettiar (P.W. 2), who was a tenant of that property from 1949 onwanjs, came to know of the intended sale and sent a registered notice to defendant No."}}, {"text": "July 22,\n\n1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 however we.nt ahead with the sale of the property to his son and registered the sale deed on July 22,\n\n1960."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1%0", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7567, "end_char": 7584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs thereupon filed the present suit on September 15, 1%0, challenging that' sale and asking for its restorati.on to the trust."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Madurai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8006, "end_char": 8034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge of Madurai on September 10,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "September 10,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8038, "end_char": 8057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge of Madurai on September 10,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8064, "end_char": 8084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras however allowed the appeal against that judgment and decree and dismissed the suit with costs of both the courts holding that Rs."}}, {"text": "is not indisputc before us thai the Indian Trusts Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8458, "end_char": 8517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 49 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8877, "end_char": 8894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is not indisputc before us thai the Indian Trusts Act, 1882", "statute": "It is not indisputc before us thai the Indian Trusts Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "July 14, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9512, "end_char": 9525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. 13 dated July 14, 1960."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10394, "end_char": 10404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11383, "end_char": 11412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where therefore a trustee makes the sale of a property belonging to the trust, without any compelling reason, in favour of his son, without obtaining the permission of the court concerned, it is the duty of the court, in which the sale is challenged, to examine whether\n\n• •\n\nRAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI (Shinghal, J.) 1181\n\nthe trustee has acted reasonably and in good faith or whether he has committed a breach of the trust by benefitting himself from the transaction in an indirect manner.", "canonical_name": "RAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI"}}, {"text": "Shinghal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11414, "end_char": 11422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where therefore a trustee makes the sale of a property belonging to the trust, without any compelling reason, in favour of his son, without obtaining the permission of the court concerned, it is the duty of the court, in which the sale is challenged, to examine whether\n\n• •\n\nRAMASUBBIER V. NARASIMHACHARI (Shinghal, J.) 1181\n\nthe trustee has acted reasonably and in good faith or whether he has committed a breach of the trust by benefitting himself from the transaction in an indirect manner.", "canonical_name": "SHINGHA L"}}, {"text": "Annandanam Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13024, "end_char": 13040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, in his capacity as the trustee of the Annandanam Trust for Rs."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14180, "end_char": 14193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That notice was issued on July 21, 1960."}}, {"text": "Chithambaram Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14329, "end_char": 14350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in his statement in the trial court, and he has further admitted that Chithambaram Chettiar offered to purchase the property for Rs."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14648, "end_char": 14661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~,0!1, the second defendant, on July 22, 1960."}}, {"text": "V. Rajagopala Iyengar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16664, "end_char": 16685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, began to \"give trouble\" and that he resolved that H trouble on the advice of his family lawyer Shri V. Rajagopala Iyengar (D. W. 3) by selling the property to his son."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_1184_1205_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "i c\n\nils4\n\nS. k. GUPTA & ANR\n\nK. P. JAIN & ANR.\n\nJanuary 30, 1979\n\n(P. S. KAILASAM, 0. A. DESAI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nCon1panies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) Ss. 391 and 392--Scope of--V111ission of the original spo11sor arid substituting another whether J;:oufd chan!}e the 'basic fabric' of the schen1e.\n\nWords & Phrases-'Modify' a11d '111odifications'-lvlea11i11:; of.\n\nThe Companies Act, 1956 by s. 391 enables a member or a creditor of the company or a company which is being wound up, its liquidator, to make. an application to the court proposing a compromise c:r arrangement between the company and its creditors or any class of them or between the company and its n1embers or any class of them and seeking directions of the court to convene a meeting of each class of creditors and/or each clo.ss of members to v.hom the compromise or nrrangement is offered. On the court giving the directions, the n1eeting \\Vould be convened in which the proposed scheme of compron1ise and/or arrangement would be submitted for consideration and each class will have to vote upon it and if the schen1e is accepted by a majority in nun1ber representing three fourths in value of the creditors or members or class of members as the cuse may be, present and\n\nvoting either in person or where proxy is allowed by proxy, such approved sl'.'heme has to be placed before the court for sanction of the court as envisageJ ins. 391(2).\n\nUnder s. 392 of the Act, the High Court which has sanctioned the sche1nc has the power to supervise the carrying out of it and to give directions in regard to any tnatter or to make modifications in it as it may consider necessary ,/._ for its proper working.\n\nBut if the court is satisfied that the scheme cannot -- work satisfactorily with or without modifications, it can either suo motu or on an application of any person interested in the con1pany's affairs order its \\1.'inding up.\n\nThe holding company proposed a scheme of con1pron1ise/arrangen1ent bet\\\\'een its subsidiary and the unsecured creditors of the subsidiary company.\n\nAfter obtaining the approval of the shareholders the holding company obtained the sanction of the co1npuny court.\n\nA large number of shares in the subsidiary compl.\\ny held by it and its claim for a sum of Rs. 23 lacs rec.overable from the subsidiary company were tran-;- ferred by the holding company to the appellant~. The appellants then applied to the court to make lln <tppropriate n1odification and/or grant further direction for implen1enting the schen1e sanctioned by the court in respect of the subsidiary company by substituting the1n (the appellants) in place of the holding company as proponents of the scheme.\n\nThe repondent in the meanwhiL~ nlade an application to the company court under s. 392 of the Companies Act, 1956 to hold that the scheme sanctioned by the court could not work sati5factorily with or without modification and that, therefore, the court should\n\nS. K. GUPTA V. K. P. JAIN. 1185\n\nmake an order of windin~ up.\n\nThe company jude allowed substHution of \"· the appellants as proponents of the scheme and rejected the repondents' 1.pplication for winding up of the subsidiary company.\n\nOn appeal by the respondents under s. 483 of the Companie~ _Act a Division Bench held: (1) that since the substitution of a new propounder in a schen1e sanctioned by the court in place of the orii::inal propounder was a change of a basic nature which would not be comprehended withinthe me, n- Bt ing of the expression \"modification\" in s. 392 and, there(ore,_ the company judge could not havi: granted substitution of the propounder of the scheme without referring the proposed modified scheme to the creditor!.Jho approvCµ the original scheme, (2) that since the tranafer of the share! in favour of the appellants had not been effected in the company's registers, the appe\\}ant! , wete not members of the subsidiary, (3) that the debt owed by the_ subsidiary to the holding company was not assigned tJ:ccording to law in favour of. the,\n\nQ appellants and, therefore, they were not creditors and (4) that not bei, ng either members or creditors of the subsidiary, the 'appellants had no locus standi to move an appli<.IJ{ion under s. 392 for the modification of the scheme.\n\nOn the question whether the court had power to grant an application under s 392 of the Act.\n\nI>,\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. Though a large number of prov1s1ons of the Companie! Act, 1956 are in pari n1ateria with the provisions of Companies Act, 1948 of the.\n\nU.K. there is no provision analogous to s. 392 in the U.K.\n\nAct. The court unrler the U.K. Act has no power to n1odify the. scheme eithr at the time when it is offered for its 5an,,; tion or at any time subsequent thereio.\n\nTh~· Parliament has in its wisdom, conferred a power of wide amplitude. on the IEgh Court in India to provide for its continuous supervision of the carrying out of compromise and/or arrangement and also the consequential power to\n\nmt:1k~ the supervision effective by removing the hitches, obstacles or 'impedirnents in the working of compromise or arrangement by confe_rring pov:cr to give such directions for the proper ¥/orking of tbe compromise and /or arrangen1ent.\n\n[1193 D-F]\n\nThis power of widest amplitude being conferred on the Hih Court is a basic departure from the schen1e of the U.K. Act in which provision analog-\n\nOU5 to s. 392 is absent.\n\nThe sponsors of the scheme unde; r s. 206 of the U.K.\n\nAcl have tried to get over the difficulty by taking power in the scheme of con1promise or arrangen1ent to make alterations and modifications as proposed by the court.\n\n[1195 CJ\n\nIn the instant case the scheme is essentially a con1prornise between the co1npany and its unsecured creditors.\n\nThe scheme v.hen sanctioned does not merely operate as an agreement between the parties but has st('\\tutory force and is binding not only on the company but even dissenting creditors or metnbers, as the c.lase may be.\n\n[119\"4 B-C]\n\nJ. K. (Bon1bay) P\\t. Ltd. v. Nelv Kaiser-I-Hind Spg. & WFg. Co. LJtl • .y, Ors. etc., [1969] 2 SCR 866 at 891; referred to.\n\n2. Section 391(1) by Ol specific and positive prov1s1on prescribes who can moYe an application under it.\n\nOnly the creditor or n1ember of that company or a liquidator in the case of a company being \\vound up is entitled to move au application proposing a compromise or arrangement. By necessary inlplication any one other than those specified in the section would not be entitled. to move such an application.\n\n[1194 DJ\n\n3. Sub-section (2) of s. 392 provides the legislati\\'e exposition as to who 1...an move the court for taking action under s. 392.\n\nReference to s. 391 in sub-s. (2) of s. 392 n1ercly indicates \\vhich con1prornise or arrangen1ent can be brought b6.Wre the court for taking action under s. 392.\n\nThe reference to s. 391 in sub-section (2) of s. 392 does not mean that all the limitations nr restrictions on the right of an individual to move the cburt while propos~ ino a scheme of compromise or arrangement have to be read in subs. (2) increly because s. 391 is referred to therein.\n\nUnlike s. 391, s. 392 does not specify that a member or a creditor or in the case of a company being wound up, its liquidator, alone can move the court under s. 392.\n\nThe legislature uses the expression 'any person, interested in the nffairs of the company' y,:hich has \\Vider denotation than a member or creditor or liquidator of a company. The ambit of the power to act under s. 392(2) is demonstr:.it!:d by the provision that the court can suon1otu ttct to take action as contemplated by s. 392(1) or it may act on an application of any person interested in the affairs of the company.\n\n[1195 F-H]\n\nMansukhla/ v. M. V. Shah, [1976] 46 Company cases 279 at 290-291; referred to.\n\n4. If the court can suo 1notu act, it is immaterial as to who drew the attention of the court to a situation which necessitated court's intervention. \\Vhere the power is conferred on the court to take action on its own motion, the informaticn emanating from whatever source whi...:h calls for court's atten\n\ntion can as \\\\'ell be obtained from any person without questioning his credentials, n1oving Mt application drawing attention of the court to a situation where it must act.\n\nThe court may decline to act at the instance of a busy body but if the action proposed to be taken is justified, valid, legal or called for the capacity or credentials of the person 'h'ho brought the situation calling fof court's intervention is hardly rdcv::1nt nor \\vould it invalidate the resultant action only on that ground. \\Vhen sub-s. (2) confers po\\ver on the court to act on it'l o\\vn n1otion, the question of locus standi hardly arises.\n\n[1197 C-EJ\n\nIn the instant cuse while cxan1ining the question of focus standi after considering the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) the High Court wholly overlooked the important provision therein contained. that the I-Jigh Court can act on its own n1otion.\n\n[1197 F]\n\n5. E\\'en though section 391 ltlnd 392 are con1plcmentary they operate at different stages and have to be harmoniously read.\n\n[1197 G-H]\n\n6. \\Vinding up n1eaning civil death of a company, must be the ultin1a.te resort of the court.\n\nA living ~'orkable scheme infusing life into a sick uni1 .H is generally to be preferred to civil death of the company. There is no \\V:; i.rrant for circumscribing the expression •on the application of tany person inierested in the affairs of the company as to limit it to a member or a\n\nS. K. GUPTA V. K. P. JAIN\n\nI I 87\n\ncreditor. If the legislature used the expression 'member or creditor' in A s. 391(1) and yet used an expression of wider denotation 'any person interested in the affairs of the company,' in s. 392(2), the legislative intention is dearly expcsed in that any such person interested in the affairs of the company need not be limited or restricted to refer to a member or creditor.\n\n[1198 G-1199 A}\n\nfn the instant case, there is enough evidence on record that as between the holding con1pany and the appellants the sale of shares is complete, and that tile debt owed by the subsidiary to holding company has been assigned by the holding company to the appellants.\n\nThe appellants therefore have requisite\n\n\\nteres~ both in the subsidiary company and the scheme in respect of it, so . us to enable them to maintain an application under s. 392(2), as being persons nterested in the affairs of the company, and therefore the application for \" edification by them is maintainable. [1200 B-CJ\n\n7. The High Court was in error in holding that the appellants had no\n\nfocu.~ standi to maintain un application under s. 392(1). The words 'modify'\n\n:ind 'modification' have been defined in s. 2(29) of the Act to include the n1aking of additions and omissions.\n\nSection 2(1) defines 'altered' and 'alteration' to include 'making of additions and omissions', while 'variation' i~ defined in s. 2(31) to include 'abrogation'. The definition of cognate words is noted to arrive at a true meaning of the word 'modification'.\n\nThe noticeable feature is that it is an inclusive definition, and where in a definition clause the v;'ord '1'\"1-:lude' is used, it is so done in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or r hrases occuring in the body of the statute and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed b.s comprehending not only such things 'vhich they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clau'\\e declares that they shall include.\n\n[1200 H,\n\n1201 D-G, H-1202 BJ\n\nDilworth v. Con1missio11er of Stamps, [1899] AC 99 at 105; Jobbins v.\n\nMiddlesex County Council, [1949] 1 KB 142; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. i_ Raj Narain (1975) Suppl. SCC I at 97; Kclira Sinh v.\n\nGenda Lal, (1976] , I SCC 304 at 309; Cox v. Hakes, (1890] 15 AC 506; referred to.\n\n8. AccorO.ing to the definition 'modify' and 'modification' \\vould include the making of additions and omissions.\n\nIn the context of s. 392 'modification' would mean addition to the scheme of compromise and/or arrangen1ent or omission therefrom solely for the purpose of making it workable.\n\n[1203 B]\n\n9. The High Court misdirected itself when it resorted to dictionaries for the meaning of the expression 'modification' in s. 392 when the said term \\Vas defined in s. 2(29) of the Act itself.\n\n(1203 A]\n\nIn the instant case, the schen1e is one by which a compromise is offered • to the unsecured creditors of the company and whoever cornes in as sponsor would be bound by it. Omission of the original sponsor and subst!tut[ng •- 01.nother one would not therefore, change the 'basic f• .. bric' of the chen1e. [1203 El\n\n10. The court on which G duty is cast bys. 392(1) to supervise the working of compromise/arrangement must examine the bona fides of the person applying to be substituted as sponsor, his capacity, his ability, his interest\n\n~- qua the company and other relevant considerations before substituting one sponsor for another.\n\nIn a given case la'll application n1ay be rejectd if the\n\nA court is of the opinion that the sponsor is not one \\Vho can be trusted \\Vith the implementation of the scheme.\n\n(1204 A-C1\n\nIn the instant case the appellants have applied for substituting them a!i &ponsors of the scheme in place of the holding company. They claim to have purchased 44,000 shares out of 80.000 issued and subscribed equity &hares of the con1pany.\n\nThe sponsor hns t:'lken an assign1nent of a debt of Rs. 23 lacs \\Vhich the subsidiary company owed to the holding company from t11e holding company. The only objector is respondent holding 1,000 equity shares representing 1.25 per cent of the issued and subscribed capital. In pursuance to the court's order notice in the newspaper v.la-s inserted ca1ling for objection to the app1ic8.tion for substitution/n1odification. None including the petitioning creditor except the respondent lodged such an objection. ) l\"hc appellnnts agreed to implement the sche1ne and undertook to provide_......._ R'l. 3 lacs as liquid finance for implementation. The appellants therefore have a subsisting lu1d vital interest in the fate and future of the subsidiary company and they are the appropriate persons v, rho could and should be substituted in place of the original sponsor and there is no objection to granting their application.\n\n[1204 D-F, 1205 E, BJ\n\nD CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1217 o! 1976.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16-7-1976 of the Delhi High Court in Company Appeal No. 15/76.\n\nY. S. Chitale, K. R. Khaitan, B. Mohan, and Praveen Kumar for E the Appellants.\n\nI'. R. Mridul, R. L. Roshan, H. K. Pwi and Vijai K. Bahl for Respondent No. 1.\n\nPramod Dayal and S. K. Gupta for Respondent No. 2.\n\nR. M. Gupta and K. N. Bhat for Intervener/Dena Bank.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-A private sector sick unit, Indian Hardware Industries Ltd. ('IHI' for short). engaged in manufacture of builders' hardware. now in a state of suspended animatlon since 1971, awaits the outcome of this appeal for infusion of life into it simultaneously providing a ray of hope to primarily the workmen who were rendered jobless and the unsecured and secured creditors whose hard earned money is locked up in it.\n\nA few facts will put the problem raised in this appeal in focus and proper perspective.\n\nM/s. Delhi Flour Mills Ltd. ('DFM' for short) was the holding company of which IHI was the subsidiary.\n\nSomewhere by the fall of 1971 functioning of IHI came to a halt and the huge debt was mountin¥ up with the spiralin~ of interest,\n\n• f' •\n\nAs the shares of DFM were closely held by relations of respondent A No. 1 referred to as 'Jain group' and as there were fratricidal disputes in Jain family culminating into a litigation in 'the High Court of Delhi, IHI languished for want of attention.\n\nIn the meantime M/s. Indian Smelting & Refining Co. Ltd. ('petitioning creditor' for short) filed a winding up petition against IHI in 1975 alleging that IHI was heavily indebted and was unable to pay its debts as and when they became due.\n\nAfter the dispute in the Jain family was resolved somewhere in 1974, a situation emerged in which one R. P. Jain and the members of his family acquired controlling interest in the holding company DFM.\n\nOnce R. P. Jain came into saddle, the DFM as holding company proposed a scheme of compromise/ arrangement between IHI and its unsecured creditors and after the scheme was approved, the proponent of the scheme submitted Company Petition No. 86/74. to the Company Court for according sanction to the scheme and by Order dated 15th October 1975 the scheme was sanctioned. Sometime after the scheme was sanctioned, DFM transferred its 44,000 shares of IHI and its claim to the tune of Rs. 23 lacs recoverable from IHI, to the present appellants S. K. Gupta and Mrs. Dropadi Gupta (referred to as 'appellants' hereafter).\n\nThereafter the appellants filed Company Application No. 193/76 requesting .the Court to make appropriate modification and/or granting further direction for effectively implementing the scheme sanctioned by\n\nthe Court in respect of IHI by substituting the appellants in place of E . DFM as proponents of the scheme and imposing upon them the liability to implement the scheme under the supervision of the Court.\n\nA little while before this application was moved, respondent K. P.\n\nJain filed Company Application No. 190/76 purporting to be under s. 392 of the Companies Act, 1956, inviting the Court for the reasons mentioned in the application to hold that the scheme sanctioned by the Court cannot be worked satisfactorily with or without modification and therefore an order winding up the Company should be made.\n\nThe Company Judge by his two orders in the two aforementioned applications dated 26th April 1976 granted the application of the G appellants and modified the scheme by substituting the appellants as proponents of !_he scheme and simultaneously rejected the application of the respondent K. P. Jain for winding up the Company.\n\nRespondent Jain preferred two appeals being Company Appeals Nos. 15 and 15/76 under s .483 of the Companies Act. Both these H appeals came up before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, and they were disposed of by a common judgment.\n\nThe Division\n\nBench was of the opinion that substitution of a new propounder in a scheme already sanctioned by the. Court in place of the original propounder of the scheme was a change of a basic nature which would not be comprehended in the expression 'modification' as under s. 392 and, therefore, the Company Judge could not have granted such a substitution of the propounder of the scheme without referring back the proposed modified scheme to the creditors who had approved the original scheme.\n\nIt was further of the opinion that though the transfer of 44,000 shares of IHI held by DFM in favour of the appellants may be complete as between the transferor and the transferee, the same would not clothe the appellants with the right of a . member unless their names were put on the register of members~. maintained by IHI and that the same having not been done, the appellants were not members of IHL It was further of the opinion\n\n:.( that the debt owed by IHI to DFM was not assigned according to law in favour of the appellants and, therefore, they were not creditors, and in view of the language of s. 391 of the Companies Act, the appellants being neither members nor creditors of IHI, had no locus standi to move an application under s. 392 for modification of the scheme because in the opinion of the Court s. 391 controls s. 392 and either a member or a creditor or in the case of a company being wound up, a liquidator alone can file an application for modification.\n\nIn accordance with this opinion, the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 being Company Appeal No. 15/76 challenging the order of the CQmpany Judge which granted modification/substitution of appellants as proponents was allowed and the.application of the appe!lants for substitution was rejected.\n\nThe Division Bench dismissed Company Appeal No. 16/76 pre--1_ ferred by respondent Jain against the order of the Company Judge refusing to make an order for winding up of the Company observing that even while dismissing the application for substitution of the present appellants, the Court was not in :.i positon to come to an affirmative finding that the scheme cannot be satisfactorily worked with or without modification and the matter should be left to the Company Judge as to what future course of action should be taken in the matter.\n\nThe appellants preferred the present appeal by special leave against the decision of the Division Bench in Company Appeal No. 15/76 by which their application for substitution/modification was H rejected.\n\nMr. S. S. Ray, learned counsel for the appellants urged that the Court committed a basic error in holding that the application for +\n\n) •\n\n• J.\n\nsubstitutiou/modification was not maintainable because the appellants A were neither members nor creditors of the Company, IHI, thereby importing a narrower concept in respect of the locus standi of the present appellants to move the Court under s. 392 which restrictive approach would run counter to the power of widest amplitude conferred on the Court, namely, even to make modification suo motu or B on the application of a person interested in the affairs of the Company.\n\nHe further urged that the appellate Court clearly misdirected itself when it went in search of the meaning of the expression 'modification' in s. 392 by ransacking dictionaries completely overlooking the fact that in s. 2(29) of the Companies Act the words 'modify' and 'modification' have been defined and it is a well known canon of construction that unless the context otherwise requires, the definition of an expression given in a statute shall govern the meaning of the expression wherever used in the same statute. It was urged that the words \"modify' and 'modification' for the purpose of s. 392 would include the making of additions and omissions and according to him additions and omissions in the context of s. 392 would and could only mean additions and omissions to the sanctioned scheme because s. 392 operates at a stage subsequent to the sanctioning of the scheme under s. 391 (2). It was further urged that if the words 'modify' and 'modification'! would include additions and omissions, the Court would have plenary power to substitute one proponent for the other if in the opinion of the Court the scheme cannot be worked satisfactorily without the necessary modification and in all such cases it would be imprudent tp hold that the Court will have to fall back to the cumbersome procedure of s. 391 over again delaying for a considerable period the vital requirement of restarting a sick unit. It was submitted that the Court committed a fallacy in importing the concept of Constitution while interpreting a provision of the Companies Act.\n\nMr. Lal Narain Sinha on the other hand on behalf of the respondents, while conceding that in an emergency the Court can act on the application of any person, ordinarily the Court would act . on the application of a member or creditor of the Company and in this blurred area some light is shed by the provision contained in Rule 87 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. Proceeding further, it was urged that ss. 391 and 392 constitute a code and, therefore, if there was a qualification for proposing a scheme under s. 391, the same qualification should be read in s. 392 and any other approach would be self-defeating. It was submitted that viewed from this angle, only a member or a creditor can maintain an application under s. 392 and as the appellants are neither members nor\n\nSUPREME COURT•REPORTS [1979] 2 s.c.R.\n\ncreditors of the Company, they :have no locus standi to maintain the petition. He further urged that putting .too wide a construction on :the expression 'modification' in s. 392 (2) would lead to such . a startling result as could not have been within the contemplation of the legislature and that, therefore, in order to arrive at a true meaning of word 'modification', the Court should bear in mind the purpose and object behind using the expression or enacting the provision in which the expression is found.\n\nIt was also contended that substitution of the original sponsor amounts to repudiation of the contract which the scheme represents between the proponent of the scheme and the Ccimpany and another person cannot be substituted in place of the original contracting party without the consent or affirmance L of the second party to the contract and hence such a thing cannot be :brought about by way of a modification under s. 392 .. The word 'modification' or 'modify', therefore, should be given a restricted :meaning looking to the context in which it is used in s. 392 as has been done by the High Court.\n\nPrincipal contentions advanced on either side turn upon the right to make an application and the power of the Court to grant an application under s. 392 of the Companies Act.\n\nSection 392 finds its place in Chapter V of the Companies Act bearing fascicules 'Arbitration, Compromise, Arrangements and Reconstructions'. Section 391 enables a member or a creditor of the Company or a Company which is being wound up, its liquidator, to make an application to the Court proposing a compromise or arrangement between the company and its creditors or any class of them or between the Company and its members or any class of them and seeking directions of the Court to convene a meeting of each class of creditors ._,( and/ or each class of members to whom the compromise or arrangement is offered.\n\nOn the Court's giving the directions, the meeting would be convened in which the proposed scheme of compromise and/or arrangement would be submitted for consideration and each class will have to vote upon it and if the scheme is accepted by a majority in number representing three fourths in value of the creditors or members or class of members as the case may be, present and voting either in person or where proxy is allowed, by proxy, such approved scheme . has to be placed before the Court for sanction of the Court as envisaged ins. 391(2). Then comes .s. 392 which may be reproduced .in extenso :\n\n\"392. Power of High Court.to enforce compromises and arrangements-(L) Where1a High.Court makes an order .under i.ection 391,, sanctioning-a co.mpromise :or an.ruiiu, gement.in respect..of.a .. cOl:lilPl:llypit-\n\n' • •\n\n(a) shall have power to supervise the carrying out of the A compromise or arrangement; and\n\n(b) may, at any time of making such order or at any time thereafter, give such directions in regard to any matter or make such modifications in the compromise or arrangement as .it may consider necessary for the proper working of the compromise or arrangement.\n\n(2) If the Court aforesaid is satisfied that a compromise <>r arrangement sanctioned nnder section 391 cannot be worked satisfactorily with or without modifications it may, , either on its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the company, make an order winding up the company, and such an order shall be deemed to be an order made under section 433 of this Act\".\n\nAt the outset it may be mentioned that though a large number of provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, are in pari materia with the provisions of Companies Act, 1948, of the U.K. ('U.K. Act' for short), there is no provision analogous to s. 392 in the U.K. Act. The Court under the U.K. Act has no power to modify the scheme either at the time when it is offered for its sanction or at any time subsequent thereto. The Parliament lias in its wisdom, conferred a power of wide amplitude on the High Court in India to provide for its continuous supervision of the carrying out of compromise and/or arrangement and also the consequential power to make the supervision effective by removing the hitches, obstacles or impediments in the working of com- .prqmise or arrangement by conferring power to give such direction in regard to any matter or for making such modification in the compromise or arrangement as it may consider necessary for the proper working of the compromise and/or arrangement. Sub-s. (2) confers power on the Court to .act under s. 392 either on its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the company.\n\nWhat falls for consideration is the true meaning of the expression 'on the a, pplkation of any person interested in the affairs of the company'.\n\nI!'\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that the appellants have no .G locus stanili to maintain an application for modification/substitution of themselves as proponents of the scheme with a liability to implement 'the -scbeine as they were neither members nor creditors of the Company and according to the High Court, if a scheme of compromise or arrange- ·\n\nmertt cannot be proposed by any one except a member or creditor ipso •facto, an application for modification of such scheme sanctioned JI 'by the Court untler s. 391(2) could not be made by any one other than a member or a creditor.\n\nA Section 391 envisages a compromise or arrangement being proposed for consideration by members and/or creditors of a Company liable to be wound up under the Companies Act, 1956. Compromise or arrangement has to be between creditors and/or members of the Company and the Company, as the case may be.\n\nIt was always open to the Company to offer a compromise to any of the creditors or enter into arrangement with each of the members. The scheme in this case is essentially a compromise between the company and its unsecured creditors. The scheme when sanctioned does not merely operate as an agreement between the parties but has statutory force and is binding not only on the company but even dissenting creditors or members, as the case may be. The effect of the sanctioned scheme is \"to supply by recourse to the procedure thereby prescribed the absence of that individual agreement by every member of the class to be bound by the scheme which would otherwise be necessary to give it validity\" (see J. K. (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd., v. New Kaiser-I-Hind Spg. & Wvg. Co.\n\nLtd. & Ors. etc.('). Further section 391(1) itself by a specific and positive provision prescribes who can move an application under it.\n\nOnly the creditor or member of that company or a liquidator in the case of a company being wound up is entitled to move an application proposing a compromise or arrangement.\n\nBy necessary implication any one other than those specified in the section would not be entitled to move such an application.\n\nE When a scheme is being considered by the Court, in all its ramifications, for according its sanction, it would not be possible to comprehend all situations, eventualities and exigencies that may arise while implementing the scheme.\n\nWhen a detailed compromise and/or arrangement is worked out, hitches and impediments may arise and if there was no provision like the one in s. 392, the only obvious alter- F native would be to follow the cumbersome procedure as provided in s. 391 (1), viz., again by approaching the class of creditors or members to whom the compromise and/or arrangement was offered to accord their sanction to the steps to be taken for removing such hitches and impediments. This would be unduly cumbersome and time consuming\n\nand, therefore, the legislature in its wisdom conferred power of widest amplitude on the High Court under s. 392 not only to give directions but to make such modification in the compromise and/or arrangement as the Court may consider necessary, the only limit on the power of the Court being that such directions can be given and modifications can be made for the proper working of the compromise and/ or arrangement.\n\nThe purpose underlying s. 392 is to provide for effective working of the compromise and/or arrangement once sanctioned and\n\n[1969] 2 S.C.R. 866 at 891.\n\n,, L\n\nover which the Court must exercise continuous supervision[see s. 392(1)], and if over a period there may arise obstacles, difficulties or impediments, to remove them, again, not for any other purpose but for the proper working of the compromise and/or arrangement. This power either to give directions to overcome the difficulties or if the provisions of the scheme themselves create an impediment, to modify the provision to the extent necessary, can only be exercised so as to provide for smooth working of the compromise and/ or arrangement.\n\nTo effectuate this purpose the power of widest amplitude has been conferred on the High Court and this is a basic departure from the scheme of the U.K. Act in which provision analogous to s. 392 is absent.\n\nThe sponsors of the scheme under s. 206 of the U.K. Act C have tried to get over the difficulty by taking power in the scheme of compromise or arrangement to make alterations and modifications as proposed by the Court. But the Legislature foreseeing that a complex or complicated scheme of compromise or arrangement spread over a long period may face unforeseen and unanticipated obstacles, has conferred power of widest . amplitude on the Court to give directions and if necessary, to modify the scheme for the proper working of the compromise or arrangement. The only limitation on the power of the Court, as already mentioned, is that all such directions that the Court may consider appropriate to give or make such modifications in the scheme, must be for the proper working of the compromise and/ or arrangement.\n\nSub-section (2) provides the legislative exposition as to who can move the Court for taking action under s. 392. Reference to s. 391 in sub-s. (2) of s. 392 merely indicates which compromise or arrangement can be brought before the Court for taking action under s. 392.\n\nThe reference to s. 391 does not mean that all the limitations or restrictions on the right of an individual to move the Court while proposing a scheme of compromise or arrangement have to be read in sub-s. (2) merely because s. 391 is referred to therein.\n\nUnlike section 391, s. 392 does not specify that a member or creditor or in the case of a company being wound up, its liquidator, can move the Court under s. 392. On the other hand, the legislature uses the expression 'any person interested in the affairs of the company' which has wider denotation than a member or creditor or liquidator of a company. In fact, the ambit of the power to act under s. 392(2) can be gauged from the fact that the Court can suo motu act to take action as contemplated bys. 392(1) or it may act on an application of any person interested in the affairs of the Company.\n\nIn this context the observations of the Gujarat High Court, extracted hereunder, in Mansukhlal v. M. V. Shah,(') can be referred to with advantage as it precisely lays bare the ambit and width of Court's power under section 392 :\n\n\"The framers of the company law in India have conferred statutory powers ou the High Court to make such modifications in the compromise or arrangement as the Court may consider necessary for the proper working of the compromise and arrangement.\n\nThe power of the widest amplitude has been conferred on the court under section 392(1) (b) and the width and the magnitude of the power can be gauged from the langnage employed in section 3 92 (1 )(a) which confers a sort of a supervisory role on the court during tlje period the scheme of compromise or arrangement is being implemented.\n\nReading clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 392, it appears that Parliament did not want the court to be functns officio as soon as the scheme of compromise and arrangement is sanctioned by it.\n\nThe Court has a continuing supervision over the implementation of compromise and arrangement. Unenvisaged, unanticipated, unforeseen or even unimaginable hitches, obstruction and impediments may arise in the course of implementation of a scheme of compromise and arrangement and if on every such occasion, sponsors have to go back to the parties concerned for seeking their approval for a modification and then seek the approval of the court, it would be a long-drawn out, protracted, time-consuming process with no gnarantee of result and the whole scheme of compromise and arrangement may be mutilated in the process. Parliament has, therefore thought it fit to trust the wisdom of the court rather than go back to the interested parties. If the parties have several times to decide the modification with the democratic process, the good part of an election machinery apart, the dirt may step in, the conflicting interests may be bought and sold, and, in the process, the whole scheme of compromise and arrangement may be jettisoned. In order, therefore, to gnard against this eventuality and situation, which is clearly envisageable, Parliament has conferred power on the court, not only to make modifications even at the time of sanctioning the scheme, but at any time thereafter during the period the scheme is being implemented.\n\nConceding that, before the Court sanctions the scheme, it partakes the character of an emerging contract between the\n\n(!) (1976) 46 Company Cases 297 at 290-291.\n\n( ..\n\n• •\n\n• • •\n\ncompany and the creditors and members; once the court approves it, it becomes a statutorily enforceable contract even on dissidents, with power in the court to modify, amend or correct or revise the contract the outer periphery or the limit . on the power being that, after testing it on thes anvil of probabilities, surronnding circumstances and the prevalent slate of affairs, it can be done for the proper working of the compromise and arrangement, and subject to this limit on the Court's power, the power seems to be absolute and of the widest amplitude and it would be unwise to curtail it by process of interpretation\".\n\nIf the Court can suo motu act, it is immaterial as to who drew the attention of the Court to a situation which necessitated Court's intervention.\n\nWhere the power is conferred on the Court to take action on its own motion the information emanating from whatever source which calls for Court's attention can as well be obtained from any person without questioning his credentials, moving an application drawing attention of the Court to a situation where it must act. Undoubtedly, the Court may decline to act at the instance of a busy body but if the action proposed to be taken is justified, valid, legal or called for, the capacity or credentials of the person who brought\n\nthe situation calling for Court's intervention is hardly relevant nor E would it invalidate the resultant action only on that ground.\n\nTherefore, when sub-s. (2) confers power on the Court to act on its own motion, the question of locus standi hardly arises. The High Court while examining the question of locus standi, after combing the provision contained in sub-s. (2), wholly overlooked the important provision therein contained that the High Court can act on its own motion.\n\nIt was, however, said in passing that sub-s. (2) enables the Court to wind up the Company and, therefore, the Court may act on its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the company not for modifying the scheme or for any directions but for winding up the company.\n\nBut when the Court is required to act under s . 392(1), the limitations and re1>trictions imposed upon the Court under s. 391(1) must be read in section 392(1) because the sections are complimentary to each other.\n\nThis submission overlooks the two different stages at which sections 391 and 392 operate though they may be complimentary to each other.\n\nTwo sub-sections of s. 392 have to be harmoniously read and sub-s. (2) clearly indicates the power of Court to take action suo motu while taking action under sub-s. ( 1).\n\nAgain this approach is inconsistent with the language employed in s. 392(2) in that the Court can wind up the company\n\nunder s. 392(2) if and only it is satisfied that the compromise and/or arrangement sanctioned by it cannot be satisfactorily worked with or without modifications.\n\nThe Court has to reach an affirmative conclusion before acting under s. 392(2) that the compromise and/or arrangement cannot be worked satisfactorily with or without modification (se>~ J. K. Bombay p. Ltd.) (supra). It follows as a corollary that if the compromise or arrangement can be worked as it is or by making modifications, the COP<t will have no power to wind up the Company under s. 392(2). Now, if the arrangement or oompromise can be worked with or without modification, the Court must undertake the exercise to find out what modifications are necessary to make the compromise or arrangement workable and that it can do so on its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the Company. If such be the power conferred on the Court, it is difficult to entertain the submission that an application for directions or modification cannot be entertained except when made by a member or. creditor.\n\nIt would whittle down the power of the Court in that it cannot do so on its own motion.\n\nMr. Sinha referred to Rule 87 of Companies (Court) Rules and urged that it throws some light on the question as to at whose instance the Court can act under s. 392. The rule is procedural in character and at any rate the rule cannot circumscribe the power conferred by the section. Hence rule 87 is of no assistance.\n\nAssuming that the Court would not act on its own, the next question is : could it act under s. 392( 1) on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the Company ? Now, if the Court under s. 392(2) can order winding up of the company on the application of any F person interested in the affairs of the company who need not be a member or a creditor, we fail to see how the Court cannot act on the application of such a person interested in the affairs of the Company either to give directions or to make modifications so as to make the compromise or arrangement workable.\n\nWinding up meaning civil death of a company, must be the ultimate resort of the Court. A living G workable scheme infusing life into a sick unit is generally to be preferred to civil death of the company. There is, therefore, no warrant for circumscribing the expression 'on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the company' as to limit it to member or creditor. If the legislature used the expresson 'member or creditor' ins. 391(1) and yet used an expression of wider denotation 'any H person interested in the affairs of the company', the legislative intention is clearly exposed in that any such person interested in the affairs of the company need not be limited or restricted to refer to a\n\n_.1\n\nmember or creditor.\n\nIt would, therefore, be necessary to ascertain A whether the appellants would be comprehended in the expression 'any person interested in the affairs of the company'.\n\nAt one stage there was a threatened long argument to ascertain whether the appellants have become the members of the company or are the creditors of the company. The appellants contended that they B and their friends have purchased 44,000 eqnity shares of IHI from its former holder DFM itnd they have also taken an assignment of the debt in the amonnt of Rs. 23 lacs owned by IHI to DFM from DFM.\n\nRespondent Jain contended that the assignment is not valid as it fails to comply with s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and as the names of the appellants are not pnt on the register of IHI, they have not acquired the status of member of IHI and, therefore, they being neither creditors nor members of IID, they have no locus standi, to maintain the application under s. 392.\n\nThe stand taken by respondent Jain in th.is behalf is wholly ambic valent. Sometime after the scheme was sanctioned on 15th October 1975, the appellants assert that they purchased the 44,000 equity shares of IID from DFM and they simultaneously took assignment of the debt.\n\nThereafter respondent Jain filed Company Application No. 190/76 in which he sought a direction under s. 392(2) for windc\n\ning up the Company.\n\nIn inviting the Court to grant his prayer for E winding up the Company, the averment made is that since the sanction of the scheme by the Court, DFM has sold its interest to Shri S. K.\n\nGupta and others who wanted to operate the scheme as if they were the substitutes for DFM.\n\nAnother averment is that DFM was not entitled to sell its shares because it was the propounder of the scheme.\n\nTherefore, the raison d'etre for moving the application under s. 392(2) was the sale of shares of IID held by DFM to the appellants. When the appellants filed Company Application No. 193/76 under s. 392(1), in order to show their newly acquired or subsisting interest in the scheme so as to enable them to move the application under s. 392, it was averred that the appellants have purchased 41,800 shares of IHI from DFM and the balance of holding of DFM to the tune of 2200 equity shares have been purchased by the nominee of the appellants.\n\nIt is further averred that the amount standing in the name of DFM in the books of IHI also been taken over by the appellants.\n\nWhile replying to these averrnents in the application, respondent K. p. Jain in para 16 of his counter affidavit dated 29th March 1976 has stated that 'there is some understanding or agreement between the Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd. and Shri S. K. Gupta for the sale of the shares held by Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd., in the IHI and I have referred to\n\nit in my application CA. 190/76'. If the very alleged sale of the shares by DFM to the appellants gave canse of action to respondent Jain to maintain an application under s. 392(2) praying for an order for winding up of the company, what greater ambivalance conld it disclose when it was contended on his behalf that the sale has not taken place ?\n\nB There is enough evidence on record as is evident from the affidavit filed by DFM that as between DFM and the appellants the sale is complete. Similarly, there is evidence in the affidavit that the debt owned by IHI to DFM has been assigned by DFM to the appellants. In the face of this express position adopted by Jain, would it not clothe the\n\nappellants with necessary interest both in the company IHI and the scheme in respect of it, so as to enable them to maintain an application nnder s. 392(2) ? Appellants are certainly persons interested in the affairs of the company. For this additional reason the application for modification by them is certainly maintainable.\n\nIn the aforementioned circumstances we are not inclined to examine D a very serious contention raised by Mr. Mridul who appeared at a later stage of hearing for the respondent Jain that unless names of the appellants are put on the register of IHI they do not become members and' as the assignment on which the appellants rely does not comply with the requirements of s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act, the assignee's title to the debt assigned has not become complete, and, therefore, E the appellants are not creditors of IHI. We may in passing say that the factum of assignment or the sale of shares was never seriously questioned but we are prepared to proceed on the assumption that even if it be so, in the circumstances herein discussed and the ambivalence of respondent Jain the appellants conld certainly be said to be persons sufficiently interested both in the company IHI and the scheme in res- F pect of it so as to be able to maintain an application under s. 392(1).\n\nLastly in this connection it must be remembered that if DFM whose scheme was sanctioned and not challenged by respondent Jain, started implementing the scheme and after getting into the saddle by constituting the Board of Directors as desired by it, it could have transferred its shares to appellants and appellants could have as well taken over G management and implemented the scheme and no one, at any rate, Respondent Jain holding only 1000 equity shares, i.e. 1.25% of the issued capital, could have objected to it. The objection at this stage is equally futile. Therefore, with respect, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellants had no locus standi to maintain an appli-\n\nH cation under s. 392(1).\n\nThe next important contention is that the sponsor or propounder of a scheme is such an integral part of the whole scheme or an important element of the 'basic structure' of the scheme that its substitution changes, alters or amends the scheme in almost its entirety and such a thing cannot be done by way of modification under s. 392.\n\nThe word 'modification' must be given, according to the respondent and according to the High Court, a restricted and narrow meaning.\n\nThe High Court, after reaching the conclusion that propounder of a scheme is 'the very life blood and soul of the scheme and on his going out the scheme itself becomes lifeless and inert', proceeaea fo examine the connotation of the word 'modification' as used iri~ s. 392 and after referring to various dictionary meanings, reached a conclu-\n\n. sion that the context and setting in which the word is used, it would ........ only means a \"small adjustment a minor or slight change, a qualification c or limitation, alteration of a subordinate character\", and substitution v of a sponsor of a scheme is of such a vital nature altering, in the opinion of the High Court, the 'basic structure' of the scheme that such a three dimentional change would not be comprehended in the word 'modification' as used in s. 392.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion the High Court referred to the meaning assigned to the word 'modify' in various die- D tionaries such as Webster, Biack's Law Dictionary, et el.\n\nUnfortunately the High Court completely overlooked the obvious that the words 'modify' and 'modification' have been defined in s. 2(29) of the Companies Act as under:\n\n\"2. Definitions--:-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-\n\n(29) \"Modify\" and \"modification\" shall include the making of additions and omissions\".\n\nIt may also be mentioned that s. 2 ( 1) defines 'altered' and 'alteration' to include making of additions and omissions, while 'variation' is defined in s. 2(31) to include 'abrogation'.\n\nThe definition of cognate words is noted by us to arrive at a true meanin& of the word 'modification'.\n\nThe High Court nowhere refers in its judgment to the definition of 'modify' and 'modification' given in the very statute and proceeded to examine the content and meaning of the word used in a provision in the same statute which, unless the context otherwise requires, must bear the same meaning as set out in the definition section.\n\nThe noticeable feature of this definition is that it is inclusive definition and where in a definition clause the word 'include' is used it is\n\nso done in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occnrring in the body of the statute and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import, but alo those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include (see Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps)(').\n\nWhere in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that word is used in that statute. it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires.\n\nBut where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning.\n\nAt any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting prov1slons of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect (see Jobbins v. Middlesex County Council)(').\n\nwhere the definition of an expression in a definition clause is preceded by the words 'unless the context otherwise requires', normally the definition given in the section should be applied and given effect to but this normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied (see Khanna, J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain) (3). It would thus appear that ordinarily one has to adhere to the definition and if it is an expansive definition the same should be adhered to.\n\nThe frame of any definition more often than not is capable of being made flexible but the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made loose a'nd kept tight as far as possible (see Kalva Singh v. Genda Lal)(').\n\nF Is there anything in the context and setting in which the word 'modification' is used in s. 392 to indicate that the legislature has not used the expression assigning the meaning to the word as set out in the definition clause?\n\nAt least nothing was pointed out to ui Undoubtedly, as pointed out by Lord Hershell in Cox v. Hakes,(') that for the purpoe of construing any enactment it is right to look, not iG only at the provision immediately under construction, but at any others found in connection with it which may throw light upon it, and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to\n\n(l) [1899] A.C. 99 at 105.\n\n(2) [1949] I K.B. 142.\n\n(3) [1975] Suppl. S.C.C. I at 97.\n\n(4) ]1976] I S.C.C. 394 at 309.\n\n5) [l 890] 15 A.C. 506.\n\nI ~\n\n<I. ..\n\n' ..\n\n...... .\n\n.,.,\n\n\nbe applied without some limitation.\n\nEven with this caution we find nothing in s.392 or reading s.392! with s. 391, to cut down and restirct the meaning as has been attempted by the High Court completely ignoring the definition section.\n\nAccording to the definition 'modify' and 'modification' would include the making of additions and omissions. In the context of s. 392 'modification' would mean addition to the scheme of compromise and/ or arrangement or omission therefrom solely for the purpose of making it workable.\n\nReading s. 392 by substituting the definition of the word 'modification' in its place, if something can be .omitted or some-\n\nC thing can be added to a scheme of compromise by the Court on its own motion or on the application of a person interested in the affairs of the company for the proper working of the compromise and/ or arrangement, we see no justification for cutting down its meaning by a process of interpretation and thereby whittle down the power of the Court to deal with the scheme of a compromise and/ or arrangement for the purpose of making it workable in course of its continued supervision as ordained by s. 392 ( 1).\n\nStrictly speaking, omission of the original sponsor and substituting another one would not change the 'basic fabric' of the scheme.\n\nThe scheme in this case is one by which a compromise is offered to the unsecured creditors of the company and whoever comes in as sponsor would be bound by it.\n\nUndoubtedly a sponsor of the scheme enjoys an important place in the scheme of compromise and/or arrangement bnt basically the scheme is between the company and its creditors or any class of them, or the company and its members or any class of them, and not between the sponsor of the scheme and the creditor or member. The scheme represents a contract sanctified by Court's approval between the company and the creditors and/or members of the company. The company may as well be in charge of directors\n\nand the implementation of the scheme may come through the agency of directors but that would not lead to the conclusion that during the working of the scheme the directors cannot be changed. If the G scheme has to be ultimately implemented by the company as part of its contract and yet its directors can be changed according to its Articles of Association, we see no difference in the situation where a sponsor is required to be changed in the facts and circumstances of a case.\n\nTherefore, it is not possible to accept the submission that as and by way of modification one sponsor of a scheme cannot be substituted for another sponsor.\n\nWe .may not be understood to say for a moment that the Court can appoint any one as sponsor.\n\nThe Court on which a duty is cast . by s. 392 (1) to exercise continuous supervision over the working of the compromise and/ or arangement must, in order to effectively dis- ..:harge its duty, examine the bona {ides of the person applying to be substituted as sponsor, bis capacity, his ability, bis interest qua th~ company . and other ; relevant considerations before substituting one &ponsor for another.\n\nIn a given case an application •roaY be rejected as the Court is-of the opinion that the sponsor is not one who can be trusted with the implementation of the scheme but that is entirely a different thing from saying that the Court has no power to make such a substitution as and by way .of modification of a compromise or arrangement.\n\nJ...\n\nNow to .the .facts of the case.\n\nThe appellants have applied for substituting them as sponsors of the scheme in place of DFM.\n\nThey claim to have purchased 44,000 shares out of 80,000 issued and subscribed eguity shares of the company.\n\nAs stated earlier, between the transferor and transferee of the shares, the transfer of .the shares is complete and not even seriously objected to by the respondent as pointed out hereinbefore. The sponsor has taken an assignment of a debt of Rs. 23 lacs which llil owed to DFM from the creditor DFM. A gain, as between the. transfe; rqr and transferee the assignment is complete.\n\nThe only objector is respondent holding\n\nLOOO equity shares .representing 1.25 per cent of the issued and subscribed capital. An advertisement was directed to be inserted by the order of the Court in newspapers in respect of the application for substitution-modification made by the appellants inviting every one interested in the company or in the scheme of compromise and/or arrangement to come and lodge objection, if it was so desired, against substitution/modification .prayed by the appellanfs.\n\nNone including the petitioning creditor except the respondent Jain has lodged such an objection.\n\nThis procedure was also followed by the Gujarat High Court in Mansukhlal's\n\n(supra) .case and by referring to that part of the judgment, the High Court held that that judgment itself is an authority for the proposition that substitution .of the -sponsor -is a -vital change of a ba'sic nature and cannot be.ordered-by the.Court acting under s. 392 and.must be referred to.a, meeting, of the creditors.or members.\n\nWith respect, this is not\n\n-1 ..\n\na fair, reading, 0f.theJiu<lgment.\n\nAt p!!ges 290-291, the scope and ambit of the.power; of:the Gourt under s. 392 has been precisely. set out and it is&onclllded.JhaLthe 1power to ~!llQdify would comprehend the power to substitute one sponsor for the other if he , is Jound •l>lherwise tfit.and competent.\n\nAs an additional string to the bow, it was observed, as it\n\n\" , •\n\n•••\n\n:-\"\n\n~ •\n\n~~ • .,\n\n.l.\n\nI'< ll\n\nis being done here also, that no one has come forward to object to the :substitution and that would further strengthen the hands of the Court.\n\nSuch observation cannot be construed to mean that the Court lacks the power to make such a modification without reference back to the creditors and/or members, as the case may be.\n\nIn the background of these unimpeachable facts the conclusion is inescapable that the apPellants have a subsisting and vital interest in the fate and future of IHI and they are the appropriate persons who could and should be 'substituted in place of the original sponsor .\n\nIn passing it was said that the fate of the company should not be placed in the hands of the appellants and the lack of bona {ides of the .appellants becomes discernible from the fact that they tooth and nail opposed the very scheme which they now seek to implement. This is hardly a relevant consideration.\n\nA creditor may come and oppose a .scheme' being implemented by some person and yet may be interested in taking over the affairs of the company.\n\nThis could hardly be treated .as a disqualification of the appellants.\n\nLastly it may be mentioned that the awellants agree to implement . the scheme.\n\nThey undertake to bring Rs. 3 lacs as liquid finance for implementing the scheme.\n\nThe question of the know-how was examined by the company Judge who has accepted their fitness to run the business and nothing was pointed out to us to depart from the same.\n\nE Therefore, viewed from any angle, we see no objection to granting the application of the appellants for substitution/modification as sponsors .of the scheme.\n\nAccordingly, the judgment of the Division Bench dated 16th July 1976 in Company Appeal No. 15/76 is set aside and the order of the Company Judge dated 26th April 1976 in Company Application F No. 193/76 is restored with costs throughout.\n\nN.V.K. .-4.ppeal allowed.\n\nMGIPF-119 SCI/79-2500-20-9-79.", "total_entities": 198, "entities": [{"text": "ANR\n\nK. P. JAIN & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. P. JAIN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 30, 1979\n\n(P. S. KAILASAM, 0."}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss. 391 and 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "The Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1422, "end_char": 1428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2756, "end_char": 2762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 483", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10783, "end_char": 10795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10911, "end_char": 10919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12260, "end_char": 12266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(29)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12302, "end_char": 12310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14490, "end_char": 14506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16-7-1976 of the Delhi High Court in Company Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14537, "end_char": 14550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. R. Khaitan, B. Mohan, and Praveen Kumar for E the Appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14552, "end_char": 14565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. R. Khaitan, B. Mohan, and Praveen Kumar for E the Appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14567, "end_char": 14575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. R. Khaitan, B. Mohan, and Praveen Kumar for E the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Praveen Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14581, "end_char": 14594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. R. Khaitan, B. Mohan, and Praveen Kumar for E the Appellants."}}, {"text": "I'. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14618, "end_char": 14631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I'."}}, {"text": "L. Roshan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14636, "end_char": 14645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Mridul, R. L. Roshan, H. K. Pwi and Vijai K. Bahl for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "H. K. Pwi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14647, "end_char": 14656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Mridul, R. L. Roshan, H. K. Pwi and Vijai K. Bahl for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vijai K. Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14661, "end_char": 14674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Mridul, R. L. Roshan, H. K. Pwi and Vijai K. Bahl for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Pramod Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14698, "end_char": 14710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pramod Dayal and S. K. Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14715, "end_char": 14726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pramod Dayal and S. K. Gupta for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. k. GUPTA & ANR"}}, {"text": "R. M. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14750, "end_char": 14761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Gupta and K. N. Bhat for Intervener/Dena Bank."}}, {"text": "K. N. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14766, "end_char": 14776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Gupta and K. N. Bhat for Intervener/Dena Bank."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14848, "end_char": 14853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-A private sector sick unit, Indian Hardware Industries Ltd. ('IHI' for short)."}}, {"text": "Delhi Flour Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15365, "end_char": 15387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Delhi Flour Mills Ltd. ('DFM' for short) was the holding company of which IHI was the subsidiary."}}, {"text": "IHI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15439, "end_char": 15442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Delhi Flour Mills Ltd. ('DFM' for short) was the holding company of which IHI was the subsidiary."}}, {"text": "DFM", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15620, "end_char": 15623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somewhere by the fall of 1971 functioning of IHI came to a halt and the huge debt was mountin¥ up with the spiralin~ of interest,\n\n• f' •\n\nAs the shares of DFM were closely held by relations of respondent A No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15797, "end_char": 15816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 referred to as 'Jain group' and as there were fratricidal disputes in Jain family culminating into a litigation in 'the High Court of Delhi, IHI languished for want of attention."}}, {"text": "Indian Smelting & Refining Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15878, "end_char": 15913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime M/s. Indian Smelting & Refining Co. Ltd. ('petitioning creditor' for short) filed a winding up petition against IHI in 1975 alleging that IHI was heavily indebted and was unable to pay its debts as and when they became due."}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16123, "end_char": 16127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dispute in the Jain family was resolved somewhere in 1974, a situation emerged in which one R. P. Jain and the members of his family acquired controlling interest in the holding company DFM.", "canonical_name": "Jain"}}, {"text": "R. P. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16200, "end_char": 16210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dispute in the Jain family was resolved somewhere in 1974, a situation emerged in which one R. P. Jain and the members of his family acquired controlling interest in the holding company DFM.", "canonical_name": "K. P.\n\nJain"}}, {"text": "15th October 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16624, "end_char": 16641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Company Court for according sanction to the scheme and by Order dated 15th October 1975 the scheme was sanctioned."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16841, "end_char": 16852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 lacs recoverable from IHI, to the present appellants S. K. Gupta and Mrs. Dropadi Gupta (referred to as 'appellants' hereafter).", "canonical_name": "S. k. GUPTA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Dropadi Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 lacs recoverable from IHI, to the present appellants S. K. Gupta and Mrs. Dropadi Gupta (referred to as 'appellants' hereafter)."}}, {"text": "K. P.\n\nJain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17391, "end_char": 17402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A little while before this application was moved, respondent K. P.\n\nJain filed Company Application No.", "canonical_name": "K. P.\n\nJain"}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17463, "end_char": 17469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17477, "end_char": 17496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. P. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18021, "end_char": 18031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he scheme and simultaneously rejected the application of the respondent K. P. Jain for winding up the Company.", "canonical_name": "K. P.\n\nJain"}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18072, "end_char": 18076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Jain preferred two appeals being Company Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Jain"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18172, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18578, "end_char": 18584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IHL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19203, "end_char": 19206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "member unless their names were put on the register of members~. maintained by IHI and that the same having not been done, the appellants were not members of IHL It was further of the opinion\n\n:.("}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19409, "end_char": 19415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19423, "end_char": 19436, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19546, "end_char": 19552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19620, "end_char": 19626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19636, "end_char": 19642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. S. Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20833, "end_char": 20842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. S. Ray, learned counsel for the appellants urged that the Court committed a basic error in holding that the application for +\n\n) •\n\n• J.\n\nsubstitutiou/modification was not maintainable because the appellants A were neither members nor creditors of the Company, IHI, thereby importing a narrower concept in respect of the locus standi of the present appellants to move the Court under s. 392 which restrictive approach would run counter to the power of widest amplitude conferred on the Court, namely, even to make modification suo motu or B on the application of a person interested in the affairs of the Company."}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21220, "end_char": 21226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21594, "end_char": 21600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(29)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21668, "end_char": 21676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21684, "end_char": 21697, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22047, "end_char": 22053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22169, "end_char": 22175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22259, "end_char": 22265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22336, "end_char": 22342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22762, "end_char": 22768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22995, "end_char": 23008, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23015, "end_char": 23031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lal Narain Sinha on the other hand on behalf of the respondents, while conceding that in an emergency the Court can act on the application of any person, ordinarily the Court would act ."}}, {"text": "ss. 391 and 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23418, "end_char": 23433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23526, "end_char": 23532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23575, "end_char": 23581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23738, "end_char": 23744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24002, "end_char": 24008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ccimpany", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24519, "end_char": 24527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that substitution of the original sponsor amounts to repudiation of the contract which the scheme represents between the proponent of the scheme and the Ccimpany and another person cannot be substituted in place of the original contracting party without the consent or affirmance L of the second party to the contract and hence such a thing cannot be :brought about by way of a modification under s. 392 .. The word 'modification' or 'modify', therefore, should be given a restricted :meaning looking to the context in which it is used in s. 392 as has been done by the High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24763, "end_char": 24769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24905, "end_char": 24911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25095, "end_char": 25101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25109, "end_char": 25122, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25125, "end_char": 25136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25156, "end_char": 25186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25267, "end_char": 25278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Companies Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26302, "end_char": 26308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27012, "end_char": 27023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27297, "end_char": 27308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27406, "end_char": 27419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27470, "end_char": 27489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27562, "end_char": 27568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1948", "statute": "Companies Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28370, "end_char": 28376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1948", "statute": "Companies Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 391(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29145, "end_char": 29154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29222, "end_char": 29233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Company liable to be wound up under the Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29338, "end_char": 29397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 391(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30314, "end_char": 30328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company liable to be wound up under the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Company liable to be wound up under the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31101, "end_char": 31107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31201, "end_char": 31207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31579, "end_char": 31585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31915, "end_char": 31921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 866", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32016, "end_char": 32035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 392(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32113, "end_char": 32122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32785, "end_char": 32791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 206", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32837, "end_char": 32843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33728, "end_char": 33734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33749, "end_char": 33755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33773, "end_char": 33779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33885, "end_char": 33891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33911, "end_char": 33917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34120, "end_char": 34126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34159, "end_char": 34170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34172, "end_char": 34178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34307, "end_char": 34313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34550, "end_char": 34559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34792, "end_char": 34810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this context the observations of the Gujarat High Court, extracted hereunder, in Mansukhlal v. M. V. Shah,(') can be referred to with advantage as it precisely lays bare the ambit and width of Court's power under section 392 :\n\n\"The framers of the company law in India have conferred statutory powers ou the High Court to make such modifications in the compromise or arrangement as the Court may consider necessary for the proper working of the compromise and arrangement."}}, {"text": "section 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34968, "end_char": 34979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 392(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35301, "end_char": 35315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35409, "end_char": 35418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35618, "end_char": 35629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39501, "end_char": 39510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 392(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39527, "end_char": 39541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 391 and 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39657, "end_char": 39677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39755, "end_char": 39761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39973, "end_char": 39982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40032, "end_char": 40041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40259, "end_char": 40268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. K. Bombay p. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40375, "end_char": 40395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court has to reach an affirmative conclusion before acting under s. 392(2) that the compromise and/or arrangement cannot be worked satisfactorily with or without modification (se>~ J. K. Bombay p. Ltd.) (supra)."}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40579, "end_char": 40588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41219, "end_char": 41224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sinha referred to Rule 87 of Companies (Court) Rules and urged that it throws some light on the question as to at whose instance the Court can act under s. 392."}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41372, "end_char": 41378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41625, "end_char": 41635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41736, "end_char": 41745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43519, "end_char": 43525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43533, "end_char": 43557, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "IID", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43740, "end_char": 43743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Jain contended that the assignment is not valid as it fails to comply with s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and as the names of the appellants are not pnt on the register of IHI, they have not acquired the status of member of IHI and, therefore, they being neither creditors nor members of IID, they have no locus standi, to maintain the application under s. 392."}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43806, "end_char": 43812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44191, "end_char": 44200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nGupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44412, "end_char": 44424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In inviting the Court to grant his prayer for E winding up the Company, the averment made is that since the sanction of the scheme by the Court, DFM has sold its interest to Shri S. K.\n\nGupta and others who wanted to operate the scheme as if they were the substitutes for DFM.", "canonical_name": "S. k. GUPTA & ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44684, "end_char": 44693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44818, "end_char": 44827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44955, "end_char": 44961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. p. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45359, "end_char": 45369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While replying to these averrnents in the application, respondent K. p. Jain in para 16 of his counter affidavit dated 29th March 1976 has stated that 'there is some understanding or agreement between the Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd. and Shri S. K. Gupta for the sale of the shares held by Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd., in the IHI and I have referred to\n\nit in my application CA.", "canonical_name": "K. P.\n\nJain"}}, {"text": "Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45498, "end_char": 45524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While replying to these averrnents in the application, respondent K. p. Jain in para 16 of his counter affidavit dated 29th March 1976 has stated that 'there is some understanding or agreement between the Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd. and Shri S. K. Gupta for the sale of the shares held by Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd., in the IHI and I have referred to\n\nit in my application CA."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45534, "end_char": 45545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While replying to these averrnents in the application, respondent K. p. Jain in para 16 of his counter affidavit dated 29th March 1976 has stated that 'there is some understanding or agreement between the Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd. and Shri S. K. Gupta for the sale of the shares held by Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd., in the IHI and I have referred to\n\nit in my application CA.", "canonical_name": "S. k. GUPTA & ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45815, "end_char": 45824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46486, "end_char": 46495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46778, "end_char": 46784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the aforementioned circumstances we are not inclined to examine D a very serious contention raised by Mr. Mridul who appeared at a later stage of hearing for the respondent Jain that unless names of the appellants are put on the register of IHI they do not become members and' as the assignment on which the appellants rely does not comply with the requirements of s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act, the assignee's title to the debt assigned has not become complete, and, therefore, E the appellants are not creditors of IHI."}}, {"text": "s. 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47037, "end_char": 47043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47051, "end_char": 47075, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 392(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47644, "end_char": 47653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48366, "end_char": 48375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48705, "end_char": 48711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49114, "end_char": 49120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49654, "end_char": 49660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Biack", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49805, "end_char": 49810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reaching this conclusion the High Court referred to the meaning assigned to the word 'modify' in various die- D tionaries such as Webster, Biack's Law Dictionary, et el."}}, {"text": "s. 2(29)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49964, "end_char": 49972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49980, "end_char": 49993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50195, "end_char": 50199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50318, "end_char": 50326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52325, "end_char": 52331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where the definition of an expression in a definition clause is preceded by the words 'unless the context otherwise requires', normally the definition given in the section should be applied and given effect to but this normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied (see Khanna, J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain) (3)."}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52846, "end_char": 52852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hershell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53061, "end_char": 53069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At least nothing was pointed out to ui Undoubtedly, as pointed out by Lord Hershell in Cox v. Hakes,(') that for the purpoe of construing any enactment it is right to look, not iG only at the provision immediately under construction, but at any others found in connection with it which may throw light upon it, and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to\n\n(l) [1899] A.C. 99 at 105."}}, {"text": "s.392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53638, "end_char": 53643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53655, "end_char": 53660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53667, "end_char": 53673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53924, "end_char": 53930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54091, "end_char": 54097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54708, "end_char": 54714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56292, "end_char": 56298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mansukhlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58285, "end_char": 58295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This procedure was also followed by the Gujarat High Court in Mansukhlal's\n\n(supra) .case and by referring to that part of the judgment, the High Court held that that judgment itself is an authority for the proposition that substitution .of the -sponsor -is a -vital change of a ba'sic nature and cannot be.ordered-by the."}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58564, "end_char": 58570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58779, "end_char": 58785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-9-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60994, "end_char": 61001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MGIPF-119 SCI/79-2500-20-9-79."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_875_904_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nJanuary 4, 1979\n\n[JASWANT SINGH AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nPre1e111ion of Corrup•tion Act, 1947 s. S(l)(d) & s. 5(2)-Scope of-Proof of guilt based on circumstantial evidence-Tests for deciding.\n\nBoth the appellants were officers of Indian Oil Corporation.\n\nThe Corpora tion invited tenders from experienced contractors for rock cutting, filling and levelling of cert2.i1.1 land acuired by it.\n\nOn the notified date it opened the tenders received from eleven contractors.\n\nBut in the meantime since it made a change in the specification of work to be done it asked the tenderers to sub mit revised tender.\n\nThe direction to submit fresh tt:nders was restricted only to the original 11 tenderers.\n\nEven so it \\\\'as alleged that a te\\1der form was issued by the appellants to A-4, who was not one of the 11 tenderers.\n\nThere \\:Vas age.in a change in the specifr:ation of the work to be done at the suggestion of foreign collaborators.\n\nThe appellants were alleged to have asked the concerned officers of the Corporation to make a fresh survey along with A-4, keepi•.1g in view the suggestion of the foreign collaborators. EventuaJly ~1-'!.e contract \\Vas giYe11 to A-4.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that ( 1) the conduct of the appellants showed their keenness to have the contract entrusted to A-4. (2) the issue of work order was inflated with :figures relating to rock cutting and filling; and ( 3) the appellants removed certain original documents fron1 the departmental files at.1d substituted in their pla; ce fabricated material.\n\nThe appellants who were charged with offences under s. 120B and s. 109 IPC ands. 5(2) read withs. 5(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment.\n\nOn the question whether the appellants had been rightly convicted under s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nA11o\\ving the appeals,\n\nHELD : 1. An analysis of the circumstantial evidence adduced by t!le prosecution did not lead to the unerring certainty that the appellants acted with any dishonest or corrupt motive or abused their position. [904 FJ.\n\n2. (a) It is well settled that abuse of position, in order to come v1ithin G the mischief of s. 5(1) (d) of the Act, must necessarily be dishonest so that it may be proved that the ar.:cused caused deliberate loss to the department. Further it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the accused, by corrupt or i1legal means or by abusing his position, obtained any pecuniary advantage for some other person. [892 G; 893 A].\n\n(b) Again, the fundamental rule relating to the proof of guilt based on circumstantial evidence is that there is always danger that conjecture or supi~\n\nion n1ight take the place of legal proof.\n\nIn such cases the mind is apt to take a pleasure in adC:hpting circumstances to one another and even in straining then! a\n\nA little, if need be to force them to forn1 parts of one connected whole and the more ingenious the mind of the individual the more likely it is, in considering such matters, to over-reach and mislead itself to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for gratited some fact consistent with its previo; Js thcoric:s and necessary to render them complete. [893 B-D].\n\n(c) In cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial n1ature. the circum- B stances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fu1Jy established, and all the facts so estah!ished should be consistent only \\Yith the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.\n\nAgain, t'1e circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and should be such as to t:Al'lndc every\n\nhypothesis but the one proposed, to be proved. In other words there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to give any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such C as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. [893 D-F].\n\nM. Narayanana Nambiar v. State of Kera/a, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 724; Maior S. K. Kale v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 822; Hanumant Govind Nergundkar v. State of M.P.,\n\n[1952] SCR 1091, AIR 1952 SC 343; Palvinder Kaur v. State of Pun; ab, [1953] SCR 94: AIR 1952 SC 354; Charan Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 196' SC\n\n529; referred to.\n\n(d) The principle that inculpatory fact must be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and i!lcapable of explanation on any other hypothesis\n\nthan that of guilt does not mean that any extravagant hypothesis would be sufficient to sustain the principle, but that the hypothesis suggested must be reasonable. [893 G].\n\nGovinda Reddy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 29; referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the conduct of the appel1ants in preferring A~4 to any ne\\V contractor did not savour of dishonest irltcntions on their part.\n\nAlthough the notice was sent by registered post to the 11 original tenderers there is nothing in that notice or elsewhere on the record to indicate that other contract0rs F were precluded from submitting their tenders or that the corrigendum extending the date for submission of the tenders was neither intended to be published\n\nTI(1f \\Vas it actually published. The High Court had missed this fact.\n\nTh:! High Court was also wrong in thinking that out of the nine contractors who submitted their revised tenders eight were from the original nine tenderers and the ninth \\Vas A-4. In fact five of the contractors that submitted the fresh tenders were fresh tenderers.\n\nMoreover none of the officers of the Finance G and Engineering Department of the Corporation who handled the file :elating to the griant of contract ever raised any objection regarding the improper reception or ente1tainment of A-4's tender.\n\nThis showed that there was nothing wrong about the issue of tender Form to A-4 or its entertainment by the appellants.\n\nThe contr21.::t in question was not a specialised job requiring any extraordinary skill.\n\nA-4 was the Corporation's old and tried contractcr who had\n\npreviously executed a number of works including rock cutting.\n\n(2) Though it cannot be gainsaid that the second appellant had been extremely negligent in not scrutinising the papers, he affixed his signature in a routine manner to the work order prepared by his subordinates without realising\n\nthe importance of his act, placing fmplicit faith in the integrity of the latter.\n\n[900 E-Fl\n\n(3) There is no clear, cogent and convincing evidence to show that the appellants had a1 hand in the removlll of the level plans from the dcpartn1cntal file relating to the contract and substitution of the faked plans. [900 G).\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal !'fas. 346 and 387 of 1975.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n~ 6-8-75 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1005 and 1006 of 1973. l La/it Chari, P. R. Guna, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for\n\nthe Appellant in Cr!. A. No. 387 /75.\n\nR. L. Kohli, P. P. Rao, R. C. Kohli and R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 346/75.\n\nV. S. Desai, H. R. Kh, inna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in both the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJASWANT SINGH, J.-The above noted two criminal appeals which are directed against the common judgment and order dated August 6, 1975 o( the High Court of Judicature at Bombay a!fuming on appeal the judgment and order dated August 6, 1973 of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay, convicting S. P. Bhatnagar, appellant in the aforesaid first appeal, (hereinafter described as A-1) under s. l 20B read\n\n'°'~ with sections 409 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5 ( 1) read with s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and sentencing him to six months simple imprisonment on each of the said two • coui!ts as well as convicting A. S. Krishnaswamy, appellant in the\n\n,)c, aforesaid second appeal (hereinafter described as A-2) under the afore- .,- said two counts but reducing his sentence from nine months' imprisonment to , six months simple imprisonment on each one of those counts, shall be disposed of by this judgment. • Briefly put the case as set up by the prosecution was :\n\nIn 1964, the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') which is a Government owned company, decided to purchase 13 acres and odd of a hilly tract of land situate in village Mahul in Trombay (Bombay) from the Tatas for the purpose of erecting black furnace oil storage tanks and construction of administrative buildings.\n\nAfter the area was taken over by the Corporation Varandani (P. W. 20), Junior Engineer of the Corporation surveyed the land in October, 1964, under the directions of A-1 and A-2 the Engineering Manager and Senior Engineer respectively of the Engineering Department of the Marketing Division of the Corporation with a view to find out the extent of rock cutting and filling which might be required to be done for levelling the area of 7 acres out of the said tract of land.\n\nThe kacha level plan (Exh. 125) and worksheets prepared by Varandani on October 13, 1964 and November 3, 1964 respectively during the course of his aforesaid survey (which were signed by A-l and A-2, showed that 16,80,000 cft. of rock cutting work and 8,00,000 cft. of filling work would have to be done to suit the purpose for which the land was acquired.\n\nEstimate (Exh.\n\n27) prepared by Varandani indicated that expenditure at the rate of Rs. 30/- per 100 cft. for rock cutting and Rs. 10/- per 100 cft. for filling would have to be incurred.\n\nPucca tracing (Exh. 34) of level plan (Exh. 125) and copies thereof signed by A-1 and A-2, and contour plan prepared by Varandani and approved by Engineering Manager were kept on the record.\n\nOn the basis of the survey and the estimate of expenditure made by Varandani, notice (Exh. 28) inviting tenders fron1 experienced civil contractors for rock cutting, filling and levelling of the land in question was prepared by A-2 on February 2, 1965, and was forwarded (under his signatures) by A-1 to the Finance Department for approval on February 5, 1965. After the approval of the Finance Department, the Public Relations Oftlcer of the Corporation by his letter (Exh. 29) dated February 11. l 965 requested Times of India, Indian Express and Free Press to publish the tender notice (Exh. 28) wherein it was stated that the tenders which should reach the Corporation by 2.30 P.M. on March 2, 1965 would be opened at 3.00 P.M. on that date.\n\nIn response to this notice eleven firms of contractors including Ram & Co. submitted their tenders.\n\nN. N. Desai (hereinafter described as A-4) however abstained from submitting his tender.\n\nIn the meanwhile, it was decided that instead of having stack measurement as provided in Exhibit 28, it would be desirable to have the measurements on the basis of differences between the existing and finished levels. Accordingly, on March 5, 1965, the aforesaid eleven tenderers were asked to submit revised tenders on the basis of the amended tender notice by March 15, 1965.\n\nAlthough fresh tenders were restricted to the original eleven tenderers, a tender form was issued to A-4 in response to the application made by him on March 8, 1965.\n\nOn opening the tenders on March 15, 1965, it was found that five out of the eleven original H tenderers and four new ones including A-4 had submitted their tenders, that the tender of Ram & Co. whereby it had quoted Rs. 28/- per I 00 cft. for cutting work and 'nil amount for filling was the\n\n,,_.\n\n• )t\n\nlowest and that the second lowest tender was of A-4 who had quoted Rs. 26/- per 100 cit. for cutting and Rs. 6/- per 100 cft. for filling work. Thus, the actual amount as per quotation of Ram & Co. was Rs. 4,70,400/- and that of A-4 was Rs. 4,84,800/- for 16,80,000 cit. of cutting work and 8,00,000 cft. of filling work. On discovering that the tender of his firm was the lowest, Roshan Lal, a partner of Ram & Co. addressed communication dated March 20, 1965 to the Managing Director of the Corporation requesting him that the aforesaid job of rock cutting and filling be entrusted to his firm in view of its working experience detailed therein but handed over the same to A-1. At or about this time, Messrs Labitos Oil Fields Limited, a British firm whom the Corporation was trying to collaborate in its project advised the Corporation that instead of three levels (steppings) which had been planned as per cantour map (Exh. 34) there should be a single level and instead of the survey being on the basis of 100 ft. spacing as done earlier by Varadani, it should be on the basis of 10 ft. spacing. Accordingly A-1 and A-2 told Varadani (P.W. 20) and S. D. Vaidya, another Assistant Engineer (hereinafter described as A-3) to make a fresh survey alongwith A-4 according to the advice of Messers Labitos Oil Fields Limited as it had been almost decided to entrust the aforesaid work to A-4.\n\nPursuant to the instructions of A-1 and A-2, B. N. Desai, a representative of A-4 was associated with the revised survey which was carried from March 21 to March 26, 1965.\n\nAs a result of the joint survey, kacha level plan (Exh. 22) and work-sheet (Exh. 23) were prepared by A-3 under the directions of Varandani.\n\nAs a result of this survey, it was found that rock cutting and filling would have to be done to the extent of 23,30,454 cft. and 31,500 cft. respectively as against 16,80,000 cft. and 8,00,000 cft. respectively as found as a result of the earlier survey.\n\nNotwithstanding the large variations in the cutting and filling work which required to be done as a result of the revised joint survey, the Engineering Department did not invite fresh tendett but instead prepared another comparative statement on the basis of the rates quoted by Ram & Co. and A-4 in their tenders opened on March 15, 1965 and showed therein that the tender of A-4 had turned out to be the lowest and that of Ram & Co. to be the second\n\n• lowest. On April 7, 1965, A-2 drew up tender committee proceedings (Exh. 16) as reproduced below and got them signed by A-1 in the hope that the recommendations made therein would be accepted by Srivastava, (P.W. 5) the Financial Controller and Patel. the Operation Manager of the Corporation, who were the other members H of the Tender Committee, in addition to A-l and finally by Gopiil Krishan, the then Chairman of the Company :-\n\n\"Ref. No. ENG/ASK/Q 250 April 7, 1965.\n\nSubject : Tender Committee proceedings for the finalisation of rock cutting, levelling of plot, taken over from M/s. Tata at Bombay.\n\n(1) We had taken over 13.5 acres of land from M/s.\n\nTata Power House at Trombay. It was intended to level this plot of land and recover about 7 acres of land by cutting and levelling in order to put up our Black Storage tanks and other allied facilities.\n\nDue to the uneven terrain, it was decided to have two steppings so that the storage tanks may be installed at a higher level and the remaining administrative blocks, were house stores etc., at a lower level.\n\nAccordingly, Public Tenders were invited for rock cutting and filling this area on 100 cft. basis.\n\n(2) Subsequently, M/s. Lobitos Oil Fields Ltd. Ellesmere Port, Wirral, Cheshire, had negotiations with us for putting up a Transformer Oil Blending Plant at this site.\n\nThe representatives of the above firm during their discussions with C. & S. M. and M. E. (accused No. 1) stated, that they would like to have only plain piece of land instead of steppings as was decided by us previously.\n\nThis will entail additional cutting and minimise the quantity of filling.\n\n(3) Our estimated quantity previously was 16,80,000 cft. of cutting and 8,00,000 cft. of filling.\n\nAs per the revision in the levels to be maintained at this site that the total quantity of cutting comes to 23,30,456 cft.\n\nThe quantity of filling comes to 31,500 cft. The total estimated cost for the original work was Rs. 6,13,200/-.\n\nA comparative statement has been drawn as per the tendered rates quoted by the various parties and the position of the first three is as follows\n\nS. Name of Contractor Qty.\n\nRate Amount Total No. %Cft.\n\n1. N. N. Desai Cutting 23,30,450 Cft.\n\n26/- Sd.\n\n6,05,917'L 6,07,807 Filling 31,500 Cft. 6/- 1,890 f\n\n2. Ram & Co.\n\nCutting 23,30,450 28/- 6,52,526 6,52,52'6 Cft.\n\nFilling 31,500 cft. free\n\n6,52,526'\\\n\n3. Libery Constructions Cutting 23,30,450 28/- Cft.\n\n3,150 J~\n\n6,55,676\n\nFilling 31,500 cft.\n\n'-..\n\n• •\n\nM/s. N. N. Desai, Contractor arc the lowest.\n\nThe Tender Committee therefore recommends that this work may be allotted to M/s. N. N. Desai, Contractor at their quoted rate of Rs. 6,07,8071being the lowest tenderer.\n\nSd/- (S. P. Bhatnagar)\n\nM.E.\n\nApproved (P. A. Gopalakrishnan)\n\n(A. K. Srivastava)\n\nF.O. !H. B. Patel)\n\nO.M.\n\nChairman.··\n\nContrary to the expectations of A-1 and A-2, Srivastava (P.W.\n\n5) refused to be a party to the Tender Committee recommendations.\n\nIgnoring not only the opposition of Srivastava and the suggestion of the Accounts Officer of the Finance Department and the Assistant Finance Controller of the Corporation made vide Exhibit 68 and Exhibit 31 respectively while processing the tender committee proceedings that in view of the fact that both the quantity and value of the work had increased substantially as a result of the revised survey, it would be fair and proper to ask all the contractors \"'l who had responded to the tender notice to re-submit their quotations\n\n-- but also the offer made by Ram & Co. (which possessed the requisite skill and equipment) to execute the contract at the lower rates of Rs. 20/- per 100 cft. for rock cutting and Rs. 15/- per 100 cit. for filling as well as the flat refusal to reduce his rates given by A-4 during the negotiations conducted at the suggestion of the Accounts Departmcr•t of :the Corporation on April 17, 1965 with the three contractors mentioned in Exhibit 16, A-2 carried on, in pursuance of the conspiracy entered into between himself and A-1 and A-4 fresh negotiations with A-4 on or about April 20, 1965 without associating any member of the Finance Department and persuaded him to accept the lowest revised rates offered by Ram & Co. although he did not possess the requisite experience in and equipment for rock cutting and filling and by passing the Financial Controller forwarded the papers'to the Operation Manager who not being conversant with the proceedings supported A-2 for entrusting the contract to A-4 at the lowest rates offered by Ram & Co.\n\nOn the Tender Committee recommendations reaching him in circulation.\n\nSrivastava put on record his bold and emphatic protest but eventually reluctantly gave his con-\n\nA currence to the recommendations made by A-1 and the Operation Manager as is evident from the concluding sentence of the Note :\n\n\"The case is recommended for acceptance of the Chairman only because the Engineering Manager has certified that he would not be able to accept any responsibility about the deadline if work is not given to Desai.\"\n\nAlthough according to A-2's note (Exh. 33) dated April 19, 1965, the Coordinator and Sales Manager was keen to have the site developed as early as possible, the latter held up the matter for nearly three months in the vain expectation that the work would be done free of cost either by the Government of Maharashtra or the Bharat\n\nSevak Samaj and it was not before July 15, 1967 that he gave his\n\napproval to A-l's proposal to award the contract to A-4 whereafter accepting the said proposal the Managing Director of the Marketing Division and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation accorded sanction to the entrustment of the work to A-4.\n\nOn receipt of the sanction, A-1 forwarded the papers with his endorsement to the Financial C:ontro!ler on July 29, 1965.\n\nOn July 30, 1965, work order (Exh. 19) manifesting quantity of rock cutting work as 29,30,450 cft., filling work as 90,000 cft. and value of the work as Rs. 5,99,590/- as against the corresponding figures of 23,30,450 cft., 31,500 cft. and Rs. 4,70,000/- respectively as specified in the final sanction which was based on the aforesaid level statement (Exh. 22) and work sheet (Exh. 23) was prepared and handed over by A-2 to A-4. Copies of the work order were also endorsed by A-2 to the f Bills Section of the Engineering Department and the Accounts Section of the Finance Department of the Corporation with the endorsement \"the above has Chairman's approval on our note of even reference dated 7th April 1965.\n\nPlease have the agreement executed.\n\nEarnest money of unsuccessful tenderers may also please be refunded early.\" On July 30, 1965, formal contract (Exh. 74) mentioning only the number and date of the work order in the blank columns of the printed forrn was prepared and signed by A-4 and a representative of the Company.\n\nThe joint level statement Exhibit 22 and the work sheet Exhibit 23 in respect of the joint survey made between March 21 and 26, 1965 for ascertaining the extent of rock cutting and filling which formed the basis for invitation of tenders and the final sanction in favour of A-4 were not only left unsigned by the concerned but were actually removed from the file and were substituted by spurious level plan (Exh. 24) and its copy (Exh. 38) which were fabricated by A-3 to justify the inflated figures of rock cutting and filling work mentioned in the work order (Exh. 19) dated\n\n-.A\n\nJuly 29/30, 1965. On August 19, 1965, fabricated level plans A (Exhibits 24 and 38) prepared by A-3 were sent to A-4 as annexures to Exhibit 106 which ran as under :-\n\n\"We are enclosing herewith two prints of spot level of land area to be dressed and levelled at our Trombay plot.\n\nThe whole plot should be brought to a level of 102.00 as directed.\n\nPlease return to us a copy of the Blue Print showing spot levels duly signed as a token of acceptance of the same for payment.\"\n\nWhile A-4 retained one of the spurious plans viz. Exhibit 38 with himself, he returned the other viz. Exhibit 24 after putting his initials thereon.\n\nThereafter A-3 endorsed on the Jetter Exhibit 106 that 'the print signed by A-4 should be filed by Sukhtankar (P.W. 13 J who is in charge of the filing section.' Accordingly, Sukhtankar filed Exhibit 106 alongwith Exhibit 24 in the Bill Section.\n\nThe actual rock cutting operations commenced with effect from August 1, 1965 and on August 27, 1965, A-4 prepared and submitted the first running bill (Exhibit 51) indicating that 8,00,000 cft. of cutting work and 80,000 cft. of filling work had been completed. This bill was accompanied by the certificate of A-3 reading as under :-\n\n\"The measurements on which column No. 3 of this bill are based were taken by me on 24-8-65 and recorded at pages of MMC No. 7201.\n\nCertified that the quantities of work actually executed as shown in column No. 4 has actually been done and in no case less than the on account payments claimed.''\n\nThe above certificate was countersigned by A-2 on August 26,\n\n1965. A-2, A-3 and A-4 also signed measurement certificate (Exhibit 52) which read as follows :-\n\n\"We certify that the measurements given above are the actual works carried out in accordance with the drawings and specifications as indicated in the work order referred to above.\"\n\nOn the basis of these certificates, the first on account running bill H was passed and paid for.\n\nThereafter the second and third running bills and measurement certificates Exhibits 53 and 54 dated Septembcr 16, 1965 and November 17, 1965 respectively claiming that the\n\nadditional cutting work of 5,00,000 cft. and 8,00,000 cft. had been done were likewise prepared by A-4 and signed by A-3 and countcrsigned by A-2.\n\nThe fourth running bill and measurement certificate (Exh. 55) dated February 22, 1966 claiming that additional work to the extent of 7,00,000 cft. had been done was prepared by A-4 and signed by A-3. This bill which was countersigned by K. S. Joshi, another Senior Engineer who was put incharge of the Project in :he absence of A-2 who had been transferred to Delhi was also paid.\n\nOn November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager.\n\nAccordingly Naik met Ramrao who directed him to go to the spot and have the level drawings.\n\nPursuant to this direction, Naik went to the site for spot verification and reported to Ramrao vide Exhibit 18 that excepting at one place where he got a level of 102-9 nowhere else did he get a level of 102. Naik also reported that as against an area of 7 .4 acres which had to be levelled hardiy an area of 4.8 acres was attempted to be levelled.\n\nOn December 30, 1966, A-4 submitted his final bill (Exb. 56) claiming to have completed the work by August 11, 1966. This bill bore the certificate dated December 29, 1966 of A-3 to the effect that the measurements on which column No. 3 of the bill was based was taken by him on that date, and bad been recorded in the measurements of the .M.B.M.C. book. A-3 also recorded a further certificate to tho effect that the work had been completed 100% according to the specifications and drawings.\n\nThis certificate of A-3 was followed by another certificate of A-4 that he accepted the above certificate and certifiee that the amount of payment which he received on that bill would be in full and final settlement of all his claims in respect of the work excepting the refund of his security deposit.\n\nBy this bill, A-4 claimed to have done 3,84,720 cft. of cutting work and 18,200 cft. of hlling work in addition to the work covered by the four earlier running bills.\n\nThus A-4 claimed to have done 31,84,720 cft. of rock cutting work and 98,200 cft. of filling work.\n\nOn this bill, which bore the certificates of A-3 and A-4 was countersigned by Ramrao on December 30, 1961 and wherein it was falsely claimed by A-4 that the work was completed on August 11, 1966-although that date was also much beyond the stipulated clate-A-3 recorded the foilowing note:-\n\n• •\n\n\"The final bill amounts to Rs. 6,51,674/- and is in excess of work order amount by Rs. 52,084.\n\nSince this excess is within 10% of the ordered amount, M.E. may kindly approve.\"\n\nAccordingly the papers were laid before A-1 who accorded the desired approval the moment the bill was laid before him and sent it for payment to the Accounts Officer ignoring the practice which required all such bills involving an excess of 10% over the sanctioned amount to be submitted to the Chairman for sanction.\n\nOn the bill coming before the Accounts Department for scrutiny, it pointed out that since the actual work exceeded the sanctioned amount by Rs. 52,084/- for which originally the approval of the Chairman was taken, the excess needed to be regularised by obtaining his sanction. It was also pointed out that as the contractor had not completed the work within the stipulated time, the question of imposition of penalty also required to be considered.\n\nOn the pay order being returned to the Engineering Department, Ramrao, the then Deputy Engiueering Manager, submitted the following reply vide Exhibit 59 dated January 12, 1967 :-\n\n\"The work is now completed as required.\n\nHowever to acquire the required level and gradient, the quantity of\n\nwork has increased.\n\nThe party has now submitted their E final bill for this work amounting to Rs. 6,51,674/- which is in excess by Rs. 52,084/- than the original amount of work order .\n\nThe excess is within 10% of the original estimate, M.D. is therefore requested to kindly approve the excess wdrk done and to pass the final bill for Rs. 6,51,674/-.\n\nAs per the work order, the work was to be completed within 4 months (120 working days). However, the Contractors could not complete this work including the disposal of the excavated stuff within this time limit due to the fact that there was no approach available to this plot.\n\nThe party has completed the work expeditiously, after the approach was given to them by M/s. Talas.\n\nM. D. is therefore, requested to consider this aspect and approve the time limit extension upto 11-8-1966, the date on which the party has completed the work.\" l8-40SCI/79\n\nOn the matter coming back to the Finance Department, Shende (P.W. 16) pointed out that not only the quantities of rock cutting and filling work which were found as a result of the survey made between March 21 and 26, 1965 had been enormously inflated in the work order but the work claimed to have been done also exceeded the inflated figures mentioned in the work order. He, therefore, suggested that the Department might agree to the payment of extra amount to A-4 subject to A-l's obtaining the Board's ratification. Sometime before March 28, 1967, Krishnaswamy Rajam (P.W. 1), the Chief Internal Auditor, was summoned by the Managing Director and the General Manager and was asked to have a personal talk with A-3 in connection with the matter.\n\nOn P.W. l's questioning A-3 on March 28, 1967, the latter made confessional statement (Exh. 21) which is. reproduced below for facility of reference :-\n\n''Regarding rock cutting and filling at T rombay site I wish to bring to your kind attention the following :\n\nI was assigned to this job after the work was started at site by M/s N. N. Desai.\n\nThe original estimates for cutting and filling were 16,80,000 cft. and 8,00,000 cft. respectively. It was later revised to 23,30,450 cft. and 31,500 cft. for cutting and filling.\n\nI have got the workings for this revision with me at Ahmedabad. (He refers to the genuine level statements and plans and worksheets Bxs. 22 and 23 which were prepared by him under the directions of Varandani between 21st and 26th March, 1965).\n\nLater on I was advised by my superiors to give a still further upward revision giving the quantities as 29,30,450 cft. for cutting and 90,000 cft. for filling.\n\nThe work sheets prepared by me and signed by contractor only (N. N. Desai) has no bearing to actual quantities involved.\n\nI had merely acted as asked by my superiors in preparing worksheets accordingly which has resulted in this upward revision. I have also given measurement certificates irr this regard in line with the revised wrong quantities.\n\nI realise now this has resulted in making excess payments to the contractor. I beg to be excused for having done such a thing which was done solely at the instance of my superiors in Engineering Depart-\n\n.... •\n\n~ •' I\n\n, ..\n\n.-;\n\nment.\n\nE.M. (accused No. 1) and Dy. E.M. are A aware of this.\"\n\nThereupon P.W. 1 put up the papers before the Managing Director and the General Manager who advised him to start investigation on particular lines. During the course of the inquiry, A-2 told P.W. 1 that the work order which as far as he remembered was prepared by A-3 was cursorily signed by him due to heavy rush of work and that while checking the running bills submitted for payment, he normally checked the percentage of progress of work certified by the Assistant Engineer.\n\nOn further investigation made on April I, 1967, A-3 produced the genuine level statement (Exh. 22) and the work sheet (Exh. 23) before P.W. 1 and told him that the substitution of the fabricated level statement and work sheet relating to rock cutting and filling at Trombay was done at the instance of Joshi, A-2 and A-1 and that they were aware of the same.\n\nTo the further question as to what was the basis for the work order for the figure of 29,00,000 cft. of rock cutting and 90,000 cft. of filling, A-3 told P.W. 1 that there was no basis for the work order and the quantities were fixed to suit sanctioned amount.\n\nOn a query being made by P .W. 1 from Ramrao regarding the final bill, he admitted that he had not personally checked the calculations and had counter; signed the bill relying on the accuracy of the measurements shown in the bill which was prepared by A-3. He further stated that he had not personally checked the calculations based on the final bill and initialled joint levels which according to him were normally done by the Assistant Engineer.\n\nDuring the course of this inquiry, Murthy (P.W. 18) was deputed by A-1 and Krishnaswamy (P.W. 1) to go to the spot and find out the work which had actually been done.\n\nThereupon, Murthy (P. W.\n\n18) submitted his interim report on April 6, 1967 pointing out that at only one place the level was 103.94 and elsewhere it remained much more.\n\nBy his final report (Exh. 44) dated April 20, 1967, Murthy (P.W. 18) pointed out tha~ actually on the spot only 9,73,000\n\ncft. of rock cutting and 50,000 cft. of filling had been done.\n\nAfter recording the statements of A-2, A-3 and A-4, Krislmaswamy (P.W.\n\n1) submitted a detailed report (Exh. 25) on April 8, 1967 to the Managing Director through the Financial Controller. In his report, P.W. 1 also pointed out that contour plan/levels statement which in case of this nature are jointly signed by the contractor and the representative of the Engineering Department were not available in the instant case for inspection and that A-3 had produced a level statement alleged to have been processed by him and Varandani which was not signed by any hody including A-3's superiors.\n\nP.W. 1 also\n\npointed out in the course of the report that the quantities of rock cutting and filling shown in the work order were 29,30,450 cft. and 90,000 cft. respectively and that there was an increase of 6,00,000 cft. of rock cutting straightaway.\n\nKrishnaswamy (P.W. 1) also mentioned in his report that according to A-3, the level statement giving the figure of 29,30,450 cft. for cutting and 90.000 cft. for filling had been signed by A-4. ~\n\nOn the report being put up before the then Financial Controller, he directed that before proceeding with the matter, it was necessary to call for the comments of A-1.\n\nThereupon after calling for a report from Ramrao, A-1 gave his comments vide Exhibit 178 dated April 17, 1967 wherein after doubting the competence and qualification of P.W. 1 to hold the investigation, he offered to send one of the senior engineers from Western Branch to carry out an independent survey to find out the quantity of work done by A-4 and suggested that measurements might be made by reference to the kacha level statement (Exh. 125), the work sheet (Exh. 126) and the contour plan (Exh. 34) which were checked by A-2 and approved by him and which must be with the department. On April 18, 1967, A-1 sent for A-3 and questioned him in regard to the matter. In the statement penned by A-3 himself, he stated that he changed the levels of drawing of Trombay plot regarding rock cutting and filling job at the instance of A-2 and KSJ (i.e. Joshi) but did not inform A-1.\n\nOn May 3, 1967, A-1 issued show cause notices to A-2 and A-3 with a view to hold departmental enquiry against them. By his reply dated May 20, 1967 to the show cause notice, A-3 stated that he had changed the original contour plan at the instance of A-2.\n\nOn getting information on July 15, 1967 that A-4 was having some rock cutting done on the site althougli he had in his final bill claimed that he had fully completed the work on August 11, 1966, A-1 and A-2 visited the site along with Lakshmanan, the Operations Manager and finding that the work of rock cutting was still going on and that the claim of A-4 as certified by A-3 and countersigned by Ramrao about the work having been completed on August 11, 1966 was apparently false had the measurements of rock cutting and filling work taken by Ganapathy.\n\nAs the measurements taken by Ganpathy were on the basis of level plans prepared by Talas in which the bench mark was 94.5 as against the bench mark of 100 for the survey in question, the Managing Director had the measurements taken by M/s R. L. Dalal & Co. The report of Dalal & Co. showed that the rock cutting work done was 9,60,000 cft. and filling work was 1,96,000 cft. only.\n\n• • ..\n\nOn July 28, 1967, the Managing Director issued a charge sheet to A-1, A-2, A-3 and Ramrao. In his reply (Exh.64) dated August 4, 1967 to the charge sheet, A-3 submitted that whatever he did was W1der the orders of A-1 and the Deputy Engineering Manager.\n\nThis time he did not mention A-2 to be responsible for anything done by him.\n\nOn the same day i.e. August 4, 1967, A-1 sent for A-3 in his cabin and questioned him in the presence of three other officers viz.\n\nRoy Chowdhary (P.W.2), who was the Deputy Financial Controller, Shriyan (P .W.23), the Assistant Engineer, and Vora, the Senior Engineer.\n\nOn this Occasion, A-3 allegedly made statement (Exh.43) absolving A-1 and throwing the entire responsibility on A-2.\n\nWhile the three other officers and A-1 signed the statement (Exh.48) made by A-3, A-3 declined to sign it and fled away from the chamber on some excuse and rushed to the chamber of Krishnaswamy, Chief Internal Auditor whereupon Roy Chowdhary (P.W.2) also followed A-3 to the chamber of Kri, shnaswamy.\n\nIn the chamber of Krishnaswamy, A-3 resiled from the statement.\n\nHaving regard to the position adopted by A-3 in resiling from his earlier statement of that very day before A-1, Roy Chowdhary reminded him that in the morning ill his presence, he had stated that it was A-2 who was responsible for asking him to change the drawing and increase the quantities.\n\nTo this question of Roy Chowdhary in the chall!ber of Krishnaswamy, A-3 replied in tho negative and stated that A-1 called him and Joshi into his room and instructed him personally to increase the quantity.\n\nWhen questioned by Roy Chowdhary as to why he did not come out with that \"\"\" truth in the room of A-1 in the presence of Roy Chowdhary, A-3 replied that he did not do so out of fear or A-1.\n\nIn his reply to the charge sheet, Ramrao inter alia stated that he signed the bill (Exh.56) relying on the certificate of A-3 who had been assigned to the job and added that according to the practice prevailing in the Corporation, Senior Engineers were not expected to verify the measurements.\n\nElaborating his explanation; he stated that just as Senior Engineer, Doraiswamy could not proceed to a BPI nor Senior Engineer Vora nor Senior Engineer Chari could proceed to an installation just to verify the billed quantities in view of the fact that there were a number of bills on each work order and so many work orders for each location.\n\nSimilarly in the Branches, Senior Engineers who were controlling the work for so many depots and installations were not expected to verify the quantities in each bill; that however, if there was a dispute with the contractor or there was some other reason to doubt the correctness of the Assistant Engineer's certificate, the Senior\n\nEngineer might either take measurements himself or get them taken by another Assistant Engineer; that subsequent to the counter signature by the Senior Engineer, the bill was passed on to the Engineering Bills Section where the bills were checked by the Accountant against sanctions, work order, rates and amounts, deductions for cement A. C. sheets or other materials supplied ar.d security; deposit etc; that the Accountant prepared the pay order giving all these details for 'iignaturc by a Senior Engineer as far as possible other than the countersigning Senior Engineer; that the bill then went to the Accounts Department\n\nwhere it was snbjected to further detailed scrutiny before payment; that on December 30, 1966 Vaidya bronght the bill for Rs.79, 674/- dated December 30, 1966 to him for counter signature; that it would have normally been put up to K. S. Joshi but was brought to him as he was not available; that Vaidya was the Assistant Engineer who had handled that contract from the time of placing the work order; that the bill was for the work carried out by the Contractor subsequent to the previous 'on account bill' 21-2-66 (nearly 10 months earlier) i.e. about 3.18 lakhs cft. at Rs. 20/- per lCO cft. of cutting and 18,200 dt. of filling at Rs. 15/- per 100 cft; that he bad visited Trombay number of times in connection with other works during the period cormnencing from August, 1966 and was aware that the Contractor had carried out approximately that much work during 1966; that the extra quantity required sanction of competent authority; that the previous bills passed showed that the major portion o[ the work was carried out during the period August to December, 1965 and about 7 lakhs CFr of cu!ting\n\nduring December, 1965 to February, 1966; that A. S. Krishnaswamy who placed the work order bad countersigned bills upto 21 lakhs cft.\n\nof cutting and 80.ono cft. of filling as early as November 17, 1965 and subsequently K. S. Joshi had countersigned a bill for an additional 7 lakhs cft. of cutting and the contractor had already been paid Rs. 5.72 lakhs less security deposit; that he, therefore' countersigned the bill dated December 30, 1966 and passed it on to M.E. for approval of the extra quantity of cutting; that M.E. approved on the same date and the bills was sent to Engineering Bills for scrutiny by the Accountant in respect of sanctions, work; order term.s etc; that he also particularly instructed that the bill should be shown to K. S. Joshi before the pay order was issued since normally the bill should have gone to him for counter signature; that the Accountant carried out his inStructions; that the counter signature did not denote final passing of a bill but only that it might be proceeded further and subjected to all the necessary administrative and financial checks before payment; that all the bills for the work bad been certified by the Assistant Engineer incharge who was fully familiar with work and the previous bills had been counter-\n\n.....\n\n. •(' -.\n\nI\" '\n\nsigned by colleagues of status equal to him; that he had no reasons to suspect any malpractice or mistakes and also there was no dispute with contractor; that he had exercise the normal technical checks which were the functions denoted by counter signature as per the prevailing practice and that countersignature did not imply correctness of the quantities certified by the Assistant Engineer (who alone was responsible for the correctness) in either the current or previous bilis.\n\nWhen the matter was thus pending, a confidential information reached Rege, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. (P.W. 27)\n\nwho registered the case on December 27, 1967.\n\nDuring the course \"'. investigation, he visited the office. of the Corporation, !ook charge of all the concerned documents. had the site measured by Shivashankar.\n\nTechnical Examiner, Central Intelligence Service, ( P.W.4) accnrdin;\n\nto whom the cutting and filling work done by the contractor was to the extent of 9,61,000 cft. and 1,50,000 cit. resp£ctively and after securing the requisite sanction, prosecuted A-1, A-2 and A-3 and also submitted the charge sheet against A-4 with the result that all the four accused were convicted.\n\nIn these appeals, we have had the advantage of hearing full Jrcsscd arguments of counsel on both sides who diligently prepared the case and put across their respective contentions with great ability.\n\nWe must point out at the outset that although the trial court had clearly acquitted A-1 of the charge under section 409 read with section 120-B aqd section 109 of the Indian Penal Code it unfortunately forgot to keep that fact in mind with the result that while concluding its judgment it held him guilty on tllat charge as well. Jn the circumstances, it was not open to the High Court in the appeal by A-1 to go into that charge and reverse the findings arrived at by the trial court.\n\nWe will accordingly be concerned with the question of validity of A-1 's conviction nnder section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act only but so far as A-2 is concerned, we will have to examine the validity of his conviction uncler ,,)1 the charges.\n\nBefore examining the sufficiency or otherwise of the material bearing on the charges against both the appellants, we consider it necessary to have a clear concept of the meaning and ambit of the phraseology \"by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant\" used in section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Acl\"l for the mnt.cu- . . vention of which the appellants have been convicted.\n\nIt will be advantageous in this connection to refer to two decisions rendered by this\n\nA Court in M. Narayanana Nambiar v. State of Kera/a(') and Major S. K. Kale v. State of Maharashtra.(') In the first case, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) while construing clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act observed :-\n\n\"The pharaseology 'by otherwise abusing his position as public servant' covers acts done otherwise than by corrupt or illegal means by an officer abusing his position. The gist of the offence under this clause is that a public officer abusing his position as a public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. \"Abuse\" means misuse i.e. using his position for something for which it is not intended.\n\nThat abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise than those means.\n\nThe word 'otherwise' has wide connotation and if no limitation is placed on it the words 'corrupt', 'illegal' and 'otherwise' mentioned in the clause become surplusage, for on that construction every abuse of position is gathered by the clause.\n\nSo some limitation will have to be put on that word and that limitation is that it takes colour from the preceding words along with which it appears in the clause, that is to say something savouring of dishonest act on his part.\n\nThe contention of the learned counsel that if the clause is widely construed even a recommendation made by a public servant for securing a job for another may come within the clause and that could not have been the intention of the Legislature.\n\nBut in our view such inocuous acts will not be covered by the said clause.\n\nThe juxtaposition of the word otherwise' with the words \"corrupt or illegal means\" and the dishonesty implict in the word \"abuse\" indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on his part to bring him within the meaning of the clause.\n\nWhether he abused his position or not depends upon the facts of each case.\"\n\nFollowing the decision in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of G Kerala (supra), it was beld by this Court in Major S. K. Kale v. State of Maharashtra (supra) that tbe abuse of a position in order to come within the mischief of the section must necessarily be dishonest so that it may be proved that the accused caused deliberate loss to the department. It was further held in this case that it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the accused by corrupt or illegal means or by H abusing his position obtained any pecuniary advantage for some other\n\n(I) [19631 Supp. 2. s.c.R. 724.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1977 S.C. 822.\n\n' -\n\n...\n\n~Jl\n\nperson.\n\nIt would, therefore, be necessary to find out in this case as to whether the accused abused their position and acted dishonestly or with a corrupt or oblique motive in having the contract in question entrusted tc A-4. As the courts below have rested their judgments on a cons .. tellation of circumstances, it would be well to bear in mind the fundamental rule relating to the proof of guilt based on circumstantial evidence which has been settled by a long line of decisions of this Court.\n\nThe rule is to the effect that in cases depending on circumstantial evidence, there is always the dang.\\Or that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof.\n\nIn such cases the mind is apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them zo llttle, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely it is, considering such matters to cover reach and mislead itselt. to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete.\n\nIn cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypotheisis of the guilt of the accused.\n\nAgain, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one pro- ' posed to be proved.\n\nIn other words, there must be a chain of evi-\n\n- ' dence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable grounds for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (See Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.,(1) Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab(') and Charan Singh v .\n\nState of U.P. (3).\n\nThe principle that inculpatory fact must be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of gnilt does not mean that any extravagant G hypothesis would be sufficient to sustain the principle, but that the hypothesis suggested must be reasonable. (See Govinda Reddy v .\n\nState of Mysore(').\n\n(1) [!952] S.C.R. 1091~A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 343.\n\n(2) [1953] $.C.R. 94~A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 354\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 520.\n\n( 4) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 29.\n\nKeeping in view the aforesaid construction placed on section 5 (l)(d) of the Act and the principles with regard to proof of guilt based on circumstantial evidence, let us now turn to the various circumstauces which have been relied upon by the High Court in holding the appellants guilty and see whether they factually exist and if so whether they are of such a character as to be wholly incompatible with the innocence of the appellants and consistent only with their guilt. In so doing, we purpose to divide the aforesaid circumstances under the following broad heads and deal with them seriatim :-\n\n1. The conduct of the appellants evidencing their keenness to have the contract entrusted to A-4.\n\n2. Issue of work order (Exh. 19) with inflated figures relating to rock cutting and filling.\n\n3. Removal of statement of level plan (Exh. 22) and work sheet (Exh. 23) from the departmental file and fabrication and substitution in their place of the fabricated ones by A-3.\n\n4. Despatch on August 19, 1965 of spurious level plan (Exh. 24) and its copy (Exh. 38) by A-2 to A-4 as annexures to Exhibit 106.\n\n5. Counter-signing of the on running bills by A-2.\n\n6. The initialling of the final bill by A-1.\n\nThe first circumstance relied upon by the High Court in this behalf is that though the revised tender notice was limited to the eleven contractors who had originally submitted their tenders in response to the Tender Notice (Exh. 28), the appellants improperly got a tender form issued to A-4 and entertained by the Tender Committee.\n\nIt is true that the copies of Exhibit 15 on which the prosecution has sought to rely were sent by registered post to the eleven original tenderers by the Engineering Department of the Corporation but it cannot be overlooked that there is nothing in Exhibit 15 or elshhere on the record to indicate that other contractors were precluded from submitting their tenders or that the corrigendum extending the date for submission of the tenders was neither intended to be published nor was it actually published. It seems that the attention of the High Court was not drawn to the co=unication (Exh.\n\n29) dated March 9, 1965 addressed by Ranganath, Public Relations\n\nt (\n\nOfficer, to the Advertisement Manager, Times of India and others and A the corrigendum forming annexure thereto which ran as under :-\n\nINDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED\n\n(MARKETING DIVISION)\n\nClarke Road, Mahalaxmi, Bombay-34, WB, India\n\nIN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO\n\nPR 31 317 9th March, 1965\n\nThe Advertisement Manager, The Times of India, (Bombay) The Indian Express, (Bombay) Free Press Journal, (Bombay)\n\nDear Sir,\n\nSubject : Tender No. 249/65 Corrigendum\n\nAttached is text of an advertisement for IMMEDIATE Publication utilising the minimum possible space under Public Notice/Tenders or in its appropriate place.\n\nWe would appreciate your treating this request as URGENT.\n\nThanking you.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd/-\n\n(B. V. Ranganalh) F\n\nEncl One.\n\nPublic Relations Officer\n\nc.c. Engineering Manager, H.O. with reference to their inter-office memo No- Eng/ ASK dated 9-3-1965.\n\nWe are trying to get it published on March 10.\n\nINDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.\n\n(MARKETING DMSION) Corrigendum to Public Tender No. 249 /65\n\nThe last date for receiving this Tender has been exten- H ded to 15th March, 1965 at 2-30 P.M. and will be opened the same day at 3-00 P.M.\"\n\nThe attention of the High Court also does not seem to have been invited to the above noted endorsement at the foot of Exhibit 29.\n\nThe High Court also seems to be wrong in thinking that out of the nine contractors who submitted their tenders in response to the revised tender notice, eight were from the original nine tenders and the ninth was A-4. A comparison of the two lists viz. the one of the original tenders and the other of those contractors who submitted their tenders in response to the revised tender notice would make it clear that five contractors appearing in the second list were fresh tenderers.\n\nThe Financial Controller's note (Exh. 17) dated April 2, 1965 which appears to be the outcome of some personal pique itself shows that it was only on April 15, 1965 that it was agreed between the members of the Tender Committee that the grant of the contract would be confined to one out of the three lowest tenderers, one of whom was\n\nA-4.\n\nThe fact that none of the eleven officers of the Finance and the EnginG-ering Department of the Corporation who handled the file relating to the grant of the contract in question ever raised any objection regarding the improper reception or entertainment of A-4's tender by the Engineering Department is a proof positive of the fact that Lhere was nothing wrong about the issue of tender form to A-4 or its entertainment by the appellants.\n\nThus it is clear that the first circumstance relied upon by the High Cour.t had no factual existence and could not be pressed into service against the appellants.\n\nThe next finding of the High Court that while Ram & Co. was best fitted for entrustment of the contract in question in view of the vast experience and equipment possessed by it, A-4 did not have any such merit.\n\nIt is a matter of common knowledge that rock cutting is not a specialised job and no extra-ordinary skill or experience is required for the same and that every civil construction involves some sort of rock cutting. It is also in evidence that A-4 who was the Corporation's old and tried contractor had previously executed 98 works including the one on the An-top Hill in Bombay for the Corporation to its entire satisfication, and out of the aforesaid works many related to installations which were more complicated than rock cutting and filling. It would also be noticed that in the notes put up\n\n--•\"\n\nby them neither Srivastava (P.W. 5) nor Shivananda, Superintendent,\n\nllOr Khurana, Assistant Financial Controller of the Finance Department, nor the Operation Manager ever pointed out that A14 lacked the requisite experience or competence which disentitled him to the grant of the contract.\n\nIn fact Shivananda and Khurana had suggested as an alternative to inviting fresh tenders that A-4 should be asked to reduce his rates in view of the revised figures on account of which the value of the contract had gone up considerably.\n\nIt wonld also be noticed that the High Court while rightly holding that Exhibit 122 was not delivered to A-1 by Roshan Lal (P.W. 19) tell into an error in observing that A-1 had a hand in suppressing it.\n\nIt seems to have escaped its notice that at the negotiations conducted on April 17, 1965 with the three lowest tenderers viz. Ram and Co., Liberty and Co., and A-4 by the Tender Committee, of which P.W. 5 was a prominent member, Roshan Lal was present and while pressing his firm's claim to the grant of the contract he did draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the contents of Ext. 122 sent earlier by his firm to the Corporation. This is evident from Roshan Lal's own admission that he informed the corporation in writing as to his experience in the line and whatever he had written he had also told the concerned officers who were two or three in number.\n\nIf A-1 wonld have had a hand in suppressing Ext. 122 he would not have allowed it to remain on the file.\n\nThat apart a barn.perusal of report Ext. 33 which i's fairly ddailed is enough to show that neither A-1 nor A-2 was intere'sted in suppressing or distorting any material fact.\n\nThere was, therefore, hardly any justification for the observation in question.\n\nThe third finding of the High Court that the appellants told Vrindani (P.W. 20) and Vaidya (A-3) that it had already been decided to entrust the contract to A-4 and in order not to loose time, a joint survey should be made, is also erroneous. It is unbelievable that A-1 and A-2 who were pre-occupied with several projects would go and tell Vrindani who was three or four steps below them and was admittedly not a member of the conspiracy nor concerned with policy matters that it had been already decided to assign the contract to A-4.\n\nThe aforesaid briefing attributed to the appellants also seems to be incredible in view of the fact that it was only on the basis of the level measurements taken by P.W. 20 and A-3 during the survey made by them between March 20 and 26, 1965 that A-4 turned out to be the lowest tenderer and at the time when the briefing is alleged to have been given the lowest tender was of Ram & Co.\n\nThe insinuation implicit in the fourth finding of the High Court that Exts. 16, 17, 30-33 and 123 led to the inference that A-1 was the author and architect of the proposal for acceptance of A-4's tender, is also unwarranted. There is nothing in these documents which can be interpreted to indicate that the appellant was actuated by any ulterior or corrupt motive or that he was guilty of any mis-demeanour, irregularity or impropriety. Pn the contrary the said documents particularly Exts. 16 and 33, which like an open book fairly set-out all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the allotment of the contract in question including the claim thereto of Ram & Co. not only manifest, that the procedure referred to by P.W. 1 in his deposition for inviting and finalizing the tenders was meticulously followed in the present case, but also establish A-l's bona fides. It has also to be borne in mind that the Tender Committee wbich comprised of the Operation Manager and the Financial Controller in addition to A-1 had only an advisory role to play and the decision to entrust the contract to a particular contractor lay with the Chairman of the Board of Directors in consultation with the coordinator and Sales Manager who was above the Tender Committee. That the appellant's proposal favouring A-4 was in the interest of the corporation both from the point of view of economy as well as speedy and satisfactory execution of work and was solely inspired by his concern tu avoid the sad experience which the corporation had in respect of rock cutting work at An-top hill with the Kore Brothers which was a new party is evident from the following endorsement made on A33 by H. B. Patel, Operation Manager :-\n\n\"In view of the urgency and our past experience with a new party at An-top hill, I agree to Senior Engineer's proposal that we give the job to M/s. N. N. Desai at the lowest tendered rates.\"\n\nThe fifth finding of the High Conrt that the appellants had negotiations on their own with A-4 with a sinister object is also against the weight of the material on the record. The act of the appellants in trying to ascertain from A-4 whether he was prepared to reduce his rates to the level of M/s. Ram & Co. which seems to have been taken in consultation and agreement with P.W. 5 was, in our opinion, guiltless, It would be well to remember in this connection that Shrivastava P.W. 5 himself admitted in the course of his deposition that there was practice in their corporation of asking the second lowest tenderer to match his rates with the lowest tender. The proposal about the allotment of work in favour of A-4 was, therefore, not only consistent with the practice but was also in the interest of the corporation.\n\nr '\n\nIn view of the foregoing we arc inclined to think that the conduct A of the appellants in prefering A-4 to any new contractor did not savour of dishonest intention.\n\nRe. 2 : Coming to the work order (Exh. 19) containing inflated figures which is the comer stone of the prosecution case, it may be pointed out that the prosecution has not been able to produce any evidence showing the circumstances under which it was prepared. The observation of the High Court that the work order must be the creation of not only A-2 but of A-1 as well seems to be based upon mere conjecture. It would be noticed that the work order does not bear the signatures of A-1 and there is nothing to show that in the normal course, the work order had to come to A-I before being issued to A-4.\n\nWe cannot also in this connection afford to lose sight of the observations made by the trial court at page 279 of the Paper Book that 'it is a common ground that accused No. i is not concerned with the making of the order and that it is also a common ground that a work order is issued by the Engineer Incharge'. In these circumstances, it is difficult to understand how the High Court came to the conclusion that the work order (Exh. 19) was the creation of not only A-2 but of A-I as well. It seems that the finding of the High Court was influenced by its finding with regard to Exhibits 16 and 33. In view, however, of our finding with regard to Exhibits 16 and 33, the observation of the High Courc that the work order was also the creation of A-1 cannot be substained. We will, accordingly advert to the material on the record with a view only to see how far it reflects on the bonafides of A-2. The prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that A-2 dictated or prepared the work order. The proven facts show that according to the normal practice prevalent in the department it is not the Senior Engineer like appellant No. 2 who is incharge of the Project that prepared a work order but an assistant or Junior Engineer in charge of the work working under him.\n\nAlthough Varandani has in the course of his deposition tried to suggest that the work order was prepared by A-2, his suggestion cannot be relied upon in the face of Exhibit 67 whcreia he told P.W. 1 that the work order was presumably prepared by Vaidya, A-3. It is highly improbable that on the very day of the grant of the sanction of the contract in question A-2 would take the extremely hazardous step of inflating the figures to obtain undue advantage for A-4 specially when he knew that the fraud would be at once discovered by reference to the sanction which bad been transmitted to the Finance Department.\n\nThe prosecution theory that the work order giving inflated figures was not only signed but was also prepared by A-2 is also negatived\n\nA by the following endorsement on the copy of the work order sent to the Bills and Accounts Sections of the Engineering Department of the Corporation :\n\n\"The above has Chairman's approval on our note of even 1eference dated 7th April, 1965.\n\nPlease have the agreement executed.\n\nEarnest money of unsuccessful tenderer; may be refunded early.\"\n\nThe above quoted endorsement completely demolished the prosecution case. If A-2 had been the author of Exhibit 19, or had suspected that his subordinate would have dared to inflate the quantities of the work, it is inconceivable that he would have made the above quoted insertion giving the particulars of the above mentioned note meant for the Chairman's aproval in the copy of the work order addressed to the Bills and Accounts Sections which would have furnished a valuable clue for the speedy detection of the fraud that is alleged to have been perpetrated.\n\nAgain if A-2 were really a conspirator who had falsely inflated the figures of rock cutting and filling in the work order he would have seen to it that the potential documentary evidence embodied in Exhibit 125 which showed the genuine levels on the spot was destroyed or done away with.\n\nThe fact that be did not do anything of the kind raises a strong doubt about his culpability.\n\nThus though it cannot be gainsaid that A-2 has been extremely negiigent in not crutinising the papers, it seems to us that he affixed his signatures in a routine manner to the work order prepared by his subordinate engineer without realizing the importance of his act placing implicit faith in the integrity of the latter.\n\nRe. 3 : There is no clear, cogent and convincing evidence to show that A-1 or A-2 or both had a hand in the removal of the level plan (Exh. 22) or the work sheet (Exh. 23) from the departmental file relating to the contract in question and substitution in their place of the faked level plan (Exh. 24) and work sheet (Exh. 38) which were admittedly fabricated by A-3. The statements made from time to time by A-3 in this behalf being contradictory and discrepant as would be evident from the following table :\n\nDate No.\n\nNo. of the Exhibit Text of the statement -------- ------------\n\nI. 28-3-1967 21 The original estimates for cutting and filling were\n\n16,80,000 cft. and 8,00,000 cft. respectively.\n\nIt was later revised 23,30,450 cft and 31,<00 cft.\n\n_.-r\n\nDate No.\n\nNo. of the Text of the statement Exhibit\n\nfor cutting and filling ............ Later on I was advised by my superior in Engineering Depart .. ment, E. and Dy. E.M. to give a still further UP ward revision giving the quantities as 29,30,450 cft.\n\nfor cutting and 90,000 cft. for filling.\n\n2. 1-4-1967 J6 ASK, KSJ and SPB asked me to substitute SHS\n\nrelating to rock cutting and filling at Trombay which has resulted in larger quandties of cutting and filling and they are fuUy aware of it.\n\n3&4 18-4-1967 39 & 41 I told R. Krishnaswamy when he called me on\n\n5. 20-5-1967\n\n6. 4-8-1967\n\n7. 4-8-1967\n\n29-3-1967 that A.S. Krishnaswamy and K.\n\nJoshi told me to change the levels of drawings of Trornbay plot regarding rock cutting/filling job In reply to the further query of R. Krishnaswamy, I told him that I did not inform M.E. about this and that he n1ight be knowing.\n\n69 In addition to the statement dated 18-4-1967, I have to submit that I was asked to change the original contour, plane by A.S. Krishnaswamy, Senior Engineer.\n\n43 Sometime in September> 1%5. A.S. KrishnaswamY told me to increase the levels at random and bring the quantity to about 30 lakhs cft. I did so accordingly.\n\n42 The Engineering Manager called me and Shri Joshi into his room one day and instructed me personally to increase the quantity.\n\nthe prosecution ought to have made a serious attempt to produce K. S. Joshi whose testimony was essential to clear up the mystery in which the whole affair is shrouded.\n\nThe non-production of K. S.\n\nJoshi who appears to have been one of the main actors in the drama has left a lacuna which is very difficult to bridge.\n\nIn thB present state of evidence, it is inconceivable that A-1 who admittedly had a meritorious record of service, had won commendation from the Board of Directors for designing a tank and saving considerable sums of money and who was the only Head of Department to be given three advance increments for his integrity and efficient work and who had no are to grind would be a party to the unholy conspiracy for the removal of genuine level plan and work sheet and their substitution by spurious ones simply to obtain some pecuniary advantage for A-4 who was neither his friend nor relative. The position of A•2 is also\n\nA not materially different as in his case also the prosecution has not been able to show that he derived any monetary gain out of the transaction.\n\nRe. 4 :-A bare perusal of statement contained in Exhibit 43 which according to H.N. Roy Chowdhary (P.W. 2) and C. L. Shriyan\n\n(P.W. 23) was voluntarily and without any pressure made by A-3 is enough to show that it was in September, 1965 that A-3 incrca, cd the levels shown in the original drawings and brought up the quant:'.y of rock cutting to 30 lakhs cft.\n\nThis statement totally knocks the bottom out of the prosecution case that the spurious level plan and the work sheet were despatched to A-4 on August 19, 1965 as anncxures to Exhibit 106. If the spurious plan and the work sheet came into existence in September, 1965, it is difficult to underst; md how they could be despatched to A-4 along with Exhibit 106 en August 19, 1965.\n\nThe conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that when the communication (Exh. 106) was despatched to A-4, it was nct accompanied by fabricated level plan (Exh. 24) and work sheet (Exh. 38) but by the genuine ones viz. Fxbib; ts 22 and 23 and that it was later on that the genuine ones were removed and retained by A-3 who during the course of the enquiry by R.\n\nKrisbnaswamy (P.W. 1) brought them from Abmedabad and banded them over to P .\\'II. 1. The ommission on the part of Shriyan who claims to be certain that A-3 got the tracings Exhibits 24 and 38 prepared by him in April/May, 1965 to contradict A-3 when he made the aforesaid statement (Exh. 43) is also intriguing and lends assurance to the correctness of our conclusion.\n\nRe. 5 :-The first thing to be borne in mind with regard to the measurement certificates on the running bills is that it is the Assistant Engineer incharge of the work who is responsible for taking measurements of the actual quantities of the work executed by the contractor for entering the same in the measurement book and for recording a certificate that the measurements given in the bill are of the actual work carried out on spot in accordance with the Department's drawings and specifications. It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nIt cannot also be ignored that according to Ganpati (D.W. 3) when a Senior Engineer visits the site, he determines the progress of the work by visual inspection determining visually the approximate\n\nquantity of the work done. All this apart, an examination of the running bills (Exhibits 51, 53, 54, 55 and 56) shows that all of them bear the certificates as referred to and reproduced at page 11 of this judgment. It would be noted that whereas first three of these bills bear the counter-signatures of A-2, Bill (Exh. 55) bears the countersignatures of K. S. Joshi, Senior Engineer and Bill (Exh. 5 6) bears the counter-signatures of Ramrao, another Senior Engineer, who was absolved in the departmental enquiry.\n\nNow the fact that\n\nA-2 countersigned the first three bills does not appear to be material in view of the following statement made by Ramrao vide Exi1ibit 107\n\n\"I had no reason to doubt Shri Vaidya's figures.\n\nCountersignature of a bill as per our prevailing practice is not indicative of verification but only indicates that there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the figures.\"\n\nThe fact that K. S. Joshi, Senior Engineer, also countersigned the\n\nbill (Exh. 55) which contains inflated figures and no action was D taken against him also lends assurance to the inference that the counter-signatures were appended merely as a routine by the Senior Engineers who seem to have reposed blind and nnllinching faith on the honesty of their subordinates.\n\nNow if Ramrao who countersigned the bill (Exh. 56) showing the quantity of cutting work: as 31 lak:hs cft. was exonerated in the departmental enquiry and no action was taken against K. S. Joshi who made the wrong endorsement in respect of the measurement on Exhibit 55 or against Vora who had prepared the note (Exh. 58) showing that the work had been completed, it is difficult to understand how A-2 could be treated differently and criminal intention attributed to him.\n\nThe finding of the High Court in respect of the third running bill (Exh. 54) that the very defence of A-2 would itself furnish the best evidence of the conspiracy involving A-1 is not correct for apart from other infirmities from which if suffer, it is well settled that the defence taken by one accused cannot in law be treated as evidence against his co-accused.\n\nRe. 6 :-The finding of the High Court that A-1 signed the bill (Exh. 56) and sanctioned excess amount involved knowing full well that the bill was not true is also against weight of the evidence on the record. It cannot in the first instance be forgotten that it was on July 29, 1965 that A-1 could have had occasion to see the figures of the work for which sanction was granted by the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the bill (Exh. 56) was put up to him on\n\nDecember 30, 1967. In the absence of the sanction from which the genuine figures could have been gleaned, it would not be reasonable to expect A-1 to remember the sanctioned figures after the lapse of 17 months specially when it is admitted on all hands that being the head of the E_ngineering Department, he had to tour extensively to supervise several projects spread all over the country and to discharge multifarious duties in connection therewith. The bill, it would be noted was prepared by A-3 and was countersigned by no less a functionary than the Deputy Engineering Manager, Ramrao, who was next below A-1 in the hierarchy of the Department.\n\nIn the note prepared by him, it was not pointed out by A-3 that the bill had to gQ to the Managing Director.\n\nThe evidence in the case also shows that A-1 was not expected to meticulously scrutinize the bill but was conci; med only with the initialling of the note which although it had passed through several hands did not indicate that the competent authority to grant sanction for the excess amount was the Chall:man of the Board of Directors.\n\nIt will also be wrong to hold A-1 responsible for simply initialling the note contained in Exhibit 56 without examining Ramrao who approved the bill including the note and also countersigned the measurement certificate before it came to A-1. In the circumstances, the mere initialling by A-1 of the bill alongside the note marked for him by A-2 is, therefore not a circumstance which can unmistakably be said to point to the guilt of the appellant.\n\nAn analysis of the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution does not in our opinion lead to an unerring certainty that A-1 and A-2 acted with any dishonest or corrupt motive or abused their position.\n\nIn conclusion we cannot help observing that non-examination by the prosecution of Ramrao, Joshi, Vora and Patel who were material witnesses for the unfolding of its case has left some yawning gaps in the evidence which we have found very difficult to bridge. If these\n\nperons had been produce many of the points which have remained obscure and hidden up would have been cleared up.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeals, set aside the convictions of the appellants and the sentences imposed upon them and acquit them of the offences with which they were charged.\n\nP.B.R.\n\n40SCI/79-2500-21-8-79-GIPF .\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 203, "entities": [{"text": "S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nJanuary 4, 1979\n\n[JASWANT SINGH AND 0."}}, {"text": "JASWANT SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JASWANT SINGH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Oil Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 279, "end_char": 301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the appellants were officers of Indian Oil Corporation."}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1691, "end_char": 1725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 822", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4116, "end_char": 4131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1952 SC 343", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4196, "end_char": 4211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1952 SC 354", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4264, "end_char": 4279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1960 SC 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4703, "end_char": 4717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. R. Guna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6913, "end_char": 6923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l La/it Chari, P. R. Guna, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for\n\nthe Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "A. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6925, "end_char": 6941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l La/it Chari, P. R. Guna, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for\n\nthe Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6946, "end_char": 6958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l La/it Chari, P. R. Guna, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for\n\nthe Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7003, "end_char": 7014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Kohli, P. P. Rao, R. C. Kohli and R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant in Crl.", "canonical_name": "R. L. Kohli"}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7016, "end_char": 7025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Kohli, P. P. Rao, R. C. Kohli and R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant in Crl."}}, {"text": "R. C. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Kohli, P. P. Rao, R. C. Kohli and R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant in Crl.", "canonical_name": "R. L. Kohli"}}, {"text": "R. Nagarathnam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7043, "end_char": 7057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Kohli, P. P. Rao, R. C. Kohli and R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant in Crl."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7100, "end_char": 7111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, H. R. Kh, inna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "H. R. Kh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, H. R. Kh, inna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7132, "end_char": 7144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, H. R. Kh, inna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "S. P. Bhatnagar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7517, "end_char": 7532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJASWANT SINGH, J.-The above noted two criminal appeals which are directed against the common judgment and order dated August 6, 1975 o( the High Court of Judicature at Bombay a!fuming on appeal the judgment and order dated August 6, 1973 of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay, convicting S. P. Bhatnagar, appellant in the aforesaid first appeal, (hereinafter described as A-1) under s. l 20B read\n\n'°'~ with sections 409 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5 ( 1) read with s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and sentencing him to six months simple imprisonment on each of the said two • coui!ts as well as convicting A. S. Krishnaswamy, appellant in the\n\n,)c, aforesaid second appeal (hereinafter described as A-2) under the afore- .,- said two counts but reducing his sentence from nine months' imprisonment to , six months simple imprisonment on each one of those counts, shall be disposed of by this judgment. •", "canonical_name": "S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC"}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7637, "end_char": 7657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7665, "end_char": 7682, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7687, "end_char": 7691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7723, "end_char": 7757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. S. Krishnaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7868, "end_char": 7886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJASWANT SINGH, J.-The above noted two criminal appeals which are directed against the common judgment and order dated August 6, 1975 o( the High Court of Judicature at Bombay a!fuming on appeal the judgment and order dated August 6, 1973 of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay, convicting S. P. Bhatnagar, appellant in the aforesaid first appeal, (hereinafter described as A-1) under s. l 20B read\n\n'°'~ with sections 409 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5 ( 1) read with s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and sentencing him to six months simple imprisonment on each of the said two • coui!ts as well as convicting A. S. Krishnaswamy, appellant in the\n\n,)c, aforesaid second appeal (hereinafter described as A-2) under the afore- .,- said two counts but reducing his sentence from nine months' imprisonment to , six months simple imprisonment on each one of those counts, shall be disposed of by this judgment. •", "canonical_name": "A. S. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "Mahul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8424, "end_char": 8429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefly put the case as set up by the prosecution was :\n\nIn 1964, the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') which is a Government owned company, decided to purchase 13 acres and odd of a hilly tract of land situate in village Mahul in Trombay (Bombay) from the Tatas for the purpose of erecting black furnace oil storage tanks and construction of administrative buildings."}}, {"text": "Trombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8433, "end_char": 8440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefly put the case as set up by the prosecution was :\n\nIn 1964, the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') which is a Government owned company, decided to purchase 13 acres and odd of a hilly tract of land situate in village Mahul in Trombay (Bombay) from the Tatas for the purpose of erecting black furnace oil storage tanks and construction of administrative buildings."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8442, "end_char": 8448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefly put the case as set up by the prosecution was :\n\nIn 1964, the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') which is a Government owned company, decided to purchase 13 acres and odd of a hilly tract of land situate in village Mahul in Trombay (Bombay) from the Tatas for the purpose of erecting black furnace oil storage tanks and construction of administrative buildings."}}, {"text": "Varandani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8621, "end_char": 8630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the area was taken over by the Corporation Varandani (P. W. 20), Junior Engineer of the Corporation surveyed the land in October, 1964, under the directions of A-1 and A-2 the Engineering Manager and Senior Engineer respectively of the Engineering Department of the Marketing Division of the Corporation with a view to find out the extent of rock cutting and filling which might be required to be done for levelling the area of 7 acres out of the said tract of land."}}, {"text": "Varandani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9105, "end_char": 9114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "125) and worksheets prepared by Varandani on October 13, 1964 and November 3, 1964 respectively during the course of his aforesaid survey (which were signed by A-l and A-2, showed that 16,80,000 cft.", "canonical_name": "Varandani"}}, {"text": "13, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "125) and worksheets prepared by Varandani on October 13, 1964 and November 3, 1964 respectively during the course of his aforesaid survey (which were signed by A-l and A-2, showed that 16,80,000 cft."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9139, "end_char": 9155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "125) and worksheets prepared by Varandani on October 13, 1964 and November 3, 1964 respectively during the course of his aforesaid survey (which were signed by A-l and A-2, showed that 16,80,000 cft."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10128, "end_char": 10144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28) inviting tenders fron1 experienced civil contractors for rock cutting, filling and levelling of the land in question was prepared by A-2 on February 2, 1965, and was forwarded (under his signatures) by A-1 to the Finance Department for approval on February 5, 1965."}}, {"text": "February 11. l 965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10270, "end_char": 10288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29) dated February 11."}}, {"text": "Times of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l 965 requested Times of India, Indian Express and Free Press to publish the tender notice (Exh."}}, {"text": "Indian Express", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10315, "end_char": 10329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l 965 requested Times of India, Indian Express and Free Press to publish the tender notice (Exh."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10474, "end_char": 10487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28) wherein it was stated that the tenders which should reach the Corporation by 2.30 P.M. on March 2, 1965 would be opened at 3.00 P.M. on that date."}}, {"text": "Ram & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10597, "end_char": 10606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to this notice eleven firms of contractors including Ram & Co. submitted their tenders."}}, {"text": "N. N. Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10633, "end_char": 10644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Desai (hereinafter described as A-4) however abstained from submitting his tender.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Desai Cutting"}}, {"text": "March 5, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10957, "end_char": 10970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, on March 5, 1965, the aforesaid eleven tenderers were asked to submit revised tenders on the basis of the amended tender notice by March 15, 1965."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11085, "end_char": 11099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, on March 5, 1965, the aforesaid eleven tenderers were asked to submit revised tenders on the basis of the amended tender notice by March 15, 1965."}}, {"text": "March 8, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11253, "end_char": 11266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although fresh tenders were restricted to the original eleven tenderers, a tender form was issued to A-4 in response to the application made by him on March 8, 1965."}}, {"text": "Roshan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11955, "end_char": 11965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On discovering that the tender of his firm was the lowest, Roshan Lal, a partner of Ram & Co. addressed communication dated March 20, 1965 to the Managing Director of the Corporation requesting him that the aforesaid job of rock cutting and filling be entrusted to his firm in view of its working experience detailed therein but handed over the same to A-1."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12020, "end_char": 12034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On discovering that the tender of his firm was the lowest, Roshan Lal, a partner of Ram & Co. addressed communication dated March 20, 1965 to the Managing Director of the Corporation requesting him that the aforesaid job of rock cutting and filling be entrusted to his firm in view of its working experience detailed therein but handed over the same to A-1."}}, {"text": "Messrs Labitos Oil Fields Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At or about this time, Messrs Labitos Oil Fields Limited, a British firm whom the Corporation was trying to collaborate in its project advised the Corporation that instead of three levels (steppings) which had been planned as per cantour map (Exh."}}, {"text": "Varadani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12620, "end_char": 12628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "spacing as done earlier by Varadani, it should be on the basis of 10 ft.", "canonical_name": "Varandani"}}, {"text": "Varadani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12704, "end_char": 12712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly A-1 and A-2 told Varadani (P.W. 20) and S. D. Vaidya, another Assistant Engineer (hereinafter described as A-3) to make a fresh survey alongwith A-4 according to the advice of Messers Labitos Oil Fields Limited as it had been almost decided to entrust the aforesaid work to A-4."}}, {"text": "S. D. Vaidya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12727, "end_char": 12739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly A-1 and A-2 told Varadani (P.W. 20) and S. D. Vaidya, another Assistant Engineer (hereinafter described as A-3) to make a fresh survey alongwith A-4 according to the advice of Messers Labitos Oil Fields Limited as it had been almost decided to entrust the aforesaid work to A-4."}}, {"text": "Labitos Oil Fields Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12871, "end_char": 12897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly A-1 and A-2 told Varadani (P.W. 20) and S. D. Vaidya, another Assistant Engineer (hereinafter described as A-3) to make a fresh survey alongwith A-4 according to the advice of Messers Labitos Oil Fields Limited as it had been almost decided to entrust the aforesaid work to A-4."}}, {"text": "B. N. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13012, "end_char": 13023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the instructions of A-1 and A-2, B. N. Desai, a representative of A-4 was associated with the revised survey which was carried from March 21 to March 26, 1965."}}, {"text": "March 21 to March 26, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13111, "end_char": 13137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the instructions of A-1 and A-2, B. N. Desai, a representative of A-4 was associated with the revised survey which was carried from March 21 to March 26, 1965."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14004, "end_char": 14017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 7, 1965, A-2 drew up tender committee proceedings (Exh."}}, {"text": "Srivastava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14188, "end_char": 14198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16) as reproduced below and got them signed by A-1 in the hope that the recommendations made therein would be accepted by Srivastava, (P.W. 5) the Financial Controller and Patel."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14238, "end_char": 14243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16) as reproduced below and got them signed by A-1 in the hope that the recommendations made therein would be accepted by Srivastava, (P.W. 5) the Financial Controller and Patel."}}, {"text": "Gopiil Krishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Operation Manager of the Corporation, who were the other members H of the Tender Committee, in addition to A-l and finally by Gopiil Krishan, the then Chairman of the Company :-\n\n\"Ref."}}, {"text": "Lobitos Oil Fields Ltd. Ellesmere Port, Wirral", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15190, "end_char": 15236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Subsequently, M/s. Lobitos Oil Fields Ltd. Ellesmere Port, Wirral, Cheshire, had negotiations with us for putting up a Transformer Oil Blending Plant at this site."}}, {"text": "Cheshire", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15238, "end_char": 15246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Subsequently, M/s. Lobitos Oil Fields Ltd. Ellesmere Port, Wirral, Cheshire, had negotiations with us for putting up a Transformer Oil Blending Plant at this site."}}, {"text": "N. N. Desai Cutting", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Desai Cutting 23,30,450 Cft.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Desai Cutting"}}, {"text": "Ram & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16277, "end_char": 16286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram & Co.\n\nCutting 23,30,450 28/- 6,52,526 6,52,52'6 Cft."}}, {"text": "Libery Constructions Cutting", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16377, "end_char": 16405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Libery Constructions Cutting 23,30,450 28/- Cft."}}, {"text": "N. N. Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16484, "end_char": 16495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'-..\n\n• •\n\nM/s. N. N. Desai, Contractor arc the lowest.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Desai Cutting"}}, {"text": "S. P. Bhatnagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16701, "end_char": 16716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- (S. P. Bhatnagar)\n\nM.E.\n\nApproved (P. A. Gopalakrishnan)\n\n(A. K. Srivastava)\n\nF.O. !", "canonical_name": "S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC"}}, {"text": "P. A. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16735, "end_char": 16755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- (S. P. Bhatnagar)\n\nM.E.\n\nApproved (P. A. Gopalakrishnan)\n\n(A. K. Srivastava)\n\nF.O. !"}}, {"text": "H. B. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16784, "end_char": 16795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. B. Patel)\n\nO.M.\n\nChairman.··", "canonical_name": "H. B. Patel"}}, {"text": "Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16983, "end_char": 16993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ignoring not only the opposition of Srivastava and the suggestion of the Accounts Officer of the Finance Department and the Assistant Finance Controller of the Corporation made vide Exhibit 68 and Exhibit 31 respectively while processing the tender committee proceedings that in view of the fact that both the quantity and value of the work had increased substantially as a result of the revised survey, it would be fair and proper to ask all the contractors \"'l who had responded to the tender notice to re-submit their quotations\nbut also the offer made by Ram & Co. (which possessed the requisite skill and equipment) to execute the contract at the lower rates of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17859, "end_char": 17873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for filling as well as the flat refusal to reduce his rates given by A-4 during the negotiations conducted at the suggestion of the Accounts Departmcr•t of :the Corporation on April 17, 1965 with the three contractors mentioned in Exhibit 16, A-2 carried on, in pursuance of the conspiracy entered into between himself and A-1 and A-4 fresh negotiations with A-4 on or about April 20, 1965 without associating any member of the Finance Department and persuaded him to accept the lowest revised rates offered by Ram & Co. although he did not possess the requisite experience in and equipment for rock cutting and filling and by passing the Financial Controller forwarded the papers'to the Operation Manager who not being conversant with the proceedings supported A-2 for entrusting the contract to A-4 at the lowest rates offered by Ram & Co.\n\nOn the Tender Committee recommendations reaching him in circulation."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18058, "end_char": 18072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for filling as well as the flat refusal to reduce his rates given by A-4 during the negotiations conducted at the suggestion of the Accounts Departmcr•t of :the Corporation on April 17, 1965 with the three contractors mentioned in Exhibit 16, A-2 carried on, in pursuance of the conspiracy entered into between himself and A-1 and A-4 fresh negotiations with A-4 on or about April 20, 1965 without associating any member of the Finance Department and persuaded him to accept the lowest revised rates offered by Ram & Co. although he did not possess the requisite experience in and equipment for rock cutting and filling and by passing the Financial Controller forwarded the papers'to the Operation Manager who not being conversant with the proceedings supported A-2 for entrusting the contract to A-4 at the lowest rates offered by Ram & Co.\n\nOn the Tender Committee recommendations reaching him in circulation."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19028, "end_char": 19033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srivastava put on record his bold and emphatic protest but eventually reluctantly gave his con-\n\nA currence to the recommendations made by A-1 and the Operation Manager as is evident from the concluding sentence of the Note :\n\n\"The case is recommended for acceptance of the Chairman only because the Engineering Manager has certified that he would not be able to accept any responsibility about the deadline if work is not given to Desai.\""}}, {"text": "April 19, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19086, "end_char": 19100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33) dated April 19, 1965, the Coordinator and Sales Manager was keen to have the site developed as early as possible, the latter held up the matter for nearly three months in the vain expectation that the work would be done free of cost either by the Government of Maharashtra or the Bharat\n\nSevak Samaj and it was not before July 15, 1967 that he gave his\n\napproval to A-l's proposal to award the contract to A-4 whereafter accepting the said proposal the Managing Director of the Marketing Division and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation accorded sanction to the entrustment of the work to A-4."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19327, "end_char": 19352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33) dated April 19, 1965, the Coordinator and Sales Manager was keen to have the site developed as early as possible, the latter held up the matter for nearly three months in the vain expectation that the work would be done free of cost either by the Government of Maharashtra or the Bharat\n\nSevak Samaj and it was not before July 15, 1967 that he gave his\n\napproval to A-l's proposal to award the contract to A-4 whereafter accepting the said proposal the Managing Director of the Marketing Division and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation accorded sanction to the entrustment of the work to A-4."}}, {"text": "Bharat\n\nSevak Samaj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19360, "end_char": 19379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33) dated April 19, 1965, the Coordinator and Sales Manager was keen to have the site developed as early as possible, the latter held up the matter for nearly three months in the vain expectation that the work would be done free of cost either by the Government of Maharashtra or the Bharat\n\nSevak Samaj and it was not before July 15, 1967 that he gave his\n\napproval to A-l's proposal to award the contract to A-4 whereafter accepting the said proposal the Managing Director of the Marketing Division and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation accorded sanction to the entrustment of the work to A-4."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19402, "end_char": 19415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33) dated April 19, 1965, the Coordinator and Sales Manager was keen to have the site developed as early as possible, the latter held up the matter for nearly three months in the vain expectation that the work would be done free of cost either by the Government of Maharashtra or the Bharat\n\nSevak Samaj and it was not before July 15, 1967 that he gave his\n\napproval to A-l's proposal to award the contract to A-4 whereafter accepting the said proposal the Managing Director of the Marketing Division and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation accorded sanction to the entrustment of the work to A-4."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19799, "end_char": 19812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of the sanction, A-1 forwarded the papers with his endorsement to the Financial C:ontro!ler on July 29, 1965."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19818, "end_char": 19831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 30, 1965, work order (Exh."}}, {"text": "7th April 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20512, "end_char": 20526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Copies of the work order were also endorsed by A-2 to the f Bills Section of the Engineering Department and the Accounts Section of the Finance Department of the Corporation with the endorsement \"the above has Chairman's approval on our note of even reference dated 7th April 1965."}}, {"text": "March 21 and 26, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20962, "end_char": 20983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The joint level statement Exhibit 22 and the work sheet Exhibit 23 in respect of the joint survey made between March 21 and 26, 1965 for ascertaining the extent of rock cutting and filling which formed the basis for invitation of tenders and the final sanction in favour of A-4 were not only left unsigned by the concerned but were actually removed from the file and were substituted by spurious level plan (Exh."}}, {"text": "July 29/30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21435, "end_char": 21451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19) dated\n.A\n\nJuly 29/30, 1965."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21456, "end_char": 21471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 19, 1965, fabricated level plans A (Exhibits 24 and 38) prepared by A-3 were sent to A-4 as annexures to Exhibit 106 which ran as under :-\n\n\"We are enclosing herewith two prints of spot level of land area to be dressed and levelled at our Trombay plot."}}, {"text": "Sukhtankar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22163, "end_char": 22173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter A-3 endorsed on the Jetter Exhibit 106 that 'the print signed by A-4 should be filed by Sukhtankar (P.W. 13 J who is in charge of the filing section.'"}}, {"text": "Sukhtankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22239, "end_char": 22249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, Sukhtankar filed Exhibit 106 alongwith Exhibit 24 in the Bill Section."}}, {"text": "August 1, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22373, "end_char": 22387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual rock cutting operations commenced with effect from August 1, 1965 and on August 27, 1965, A-4 prepared and submitted the first running bill (Exhibit 51) indicating that 8,00,000 cft."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22395, "end_char": 22410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual rock cutting operations commenced with effect from August 1, 1965 and on August 27, 1965, A-4 prepared and submitted the first running bill (Exhibit 51) indicating that 8,00,000 cft."}}, {"text": "August 26,\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22992, "end_char": 23008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above certificate was countersigned by A-2 on August 26,\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23771, "end_char": 23788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "55) dated February 22, 1966 claiming that additional work to the extent of 7,00,000 cft."}}, {"text": "K. S. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23940, "end_char": 23951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This bill which was countersigned by K. S. Joshi, another Senior Engineer who was put incharge of the Project in :he absence of A-2 who had been transferred to Delhi was also paid.", "canonical_name": "K. S.\n\nJoshi"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24063, "end_char": 24068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This bill which was countersigned by K. S. Joshi, another Senior Engineer who was put incharge of the Project in :he absence of A-2 who had been transferred to Delhi was also paid."}}, {"text": "November 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24088, "end_char": 24104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager."}}, {"text": "Gurunath Naik", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24110, "end_char": 24123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24240, "end_char": 24249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24251, "end_char": 24257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager."}}, {"text": "Mugalsarai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24262, "end_char": 24272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager."}}, {"text": "Ramrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24308, "end_char": 24314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1966, one Gurunath Naik (P.W. 17) who was working as a Junior or Assistant Engineer for some time in Bombay and for the remaining period at Allahabad, Kanpur and Mugalsarai was called by A-1 and asked to see Ramrao, the then Junior Engineering Manager."}}, {"text": "Naik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24366, "end_char": 24370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly Naik met Ramrao who directed him to go to the spot and have the level drawings."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24800, "end_char": 24817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 30, 1966, A-4 submitted his final bill (Exb."}}, {"text": "December 29, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24951, "end_char": 24968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This bill bore the certificate dated December 29, 1966 of A-3 to the effect that the measurements on which column No."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25951, "end_char": 25968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this bill, which bore the certificates of A-3 and A-4 was countersigned by Ramrao on December 30, 1961 and wherein it was falsely claimed by A-4 that the work was completed on August 11, 1966-although that date was also much beyond the stipulated clate-A-3 recorded the foilowing note:-\n\n• •\n\n\"The final bill amounts to Rs."}}, {"text": "August 11, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26042, "end_char": 26057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this bill, which bore the certificates of A-3 and A-4 was countersigned by Ramrao on December 30, 1961 and wherein it was falsely claimed by A-4 that the work was completed on August 11, 1966-although that date was also much beyond the stipulated clate-A-3 recorded the foilowing note:-\n\n• •\n\n\"The final bill amounts to Rs."}}, {"text": "Ramrao", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27169, "end_char": 27175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the pay order being returned to the Engineering Department, Ramrao, the then Deputy Engiueering Manager, submitted the following reply vide Exhibit 59 dated January 12, 1967 :-\n\n\"The work is now completed as required."}}, {"text": "January 12, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27266, "end_char": 27282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the pay order being returned to the Engineering Department, Ramrao, the then Deputy Engiueering Manager, submitted the following reply vide Exhibit 59 dated January 12, 1967 :-\n\n\"The work is now completed as required."}}, {"text": "11-8-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28226, "end_char": 28235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. D. is therefore, requested to consider this aspect and approve the time limit extension upto 11-8-1966, the date on which the party has completed the work.\""}}, {"text": "Shende", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28356, "end_char": 28362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l8-40SCI/79\n\nOn the matter coming back to the Finance Department, Shende (P.W. 16) pointed out that not only the quantities of rock cutting and filling work which were found as a result of the survey made between March 21 and 26, 1965 had been enormously inflated in the work order but the work claimed to have been done also exceeded the inflated figures mentioned in the work order."}}, {"text": "March 28, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28839, "end_char": 28853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime before March 28, 1967, Krishnaswamy Rajam (P.W. 1), the Chief Internal Auditor, was summoned by the Managing Director and the General Manager and was asked to have a personal talk with A-3 in connection with the matter."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswamy Rajam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28855, "end_char": 28873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime before March 28, 1967, Krishnaswamy Rajam (P.W. 1), the Chief Internal Auditor, was summoned by the Managing Director and the General Manager and was asked to have a personal talk with A-3 in connection with the matter."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29632, "end_char": 29641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have got the workings for this revision with me at Ahmedabad. ("}}, {"text": "21st and 26th March, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29795, "end_char": 29820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 and 23 which were prepared by him under the directions of Varandani between 21st and 26th March, 1965)."}}, {"text": "April I, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31142, "end_char": 31155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On further investigation made on April I, 1967, A-3 produced the genuine level statement (Exh."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31411, "end_char": 31416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23) before P.W. 1 and told him that the substitution of the fabricated level statement and work sheet relating to rock cutting and filling at Trombay was done at the instance of Joshi, A-2 and A-1 and that they were aware of the same."}}, {"text": "Ramrao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31769, "end_char": 31775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a query being made by P .W. 1 from Ramrao regarding the final bill, he admitted that he had not personally checked the calculations and had counter; signed the bill relying on the accuracy of the measurements shown in the bill which was prepared by A-3."}}, {"text": "Murthy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32215, "end_char": 32221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of this inquiry, Murthy (P.W. 18) was deputed by A-1 and Krishnaswamy (P.W. 1) to go to the spot and find out the work which had actually been done."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswamy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32255, "end_char": 32267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of this inquiry, Murthy (P.W. 18) was deputed by A-1 and Krishnaswamy (P.W. 1) to go to the spot and find out the work which had actually been done."}}, {"text": "April 6, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32410, "end_char": 32423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, Murthy (P. W.\n\n18) submitted his interim report on April 6, 1967 pointing out that at only one place the level was 103.94 and elsewhere it remained much more."}}, {"text": "Krislmaswamy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32757, "end_char": 32769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the statements of A-2, A-3 and A-4, Krislmaswamy (P.W.\n\n1) submitted a detailed report (Exh."}}, {"text": "April 8, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32821, "end_char": 32834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25) on April 8, 1967 to the Managing Director through the Financial Controller."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34511, "end_char": 34525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 18, 1967, A-1 sent for A-3 and questioned him in regard to the matter."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34803, "end_char": 34814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 3, 1967, A-1 issued show cause notices to A-2 and A-3 with a view to hold departmental enquiry against them."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34935, "end_char": 34947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his reply dated May 20, 1967 to the show cause notice, A-3 stated that he had changed the original contour plan at the instance of A-2."}}, {"text": "Lakshmanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35291, "end_char": 35301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On getting information on July 15, 1967 that A-4 was having some rock cutting done on the site althougli he had in his final bill claimed that he had fully completed the work on August 11, 1966, A-1 and A-2 visited the site along with Lakshmanan, the Operations Manager and finding that the work of rock cutting was still going on and that the claim of A-4 as certified by A-3 and countersigned by Ramrao about the work having been completed on August 11, 1966 was apparently false had the measurements of rock cutting and filling work taken by Ganapathy."}}, {"text": "Ganapathy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35601, "end_char": 35610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On getting information on July 15, 1967 that A-4 was having some rock cutting done on the site althougli he had in his final bill claimed that he had fully completed the work on August 11, 1966, A-1 and A-2 visited the site along with Lakshmanan, the Operations Manager and finding that the work of rock cutting was still going on and that the claim of A-4 as certified by A-3 and countersigned by Ramrao about the work having been completed on August 11, 1966 was apparently false had the measurements of rock cutting and filling work taken by Ganapathy.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathy"}}, {"text": "Ganpathy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35642, "end_char": 35650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the measurements taken by Ganpathy were on the basis of level plans prepared by Talas in which the bench mark was 94.5 as against the bench mark of 100 for the survey in question, the Managing Director had the measurements taken by M/s R. L. Dalal & Co. The report of Dalal & Co. showed that the rock cutting work done was 9,60,000 cft.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathy"}}, {"text": "Talas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35696, "end_char": 35701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the measurements taken by Ganpathy were on the basis of level plans prepared by Talas in which the bench mark was 94.5 as against the bench mark of 100 for the survey in question, the Managing Director had the measurements taken by M/s R. L. Dalal & Co. The report of Dalal & Co. showed that the rock cutting work done was 9,60,000 cft."}}, {"text": "R. L. Dalal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35852, "end_char": 35869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the measurements taken by Ganpathy were on the basis of level plans prepared by Talas in which the bench mark was 94.5 as against the bench mark of 100 for the survey in question, the Managing Director had the measurements taken by M/s R. L. Dalal & Co. The report of Dalal & Co. showed that the rock cutting work done was 9,60,000 cft."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36006, "end_char": 36019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• • ..\n\nOn July 28, 1967, the Managing Director issued a charge sheet to A-1, A-2, A-3 and Ramrao."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36357, "end_char": 36371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day i.e. August 4, 1967, A-1 sent for A-3 in his cabin and questioned him in the presence of three other officers viz."}}, {"text": "Roy Chowdhary", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36468, "end_char": 36481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roy Chowdhary (P.W.2), who was the Deputy Financial Controller, Shriyan (P .W.23), the Assistant Engineer, and Vora, the Senior Engineer."}}, {"text": "Vora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36579, "end_char": 36583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roy Chowdhary (P.W.2), who was the Deputy Financial Controller, Shriyan (P .W.23), the Assistant Engineer, and Vora, the Senior Engineer."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36906, "end_char": 36918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the three other officers and A-1 signed the statement (Exh.48) made by A-3, A-3 declined to sign it and fled away from the chamber on some excuse and rushed to the chamber of Krishnaswamy, Chief Internal Auditor whereupon Roy Chowdhary (P.W.2) also followed A-3 to the chamber of Kri, shnaswamy.", "canonical_name": "R. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "Roy Chowdhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37206, "end_char": 37219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the position adopted by A-3 in resiling from his earlier statement of that very day before A-1, Roy Chowdhary reminded him that in the morning ill his presence, he had stated that it was A-2 who was responsible for asking him to change the drawing and increase the quantities."}}, {"text": "Doraiswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38151, "end_char": 38161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Elaborating his explanation; he stated that just as Senior Engineer, Doraiswamy could not proceed to a BPI nor Senior Engineer Vora nor Senior Engineer Chari could proceed to an installation just to verify the billed quantities in view of the fact that there were a number of bills on each work order and so many work orders for each location."}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38234, "end_char": 38239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Elaborating his explanation; he stated that just as Senior Engineer, Doraiswamy could not proceed to a BPI nor Senior Engineer Vora nor Senior Engineer Chari could proceed to an installation just to verify the billed quantities in view of the fact that there were a number of bills on each work order and so many work orders for each location."}}, {"text": "Vaidya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39483, "end_char": 39489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly in the Branches, Senior Engineers who were controlling the work for so many depots and installations were not expected to verify the quantities in each bill; that however, if there was a dispute with the contractor or there was some other reason to doubt the correctness of the Assistant Engineer's certificate, the Senior\n\nEngineer might either take measurements himself or get them taken by another Assistant Engineer; that subsequent to the counter signature by the Senior Engineer, the bill was passed on to the Engineering Bills Section where the bills were checked by the Accountant against sanctions, work order, rates and amounts, deductions for cement A. C. sheets or other materials supplied ar.d security; deposit etc; that the Accountant prepared the pay order giving all these details for 'iignaturc by a Senior Engineer as far as possible other than the countersigning Senior Engineer; that the bill then went to the Accounts Department\n\nwhere it was snbjected to further detailed scrutiny before payment; that on December 30, 1966 Vaidya bronght the bill for Rs.79, 674/- dated December 30, 1966 to him for counter signature; that it would have normally been put up to K. S. Joshi but was brought to him as he was not available; that Vaidya was the Assistant Engineer who had handled that contract from the time of placing the work order; that the bill was for the work carried out by the Contractor subsequent to the previous 'on account bill' 21-2-66 (nearly 10 months earlier) i.e. about 3.18 lakhs cft."}}, {"text": "21-2-66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39897, "end_char": 39904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly in the Branches, Senior Engineers who were controlling the work for so many depots and installations were not expected to verify the quantities in each bill; that however, if there was a dispute with the contractor or there was some other reason to doubt the correctness of the Assistant Engineer's certificate, the Senior\n\nEngineer might either take measurements himself or get them taken by another Assistant Engineer; that subsequent to the counter signature by the Senior Engineer, the bill was passed on to the Engineering Bills Section where the bills were checked by the Accountant against sanctions, work order, rates and amounts, deductions for cement A. C. sheets or other materials supplied ar.d security; deposit etc; that the Accountant prepared the pay order giving all these details for 'iignaturc by a Senior Engineer as far as possible other than the countersigning Senior Engineer; that the bill then went to the Accounts Department\n\nwhere it was snbjected to further detailed scrutiny before payment; that on December 30, 1966 Vaidya bronght the bill for Rs.79, 674/- dated December 30, 1966 to him for counter signature; that it would have normally been put up to K. S. Joshi but was brought to him as he was not available; that Vaidya was the Assistant Engineer who had handled that contract from the time of placing the work order; that the bill was for the work carried out by the Contractor subsequent to the previous 'on account bill' 21-2-66 (nearly 10 months earlier) i.e. about 3.18 lakhs cft."}}, {"text": "Trombay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40066, "end_char": 40073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15/- per 100 cft; that he bad visited Trombay number of times in connection with other works during the period cormnencing from August, 1966 and was aware that the Contractor had carried out approximately that much work during 1966; that the extra quantity required sanction of competent authority; that the previous bills passed showed that the major portion o[ the work was carried out during the period August to December, 1965 and about 7 lakhs CFr of cu!ting\n\nduring December, 1965 to February, 1966; that A. S. Krishnaswamy who placed the work order bad countersigned bills upto 21 lakhs cft."}}, {"text": "Rege", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42339, "end_char": 42343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter was thus pending, a confidential information reached Rege, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. (P.W. 27)\n\nwho registered the case on December 27, 1967."}}, {"text": "December 27, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42427, "end_char": 42444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter was thus pending, a confidential information reached Rege, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. (P.W. 27)\n\nwho registered the case on December 27, 1967."}}, {"text": "Shivashankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42596, "end_char": 42608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had the site measured by Shivashankar."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43294, "end_char": 43305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43316, "end_char": 43327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43334, "end_char": 43345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43353, "end_char": 43370, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43763, "end_char": 43772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43787, "end_char": 43796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43812, "end_char": 43840, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44259, "end_char": 44271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44283, "end_char": 44317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44641, "end_char": 44650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first case, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) while construing clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act observed :-\n\n\"The pharaseology 'by otherwise abusing his position as public servant' covers acts done otherwise than by corrupt or illegal means by an officer abusing his position."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44722, "end_char": 44731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49596, "end_char": 49605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ranganath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51712, "end_char": 51721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29) dated March 9, 1965 addressed by Ranganath, Public Relations\n\nt (\n\nOfficer, to the Advertisement Manager, Times of India and others and A the corrigendum forming annexure thereto which ran as under :-\n\nINDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED\n\n(MARKETING DIVISION)\n\nClarke Road, Mahalaxmi, Bombay-34, WB, India\n\nIN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO\n\nPR 31 317 9th March, 1965\n\nThe Advertisement Manager, The Times of India, (Bombay) The Indian Express, (Bombay) Free Press Journal, (Bombay)\n\nDear Sir,\n\nSubject : Tender No."}}, {"text": "INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51881, "end_char": 51911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29) dated March 9, 1965 addressed by Ranganath, Public Relations\n\nt (\n\nOfficer, to the Advertisement Manager, Times of India and others and A the corrigendum forming annexure thereto which ran as under :-\n\nINDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED\n\n(MARKETING DIVISION)\n\nClarke Road, Mahalaxmi, Bombay-34, WB, India\n\nIN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO\n\nPR 31 317 9th March, 1965\n\nThe Advertisement Manager, The Times of India, (Bombay) The Indian Express, (Bombay) Free Press Journal, (Bombay)\n\nDear Sir,\n\nSubject : Tender No."}}, {"text": "Advertisement Manager, The Times of India, (Bombay) The Indian Express, (Bombay) Free Press Journal, (Bombay)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52038, "end_char": 52147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29) dated March 9, 1965 addressed by Ranganath, Public Relations\n\nt (\n\nOfficer, to the Advertisement Manager, Times of India and others and A the corrigendum forming annexure thereto which ran as under :-\n\nINDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED\n\n(MARKETING DIVISION)\n\nClarke Road, Mahalaxmi, Bombay-34, WB, India\n\nIN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO\n\nPR 31 317 9th March, 1965\n\nThe Advertisement Manager, The Times of India, (Bombay) The Indian Express, (Bombay) Free Press Journal, (Bombay)\n\nDear Sir,\n\nSubject : Tender No."}}, {"text": "INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52667, "end_char": 52693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD."}}, {"text": "April 2, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53561, "end_char": 53574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17) dated April 2, 1965 which appears to be the outcome of some personal pique itself shows that it was only on April 15, 1965 that it was agreed between the members of the Tender Committee that the grant of the contract would be confined to one out of the three lowest tenderers, one of whom was\n\nA-4."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53663, "end_char": 53677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17) dated April 2, 1965 which appears to be the outcome of some personal pique itself shows that it was only on April 15, 1965 that it was agreed between the members of the Tender Committee that the grant of the contract would be confined to one out of the three lowest tenderers, one of whom was\n\nA-4."}}, {"text": "Shivananda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 55316, "end_char": 55326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would also be noticed that in the notes put up\n•\"\n\nby them neither Srivastava (P.W. 5) nor Shivananda, Superintendent,\n\nllOr Khurana, Assistant Financial Controller of the Finance Department, nor the Operation Manager ever pointed out that A14 lacked the requisite experience or competence which disentitled him to the grant of the contract."}}, {"text": "Shivananda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55576, "end_char": 55586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact Shivananda and Khurana had suggested as an alternative to inviting fresh tenders that A-4 should be asked to reduce his rates in view of the revised figures on account of which the value of the contract had gone up considerably."}}, {"text": "Khurana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55591, "end_char": 55598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact Shivananda and Khurana had suggested as an alternative to inviting fresh tenders that A-4 should be asked to reduce his rates in view of the revised figures on account of which the value of the contract had gone up considerably."}}, {"text": "Roshan Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 55918, "end_char": 55928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It wonld also be noticed that the High Court while rightly holding that Exhibit 122 was not delivered to A-1 by Roshan Lal (P.W. 19) tell into an error in observing that A-1 had a hand in suppressing it."}}, {"text": "Ram and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56137, "end_char": 56148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram and Co., Liberty and Co., and A-4 by the Tender Committee, of which P.W. 5 was a prominent member, Roshan Lal was present and while pressing his firm's claim to the grant of the contract he did draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the contents of Ext."}}, {"text": "Liberty and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56150, "end_char": 56165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram and Co., Liberty and Co., and A-4 by the Tender Committee, of which P.W. 5 was a prominent member, Roshan Lal was present and while pressing his firm's claim to the grant of the contract he did draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the contents of Ext."}}, {"text": "Vrindani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 57111, "end_char": 57119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third finding of the High Court that the appellants told Vrindani (P.W. 20) and Vaidya (A-3) that it had already been decided to entrust the contract to A-4 and in order not to loose time, a joint survey should be made, is also erroneous."}}, {"text": "Vaidya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 57134, "end_char": 57140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third finding of the High Court that the appellants told Vrindani (P.W. 20) and Vaidya (A-3) that it had already been decided to entrust the contract to A-4 and in order not to loose time, a joint survey should be made, is also erroneous."}}, {"text": "Vrindani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57391, "end_char": 57399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unbelievable that A-1 and A-2 who were pre-occupied with several projects would go and tell Vrindani who was three or four steps below them and was admittedly not a member of the conspiracy nor concerned with policy matters that it had been already decided to assign the contract to A-4."}}, {"text": "March 20 and 26, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57808, "end_char": 57829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid briefing attributed to the appellants also seems to be incredible in view of the fact that it was only on the basis of the level measurements taken by P.W. 20 and A-3 during the survey made by them between March 20 and 26, 1965 that A-4 turned out to be the lowest tenderer and at the time when the briefing is alleged to have been given the lowest tender was of Ram & Co.\n\nThe insinuation implicit in the fourth finding of the High Court that Exts."}}, {"text": "Kore Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59560, "end_char": 59573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the appellant's proposal favouring A-4 was in the interest of the corporation both from the point of view of economy as well as speedy and satisfactory execution of work and was solely inspired by his concern tu avoid the sad experience which the corporation had in respect of rock cutting work at An-top hill with the Kore Brothers which was a new party is evident from the following endorsement made on A33 by H. B. Patel, Operation Manager :-\n\n\"In view of the urgency and our past experience with a new party at An-top hill, I agree to Senior Engineer's proposal that we give the job to M/s. N. N. Desai at the lowest tendered rates.\""}}, {"text": "H. B. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 59653, "end_char": 59664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the appellant's proposal favouring A-4 was in the interest of the corporation both from the point of view of economy as well as speedy and satisfactory execution of work and was solely inspired by his concern tu avoid the sad experience which the corporation had in respect of rock cutting work at An-top hill with the Kore Brothers which was a new party is evident from the following endorsement made on A33 by H. B. Patel, Operation Manager :-\n\n\"In view of the urgency and our past experience with a new party at An-top hill, I agree to Senior Engineer's proposal that we give the job to M/s. N. N. Desai at the lowest tendered rates.\"", "canonical_name": "H. B. Patel"}}, {"text": "Shrivastava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 60347, "end_char": 60358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The act of the appellants in trying to ascertain from A-4 whether he was prepared to reduce his rates to the level of M/s. Ram & Co. which seems to have been taken in consultation and agreement with P.W. 5 was, in our opinion, guiltless, It would be well to remember in this connection that Shrivastava P.W. 5 himself admitted in the course of his deposition that there was practice in their corporation of asking the second lowest tenderer to match his rates with the lowest tender."}}, {"text": "7th April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63724, "end_char": 63739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution theory that the work order giving inflated figures was not only signed but was also prepared by A-2 is also negatived\n\nA by the following endorsement on the copy of the work order sent to the Bills and Accounts Sections of the Engineering Department of the Corporation :\n\n\"The above has Chairman's approval on our note of even 1eference dated 7th April, 1965."}}, {"text": "R. Krishnaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66404, "end_char": 66419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3&4 18-4-1967 39 & 41 I told R. Krishnaswamy when he called me on\n\n5.", "canonical_name": "R. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "20-5-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66445, "end_char": 66454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20-5-1967\n\n6."}}, {"text": "4-8-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66459, "end_char": 66467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-8-1967\n\n7."}}, {"text": "A.S. Krishnaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66497, "end_char": 66514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-8-1967\n\n29-3-1967 that A.S. Krishnaswamy and K.\n\nJoshi told me to change the levels of drawings of Trornbay plot regarding rock cutting/filling job In reply to the further query of R. Krishnaswamy, I told him that I did not inform M.E. about this and that he n1ight be knowing.", "canonical_name": "A. S. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "K.\n\nJoshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66519, "end_char": 66528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-8-1967\n\n29-3-1967 that A.S. Krishnaswamy and K.\n\nJoshi told me to change the levels of drawings of Trornbay plot regarding rock cutting/filling job In reply to the further query of R. Krishnaswamy, I told him that I did not inform M.E. about this and that he n1ight be knowing."}}, {"text": "A.S. KrishnaswamY", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66945, "end_char": 66962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.S. KrishnaswamY told me to increase the levels at random and bring the quantity to about 30 lakhs cft.", "canonical_name": "A. S. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "K. S.\n\nJoshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67395, "end_char": 67407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The non-production of K. S.\n\nJoshi who appears to have been one of the main actors in the drama has left a lacuna which is very difficult to bridge.", "canonical_name": "K. S.\n\nJoshi"}}, {"text": "H.N. Roy Chowdhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68370, "end_char": 68388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 :-A bare perusal of statement contained in Exhibit 43 which according to H.N. Roy Chowdhary (P.W. 2) and C. L. Shriyan\n\n(P.W. 23) was voluntarily and without any pressure made by A-3 is enough to show that it was in September, 1965 that A-3 incrca, cd the levels shown in the original drawings and brought up the quant:'.y of rock cutting to 30 lakhs cft."}}, {"text": "C. L. Shriyan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 68402, "end_char": 68415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 :-A bare perusal of statement contained in Exhibit 43 which according to H.N. Roy Chowdhary (P.W. 2) and C. L. Shriyan\n\n(P.W. 23) was voluntarily and without any pressure made by A-3 is enough to show that it was in September, 1965 that A-3 incrca, cd the levels shown in the original drawings and brought up the quant:'.y of rock cutting to 30 lakhs cft."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nKrisbnaswamy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 69390, "end_char": 69406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fxbib; ts 22 and 23 and that it was later on that the genuine ones were removed and retained by A-3 who during the course of the enquiry by R.\n\nKrisbnaswamy (P.W. 1) brought them from Abmedabad and banded them over to P .\\'II."}}, {"text": "Abmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69434, "end_char": 69443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fxbib; ts 22 and 23 and that it was later on that the genuine ones were removed and retained by A-3 who during the course of the enquiry by R.\n\nKrisbnaswamy (P.W. 1) brought them from Abmedabad and banded them over to P .\\'II."}}, {"text": "Shriyan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69509, "end_char": 69516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ommission on the part of Shriyan who claims to be certain that A-3 got the tracings Exhibits 24 and 38 prepared by him in April/May, 1965 to contradict A-3 when he made the aforesaid statement (Exh."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70375, "end_char": 70380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Sabarmati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70523, "end_char": 70532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Okba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70545, "end_char": 70549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Kandla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70554, "end_char": 70560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70564, "end_char": 70571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Sewri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70576, "end_char": 70581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Wadala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70583, "end_char": 70589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70605, "end_char": 70616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70630, "end_char": 70644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that A-1 had to look after the Corporation's projects and installations all over India nnd A-2 had to look after and supervise a large number of the Corporation's projects under the Western Branch which included installations at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad, Okba and Kandla in Gujarat and Sewri, Wadala and Trombay in Maharashtra and parts of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Ganpati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 70691, "end_char": 70698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot also be ignored that according to Ganpati (D.W. 3) when a Senior Engineer visits the site, he determines the progress of the work by visual inspection determining visually the approximate\n\nquantity of the work done."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73424, "end_char": 73441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "56) was put up to him on\n\nDecember 30, 1967."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 75276, "end_char": 75281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In conclusion we cannot help observing that non-examination by the prosecution of Ramrao, Joshi, Vora and Patel who were material witnesses for the unfolding of its case has left some yawning gaps in the evidence which we have found very difficult to bridge."}}, {"text": "Vora", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 75283, "end_char": 75287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In conclusion we cannot help observing that non-examination by the prosecution of Ramrao, Joshi, Vora and Patel who were material witnesses for the unfolding of its case has left some yawning gaps in the evidence which we have found very difficult to bridge."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 75292, "end_char": 75297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In conclusion we cannot help observing that non-examination by the prosecution of Ramrao, Joshi, Vora and Patel who were material witnesses for the unfolding of its case has left some yawning gaps in the evidence which we have found very difficult to bridge."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_905_910_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "INCOME TAX OFFICER & ORS.\n\nM/S. MADNANI ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.,\n\nCALCUTTA\n\nJanuary 4, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961-S. 141(a)-Scope of-Income 1\"ax Officer at first t' refused .to give reasons for beUeving that income tscaped assessment-In the seco1i'd af]ida1•it did not set out any material for the basis of his belie/- Validity of.\n\n.. -In respect of the assessment year 1959-60 the assessee was allowed deduction of interest pa.id to creditors from whom it claimed to have borrowed montya on hundis. In January, 1968 the Income Tax Officer issued a notice to the '!SSessee under s. 147(a) of the Inoome-tax Ac~ 1961 on the ground that the transattiOns of loans represented by the hundis were bogus and no intereslwas paid by it to any of the creditors shown in the hundis, that it was WrOJ:!gly allowed asa. deduction and therefore a part of the assessee's income had escaped assessment by reason of its failure to disclose fully and truly all maferiaL facts necessary for the assessment.\n\nIn the ass_essee'er writ petition before the High Court the Income Tax Officrtr at fit&t declined to disclose the 'facts which had weighed with him in reaching the belief that income had escaped assessment on the ground that if they were disclosed jt would cause great prejudice to the interests of revenue and \\vould frustrate the object of reopening the assment. Later however, realising that this stand was untenable he gave his reasons for issuing the notice.\n\nA Smgle Judge of the High Court dismissed the assesse's writ petition.· On appeal a Division Bench held that there was no failure on the part of the ;>. a'6essee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and that in any vent the\n\n; JnCome Tax Officer had no reason to believe that any part of the income had\n\n/ escaped assessment by reason of such failure on the ass'essee's part.\n\nDisniisoing the ppeal,\n\nlIELD:\n\nThere was no failure on the part of the ,,.c., ee to discle>; e fully and truly all material facts nec?ssary for its assessment and the condition for the .appiieabitity of s. 147(a) was not satified. The notice in the circumstances was void. [910 Al\n\n(I) In CIT v. Bur/op Dealm Ud., 79 ITR 609 thi• Court held that there was no obli&ation on the part of tho asse'8ee to disclose that the documents , produe'ed by it were bogus and that the entries made in its books Of account\n\nW!'f• false. 1he assessee discharged its obligation by disclosing its books of accoUnts and evidence from which material facts could be discovered and it is for the Income Tax Officer to decide wh'cther the documents were genuine or false. [909 FJ\n\nSvPREME COl'RT REPORTS (1979] 2 S.C.Jt ..\n\nA In the instanl case the assessee could not be said to have failed to make a.\n\ntrue and fulJ disclosure of the material facts by not confessing before the Income Tax Officer that the hundis and the eutrics in the books of account produced before him were bogus. [909 G]\n\nCIT v. Bur/op Dealers Ltd. 79 lTR 609; applie<l.\n\n(2) AU that the Income Tax Officer stated in his affidavit was that ;,, di•- cover(\"d that the transactions of loan again3t security of J1undis were not genuine MJd that the credits against th'e names of certain persons who were alleged to' have :Y.lvanccd the loans were bogus.\n\nHe merely stated his 6elief bnt dfd rot set out any maicrial on the basis of which h'c had arrived at such\n\nbelief. [9!0 Cl\n\n(3) Th~. erh; tence or reason to belic\\c on the part of the Income Tax Ofticcr i9 a jmrticeabJe is!'!ue and it is for th'e court to be satisfied \\vhethCr in fllcf the\n\nrncollt~ Tax Officer had ooy material on the h01is of \\vhich he coufd re&Soriabfy entertain rnc h be! ief. [907 D1\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISIJICTION; Civil Appeal No. 829 of 1975\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 11-4-74 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from original Order dated 221/70.\n\nS. C. Manchanda, and Miss A. Subhashitri for the Appellant\n\nV. S. Desai, Sanjay BhaJtacharya and Rathln Dass for the ReipOn-- den!.\n\n1!: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal by 'certificate is directed against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta allowing an appeal against a decision of a Single Judge dismissing thewtit petition of the respondent.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appea1- F may Be briefly stated as follows :\n\nThe respondent was assessed to income-tax for the assesment year 1959-60 and certain interest paid by the respondent to creditorsfrom whom it claimed to have borrowed monies on hundis, was allowed as deductible expenditure.\n\nThe assessment of the respondent was completed on 23rd August, 1960. On or abont 25th Janililty, 1968, hoi'Vever, a Notice was isued by the Income Tax Officer ut\\der Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to re-open the assessment of tire respondent for the assessment year 1959-60. The Notice was\n\noosly under Section 14 7 (a) since a period of four years had alfeacfy elapsed from the close of the' assessment year 1959-60 artd no- Notice could be issued under Section 147(b). The Income Tax Officer claimed that the transactions of loan represented by the liundis were bggus and no interest was paid by the respondent to any of the-\n\n\" ..\n\n\" ,,,\n\nJ.T.O. V. MADNANJ WORKS LTD. (Bhagwati, J.) 907\n\nc.re<lit0l\"s shown in the hundis and it was wrongly allowed as .a deduction and hence a pan of the income of the respondent had e8caped\n\niu; ssment by reason of the failure of the respondent to disclose fully\n\nrul truly all material facts necessary for its assessment.\n\nThe responpent challenged the validity of .the Notice issued by the Income Tax\n\nOffiCl!r by filing a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court. The resporulent cout; inded that there was no failure on its part to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment and that in any event the Income Tax Officer had no reason to believe that .any part of the income of tlic respondent had escaped assessment by\n\nreaspn of such failure on the part of the respondent.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer in the affidavit in reply filed by him on 5th December, 1968 declined to disclose the facts which had weighed with him in reaching the belief that the income of the respondent had escaped\n\nal>Sessment by reason of its failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, on the ground that if such facts were disclosed to the respondent, it would cause great prejudice to the interests of the Revenue and would frustrate the object o[ re-opening the assessment.\n\nThis was obviously an untenable stand because the existence of reason to believe on the part of the Income Tax Officer was a justiceable issue and it was for the court to be satisfied whether in fact the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment hy reason of failure of the respondent to make a full and true disclosure.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer realising this position filed a further affidavit on 27th January, 1970 stating as. follows :\n\n\"In January 1968 I was the Income Tax Ollicer 'I' Ward, Hundi Circle, Calcutta.\n\nOn or about the 25th January 1968 I issued a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the petitioner. My reasons for issuing such notice were these.\n\nIn the course of assessment of the petitioner for assessment year 1963-64 it was discovered that various items shown as loans against the security of bundis in the petitioner's books of account for the previous year relevant to assessment year 1959-60 were in fact fictitious.\n\nCredire against the. names of certain persons. a~ having advanced Joans viz.\n\nArnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine.\n\nIt appeared during assessment proceedings for 1963-64 that none ofii such loans were genuine.\n\nIn the premises, it appe\\U'ed to me that 111e petitioner bad failed to disclose fully and truly all material tacts necessary for its assessment, and a portion of the petitioner's income had escaped assessment by reason of such failure\".\n\nD r\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1979} 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe writ petition was heard by a Single Judge of the ffigh Court and he took the view that .the affidavit of the Income Tax Officer dated 27th January, 1970 clearly showed that he had reason to believe that incom~ of the respondent had escaped assessment by reason of its failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts and he ac- B cordingly dismissed the writ petition.\n\nThe respondent preferred an appeal and a Division Bench of the ffigh Court disagreeing with the view taken by the Single Judge held that there was no failure on the part of the respondent to disclose fully and truly all material facts and in any event there was no material on the basis of which it could be\n\nI!'\n\nsaid that the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that any part of the income had escaped assessment by reason of such failure on the part of the respondent.\n\nThe Division Bench accordingly allowed the writ petition and quashed and set aside the Notice for re-opening the assessment.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer thereupon preferred the present appeal to this Court after obtaining a certificate from the High Court.\n\nThe present case is clearly covered by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Bur/op Dealers Ltd.(') There the assessee in the course of its original assessment to incometax for the assessment year 1949-50 had produced a partnership agreement with one Ratiram Tansukhrai and claimed that the profits earned by it from H. Manory Ltd. had been divided between itself and Ratiram Tansukhrai under the partnership agreement and its one-half share of the profit, namely, Rs. 87,937 /- was the only amount assessable to tax in respect of this source.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer accepted the partnership agreement and assessed the assessee only on the profit of .._ Rs. 87,937 /-. It appears that while making assessment for the assessment year 1950-51 the Income Tax Officer found that the partnership agreement between the assessee and Ratiram Tansukhrai was a got up device to reduce the profit received from H. Manory Ltd. and the assessee was, therefore, liable to tax on the entire amount of profit coming from H. Manory Ltd. This view taken by the Income Tax Officer was confirmed on appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Tribunal. The High Court also on a reference agreed with the view of the Tribunal.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer thereupon issued a Notice under Section 34(1) (a) of the Income Tax Act to re-open the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1949-50 in order to bring to tax the further amount of Rs. 87,937 /- being the half share of the profit from H. Manory Ltd. alleged to have been paid to atiram Tansukhrai under the partnership agreement.\n\nThe assessee con-\n\n(1) [19711 79 I.T.R. 609\n\n• ¥ •\n\nI.T.O. v. MADNANI WOR.ICS LTD. (Bhagwati, /.) 909\n\ntended that it had produced all the relevant accounts and documents necessary for completing the assessment and it was under no obligation to inform the Income Tax Officer about the true nature of the transaction and there was accordingly no failure on its part to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment.\n\nThis contention was negatived by the Income Tax Officer and the income of the assessee was re-assessed by adding Rs. 87,937 /- to the income returned by the assessee.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commisioner confirmed the order of the Income Tax Officer on appeal, but on further appea], tbe Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and held that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to make a. full and true disclosure of the material facts and hence the Income Tax Officer was not justified in seeking to re-open the assessment under Section 34(1) (a) of the Income Tax Act.\n\nThe Revenue applied to the Tribunal for a reference but the application was rejected and the High Court also dismissed the application of the Revenue for calling for a reference from the Tribunal.\n\nThe Revenue thereupon preferred an appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nThe appeal was rejected by this Court on the ground that the assessee had disclosed all its books of account and evidence from which material facts could be discovered and it was under no obligation to inform the Income Tax Officer about the possible inferences which might be raised against him and hence there was no failure on its part to disclose the preliminary facts rele--\n\nvant to the assessment which would invite the applicability of Section 34(1)(a)., It will thus be seen that according to this judgment, there was no obligation on the assessee to disclose that the partnership agreement ptoduced by it was bogus and that the entries made by it in its books of accounts were false.\n\nThe assessee discharged the obligation which lay upon it by disclosing its books of account and evidence from which material facts could be discovered and it was for the Income Tax Officer to decide whether the documents produced by the assessee were genuine or false. Here also the respondent produced. all the hundis on the strength of which it had obtained loans from creditors as also entries in the books of account showing payment of interest and it was for the Income Tax Officer to investigate and determine whether these documents were genuine or not.\n\nThe respondent could qot be said to have failed to make a true and full disclosure of the material facts by not confessing before the Income Tax Officer that the hundis and the entries in the books of account produced by it were bogus.\n\nWe do not see any distinction at all between Bur/op Dealers case (supra) and the present one and the language of Section 147(a) being identical with that of Section 34(1) (a), the ratio of the decision in Bur/op Dealers case (supra} must govem the decision of the present case. We\n\nSUPJU!MB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA must, therefore, hold that there was no failure on the part of the respondent to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment and the condition for the applicability of Section 147 (a) was not satisfied.\n\nWe may also point out that though it was contended in the Writ B Petition that the Income Tax Officer could have no reason to believe • that any part of the income of the respondent had escaped assessment 1 by reason of its failure to make a full and true disclosure of material facts, the Income Tax Offioor did not disclose in his affidavit any material on the basis of which it could be said that he had come to the requisite belief.\n\nAll that the Income Tax Officer stated in his afidavit C was that he discovered that the transactions of loan against secnrity\n\nof hundis were not genuine and that the credits against the names of certain persons who were alleged to have advanoed loans were bogus.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer merely stated his belief but did not set out an} material on the basis of which he had arrived at such belief so D that the Court could decide for itself whether there was any material on the basis of which the Income Tax Officer could reasonably entertain such belief. We are, therefore, not at all satisfied on the affidavit that the lncom!l Tax Officer had rcas0n to believe that a part of the income of the respondent bad escaped assessment by reason of its failure to make a true and full disclosure of the material facts.\n\nE _The Notice under Section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act for re-opening the assessment must in the circumstances be held to be void.\n\nWe accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dimiisud.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "INCOME TAX OFFICER & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INCOME TAX OFFICER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MADNANI ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.,\n\nCALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. MADNANI ENGINEERING WORKS LTD., CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 90, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CALCUTTA\n\nJanuary 4, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 141(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 619, "end_char": 628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2086, "end_char": 2095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, and Miss A. Subhashitri for the Appellant\n\nV. S. Desai, Sanjay BhaJtacharya and Rathln Dass for the ReipOn-- den!."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashitri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, and Miss A. Subhashitri for the Appellant\n\nV. S. Desai, Sanjay BhaJtacharya and Rathln Dass for the ReipOn-- den!."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, and Miss A. Subhashitri for the Appellant\n\nV. S. Desai, Sanjay BhaJtacharya and Rathln Dass for the ReipOn-- den!."}}, {"text": "Sanjay BhaJtacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3943, "end_char": 3962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, and Miss A. Subhashitri for the Appellant\n\nV. S. Desai, Sanjay BhaJtacharya and Rathln Dass for the ReipOn-- den!."}}, {"text": "Rathln Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, and Miss A. Subhashitri for the Appellant\n\nV. S. Desai, Sanjay BhaJtacharya and Rathln Dass for the ReipOn-- den!."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4051, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal by 'certificate is directed against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta allowing an appeal against a decision of a Single Judge dismissing thewtit petition of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4767, "end_char": 4787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4894, "end_char": 4904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 147(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5046, "end_char": 5060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "5th December, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6102, "end_char": 6120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Officer in the affidavit in reply filed by him on 5th December, 1968 declined to disclose the facts which had weighed with him in reaching the belief that the income of the respondent had escaped\n\nal>Sessment by reason of its failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, on the ground that if such facts were disclosed to the respondent, it would cause great prejudice to the interests of the Revenue and would frustrate the object o[ re-opening the assessment."}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7139, "end_char": 7150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arnarlal Moolchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7602, "end_char": 7620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine."}}, {"text": "Girdharidas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine."}}, {"text": "Reghoomal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7635, "end_char": 7644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine."}}, {"text": "Murlidhar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7646, "end_char": 7655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine."}}, {"text": "Kanhaiyal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7657, "end_char": 7666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine."}}, {"text": "Deudaram Basdeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arnarlal Moolchand, Girdharidas, Reghoomal, Murlidhar, Kanhaiyal:tl\n\nand Deudaram Basdeo in the petitioner's books were found not to be genuine."}}, {"text": "Ratiram Tansukhrai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9521, "end_char": 9539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present case is clearly covered by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Bur/op Dealers Ltd.(') There the assessee in the course of its original assessment to incometax for the assessment year 1949-50 had produced a partnership agreement with one Ratiram Tansukhrai and claimed that the profits earned by it from H. Manory Ltd. had been divided between itself and Ratiram Tansukhrai under the partnership agreement and its one-half share of the profit, namely, Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ratiram Tansukhrai"}}, {"text": "H. Manory Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9587, "end_char": 9601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present case is clearly covered by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Bur/op Dealers Ltd.(') There the assessee in the course of its original assessment to incometax for the assessment year 1949-50 had produced a partnership agreement with one Ratiram Tansukhrai and claimed that the profits earned by it from H. Manory Ltd. had been divided between itself and Ratiram Tansukhrai under the partnership agreement and its one-half share of the profit, namely, Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10555, "end_char": 10568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "atiram Tansukhrai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "87,937 /- being the half share of the profit from H. Manory Ltd. alleged to have been paid to atiram Tansukhrai under the partnership agreement.", "canonical_name": "Ratiram Tansukhrai"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11861, "end_char": 11874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12620, "end_char": 12636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13827, "end_char": 13840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPJU!MB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13952, "end_char": 13991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We\n\nSUPJU!MB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA must, therefore, hold that there was no failure on the part of the respondent to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment and the condition for the applicability of Section 147 (a) was not satisfied."}}, {"text": "Section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14192, "end_char": 14203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15504, "end_char": 15518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_911_922_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "4, I\n\n' •\n\nINDIAN OXYGEN LTD. v:\n\nTHE WORKMEN AS REPRESENTED BY INDIAN\n\nOXYGEN KARAMCHARI UNION\n\nJanuar; y 9, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.] B\n\nU.P. lndu51ria/ Disputes Act, 1947 (28 of 1947) Ss. 2(/), J(d), 4K, 6B, 61, 1(ii)-lu<lustrial dispute-Tests for calling a dispule an \"industrial dispute\" -Eltabli:.l11nen1 had a union affiliated to a Fcdtratio:1 and a non-affiliated union -Employer entered into settlement with affiliated union-Non-affiliated union\n\ntcot a p(l.riy to such settlement-Disputei raised by a non-affiliated un{on on the Same point-If an i_ndustrial dispute.\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) S. IS-Applicability of.\n\nThe appe.llant company had its establishments in a number of/ States in the .country. In its establishment at Kanpur there wer'e two unions, One of which,\n\nthe Shramik Sangh; was a-ffiliated to the Fr..deral Union comprising of some of the trade unions in the various establishments. while the other, the Karama chari lTnior:, was not.\n\nA demand relating to revision of dearness allowance D among others, was raised by -both the Unions at Kanpur. The Shramik Sangh and the appel1ant entered into a settlement. Karamchari Union which was not a party to the settlement, made an application to the State Government to constitute a concililartion board for reference of the dispute. \"('he Board was constituted.\n\nIn the meantime, how'cver, to bring the settlement within the purview of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act the Shramik Sangh applied for the constitution of a conciliation board.\n\nA conciliation board was constituted ac.d E the memorandum of settlement arrived at between th'e parties was registere~ even though the dispute on the same point raised by the Karamchari Union\n\nwas pending before th'e Conciliation Boa.rd all the while.\n\nThe dispute raised by the Karamchari Union was, therefor6, referred to a Tribunal under s 4K of th< Act.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the appellant's co1,1tention that it had no jurisdiction ir 10 adjudicate on th'e dispute.\n\nOn appeal to this Court it was contended that it was implicit in the various provisions of the U.P. Act that a settlement arrived at before a Conciliation Board by a Union of the majority of workmen was binding on all the workmen r.d that in the absence of a provision like s. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it 1vas not pe1missible for the Karamchari Union to contend that the, settlement would bind ooly the membersof the Shramik Sangh and in arw event reference G \"(lf the dispute to a Tribunal was without jurisdiction. ·\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: l. The State Government rightly took the view that the controversy raised hy the Karamchari Union was an industrial dispute. [922 GwH]\n\n2. A realling of the relevant provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, H 1947, clearly shows that there is nothing in the Act to require that the di9pute\n\n2-119SCI/79\n\nS1JPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nor difference should be raised by all the workmen of the industry, or by everyone of them, or even by a majority of them. It is enough if the controversy is between the empl6y'cr on the orie side and workmen on the other. There is also nothing in the Act to require that the workmen raising the controversy shculd form a majority of the employees, the reason being that whre it is found that the controversy affects, or will affect, the interests of workmen as a\n\nclas~, the law envisages that, in the interest of industr'ial peace, it should be exc, rnined and decided in one of the modes provided by it. [917 D-F]\n\n3. An individual dispute cannot, however, be said to be an industrial dispute\n\nunless the other workmen associate themselves with it.\n\nNo bard and fas-t rule t-1 can be laid down to decide when and by how many workmen an industrial dispute could be raised within the meaning of the Act, or whether a minority union or 'even an unrecognised union, could raise an industrial dispute. It is C enough if there is a potential cause of disharmony which is liely to endanger industrial peace, and a substantial number of workmen raise a dispute about it, for then it is permissible to view it as an industrial dispute within the meaning of clause (1) of s. 2 of the Act, and to refer it for adjudication to a tribunad.\n\n[917 fHJ\n\n4. The settlement arrived at with the1 Federal Union did not bind the D ; Karamchari Union as it was not a party to it and was not affiliated 'to the Federal Union. Section 18 of the Central Act provides that a settlement arrived at by agfeement between the pa.rties oth'erwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings Ehall be binding on the parties Jo the agrcen1e111. [918 E]\n\n5. Moreover, the s'ettlement arrived at with the Shramik Sangh was under the provisions of the U.P. Act arid, therefore, s. 18 of the Central Act had no E arpl.icaticn. There is no provision similar 10 it in the U.P. Act. [918 G]\n\n6. There was no occasion for invoking s. 7 of the U.P. Act.\n\nThat Bection iS ma.inly intended to serv'e the purposes contemplated bys. 3 of the Act, namely, securing the rublic safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the' life of th'e community or for maintaining employment etc.\n\nIt cannot therefore be said that the settlerllent arrived at by the Sangh became binding on all workmen including the Karamchari Union which W<hS not a party to it nor is there any other provis.ion in the Act or the Rules making the settlement binding on the Karamchari Union.\n\nNor again can it be said that s. 3(d) of the U.P. Act justifies the argument that merely becaus'e a union, consisting of a majority of workers, can represent all the workmen, the settlement arrived at before a conciliation board would bind those \\vho are net parties to it. [919 B, C, F-GJ\n\n7. In the abse\".Jce of any prohibitory provision in the Act it cannot be said that the State Government had no jurisdiction to make a general reference under s. 4K of the U.P. Act merely because the settlement was made by a majority union and wa.s binding on the Shramik Sangh, The Tribunal has found it s a fact that the Karamchari Union represented a substantial number of the workmen of the company at Kanpur, and there is no reason why they should be debarred from raising a dispute for the benefit of all the workmen as a class.\n\nIt is well recognised, that \"collective bargaining\" can take place between the emploYer and a bona fide labour unio~ and there is nothing on the record to show that the Karamchari Union was not a bona fide unio.n. [920 A.CJ\n\n•• -\n\n• •\n\nIn the instant case the Shramik Sangh entered into the settlement in collu A sioo with the company and th'e Conciliation Board finalised the settlement even\n\nthough the Karamchari Union's dispute was still pending. No effort was made to make it a party to the proceedings. Although, to begin with, a both the Shramik Sangh and the Karamchari Union were opposed to the settlement\n\n'earlier arrived at by the Federal Union the Shramik Sangh changed its otand\n\nand endorsed the settlement of the Federal Union when it was placed on the notice board. The Tribunal also found as a fact that the settlement was not B even put on th'e notice board of the company. In these circumstances if thr- State Government had decided to make a reference of the dispute to the Tribuna1 it could not be said that it did not apply its mind to the controversy or com~\n\nmilted an illegality in doing so.\n\n[920 H-921 CJ\n\n8. Ev'en c:\\bsuming that the earlier settlements wefe in the nature of a package C deal arrived at between the company and the Federal Union it cannot be said that there Was any legal bar to the reference of the dispute r'egarding one particular item of the package deal for adjudication by the tribuna.l so as to vitiate\n\nt're reference. The company brought this aspect of the matter specifically to the notice of the State Government.\n\nThe point does not, however, relate to the jurisdiction or the maintainability of the reference under s. 4K for it is essen\n\ntially a matter for the Tribunal's examination with due regard to the evidence\n\nbefore it. [921-F-G] D\n\nHerbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen of Herbertsons Ltd. & Ors. [1977] 2 SCR 15 and New Standard Engg. Co. Ltd. v. M. L. Abhyankar & Ors., [1978] 1 L.L.J. 487; held inltpplicable.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2335 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-7-78 of the Industrial Tribunal U.P. in Adjudication Case No. 15/77 .\n\nF. S. Nariman, 0. C. Mathur and D. N. Misra for the Appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthl, litendra Sharma and lanardan Sharma for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSmNGIIAL J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the G order of Industrial Tribunal (Ill) U.P. at Kanpur dated July 14. 1978, deciding the following two preliminary issues which were raise.i by the Indian Oxygen Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)\n\nagainst the Company-\n\n\"(1) Whether present dispute is not an industrial dis- 11 pute in the light of the objections raised by the employers in paragraph (1) of their written Statement?\n\n( 2) Whether the present Order of Reference is bad in law in the light of the objections raised by the employers in paragraph (1) of their Written Statement?\"\n\nThe Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala. Then' were several recognised trade unions of the workmen. The All-India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Union (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Union) was the recognised federation of some of the trade unions from 1973 onwards.\n\nThe Indian Oxygen Shramik Sangh (hereinafter referred to as the Shramik Sangh), which represented some of the workmen at Kanpur, was affiliated to the Federal Union.\n\nThere was another union known as the Indian Oxygen Karamchari Union (hereinafter referred to as the Karamchari Union) which was registered much earlier but its constitution was revised because of the merger of two other unions in it and was approved by the Rgistrar of Trade Unions on May 10, 1978. It was not a member of the Federal Union.\n\nThe Federal Union raised a charter of demands in February 1973 of all India nature and a settlement was arrived at on June 22, 1973, according to which the demand for revision of pay scales was to be taken .up for discussion at a mutually convenient, date.\n\nA similar settlement was made with the Shramik Sangh on November 22, 1973.\n\nIt was followed by negotiations and an order was made for the constitution of a Conciliation Board under section 3(d) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act) .\n\nA memorandum of settlement was drawn up on April 30, 1974 between the Company and the Shramik Sangh.\n\nIt was agreed, inter alia, that the question of revision of the dearness allowance of the Kanpur unit employees would be negotiated by the Company with the Federal Unit and/or the Union on or before April 1, 1975.\n\n1n the meantime, the Karamchari Union made on application on January 23, 1975, for the constitution of a Conciliation Board under section 3(d) of the U.P. Act and the Board was constituted by an order dated January 30, 1975.\n\nThe Company raised objections to the constitution of the Board on February 24, 1975, but the proceedings were commenced by the Board on February 26, 1975, and March 19, 1975 was fixed for appearance.\n\nThe Company however proceed- ' cd with its efforts for a settlement with the Federal Union, and entered into a settlement with.it on June 30. 1975. In order to bring it under the purview of the U.P. Act, the Shramik Sangh applied on\n\n•• -.\n\n..,\n\nJuly 18, 1975, for the constitution of a Conciliation Board under that Act and a Conciliation Board was constituted on July 29, 1975.\n\nA memorandum of settlement about the dearness allowance was drawn up with the Shramik Sangh on Angust 27, 1975; in accordance with rnle SA of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, jn Form IA, even though the dispute regarding the variable dearness allowance, which had been raised by the Karamchari Union earlier, was pending all the while.\n\nThe settlement with the Shramik Sangh made a specific reference to the all-India Federation settlement which had been made ?n June 30, 1975.\n\nThat settlement with the Federal Union was in fact annexed to the settlement with the Shramik Sangh and was treated as a settlement under the U .P. Act.\n\nThe dispute regarding the variable dearness allowance which had been raised by the Karamchari Sangh by its appl.ication dated January 23, 1975 for the constitution of a Conciliation Board, did not however bear fruit.\n\nMoreover the settlement which had been reached between the Company and the Federal Union was opposed by the Shramik Sangh and the Karamchari Sangh.\n\nThe Conciliation Officer . D did not therefore pass an order for the registration of the aforesaid settlement.\n\nThe Shramik Sangh, which had claimed dearness allowance according to the Kanpur cost of living index, however changed its stand and, as has been stated,, it filed a memorandum of the settlement on August 27, 1975.\n\nThese facts are not in dispute before us.\n\nIt was in these circumstances that the State Government made an order on May 23, 1977, referring the dispute between the Company and the Karamchari Sangh for adjudication under section 4K of the\n\nU .P. Act. The precise matter of dispute was the question whether the dearness allowance payable by the Company to its workmen should be revised and linked with ilie consumer price inde.x for the industrial workers at Kanpur computed by the Labour ; Bureau at Simla\n\nand, if so, from what date and with what other details.\n\nThe Company filed a written statement in which it raised preliminary objections to the maintainability of the reference.\n\nThat gave rise to the two issues mentioned above and as they have been found against the Company by the impugned order of the Tribunal, it has come up in appeal to this Court.\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for the Company, that it is implicit in the various provisions of the U.P. Act\n\nthat a settlement arrived at before a Conciliation Board, by a union H of a majority of the workmen, is binding on all the workmen.\n\nRefer enoe in this connection has been made to the Preamble. and sections\n\n2(t), 3(d), 6B, 6-1, ?(ii) of the U.P. Act, rules SA and 40 and Forms lA and !I! of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, and to clauses (4) and (8) of the order dated December .3, 1957 made under section 3(d) of the U.P. Act. It has further been argued that the power to enforce a settlement under section 7 of the U.P. Act [B shows that the settlement is meant to be binding on all the workmen.\n\nIt has also been argued that once a valid settlement is made, it is not permissible to refer a dispute (covered by it) for adjudication.\n\nAn attempt has been made to support that contention with reference to some decisions.\n\nLearned counsel has gone to the extent of arguing that as there is no provision in the U.P. Act similar to sub-sections c\n\n(1) and (3) of section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act), it is not permissible for the Karamchari Union to contend that the settlement which had been made with the Shramik Sangh will bind only the workmen who were members of that Sangh.\n\nIn the alternative, it has been argued that the State Government did not have the jurisdiction to make a valid reference under section 4K of the U.P. Act as the demand for variable dearness allowance had been settled through the Shramik Sangh in respect of a majority of the workmen of the Kanpur unit and was binding on the members of that Union. Then it has been argued that the settlement which had been made with the Federal Union on June 30, 1975 was by itself and independently of the U.P. Settlement (with the Shramik Sangh), a settlement under section 18(1) of the Central Act and was binding on the members of the Shramik Sangh\n\nas it was affiliated to the Federal T.Jnion and for that reason also it was not permissible to make a reference for adjudication in respect of all the workmen including those who belonged to the Shramik Sangh. It has further been argued that the settlement of June 30,\n\n1975 with the Federal Uniol) would have been operative even without the Shramik Sangh settlement and section 18 ( 1) of the Central Act would be applicable to it as it was not a setilement during the course of conciliation proceedings and was binding on the Federal Union\n\nunder section 36(1)(a) and (b) of the Centra~ Act and it was not permissible to make a general reference covering even the workmen belonging to a union affiliated to the Federal Union. It has been urged that the reference should have been restricted to those workmen who were not governed by the settlement of June 30, 1975 or that settlement should also have been referred to the Tribunal if it was felt by the State Government that it was not valid or fair.\n\nLastly, it has been argued that the settlements of June 30, 1975 and August 27, 1975 were in the nature of package deals arising out of collective! and mutual bargaining and a reference refating to one term of the deals\n\n...\n\nwas invalid.\n\nReference for this proposition has been made to Herbertsons Limited v. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and others(') and New Standard Engg. Co. Ltd. v. M. L. Abhayankar and others(').\n\nThus the question for consideration before us is whether the State .\n\nGovernment had the authority or jurisdiction to make the order dated May 23, 1977, under section 4K of the U.P. Act referring the dispute regarding variable dearness allowance for adjudication to the Tribunal .\n\nThe two issues before the Tribunal related to that basic question and it will be sufficient for us to examine it in the facts and circumstances of this case and the law bearing on it.\n\nSection 4K of the U.P. Act provides that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be comiected with, or relevant to the dispute to a Tribunal. Clause ( 1) of section 2 of that Act defines an industrial dispute to mean, inter alia, any dispute or difference between employers and workmen which is connected with the terms of their employment.\n\nThe expression \"workmen\" bas been defined in clause (z) of section 2 to mean, speaking generally, \"any person\" employed in any industry in the capacity mentioned therein.\n\nThere is nothing in the Act to' require that the dispute or difference should be raised by all the workmen of the industry, or by every one of them, or even by a majority of them. It is enough if the controversy is between the employer on the one side and workmen on the other.\n\nSo also, there is nothing in the Act to require that the workmen raising the controversy should form a majority of the employees.\n\nThe reason appears to be that where it is found that the controversy affects, or will affect, the interest of workmen as a class, the law envisages that, in the interest of industrial peace, it should be examined and decided in one of the modes provided by it.\n\nAn individual dispute cannot however be said to be an industrial dispute unless of course the other workmen associate themselves with it.\n\nNo hard and fast rule can possibly be laid down in such circumstances to decide when and by how many workmen an industrial dispute can be raised within the meaning of the Act, or whether a minority union,\n\nor even an unrecognised union, can raise an industrial dispute. It is G enough if there is a potential cause of disharmony which is likely to endanger industrial peace, and a substantial number of workmen raise a dispute about it, for then it is permissible to take the view that it is an industrial dispute within the meaning of clause (1) of section 2 of the U.P. Act, and to refer it for adjudication to a Tribunal.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to the Tr\\bunal's finding H\n\n(!) (1977] 2 S.C.R. 15\n\n(2) (1978] l L.L. J. 487.\n\nof fact that although the Karamchari Union was not a recognised union and it was not a member of the Federal Union, it had a \"substantial number of workmen of the concern as its members.\" We have no doubt therefore that the State Government rightly took the view that the controversy raised by the Karamchari Union was an industrial dispute,\n\nIt cannot be gainsaid that the dispute in the present case was raised by the Karamchari Union and they made an application for the constitution of a Conciliation Board as far back as January 23, 1975, and the Board was constituted on January 30, 1975. It will be recalled that the Company filed its objections before the Board on February 24, 1975, and the Board fixed March 19, 1975 for their consideration. It is not in controversy before us that the conciliation effort met with failure, and the point for consideration is whether the State Government lost its power to make a reference under section 4K of the U.P. Act merely because of the settlement dated June 30, 1975 between the Company and the Federal Union under the Central Act and the settlement dated August 27, 1975 between the Company and the Shramik Sangh in the conciliation proceedings under the U.P. Act.\n\nSection 18 of the Central Act deals with the binding effect of settlements and awards.\n\nSub-section ( 1) of that seCtion provides that a &ettlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and E workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.\n\nThe settlement dated June 30, 1975, with the Federal Union did not therefore bind the Karamchari Union as it was not a party to it and was not affiliated to the Federal Union.\n\nIt is true that the Shramik Sangh made an application for the constitution of a Conciliation Board on July 18, 1975, and a Board was constituted on July 29, 1975.\n\nThat in fact led to a settlement with the Shramik Sangh on August 27, 1975.\n\nBut that took place .under the provisions of the U.P. Act and Mr. Nariman has himself pointed out the proceedings in fact took place under rule SA of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 and the memorandum of settlement was prepared in Form 1-A.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 18 of the Central Act could not therefore be attracted to that settlement and there is no provisi?n similar to it in the U.P. Act.\n\nWe have gone through ection ?(ii) of the U.P. Act and the H rules made thereunder, as well as the order dated December 31, 1957, on which much reliance has been placed by Mr. Nariman.\n\nClause\n\n(ii) of section 7 deals with the power of the State Government to\n\nenforce, by order, in the prescribed manner. for snch period as may be specified, the whole or any part of an agreement reached in conciliation proceedings between the parties to an industrial dispute. But the section, it appears, is mainly intended to deal with an order passed under any other enactment, and is meant to serve the purposes contemplated in section 3, namely. for securing the public safety or conveniences or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to life of the commnnity, or for maintaining employment etc.\n\nIt has not been urged before us that there was any such occasion for invoking section 7.\n\nA mere reference to that section cannot therefore sustain the argnment that the settlement dated Augnst 27, 1975, became bindhg on all workmen including the Karamchari Union, which had nothing to do with it and was not even a party to it, and that the Union was precluded from raising an industrial dispute and the State Government was precluded from referring it for adjuqication under section 4K of the U.P. Act. Rule SA of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules and the preparation of the memorandum of settlement in Form 1-A could not therefore justify the argnment to the contrary.\n\nSo also, a reference to Form III of the Rules which provides that a person who contravenes or attempts to contravene, any provision of the State Government's order shall be liable, on conviction, to fine or to imprisonment not exceeding three years or both, is hardly of any 'avail for obvious reasons.\n\nIn fact Mr. Nariman has not found it !possible to support his argnment about the binding nature of the settlement dated August 27, 1975, on the basis of such a penal provision in a form appended to a set of Rules, and we need not examine it any further.\n\nWe have gone through the order which has been made under section 3(d) of the U.P. Act, on paragraph 8 of which considerable F reliance has been placed by Mr. Nariman. It was made on December 31, 1957, and was to remain in force for one year n_nder paragraph\n\n15. Even otherwise, paragraph 8 merely makes provision for impleading other workmen, or concerns, or a union, in proceedings before a Conciliation Board. It provides that it would be enough to implead a union covering the majority of such \"concern or workmen\". But G such a provision cannot justify the argumnt that, merely because a union consisting of a majority of workers cat\\ represent all the workmen, the settlement made in the Conciliation Boar~ will bind those who are not parties to it.\n\nAs regards the alternative argument of Mr. Nariman that as the H settlement dated August 27, 1975, was made by a \"majority union\", it was, at any rate, binding on the members of the Shramik Sangh, and\n\nthat the State Government had no jurisdiction to make a general reference under section 4K of the U.P. Act, it will be sufficient to say that no such bar could possibly be raised in the absence of any prohibitory provision in the law.\n\nAs has been stated, the Tribnnal has found it as a fact that the Karamchari Union represented a substantial number of the workmen of the Company at Kanpur, and there is no reason why they should be debarred from raising a dispute for the benefit of all the workmen as a class. It is well recognised, and cannot be disputed, that \"collective bargaining\" can take place between the employer and a bona fide labour union, and there is nothing on the record to show that the Karamchari Union was not a bona fide union.\n\nIn fact it may well be said that as the Shramik Sangh was an affiliated unit of the Federal Union, it was not permissible for it to make the application dated July 18, 1975, for the constitution of a Conciliation Board to resolve the dispute and to enter into the memorandum of settlement dated August 27, 1975.\n\nThe Tribnnal has examined the file (No.391 of 1975) of the Conciliation Board case relating to the industrial dispute raised by the Karamchari Union on January 23, 1975, about the payment of the dearness allowance to the workers of the Kanpur unit according to the cost of living index for industrial workers at Kanpur, and the file of the other conciliatiDn case relating to the similar dispute raised by the Shramik Sangh on July 18, 1975, and has stated the factual position as follows-\n\n\"It is clear from the latter file that the management of the Kanpur unit of the Company had applied on 29-7-75 to the Regional Conciliation Officer for the registration of the settlement reached between the company and the All India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Unions on 30-6-75 but on. account of the pendency of C.B. Case No.391/75 some information was asked to be furnished by the company which the company did not furnish.\n\nOn the other band, the representatives of the Shramik Sangh and the Kanpur unit of the company appeared before the Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur on 27-8-75 and submitted a brief memorandum of settlement making applicable to the Kanpur unit the settlement which had been reached between the company and the Federation\" on 30-6-75.\" -\n\nIt will thus appear that the Shramik Sangh entered into the settle-\n\nI< ' ment dated August 27, 1975 in collusion with the Company and that ff the Conciliation Board allowed the memorandum of settlement to be filed and firialised even though the Karamchari Union's dispnte dated January 23, 1975 was pending and no effort was made to make it a\n\n• ..\n\nparty to the proceedings which were taken at the instance of the Shrarnik Sangh.\n\nIt is. important to remember in this connection that although the settlement which had been made by the Federal Union on June 30, 1975 was opposed by both the Unions when it was placed on the notice board of the Kanpur unit, the Shrarnik Sangh changed its stand and filed a memorandum of settlement on August 27, 19i5\n\nendorsing the settlement which had 'been made with the Federal Union on June 30, 1975. The Tribunal has also stated it as a fact that the settlement dated August 27, 1975 was not even put on the notice board of the Company.\n\nIf, therefore, the State Government decided to make a reference of the dispute to the Tribunal in these circumstances, it cannot be said that it did not apply its mind to the controversy or committed an illegality in doing so.\n\nIt has, to be appreciated that it would not have been practicable for the State Government.to exclude the workmen who were members ·\n\nof the Shramik Sangh (at Kanpur) from the scope of the reference under section 4K of the U.P. Act and. to confine the dispute to the D rest of the workmen, for that might have given rise to one pay structure for one section of the workmen (represented by the Karamchari Union) and another for the other workmen (represented by the Shrarnik Sangh). At any rate, this was not a matter at the threshold, and is essentially fot the Tribunal to examine on the merits of the controversy. ' E\n\nWe have also considered the other argumeIJ.t of Mr. Nariman that as the settlements dated June 30, 1975 and August 27, 1975 were in the nature of package deals, and arose out of collective bargaining, it was not permissible for the State Government to make a reference F to the Tribunal about one item of that deal, namely, that relating to the variable dearness allowance. Our attention in this connection has been invited to the statement of the Company's Personnel Manager V. John in which reference has been made to the nature and the contents of the package.\n\nThe point does not however relate to the jurisdiction or the maintainability of the reference under section 4K G of the U.P. Act, for it is essentially a matter for the Tribunal's examination with due regard to the evidence before it. It appears from the record that the Company brought this aspect of the matter specifically to the notice of the State Government in its representation dated April 20, 1976, and it cannot be said that it was not before the Government when it made the impugned order of reference dated May H 23, 1977. At any rate, it cannot be said that there is any legal bar to 'the reference of the dispute regarding one particular item of a ·\n\npackage deal for adjudication by the Tribu11al so as to vitiate the reference at the threshold.\n\nWe have gone through the two cases which have been cited by Mr. Nariman in this connection.\n\nHerbertsons Ltd. (supra) was a case where all the workers of the Company had accepted the settlement and received the arrears and the emoluments according to it.\n\nIn fact it was in the facts and circumstances of that case that this Court took the view that it was not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.\n\nEven so, \\his Court expressed the view that if the objectionable part was shown to outweigh all the other advantages, the Court would be slow to hold the settlement unfair and unjust. llerbertsons is therefore no authority for the argument that a part of a package deal cannot be the subject matter of a reference for adjudication by the Tribunal.\n\nNew Standard Engineering Co. Ltd (supra) was also a different case, for there the justness and fairness of the settlement was examined with reference to t, he situation as it stood on the date on which it was arrived at, and it cannot also avail the argument of Mr.\n\nNarimari about the illegality of a reference merely because it relates to a part of a package deal.\n\nThat is essentially a matter for the Tribunal to examine and adjudge on the merits of the reference.\n\nLastly, Mr. Nariman has argued that as the members of the Karamchari Union accepted the benefits . of the settlement which had been made with the Federal Union on June 30, 1975, they were precluded from obtaining the order of reference dated May 23, 1977. The argument is fu(ile because the Tribunal has specifically stated in its order under appeal that even the settlement dated August 27, 1975 was not put on the Company's notice board and the emoluments of the workmen were increased from July 1975. It has further been stated that the members of the Karamchari Union \"took the increase but under protest vide the Union's letter dated 28-7-75 which is annexure D to the Workmen's written statement.\"\n\nThere is thus no force in the argument which have been advanced for the purpose of showing that the settlements dated June 30, 1975 and August 27, 1975 debarred the State Government from making the impugned order of reference dated May 23, 1977 under section 4K of the U.P. Act or that the dispute was not an industrial dispute and the order was otherwise bad in law.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismisJed.\n\n_!(.\n\n, •", "total_entities": 122, "entities": [{"text": "INDIAN OXYGEN LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDIAN OXYGEN LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE WORKMEN AS REPRESENTED BY INDIAN\n\nOXYGEN KARAMCHARI UNION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE WORKMEN AS REPRESENTED BY INDIAN OXYGEN KARAMCHARI UNION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 2(/)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 777, "end_char": 783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In its establishment at Kanpur there wer'e two unions, One of which,\n\nthe Shramik Sangh; was a-ffiliated to the Fr..deral Union comprising of some of the trade unions in the various establishments."}}, {"text": "Shramik Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Shramik Sangh and the appel1ant entered into a settlement."}}, {"text": "Karamchari Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1177, "end_char": 1193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karamchari Union which was not a party to the settlement, made an application to the State Government to constitute a concililartion board for reference of the dispute. \"('"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1458, "end_char": 1481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2303, "end_char": 2308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2316, "end_char": 2345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2783, "end_char": 2806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4451, "end_char": 4461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4793, "end_char": 4798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4941, "end_char": 4945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5547, "end_char": 5554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5966, "end_char": 5971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8017, "end_char": 8022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 SCR 15", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8199, "end_char": 8214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8511, "end_char": 8524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, 0."}}, {"text": "D. N. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8543, "end_char": 8554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and D. N. Misra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8575, "end_char": 8591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthl, litendra Sharma and lanardan Sharma for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "litendra Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8593, "end_char": 8608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthl, litendra Sharma and lanardan Sharma for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "lanardan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8613, "end_char": 8628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthl, litendra Sharma and lanardan Sharma for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SmNGIIAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSmNGIIAL J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the G order of Industrial Tribunal (Ill) U.P. at Kanpur dated July 14."}}, {"text": "Indian Oxygen Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8904, "end_char": 8922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1978, deciding the following two preliminary issues which were raise.i by the Indian Oxygen Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)\n\nagainst the Company-\n\n\"(1) Whether present dispute is not an industrial dis- 11 pute in the light of the objections raised by the employers in paragraph (1) of their written Statement?"}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9374, "end_char": 9385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9387, "end_char": 9392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9394, "end_char": 9398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9400, "end_char": 9405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9407, "end_char": 9413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9415, "end_char": 9420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9422, "end_char": 9433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9435, "end_char": 9442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Tamilnadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9444, "end_char": 9453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9455, "end_char": 9469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9485, "end_char": 9491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company employed some 5400 workmen in its establishment in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P., Assam, Punjab, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala."}}, {"text": "All-India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9556, "end_char": 9609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The All-India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Union (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Union) was the recognised federation of some of the trade unions from 1973 onwards."}}, {"text": "Indian Oxygen Shramik Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9739, "end_char": 9766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Oxygen Shramik Sangh (hereinafter referred to as the Shramik Sangh), which represented some of the workmen at Kanpur, was affiliated to the Federal Union."}}, {"text": "Indian Oxygen Karamchari Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was another union known as the Indian Oxygen Karamchari Union (hereinafter referred to as the Karamchari Union) which was registered much earlier but its constitution was revised because of the merger of two other unions in it and was approved by the Rgistrar of Trade Unions on May 10, 1978."}}, {"text": "May 10, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10187, "end_char": 10199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was another union known as the Indian Oxygen Karamchari Union (hereinafter referred to as the Karamchari Union) which was registered much earlier but its constitution was revised because of the merger of two other unions in it and was approved by the Rgistrar of Trade Unions on May 10, 1978."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10362, "end_char": 10375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Federal Union raised a charter of demands in February 1973 of all India nature and a settlement was arrived at on June 22, 1973, according to which the demand for revision of pay scales was to be taken .up for discussion at a mutually convenient, date."}}, {"text": "November 22, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar settlement was made with the Shramik Sangh on November 22, 1973."}}, {"text": "section 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10683, "end_char": 10695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 30, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10826, "end_char": 10840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A memorandum of settlement was drawn up on April 30, 1974 between the Company and the Shramik Sangh."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11084, "end_char": 11097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was agreed, inter alia, that the question of revision of the dearness allowance of the Kanpur unit employees would be negotiated by the Company with the Federal Unit and/or the Union on or before April 1, 1975."}}, {"text": "January 23, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11161, "end_char": 11177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n the meantime, the Karamchari Union made on application on January 23, 1975, for the constitution of a Conciliation Board under section 3(d) of the U.P. Act and the Board was constituted by an order dated January 30, 1975."}}, {"text": "section 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11230, "end_char": 11242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "January 30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11307, "end_char": 11323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n the meantime, the Karamchari Union made on application on January 23, 1975, for the constitution of a Conciliation Board under section 3(d) of the U.P. Act and the Board was constituted by an order dated January 30, 1975."}}, {"text": "February 24, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11392, "end_char": 11409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company raised objections to the constitution of the Board on February 24, 1975, but the proceedings were commenced by the Board on February 26, 1975, and March 19, 1975 was fixed for appearance."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company raised objections to the constitution of the Board on February 24, 1975, but the proceedings were commenced by the Board on February 26, 1975, and March 19, 1975 was fixed for appearance."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11485, "end_char": 11499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company raised objections to the constitution of the Board on February 24, 1975, but the proceedings were commenced by the Board on February 26, 1975, and March 19, 1975 was fixed for appearance."}}, {"text": "June 30.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11660, "end_char": 11668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company however proceed- ' cd with its efforts for a settlement with the Federal Union, and entered into a settlement with.it on June 30."}}, {"text": "Conciliation Board under that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11814, "end_char": 11847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Angust 27, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12003, "end_char": 12018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A memorandum of settlement about the dearness allowance was drawn up with the Shramik Sangh on Angust 27, 1975; in accordance with rnle SA of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, jn Form IA, even though the dispute regarding the variable dearness allowance, which had been raised by the Karamchari Union earlier, was pending all the while."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12059, "end_char": 12090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karamchari Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12633, "end_char": 12649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute regarding the variable dearness allowance which had been raised by the Karamchari Sangh by its appl.ication dated January 23, 1975 for the constitution of a Conciliation Board, did not however bear fruit."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13226, "end_char": 13241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Shramik Sangh, which had claimed dearness allowance according to the Kanpur cost of living index, however changed its stand and, as has been stated,, it filed a memorandum of the settlement on August 27, 1975."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13360, "end_char": 13372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstances that the State Government made an order on May 23, 1977, referring the dispute between the Company and the Karamchari Sangh for adjudication under section 4K of the\n\nU .P. Act."}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13464, "end_char": 13474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13743, "end_char": 13748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The precise matter of dispute was the question whether the dearness allowance payable by the Company to its workmen should be revised and linked with ilie consumer price inde.x for the industrial workers at Kanpur computed by the Labour ; Bureau at Simla\n\nand, if so, from what date and with what other details."}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14132, "end_char": 14139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argued by Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for the Company, that it is implicit in the various provisions of the U.P. Act\n\nthat a settlement arrived at before a Conciliation Board, by a union H of a majority of the workmen, is binding on all the workmen.", "canonical_name": "Narimari"}}, {"text": "sections\n\n2(t), 3(d), 6B, 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14435, "end_char": 14462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14538, "end_char": 14563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December .3, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14611, "end_char": 14628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, and to clauses (4) and (8) of the order dated December .3, 1957 made under section 3(d) of the U.P. Act."}}, {"text": "section 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14640, "end_char": 14652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14742, "end_char": 14751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15204, "end_char": 15214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15607, "end_char": 15617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "June 30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15918, "end_char": 15931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then it has been argued that the settlement which had been made with the Federal Union on June 30, 1975 was by itself and independently of the U.P. Settlement (with the Shramik Sangh), a settlement under section 18(1) of the Central Act and was binding on the members of the Shramik Sangh\n\nas it was affiliated to the Federal T.Jnion and for that reason also it was not permissible to make a reference for adjudication in respect of all the workmen including those who belonged to the Shramik Sangh."}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "June 30,\n\n1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16378, "end_char": 16392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has further been argued that the settlement of June 30,\n\n1975 with the Federal Uniol) would have been operative even without the Shramik Sangh settlement and section 18 ( 1) of the Central Act would be applicable to it as it was not a setilement during the course of conciliation proceedings and was binding on the Federal Union\n\nunder section 36(1)(a) and (b) of the Centra~ Act and it was not permissible to make a general reference covering even the workmen belonging to a union affiliated to the Federal Union."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16489, "end_char": 16499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16667, "end_char": 16683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17705, "end_char": 17715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18013, "end_char": 18023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18277, "end_char": 18286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18521, "end_char": 18530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1977] 2 S.C.R. 15", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20145, "end_char": 20163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21131, "end_char": 21141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21411, "end_char": 21421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 18, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22004, "end_char": 22017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the Shramik Sangh made an application for the constitution of a Conciliation Board on July 18, 1975, and a Board was constituted on July 29, 1975."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22050, "end_char": 22063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the Shramik Sangh made an application for the constitution of a Conciliation Board on July 18, 1975, and a Board was constituted on July 29, 1975."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22302, "end_char": 22333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22413, "end_char": 22423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "December 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22663, "end_char": 22680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ii) of the U.P. Act and the H rules made thereunder, as well as the order dated December 31, 1957, on which much reliance has been placed by Mr. Nariman."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22754, "end_char": 22763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23170, "end_char": 23179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23446, "end_char": 23455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Augnst 27, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23555, "end_char": 23570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A mere reference to that section cannot therefore sustain the argnment that the settlement dated Augnst 27, 1975, became bindhg on all workmen including the Karamchari Union, which had nothing to do with it and was not even a party to it, and that the Union was precluded from raising an industrial dispute and the State Government was precluded from referring it for adjuqication under section 4K of the U.P. Act."}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23845, "end_char": 23855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23893, "end_char": 23918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Form III of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24066, "end_char": 24087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24658, "end_char": 24670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Form III of the Rules", "statute": "Form III of the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25640, "end_char": 25650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "29-7-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27219, "end_char": 27226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribnnal has examined the file (No.391 of 1975) of the Conciliation Board case relating to the industrial dispute raised by the Karamchari Union on January 23, 1975, about the payment of the dearness allowance to the workers of the Kanpur unit according to the cost of living index for industrial workers at Kanpur, and the file of the other conciliatiDn case relating to the similar dispute raised by the Shramik Sangh on July 18, 1975, and has stated the factual position as follows-\n\n\"It is clear from the latter file that the management of the Kanpur unit of the Company had applied on 29-7-75 to the Regional Conciliation Officer for the registration of the settlement reached between the company and the All India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Unions on 30-6-75 but on."}}, {"text": "All India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Unions", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27339, "end_char": 27393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribnnal has examined the file (No.391 of 1975) of the Conciliation Board case relating to the industrial dispute raised by the Karamchari Union on January 23, 1975, about the payment of the dearness allowance to the workers of the Kanpur unit according to the cost of living index for industrial workers at Kanpur, and the file of the other conciliatiDn case relating to the similar dispute raised by the Shramik Sangh on July 18, 1975, and has stated the factual position as follows-\n\n\"It is clear from the latter file that the management of the Kanpur unit of the Company had applied on 29-7-75 to the Regional Conciliation Officer for the registration of the settlement reached between the company and the All India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Unions on 30-6-75 but on."}}, {"text": "30-6-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27397, "end_char": 27404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribnnal has examined the file (No.391 of 1975) of the Conciliation Board case relating to the industrial dispute raised by the Karamchari Union on January 23, 1975, about the payment of the dearness allowance to the workers of the Kanpur unit according to the cost of living index for industrial workers at Kanpur, and the file of the other conciliatiDn case relating to the similar dispute raised by the Shramik Sangh on July 18, 1975, and has stated the factual position as follows-\n\n\"It is clear from the latter file that the management of the Kanpur unit of the Company had applied on 29-7-75 to the Regional Conciliation Officer for the registration of the settlement reached between the company and the All India Federation of Indian Oxygen Employees Unions on 30-6-75 but on."}}, {"text": "27-8-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27710, "end_char": 27717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other band, the representatives of the Shramik Sangh and the Kanpur unit of the company appeared before the Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur on 27-8-75 and submitted a brief memorandum of settlement making applicable to the Kanpur unit the settlement which had been reached between the company and the Federation\" on 30-6-75.\" -"}}, {"text": "Shrarnik Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28312, "end_char": 28326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will thus appear that the Shramik Sangh entered into the settle-\n\nI< ' ment dated August 27, 1975 in collusion with the Company and that ff the Conciliation Board allowed the memorandum of settlement to be filed and firialised even though the Karamchari Union's dispnte dated January 23, 1975 was pending and no effort was made to make it a\n\n• ..\n\nparty to the proceedings which were taken at the instance of the Shrarnik Sangh."}}, {"text": "August 27, 19i5", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28631, "end_char": 28646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "important to remember in this connection that although the settlement which had been made by the Federal Union on June 30, 1975 was opposed by both the Unions when it was placed on the notice board of the Kanpur unit, the Shrarnik Sangh changed its stand and filed a memorandum of settlement on August 27, 19i5\n\nendorsing the settlement which had 'been made with the Federal Union on June 30, 1975."}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29306, "end_char": 29316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. John", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30198, "end_char": 30205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention in this connection has been invited to the statement of the Company's Personnel Manager V. John in which reference has been made to the nature and the contents of the package."}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30387, "end_char": 30397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 20, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30679, "end_char": 30693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the record that the Company brought this aspect of the matter specifically to the notice of the State Government in its representation dated April 20, 1976, and it cannot be said that it was not before the Government when it made the impugned order of reference dated May H 23, 1977."}}, {"text": "May H 23, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30806, "end_char": 30820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the record that the Company brought this aspect of the matter specifically to the notice of the State Government in its representation dated April 20, 1976, and it cannot be said that it was not before the Government when it made the impugned order of reference dated May H 23, 1977."}}, {"text": "Herbertsons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31142, "end_char": 31158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Herbertsons Ltd. (supra) was a case where all the workers of the Company had accepted the settlement and received the arrears and the emoluments according to it."}}, {"text": "llerbertsons", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31702, "end_char": 31714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llerbertsons is therefore no authority for the argument that a part of a package deal cannot be the subject matter of a reference for adjudication by the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "New Standard Engineering Co. Ltd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31867, "end_char": 31899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New Standard Engineering Co. Ltd (supra) was also a different case, for there the justness and fairness of the settlement was examined with reference to t, he situation as it stood on the date on which it was arrived at, and it cannot also avail the argument of Mr.\n\nNarimari about the illegality of a reference merely because it relates to a part of a package deal."}}, {"text": "Narimari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32134, "end_char": 32142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New Standard Engineering Co. Ltd (supra) was also a different case, for there the justness and fairness of the settlement was examined with reference to t, he situation as it stood on the date on which it was arrived at, and it cannot also avail the argument of Mr.\n\nNarimari about the illegality of a reference merely because it relates to a part of a package deal.", "canonical_name": "Narimari"}}, {"text": "28-7-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32976, "end_char": 32983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has further been stated that the members of the Karamchari Union \"took the increase but under protest vide the Union's letter dated 28-7-75 which is annexure D to the Workmen's written statement.\""}}, {"text": "section 4K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33293, "end_char": 33303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33458, "end_char": 33464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismisJed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_923_944_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC. A v.\n\nSTATE OF DELHI (ADMN.)\n\nJanuary 10, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 173-Whether the Police have powers to jur1/lr investigate, after the magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence-Scope and ambit of Section 173 Cr. P.C.\n\nA criminal case, arisi1.1g out of F.I.R. 72 of 1967 against one Sri Bali Ram Sharma and two others for the offence of the th'eft of two sandstone pillars of great antiquity, beauty and value from the Suraj Kund Temple, in village Amin, Dist. Karnal, ended in the acquittal of the accused. During th! pendency of this ca~'e •. on an applica.tion made by him rn:1e Narinder Nath Malik (N. N.\n\nMalik) an alleged research scholar and a. friend of H. L. Mehfa, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate was given the custody of these two sandstone pillars which had been recovered from th'e accused.\n\nThe pilla.rs remuined in the custody of N. N. Malik from 1-3-1968 to 27-5-1968 and on the acquittal of the accused on 16-7-1968, they were handed over to the Lambardar of Village Amin. LatC:r,\n\nit came to light that the pillars returned by Malik w'ere not the original pillars but fakes. 1hereupon, F.I.R. RC 2-71-CIA/SPEICBI was registered at Delhi against Malik and H. L Mehra under Section 120 B read with Sections 406 and 420 J.P.C. After completing the investigation a charge sheet No. RC 2\n\nof 1971 wa:rs fded on 30-12-1972, in the Court of Spe-cial Magistrate, Ambala against Malik and H. L Mehra for the aforesaid offences noted in the F.l.R.\n\nThough an order was passed oo 17-5-1976 directing the framing of charge3, no charges were actuaJly framed.\n\nHowever, on 16-5-77, on an application dated 17-4-77 filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the Special Magistrte permitted the \\vithdrawal of the case and discharged the accused.\n\nDuring th'e pendency of the case, the two genuine pillars were traced and found in London in the ware house Of Spink & Co.\n\nJt wa.s \\uspected that Manohar Lal Narang and Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkisban Rawat and Nathubai Rawal of Delhi to make three s'ets of\n\nt'aJceB and had exported the genuine pillars to London.\n\nThis resulted in the registering of F.T.R. RC 4/76-0W(A)/SPE by the Superintendent of Police, CIV\n\n(Antiquities 5PE/CBI, New Delhi) against l\\fanohar L'll Narang and others for aHet:ed offences under Section 120B, read \\.Vith Section 411 IP.C. and Section 25 (I) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.\n\nAn application under s. 306 Cr.P.C. filed by N. N. Malik on 26-6-1976 before the Chief Metropolitan M; iglstrate, New Delhi with reference to this F.lR. RC 4/76, was accepted on 3-7-1976 and Malik was granted pardon, after confessiorial statement was recorded.\n\nOn 19-r-1976 a charge sheet was filed (RC 4 of 1976) before the same Court for offences under Sections 120B, I.P.C. rad with Section 420, 411 and 406 J.P.C. and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act\n\n1972. The case was transferred to the Court of Additional Chier Metropolitim Magistrate.\n\nOn 20-7-1976 the Magistrate issued process for the appearance of the accused including the three Narang brothers out of whom the appellant in Cr!. Appeal 373 of 1978 was already under detention under\n\nMISA and COFEPOSA. The other two who were in London were extradited and brought\n\nA to India on 27-7-1977. An application filed by Ramlal Narang in March 1977 immedia.tely after his release from detention, to drop the proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants against his two brothers and to discharge all the accused on the ground of illegality of the Delhi case in view of the fact that a case on the same facts was a.lready peding in th'e Ambala Court failed.\n\nThereafter two applications filed by the three N arang brothers on 21-6-1977 in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Crl. P.C. once again B challenging the legality of the proceedings arising out of charge sheet RC 4 of 1974 were admitted on 22-6-1977, but dismissed on 10-1-1978. During the pendency of these two appeals Malik died sometime during May 1977 and Mehra \\\\as made a co-accused in the Delhi case on 1-8-1977 in view of th'e withdrawal of the Ambala case on 1~-5-1977.\n\nDismissing the appeals by special IeM>e, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The police have the statutory right and duty to 'register' tvery informatiotl relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The police also have the stntutory right and duty to investigate the facts and circumstances of the cas'e where the commission of a. cognizable offence was suspected and to submit the report of s.uch investigation to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report. These statutory rights and duties of the police were not circumscrib'ed by any power of superintendence or interference in the Magistrate; nor was any sanction required from a 1'..iagistrate to empolh•er the police to investigate into a cognizable offence. [937 F-H]\n\n(a) The scheme. of the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure was that the First Information Report was. followed by investigation, the investigation led to the submission of a report to the Magistrate, the Magistr3.te took cognizance of the offence on receipt of the police report and finally, the Magistrate taking cognizance issued process to the accused.\n\nAs such ordinarily the right and duty of the police would end with the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code upon receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take or not to tl>ke cognizance of the offence. [937 E-F, 938 Fl\n\n(b) There was no provision in the 1898 Code prescribing the procedure to be followtd by the police, where after the snbmiedon of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code and after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence, fresh facts came to light which required further investigation.\n\nSimilarly, there was no express provision prohibiting the police from launching upon an investigation into the fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under-Section 173(1) or after the Magistrate had taken cognizan.ce of the offence.\n\nTherefore further investigation was permissible and was not altogether ruled out merely because cognizance of the case has been taken by the Court; defective investigation coming to light during the course of a trial could also be cured by a further investigation, if circumstances permitted it, [938 F~H,\n\n941 C-DJ\n\nKing Emperor v. Khwaja Wazir ~4hmed, 71 Indian Appeals, PO 203; followed.\n\nH Diwakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthy Naidu, AIR 1919 Madras 751. ln re. Palaniswami Goundan, AIR 1946 Madras 502; Mohd. Niwa/ v. The Crov:n, 48 Crl. L.J. 744 Lahore; Prose.uting l11spector v. Minaketan\n\n--~-.-..--\n\n~·\n\nR. L. NARANG v. STATE 925\n\nMonato, AIR 1952 Orissa 350; Ramashankar v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 All. 525; In re. State of Kera/a v. State Prosecutor, 79 Cr!. L.J. 1973 p. 1288 (Kerala) D.B.; approved.\n\nH. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, [1955] 1 SCR !150; Tara SingM!.\n\nS1\"te [1951] SCR 72; referred to .\n\n2. (a) Neither Section '173 nor section 190 lead to the conclusion that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate tak~ ing cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authori '.y, permitted repeated investigations and discovery of fresh facts.\n\nNot~ withstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a p61ice report :mbmitted under Section 173. of !be 1898 Code, !be right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often aa necessary when fresh information came to light.\n\nWhere the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could' express their regard and respect for the Court by seeking its formal permission to make further investi4 g:.tion.\n\n[943 GH, 944 A]\n\ntb) When it comes to the notice of the invesligating agency that a person alrt.'aJy an accused of an offence has a good alibi or where the involvement.of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the innocence or involvement of the persons concerned.\n\nIn either case, it is for the Maogistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved acCused and proceed with the case as a separate case.\n\nWhat action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. A further investigation by the police cannot be considered as trenching upon the proceedings before the Court because whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate.\n\nThat the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation.\n\n[942 P..H, 943 ADJ\n\nRam Copa/ Neotia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 Cal. 316 Hanuman and Anr. v. Raj. AIR 1951 Rajasthan 131; State v. Mehr Singh and Ors., !LR 1973 (3) P & H 561-[1974] 2 Cal. U 970; over-ruled.\n\n• ( c) Wherf; the rep(\\rt of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than lhe Magistrate who has already taken cognizaoce of the first case, it is up to thr prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior Court to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrate themselves may take action suo motu.\n\n[944 BJ\n\nr B\n\nc •\n\nIn the inslant case; the proscution did not act with any oblique motive or out of any malice by submitting a charge sheet to the Delhi Court and by withdrawing the case in the Ambala Court. In the charge sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against ehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdraw&! of the case. [944 C-E]\n\n3. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy \\vhich covered a smaller field of narrower dimentions. [936 B-C]\n\nIn the present case, (a) the conspiracies which are the subject matter of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy \\vhich is the subject matter of the first case, may perhaps be sf.Lid to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the second case . \\Vhen invetigation comn1enced in First Information Report No. RC4 of 1976, apart from the circumstance that the property involved was the same, the Iiitk between lhe conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and thC conspira-cy to dispose cf the stolen property was not known. [936 Cl)]\n\n(h) A con1parison of the two First Infonnation Report cot1pled with the several facts and circumstances show that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the second case could not be said to. be identical with the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the first case.\n\nThe conspirators were different. l\\.falik and Mehra alone were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, while the three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators in the second case. The objects of the two conspiracies were different.\n\nThe alleged object of the first conspiracy was to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating and to misappropriate them. The alleged object of the second conspiracy was the disposal of the stolen property by exporting the pillars to London. The offences alleged in the first case were Section 120B read with Section 420 and 406 IIldian Penal Code while the offences. alleged in the second case were S. 120B read with S. 411 IPC and ction 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. ~935 D-Fj\n\n(c) No fault could be found with the police for registering a first information Report against the Narang brothers for the offence of conspiracy to commit an offence under section 411 Indian Penal Code. In the course of the investigation into this offence, it transpired that the Narang brothers were also parties to the original conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by chating.\n\nFacts came to light which indic:itel that the conspiracy which was the subject 'matter of the case pending in the Ambala court was but part of a larger conspiracy. The fresh facts which came to light resulted in the filing of the second charge sheet. [935 C-D]\n\n(d) Neither at the time when the Fir<; t Information Report perta1n1ng to the Ambala Case was registered nor at the time when'. the Charge sheet was filed in the Ambala Court, were the Narang brothers known to be in the picture. The investigating agency was not also aware 'of what Malik and Mehra had done with the pillars after they bad obtained possession of the pillars from the court and substituted and returned fake pillars to the Court. The First Information Report and the charge-sheet were concerned primarily with the\n\n,._\n\n. r\n\noffences of conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate committed by Malik and A Mehra. At that stage, the investigating agency. was not aware of, any conspiracy to send the pillars out of the country. It was not known that Narang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the\n\ncourL It was ni.ucb later, that the pillars sutfaced in London were discovered to be in the constructive possession of Narang brothers.\n\nEven then, the precise connection between Malik and. Mehra on the one side and Narang brothers on the other was not known.\n\nAll that was known was that the pillars which B were stolen prciperty within the definition of the expression in Section 410\n\nIndian Penal Code were found to be in the possession of Narang brothers in London.\n\nOn the discovery of the genuine pillars in the possession of Narang brothers, without anything further to connect N arang brothers with Malik and Mehra, the police had no option but to register a case under Section 411 Indian Penal Code against Namng brothers. That was what was done. [934 F-H, 935 A-Bl C\n\nObservation :\n\nIn the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the puri\\Y of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions en~\n\ntrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the Court and seek formal permission to make further investigatio1t when fresh facts come to light. [943 El\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 373- 3,74 of 1978.\n\n Appeals by Special Leave frO!m the Judgment and Orders dated E !0-1-1978 and 14-9-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Misc.\n\n(M) No. 323 and 322/77 and Criminal Misc. Nos. 1083, 1149 cl 1978 in Special Misc. (M) No. 322/77.\n\nRam Jethnra/a11i (In Cr!. A.373), A. K. Sen (In Cr!. A.374) and iiarjinder Singh for the Appellants .\n\nU. R. La/it and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-On the intervening light of 31st March 1967 and 1st April 1967, two sandstone pillars of great antiquity,\n\nbeauty and value were stolen from Suraj Kund temple, in Village Amin G (District Kamal, Haryana). They were of the Sunga period (2nd Century B.C.) and their present estimated value in the Intematiopal Art Treasures' Market is said to be aronnd five hundred thousand American dollars. A first information report (F.l.R. No. 72 of 1967) was registered by the Police of Butana, District Kamal.\n\nThe pillars were recovered on 2nd May 1967. On completion of investigation a H charge-sheet was filed on 3rd October 1967 in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate at Kamal, against one Bali Ram Sharma and two others.\n\n3-119 SC!/79\n\nThe case ended in their acquittal on tl6th July\n\n1968. During the pendency of the case one Narinder Nath Malik (N. N. Malik) filed an application before tho Magistrate alleging that he was a research scholar and requesting that he might be given custody of the two pillars to enable him to make a detailed study.\n\nAt the instance of H. L. Mehra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karna! and a friend of N. N. Malik, the learned. Ilaqa Magistrate gave custody of the two pillars to N. N. Malik on his executing a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. The orde.r was written by H. L. Mehra himself and signed by the Ilaqa Magistrate. The pillars remained in the custody of N. N. Malik from 1st March 1968 to 27th May 1968, when N. N.\n\nMalik purported to return the~ to the Court of the Jlaqa Magistrate.\n\nKamal. After the acquittal of Bali Ram Sharma and others, the pillars were handed over to the Lambardar of village Amin. Later, it came to light that the pillars returned by _N. N. Malik were not the original pillars but fakes.\n\nThereupon, First Information Report No. RC.2/71-CIA/SPE/CBI was registered at Delhi against N. N.\n\nMalik and H. L. Mchra under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code.\n\nAfter completing the investigation the C.B.I. filed a charge-sheet No. R.C. 2 of 1971 in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against N. N.\n\nMalik and H. L. Mel:u-a for alleged offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code. The charge-sheet was filed on 30th December,\n\n1972. On 17th May, 1976, the learned Special Magistrate, Ambala, passed an order directing the framing of charges against N. N. Malik and H. L. Mehra. But, no charges were actually framed as the accused were uot present in the Court. On 17th April, 1977, the Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code for permission to withdraw the case against Malik and Mehra.\n\nThe learned Special Magistrate, Ambala, by his order dated 16th May 1977, permitted the withdrawal of the case and discharged the accused.\n\nBetween May 1976 and May 1977 several othe.r things happened (; and the Narang brothers, the appellants in the two appeals, made their appearance on the scene. It may be mentioned here, that of the three Narang 'brothers, Om Prakash alias Omi Narang had been 'Jiving in London since 1970, Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang had been similarly living in London since July 197 4 and Ram Lal Narang alone had been living in India. Ram Lal Narang was detained first undc.r H the MISA from September 197 4 till he was released under o.rders ol the High Court, and later, under the COFEPOSA from 1st July 1975 till after the revocation of the internal Emergency in March 1977.\n\n-~'\n\n• ..\n\nThe two genuine pillars which had been removed from Suraj Kund temple were traced and found in London in the W3rehouse of Messrs Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manojharlat Narang and Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi to make three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London.\n\nA First Information Report (R.C.\n\n4/76-CIU(A) /SPE) was rstered by .the Superintendent of Police, C!U (Antiquities, SPE/CBI, New Delhi) against Manohar Lal Narang and others, for alleged offences under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code ; read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. On 26th June,\n\n1976, N.\n\nN. Malik made an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, in case R.C. No. 4/76-CIU(A) /SPE, New Delhi, purporting to be under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying that he might be granted pardon. The application mentioned Sectioris 411, 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120-B and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, as the offences involved.\n\nThe application was supported by the reply filed by the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. On 3rd July 1976, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, granted pardon to N. N. Malik. Before the grant of pardon the confessi_onal statement of N. N. Malik was got recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate; Delhi.\n\nThereafter, on 19th July 1976, a charge-sheet (R.C. 4/1976) was filed in the -Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi, for offences under Section\n\n120-B Indian Penal Code read with Sections 420, 411 and 406 Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Trea- sures Act, 1972. The case was transferred to the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. On 20th July 1976, the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate issued process for'the appearance of the three Narang brothers.\n\nThe learned Magistrate also issued. warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang who were iii London. Extradition proceedings were initiated in Britain at the ins- tance of the Government of India. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Bow Street, London ordered the detention of Omi Narang and Manu Narang pending the issue of warrants by the Secretary of State under Section 5 of the Fugitive Offenders Act. A petition for the issue of Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum was filed in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London.\n\nThe Divisional Court directed the release of Omi Narang and Manu Narang. The Government of India filed an appeal to the House of Lords and on 24th March, 1977, the appeal was allowed.\n\nOmi Narang and Mann Narang were finally extradited and brought to India on 27th July, 1977.\n\n7/ A\n\nMeanwhile internal emergency was lifted in India in March 1977 and Ram Lal Narang was released.\n\nAlmost immediately he filed a petition before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate to drop the proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants and to discharge the accused.\n\nThe contention was that the entire investigation in First Information Report No. R.C. 4/76 was illegal as a case on the same facts was already pending bfore the Ambala Court and that the Delhi Court acted without jurisdiction in takin[; cognizance of the case pursuant to a report of police based upon such illegal, investigation.\n\nThe learned Magistrate held that he was not competent to sit in judgn1ent, as it were, over the order of his predecessor taking cognizance of the case. He, however, found that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the case before the CoJurt at Ambala and the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the case before himself were one and the same, but, he held that the question as to which Court should proceed with the case, was not for him to decide; it was a matter for the High Court to decide under Section 186 Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate also noticed an application filed before him, after the conclusion of arguments, informing him that the case in the Court at Ambala against Malik and. Mehra had since _been withdrawn on 16th May 1977.\n\nOn 21st June 1977, two applications were filed in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, one by Ramlal Narang and the other on behalf of Omi Narangi and Manu Narang who were still in England awaiting extradition. The applicants sought quashing of the orders of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate issui'ng process to them and warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang. It was also songht to be declared that the entire investigation in R. C. 4 of 197 6 was illegal and the orders of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of R.C. 4 of 1976 were illegal. The grant of pardon to N. N. Malik was questioned. It was also prayed that the proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate might be quashed.\n\nThe petitions were admitted by the Delhi High Court on 22nd June, 1977, but ultimately dismissed on 10th January 1978, by a common judgment.\n\nRamlal Narang having obtained special leave from this Conrt hes filed Criminal Appeal No. 373 of 1978 and Omi and Manu Narang bave preferred Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 1978. We may mention ibere that on 1st August, 1977, a supplemental charge-sheet was filed making Mehra an accused in the Delhi case, the case in the Ambala Conrt having been withdrawn on 16th May, 1977, as mentioned earlier.\n\nMalik, we may add, died sometime during August, 1977.\n\n.1.1..\n\nWe are given to understand that Mehra also was subsequently granted pardon.\n\n, Shri Harjinder Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 373 of 1978 and Shri Ashok Sen, learned Counsel for the appeUan!s in Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 1978 argued that the conspiracy and the overt acts which were the subject matter of the two First Information Reports and the two charge-sheets were the same and, therefore, there was an implied bar to the power of the Police to investigate into First Information Report No. R.C. 4 of 1976 and the power of the Court at Delhi to take cognizance of the case upon the report of such information. It was submitted that the mere circumstance that some more persons were mentioned as involved or the mere circumstance that the property was said to pave been recovered later would not affect the legal position. It was submitted that gist of the consp.iracy in both the cases was to obtain possession of the pillars. The offence of conspiracy relating to the obtaining of the pillars having been investigated and a charge-sheet having been filed in the Ambala Court, the Police had no authority in law to start a fresh investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code by registering another First Information Report and to submit a charge-sheet in the Delhi Court for the very same offence.\n\nThat was an unwananted interference by the Police with the proceedings pending in the Court. The whole of the investigation subsequent to the filing of the charge-sheet in the Ambala Court was without jurisdiction and no material or fact gathered during the course of such 'illegal investigation could be used to found further proceedings.\n\nThe Delhi Court was, therefore, in error in taking cognizance of offences which had already been investigated and which wen' the subject matter. of proceedings in another Court. It was also argued that the subsequent withdrawal of the case from the Ambala Court did not and could not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court.\n\nThe withdrawal itself was an abuse of the process of the Court.\n\n/ Shri Lalit, learned Counsel for the respondents urged that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the charge-sheet Yiled in the Delhi Court was not the same as the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court.\n\nThe circumstance that some of the conspirators were common and part of the case was the same did not make the two conspiracies identical with each other.\n\nThere was, therefore, no question of any bar against the Delhi Court from taking cognizance of the .case based upon the wider conspiracy merely because the Ambala Court had taken cognizance of the case based upon the narrower conspiracy.\n\nSbri Lalit also urged that the statutory right of the Police to investigate into cognizable\n\n932 SUPREME 'coURT REPORTS [ 1979] 2 s.c.R.\n\noffences was not fettered and did not end with the submission of a -charge-sheet to the Court.\n\nHe submitted that the Police had the right and indeed, the duty, to investigate into fresh facts coming to light and to appraise the Court of the same.\n\nThe basic submission on behalf of the appellants was that the two conspiracies alleged in the two cases were but one. The sequitur was that the investigation into and the taking of cognizance of the second case were without jurisdiction.\n\nWe will first examine the question whether the conspiracy which was investigated by the Police and which investigation led to the flling of the charge-sheet in the Ambala case can be said to be the same as the conspiracy which was later investigated and which led to the filing of the charge-sheet in the Delhi Court.\n\nFor this purpose, it is necessary to emµpare the First Information Report and the chargesheet in the two cases_\n\nThe First Information Report relating to the ease in the Ambala D Court was registered against \"N. N. Malik and others\" for aileged offences under \"Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 420 and Section 406 Indian Penal Code.\" It was stated therein that N. N. Malik applied to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Karna! and obtained possession of the two stone pillars and dishonestly substituted two fake pillars in their place and returned them to the E Court.\n\nThe charge-sheet which was filed on 30th December, 1972 mentioned N. N. Malik and H. L Mehra as the two accused in the case and recited that N_ N. Malik was introduced by Mehra to the Magistrate as an eminent archaeologist and that he obtained possession of the pillars on the pretext that he wanted to make some research.\n\nThe actual order granting custody of the pillars to Malik was written by Mehra but signed by the Magistrate R. K. Sen.\n\nIt was further recitec•. that sometime after the pillars were returned by Malik to the Court it was discovered that the pillars so returned were fakes and that N. N. Malik was not an archaeologist. It was finally said that Malik and Mehra had \"thus dishonestly made misrepresentat; on of fact and got the delivery of the two statues which were subsequently substituted by them\" and they had \"thus committed the offence under Section 120-B read with Section 420 Indian Penal Code and Section\n\n406 Indian Penal Code.\" It is, .therefore, seen from the allegations in the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court that the conspirators involved in the conspiracy which was its subject matter were two, namely, Malik and Mehra, that the object of the conspiracy was to dishonestly obtain possession of the pillars by making false representation to the Magistrate and to substitute the pillars by fakes after\n\nobtaining possessiol} of the same and that the offences committed were\n\nnnde~ Secti0n 120-B read with Section 420 and 406 Indian Penal\n\nCod~.\n\nThe First Information Report, in the Delhi case was registered on 13th May, 1916, and the offences mentioned were Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. The accused mentioned in the report were Manu Narang and Ram!a!' Narang.\n\nAfter reciting that the pillars had been taken from the Court by N. N. Malik and had been s, nbstituted by fake pillars, the First Information Report went on to recite that the genuine pillars; which\n\nwere stolen from Suraj Kund temple as mentioned above were found to be in the possession and control of Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang in London. It was further recited that Manu Narang was negotiating the sale of the pillars through some London brokers and the price expected to be fetched was approximately five hundred American dollars. It was recited further that Manu Narang and bis brother Ramlal N arang had commissioned two well known sculptors of Delhi to make three sets of fake pillars.\n\nThe two brothers and others, acting in conspiracy, had dishonestly received and exported the two stone pillars.\n\nThe charge-sheet which followed the investigation was filed on 19th July 1976 in the Delhi Court.\n\nThe charge-sheet mentioned the three Narang brothers, Ramlal Narang, Manoharlal Narang and Om Parkash Narang, as the three accused persons sent up for trial and H. L. Mehra as a person not sent up for trial as he was already facing trial before the Special Mag.istrate, Ambala. The chargesheet recited, among other facts, that the Narang brothers had come to know in or about the month of February 1978 about the invaluable nature of the pillars and devised a stratagem to get the custody of the pillars. They discussed their stratagem with their family friend N. N.\n\nMalik, informing hlm that the pillars were worth a fortune.\n\nRamlal Narang and Malik met Mehra and it was decided that Malik should file an application for temporary custody of the pillars and that Mehra shoukl wield his influence over the Magistrate to help N. N. Malik to get such temporary custody.\n\nThat was done.\n\nTemporary custody of the pillars was obtained and they were removed . to Delhi in a truck at the instance of the Narang brothers to a place in Defence Colony, New Delhi. Replicas of the pillars were made by Balkrishan Rawal and Natwarlal, two eminent sculptors of Delhi under the supervision of Ramlal Narang and Omi Narang.\n\nManu Narang also used to visit Delhi and check the progress made.\n\nThe original pillars were transported to Bombay by Manu Narang and smuggled out of the country.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Fake pillars were substituted and returned by N. N. Malik to the Court.\n\nLater on, suspicion was created by the discovery of two fake pillars which were also attempted to be smuggled out of the country.\n\nThe two pillars returned by N. N. Malik were then got examined by experts and were found to be fakes.\n\nMalik was presented by the N arang . b1others with a Fiat car, a revolving brass bed a..'1d a sum of B Rs. 70,000/-.\n\nThey also paid for two pleasure trips made by Malik and his wife io Bombay. It was recited in the charge-sheet that the facts disclosed \"the commission of offences under Section 406 ( criminal breach of trust) , Section 411 (receiving and retaining stolen property), Section 420 (cheating) Indian Penal Code and Section 25 (1) C of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, all read with Section\n\n120-B Indian Penal Code, in pursuance of criminal conspiracy to which Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang and Om Prakash Narang, H. L. Mehra and N. N. Malik (already granted pardon) were parties.\" It was further recited \"Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang and Omi Narang also abetted the commission of offences under Section 420 and - D Section 406 Indian Penal Code by N. N. Malik approver and these\n\nthre~ accused were, therefore, liable for prosecution under Section 406 and Section 420 Indian Penal Code read with Section 109 Indian Penal Code and they had also committed other offences under Section 411 Indian Penal Code.\" It was further mentioned in the chargeshee'. that J\\Ianoharlal Narang and Omi Narang were in London and that proceedings for their extradition were under way.\n\nIt was also mentioned that H. L. Mehra was facing trial before the Special Magistrate, Ambala, for the offences committed by him and, :hereforc. he was nor being sent up for trial in this case.\n\nIt is obvious that neither at the time when the First Information Report pertaining to the Ambala case was registered nor at the time when the charge-sheet was filed in the Ambala Court, were the Narang brothers known to be in the picture.\n\nThe investigating agency was not also aware of what Malik and Mehra had done with the pillars after they had obtained possession of the pillars from the Court and substituted a!1d returned fake pillars to the Court.\n\nThe First Information Report and the charge-sheet were concerned primarily with the offences of conspiracy. to cheat and to misappropriate committed by Malik and Mehra.\n\nAt that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars out of the country. It was not known that the N arang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court. It was much later that the pillars surfaced in London and were discovered to be in the constructive possession of Narang brothers.\n\nEven then, the precise connection between Malik .and Mehra on the one side and\n\ni /'°'\\\n\n\" -\n\nR. L. NARANG v. SH.TE (Chinnappa Reaay, j.) 935\n\nNarang brothers on the other was not known.\n\nAll that was known was that the pillars which were stolen property within the definition of the e:xpression in Section 410 Indian Penal Code were found to be in the posession of Narang brothers in London.\n\nOn the discovery of the genuine pillars in the possession of N arang brothers, without anything further to connect N arang brothers with Malik and Mehra, the police had no option but to register a case under Section 411 Indian Penal Code against Narang brothers.\n\nThat was what was done.\n\nNo fault could, therefore, be found with the police for registering a First Information Report against the Narang brothers for the offence of conspiracy to commit an offence under Section 411 Indian Penal Code.\n\nIn the course of the investigation into this offence, it transpired that the Narang brothers were also parties to the' original conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating.\n\nFacts came to light which indicated that the conspiracy, which was the subject matter of the case pending in the Ambala Court was but part of a larger conspiracy.\n\nThe fresh facts which came to light resulted in the filing of the second charge-sheet.\n\nThe several facts and circumstances mentioned , by us earlier and a comparison of the two First Information Reports and the two charge-sheets show that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the second case could not be said to be identical with the conspiracy which was the subject matter o! the first case. The conspirators were different. Malik and Mehra\n\nalone; were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, . while the three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators in the second case. The objects of the two conspiracies were different.\n\nThe alleged object of the first conspiracy was to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating and to misappropriate them.\n\nThe alleged object of the second .conspiracy was the disposal of the stolen property by exporting the pillars to London.\n\nThe offences alleged in the first case was Section 120-B read with Section 420 and Section 406 Indian Penal Code, while the offences alleged in the second case were Section 120-B read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. It is true that the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act had no~ yet come into force on the date when the First Information Report was registered. It is also true that Omi Narang and Mann Narang were not extradited for the offence under the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act and, therefore, they could not be tried for that offence in India.\n\nBut the question whet1<_er any of the accused may be tried for a contravention of the _ Ar.tiquities and Art Treasures Act or under the corresponding provision of the earlier Act is really irrelevant in deciding whether the two\n\nconspiracies are one and the same.\n\nThe trite argument that a Court takes cognizance of offences and not offenders was also advanced. This argument is again of no relevance in determining the question whether the tw0 conspiracies which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala\n\nnd the Delhi Courts were the same in substance.\n\nThe question is not whether the nature and character of the conspiracy has changed by the mere inclusion of a few more conspirators as accused or by the addition of one more among the objects of the conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies are in substance and truth the same.\n\nWhere the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions.\n\nWe are clear, in the present case, that the conspiracies wl:ich are the subject matter of the two cases cannot be said to be id ontical though the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the second case.\n\nAs we mentioned earlier, when investigation commenced in First Information Report No. R.C. 4 of 1976, apart from the circumstance that the property in.-olved was the same; the link between t)ie conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of the stolen property was not known.\n\nThe further connected questions arising for consideration arc, what was the duty of the police on discovering that the conspiracy, which was the subject matter of the earlier case, was part of a larger conspiracy, whether the police acted without jurisdiction in investigating or in continuing to investigate into the case and whether the Delhi Court acted illegally in taking cognizance of the case ?\n\nIn order to answer these questions, it is necessary to refer to rhe relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nCounsel on both sides argued the questions on the basis that the Old Criminal Procedure Code governed the situation.\n\nWe proceed on that assumption without deciding whether the trial in the Delhi Court will be governed by the old Code or the new one.\n\nUnder the Criminal Procedure Code, l 898, whenever an officer incharge of the Police Station received information relating to the com~ TJJission of a cognizable offence, he was required to enter the substance H thereof in a book kept by him, for that purpose, in the prescribed form !Section 154 Criminal Procdure Code).\n\nSection 156 Criminal Procedure Code invested the Police with the power to investigate into\n\nccgnizable offences without the order of a Court. If, from the information received or otherwise, the officer in charge of a Police Station suspected the commission of a cognizable offence, he was required to send forthwith a report of the same to aMagistrate empowered to take cognizauce of >uch offence upon a police report and than to proceed m person or depute one of his subordinate officers to proceed to the spot, to im estigate the facts and circumstances of the case and to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender (Section 157 Criminal Procedure Code). He was required to complete the investigation without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it was completed, to forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report, a report in the prescribed form, setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appeared to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case (Section 1 7 3 (! ) Criminal Procedure Code) . He was also required to state whether the accused had been forwarded in cu>- tody or had been released on bail. Upon receipt of the report submitted under Section 173 ( 1) Criminal Procedure Code by the officer incharge of the Police Station, the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon a police report might take cognizance of the offence (Section 190 (I) (b) Criminal Procedure Code). Thereafter, if, in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, there was sufficient !Round for proceeding, the Magistrate was required to issue the necessary process to secure the attendance of the accused\n\n(Section 204 Criminal Procedure Code). The scheme of the Code thus was that the First Information Report was followed by investigation, the investigation led to the submission of a report to the Magis· !rate, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on receipt of the police report and, finally, the Magistrate taking cognizance issued process to the accused.\n\nThe police thus had the statutory right and duty to 'register' every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence.\n\nThe police also had the statutory right and duty to investigate the facts G and circumstances of the case where the commission of a cognizable offence was suspected and to submit the report of such investigation to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report.\n\nThese statutory rights and duties of the police wern not circumscribed by any power of superintendence oc interference in the Magistrate; nor was any sanction required from a R Magistrate lo empower the Police to investigate into a cognizable offence.\n\nThis position in law was well established.\n\nIn King Emperor\n\n3UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nv. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed('), the Privy Council observed as follows:\n\n\"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice, so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with !which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importanc~ that the judiciary should not interfere with the police iu matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty o( inquiry.\n\nIn India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime witho11t requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rules by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.\n\nThe functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right •Jf the Courts to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus.\n\nIn such a case as the present, however, the Court's function begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. . ...... .\n\nIn the present case, the police have under Sections 154 and 156 of tl1e Criminal Procedure Code, a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence without requiring the sanction of the Court .............. \"\n\nOrdinarily, the right and duty of the police would end with the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code upon receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take or not to take cognizance of the offence.\n\nThere was no provision in the 1898 Code prescribing the procedure to be followed by !he police. where, after the submission of a report under Section 173 ( n Criminal Procedure Code and after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence, fresh facts came to light which required further investigation.\n\nThere was, of c.ourse, no express provision prohibiting the police from launching upon an investigation into the fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under Section 173 (I)\n\nor after !he Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence.\n\nAs we shall presently point out, it was geurally, thought by many High\n\n(l) 71 Tndian Appeals 203.\n\nCourts, though doubted by a few, that the police were not barred A from further investigation by the circumstance that a report uuder Section 173 ( 1) had already been submitted and a Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence.\n\nThe Law Commission in its 41st report recognized the position and recommended that the right of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed.\n\nThe Law Commission said :\n\n. B '\n\n\"14.23. A report under Section 173 is normally the end of the investigation.\n\nSometimes, however, the police officer after submitting the report under Section 173 comes upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused.\n\nWe sheuld have thought that the police officer can collect that evidence and se.nd it to the Magistrate concerned. It appears, however, that Courts have sometimes taken the narrow view that once a final report under Section 173\n\nhas been sent, the police cannot touch the case again and cannot re-open the investigation.\n\nThis view places a hindrance in the way of the investigating agency, which can be very unfair to the prosecution and, for that matter, even to the accused. It should be made clear in Section 173 that the competent police officer can examine such evidence and send a report to the Magistrate. Copies concerning the fresh material must of course be furnished to the accused''.\n\nAccordingly, in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, a new provision, Section 173 ( 8), was introduced anc; I it says :\n\n\"Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge Of the police Station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed, and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to ( 6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under subsection (2)\".\n\nThe right of the police to make repeated investigations under the old Code was recognised by the Madras High Court as early as in\n\n1919 in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu ( 1), where Phillips B .aad Krishnan, JJ., observed as follows :\n\n(ll A.I.R. 1919 Madras 751.\n\n_ _,,,\n\n\"Another contention is put forward that when a report of investigation has been sent in under Section 173, Criminal P.C., the police has no further powers of inv, estigation, but this argument may be briefly met by the remark that the number of investigations into a crime is not limited by law and that when one has been completed another may be begun on further information received\".\n\nIn re. Palaniswami Goundan(') the Madras High Court held that notwithstanding the filing of a final charge-sheet, a police officer could still investigate and lay further charge-sheets if he got information and that there was no finality either to the investigation or to the layrng of charge-sheets. In Md. Niwaz v. The Crown(') a Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of Din Mohammad and Cornelius JJ., cited with approval the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramainurthi Naidu(•) already referred to by us.\n\nIn Prosecuting Inspector v. Minaketan Mahato('), the High Court of Orissa held that the police had the right to reopen investigation even after the submission of the chargesheet under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code if fresh facts came to light. In Rama Shanker v. State of U.P.(') a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court took the view that the submission of a chargesheet not being a judicial act, the submission of a fresh charge-sheet 2fter submission of a report under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code was not illegal.\n\nIn re. State of Kerala v. State Prosecu:vr( 6 ) a Divismn Bench of the Kerala High Court thought it was well settled law that the police had the right to reopen the investigation even after !he submission of a charge-sheet under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code and that there was no bar for further investigation or for filing of\n\nr 'supplementary report.\n\nIn H. N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi('), this Court contemplated the possibility of further investigation even after a Court had taken cognizance of the case.\n\nWhile noticing that a police report resulting from an investigation was provided in Section 190 Criminal Procedure Code as the material on which cognizance was taken, it was pointed out that it could not be maintained that a valid and legal police report was the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance.\n\n(1) A.J.R. 1946 Madras 502.\n\n(2) 48 Cr!. Law Journal 774.\n\n(3) A.I.R.1919 Madrcs751.\n\n(4) A.J.R. 1952 Orissa 350.\n\n(5) A. I. R. 1956 All 525.\n\n(6) 79 Crl. Law Journal 1973, p. 1288\n\n\n.,.\n\nI It was held that where cognizance of the case had, in ~' been taken A and the case had jlToceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigatipn did not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of iustice had been caused thereby. It was said that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, had no direct bearing on the compe- tence of the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. However, it was .observed : B\n\n\"It does not follow that the invalidity of the. investigation is to be completely ignored by a Court during trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizan<X!, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such re-investigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for\".\n\n!his decision is a clear authority for the view that further investigation\n\n1s not altogether ruled out merely because cognizance of the case has D !been taken by the' Court; defective investigation coming to light during the course of a trial may be cured by a further investigation, if circnmstances permit it.\n\nIn Tara Singh v. State(') the police first submitted a report styled , as \"an incomplete challan\", which, however, contained all the parti- E culars prescribed by Section 173 (1).\n\nLater, two supplemental challans were submitted containing the names of certain formal witnesses.\n\nThe Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case when the incomplete .challan was submitted. It was urged that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case. illegally and the statements of witneses examine}! .before submission of the supplemental challans should be excluded f!' cfrom the record.\n\nThis Court held that the so called incomplete cha]c Jan was in fact a complete report of the kind contemplated by Section\n\n173(1)(a), and, therefore, the Magistrate had properly taken cognizance of the case.\n\nThe Court declined to express any opinion on ·!he question whether the police could be permitted to send incomplete .reports under Section 173 (I) Criminal Procedure Code. This case G whiie neither approving nor disapproving the practice of submitting ; incomplete challans in the first instance, certainly notices the existnce\n\nof such practice.\n\nSome High Courts tool.: the view that with the submission of a .charge-sheet under Section 173 the power of the police to investigate . H .came to an end and the Mai:istrate's cognizance of the offence started.\n\n- (I) [1951] S.C.R. 72,.\n\nA It was said that any further investigation by the police would trench upon the magisterial cognizance.\n\nVide-Ram Gopal Neotia v. State of West Bengal('). In Hanuman & Anr. v. Raf(') it was held that when a case was pending before a Magistrate, the action of the police in resuming investigation and putting up a new challan against a person not originally an accused as a result of the further investigation was unauthorised and unlawful. . In State v. Mehar Singh & Ors.('), a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the police became functus officio once the Court took cognizance of an offence on the filing of a charge-sheet by the police and thereafter further investigation by the police was not permissible.\n\nThe police, it was said, could not 'tinker' with the prQCeedings pending in the Court.\n\nIt was, however, observed that it would be open to the Magistrate to 'suspend cognizance' and direct the police to make further investiga-· tion into the case and submit a report.\n\nThe High Court of Punjab and Haryana acknowledged the existence of the practice of submitting supplemental charge-sheets, but was of the view that such practice was not sanctioned by the Code.\n\nFaced with the impracticality of banning all further investigation once cognizance of an offence was taken by the Court, the High Court tried to find a solution to the problem by suggesting the procedure of the Magistrate suspending cognizance\n\nand ordering further investigation.\n\nThe procedure of 'suspending cognizance' suggested by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana does not appear to us to be warranted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nAnyone acquainted with the day today working of the criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police pc\\ssessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the. prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power.\n\nIt is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused or absol've person' already accused.\n\nWhen it comes to the notice of the investigating 11gency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, i• it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report te the Magistrate ? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual.\n\nSimilarly, where the involvement of persons who ..re not already accuse4 comes to tke notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information.\n\nIt is their duty\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 316.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 131.\n\n(3) I.L.R. (1973] 2 P & H 561=1974 (2) Crl L J 970.\n\nto investigate. and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the invoh1ement of the olher persons.\n\nIn either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused, in a single enquiry or trial. If the case cl which lie has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to\n\n-some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed <i°gainst the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case.\n\nWhat action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with lhe provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such situations is a mailer best left to the discretion of the Magistrare.\n\nThe criticism that a further inyestigation by the police would trench upon the proceedings before the Court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate.\n\nThat the final word is with !he Magis- \\!rate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation.\n\nWe should not, l10wever, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pen- , dency of a procNding before. a Court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by th.e Court of any offence.\n\nWe think that in the interests of the independence of the magislracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in .the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entn1stcd with different stages of such administration, It would ordinarily be desirable that the police\n\nshould inform the Court and seek formal prmission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light.\n\nAs observed by us earlier, there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate, Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistratetaking cognizance of the offence.\n\nPractice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as neccsary when fresh informa!ion came to light.\n\nWhere the police desir-\n\n4-119 SCJ/79\n\ned to make a further investigation, the police could express their re gard and respect for the Court by seeking its formal pennission t<\" make further investigation.\n\nAs in the present case, occasions may arise when a second inves-· ligation started independently of the first may disclose a wide range B of offences including those. covered by the first investigation.\n\nWhere the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the first case., it is up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior Court to have the two cases tried together.\n\nThe Magistrates themselves C may take action suo motu. In the present case, there is no problem since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the prosecuting agency.\n\nIt was submitted to us that the submission of a charge-sheet to the Delhi Court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala Court amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court.\n\nWe do not think that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge- D sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mchra\n\nand others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would ha; done better if it had infonned the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal pennission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice.\n\nWe are also satisfied that there has been no illegality.\n\nBoth the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.\n\nM.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nJ.,\n\n~ ..", "total_entities": 320, "entities": [{"text": "RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF DELHI (ADMN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF DELHI (ADMN.)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 10, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 10, 1979\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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Mehfa, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate was given the custody of these two sandstone pillars which had been recovered from th'e accused.", "canonical_name": "Narinder Nath Malik"}}, {"text": "N. N.\n\nMalik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pendency of this ca~'e •. on an applica.tion made by him rn:1e Narinder Nath Malik (N. N.\n\nMalik) an alleged research scholar and a. friend of H. L. Mehfa, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate was given the custody of these two sandstone pillars which had been recovered from th'e accused.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nMalik"}}, {"text": "H. L. Mehfa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 758, "end_char": 769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pendency of this ca~'e •. on an applica.tion made by him rn:1e Narinder Nath Malik (N. N.\n\nMalik) an alleged research scholar and a. friend of H. L. 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{"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2949, "end_char": 2959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2967, "end_char": 3000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Additional Chier Metropolitim Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was transferred to the Court of Additional Chier Metropolitim Magistrate."}}, {"text": "Narang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-7-1976 the Magistrate issued process for the appearance of the accused including the three Narang brothers out of whom the appellant in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "Narang"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other two who were in London were extradited and brought\n\nA to India on 27-7-1977."}}, {"text": "27-7-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other two who were in London were extradited and brought\n\nA to India on 27-7-1977."}}, {"text": "Ambala Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application filed by Ramlal Narang in March 1977 immedia.tely after his release from detention, to drop the proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants against his two brothers and to discharge all the accused on the ground of illegality of the Delhi case in view of the fact that a case on the same facts was a.lready peding in th'e Ambala Court failed."}}, {"text": "21-6-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter two applications filed by the three 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"Section 173(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7080, "end_char": 7082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7148, "end_char": 7159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9014, "end_char": 9095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10413, "end_char": 10424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the charge sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against ehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court."}}, {"text": "ehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10507, "end_char": 10511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the charge sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against ehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court.", "canonical_name": "Mehra \\\\as"}}, {"text": "Mehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10573, "end_char": 10578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the charge sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against ehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court.", "canonical_name": "Mehra \\\\as"}}, {"text": "l\\.falik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11809, "end_char": 11817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l\\.falik and Mehra alone were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, while the three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators in the second case."}}, {"text": "Section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12341, "end_char": 12353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 420 and 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12364, "end_char": 12383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IIldian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12384, "end_char": 12402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12455, "end_char": 12462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IIldian Penal Code", "statute": "IIldian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "S. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12473, "end_char": 12479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IIldian Penal Code", "statute": "IIldian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12480, "end_char": 12483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12728, "end_char": 12739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "statute": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12740, "end_char": 12757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ambala court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13075, "end_char": 13087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Facts came to light which indic:itel that the conspiracy which was the subject 'matter of the case pending in the Ambala court was but part of a larger conspiracy."}}, {"text": "A Mehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13840, "end_char": 13847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r\n\noffences of conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate committed by Malik and A Mehra.", "canonical_name": "Mehra \\\\as"}}, {"text": "Section 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14457, "end_char": 14468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14470, "end_char": 14487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14761, "end_char": 14772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Namng", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14799, "end_char": 14804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the discovery of the genuine pillars in the possession of Narang brothers, without anything further to connect N arang brothers with Malik and Mehra, the police had no option but to register a case under Section 411 Indian Penal Code against Namng brothers."}}, {"text": "cl 1978", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15594, "end_char": 15601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethnra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15636, "end_char": 15647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethnra/a11i (In Cr!."}}, {"text": "K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15673, "end_char": 15679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.373), A. K. Sen (In Cr!."}}, {"text": "iiarjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15700, "end_char": 15716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.374) and iiarjinder Singh for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "U. R. La", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15739, "end_char": 15747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15755, "end_char": 15769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Intematiopal Art Treasures' Market", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16150, "end_char": 16184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were of the Sunga period (2nd Century B.C.) and their present estimated value in the Intematiopal Art Treasures' Market is said to be aronnd five hundred thousand American dollars."}}, {"text": "2nd May 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16384, "end_char": 16396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pillars were recovered on 2nd May 1967."}}, {"text": "3rd October 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16459, "end_char": 16475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On completion of investigation a H charge-sheet was filed on 3rd October 1967 in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate at Kamal, against one Bali Ram Sharma and two others."}}, {"text": "Ilaqa Magistrate at Kamal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16496, "end_char": 16521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On completion of investigation a H charge-sheet was filed on 3rd October 1967 in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate at Kamal, against one Bali Ram Sharma and two others."}}, {"text": "tl6th July\n\n1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16619, "end_char": 16635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3-119 SC!/79\n\nThe case ended in their acquittal on tl6th July\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "Narinder Nath Malik", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16673, "end_char": 16692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the case one Narinder Nath Malik (N. N. Malik) filed an application before tho Magistrate alleging that he was a research scholar and requesting that he might be given custody of the two pillars to enable him to make a detailed study.", "canonical_name": "Narinder Nath Malik"}}, {"text": "H. L. Mehra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16915, "end_char": 16926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of H. L. Mehra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karna!", "canonical_name": "H. L. Mehfa"}}, {"text": "H. L. Mehra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17162, "end_char": 17173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The orde.r was written by H. L. Mehra himself and signed by the Ilaqa Magistrate.", "canonical_name": "H. L. Mehfa"}}, {"text": "Ilaqa Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17200, "end_char": 17216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The orde.r was written by H. L. Mehra himself and signed by the Ilaqa Magistrate."}}, {"text": "N. N. Malik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17257, "end_char": 17268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pillars remained in the custody of N. N. Malik from 1st March 1968 to 27th May 1968, when N. N.\n\nMalik purported to return the~ to the Court of the Jlaqa Magistrate.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nMalik"}}, {"text": "1st March 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17274, "end_char": 17288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pillars remained in the custody of N. N. Malik from 1st March 1968 to 27th May 1968, when N. N.\n\nMalik purported to return the~ to the Court of the Jlaqa Magistrate."}}, {"text": "Jlaqa Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17370, "end_char": 17386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pillars remained in the custody of N. N. Malik from 1st March 1968 to 27th May 1968, when N. N.\n\nMalik purported to return the~ to the Court of the Jlaqa Magistrate."}}, {"text": "Bali Ram Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17419, "end_char": 17434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the acquittal of Bali Ram Sharma and others, the pillars were handed over to the Lambardar of village Amin."}}, {"text": "H. L. Mchra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17727, "end_char": 17738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RC.2/71-CIA/SPE/CBI was registered at Delhi against N. N.\n\nMalik and H. L. Mchra under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "H. L. Mehfa"}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17745, "end_char": 17756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 406 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17769, "end_char": 17789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17790, "end_char": 17807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.B.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17849, "end_char": 17855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After completing the investigation the C.B.I. filed a charge-sheet No."}}, {"text": "Special Magistrate, Ambala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17912, "end_char": 17938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.C. 2 of 1971 in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against N. N.\n\nMalik and H. L. Mel:u-a for alleged offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "N. N.\n\nMalik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17948, "end_char": 17960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.C. 2 of 1971 in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against N. N.\n\nMalik and H. L. Mel:u-a for alleged offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nMalik"}}, {"text": "H. L. Mel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17965, "end_char": 17974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.C. 2 of 1971 in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against N. N.\n\nMalik and H. L. Mel:u-a for alleged offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "H. L. Mehfa"}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18006, "end_char": 18017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 406 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18030, "end_char": 18050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18051, "end_char": 18068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "17th April, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18353, "end_char": 18369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th April, 1977, the Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code for permission to withdraw the case against Malik and Mehra."}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18420, "end_char": 18431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18432, "end_char": 18455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "16th May 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18577, "end_char": 18590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Special Magistrate, Ambala, by his order dated 16th May 1977, permitted the withdrawal of the case and discharged the accused."}}, {"text": "Narang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18730, "end_char": 18736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between May 1976 and May 1977 several othe.r things happened (; and the Narang brothers, the appellants in the two appeals, made their appearance on the scene.", "canonical_name": "Narang"}}, {"text": "Om Prakash alias Omi Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18880, "end_char": 18907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here, that of the three Narang 'brothers, Om Prakash alias Omi Narang had been 'Jiving in London since 1970, Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang had been similarly living in London since July 197 4 and Ram Lal Narang alone had been living in India.", "canonical_name": "Om Prakash alias Omi Narang"}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18947, "end_char": 18976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here, that of the three Narang 'brothers, Om Prakash alias Omi Narang had been 'Jiving in London since 1970, Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang had been similarly living in London since July 197 4 and Ram Lal Narang alone had been living in India.", "canonical_name": "Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang"}}, {"text": "Ram Lal Narang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19034, "end_char": 19048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here, that of the three Narang 'brothers, Om Prakash alias Omi Narang had been 'Jiving in London since 1970, Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang had been similarly living in London since July 197 4 and Ram Lal Narang alone had been living in India.", "canonical_name": "RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Messrs Spink & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19458, "end_char": 19476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~'\n\n• ..\n\nThe two genuine pillars which had been removed from Suraj Kund temple were traced and found in London in the W3rehouse of Messrs Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manojharlat Narang and Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi to make three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London."}}, {"text": "Manojharlat Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19499, "end_char": 19517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~'\n\n• ..\n\nThe two genuine pillars which had been removed from Suraj Kund temple were traced and found in London in the W3rehouse of Messrs Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manojharlat Narang and Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi to make three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London.", "canonical_name": "Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang"}}, {"text": "Balkishan Rawal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19548, "end_char": 19563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~'\n\n• ..\n\nThe two genuine pillars which had been removed from Suraj Kund temple were traced and found in London in the W3rehouse of Messrs Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manojharlat Narang and Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi to make three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London.", "canonical_name": "Balkrishan Rawal"}}, {"text": "Nathubhai Rawal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19568, "end_char": 19583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~'\n\n• ..\n\nThe two genuine pillars which had been removed from Suraj Kund temple were traced and found in London in the W3rehouse of Messrs Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manojharlat Narang and Ramlal Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi to make three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to London.", "canonical_name": "Nathubhai Rawal"}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19872, "end_char": 19883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19886, "end_char": 19903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19916, "end_char": 19927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19928, "end_char": 19945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19950, "end_char": 19963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19971, "end_char": 20010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "26th June,\n\n1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20015, "end_char": 20031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th June,\n\n1976, N.\n\nN. Malik made an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, in case R.C. No."}}, {"text": "N.\n\nN. Malik", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20033, "end_char": 20045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th June,\n\n1976, N.\n\nN. Malik made an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, in case R.C. No.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nMalik"}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20077, "end_char": 20113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th June,\n\n1976, N.\n\nN. Malik made an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, in case R.C. No."}}, {"text": "Section 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20184, "end_char": 20195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "statute": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20203, "end_char": 20235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20331, "end_char": 20348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20359, "end_char": 20370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20377, "end_char": 20390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20398, "end_char": 20437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "3rd July 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20558, "end_char": 20571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was supported by the reply filed by the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. On 3rd July 1976, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, granted pardon to N. N. Malik."}}, {"text": "Section\n\n120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20913, "end_char": 20925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "statute": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20928, "end_char": 20945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 420, 411 and 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20956, "end_char": 20981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20982, "end_char": 20999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21004, "end_char": 21014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Trea- sures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21022, "end_char": 21063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20th July 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21155, "end_char": 21169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20th July 1976, the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate issued process for'the appearance of the three Narang brothers."}}, {"text": "Omi Narang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21343, "end_char": 21353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang who were iii London.", "canonical_name": "Omi Narangi"}}, {"text": "Manu Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21358, "end_char": 21369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang who were iii London."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21433, "end_char": 21440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Extradition proceedings were initiated in Britain at the ins- tance of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21466, "end_char": 21485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Extradition proceedings were initiated in Britain at the ins- tance of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Magistrate, Bow Street, London", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21491, "end_char": 21534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Metropolitan Magistrate, Bow Street, London ordered the detention of Omi Narang and Manu Narang pending the issue of warrants by the Secretary of State under Section 5 of the Fugitive Offenders Act."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21649, "end_char": 21658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Antiquities and Art Trea- sures Act, 1972", "statute": "the Antiquities and Art Trea- sures Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21773, "end_char": 21826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition for the issue of Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum was filed in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21906, "end_char": 21925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India filed an appeal to the House of Lords and on 24th March, 1977, the appeal was allowed."}}, {"text": "24th March, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21971, "end_char": 21987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India filed an appeal to the House of Lords and on 24th March, 1977, the appeal was allowed."}}, {"text": "Omi Narang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22014, "end_char": 22024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Omi Narang and Mann Narang were finally extradited and brought to India on 27th July, 1977.", "canonical_name": "Omi Narangi"}}, {"text": "Mann Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22029, "end_char": 22040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Omi Narang and Mann Narang were finally extradited and brought to India on 27th July, 1977."}}, {"text": "27th July, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22089, "end_char": 22104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Omi Narang and Mann Narang were finally extradited and brought to India on 27th July, 1977."}}, {"text": "Additional Metropolitan Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22260, "end_char": 22294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Almost immediately he filed a petition before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate to drop the proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants and to discharge the accused."}}, {"text": "Section 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23245, "end_char": 23256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23257, "end_char": 23280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Court at Ambala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23421, "end_char": 23436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Magistrate also noticed an application filed before him, after the conclusion of arguments, informing him that the case in the Court at Ambala against Malik and."}}, {"text": "21st June 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23510, "end_char": 23524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st June 1977, two applications were filed in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, one by Ramlal Narang and the other on behalf of Omi Narangi and Manu Narang who were still in England awaiting extradition."}}, {"text": "Section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23584, "end_char": 23595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23596, "end_char": 23619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Omi Narangi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23669, "end_char": 23680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st June 1977, two applications were filed in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, one by Ramlal Narang and the other on behalf of Omi Narangi and Manu Narang who were still in England awaiting extradition.", "canonical_name": "Omi Narangi"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23715, "end_char": 23722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st June 1977, two applications were filed in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, one by Ramlal Narang and the other on behalf of Omi Narangi and Manu Narang who were still in England awaiting extradition."}}, {"text": "10th January 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24404, "end_char": 24421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were admitted by the Delhi High Court on 22nd June, 1977, but ultimately dismissed on 10th January 1978, by a common judgment."}}, {"text": "Omi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24552, "end_char": 24555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "373 of 1978 and Omi and Manu Narang bave preferred Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "1st August, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24649, "end_char": 24665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention ibere that on 1st August, 1977, a supplemental charge-sheet was filed making Mehra an accused in the Delhi case, the case in the Ambala Conrt having been withdrawn on 16th May, 1977, as mentioned earlier."}}, {"text": "16th May, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24802, "end_char": 24816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention ibere that on 1st August, 1977, a supplemental charge-sheet was filed making Mehra an accused in the Delhi case, the case in the Ambala Conrt having been withdrawn on 16th May, 1977, as mentioned earlier."}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24988, "end_char": 25003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", Shri Harjinder Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Ashok Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25083, "end_char": 25092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "373 of 1978 and Shri Ashok Sen, learned Counsel for the appeUan!s in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26981, "end_char": 26986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/ Shri Lalit, learned Counsel for the respondents urged that the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the charge-sheet Yiled in the Delhi Court was not the same as the conspiracy which was the subject matter of the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court."}}, {"text": "Ambala D Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28745, "end_char": 28759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this purpose, it is necessary to emµpare the First Information Report and the chargesheet in the two cases_\n\nThe First Information Report relating to the ease in the Ambala D Court was registered against \"N. N. Malik and others\" for aileged offences under \"Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 420 and Section 406 Indian Penal Code.\""}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28836, "end_char": 28847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28850, "end_char": 28867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28878, "end_char": 28889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28894, "end_char": 28905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28906, "end_char": 28923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Court of the Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Karna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28980, "end_char": 29029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated therein that N. N. Malik applied to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Karna!"}}, {"text": "30th December, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29211, "end_char": 29230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet which was filed on 30th December, 1972 mentioned N. N. Malik and H. L Mehra as the two accused in the case and recited that N_ N. Malik was introduced by Mehra to the Magistrate as an eminent archaeologist and that he obtained possession of the pillars on the pretext that he wanted to make some research."}}, {"text": "N_ N. Malik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29316, "end_char": 29327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet which was filed on 30th December, 1972 mentioned N. N. Malik and H. L Mehra as the two accused in the case and recited that N_ N. Malik was introduced by Mehra to the Magistrate as an eminent archaeologist and that he obtained possession of the pillars on the pretext that he wanted to make some research.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nMalik"}}, {"text": "R. K. Sen.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29607, "end_char": 29617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual order granting custody of the pillars to Malik was written by Mehra but signed by the Magistrate R. K. Sen.\n\nIt was further recitec•. that sometime after the pillars were returned by Malik to the Court it was discovered that the pillars so returned were fakes and that N. N. Malik was not an archaeologist."}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30044, "end_char": 30055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30068, "end_char": 30079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30080, "end_char": 30097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section\n\n406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30102, "end_char": 30114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30115, "end_char": 30132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 420 and 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30622, "end_char": 30641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "13th May, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30729, "end_char": 30743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, .therefore, seen from the allegations in the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court that the conspirators involved in the conspiracy which was its subject matter were two, namely, Malik and Mehra, that the object of the conspiracy was to dishonestly obtain possession of the pillars by making false representation to the Magistrate and to substitute the pillars by fakes after\n\nobtaining possessiol} of the same and that the offences committed were\n\nnnde~ Secti0n 120-B read with Section 420 and 406 Indian Penal\n\nCod~.\n\nThe First Information Report, in the Delhi case was registered on 13th May, 1916, and the offences mentioned were Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30777, "end_char": 30788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30791, "end_char": 30808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30819, "end_char": 30830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30831, "end_char": 30848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30853, "end_char": 30866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30874, "end_char": 30913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram!a!' Narang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30972, "end_char": 30986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused mentioned in the report were Manu Narang and Ram!a!'", "canonical_name": "RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Ramlal N arang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31585, "end_char": 31599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was recited further that Manu Narang and bis brother Ramlal N arang had commissioned two well known sculptors of Delhi to make three sets of fake pillars.", "canonical_name": "RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "19th July 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31864, "end_char": 31878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet which followed the investigation was filed on 19th July 1976 in the Delhi Court."}}, {"text": "Manoharlal Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31969, "end_char": 31986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet mentioned the three Narang brothers, Ramlal Narang, Manoharlal Narang and Om Parkash Narang, as the three accused persons sent up for trial and H. L. Mehra as a person not sent up for trial as he was already facing trial before the Special Mag.istrate, Ambala.", "canonical_name": "Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang"}}, {"text": "Om Parkash Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31991, "end_char": 32008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet mentioned the three Narang brothers, Ramlal Narang, Manoharlal Narang and Om Parkash Narang, as the three accused persons sent up for trial and H. L. Mehra as a person not sent up for trial as he was already facing trial before the Special Mag.istrate, Ambala.", "canonical_name": "Om Prakash alias Omi Narang"}}, {"text": "Special Mag.istrate, Ambala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32149, "end_char": 32176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet mentioned the three Narang brothers, Ramlal Narang, Manoharlal Narang and Om Parkash Narang, as the three accused persons sent up for trial and H. L. Mehra as a person not sent up for trial as he was already facing trial before the Special Mag.istrate, Ambala."}}, {"text": "Mehra shoukl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32666, "end_char": 32678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramlal Narang and Malik met Mehra and it was decided that Malik should file an application for temporary custody of the pillars and that Mehra shoukl wield his influence over the Magistrate to help N. N. Malik to get such temporary custody."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32946, "end_char": 32955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Delhi in a truck at the instance of the Narang brothers to a place in Defence Colony, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Balkrishan Rawal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32994, "end_char": 33010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Replicas of the pillars were made by Balkrishan Rawal and Natwarlal, two eminent sculptors of Delhi under the supervision of Ramlal Narang and Omi Narang.", "canonical_name": "Balkrishan Rawal"}}, {"text": "Natwarlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33015, "end_char": 33024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Replicas of the pillars were made by Balkrishan Rawal and Natwarlal, two eminent sculptors of Delhi under the supervision of Ramlal Narang and Omi Narang."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33221, "end_char": 33227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original pillars were transported to Bombay by Manu Narang and smuggled out of the country."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REP OR TS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33277, "end_char": 33317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REP OR TS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Fake pillars were substituted and returned by N. N. Malik to the Court."}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33916, "end_char": 33927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33958, "end_char": 33969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34013, "end_char": 34024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34036, "end_char": 34053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34058, "end_char": 34068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34082, "end_char": 34121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section\n\n120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34137, "end_char": 34149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "statute": "the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34152, "end_char": 34169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34253, "end_char": 34270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was recited in the charge-sheet that the facts disclosed \"the commission of offences under Section 406 ( criminal breach of trust) , Section 411 (receiving and retaining stolen property), Section 420 (cheating) Indian Penal Code and Section 25 (1) C of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, all read with Section\n\n120-B Indian Penal Code, in pursuance of criminal conspiracy to which Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang and Om Prakash Narang, H. L. Mehra and N. N. Malik (already granted pardon) were parties.\"", "canonical_name": "Om Prakash alias Omi Narang"}}, {"text": "Section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34458, "end_char": 34469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34478, "end_char": 34489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34490, "end_char": 34507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34603, "end_char": 34614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34619, "end_char": 34630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34631, "end_char": 34648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34659, "end_char": 34670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34671, "end_char": 34688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34738, "end_char": 34749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34750, "end_char": 34767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "J\\Ianoharlal Narang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34820, "end_char": 34839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that J\\Ianoharlal Narang and Omi Narang were in London and that proceedings for their extradition were under way.", "canonical_name": "Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang"}}, {"text": "N arang brothers", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35891, "end_char": 35907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not known that the N arang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court."}}, {"text": "Section 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36427, "end_char": 36438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36439, "end_char": 36456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36730, "end_char": 36741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36742, "end_char": 36759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36991, "end_char": 37002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37003, "end_char": 37020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Malik", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37829, "end_char": 37834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malik and Mehra\n\nalone; were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, .", "canonical_name": "Malik"}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38364, "end_char": 38375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38388, "end_char": 38399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38404, "end_char": 38415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38416, "end_char": 38433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38486, "end_char": 38497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38510, "end_char": 38521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38522, "end_char": 38539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38544, "end_char": 38554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38562, "end_char": 38601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38623, "end_char": 38656, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Antiquities and Art Treasures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38841, "end_char": 38874, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art Treasures Act or under the corresponding provision of the earlier Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39048, "end_char": 39121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39440, "end_char": 39446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument is again of no relevance in determining the question whether the tw0 conspiracies which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala\n\nnd the Delhi Courts were the same in substance."}}, {"text": "Counsel on both sides argued the questions on the basis that the Old Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41152, "end_char": 41244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41688, "end_char": 41699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We proceed on that assumption without deciding whether the trial in the Delhi Court will be governed by the old Code", "statute": "We proceed on that assumption without deciding whether the trial in the Delhi Court will be governed by the old Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procdure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41700, "end_char": 41722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41726, "end_char": 41737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procdure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procdure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41738, "end_char": 41761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42361, "end_char": 42372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42373, "end_char": 42396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42797, "end_char": 42806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42816, "end_char": 42839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42998, "end_char": 43009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43015, "end_char": 43038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43203, "end_char": 43214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43223, "end_char": 43246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43477, "end_char": 43488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43489, "end_char": 43512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45826, "end_char": 45837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 154 and 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46100, "end_char": 46120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46129, "end_char": 46152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 173(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46363, "end_char": 46377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46378, "end_char": 46401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46645, "end_char": 46656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46661, "end_char": 46684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46994, "end_char": 47005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47307, "end_char": 47318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47641, "end_char": 47652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47769, "end_char": 47780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48068, "end_char": 48079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48357, "end_char": 48368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48570, "end_char": 48599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48618, "end_char": 48629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49366, "end_char": 49383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right of the police to make repeated investigations under the old Code was recognised by the Madras High Court as early as in\n\n1919 in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu ( 1), where Phillips B .aad Krishnan, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Phillips B .aad Krishnan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49457, "end_char": 49481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right of the police to make repeated investigations under the old Code was recognised by the Madras High Court as early as in\n\n1919 in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu ( 1), where Phillips B .aad Krishnan, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49642, "end_char": 49653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palaniswami Goundan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49943, "end_char": 49962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palaniswami Goundan(') the Madras High Court held that notwithstanding the filing of a final charge-sheet, a police officer could still investigate and lay further charge-sheets if he got information and that there was no finality either to the investigation or to the layrng of charge-sheets."}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50281, "end_char": 50298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Md. Niwaz v. The Crown(') a Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of Din Mohammad and Cornelius JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Din Mohammad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50313, "end_char": 50325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Md. Niwaz v. The Crown(') a Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of Din Mohammad and Cornelius JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Cornelius", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50330, "end_char": 50339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Md. Niwaz v. The Crown(') a Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of Din Mohammad and Cornelius JJ.,"}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50550, "end_char": 50570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Prosecuting Inspector v. Minaketan Mahato('), the High Court of Orissa held that the police had the right to reopen investigation even after the submission of the chargesheet under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code if fresh facts came to light."}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50681, "end_char": 50692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50693, "end_char": 50716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Division Bench of Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50785, "end_char": 50823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rama Shanker v. State of U.P.(') a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court took the view that the submission of a chargesheet not being a judicial act, the submission of a fresh charge-sheet 2fter submission of a report under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code was not illegal."}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50975, "end_char": 50986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50987, "end_char": 51010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51100, "end_char": 51117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Kerala v. State Prosecu:vr( 6 ) a Divismn Bench of the Kerala High Court thought it was well settled law that the police had the right to reopen the investigation even after !"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51258, "end_char": 51269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51270, "end_char": 51293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51636, "end_char": 51647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51648, "end_char": 51671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.I.R.1919 Madrcs751", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51943, "end_char": 51963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) A.I.R.1919 Madrcs751."}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53449, "end_char": 53460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n173(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53980, "end_char": 53998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54206, "end_char": 54217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54222, "end_char": 54245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54506, "end_char": 54517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 55159, "end_char": 55191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the police became functus officio once the Court took cognizance of an offence on the filing of a charge-sheet by the police and thereafter further investigation by the police was not permissible."}}, {"text": "What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with lhe provisions of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58201, "end_char": 58282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59560, "end_char": 59592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59764, "end_char": 59775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59780, "end_char": 59791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60163, "end_char": 60174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61740, "end_char": 61751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61752, "end_char": 61775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mchra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61858, "end_char": 61863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mchra\n\nand others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court."}}, {"text": "Ambala Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 62095, "end_char": 62112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the investigating agency would ha; done better if it had infonned the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal pennission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_945_950_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• ·\"\"\n\nRAJENDERA NATH KAR v.\n\nGANGADAS & GANGADHAR RATH! & ORS.\n\nJanuary 12, 1979\n\ntY. V. CllANDRACHUD, C.J., V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.)\n\nWes/ Bengal Pre1nises Tenancy A.ct, 1956-Scope of Stctions 11A and 39 tr.ad with s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963-Condonation of delay does not \"?.cal! t:Xl't'11Sion of the period of li1nitation prescribed under the Act.\n\nJn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, on the ground that the appellant was in arrears of rent, that he had sub-let the premises and that the respondents required the premises for their personal use, the appellant deposited the arrears ofrent within a period of 30 days i.e. within the time but did not deposit th~ intnest due on the arrears as required by s. 17(i) of the Act.\n\nThe respondents therefore, filed an application 1:1-nder s. 17 (3) of the Act to strike off the appellant's defence for failure to deposit the interest. The said application was accepted by the Trial Court and, therefore, the respondents filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order which was dismissed on April 4, 1968.\n\nDuring the pendency of the said revision application, s. 17A was newly intrcduced in the 1956 Act with retrospect1\\'c from 26-8-1967.\n\nBy that section tenants v.1ere given the right, if the proceedings for eV-iction was not disposed of, to apply within 30 days of the said dttte for setting aside the order for .striking off the defence. Jn view of the challenge by wa'y of revision application in the High Court against the order striking off his defence -the aprclh1r, t did not take recourse to the provisions of the newly introduced s. 17 A of the West Bengal Premises T'enoocy Act.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the revision petition, the appellant filed an application under the ne\\v s. 17A of the Act praying that the order dated July 25, 1963 passed by the Trial Court, striking off his defence be set aside.\n\nA1ong with the aid application. an application to condone the delay under Eection of the Limitation Act was also filed. The Trial Court tlism\\ssed both the applications and the Hi£h Court confirmed that order in revision.\n\nAllowing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The true meaning and effect of s. 39 is that if any special period G of limitation is prescribed by the Act, that period will govern the proceeding under the Act in preference to the period, if any, prescribed by the Limitation Act.\n\nBut apart from such an over-riding effect of the period of limitation presciibcd by the Act, not only that the other provisions of the Limilation Act do not stand excluded or superseded, but they are expressly made applicable by s. 39 of the Act. [949 A-BJ\n\n2. Section 39 of the West Bengal Premises 1'enancy Act, 1956, which is clear and specific, leaves no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act\n\nwould apply to proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, subject to the condition that if there is a provision in the West BCngal Act relating to J; mitatk1n, that provision \\voul<l prevail over the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act relating to limitation. Since the West Bengal Act prescnOed a specific period of limitation for filing an application for scttlng aside an order st!ilting out the defence, namely a period of 30 days comn1encing on August 26. 1967 'vhcn the first Ordinance came into force, that period would undoubtedly apply to the n1aking of the application under s. 17A of the Act. Since the appellant did not file bis application under s. 17A before the due date, that is to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must be held to be barred by ]imitation. But, by reason of s. 39 of the Act, all other provisions of the Limitation Act would be attracted including '' 5 of the latter /\\ct. [948 D-F]\n\nJn the instant case since the appcllanl <lid not file his application under s. 17A of the Aet, before the due date, thnt is to say, before September 25, 1967, the app1ication under s. 17A is barred by limtta-t:ions, Ho\\vcvcr, the application filed by him un<lcr s. 5 of the Lilnitation Act for condonation of delay is maintainable. [948 A-B, G]\n\nM/s. J>akarmal Gurudayal v. Sagannal Bengani 16 C.W.N. 486 app:ovcd.\n\n3. When a Court condones the delay caused in filing a proceeding, i.t does r:ct c.xtcnd the period of Jimitation prescribed by law for filing it. It treats the\n\nproceeding as if it is filed .. vithin linlltation, \\vhich it has the power to do if\n\nntlicicnt cause is shown for not filing •he proceeding within the prescribed peri<><l. IS49 B-Cl\n\nCrv:lL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1931 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-6-1969 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. 2924168.\n\nSukunlfir G/iosh for the Appellant.\n\n'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACJIUD, C. J.-On November 27, 1962 respcmdents filed a suit for eviction against the appellant under the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act. l 956 (\"The Act\") on the ground that the appellant was in arrears of rent, that he had sublet the premises and that the respondents required the ptemiscs for their personal use. The\n\nsummons of the suit was served on the appellant on January 9, 1963 and he deposited the arrears of rent within a period of thirty days thereafter i.e. on February 5, 1963.\n\nOn July 10, respondents filed an application umlcr section 17 (3) of the Act for striking off the defence of the appellant on the ground that though the appellant had deposited the arrears o[ rent, he had 11ot deposited the interest due on the arrears, as required by section 1 7 (1) of the Act. By an order dated July 25, 1963 the trial court accepted the respondents' contention and struck off the appellant's defence. On August 26, 1963 the\n\n... •:\n\n' •\n\nR. N. KAR v. GANGADAS (Chandrachud, C.J.) 947\n\nappellant filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order but it was dismissed by the High Court on April 4, 1968.\n\nBetween August 26, 1963 when the appellant filed the revision application in the High Court and April 4, 1968 when the revision application was dismissed, ce11ain important events happened.\n\nOn August 26, 1967 an Ordinance was passed by the West Bengal Government by which a new section, namely, Section 17B was introduced into the Act.\n\nBy that section. tenants were. given the right, if the proceeding for eviction was not yet disposed of, to apply within thirty days of the commencement of the Ordinance, for setting aside the order striking off the defence. on the expiry of that Ordinance,\n\nanother Ordinance containing identical provisions was passed on January 8, 1968. This Ordinance was replaced on March 26, 1968 by President's Act 4 of 1968. Section 17-B which was inserted in the Act by the two Ordinances was numbered as section 17-A under the President's Act, the provisions of the section remaining unaltered.\n\nSection 1 (2) of the President's Act provided that the said Act shall be deemed to have come into force on August 26, 1967 which was the date on which the first Ordinance had come into force.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the revision application on April 4, 1968, the appellant fikd an application on May 3, 1968 in the Trial Court under section 17-A, praying that the order dated July 25, 1963 passed by it, striking off his defence be set aside. It ought to be mentioned that though the Trial Court had passed the order striking\n\noff the appellant's defence as Jong back as in 1963, the eviction suit filed by the rc,; pondcnts continued to remain on the file because. on September 16, 1963 the High Court in the revision application filed by the appellant had issued an order staying all further proceedings i11 the suit.\n\nAlong with the application under section 17-A, the appellant filed an application under sccti.on 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 praying that the delay caused in filing the application may for reasons stated therein be condoned.\n\nBoth the applications were dismissed by the Trial Court by an order dated August 17, 1968 which was confirmed by the Calcutta High Court in revision on June 3, 1969. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court in Civil Rule No. 2924 of 1968, the tenant has preferred this appeal by special leave of this Court.\n\nThe High Court has dismissed the application filed by the appcl- H !ant under section 17-A of the Act on the ground .that it was not • filed within 30 days of August 26, !967 when the first Ordinance\n\ncame into force and further on the ground that since Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 had no application to the proceeding, the Court had no power to condone the delay.\n\nIt is patent that the application under section 17-A was not filed within the prescribed period of thirty days.\n\nThe sole question for decision, therefore, is whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act can apply to an application under section 17-A of the Act.\n\nSection 5 of the Limitation Act provides, to the extent relevant, that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the\n\napplicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making C the application within the said period. .On the applicability of section 5 to the proceedings under section 17-A of the Act, the provisions of section 39 of the Act have a material bearing and must be noticed.\n\nSection 39 of the Act provides :\n\n\"Subject to the provisions in this Act relating to limitation, all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under this Act.\"\n\nThis provision, which is clear and specific, leaves no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, subject to the condition that if there is a provision in the West Bengal Act relating to limitation, that provision would prevail over the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act relating to limitation.\n\nSince the West Bengal Act prescribes a specific period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an order striking out the defence, namely, a period of 30 days cominencing on August 26, 1967 when the first Ordinance came into force, that period would undoubtedly apply to the making of F the application under section 17 A of the Act.\n\nAnd since the appellant did not file his application under section 17-A before the due\n\ndate, that i\"s to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must be held to be barred by limitation.\n\nBut, by reason of section 39 of the Act, all other provisions of the Limitation Act would be attrac-\n\nG ted, including section 5 of the latter Act.\n\nWhether the appellant has made out sufficient ground for the condonation of delay is another matter but, in view of the provisions of section 39 of the Act, it seems to us clear that the aPPlication filed by the appellant under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is maintainable and has to be decided on meri\\s.\n\nH The learned Single Judge of the Calcutta Court has referred in his judgment of June 3, 1969 to the provisions of section 39 but he\n\n,.;._\n\ntook the view that sine c section 17 A lays down a special period of •\n\nR. N. KAR v. GANGADAS ( Chandraohud, C.J.) 949\n\nlimitation for filing a petition to set aside an order striking ont the defence, that period could not be extended by invoking the provi\" sions of the Limitation Act.\n\nThis view is unsupportable.\n\nThe true meaning and effect of section 39 is that if any special period of Jimi- 1ation is prescribed by the Act, that period will govern the proceeding under the Act in perference to the period, if any, prescribed by the Limitation Act.\n\nBut, apart from such an over-riding effect or of the period of limitation prescribed by the Act, not only that the other provisions of the Limitation Act do not stand excluded or superseded, but they are expressly made applicable by section 39 of the Act. When a Court condones the delay caused in filing a proceeding, it does not extend the period of limitation prescribed by law for filing it.\n\nIt treats the proceeding as if it is filed within limitation, which it has the power to do if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the proceeding within the prescribed period.\n\nIn M/s. Pokarmal Gurudayal v. Sagarmal Bengani(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply even to an application made for setting aside the decree passed after and following upon an order striking out of the defence.\n\nWe endorse the view of the High Court which, ex hypothesi, would justify the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application for setting aside an order striking out the defence.\n\nThat leaves for consideration the question whether the appellant has tihown sufficient cause for not preferring his application within a period <>f thirty days after August 26, 1967. On this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to bear in mind that in the revision application filed by the appellant against the order striking out his defence, the High Court on September 16, 1963 had stayed all further proceedings in the suit.\n\nIf the appellant were to succeed in that revision application, the suit would have been required to be heard on merits and there would have been no reason or occasion for him to resort to the provision newly inserted by the Ordinance,, under which an application could be made for setting aside the order striking out the defence.\n\nThe appellant was evidently advised wrongly as regards the true legal position, as a result of which he awaited the disposal of his rnvision application.\n\nHe filed the application under section 1 7 A within 30 days of the date on which the revision application was dismissed.\n\nThe appellant acted bona fide in pursuing his remedy by way of a revision application which he had already filed and which, if successful, could have given him effective relief.\n\nWe are cSatisfied that he had sufficient cause for not filing the application under\n\n(I) 76 C'akuita Weekly Notes 486.\n\n950 SuPREMB COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 s.c.rr.\n\nA section 17 A within the prescribed period.\n\nAccordingly, tlie delay cauSed in filing that application must be condoned under section 5. of the Limitation Act and the application under section 17 A must he allowed ..\n\nFor these reasons, we allow the application filed by the appellant under section 17A of the Act, set aside the order dated July 25, 1963 B striking ont his defence and remit the matter back to the Trial Court for deciding the respondents' suit for eviction in accordance with Jaw.\n\nThe suit has been pending since September 1962 and we direct that it shall be disposed of expeditiously.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed and the High Court's Judgment is set aside but without an order of costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n• \"\"", "total_entities": 97, "entities": [{"text": "RAJENDERA NATH KAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDERA NATH KAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GANGADAS & GANGADHAR RATH! & ORS.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GANGADAS & GANGADHAR RATHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 807, "end_char": 815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956", "statute": "Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 886, "end_char": 891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956", "statute": "Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said application was accepted by the Trial Court and, therefore, the respondents filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order which was dismissed on April 4, 1968."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1171, "end_char": 1184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said application was accepted by the Trial Court and, therefore, the respondents filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order which was dismissed on April 4, 1968."}}, {"text": "s. 17A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956", "statute": "Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "26-8-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1310, "end_char": 1319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the said revision application, s. 17A was newly intrcduced in the 1956 Act with retrospect1\\'c from 26-8-1967."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1724, "end_char": 1729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Eection of the Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2073, "end_char": 2102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2312, "end_char": 2317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Eection of the Limitation 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"gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3200, "end_char": 3225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 26. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3390, "end_char": 3405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the West Bengal Act prescnOed a specific period of limitation for filing an application for scttlng aside an order st!ilting out the defence, namely a period of 30 days comn1encing on August 26."}}, {"text": "s. 17A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "statute": "Since the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3599, "end_char": 3605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "statute": "Since the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "September 25, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3650, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the appellant did not file bis application under s. 17A before the due date, that is to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must be held to be barred by ]imitation."}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3745, "end_char": 3750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "statute": "Since the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3791, "end_char": 3805, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 17A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "statute": "Since the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4052, "end_char": 4058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "statute": "Since the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4133, "end_char": 4137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the West Bengal Act", "statute": "Since the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "Sukunlfir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukunlfir G/iosh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACJIUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACJIUD, C. J.-On November 27, 1962 respcmdents filed a suit for eviction against the appellant under the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nsummons of the suit was served on the appellant on January 9, 1963 and he deposited the arrears of rent within a period of thirty days thereafter i.e. on February 5, 1963."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nsummons of the suit was served on the appellant on January 9, 1963 and he deposited the arrears of rent within a period of thirty days thereafter i.e. on February 5, 1963."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5451, "end_char": 5461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5677, "source": "regex", 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{"document_id": "1979_2_951_952_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY,\n\nKARNATAKA, BANGALORE v.\n\nUMESH RUDRA\n\nJanuary 15, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nEstat~ Duty Act, 1953, S. 10~ enjoyn1i>11t to tlic entire exclusion of t!ie donor, applicabi(ity when liusband is donor.\n\nThe deceased gifted his residential property to his W'lfe, but continued to live there with her.\n\nOn his death, while calculating the estate duty, the appellant indudcd the \\'alue of the residential proprty, in the principal value of the estate, on the ground that the deceased continued to reside with the \\Vifc, even after the gift. Upholding the High Cornt's judgment, and rejecting the special leave petition, the Court\n\nHELD : Stction 10 cannot be construed in a n1anner which \\Yould require the ln, sband who bas gifted residential house to the wife, to live Separately from her. \\\\!hen the wife obtains possession of the house and remains in enjoyment of D\" it, it cannot be said that the husband who resid, es with the wife, is, on that account, in possession or enjoyment of the house so as to attract the applicability of Section JO. [952 B-D)\n\nMrs. Shanis111n Nelrar Mansur \\'. Controller of lrstate Duty, West Blngal il ITR 301 : Sunil Roy v. Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta, 77 ITR 667; Mohammad Blwi & Anr. v. Controller of Estate Duty,\n\nA.P.,\n\n69 ITR 770;\n\nI'~ Kamla Pandt1foi v. Controller of Estate Duty, 105 JTR 531; approved.\n\nBibi Al11nedi IJc{lum v. Controller of Estate Duty, Cl.P .. 83 lTR 303, overruled.\n\nCIVIL APPEi.LATE JURTSDICTIO:< : Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6311/78.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 1-6-78 of the Karnataka High Court at Bangalore in T.R.C. No. I /75.\n\nR. N. Sac/1they and Miss A. Subhasluzi for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Karnataka raises a qncstion of interpretation of section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.\n\nThe deceased made a gift of his residential property to his wife on 27th November, 1957 and on his death which occurred on 2nd August, 1963, the question arose whether the value of the residential property was liable to be included in the principal value of the estate passing on the death of the deceased nuder section 10. The argument of the Revenue was that even after the gilt the deceased continued to reside with the wife and, therefore, it\n\nII!\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979) 2 s.c.R.\n\n;\\ could not be said that the wife retained possession and enjoyment of the residential property to the entire exclusion of the deceased and hence section I 0 was attracted. Now there can be no doubt that on a proper interpretation of section 10, the donee must retain possession and enjoyment of the property gifted to the entire exclusion cf the\n\ndonor, in order to repel the applicability of that section. But we do not see how in the present case it can at all be said that the wife did not retain possession and enjoyment of the residential house to the exclusion of the deceased, merely because the deceased in his capacity as husband continued to reside with the wife.\n\nSection I 0 cannot possibly be construed in a manner which would require the husband who has gifted residential house to the wife to live separately from her, if he wants to escape from the mischief of that section. Such an interpretation would subvert family life and social order and would be contrary to morality and good sense. When the residential house is gifted to the wife and she obtains possession and remains in enjoyment of it, it cannot be said that the husband who resides with the wife, as in a happy family life every husband would be expected to do, is, on that account, in possession of the residential house or in enjoyment of it.\n\nIt is the wife who is in possession and enjoyment of the residential house and the husband, by reason of the marital ties, continues to reside with the wife.\n\nWe do not think that section 10 would at all be attracted in such a case.\n\nWe fmd that this view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mrs. Sham.mm Nehar Mansur v. Controller of Estate Duty, West Bengal(') and Sunil Roy v. Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta('), the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohammed Bhai and a1wther v. Controller of Estate Duty, (3) the Madras High Court in Kam/a Panda/al v.\n\nController of Estate Duty,(•) and the Karnataka High Court in the\n\njudgment under appeal and it commends itself to us.\n\nWe think that these High Courts rightly refused to apply section 10 to a case like the present where the hu.sband has gifted the residential house to the wife and thereafter continued to reside with the wifo in the residential house.\n\nThe contrary view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Bibi Ahmedi Begum v. Controller of Estate Duty, U.P. (') must be held to be erroneous.\n\nWe accordingly reject the special leave petition.\n\nM. R.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(I) 71 I.T.R. 301\n\n(2) 77 I.T.R. 667.\n\n\\ 11 69 J.T. R. 770.\n\n(4' 1051.T.R •. IJJ,\n\n~S 8'3 IT.R, Jn3\n\n' • •", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY,\n\nKARNATAKA, BANGALORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, KARNATAKA, BANGALORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UMESH RUDRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UMESH RUDRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 15, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 82, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY,\n\nKARNATAKA, BANGALORE v.\n\nUMESH RUDRA\n\nJanuary 15, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Karnataka High Court at Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1619, "end_char": 1652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 1-6-78 of the Karnataka High Court at Bangalore in T.R.C. No."}}, {"text": "R. N.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1675, "end_char": 1680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sac/1they and Miss A. Subhasluzi for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. Subhasluzi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sac/1they and Miss A. Subhasluzi for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1776, "end_char": 1784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Karnataka raises a qncstion of interpretation of section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1936, "end_char": 1957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2687, "end_char": 2697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4058, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fmd that this view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mrs. Sham.mm Nehar Mansur v. Controller of Estate Duty, West Bengal(') and Sunil Roy v. Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta('), the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohammed Bhai and a1wther v. Controller of Estate Duty, (3) the Madras High Court in Kam/a Panda/al v.\n\nController of Estate Duty,(•) and the Karnataka High Court in the\n\njudgment under appeal and it commends itself to us."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fmd that this view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mrs. Sham.mm Nehar Mansur v. Controller of Estate Duty, West Bengal(') and Sunil Roy v. Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta('), the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohammed Bhai and a1wther v. Controller of Estate Duty, (3) the Madras High Court in Kam/a Panda/al v.\n\nController of Estate Duty,(•) and the Karnataka High Court in the\n\njudgment under appeal and it commends itself to us."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fmd that this view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mrs. Sham.mm Nehar Mansur v. Controller of Estate Duty, West Bengal(') and Sunil Roy v. Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta('), the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohammed Bhai and a1wther v. Controller of Estate Duty, (3) the Madras High Court in Kam/a Panda/al v.\n\nController of Estate Duty,(•) and the Karnataka High Court in the\n\njudgment under appeal and it commends itself to us."}}, {"text": "Karnataka High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4384, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fmd that this view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mrs. Sham.mm Nehar Mansur v. Controller of Estate Duty, West Bengal(') and Sunil Roy v. Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta('), the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohammed Bhai and a1wther v. Controller of Estate Duty, (3) the Madras High Court in Kam/a Panda/al v.\n\nController of Estate Duty,(•) and the Karnataka High Court in the\n\njudgment under appeal and it commends itself to us."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4523, "end_char": 4533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4732, "end_char": 4752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contrary view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Bibi Ahmedi Begum v. Controller of Estate Duty, U.P. (') must be held to be erroneous."}}, {"text": "S 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5007, "end_char": 5010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_953_973_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SWARAN LATA v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS .\n\nJanuary 16, 1979\n\n[A. P. SEN AND V. R. KRISHNA lYER, JJ.J\n\nConstitution-Art. 309, proviso--lf obligatory on the part of the Gov\"\n\ntrranent to n:ake rules of recruitment before a sen•u'r! could bl' constituted or a post created or filled.\n\nJntervrctation of statutes-States Reorganisation Act, 1966-S. 84-Scopc of\n\n--Section, if an incidental provision-Effect of incidentul provision after its pur- C\n\npose was served .\n\n....... Administrative directions issued by Jhe Central Government for implementing\n\nsr:/ien1e of reorganisation Of services-llf co:tltl circ11111scribe tf1e powers of Stare , Government-Nature of instructions issued.\n\nServire Commission-If has power to relax e.:; sential qualifications in selecting a candidate for a post.\n\nWn:ds and phrases: \"1nainly' 1-Meani11g of.\n\nl\\1ala fi.des--Burden of proof-On lVho1n lies.\n\nSection 84 of the States' Reorganisation Act, 1966 empowered the Central Government to issue directions to the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and to the Administrator of the Union t'erritory of Chandigarh\n\n\"for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this part (of the act)\". For filling up the different posts under the control of the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, the Government of 1ndia issued instructions that the posts should be filled _up by deputation mainly from the Punjab nnd Haryana State cadres, and that the officer whose services were sought to be borrowed should have been holding a post, the scale of pay of which was equivalent to the scale of pay of the post in the Chandigarh Administration for which the officer was to be selected on deputation.\n\nAt the request of the Chandigarh Adn1inistration the Govcrn1nent of Haryruna forwarded a panel of three names,~ including that of the appellant, for appointment on deputation to the post of Principal of a \\Vomn 1s Techni cal Institute: The post carried a scale of pay of Rs. 350-900. Although 1he appellant was junior to the other two candidates, she was selected and\n\ntempora.rily appointed to the post since at that time she was on a pay scale of Rs. 350--900 in Haryana. Since in the meantime she had been offered a post in Delhi she left the post in Chrl.ndigarh. All efforts to get a suitable candidate either from the State of Haryana or of Punjab having prove<l un~ successful the Chandigarh Administration requested the Union Public Service Commission to select a. candidate for the post.\n\nNone of the candidates that applied for the post satisfied all the prescribed -qualifications for the post.\n\nTherefore, the UPSC relaxed one or the other\n\nSUPRBIE COURT REPORTS\n\n(1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA qualification in re&pect of each of the candidates and eventually selected respondt:.nt No. f., for the post, The appellant V.'as also one of the candidates CTIUed for interviev.'; but she was not selected.\n\nAHowing th0 appellant's writ tition :1 '.>ingle Judge of th..: Tligh Court struck down the appointment of repondcnt no. 6 mainly on the ground th4t the presence of the Director of Technk:il Education 1'epresenting the Chandigarh Admini5tration in the interview board Yitiated. her appointinent inasmuch\n\nns he was actuated by bias against 1he appellant.\n\nBut on appeal a Division Bt.>nch reversed the order of the single Judge holding that the allegation of nuila (ides or bias had not been made out by the appellant against the representative of tht: Chandigarh A<ln1inistn1tion in the interview board.\n\nC The appellant. on appeal to this Cou't. contended that (I) the post being a deputation post in terms of instn1ction<; issued by the Government of India under s. 84 of the States' Reorganis~1tion Act, the Chandigarh Administration had no authority to fill up the post by dir'ect recruitment and (2) the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission had no po\\ver to relax the essential qualifications of the cadidr:.tes 'vithoLrt prior concurrence of the Chandigarh Administration.\n\nD Dismisfing the appe<1I,\n\nHELD : 1 (a) The post of Principal of the lnstitu.te wns not a \"deputa. tion post\" and, therefore, the appointment of respondent no. 6 to that post by din.•ct rccruit111ent •.vas not invalid. f962 l)]\n\n(b) It is not obligatory under the p10\\'iso to Art. 309 to ntake rules. of re- E cruitment before a .service could be {'onstituted or a post created or filled.\n\nThe State Government ha.s executive power in relation to all matters in respect of \\Vhich th'e legislature of the State has power to make laws.\n\nThere is nothing: in the terms of Arl. 309 which abridges the power of the executive to act under Art. 162 of the Constitution \\Vithout a law. The san1c principle underlies-\n\nArt. 73 in reJation lti the executive pO\\\\'er t1f the Unon. (!)61 G-ll] 41l\n\nF In the instrint case since there 'vctc no rules requiring the A.dministration tofill up the post by deputation, the Adminijtration had the -::.•ption either to- 1nake direct recruit1ni nt or to take a pcr-; on on deputation from the States of Punjab er Hnryana. [962 BJ\n\nB. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, [1966] 3 SCR 682; T. Caj<e v. N.\n\nJonnanik Siem & Anr., [1961] 1 SCR 750; Sant Rani Sharma v. State of G Jlajasthan & A nr., [ 1968] 1 SCR 111; referred to.\n\n(c) Moreover the Chandigarh Adn1inistration did all thrit it could, for selecting a candid at.: on deputation from either Punjab or Haryana, but could not succeed.\n\nIt C:lnnot, therefore, be asserted that there \\\\'as any breach of instructions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Act, even assuming they '\\'ere applicable. [962 E; 964 B:\n\n(d) 'fhe po\\\\'er of the Chandigarh Administration cannot be said to be circumscribed by the terms of the directions issueJ by the (entral Government\n\n'- •\n\nSWARAN 1.ATA 1'. UNION 955\n\nunder s. 8.t of the Act. 1'he instruction.<i issued were supplemental, incidental\n\nor conseqnentinl to the provisions for the reorganisation or States. (959 A]\n\n(e) The meaning of the \\Verd \"mainly\" used in the intruction issued by the Governnlc nt of India must, in the context, mean\n\n11sub5tantially'\\ \"as far as practicable'' or \"so far as possible\". [959 C]\n\n(f) The directions issued by the central Government v:ere only for the B limited purpose of implementing the scheme for the reorganisation of services.\n\nWhen the process relating to integration of services as envisaged by the supplemental, incident.al or consequential provisions for reorganisation of services under a law was completed an incide-ntal provisioni like s. 84 necessarily ceases 10 have effect. Such power is only kept in suspended animation till the process of reorganisation of services is con1plcted and once the in1egration of services was finalised there is no reason for a transitory, consequential or incidental C provisien like s. 84 to operate in perpetuity. [959 H]\n\nlagtar Si11Rh v. State of Pu11jab & Ors. [1972] I SCC 171; referred to.\n\n2(a) There was no statute or regulation having the force of law by which any qualifications \\Vere prescribed for the post. No rules 'vcrc framed to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of the post. It was, therefore.\n\nD the exclusive pov1rer of the Adminj, tration, to prescribe the essential qualifi cations for direct recruitment.\n\nTire qualifications v; re.rc prescribed in consul talion with the Commission. [967 llJ\n\n(b) The appellant could not be heard at this stage to say that the Union Public Service Comn1ission had no power to relax any of the essential qualifications. Her nssertion in the writ petition '\\Vas th3.t though the UPSC had the E power to relax the qualifications it could not be exercised arbitraril~'. [965 CJ\n\n(c) The Con1mission acted well within its powers in relaxing the qualifica- tion of the candidntcs. called for intcrvic\\\\' and in maklng the nppointment, the Administration ratified the Commission's action. (966 A]\n\n(d) 111e essential qualificat.ions \\\\'ere prescribed by the Administration in consultation \\\\'ith the Commission rind \\Vhile issuing the advertisement the Commission hnd reserved to itself the power to relax the qualifications in a suitable case. \\Vhere qualifications for eligibility were not prescribed by rules, broad decisions as to the method of recruitment are taken in consultation with. the Comn1ission.\n\nThis requirement was fulfilled in this case.\n\nThe Administration 'vas fully aware that the Commission had reserved to ilc; e]f the power to relax the essential qualifications. [965 G-J.f]\n\nUn;.,11 of 111dia & Ors. v. S. R. Ko/1Ti & Anr.. [1973] 3 SCll 117; Omprakash v. The State of M. P. & Anr .. AIR 1978 MP 59; Maharashtra State EliCtricity Board Engineers' Assacintion, Nagpur v. Malu1r(Lfhtra Stale\n\nElectricity Ronrd, MR 1968 Bom. 65; held inapplicable.\n\n( e) nie appellant could not approbate and reprobate.\n\nShe knew fully well that, under the terms of the nd\\'crtiscn1ent, the Commission had reserved D to itself the po\\vcr to relax any of the essential qualifications.\n\nBecailse she -had not been selected she could not complain either that t.lircct recruitment\n\nSUPREME COURT RCPORTS l l 979] 2 S.(\".R,\n\nthrough the UPSC was invalid or that the Commission had usurped the functions of the Chandigarh Administration in relaxing the essential qualifications. [972 Dl\n\n(f) No relaxation in essential qualifications can be made after an advertisement had been issued and p'ersoos possessing the qualifications advertised for, have Fuhmitted their applications.\n\nIf no relaxation has to be niade a duty is cast on the Commi9Sion to re-advertise the post.\n\nIn the present ca5e, ho.vever, the advertisement itself contained the relaxation clause and nothing prevented a candidate with the requisite qualifications fron1 mating an application. [972 HJ\n\n3(a) The burden of establishing 1nala {ides lies very heavily on the per5on C alleging them. The Court would be justified in refusing to carry on an investi- gation into allegations of 'nala fides if necessary particulars of the allegatioR \\Vere noi. ,!liYen in the writ petition. [970 Bl\n\n(b) There was nothing on record to substantiate the appellant's gooeral and vague allegations as to the mala fides or bias 011 the part of the Director of Technical Education or that he influenced the members of the Selection Com- D mittee in any manner so as to vitiate the selection. A representative of the\n\nChandigarh Administration was associated as an expert member to the limited extent of apprising the Chairman of thlection Committee as to the nature of duties to be performed by the selected candidate. There is nothing wrong in the Commission taking such expert advice.\n\n[970 H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 628 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26-5-77 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 34 of 1976.\n\nP. P. Rao, N. D. Garg and T. L. Garg for the Appellant.\n\nH. L. S. Lal and Ashok Grover for Respondents 3 and S.\n\nS. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 4.\n\nS. C. Gupta and Ramesh Chand for Respondent No. 6.\n\nC. M. Nayar for Respondent No. 7.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, directed against a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated May 26, 1977, in its appellate jurisdiction reversing the judgment and order of a Single Judge of that Conrt dated February 13, 1976 mainly raises the question whether the appointment of the respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem Lala Dewan by the Chandigarh Administration to the post of Principal, Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh, by direct recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission was invalid, as being contrary to the directions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Punjab Rorganisation Act, 1966.\n\n' ..\n\n• j\n\nThe principal point in controversy in the appeal is whether the post of Principal of the Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh in the pay scale of Rs. 350-900 was a 'deputation post' and required to be filled in by the Chandigarh Administration only by an officer on deputation drawing an equivalent scale from the States of Haryana and Punjab or could also be filled up by appointment of a suitable candidate by advertising the post through the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThree subsidiary questions also arise in the appeal, namely ( 1) whether the Union Public Service Commission had, in fact, exceeded its power by usurping the functions of the newly created Union territory of Chandigarh by relaxing the essential qualifications of the candidates while recommending the name of respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem Lala Dewan for appointment to the post of Principal, and thereby altered the qualifications prescribed by the Chandigarh Administration to regulate recruitment to that post; (2) whether the appointment of respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem Lala Dewan by the Chandigarh Administration to the post of Principal was illegal inasmuch as, she did not possess the requisite essential qualifications, if any, prescribed for the post in question; and (3) whether the proceedings of the Selection Committee dated April 23, 1975 culminating in the selection of respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem Lala Dewan as the candidate most suitable for appointment to the post of Principal, were vitiated because Dr. 0. S. Sehgal, Director, Technical Education, Chandigarh assisted the Selection Committee in its delibera lions during the interview, on account of his bias, if any, against the appellant.\n\n_The main argument advanced by the counsel for the appellant, can be conveniently considered under two heads: The first branch of his contention is, that in terms of the instructions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, the post of Principal of the Institute was 'deputation post' and, therefore, the Chandigarh Administration had no authority to fill up the post by direct recruitment through Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe other branch of the counsel's contention is that the Union Public Service Commission had no power to relax the essential qualifications of the candidates to be selected at the interview without the prior concurrence of the Chandigarh Administration.\n\nThere is no warrant for the contention that the power of the Chandigarh Administration in relation to the mode of filling up the\n\n::::\n\nA post in question, which admittedly is under the control of the Administrator, Chandigarh Administration, stands circumscribed by the terms of the directions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Act.\n\nThe decisioll must tum on a construction of the instructions issue<! on November 4, 1966 by w)l.ich the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, which consequent upon the amendment of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 by Order of the President of India dated October 30, 1966 was made responsible for the work of the Union territory of Chandigarh.\n\nThese instructions were issued on tl1c basis that personnel for the Union territory o( .c\n\nChandigarh would be provided on deputation by the two States of\n\nPunjab and Haryana, The said instructions, so far matcriaL read as folk1ws:\n\n\"Except for the department of (i) Printing and stationery (ii) Architecture and (iii) Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh, the posts in the other departments under the control of the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh will be tilled up by deputatian mainly from the Punjab /Haryana State Cadres.\n\nIn respect of the above-mentioned departments. the staff will be taken en bloc by the Chandigarh Union territory Administration.\n\nA committee consisting of the representatives of the Governments of Punjab, Haryana, the Chandigarh Union territory Administration and the Ministry of Home Affairs has been constituted to recommend absorption of persomfol against posts in the Chandigarh Union territory Administration, from the Punjab/Haryana State cadres on pcrmanmt basis.\" The aforesaid conununication also conveyed the order of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, sanctioning the creation and continuance of \"existing posts\" in the Union territory of Chandigarh from November 1, 1966.\n\nThese instructions were in conformity with the earlier decision of\n\n. G the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed by the letter of the Chief Secretary to the Government of erstwhile State of Punjab dated August 9, 1966 staling that the Government had set up\n\na committee headed by Sri V. Shanker, J.C.S., for the finalisation of the proposals of the Departmental Committees in regard to the allocation of the personnel to the reorganised States of Punjab and Haryana \\.ff and the Union territory of Chandigarh.\n\nIn regard to the Union territory of Chandigarh, the decision o[ the Government of India was in these terms:\n\n• •\n\n. ,..\n\n\"It may be presumed that personnel for the Union territory of Chandigarh will be provided on deputation by the two States of Punjab and Haryana.\"\n\nThe aforesaid instructions issued under s. 84 of the Act were supplemental, incidental or consequential provisions for the reorganisation of the States.\n\nThe instructions were binding on the State Gov- B ernments of Punjab and Haryana as also on the Chandigarh Administration in the matter of integration of services : Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.( 1)\n\nThe key to the interpretation of the aforesaid instructions issued under s. 84 of the Act, obviously lies in th word 'mainly'.\n\nAccording to the ordinary plain meaning, the word \"mainly\" Rrnst, in the context, mean \"substantially\", \"as. far as practicble\" or \"so far as possible.\" 1n Shorter Oxford Dictionary,, 2nd Edn., vol. 1, p. 1189, the meaning given is : \"For the most part; chiefly, principally\". lit\n\nWebster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edn., vol. III, p. 1483, more or less the same meaning is given: \"Principally, chiefly, in the n1ainH.\n\nIt seems to us that for a proper determination of the question, it is necessary first of all to formulate as clearly as possible the precise\n\nnatu~ and the effect of the directions issued by the Central Government under s .84 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, which reads :\n\n\"84. Power of Central Government to give directions: The Central Government may give such directions to the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and to the Administrators of the Union territories of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of givil)g effect to the foregoing provisions of this Part and the State Governments and the Administrators shall comply with such directions.\"\n\nThe use of the words \"for the purpose of glVlng effect to tk foregoing provisions of this Part\" clearly curtails the ambit of the G section.\n\nThe directions that the Central Government issues under the section are only for a limited purpose, i.e., for the implementation of the scheme for the re-organisation of services.\n\nWhen the process relating to integration of services as envisaged by the supplemental, incidental or consequential provisions for re-organisation of services under a law made by the Parliament in exercise of its power under H\n\n(1) [1972] I S.C.C. 171.\n\n5~119 SC!/79\n\n_, ' A Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitution is completed, such an incidental provision like s. 84 necessarily ceases to have effect\n\nWhile it is not disputed that the power to regulate matters relating to services under the Union of India and under the various States specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution is an exclusive function of the Union and the States under Entry 70, List I and Entry 41, List II of Seventh Schedule read with Article 309 and normally, therefore, it is the exclusive power of the Union and the States to deal with their services either in exercise of their Legislative functions or rule-making powers, or in the absence of any law or rules, in exercise of their executive power under Article 73 and Article 162 of the .C - Constitution, which is co-extensive with their legislative powers to regulate recruitment and conditions of service, nevertheless 1t is strenuously urged that this power of the Union and of the States which embraces within itself the power to regulate the mode of recruitment of services must yield to the supplemental, incidental or consequential\n\ndirections issued by the Central Government in relation to the setting up of services in a newly formed State under a law made by the Parliament relatable to Article 3 of th<! Constitution, in the context of reorganisation of States.\n\nTo put it more precisely, it is argued that the newly formed State is completely divested of its power to d\"ll _with its services.\n\nIn Union of India v. P. K. Roy & Ors. ( 1) this Court touched upon the subject, but expressed no final opinion since the question did not directly arise.\n\nAfter the process of integration of services is finalized in conformity with any law made by the Parliament referred to in Articles 2 or 3 of the Constitution, the supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions contained therein, which. by reason of Article 4 have the effect to divest the newly formed State of its power to deal with its services, wonld no longer operate.\n\nSuch power is only kept under suspended animation till the process of re-organisation of services is not completed.\n\nOnce the integration of services in a newly formed State is finalized, there is no reason for a transitory, consequential or incidental provision like s. 84 of the Act to operate in perpetuity.\n\nFor the reasons already stated, there is no basis for the submission that the supplemental, incidental or consequential provisions which the Parliament is competent to make while enacting a law under Articles 2 or 3 have an overriding effect for all times.\n\nOn the plain words of ff Article 4 of the Constitution, a provision like s. 84 of the Act, or the directions issued thereunder are only supplemental incidental or con-\n\n(l) [1968]2 S.C.R. 186.\n\nsequential to the 'scheme of re-organiiation of services, which is con- A sequential upon the re-organisation of a State.\n\nThey cannotoe given a wider effect than what is intended.\n\nIt may incidentally be mentioned that on November 1, 1966, i.e., .on the appointed day under s. 2(b), the President of India issued an order, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article B 309 of the Constitution directing that the Administrator of the Union territory of Chandigarh shall exercise the power to make rules in regard to the following matters namely :\n\n(i) the method of recruitment to the Central Civil Services and posts (Class II, Class III and Class IV) under his adc ministrative control in connection with the affairs of the Union territory of Chandigarh;\n\n(ii) the qualifications necessary for appointment to such services and posts; and\n\n(iii) the conditions of service of persons appointed to such D services and posts for the purpose of probation; confirmation, seniority and promotion:\n\nProvided that the power conferred by this notification shall not be exercisable in respect of such services and posts as are borne on a cadre common to two or more Union territories.\"\n\nThe Administrator in exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid order of the President, framed no rules to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of the post of Principal. Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh, nor were any rules framed prescribing the qualifications necessary for appointment to such posts.\n\nIt is not obligatory under the proviso to Article 309 to make rules of recruitment etc. before a service can be constituted, or a post created or filled.\n\nThe State Government has executive power in relation to all matters in respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. It follows from this that the State Government will have executive powers in respect of List II, Entry 41 of the Seventh Schedule: 'State Public Services': B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore.(') There is nothing in the terms of Article 309 of the Constitution whkh abrides the power of the executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution without a law.\n\nThe same view has been\n\n(I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682.\n\n962 SUPRE!\\1E COUR f REPORTS [1979] 2 s.c.R.\n\ntaken by this Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem & Anr. (1) and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (') The same priuciple underlies Article 73 of the Constitution in relation to the executive power of the Union.\n\nThere are thus no rules and regulations which require the Chandigarh Administration to fill up by deputation the vacancy in the post of the Principal, Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh.\n\nThe Chandiiarh Administration had, therefore, the option to either directly recruit persons to be appointed to the post through Union Public Service Commission or to request either the State of Punjab or the State of Haryana to send the names of suitable persons whom the Chandigarh Administration might be willing to appoint.\n\nIt must, accordingly, he held that the post_ of principal of the Institute was not a \"deputation post\" and, therefore, the appointment of respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem Lala Dewan by the Chandigarh Administration to that post, by direct recruitment through the Commission was not invalid.\n\nEven assuming that the directions issued by the Central Government uuder s. 84 of the Act were binding on the Chandigarh Administration, it is clear that there is no breach thereof.\n\nFrom the correspondence that JYasscd between the Chandigarh Administration and the Government of Haryana, there can be no doubt whatever that the Chandigarh Administration made their utmost endeavour to get a suitable person on deputation for appointment as Principal of the Institute.\n\nA long correspondence on the subject ensued and eventu11lly the Government of Haryana by its letter dated July 7, 1974, informed the Chandigarh Administration that it was not possible to relieve any woman officers in the grade of Rs. 350-900 from the Industrial Training Department except that of Smt.\n\nChampa Malhotra who was facing an inquiry, with a request that the appellant should instead be appointed.\n\nThe Government of Haryana was obviously wrong in insisting upon the appointment of an officer in the scale of Rs. 300-500.\n\nThis could not obviously be done as it would be contrary to the instructions of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs dated August 16, 1971 that an officer cannot be appointed on deputation to a post that carried a higher grade of pay in the Union territory of Chandigarh. Thus. the post of Principal in the pay scale of Rs. 350- 900 could only be filled by a person on deputation who manned a post\n\n(l) fl96l] I S.C.R. 750.\n\n(2) [196!] 1 S.C.R. t 11.\n\n_ .... -\n\nthe Scale oi pay of which was equivalent to the srnle of pay of the A Principal i.e. Rs. 350-900.\n\nIt appears that the entire question was re-examined by the Chandigarh Administration.\n\nThe Director, Technical Education by his letter dated October 9, 1974 addressed to the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration stated that the qualifications prescribed by the Govern- B ment of India in the Training Manual for the post of Principal in such institutions were as under :\n\nI. Degree or its equivalent in Mechanical Engineering or Electrical Engineering will be preferred.\n\n2. In the case of degree holder, pmctical experience of one C year in a reputed concern or in a training institute will be desirable.\n\n3. In the case of Diploma holders, practical experience of 5 years in a reputed concern or in a training institute will be desirable.\n\nFurther, he mentioned that there was no institution similar to the Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh e.ither in the State of Punjab or in the State of Haryana.\n\nThere were only Government Industrial Schools for girls which were still in the process of being developed.\n\nThese institutions were headed by Head-Mistresses Principals in the non-gazetted scale of Rs. 300-500. He therefore, rightly pointed out that the posts of Assistant Directresses in the States of Punjab and Haryana were equivalent to the post of Principal of the Institute, as they also carried the scale of Rs. 350-900 and that throughout the Chandigarh Administration had been appointing Principal of the Institute only from the cadre of Assistant Directresscil.\n\nIn response to Government of Haryana's letter dated September 27 /30, 1974, the Chandigarh Administration accordingly wrote on October 11/14, 1974 giving detailed reasons why it was not possible\n\nto take the appellant on deputation as Principal because on her rever- G sion from her current assiment with the Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation she would be posted as Head Mistress in the scale of Rs. 300-500 whereas the scale of the Principal's post at the Institute was Rs. 350-900 inasmuch as the Government of India's instructions forbid giving a deputationist a scale of pay which she is not already holding in her parent State and also because it was of the H opinion that looking to her past performance as Principal during her • )._ short stay, it was considered that she would not be a suitable person\n\n964 SUPREMl COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 s.c.R.\n\nto be appointed as Principal.\n\nThe Chandigarh Administration also pointed out that they were still prepared to take back Smt. Champa Malhotra as Principal of the Institute despite the inquiry against her.\n\nBut, the Government of Haryana maintained complete silence. It disdained from replying to this letter or from relieving Smt. Champa Malhotra.\n\nIt would, therefore, >appear that right from March 7, 1974 till August 14, 1974 when the Chandigarh Administration forwarded requisition to the Union Public Service Commission to advertise the post for direct recruitment, i.e. for nearly 6 months, the Government of Haryana took no action in the matter.\n\nDuring this period, it just persiJ; ted in its stand in forwarding n panel of names of officers carried on the scale of Rs. 30Qc500 and when it was fully apprised about the true legal position by the Chandigarh Administration expressing their inability to take an officer working in a lower grade or to take back the appellant as Principal of the Institute, it still insisted in sponsoring her name, although this could not be done. This attitude of the Government of Haryana was just inexplicable.\n\nNevertheless, the Chandigarh Administration by their letter dated August 20, 1974, i.e., just within six days of the requisition did what was expectetl of them and duly informed the Government of Haryana of their decision to recruit a Principal through the Commission and requested that it may direct the eligible officers from Ha1yana to apply for the post.\n\nIn response, the Government of Haryana by its letter dated September\n\n27/30, 1974 registered a protest staking a claim as if the post of Principal of the Institute was a Haryana-quova post, i.e., it could be filled in only by an officer on deputation from the State of Haryana.\n\nIn spite of repeated letters sent by the Chandigarh Administration, the Government of Punjab also did not send up the name of a suitable officer.\n\nIn view of these circumstances, it cannot be asserted that there was any breach of the instructions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Act, if at all they were applicable.\n\nG Viewed from any angle, we must hold that the Chandigarh Administration was within their rights in making the appointment to the\n\npost of Principal, Government Central Craf, js Institute for Women, Chandigarh by direct recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission. Thus the appointment of respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem Lata Dewan. as Principal of the Institute '-''aS not invalid as be; ng con- H trary to the directions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Act inasmuch as the mid d'recUons were not applicable and also because there was no breach thereof, if at all they applied.\n\nAl •\n\nSWARAN cATA v. UNION (Sen, J.) 965\n\nThat leads us to the other branch of the appellant's contention, and the question arises whether in the case of this particular post could the Union Public Service Commission have relaxed the essential qualifioations ? The appellant has nowhere alleged in the writ pe.tition that the Union Public Service Commission had no authority to relax the essential qualifications.\n\nOn the contrary, she averts in para 21 thereof :\n\n\"Though the Union Public Service Commission has the power of relaxing the qualifications but the said power cannot be exercised arbitrarily.\"\n\nIn view of this udmission, she cannot be heard to say that the Union Public Service Commission had not such power.\n\nSince however the point was argued at length, we think it necessary to deal with it.\n\nIt is undisputed that there is no statute or regulation having the force of law, by which any qualifications are prescribed for the post of Principal of the Institute.\n\nNor has the Administrator framed uny rules to regulat<> the method of recruitment to such post, or faying down the qualifications necessary for appointment to the post or the conditions of service attached to the post. The Chandigarh Administration accordingly while sending up its requisition dated August 14, 1974 to the Union Public Service Commission, suggested certain essential and desirable qualifications, keeping in view the qualifications prescribed by the Government of India in the Training Manual quoted above.\n\nThe nature and duties of the pest of Principal of the Institute are primarily administrative in nature, but the qualifications prescribed were, however, essentially technical.\n\nThe Commission, therefore, by its letter dated September 16, 1974 returned the requisition to the Chandigarh Administration, with the observation that they should lay down the qualifications keeping in view the nature and duties of the post.\n\nThe Chandigarh Administration accordingly on January 2/4, 1975 forwarded a fresh requisition revising the qualifications for the post i.e, including 'Administrative Experience for three years'.\n\nThereafter, the Commission on February 1, 1975 advertised the post with the essential qualifications as suggested, with a relaxation clause. It will, therefore, appear that in the instant case, the e; lsential qualification' were pre5cribed by the Chandigarh Administration in consulration with the Commission and also that the Commission had in the advertisement issued, reserved to itself the power to relax the qualifications in case of su.itable candidates.\n\nWhere qualifications for eligibility are not prescnbed by rules, broad decisions as to the method of recruitment are taken in consultation with the Commission.\n\nThis requirement was fulfilled in this particular case.\n\nThe Chandigarh Administration was fully aware that the Commission had reserved to itself the power to relax the essential qmlifications.\n\nThe Commission, therefore, acted within its powers in relaxing the qualifications of the candidates called for interview.\n\nIn fact, the Chandigarh Administration ratified the action of the Commission in making the appointment. The appointment of respondent No. 6, Smt. Prem LatJ Dewan cannot,\n\ntherefore, be challenged on the ground that either the Commiss'on had. no power to relax the qualifications or that she did not possesss the minimum qualifications prescribed for the post.\n\nIt is, however, strenuously urged on the strength of the. decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Omprakash v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.(') that the Union or the State Public Service Commissions cannot select a candidate who docs not possess the qualifications prescribed.\n\nWe do not see how this decision is of any avail to the appellant.\n\nOn the contrary, while laying down that the Government has to fill up posts by appointing those who are selected hy the Public Service Conm1ission and must adhere to the order of merit in the list of candidates sent by the Commission, it observed :\n\n\"It is entirely in the wisdom and discretion of the Commission what mode or method it would adopt.\n\nThat is subject to statutory provisions, if any.\n\nWhere mm1mum qualifications for e!igiblity are prescribed by a statute or by the Government, the Public Service Commission cannot select a candidate who does not possess those qualifications.\n\nHowever, the Public Service Commission is free to screen the applicants, classify them in various categories according to their plus qualifications and/ or experience, and call for interyiew only those candidates who fall within those categories, eliminating others who do not satisfy these criteria.\"\n\nThis decision, in our opinion, instead of supporting the appellanr goes against her.\n\nWe are of the view that the decision of this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. S. B. Kohli & Anr. (') and that of the Bomb&y High Court in Maharashtra Stale Electricity Board Engineers' Association, Nagpur v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board(') arc both distinguishable on facts.\n\nIn S. B. Kholrs case, this Court was concerned with interpretation of items 2 and 3 of Annexure. I to the Second Schedule\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1978 M.P. 59.\n\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1968 Born. 65.\n\nof the Central Health Service Rules, 1963, as nmended, which prescribed \"a post-graduate degree in the concerned speciality\", and the question was whether the qualification of F.R.C. 5 satisfied the qualification prescribed for the post of Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery.\n\nIt was held that the Regulations framed by the Medical Council required that in addition to the general F.R.C. 5, a Snrgeon must have a diploma in Orthopaedics before he could be appointed a Professr, Reader or Lecturer in Orthopaedics.\n\nIt was said that to hold otherwise, would me3n that a person who has the qualification of F.R.C. 5 would be deemed to be specialised in Orthopaedics, without his having any snch qualification.\n\nIn the Maharashtra State Electricity Board's case, (supra) the Board, which is a statutory Corporation, made the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (Classification and Recruitment) Regulations, 1961, in exercise of its powers under s. 79 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948.\n\nRegulation 8 invests the power of modification of minimum qualifications or exeperience required for the various categories of posts only in the Board.\n\nRegulation 21,, however, confers power on the Selection Committee to recommend, in deserving cases, relaxntion of the age limit and educational or other qualifications. The Board issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of Executive Engineer\n\n(E&M).\n\nThe advertisement nowhere mentioned that the minimum requirements of qualifications and experience were liable to be relaxed.\n\nThis rescJ!ted in deni'al of equal opportunity to the departmental candidates who could have applied when the post was advertised, if it was known that the qualifications and experience, as advertised, were not rigid and liable to relaxation.\n\nThe High Court accordingly struck down the direct recruitment of a person to the post of Executive Engineer (E&M) since the advertisement effectively prevented the deFartmental candidates from applying for the post, because their period of experience was less than the advertised one, holding that, in effect, this was tantamount to a denial of equal opportunity to them in violation of Article 16 (I) . In our view, the decision turned on its own facts.\n\nIn the present case, as already pointed out, there was no statute or regulation having the force of law by which any qualifications were prescribed for the post of Principal.\n\nThere were also no rules framed to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of the post under\n\nthe proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. It was the exclusive H power of the Chandigarh Administration in the absence of any law or rules, to prescribe the essential qualifications for direct recruitment to\n\nA the post, and, accordingly the qualifications were prescribed in consultation with the Commission.\n\nThe Commission while adverfr;:p the post, had reserved to itself the power to relax the qualifications in deserving cases. It is not that the Commission had relaxed one of the essential qualifications viz. qualification No. (ii) 'Diploma in\n\nTeehuology of three years duration', in the case of respondent No. 6 alone.\n\nThere were three other candidates who were also interviewed in relaxation of essential qualifications Nos. (ii) and (iv).\n\nThe affidavit of Dr. A. C. J\\lathai, Under Secretary in the Union Public Service Commission shows that in the case of respondent No. 6, the Commission relaxed essential qualification No. (ii), as under :\n\n\"Requirement of Diploma of Industrial 'training of two years' duration\".\n\nIt is noteworthy that essential qualification No. 2, as advertised was 'Diploma in Technology of three years duration or Diploma of Industrial Training of two years' duration with one year's teachers training/C.T.l.' Indeed, respondent No. 6 had essential qualification No. 2.\n\nThe word 'or' made the two clauses disjunctive, and they were in the alternative.\n\nRespondent No. 6 besides being a graduate in Arts also held a three years' Diploma in Home Science from Lady IrwiR Coliege, Delhi. .\n\nIt is a matter of common knowledge that Home Science, in some countries called 'don1cstic economics' or 'domestic science'. is a broad field of learning integrating the subject-matters of several disciplines to form a body of knowledge focussed on the problems of the home and their living. It is concerned with all phases of home life and includes the following subjects : child devclop\\)lent and family relationships; clothing, textiles and related arts; family economics and home management; food and nutrition; housing and house management.\n\nShorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed., Vol. II. p. 2253 gives the meaning of 'Technology' as :\n\n\"a discourse or treatise on an art or arts; the ter1ninology of a particular art or subject: the scientific study of children.\"\n\nIn Webster's ]'!ew International Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. IV, p. 2590 apart from giving it the n1eaning of \"industrial science'', also conveys to it the meaning :\n\n\"any science or systematic knowlcdge of the industrial arts.''\n\n...\n\nSWARAN LATA .. l.'.NIQN ~Sen, J.) 969\n\nThe Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1349 gives, some of the meanings of the term as :\n\n\"the application of knowledge for practical ends, as in a particular field : edui:ational technology; the terminology of an art, science, etc.; technical non1enclature.\"\n\nThough in its primary sense it is true that the word 'Technology' involves a technical process, invention, method of the like, in the broader sense it embraces non-engineering related curricula pertaining to applied and graphic arts, education, health-care, nutrition, etc. i.e. it\n\n..,._ includes technique or prmessiona! skill in any of the subjects enumerated above.\n\nThe expression 'Diploma in Technology' is,. therefore, C wide enough to include a Diploma in Home Science.\n\nIn S. B. Koh/i's case (supra) this Court observed :\n\n\"This argument was based on the provision in the Annexure I to the Second Schedule which states that the qoolifications are relaxablc at C01mnission's discretion in the case of candidates otherwise well qualified. That is no doubt so.\n\nBnt the discretion is given ouly to the Union Public Service\n\nCommission in cases of direct recruitment and not to the Departmental Promotion Committee in cases of promotion.\n\nAs that is the intent of the Jaw it has to be given effect to.\"\n\nIt was then observed :\n\n\"Moreover, the Union Public Service Commission when it proceeds to fill up a post by direct recruitment does so by calling for applications by extensive advertisements and it is but reasonable that if on a consideration of all those applications it finds that persons possessing the prescribed qualifications are not a\"ailable but there arc persons otherwise wellqualified, they may be selected.\"\n\nThe Union Public Service Commission was, therefore, perhaps not wrong in selecting respondent No. 6 as a suitable candidate for the\n\npost.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether there was bias.\n\nWe are unable to hold from the material on record that there was any bias on the part of Dr. 0. S. Sehgal Director, Technical Education, Chandigarh or that he influenced the members of the Selection Committee in any manner, so as to vitiate the selection of respondent H No. 6.\n\nIn ou_r view, the allegations in the writ petition are not sufficient to constitute an avern1ent of 111alafides or bias on the part of\n\neither the Chandigarh Admu1istrntion or in particular against Dr. 0. S.\n\nSehgal sufficient to vitiate the appointment of respondent No. 6. No malafides as such are imputed against the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into allegations of malafides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition.\n\nThe burden of establishing malafides lies very heavily on the person who alleges.\n\nThe Division Bench has pointed out, and we think rightly so, that the principles laid down in Kraipak's case (supra) were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.\n\nIt rightly observes that no question of malafides or bias arises as it is clear from the Jetter written by Dr. 0. S. Sehgal dated October 9,\n\n1974 to the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration wherein he had not said a word against t11e appellant.\n\nAll that he said in his capacity as Director, Technical Education was that on account of the failure to appoint a Principal for quite sometime the Institute was in a bad condition, and that although lie had given charge to the Vice Principal, she did not prove effective, suggesting that the Government of Haryana should be requestccl to lend the services of Smt. Choampa Malhotra as he was prepared to take her back as she had worked for a long time as Principal, in order that the work of the Institute should not suffer.\n\nThe whole tenor of the document shows that it was written in the best int<crests of the institution.\n\nHe as the Director of Technical Education was solely responsible for the due administration of the Institute.\n\nThe Division Bench has also rightly held that no inference of malafides arises from the letter written by Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration elated October 11/14, 1974.\n\nAll that is said is that Dr. 0. S. Sehgal, Director, Technical Education, 'for reasons best known to him', did not went to appoint the appellant and, therefore, 'must have played an important part at the meeting of the Selection Committee' and was 'able to prevail upon the other members' to select the respondent No. 6 with a view so that the <1ppellant wl10 was better qualified should not be selected.\n\nThe appellant further averred that she h•ad in her representation dated May 1, 1975, alleged that after the interview she had overheard Dr. 0. S.\n\nSehgal talking to the third Lady member, saying as to 'how they conld take this Lady', meaning the appellant, 'as the Principal' and, therefore, she felt that she was a victim of the machination of Dr. Sehgal.\n\nThere is nothing on record to substantiate such general and vague allegations of the •appellant as to ma/afides or bias on the part of Dr.\n\n• •\n\n. ·~\n\nSehgal.\n\nDr. Sehgal in his counter-affidavit has controverted the insinuations made against him. Not a word was said at the hearing about the alleged utterance attributed to him.\n\nNothing was brought to our notice to show ill-will or malice on his part.\n\nThe entire arguments are built around the two letters, the one written by Dr. 0. S.\n\nSehgal dated October 9, 1974 to the Home Secretary, and the other addressed by Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration to> Sri S. N. Bhanot, Secrcl'ary to the Government of Haryana, Industrial Training Department.\n\nDr. A. C. Mathai, Under Secretary, Union Public Service Commission has on affidavit stated that the Commission relaxed some of the essential qualifications after applying its own mind, uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations, and denied, in particular, that the Commission was advised by any extraneous authority.\n\nDr. 0. S.\n\nSehgal as Representative of the Chandigarh Administration was associated only as an Expert Member and his only duty was to apprise the Chairman of the Selection Committee as to the nature of duties to be performed by the selected candidate. There was nothing wrong in the\n\nUnion Public Service Commission taking such expert advice.\n\nWe are informed that the Selection Committee had also selected the appellant for the post of Principal although, on evaluation of comparative merits and de-merits placed her as No. 2 while the respondent No. 6 was placed as No. 1.\n\nThis circumstance clearly shows that the Selection Committee was wholly uninfluenced by any other consideration except merit. In S. Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab(') this Conrt laid down that he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any Act for Order, must establish the charge of bad faith and abuse or misuse by Government of its powers.\n\nThe allegations which me -0£ a personal nature are not borne out at all.\n\nFurther, the allegations are wholly irrelevant and even if true, would not afford a basis upon which the appellant would be entitled to any relief.\n\nOn the appellanfs own showing, Dr. 0. S. Sehgal as Director, Technical Education recorded appreciation of her as Principal of the Institute.\n\nThis clearly shows that he had no particular animus against her.\n\nFurthermore, as the Division Bench observes, merely because Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration addressed a letter to Sri S. N. Bhanot, Secretary to the Government of Hmyana, Industrial Training Department dated October 11/14, 1974 expressing his unwillingness to take the appellant on deputation because sl1e was not holding a substantive rank in the pay scale of Rs. 350-900,\n\n(l):A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 72 •\n\ncontrary to the instructions of the Government of India and alllo because the Chandigarh Administration felt that looking to her past performance as Principal during her short stay, she was not a suitJable person to be appointed as Principal, does not necessarily give rise to an inference of bias on the part of the Chandigarh Administration or Dr. 0. S. Sehgal, Director of Technical Education.\n\nThese were all matters within the competence of the Chandigarh Administration and it was for them to decide the suitability of candidate for appointment.\n\nThere is nothing to suggest that the reasons given by the Home Secretary were not his own reasons based upon his own information. It is needless to stress that the Home Secretary to the Government of a State holds a very sensitive position and is the nerve centre of the administration fully conversant with the realities.\n\nFor aught we know, the Home Secretary had his own sources of information.\n\nIn any event, the appellant cannot approbate and reprobate. She had willingly, of her own accord, and without any persuasion by anyone, applied for the post, in response to the advertisement issued by the Union Public Service Commission for direct recruitment.\n\nShe, therefore, took her chance and simply because the Selection Committee did not find her suitable for appointment, she cannot be he<ard to say that the selection of respondent No. 6 by direct recruitment through the Commission was invalid, as being contrary to the directions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Act or that the Commission had exceeded its powers, by usurping the functions of the Chandigarh Administration, in relaxing the essential qualifications of the rnndidates called for interview or that respondent No. 6 was not eligible for appointment inasmuch as she did not possess the requisite essential qualifications.\n\nShe fully know that under the terms of the advertisement, the Commission had reserved to itself the power to relax any of the essential qualifications.\n\nWith this full knowledge, she applied for the post and she appeared at the interview.\n\nWe are clearly of the opinion that the appellant is precluded from urging these grounds.\n\nLastly, the contention of rcsponrlent No. 7. S1nt. Usha Wadhwa that the failure of the Union Public Service Conunission to re-advertise the post prevented her from aoplyine. for the post and thereby there was denial of eaual opportunity to her in violation of Article 16(1) can be easily disposed of.\n\nIt is trne that no relaxation in qualifications can be made when an advertisement has duly been issued inviting applications and persons possessing the qualifications -advertised, as prescribed by the rules, are available and rove submitted their applications. If a relaxation has to be made, there is a duty\n\n' •\n\ncast to re-advertise the post. In the instant case, however, the advertisement itself cont'ained a relaxation clause and, therefore, nothing prevented respondent No. 7 from making an application, if she felt that she was better, if not equally, qualified as respondent No. 6.\n\nThe contention appears to be an afterthought and must be rejected.\n\nIn conclusion, we cannot but express our sympathy for the appeilant.\n\nThis unfortunately is a situation of her own making.\n\nThe Courts can only act where there is any infringement of a right but not merely on equitable considerations.\n\nWe wish to mention that the counsel appearing for the Chandigarh Administration very fairly suggested that if the Government of Haryana were to forward the name of an officer immediately senior to the appellant in the cadre of Head- Mistresses, who may be holding a post in the pay scale of Rs: 350-900 for appointment on deputation in an equivalent post, such officer could be absorbed by the Chandigarh Administration in the pay scale of Rs. 350-900.\n\nThat being so, the appellant could still be saved from the predicament of being posted as a Head-Mistress in the pay scale of Rs. 300-500 on her reversion to her parent State. This is, however, a matter for the Haryana Government to decide.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the apprnl fails and is dismissed.\n\nThere shall be no order as lo costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed", "total_entities": 156, "entities": [{"text": "SWARAN LATA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SWARAN LATA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 16, 1979\n\n[A. P. SEN AND V. R. KRISHNA lYER, JJ.J\n\nConstitution-Art."}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jntervrctation of statutes-States Reorganisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 279, "end_char": 337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338, "end_char": 343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jntervrctation of statutes-States Reorganisation Act, 1966", "statute": "Jntervrctation of statutes-States Reorganisation Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 879, "end_char": 889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jntervrctation of statutes-States Reorganisation Act, 1966", "statute": "Jntervrctation of statutes-States Reorganisation Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "Reorganisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 905, "end_char": 929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 84 of the States' Reorganisation Act, 1966 empowered the Central Government to issue directions to the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and to the Administrator of the Union t'erritory of Chandigarh\n\n\"for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this part (of the act)\"."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1082, "end_char": 1092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 84 of the States' Reorganisation Act, 1966 empowered the Central Government to issue directions to the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and to the Administrator of the Union t'erritory of Chandigarh\n\n\"for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this part (of the act)\"."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1595, "end_char": 1620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For filling up the different posts under the control of the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, the Government of 1ndia issued instructions that the posts should be filled _up by deputation mainly from the Punjab nnd Haryana State cadres, and that the officer whose services were sought to be borrowed should have been holding a post, the scale of pay of which was equivalent to the scale of pay of the post in the Chandigarh Administration for which the officer was to be selected on deputation."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh Adn1inistration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the request of the Chandigarh Adn1inistration the Govcrn1nent of Haryruna forwarded a panel of three names,~ including that of the appellant, for appointment on deputation to the post of Principal of a \\Vomn 1s Techni cal Institute: The post carried a scale of pay of Rs."}}, {"text": "Haryruna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1746, "end_char": 1754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the request of the Chandigarh Adn1inistration the Govcrn1nent of Haryruna forwarded a panel of three names,~ including that of the appellant, for appointment on deputation to the post of Principal of a \\Vomn 1s Techni cal Institute: The post carried a scale of pay of Rs."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2143, "end_char": 2150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350--900 in Haryana."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2205, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since in the meantime she had been offered a post in Delhi she left the post in Chrl.ndigarh."}}, {"text": "Chrl.ndigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since in the meantime she had been offered a post in Delhi she left the post in Chrl.ndigarh."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All efforts to get a suitable candidate either from the State of Haryana or of Punjab having prove<l un~ successful the Chandigarh Administration requested the Union Public Service Commission to select a. candidate for the post."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All efforts to get a suitable candidate either from the State of Haryana or of Punjab having prove<l un~ successful the Chandigarh Administration requested the Union Public Service Commission to select a. candidate for the post."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2406, "end_char": 2437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All efforts to get a suitable candidate either from the State of Haryana or of Punjab having prove<l un~ successful the Chandigarh Administration requested the Union Public Service Commission to select a. candidate for the post."}}, {"text": "UPSC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2600, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the UPSC relaxed one or the other\n\nSUPRBIE COURT REPORTS\n\n(1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA qualification in re&pect of each of the candidates and eventually selected respondt:.nt No."}}, {"text": "V.'as", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f., for the post, The appellant V.'as also one of the candidates CTIUed for interviev.';"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3646, "end_char": 3651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union\n\nPublic Service Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contended that (I) the post being a deputation post in terms of instn1ction<; issued by the Government of India under s. 84 of the States' Reorganis~1tion Act, the Chandigarh Administration had no authority to fill up the post by dir'ect recruitment and (2) the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission had no po\\ver to relax the essential qualifications of the cadidr:.tes 'vithoLrt prior concurrence of the Chandigarh Administration."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5053, "end_char": 5069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SCR 750", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5109, "end_char": 5125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1968] 1 SCR 111", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5494, "end_char": 5499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6763, "end_char": 6768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Comn1ission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7380, "end_char": 7412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "967 llJ\n\n(b) The appellant could not be heard at this stage to say that the Union Public Service Comn1ission had no power to relax any of the essential qualifications."}}, {"text": "AIR 1978 MP 59", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8555, "end_char": 8569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10594, "end_char": 10622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[970 H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10773, "end_char": 10782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg and T. L. Garg for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. D. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10784, "end_char": 10794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg and T. L. Garg for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. L. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10799, "end_char": 10809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg and T. L. Garg for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. L. S. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10830, "end_char": 10842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. S. Lal and Ashok Grover for Respondents 3 and S.\n\nS. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ashok Grover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10847, "end_char": 10859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. S. Lal and Ashok Grover for Respondents 3 and S.\n\nS. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nS. N. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10882, "end_char": 10897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. S. Lal and Ashok Grover for Respondents 3 and S.\n\nS. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10902, "end_char": 10914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. S. Lal and Ashok Grover for Respondents 3 and S.\n\nS. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10938, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Gupta and Ramesh Chand for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10954, "end_char": 10966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Gupta and Ramesh Chand for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. M. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10990, "end_char": 11001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. M. Nayar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11069, "end_char": 11072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, directed against a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated May 26, 1977, in its appellate jurisdiction reversing the judgment and order of a Single Judge of that Conrt dated February 13, 1976 mainly raises the question whether the appointment of the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11143, "end_char": 11159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, directed against a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated May 26, 1977, in its appellate jurisdiction reversing the judgment and order of a Single Judge of that Conrt dated February 13, 1976 mainly raises the question whether the appointment of the respondent No."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11166, "end_char": 11178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, directed against a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated May 26, 1977, in its appellate jurisdiction reversing the judgment and order of a Single Judge of that Conrt dated February 13, 1976 mainly raises the question whether the appointment of the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Prem Lala Dewan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11380, "end_char": 11395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Lala Dewan by the Chandigarh Administration to the post of Principal, Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh, by direct recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission was invalid, as being contrary to the directions issued by the Central Government under s. 84 of the Punjab Rorganisation Act, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Prem Lala Dewan"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Rorganisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11681, "end_char": 11711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 23, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13059, "end_char": 13073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Lala Dewan by the Chandigarh Administration to the post of Principal was illegal inasmuch as, she did not possess the requisite essential qualifications, if any, prescribed for the post in question; and (3) whether the proceedings of the Selection Committee dated April 23, 1975 culminating in the selection of respondent No."}}, {"text": ". S. Sehgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13245, "end_char": 13256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Lala Dewan as the candidate most suitable for appointment to the post of Principal, were vitiated because Dr. 0.", "canonical_name": "0. S.\n\nSehgal"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13655, "end_char": 13660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13668, "end_char": 13699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14498, "end_char": 14503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966", "statute": "the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "November 4, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14589, "end_char": 14605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on November 4, 1966 by w)l.ich the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, which consequent upon the amendment of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 by Order of the President of India dated October 30, 1966 was made responsible for the work of the Union territory of Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14621, "end_char": 14640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on November 4, 1966 by w)l.ich the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, which consequent upon the amendment of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 by Order of the President of India dated October 30, 1966 was made responsible for the work of the Union territory of Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14809, "end_char": 14825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on November 4, 1966 by w)l.ich the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, which consequent upon the amendment of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 by Order of the President of India dated October 30, 1966 was made responsible for the work of the Union territory of Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15232, "end_char": 15287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These instructions were issued on tl1c basis that personnel for the Union territory o( .c\n\nChandigarh would be provided on deputation by the two States of\n\nPunjab and Haryana, The said instructions, so far matcriaL read as folk1ws:\n\n\"Except for the department of (i) Printing and stationery (ii) Architecture and (iii) Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh, the posts in the other departments under the control of the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh will be tilled up by deputatian mainly from the Punjab /Haryana State Cadres."}}, {"text": "Governments of Punjab, Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15642, "end_char": 15672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A committee consisting of the representatives of the Governments of Punjab, Haryana, the Chandigarh Union territory Administration and the Ministry of Home Affairs has been constituted to recommend absorption of persomfol against posts in the Chandigarh Union territory Administration, from the Punjab/Haryana State cadres on pcrmanmt basis.\""}}, {"text": "Chandigarh Union territory Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A committee consisting of the representatives of the Governments of Punjab, Haryana, the Chandigarh Union territory Administration and the Ministry of Home Affairs has been constituted to recommend absorption of persomfol against posts in the Chandigarh Union territory Administration, from the Punjab/Haryana State cadres on pcrmanmt basis.\""}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15728, "end_char": 15752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A committee consisting of the representatives of the Governments of Punjab, Haryana, the Chandigarh Union territory Administration and the Ministry of Home Affairs has been constituted to recommend absorption of persomfol against posts in the Chandigarh Union territory Administration, from the Punjab/Haryana State cadres on pcrmanmt basis.\""}}, {"text": "November 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16142, "end_char": 16158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid conununication also conveyed the order of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, sanctioning the creation and continuance of \"existing posts\" in the Union territory of Chandigarh from November 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "August 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16382, "end_char": 16396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed by the letter of the Chief Secretary to the Government of erstwhile State of Punjab dated August 9, 1966 staling that the Government had set up\n\na committee headed by Sri V. Shanker, J.C.S., for the finalisation of the proposals of the Departmental Committees in regard to the allocation of the personnel to the reorganised States of Punjab and Haryana \\.ff and the Union territory of Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "V. Shanker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16463, "end_char": 16473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed by the letter of the Chief Secretary to the Government of erstwhile State of Punjab dated August 9, 1966 staling that the Government had set up\n\na committee headed by Sri V. Shanker, J.C.S., for the finalisation of the proposals of the Departmental Committees in regard to the allocation of the personnel to the reorganised States of Punjab and Haryana \\.ff and the Union territory of Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16998, "end_char": 17003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17394, "end_char": 17399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18112, "end_char": 18144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18363, "end_char": 18379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Power of Central Government to give directions: The Central Government may give such directions to the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and to the Administrators of the Union territories of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of givil)g effect to the foregoing provisions of this Part and the State Governments and the Administrators shall comply with such directions.\""}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19097, "end_char": 19107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the process relating to integration of services as envisaged by the supplemental, incidental or consequential provisions for re-organisation of services under a law made by the Parliament in exercise of its power under H\n\n(1) [1972] I S.C.C. 171."}}, {"text": "Articles 2, 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19189, "end_char": 19208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19277, "end_char": 19282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19470, "end_char": 19484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19606, "end_char": 19622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19633, "end_char": 19644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19907, "end_char": 19917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19922, "end_char": 19933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20453, "end_char": 20462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20940, "end_char": 20950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21074, "end_char": 21083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21467, "end_char": 21472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21711, "end_char": 21721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21794, "end_char": 21803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21842, "end_char": 21847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22195, "end_char": 22202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may incidentally be mentioned that on November 1, 1966, i.e., .on the appointed day under s. 2(b), the President of India issued an order, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article B 309 of the Constitution directing that the Administrator of the Union territory of Chandigarh shall exercise the power to make rules in regard to the following matters namely :\n\n(i) the method of recruitment to the Central Civil Services and posts (Class II, Class III and Class IV) under his adc ministrative control in connection with the affairs of the Union territory of Chandigarh;\n\n(ii) the qualifications necessary for appointment to such services and posts; and\n\n(iii) the conditions of service of persons appointed to such D services and posts for the purpose of probation; confirmation, seniority and promotion:\n\nProvided that the power conferred by this notification shall not be exercisable in respect of such services and posts as are borne on a cadre common to two or more Union territories.\""}}, {"text": "s. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22238, "end_char": 22245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23357, "end_char": 23403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh, nor were any rules framed prescribing the qualifications necessary for appointment to such posts."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23546, "end_char": 23557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23913, "end_char": 23929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24028, "end_char": 24039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24113, "end_char": 24124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24189, "end_char": 24208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24402, "end_char": 24412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandiiarh Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24698, "end_char": 24723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chandiiarh Administration had, therefore, the option to either directly recruit persons to be appointed to the post through Union Public Service Commission or to request either the State of Punjab or the State of Haryana to send the names of suitable persons whom the Chandigarh Administration might be willing to appoint."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24879, "end_char": 24894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chandiiarh Administration had, therefore, the option to either directly recruit persons to be appointed to the post through Union Public Service Commission or to request either the State of Punjab or the State of Haryana to send the names of suitable persons whom the Chandigarh Administration might be willing to appoint."}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25382, "end_char": 25387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25575, "end_char": 25596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the correspondence that JYasscd between the Chandigarh Administration and the Government of Haryana, there can be no doubt whatever that the Chandigarh Administration made their utmost endeavour to get a suitable person on deputation for appointment as Principal of the Institute."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25885, "end_char": 25897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A long correspondence on the subject ensued and eventu11lly the Government of Haryana by its letter dated July 7, 1974, informed the Chandigarh Administration that it was not possible to relieve any woman officers in the grade of Rs."}}, {"text": "Champa Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26082, "end_char": 26097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champa Malhotra who was facing an inquiry, with a request that the appellant should instead be appointed.", "canonical_name": "Choampa Malhotra"}}, {"text": "August 16, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26449, "end_char": 26464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This could not obviously be done as it would be contrary to the instructions of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs dated August 16, 1971 that an officer cannot be appointed on deputation to a post that carried a higher grade of pay in the Union territory of Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27028, "end_char": 27043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Director, Technical Education by his letter dated October 9, 1974 addressed to the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration stated that the qualifications prescribed by the Govern- B ment of India in the Training Manual for the post of Principal in such institutions were as under :\n\nI. Degree or its equivalent in Mechanical Engineering or Electrical Engineering will be preferred."}}, {"text": "Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27700, "end_char": 27757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, he mentioned that there was no institution similar to the Government Central Crafts Institute for Women, Chandigarh e.ither in the State of Punjab or in the State of Haryana."}}, {"text": "September 27 /30, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28444, "end_char": 28466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to Government of Haryana's letter dated September 27 /30, 1974, the Chandigarh Administration accordingly wrote on October 11/14, 1974 giving detailed reasons why it was not possible\n\nto take the appellant on deputation as Principal because on her rever- G sion from her current assiment with the Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation she would be posted as Head Mistress in the scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 11/14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28519, "end_char": 28538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to Government of Haryana's letter dated September 27 /30, 1974, the Chandigarh Administration accordingly wrote on October 11/14, 1974 giving detailed reasons why it was not possible\n\nto take the appellant on deputation as Principal because on her rever- G sion from her current assiment with the Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation she would be posted as Head Mistress in the scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28701, "end_char": 28747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to Government of Haryana's letter dated September 27 /30, 1974, the Chandigarh Administration accordingly wrote on October 11/14, 1974 giving detailed reasons why it was not possible\n\nto take the appellant on deputation as Principal because on her rever- G sion from her current assiment with the Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation she would be posted as Head Mistress in the scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29653, "end_char": 29666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would, therefore, >appear that right from March 7, 1974 till August 14, 1974 when the Chandigarh Administration forwarded requisition to the Union Public Service Commission to advertise the post for direct recruitment, i.e. for nearly 6 months, the Government of Haryana took no action in the matter."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29672, "end_char": 29687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would, therefore, >appear that right from March 7, 1974 till August 14, 1974 when the Chandigarh Administration forwarded requisition to the Union Public Service Commission to advertise the post for direct recruitment, i.e. for nearly 6 months, the Government of Haryana took no action in the matter."}}, {"text": "August 20, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30479, "end_char": 30494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nevertheless, the Chandigarh Administration by their letter dated August 20, 1974, i.e., just within six days of the requisition did what was expectetl of them and duly informed the Government of Haryana of their decision to recruit a Principal through the Commission and requested that it may direct the eligible officers from Ha1yana to apply for the post."}}, {"text": "Ha1yana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30741, "end_char": 30748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nevertheless, the Chandigarh Administration by their letter dated August 20, 1974, i.e., just within six days of the requisition did what was expectetl of them and duly informed the Government of Haryana of their decision to recruit a Principal through the Commission and requested that it may direct the eligible officers from Ha1yana to apply for the post."}}, {"text": "September\n\n27/30, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30832, "end_char": 30854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response, the Government of Haryana by its letter dated September\n\n27/30, 1974 registered a protest staking a claim as if the post of Principal of the Institute was a Haryana-quova post, i.e., it could be filled in only by an officer on deputation from the State of Haryana."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31033, "end_char": 31049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response, the Government of Haryana by its letter dated September\n\n27/30, 1974 registered a protest staking a claim as if the post of Principal of the Institute was a Haryana-quova post, i.e., it could be filled in only by an officer on deputation from the State of Haryana."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31124, "end_char": 31144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of repeated letters sent by the Chandigarh Administration, the Government of Punjab also did not send up the name of a suitable officer."}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31338, "end_char": 31343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prem Lata Dewan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31713, "end_char": 31728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Lata Dewan.", "canonical_name": "Prem Lala Dewan"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31859, "end_char": 31864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33735, "end_char": 33743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission, therefore, by its letter dated September 16, 1974 returned the requisition to the Chandigarh Administration, with the observation that they should lay down the qualifications keeping in view the nature and duties of the post."}}, {"text": "January 2/4, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33966, "end_char": 33983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chandigarh Administration accordingly on January 2/4, 1975 forwarded a fresh requisition revising the qualifications for the post i.e, including 'Administrative Experience for three years'."}}, {"text": "February 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34146, "end_char": 34162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the Commission on February 1, 1975 advertised the post with the essential qualifications as suggested, with a relaxation clause."}}, {"text": "Prem LatJ Dewan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35204, "end_char": 35219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem LatJ Dewan cannot,\n\ntherefore, be challenged on the ground that either the Commiss'on had.", "canonical_name": "Prem Lala Dewan"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35493, "end_char": 35518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Omprakash v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.(')"}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36380, "end_char": 36405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the Public Service Commission is free to screen the applicants, classify them in various categories according to their plus qualifications and/ or experience, and call for interyiew only those candidates who fall within those categories, eliminating others who do not satisfy these criteria.\""}}, {"text": "Bomb&y High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36874, "end_char": 36891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that of the Bomb&y High Court in Maharashtra Stale Electricity Board Engineers' Association, Nagpur v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board(') arc both distinguishable on facts."}}, {"text": "S. B. Kholrs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37043, "end_char": 37055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In S. B. Kholrs case, this Court was concerned with interpretation of items 2 and 3 of Annexure.", "canonical_name": "S. B. Kholrs"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37146, "end_char": 37161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Health Service Rules, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37224, "end_char": 37258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37931, "end_char": 37966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Maharashtra State Electricity Board's case, (supra) the Board, which is a statutory Corporation, made the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (Classification and Recruitment) Regulations, 1961, in exercise of its powers under s. 79 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38157, "end_char": 38162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Health Service Rules, 1963", "statute": "the Central Health Service Rules, 1963"}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38170, "end_char": 38198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39381, "end_char": 39391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39742, "end_char": 39753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. C. J\\lathai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40507, "end_char": 40521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of Dr. A. C. J\\lathai, Under Secretary in the Union Public Service Commission shows that in the case of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "A. C. J\\lathai"}}, {"text": "SWARAN LATA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42262, "end_char": 42273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nSWARAN LATA .. l.'.", "canonical_name": "SWARAN LATA"}}, {"text": "S. B. Koh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43061, "end_char": 43070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In S. B. Koh/i's case (supra) this Court observed :\n\n\"This argument was based on the provision in the Annexure I to the Second Schedule which states that the qoolifications are relaxablc at C01mnission's discretion in the case of candidates otherwise well qualified.", "canonical_name": "S. B. Kholrs"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43178, "end_char": 43193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "0. S. Sehgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44307, "end_char": 44319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to hold from the material on record that there was any bias on the part of Dr. 0.", "canonical_name": "0. S.\n\nSehgal"}}, {"text": "Chandigarh Admu1istrntion", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44640, "end_char": 44665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In ou_r view, the allegations in the writ petition are not sufficient to constitute an avern1ent of 111alafides or bias on the part of\n\neither the Chandigarh Admu1istrntion or in particular against Dr. 0."}}, {"text": "Kraipak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45228, "end_char": 45235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench has pointed out, and we think rightly so, that the principles laid down in Kraipak's case (supra) were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case."}}, {"text": "October 9,\n\n1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45454, "end_char": 45470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Sehgal dated October 9,\n\n1974 to the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration wherein he had not said a word against t11e appellant."}}, {"text": "Choampa Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45940, "end_char": 45956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choampa Malhotra as he was prepared to take her back as she had worked for a long time as Principal, in order that the work of the Institute should not suffer.", "canonical_name": "Choampa Malhotra"}}, {"text": "B. S. Ojha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 46424, "end_char": 46434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench has also rightly held that no inference of malafides arises from the letter written by Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration elated October 11/14, 1974.", "canonical_name": "B. S. Ojha"}}, {"text": "0. S.\n\nSehgal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47053, "end_char": 47066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant further averred that she h•ad in her representation dated May 1, 1975, alleged that after the interview she had overheard Dr. 0.", "canonical_name": "0. S.\n\nSehgal"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nSehgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47758, "end_char": 47768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.\n\nSehgal dated October 9, 1974 to the Home Secretary, and the other addressed by Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration to> Sri S. N. Bhanot, Secrcl'ary to the Government of Haryana, Industrial Training Department."}}, {"text": "B. S. Ojha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47845, "end_char": 47855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.\n\nSehgal dated October 9, 1974 to the Home Secretary, and the other addressed by Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration to> Sri S. N. Bhanot, Secrcl'ary to the Government of Haryana, Industrial Training Department.", "canonical_name": "B. S. Ojha"}}, {"text": "S. N. Bhanot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47907, "end_char": 47919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.\n\nSehgal dated October 9, 1974 to the Home Secretary, and the other addressed by Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration to> Sri S. N. Bhanot, Secrcl'ary to the Government of Haryana, Industrial Training Department."}}, {"text": "A. C. Mathai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47999, "end_char": 48011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. A. C. Mathai, Under Secretary, Union Public Service Commission has on affidavit stated that the Commission relaxed some of the essential qualifications after applying its own mind, uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations, and denied, in particular, that the Commission was advised by any extraneous authority.", "canonical_name": "A. C. J\\lathai"}}, {"text": "Government of Hmyana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49841, "end_char": 49861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, as the Division Bench observes, merely because Sri B. S. Ojha, Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration addressed a letter to Sri S. N. Bhanot, Secretary to the Government of Hmyana, Industrial Training Department dated October 11/14, 1974 expressing his unwillingness to take the appellant on deputation because sl1e was not holding a substantive rank in the pay scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "0. S. Sehgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50444, "end_char": 50456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350-900,\n\n(l):A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 72 •\n\ncontrary to the instructions of the Government of India and alllo because the Chandigarh Administration felt that looking to her past performance as Principal during her short stay, she was not a suitJable person to be appointed as Principal, does not necessarily give rise to an inference of bias on the part of the Chandigarh Administration or Dr. 0.", "canonical_name": "0. S.\n\nSehgal"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51626, "end_char": 51631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52337, "end_char": 52339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Usha Wadhwa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52343, "end_char": 52354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Usha Wadhwa that the failure of the Union Public Service Conunission to re-advertise the post prevented her from aoplyine."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Conunission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52379, "end_char": 52411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Usha Wadhwa that the failure of the Union Public Service Conunission to re-advertise the post prevented her from aoplyine."}}, {"text": "Article 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52552, "end_char": 52565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haryana Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54155, "end_char": 54173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is, however, a matter for the Haryana Government to decide."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_974_996_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "97 4\n\nSTATE OF KERALA v.\n\nKUMARI T. P. ROSHANA & ANR.\n\nJanuary 17, 1979\n\n[\\'. R. KRISHNA !YER AND R S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nConsti:ution of India 1950-Al't. 14-Medical College admission-Selection of students /ro1n different universities with no unifonnity of standards--Reser11a- :io11 of 5<'t:1~ 011 territorial basis-Validity-H'11t:rhcr vio/, uiie of Art. 14.\n\nAuiclcs 32 and 136-When root of' the r; riei'l.'liCr? and the fruit of writ are nor ilulhid1ud but cC9llective courts power is l1Tle cf a.f]innative structuring of C rtdrt.\\S 10 nu1kc it n1eani11gful and sociall.v re!l'(l.'!f-Dccf ,.innaf t,'1tidclir.es 10 be _.-\n\nghen.\n\nThe State of K.crala appointed a Comn1i&Sion to recommend which sections oi the people required spe-.::ial tr ec.tn1ent under Art. 15 ( 4) having reganl to thl!ir scdal and educational conditions.\n\nThat Commission recommended equitable allJcali()fi of seals on the basis of educational b:ick\\vardness o.f the -:Vlnlahar nrca.\n\nSubgtantinlly foui.1ding itself on these recommendations the State Government evolved a formula, which by polling all applications for admission to the four medical colleges in the state, one cons.olidated list was prepared and c; indidate, s \\Vere selected strictly ac,..::ording to the marks secured by thenl.\n\nThis schen1~ having been stn1ck down by the High Court, a fresh exp'ert committee was appointed to cxarnine the quo 111odo of admissions to medica.l colleges. 'fh:e Government on the basis of these recommendafons decided that seats available for the nledical course might be distributed for the students of the two Uni1:crsities of Kcrala and Calicut in the ratio of the candidates registerl!d for the pre-degree 21nd B. Sc. course in them.\n\nIn a writ petition under Art. 226 the High Court held that the ~...:h'en1e of selection for admission to the medical colleges on on assessment of inerits of students drawn from different universities with no uniforn1ity of standards is obje<.\"tionabl'e and the linknge of the division of seats \\Vith the registered studentstrength of the universities bears no nexus :ind is Yiolative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nOn the question of the validity of the scheme of selection for admission to the medical roJleg'es.\n\nJ!ELD : 1. Current conditions warrant the classification of student comn1unity on the Zonal basis-not as a legitimation of endless perpetuation but a9' a transient panacea for a geo-human handicap which the State must actively strive to undo. f980 E]\n\n2. 1he principle of reservation with weightagc for th,,: geogrnphical area of the t1lalabar district is approved. [980 G] H\n\n3. The reasoning of the High Court that ther'e is such substantial difference iR the pre-degree courses and evaluations bet\\vecn the sister univers-ities within the same State that the breach of Art. 14 by equal treatment of the nutrks nn-\n\n~ ~\n\nI ' ' '\n\n;'.'::'. . Ii\n\n\\- ••\n\nKE!b\\LJ! v. ROSHANA 97 !j\n\neqillilty secured by the examinees ifi the !>Vo U11itetsi1ies may be spelt out.\n\nA Evet'f inctmsequentilll differentiation between two things does not cortstitute the . viCe or di:sctln'llnatfo .. 1, if lzm clubs them together igr.oring vanial varittnces.\n\nAtlitle l 4 is not a voodoo which visits. wi h invalidation every executive or regWahYe fu:rion of things or categories where there are no pronounced inequali ..\n\ntiCS. Matbem•tical equality is not the touchstone of constitutionality. [983 E-FJ\n\nSt.W of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & AllT. [1974] 1 SCC 19 B at 42; referred to.\n\n4. A latge latitude is allowed in this area to the State to classify or declaasify based ()fl diverse considerations of relevant pragmatisn1 and the judiciary should\n\nIIOl \"nlllb. in\" Where the executive vatily treads.\n\n[984 A]\n\n5. Many colleges are run by the State or institutional rnanagement9 where pre-degree or degree courses are undertaken.\n\nThe teachers move from one university ju1hdiction to the o_ther, the teaching materi2J is. inevitably of a, like\n\nnaturt, the sut:jects taught must ordinarily be :ilik.!. The xaminers are ustinlly dra\\\\n from \\\\'ithin the s ate or neighbouring States.\n\nEven the coinpositio:n ot the &el'idetttit bodie~ in the two universities may have common members.\n\nThe Uuivetsity Act& themselves are sub5tanti<•lly similar. To surmise discrimination.\n\nfrom j:los&ibilities is alien to the forensic prOC'!~5 in the <:!Jsence ot bard facls~ Grrus dtvcrgenc~ exist among Universities affeCting the quality of the teaching and the marking, the anomalies of grading and the absurdity of. equating the end producf on the blind r;; sumptic•.1 that the s.ame marks mean the same excellence.\n\nBut not glib surmises but oolid facts supply the sinews of discriminatory inequality or equality.\n\nSome backward universities and colleges have degenerated into degree-'lealers bringing rapid discredit to Indian Academic st~1.tu'i. [984 D-F]\n\n6. The vagarious element in marking aud moden:.ion of marks may be a fact of Jife, but too marginal to qualify for substantial difference unless otherwise made 011t Indeed, there may be differeoces among_ the coileges under the same University, among the examiners in the Siame University. Such fleeting factors or e9hemerail differences cannot be the solid foundation for a subsantial differentiation Whih is the necessary pre-condition for quhh:ng an executive or legislative . act as too discriminatory to satisfy the egalitarian essence of Art 14. [984 H-985 Al .\n\n7. The functional validation of the writ jurisdiction is an appropriate cXMni nation of tbe subst.:1.ntiality of the alleged di-sparity. [985 BJ\n\n8. The corner-stone of classification adopted for medical adrnissioos by the Government was University-wise allocation. By itself, this approach had constitutional sanction. r986 c1\n\nD. N. Chane/la/a v. State of Mysore & Ors. etc. [1971] Supp. SCR 608; relied on.\n\n9. TI1e discriminatory vice, if University-ise classification rrnd c:on<ieou-Cntial cllocation of seats were resorted to, was pressed therein but repelled. The fundamental 'educational_ realities and rCSuitant resolution of the legal imbrofio are\n\nfnatruthely presented therein, which havespedi\\1 relevance to the ins+ant case the social facts, con&titutional cont_rontations and administrative an.11Wem H in !lie Keraln and Karnataka litigations are similar .. [986 J), 986 H-~~7 .A]\n\n6-\"H9 BCI179\n\n10. 1he injection of the University-wise studc.nt strength is drawing_ W.,\" red herring across the trail-an irrelevance that invalidates the scheme. Tl; lere .is no , nexus between the registered student strc.'.1gth and the seats to be allotted. The\n\nfewer the o.Jlleges the fewer the pre-degree or degree students. And so, thC linkages of the division of s'cats with the registered student strength would make au\n\nirrational inroad into the University-wise allocation. Such a formula would be a punishment for backwardness, not a promotion of the advancem'ent.\n\nThe 8 discriminatory paring down based on unreasoa cannot be upheld. [990 G-H]\n\n11.\n\nLa~ is not unimaginative, especially in th'e writ jurisdiction where res~ ponsible lustie is the goal. The court cannot adopt a rigid attitude of negativity and it back after striking down the scheme of Government Jeavin& it to the helpless Government caught in a crisis to make-do as best as it may, or throwing the situat:on open to agitational chaos to find a solution by demonstrationa in the streets and \\\\Drse. Jn the instant case unnble to stop with merely declaring that the scht-me of admission accepted by Government is ultra virs and gnmting the relief to the petitioner of admission to the medical colleges, the need for controlling its repercussions calls for judicial response.\n\n[991 H-992 A]\n\n12. An incisive study of the exercise of the writ power in India may reveal that it limits its actioruf by quashing or nullifying orders proceeding on a viola tion of law, but stops short of a reconstruction whereby a valid scheme may replace a void project.\n\nThis is symptomatic of an obsolescent aspect of the judicial process, its remedial shortcomings in practice and the need to innovate the n1eans, to widen the base and to organise the reliefs so that -the Court\n\nactualise.~ sr>eial justice even as it inhibits injustice. [978 A-B]\n\n13. This community perspective of the justice system explains why the Court bas resorted to certain unusual directions ood bas s-haped the ultimate com~ pl ex of orders in thes'e proceedings in a self acting package.\n\nChronic social disability cannot be amenable to instant administrative surgery and law. 6hall not bury its head, ostrich fashion, in th'c sands of fiction and assume equality where the opposite is the reality.\n\n[978 C, 980 CJ\n\n14. The rule of law runs close to the rule of life and where societal. life, as between one part of the State and another, is the victim of die-hard disparities, the constitutional mandate of equal justice under the law responds to it pragmatically and permits classification geared to eventual equalis&tion.\n\n!'80 DJ\n\nJ.5, The writ of this Court binds the parties on record who must abide by the <lirections issued necessitated by the exigency of the situation and the need to do justice. [993 DJ\n\n16. 'fhe court system belongs to the people and must promote constructive justice; and aU institutions, including the Governments and Universities~ likewise belong t\"' the people.\n\nThis commitment is the whet-stone for doing j\\istice in the wider context of social good. [993 B-F]\n\ni7 .. Leaving the Judgment of the High Court in the conventional fofm of merely quashing the formula of admision the remedy would have &gg:raVatecl the '.malady; confusion, agitation, paralysis. The root of the grievance and the fruit n . pf. the writ are riot individual but co1Iective and white the \"adv'ersaty system\"\n\nmakes the Judge a mere umpire, traditionally speaking, the co'mmunity orientation of the judic; al function, so desirable in the Thtrd WOrld remMial juri!r\n\n• I\n\n~ ;\n\n~ \"-\n\n• J\n\n~· ,. '\n\nKERALA v. ROSllANA (Krishna Iyer, !. ) 9 7 7\n\na.....} prudence, transforms the courts' power info affirmative structuring of redress so A at to make it personaJly meaningful and soci<!Jly relevant.\n\nFrustration of in-\n\n. validity is part of the Judicial duty; fulfilment of legality is complementary, . nm principIC of affirmative action is within the court's jurisdiction under Art.\n\n1.36 and Art. 32 and the present cases deserve its exercise. Decisional auideline• giver., [994 B-F]\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2297 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 13-11-78 of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 3239/78.\n\nAND\n\nWRIT PETITION NO. 4705/78\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader, Adv. Genl. for Kerala, V. J. Francis and Mustafa K. Rowter for the Appellant in C.A. 2297 /78 and Respondents in W.P. 4705/78.\n\nP. V. Govindan Nair, N. Sudhakaran and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 4705/78 and Respondent No. 1 in CA 2297/78.\n\nDr, V. A. Sayid Muhammad, S. K. Mehta, P. K. Shamshuddin, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul for the Interveners .\n\nA. S. Nambiar for Respondent No. 3 in CA 2297 /78.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Thc dynamics of the writ jurisdiction and the potential for affirmative court action, as part of remedial jurisprudence, constitute the key thought which animates the ultimate decision and direction we give in this couple of cases which have come up by\n\nSpecial Lellve and under Art. 32 to this Court, aware as we are of a host of like proceedings which pend in the High Court.\n\nTho State of Kerala is the appellant in the civil appeal and 1st rei; pondent in the Writ Petition but the collective litigation springs from a traditional type of action and typical kind of relief granted in exercise of its writ jurisdiction by the High Court striking down a transitory scheme of adriiission to the medical colleges of the State evolved by the Government but invalidated by the High Court on the ground of discrimination in the distribution of seats among the eligible student$ drawn from two disparate regions of the State. Of course, the instant repercussion of the dC£isiQn is apt to be confusion in the admission . to the academic courses which have hardly commenced and this desperate situation has driven the Government to this Court seeking reversal of_ the Judgment under appeal.\n\nLaw promotes order, not anomie. '\n\nAny incisive study of the exercise of the writ power in India may reveal that it limits its action t<l' quashing or nullifying orders prOCtleding on a violation of law, but stops short of a reconstruction whereby a valid scheme may replace a void project.\n\nThis is no reflection on the High Court's ruling but is symptomatic of an obsolescent aspect of the judicial process, its remedial shortcomings in practice and the need to innovate the means, to widen the base and to organise the reliefs so that the court actualises social justice even as it inhibits injustice.\n\nThis community perspective of the Justice System explains why we have resorted to certain unusual directions and have shaped the ultimate complex of orders in t_hese proceedings in a self-acting package. With this exordium we proceed to narrate briefly the necessary facts and developments revelatory of the course of events and the cause of action, the impact of the High Court\"s judgment and the compulsions which have brought the State in appeal t<l' this Court.\n\nThe Kerala State, notwithstanding its striking demographic, cultural, linguistic and political integrality and educational advance, has certain histQrical hangovers of academic disparity and devel<l'prnen~ maldistribution which have survived for two decades as this case testifies.\n\nWe are not concerned with the etiological enquiry into this malady but recognise it as a reality since the authentic materials from Commission reports and prior rulings of the High Court concurrently so establish. B.roadly speaking, this 'composite' State may be dichot<l'mised as Travancore-Cochin and Malabar regions woven into ooe fabric by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Gaping disparities of development cannot be wished away by political fusion into ooe State and determined efforts at equalisation of human conditions, economic and cultural, alone lend living validity to geo-political homogeneity.\n\nMalabar being admittedly laggard in the educational field, the State endeavoured to wipe out this weakness by starting or supporting new colleges in this neglected segment; and one such institution was the medical college at Calicut.\n\nIndeed, the drive to upgrade the educational status of this backward !egion persuaded the State to set up the Calicut University to which were affiliated all the colleges in that\n\nCTndrella area, including the Calicut Medical College.\n\nAn adjoining district, Trichur, was also tacked on, for convenience, maybe.\n\nThe cynQ1; ure of attention in this litigation is the scheme c4 admission to medical colleges in the State; and so we may adjust the forensic IL lens to focus on the struggle for seats in the four medical c<l'ilege&\n\nin the State-all run by Government but providing for five hundred and odd students, as against several thousands of applicants. This 'musical +.\n\n• ,\n\nKERALA v. 11.0SllANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 979\n\nchair' situation naturally led to many qualified claimants beiug rejected A and litigative adventures being inaugurated on grounds of discrimination. One such \\\\Tit petition having been allowed, the State has, by specialleave, come up in appeal.\n\nThe points raised in the writ petition under Art. 32 are identical .\n\nA sensitive appreciation of the grievance successfully ventilated B by the writ petitioners in the High Court is possible only if we unfold a fuller conspectus of the facts.\n\nCognizance of some essential ci.rcwnstances is necessitous as the first step.\n\nThere are three Universities in the State but we are concerned only with two-the Kerala and the Calicut Universities..-to which the four medical colleges are affiliated,\n\nthree of which are unde; r the jurisdiction of the first and the fourth C under the latte<r.\n\nBroadly speaking, the latter caters to the academic requirements of the Malabar segment plus a neighbouring district and the former to the rest of the State.\n\nThe Malabar area has been regarded as notoriously backward from the point of view of collegiate education so much so, the number -0f colleges which provide pre-degree courses necessary by way of qualification for entrance into the medical colleges, are relatively fewer and, on the contrary, the remaining part of the State thanks to many factors, has been on a higher level, with colleges more numerous and pre-deg; ree students more prolific.\n\nGeographic justice, a component of social justice, has to take note of these comparative imbalances.\n\nRightly, therefore, the State Government, based on certain reports of Commissions, con•idered the two territorial divisions as separate units :and regulated seat allocations to medical colleges in the State on an\n\nequitable basis.\n\nThe social thrust of the classification, based on geographical dissimilarities, was the core factor in formulation of that scheme of admissions.\n\nThis principle found favour with the High Court in its Ful! Bench ruling in Rafia Rahim's( 1) case.\n\nWhile over the 'years, amelioration produced by State Plans has reduced the degree of backwardness, the fact remains that substantial equalisation of opportunities between the two areas is a \"consummation devoutly to be wished.\" We agree with the High Court that\n\n\"in considering the question of the educational backwardness of a particular class of people. or a particular tract of territory of this State, we cannot forget that the evolution of human society and its march from backwardness to progress must essentially be a slow and gradual process. It is not as if, by a Government or executive fiat, a class of people or a bit of territory has been condemned to backwardness, and with\n\n, .+ (I) State of Kerala v. Rafla Rahim, 1978 KLT 369.\n\nthe lifting of the ban by effi.ux of time or otherwise, they automatically spring back into a progressive or forward class of people or tract. It is useful to recall the observations made by this Court in State of Kerpla v. Jacob Mathew ( 1964 KLT 298).\n\n\"9. In these regions of human life and values the clear-cut distinctions of cause and effect merge into each other.\n\nSocial backwardness contributes to educational backwardness; educational backwardness perpetuates social backwardness; and both are often no more than the inevitable corollaries of the extremes of poverty and the deadening weight of custom and tradition.\"(') If we may add, chronic social disability cannot be amenable to instant administrative surgery and Jaw shall not bury its head, ostrich fashion, in the sands of fiction and assume equality where the opposite is the reality.\n\nThe rule of law runs close to the rule of life and where societal life, as between one part of the State and another, is the victim of die-hard disparities the constitutional mandate of equal justice under the law responds to it pragmatically and permits classification geared to eventual equalisation.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the High Court that current conditions warrant the classification of the student community on the Zonal basis-not as a legitimation of endless perpetuation bui as a transient panacea for a geo-human handicap which the State mnst actively strive to undo.\n\nIn Kerala, as in some other States, reservation policies of Governments and 'equal protection' pronouncements of courts have chased each other. A happy harmony among the great instrumentalities for accomplishment of constitutional goals by complementary action is the desideratum for developing countries, if we may say so respectfully.\n\nThe principle of reservation with weightage for the geographical area of the Malabar District has our approval in endorsement of the view Of the High Court. An earlier decision of the Kerala High Court ( 1964 KLT 298) i,:ave rise to a Commission appointed to recommend whLh sections of the people required special treatment under Art. 15(4) of the Constitution, having regard to their social and educational conditions.\n\nThat Commission, inter alia accepted the educational backwardness of the Malabar area and recommended equitable allocation of seats on that footing. Substantially founding itself on these recommendations but modifying them in some measure Government hammered out a formula, a basic feature of which was pooling together the applications for admission to the four medical colleges in the State in one consolidated list\n\n(I) 1978 KLT 369 at 387.\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Tyer; J.)\n\n98 I ;\n\nand selecting students for medical courses strictly according to the matks secured-of course, making allowance for seats reserved for a limited percentage of students from outside and the customary bonus of rescrva.. tion of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward classes. This part of the 'selection calculus' is beyond cavil before ns, as the nation with all its social engineering boasts and all its tumultuous bungling, is distances away from human justice through human law.\n\nThe rough and tumble of academic life, based on the Pooling System seemed to run smooth for some years when a new attack was mow1ted on it in the High Court with constitutional artillery from the inexhaustible armoury of Art. 14. A Full Bench hit the scheme fatally this time, not with the familiar hut fruitless archery of geographical discrimination hut with the weaponry of 'reverse discrimination' in a different manifestation.\n\nTI1e strategy of attack was neatly expressed by the learned Single Judge whose judgment on this point was endorsed by the Full Bench.\n\nDiscrimination was discovered by the Court in attributing parity to !he marks of examinees in pre-degree and degree courses of the Calicut University with those of the candidates of the Ke.rala University.\n\nThe Full Bench framed the question, tell-tale fashion :\n\n\"The question is not whether one_ University is superior to the other or maintains higher standards in the matter of syllabus, examination and evaluation than the other, hut whether the operation of different Universities with varying standards of their own is productive of inequality.'('}\n\nThe descriptive presentation of this discriminatory facet was given by the learned single Judge in the same case :\n\n\"To compare the marks obtained by students of two different Universities valued by different examiners on answer papers of different patterns may not he the proper mode of determining comparative merit.\n\nEven in the case of candidates appearing for the same examination in the same university tl1ere may be a cause for complaint in the matter of marks awarded to the candidates. Quite often revaluation has shown that at least in some cases there is justification for the plea for such revaluation. Different examiners value the answer papers and though there is a Chief Examiner his role is quite limited.\n\nBut these are inevitable and the marginal errors may have to be ignored. By and large the comparative merits of the candidates will be reflected in the marks they obtain in the exami-\n\n( l) 1978KLT369at375\n\n982 SUPl!EME COUJ.\\T REPORTS\n\n[1979] 2 S.C.R.\n\nn:; ition to which all candidates are uniformly subjected to. B11t the same could not be said in the case of examinations condllCted by two or more Universities.\n\nIt is well-known that solill'- times question papers are tough and sometimes valuation is liberal. Quite of'en valuation is guided by the percentage of pass\n\nexpected in an examination.\n\nModeration is also resorted to.\n\nWhile all these may work uniformly on all the candidates appearing for the same examination in the same University that could not be the case with regard to the candidaes appearing for the same qualifying examination from another University writing different papers, which are valued by a different set of examiners.\n\nWhen comparison is between two candidates passing out from two Universities taking respective examinations of the Universities the equation of candidates in matters where near-accuracy is called for becomes difficult.\n\nMay be the examinations are similar and the valuation also is similar, but the other factors cannot be ruled out.\n\nIf admissions to courses like medicine and engineering is to be on the basis that the best talent is to be preferred, where students from more than one University passing the qualifying examination have to compete some method other than comparing their marks shuud be devised to determine their comparative !alent.\"( 1)\n\nThe Full Bench agreed with this anathematization of equal treatment of 'unequals' and voided the Selection Process. The Court, with helpful realism, concluded by adding a positive guideline to the decla- . --'-, ration of nullification : (')\n\n\"As a result of our discus'sion, we are of the opinion, that the scheme of selection for admission to the Medical Colleges on an assessment of merit of students drawn from different Universities with no uniformity of standards is objedonablc and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nWe grant a declaration to the writ-petitioner to that effe, st.\n\nWe deny effective relief to the writ-petitioner on account of non-joinder of the selected candidates, and the fu'ility and ineffectiveness of upsetting the selections and directing fresh admission at this stage.\n\nWe consider that the best scheme of selection in the circumstances would be th!' method of selection of candidates by holding a uniform Entrance Examination to se<:ure\n\n(I) 1978 KLT 359 at 371-372\n\n(2) Ibid, 382.\n\nKERALA v. ROSH/.l<A (Krishna Tyer, J.) 983\n\nmufQmlity of stam, lards, as .recommended by the Indian Medical Council-vide El!.ts.\n\nPS and PS-and as endorsed by the University authorities (vide Ex. P7). We direct the State Government to forthwith devise a scheme of selection by holding such an Entrance Examination and publis? the same within three months from today so that the candidates wishing to apply for selection to the Medical Colleges of this .\n\nState for the next academic year, have due notice of the scheme of selection. The object being to secure uniform'ty of standards for assessment and evaluation of students drawn from different Universities, our directicrn should not be understood as unalterably and inelastically fixing the limits for Governmental action.\n\nMethods for securing un'.formity of syllabus, pattern of examination, and mode of evaluation in the different Universities, would well be within the province of the Government to undertake. We allow this writ appeal to the limited extent indicated above.\"\n\nIn •he end, the writ petitioner won the battle but lost the war, for she got an abstract declaration that her exclu5ion was invalid but was denied the concrete direction to be admitted into the college.\n\nWe are not impressed much with the surmise which colours the reasoning of the Full Bench and •he learned Single Judge that there is such substantial difference in the pre-de!!Jee courses and evaluations between the sister •rniversities w; thin the same Stole that the brearh f'f Art. 14 by equal treatment of the marks unequally secured by examinees i:l the two universities may be spelt out. It is trite law that every inconsequential differentiation be•ween two things does not constitute the vice of discrimination, if law clubs them lo!!ether i\"110ring venial variances.\n\nArt. 14 is not a voodoo which visits with invalidation_ every execu'ive or legislative fusion of things or categories where there are no pronounced inequalities.\n\nMathematical equality is not the touchstone of constitutionality. This Court in Triloki Nath Khosa(') cautioned\n\n\"Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are fa1se to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward c' assifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity.\n\nTo overdo classification is to undo equality.\"\n\nIn the same ruling there was a caveat entered by Oiandrachud, J (as be then was) against \"a charter for making minute and microcosmic\n\n\" ~\n\nq) tattof Jammu & Kashmir v. Tri/oki Nath Khosa & Anr. [1974) I SCC 19 at 42.\n\nclassifications.\" What is more, a large latitude is allowed in this area to the State to classify or declassify based on diverse considerations of relevant pragmatism, and the judiciary shonld not \"rush in\" where the executive warily treads.\n\nThe core question is whether there is such substantial differentiation between the two universities in regard to the predegree or degree courses and system of examinaions as too glaring to imperil the equal protection clause.\n\nThe presumption is in favour of the vircs of legislative and executive action where Art. 14 is the basis of challenge.\n\nWe see no factual disparities disclosed in the Full Bench ruling to reach the result of substantial difference in the syllabi, in the pattern of examinations, in the marking systems or in the choice of the examiners so as to warrant invalidation on account of equal regard being accorded to the marks secured by the examinees from the two universities. We cannot forget that many colleges are run by the State\n\nor institutional managements where pre-degree or degree courses are undertaLen.\n\nThe teachers move from one university jurisdiction to the other, the teaching material is inevitably of a like nature; the subjects ·\n\ntaught must ordinarily be alike.\n\nThe examiners are usually drawn from \\vithin the State or neighbouring States.\n\nEven the comition of the academic bodies in the two universities may have common members.\n\nThe University Acts themselves are substantially similar.\n\nTo surmise discrimination from possibilities is alien to the forensic process in the absence of hard facts.\n\nWe are aware that there arc Universities and Universities, that gross divergences among them exist affecting the quality of the teaching and the marking, the anomalies of grading and the absurdity or equating the end products on the blind assumption that the same marks mean the same excellence.\n\nBut not glib surmises but solid facts supply the sinews of discriminatory inequality or equality. Going by vague reports, some backward universities and colleges have degenerated into degree-dealers bringing rapid discredit to Indian academic status.\n\nThe Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 has constituted the Medical Council of India a's an expert body to control the minimum standards of medical educa'ion and to regulate their observance.\n\nObviously, tht' high-powered Council bas power to prescribe the minimum standards of medical ed{1cation.\n\nIt has implicit power to supervise the qualifications or eligibility standards for admission into medical institutions.\n\nThus there is an overa11 invigilation by the Medical Council to prevent iubstandard entrance qualifications for medical courses.\n\nThe vagarious element in marking and moderation of marks may be a fact of life, but too marginal to qualify for substantial difference unless otherwise made out.\n\nIndeed, there may be differences among the\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Iyer, I.) 985\n\ncolleges under the same University, among the examiners in the same nniversity.\n\nSuch fleeting factors or ephemeral differences cannot be the olid foundation for a substantial differentiation which is the necessary pre-condition for quashing an executive or legislative act as too discriminatory to satisfy the egalitarian essence of Art. 14. The functional validation of the writ jurisdiction is an appropriate examination of the substantiality of the alleged disparity. We do not, however, proceed finally to pronounce on this point with reference to the two universities since nothing is available. before us, or, for that matter, was before the High Court to warrant a fair conclusion on the issue.\n\nWe are persuaded to make these observations for future guidance, so .that academic scheme!! may not be struck down as arbitrary or irrational save where some sound basis has been laid.\n\nWe get back to where we left off before this divagation into the Full B.ench decision's ratio on discrimination as between the two universities.\n\nThe sole question that survives is of alloca'ion of 'seats on a universitywise classification.\n\nFollowing upon the Full Bench decision which struck down the pool scheme of selection, a constitutionally viable process had to be evolved.\n\nGovernment, therefore, appointed a fresh expert committee to examine and report the quo modo of admissions to medical colleges in the light of the directives contained in the Full Bench decision.\n\nTwo solutions were seriously considered by the Committee, namely ( 1) .a common entrance examination such as is in vogue in many SUI.tea and has the approval of the Medical Council of India; and (2) the •tandardization of the syllabi uiiiformly for the two universitie's and the elimination of different yardsticks in regard to the setting of question papers, marking systems and the like.\n\nThe first one, though the better, was given up as productive of public and student resistance. However wise a measure may be, its viability depends on its acceptance by the consumers, namely, the student community and the parent community.\n\nAgitational opposition or determined dead-locking may make it unwise to inflict it on an unwilling constituency.\n\nOf course, by a gradual process of enlightenment the wisdom of such a measure may dawn.\n\nWhat is rejected to-day may be greeted tomorrow.\n\nThe Committee jettisoned the first proposal of a common entrance examination\n\ntly scared of its impracticability at the moment. So it opted for the second, namely uniformity of standards, frnm the formulation of syllabi upto assignment of marks at the el!1aminations.\n\nSurely either of the proposals is an effective answer to Art. 14. Even so, when the Committee's recommendations were placed before the Government it rellected carefully on the pragmatics of implementation and reached the\n\nconclusion that it would take some time to fulfil the pre-requisites to give effect to that formula. Time runs, university applications rush Ui,\n\narlmissions must begin, courses must start and administrative paralysis in decision-making is no alibi.\n\nImplementational dilatoriness cannot stall the flow of medical education. Caught in this crisis, caused, in part, by the court ruling, Government fabricated a quick scheme of admission to the four medical colleges, which, again, bas now been struck down by the High Court resulting in the appeal before us.\n\nThe corner-stone of classification adopted for medical admi<sioM by the Government this time was uuiversitywise allocation. By itself, ths\n\napproach had constitutional sanction, having regard to the ratio in Chanchala' s case(').\n\nThe ratio in Chanchala conclndes the dispute in this case. 'The discriminatory vice, if university-wise classification and consequential allocation of seats were resorted to, was pressed but repelled.\n\nShe lat, J. speaking for the Court, formulated the contention thus : (')\n\n\"The next contention was that r.9( 1 ), which prescribes university-wise distribu'.ion of seats results in discrimination for it lays down a classification which is neither based on any inte'ligible differentia, nor has a rational nexus with the object of the rules.\n\nThe argument was that although there i\"s one selection committee for all the Government medical colleges in all the three universities and for the said 59 seats in private colleges, students passing from colleges affiliated to a parlicu'ar university arc first admitted in Government medical colleges affiliated to that university and only seats upto 20% in each of such medical colleges can be allotted to outsiders in the discretion of the committee.\n\nThe result is that a student having higher marks than the last admitted student is deprived of a seat only for the reason that he bad passed his P.U.C. examination from a college affiliated to another university.\n\nAccording to ccunsel. such a classification has no rational basis and has no reasonable nexus with and is in fact inconsistent with the very object of cs<ablishment of Government medical colleges, namely, to train in medicine the most meritorious amongst the candidates seeking admission.\"(')\n\nThe fundamental educational realities and resultant resolution of the legal imbroglio are instructively presented in Chanchala's case, which\n\n(I) D. N. Chancha/a v. St te of Mysore & Ors. etc. [19711 Supp SCR 608.\n\n(2) Ibid pp. 617-618.\n\n(3) [19711 Su.op. S.C.R. 608 at 619-€21.\n\n...\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 987\n\nhaV() special relevance to our case because the social facts, constitutional confrontations and administrative answers in the Kerala. and Karnataka litigations are similar. Shelat J. observed : (')\n\n\"The three universities were set up in three diffuent places presumably for the purpose of catering to the educational and academic need~ of thdse areas.\n\nObviously one university foc the whole of the State could neither have been adequate nor foasible to satisfy those needs.\n\nSince it would not be possible lo admit all candidates in the medical colleges run by the Government, some basis for screening the candidates had to be set up.\n\nThere can be no manner of doubt, and it is now fairly well settled, that the Government, as also other private agencies, who found such centres for medical training, have the right to frame rules for admission so long as those rules are not inconsistent with the university statutes and regulations and do not $uller from infirmities, constitutional or otherwise.\n\nSince the universities are set up for satisfying-the educational needs of different areas where they are set up and medical colleges are es'ablished in those areas, it can safely be presumed that they also were so set up to satisfy the needs for medical training -0f those attached to those universities.\n\nIn our view, there is nothing undesirable in ensuring that those attached to such universities have their ambitions to have training in spec'alised subjects, like medicine,, satisfied through colleges affiliated to their own universities.\n\nSuch a basis for selection has not the disadvantage of districtwise or unitwise selection as any student from any part of the state can pass the qualifying examination in any of the three universities irrespective of the place of his\n\nbirth or residence.\n\nFurther, the rules confer a discretion on the selection committee to admit outsiders upto 20% of the total available seats in any one of these colleges, i.e. those who have passed the equivalent examination held by any other university not only in the S•ate bnt also elsewhere in India ....\n\nThe fact that a candidate having lesser marks might obtain admission at the cost of another having higher marks from another university does not necessarily mean that a less meritorious candidate gets advan'age over a more meritorious one.\n\nAs is well known, different universitie& have different standards in the eliaminatiom held by them.\n\nA preference to one attached to< one university in its own institutions. for posl-8faG!uate\n\nOI'\n\n\\' (I) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 608 at 619-621. .. \\)\n\nH i '\n\ntechnical training is not unco=on ..... Further, the Government which bears the financial burden of running the Govern- ·. ment colleges is entitled to Jay down criteria for admission in its own colleges and to decide the sonrces from which ad mis8ion would be made, provided of conrse, such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational bass and a reasonable connection with the object of the rules.\n\nSo long as there is no discrimination within each of suc.h sonrces, the validity of the rulei laying down such sonrces cannot be succe'ssfully challen:- ed. [See Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India(')] In our view, the rules lay down a valid classification.\n\nCandidates passing through the qualifying examinations held by a university form a class by themselves as distingnished from those passin8 through such examination from the other two universities.\n\nSuch a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules, namely, to cater to the needs of candidates who would naturally look to their own university to advance their training in technical studies, such as medical studies.\n\nIn our opinion. the rules cannot justly be attacked on the ground of hostile discrimination or as being otherwise in breach of Art. 14:''\n\nWe do not mean to lay down, as an inflexible dogma of universal application, that under utterly different social and educational environ!; university-based grouping of candidates for specialised courses will, willy-nilly, be valid.\n\nBut the basic identity of pertinent circumstances bearing on the university-centred descrimen in Chanchala and here constitutionalize the scheme of selection adopted by Government grouping all eligibles from colleges affiliated to each University as separate . \"\">\n\nunits.\n\nThe High Court's perspective in this regard is impeccable.\n\nIt is an interesting sidelight that in Chanchala as much as 20% o! the total s_eats were thrown open to 'outsiders' i.e. 'those who have passed the equivalent examination he, Jd by any other university not only in the State but also elsewhere in India.\n\nThe underlying unity of syllabus and broad agreement on evaluation are assumed in this pool system, confined to 20% but open to se.veral universities.\n\nHaving held in the earlier Full Bench ca8e that university-wise categorisation for seats allocation was good the High Court, in the impugned judgment, still struck down the new scheme as discriminatory.\n\nThe vice was traced to a certain feature which went beyond mere universitywise allocation and made further modifications governed by the propor-\n\n(1) [197011 S.C.R. 413 at 418. . ' ' .\n\nKERALA v .. ROSl!ANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 989 ... ( {,. ti.on. of the number of students presented by the two universities for the A\n\npre-dgree and B. Sc. examinations. 'Ay, there's the nib'.\n\n• •\n\nTho Committee's long range proposal of uniformity between the two universities was unexceptionable and, if adopted, would end apprehensions of injustice stemming from dissimilarities flowing from diver- .gent syllabi and examination methodology. Indeed Government has ac B cepted it as the long-term solution and rightly.\n\nThe relevant\n\nG.0. dated July 14, 1978, sums up the Committee's unification solution .. thus :\n\n\"As a long term solution Government may move the Universities of Kerala and Calicut to unify the curriculum and courses of study for pre-degree course and form Inter University Board for the conduct of examination.\n\nWhen such a scheme is established pre-degree will be the only qualifying examination for selection to all courses in the medical colleges.\n\nThe Committee has pointed out that unification of the syllabus, course of study and examination in the four disciplines of B.Sc., viz., Physics, Chemistry, Zoology and Botany would be impossible and thus the reservation now given to grad.uate candidates for selection to Medical and dental colleges will have to be abolished.\"\n\nAnd the decision of Government is in these terms :\n\n\"Government.. . have accepted the recommendation of the committee to have unified curriculum and course of study and common board for conduct of examinations for the Kerala and Calicut Universities.\n\nBut Government consider that unification of syllabus and method of examination should be made also at degree level in respect of the 4 disciplines of Physics- Chemistry, Zoology and Botany and that the reservation now given to the graduates for admission to the medical and dental colleges should be continued.\n\nThe Universities concerned are being requested to take further action in the matter.\"\n\nBut the modus operandi for nnification of syllabi and what not are incapable of instant execution by unilateral declaration, since it is the business of the Universities.\n\nAnd Universities are self-consciously autonomous and often politicised, with the result that the writ of Government may not run there.\n\nMoreover, administrative slow-motion is the genius of, governmental and university processes.\n\nUniversities, with plural bpd\\es, many voices and contradictory cerebrationll, may meet and\n\n!I ·. delite, appoint sub-committees and discuss their reports, await reactions\n\nA of other organs and hold joint meetings to consider academic iSsUM iJle. all their dimensions and act generally only after leisurely reflect:ort. Ata-~ demics cannot be hus'led and often hasten slowly.\n\nMeanwhile, the year rolls 011, students stagnate and medical education grinds to a halt.\n\nThese painful realities apparently induced the Government to fabri- B cate in its secretariat foundry a transitory strategy for the current ye4r.\n\nThis short-run project adopted each University as a unit which, as we have earlier explained, was good so far as it went.\n\nBut a dubious rider was added which invited the judicial Waterloo.\n\nThat is the bone of contention and so we excerpt the relevant portion :\n\n\"After considering the proposal in all its aspects Government have decided that lhe seats available for MBBS course after deducting the seats for mandatory admission may be distributed for the students of the two Universities in the ratio of the candidates registered for the pre-degree and B.Sc. course in the two Universities, taking the average of 1hc number of candidates registered for the pre-degree and B.Sc. degree courses with eligibility for admission to Medical Colleges for the last three years as the basis.\"\n\nThis operated as a cut back on the total 'Calicut' sea's as wholly available for the Calicut University studenl:S and, indeed, as urged by counsel for the respondent, subtly subverted the criterion of 'Ma'abar' backward-- • ness.\n\nThe Calicut Medical College and the Calicut University were created as the purpose-oriented mechanisms for progre3sivc elicfr, otbn of educational backwardness in that territory.\n\nThis objective would be fulfil- F led if the entire number of seats of the Calicut Medical College were exclusively made the entitlement for eligible students from colleges affiliated to that University.\n\nA further slice knifed out of the cake would spell reversal OF policy.\n\nWe agree with the High Court that the injection of the universitY- G wise student-strength is drawing the red-herring across the trail-an irrelevance that invalidates the scheme.\n\nWe cannot see the nexus between the registered student-strength and the seats to be allotted.\n\nThe fewer the colleges the fewer the pre-degree or degree students.\n\nAnd so, the linkage of the division of seats with the registered student-strength would make an irrational inroad into the university-wise allocation. Such H a formula would be a punishment for backwardness, not a promotion of their adrnncement.\n\nWe cannot uphold the discriminatory paring down based on unreason.\n\n-~.\n\n~··\n\nKERALA V, ROSHANA (Krishna Tyer, J.) 991\n\nOnce this premise is reached the calculus is non-controversial.\n\nThe three medical colleges affiliated to the Kerala University have a total strength of 345 students and the only college affiliated to the Calicut University has a 'student strength of 180.\n\nOn these basic figures, the arithmatic worked out on the principles of deduction is beyond controversy. 42 students form the reserved quota and have to be apportioned between the two universities in the ratio of their student strength.\n\nMaking available of seats for candidates from other universities rs also common ground.\n\nBoth sides agree that the net number of seats available to be filled up, if we proceed solely on the principle of university-wise allocation, will be 166 for the Calicut University students and 317 for the Kerala University students.\n\nThe admissions, even on these agreed figures, will be subject to the die-hard rule of Communal reservation.\n\nThe further divi'sion of seats in the ratio of 60 : 40 as between the graduates and pre-degree candidates also has to be mamtained.\n\nNo question of complicating the numbers by any further injection of the population ratio between Malabar and Travancore-Cochin arises because the new formula takes care of the backwardness of Malabar and there cannot be double benefits.\n\nDecoding the rules in simplex form, what we get in arithmatical terms is that the Calicut University students who have now been alloted under the Government formula 136 seats will be entitled to an extra 30 seats.\n\nIf we rigidly direct that these additional seats be assigned to the students emerging from the colleges under the Calicut University an equal number may have to be expelled from the students already admitted from out of the Kerala University quota.\n\nThis consequence becomes compulsive since the total strength sanctioned for the four medical colleges fixed by the two Universities and approved by the Medical Council of India is 525 seats.\n\nHere comes the play of processual realism in moulding the relief in\n\n!he given milieu.\n\nThe rule of law should not petrify life or be inflexibly mulish.\n\nIt is tempered by experience, mellowed by principled compromise, informed by the anxiety to avoid injustice and softens the blow G within the marginal limits of legality.\n\nThat is the karuna of the law .\n\nNor is law unimaginative, especially in the writ jurisdiction where responsible justice is the goal. The court cannot adopt a rigid attitude of negativity and sit back after striking down the scheme of Government, leaving it to the helpless Government caught in a crisis to make\"1o as H best as it may, or throwing the situation open to agitational chaos to find a t\n\n7-119 SCI/79\n\nsolution by demonstrations in the streets and worse.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to stop with merely declaring that the scheme of admission accepted by Government is ultra vires and granting the relief to the petitioner of admission to the medical college.\n\nThe need for controlling its repercussions calls for judicial response.\n\nAfter all, law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but an operational art in society.\n\nThe High Court's ultimate direction is : \"We allow this writ petition and quash Exh. P2 G.O. to the extent to which it accepts alternative proposal of the committee referred to in Exh. P.l''.\n\nThe Court also observes : \"We think it will be unfair in the circumstances to deny effective re.1ief to the writ petitioner ... \" The relief claimed was admission to the medical college.\n\nThe upshot of the judgment, in terms of student impact, government policy, college admissions and potential for agitation, may be envisioned for a while.\n\nWe may also take note of the gregarious trend of one writ petition being followed by many when the grievance is common and the first case is in essence a test case and class action.\n\nWhat is granted to the petitioner has to be granted to others who follow her.\n\nIn terms of numbers several candidates may have to be admitted into the medical college•.\n\nMore than that is the chaotic consequence of the pro tempore project of the Government being struck down with no alternative methodology of selection.\n\nGovernments have no magic remedies to tide over sudden crisis.\n\nTheir proceS&es are notoriously slow and the temper of the student community is notoriously inflammable.\n\nThus the negative stroke o! voiding the G.O. and granting relief to the pe; itioner is to throw out a number o! students already undergoing their course and to incite unwittingly student unrest of magnitude, apart from leaving the academic algebra for admissions in a state of vacuum.\n\nOne thing is ce1 tain.\n\nIf the syndrome of campus chaos is to be obviated, the court should come to the assistance of the Kera la University students already admitted and undergoing their medical course who might otherwise have to be jettisoned.\n\nWe, therefore, do not think it right to force into the medical colleges any students who may be qualified for admission by virtue of our order at the expense of another who has already b'en admitted and is undergoing the medical course.\n\nThis means that 30 students from the colleges affiliated to the Calicut University will have to be provided for ab extra.\n\nBut how to find accommodation for 30 more students?\n\nThe Universities concerned have the. power to increase the strength\n\n<1d hoc when gripped by a crisis such as has occurred here.\n\nTI1e Medical Council of India has an overall control in this field, being the statu-\n\n• •\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 993\n\ntory body created under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. Thus, A the concurrence of the Calicut and the Kerala Universities and the Medical Council of India becomes necessary for working out effective reliefs in terms of adding to the strength on a temporary footing, with a sense of equity and anxiety to do justice to the existing entrants .\n\nUnfortunately, neither the Universities concerned nor th~ students B affected are parties.\n\nThe presence of the Medical Council of India also has to be secured.\n\nConfronted by this situation, we directed, as a measure of emergency,, issuance of notice to the two Universities and made them party to the record.\n\nA similar step was taken in the case of the Medical Council of India.\n\nAt short notice, all the three parties entered appearance.\n\nAlthough Shri A. S. Nambiar, appearing for the Unive\"ity, expressed inability to con'sent to any course of addition of strength, lie agreed that the concerned academic bodies were likely to meet shortly and the Universities themselves would abide by any directions this Court issued in the interests of Justice.\n\nThe learned Advocate General had earlier represented that the Univer'sities were likely to agree to a temporary addition of strength, provided the Medical Council of India would also approve of the course.\n\nWe need hardly say that the writ of this Court binds the parties on record and all the three bodies are before us and must abide by the directions we issue necessitated by the exigency of the situation and the need to do justice.\n\nAfter all, the Court system belongs to the people and must promote constructive justice; and all institutions, including the Governments and Universities, likewise belong to the people.\n\nThis commitment is the whet stone for doing justice in the wider context of social good.\n\nThe Universities, as we gather from counsel representing all the parties, may not find it difficult to accommodate 30 students more, apportioned among the four medical colleges of the State.\n\nThis addition is compelled by the critical condition set out above.\n\nThis need will not survive this acade1nic }ear nnd, in that sense, no long term trauma for academic stan dards will be inflicted by each of the colleges accommodating a few more students for their courses this year.\n\nAfter all, not much time has passed since the teaching session began.\n\nCompared to their existing strength. the additions are negligible.\n\nThe Medical Council of India, through the learned Additional Solicitor General, has cxpressed that it has no objection to this proposal for n miniscule addition confined to this academic year.\n\nWe see no ground for either University to plead inability to help the cause of Justice.\n\nThe insistence on standards, measured by marks, is not being relaxed, so much so the quality of the admission of additional students does not suffer.\n\nA marginal strain in the\n\nmatter of teaching and perhaps extra burden in regard to the practicals may have to be endured.\n\nWe are, therefore sure that the Universities \" ' the colleges concerned, the teaching community and the alumni themselves will appreciate; the goal and cooperate in the success of the direction we make.\n\nHad we left the Judgment of the High Court in the conventional form of merely quashing the formula of admission the remedy would have aggravated the malady-confusion, agitation, paralysis. The root of the grie\\; ance and the fruit of the writ are not individual but collective and while the 'adversary system' makes the Judge a mere umpire, traditionally speaking, the community orientation of the judicial function, so desirable in the Third World remedial jurisprud'ence, transforms the court's power into affirmative structuring of redress so as to make it personally meaningful and socially relevant.\n\nFrustration of invalidity is part of the judicial duty; fulfilment of legality is complementary.\n\nThis principle of affirmative action is within our jurisdiction under Art. 136 and Art. 32 and we think the present cases deserve its exercise\n\nWe direct the State Government to admit 30 more willing students who are qualified under the rules and who are students from the colleges affiliated to the Calicut University-in order of the marks E secured.\n\nThey will be distributed by the Selection Committee among the four medical colleges of Government in an equitable way and their decision will be final.\n\nThe Kerala and the Calicut Universities will be bound to expand the strength of the medical colleges concerned for this year in obedience to this direction of the Court and the respective bodies under the Universities will act accordingly.\n\nThe selection of these 30 students will not be confined to those who have moved this Court or the High Court by way of writ proceedings or appeal.\n\nThe measure is academic excellence, not Iitigative persistence. It will be thrown open to the first 30, strictly according to merit measured by marks secured. The apportionment as between graduates and pre-degree students and the application of the communal reservation will apply to these 30 to be selected. The Selection Committee will make its decision on or before the 31st January 1979. The Universities concerned will convey their approval to the Government for the nceessary addition to the student strength in obedience to the direction of this Court on or before the 27th January 1979.\n\nWe direct the State Government for the coming academic year 1979-80, to allot 166 seats for the students from the colleges affiliated\n\n- ~\n\n• • '\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 995\n\nto the Calicut University and 317 seats to the students from the colleges affiliated to the Kerala University, the formula regarding every other aspect being as indicated in this Judgment such as for the mandatory admissions, the apportionment between pre-degree students and th~ degree holders and other reservations .\n\nhnother imperative step we cast on the two Universities, which are parties before us, and are, therefore, bound by this Order deserves to be clearly expressed.\n\nHaving regard to the utter confusion in medical studie's that may be produced by keeping the unification of syllabi and methodology of examinations in a flux we think it absolutely essential to fix a time target for the University bodies to act.\n\nGovernment will issue necessary directions to its representatives on these bodies to accelerate the pace.\n\nWe expect both the Universities to implement the proposal made by the Committee and accepted by the Government regardnig the uniform curricula and common examination system and allied matters in such manner that there will be no inequality as between students emerging from one University and the other within the State.\n\nThis process shall be completed on or before 31st May 1979.\n\nWe are aware that these various directions and orders call for high pressure activisation.\n\nPerhaps, we may emphasise the need for guarding against the slow march of bureaucratic movement embodied in Lord Curzon 's lament respecting the administration of his time, a state of affairs wholly opposed to the dynamic fulfilment of the imperatives cast by the Constitution upon the nation and its institutions. Said Lord Curzon in a despatch to the Secretary of State :\n\n\"Your despatch of August 5th arrived. It goes to Foreign Department.\n\nThereupon Clerk No 1 paraphrases and comments upon it over 41 folio pages of print of his own composition, dealing solely With the Khyber suggestions in it. Then comes Clerk No. 2 with 31 more pages upon Clerk No. 1.\n\nThen we get to the region of Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and Secretaries.\n\nAll these gentlemen state their wcrthles£ views at equal length.\n\nFinally we get to the top of the scale and we find the Viceroy and Military Member, with a proper regard for their dignity, expanding themselves over a proportionate space of print.\n\nThen these papers wander about from Department to Department and amid the various Members of Council.\n\nI am grappling with this vile system in my own department, but it has seated i{self like the\n\nOld Man of the Sea upon the shoulders of the Indian Government and every man accepts, while deploring the burden.\"(!)\n\nHopefully, we part with this case with the thought that there will be no occasion for any party to move for extension of time or to prove that the curse Lord Curzon spelt out still haunts the wheels of administration.\n\nThe appeal is allowed; so also the writ petition-in the manner and to the extent we have directed.\n\nThe parties will bear their costs.\n\nThe decisional guidelines herein given will, we dare say, so he, Jp dispose of the many Writ Petitions pending in the High Court.\n\nThe journey to the Supreme Court is not always necessitous for final justice.\n\nORDER.\n\nWhiJe, there is agreement that thirty seats more have to be added as has been indicated in the judgment making the total number of seats allocable to the students of the Calicut University to 166, there is some dispute regarding the number of seats available for the students belonging D to the Kerala University.\n\nWe have mentioned in the judgment that it is 317.\n\nIt is open to the State Government or to the concerned Universitie's to bring it to the notice of the court in case there is any clarification necessary.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal & Petition allowed.\n\n(1) Culled from David Dike-Curzon in India\n\n• ,", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "4\n\nSTATE OF KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KUMARI T. 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M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10676, "end_char": 10694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4705/78\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader, Adv."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10719, "end_char": 10732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for Kerala, V. J. Francis and Mustafa K. Rowter for the Appellant in C.A. 2297 /78 and Respondents in W.P. 4705/78."}}, {"text": "Mustafa K. Rowter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10737, "end_char": 10754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for Kerala, V. J. Francis and Mustafa K. Rowter for the Appellant in C.A. 2297 /78 and Respondents in W.P. 4705/78."}}, {"text": "P. V. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10824, "end_char": 10843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. V. Govindan Nair, N. Sudhakaran and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Petitioner in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "N. 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Shamshuddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10997, "end_char": 11014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr, V. A. Sayid Muhammad, S. K. Mehta, P. K. Shamshuddin, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul for the Interveners ."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11016, "end_char": 11026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr, V. A. Sayid Muhammad, S. K. Mehta, P. K. Shamshuddin, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul for the Interveners ."}}, {"text": "E. M. Sarul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11031, "end_char": 11042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr, V. A. Sayid Muhammad, S. K. Mehta, P. K. Shamshuddin, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul for the Interveners ."}}, {"text": "A. S. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11066, "end_char": 11079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Nambiar for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "A. S. Nambiar"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Thc dynamics of the writ jurisdiction and the potential for affirmative court action, as part of remedial jurisprudence, constitute the key thought which animates the ultimate decision and direction we give in this couple of cases which have come up by\n\nSpecial Lellve and under Art.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11458, "end_char": 11465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho State of Kerala is the appellant in the civil appeal and 1st rei; pondent in the Writ Petition but the collective litigation springs from a traditional type of action and typical kind of relief granted in exercise of its writ jurisdiction by the High Court striking down a transitory scheme of adriiission to the medical colleges of the State evolved by the Government but invalidated by the High Court on the ground of discrimination in the distribution of seats among the eligible student$ drawn from two disparate regions of the State."}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13442, "end_char": 13454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala State, notwithstanding its striking demographic, cultural, linguistic and political integrality and educational advance, has certain histQrical hangovers of academic disparity and devel<l'prnen~ maldistribution which have survived for two decades as this case testifies.", "canonical_name": "Kerala State"}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin and Malabar regions woven into ooe fabric by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14002, "end_char": 14100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calicut University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14679, "end_char": 14697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "egion persuaded the State to set up the Calicut University to which were affiliated all the colleges in that\n\nCTndrella area, including the Calicut Medical College."}}, {"text": "Calicut Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14779, "end_char": 14802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "egion persuaded the State to set up the Calicut University to which were affiliated all the colleges in that\n\nCTndrella area, including the Calicut Medical College."}}, {"text": "Trichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14828, "end_char": 14835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An adjoining district, Trichur, was also tacked on, for convenience, maybe."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15587, "end_char": 15594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malabar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16294, "end_char": 16301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Malabar area has been regarded as notoriously backward from the point of view of collegiate education so much so, the number -0f colleges which provide pre-degree courses necessary by way of qualification for entrance into the medical colleges, are relatively fewer and, on the contrary, the remaining part of the State thanks to many factors, has been on a higher level, with colleges more numerous and pre-deg; ree students more prolific."}}, {"text": "Rafia Rahim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17292, "end_char": 17303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bench ruling in Rafia Rahim's( 1) case."}}, {"text": "Malabar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19919, "end_char": 19935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle of reservation with weightage for the geographical area of the Malabar District has our approval in endorsement of the view Of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court ( 1964 KLT 298)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20026, "end_char": 20059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An earlier decision of the Kerala High Court ( 1964 KLT 298) i,:ave rise to a Commission appointed to recommend whLh sections of the people required special treatment under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20172, "end_char": 20182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21475, "end_char": 21482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ke.rala University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22008, "end_char": 22026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he marks of examinees in pre-degree and degree courses of the Calicut University with those of the candidates of the Ke.rala University."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25214, "end_char": 25221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25736, "end_char": 25742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KERALA v. ROSH/.l<A (Krishna Tyer, J.) 983\n\nmufQmlity of stam, lards, as .recommended by the Indian Medical Council-vide El!.ts.", "canonical_name": "Kerala State"}}, {"text": "Krishna Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25757, "end_char": 25769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KERALA v. ROSH/.l<A (Krishna Tyer, J.) 983\n\nmufQmlity of stam, lards, as .recommended by the Indian Medical Council-vide El!.ts.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27254, "end_char": 27261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27551, "end_char": 27558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Triloki Nath Khosa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27794, "end_char": 27812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Triloki Nath Khosa(') cautioned\n\n\"Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are fa1se to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward c' assifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity."}}, {"text": "Oiandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28135, "end_char": 28146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same ruling there was a caveat entered by Oiandrachud, J (as be then was) against \"a charter for making minute and microcosmic\n\n\" ~\n\nq) tattof Jammu & Kashmir v. Tri/oki Nath Khosa & Anr. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28859, "end_char": 28866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30448, "end_char": 30480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Medical Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30501, "end_char": 30525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 has constituted the Medical Council of India a's an expert body to control the minimum standards of medical educa'ion and to regulate their observance."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31574, "end_char": 31581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33921, "end_char": 33928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chanchala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34853, "end_char": 34862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By itself, ths\n\napproach had constitutional sanction, having regard to the ratio in Chanchala' s case(')."}}, {"text": "Chanchala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34889, "end_char": 34898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio in Chanchala conclndes the dispute in this case. '"}}, {"text": "She lat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35078, "end_char": 35085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She lat, J. speaking for the Court, formulated the contention thus : (')\n\n\"The next contention was that r.9( 1 ), which prescribes university-wise distribu'.ion of seats results in discrimination for it lays down a classification which is neither based on any inte'ligible differentia, nor has a rational nexus with the object of the rules.", "canonical_name": "She lat"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36882, "end_char": 36888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shelat J. observed : (')\n\n\"The three universities were set up in three diffuent places presumably for the purpose of catering to the educational and academic need~ of thdse areas.", "canonical_name": "She lat"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40531, "end_char": 40538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41928, "end_char": 41940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KERALA v .. ROSl!ANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 989 ... ( {,.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "July 14, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42450, "end_char": 42463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated July 14, 1978, sums up the Committee's unification solution .. thus :\n\n\"As a long term solution Government may move the Universities of Kerala and Calicut to unify the curriculum and courses of study for pre-degree course and form Inter University Board for the conduct of examination."}}, {"text": "Kerala and Calicut Universities", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43423, "end_char": 43454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "have accepted the recommendation of the committee to have unified curriculum and course of study and common board for conduct of examinations for the Kerala and Calicut Universities."}}, {"text": "Kerala University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47171, "end_char": 47188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The three medical colleges affiliated to the Kerala University have a total strength of 345 students and the only college affiliated to the Calicut University has a 'student strength of 180."}}, {"text": "Malabar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48218, "end_char": 48225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No question of complicating the numbers by any further injection of the population ratio between Malabar and Travancore-Cochin arises because the new formula takes care of the backwardness of Malabar and there cannot be double benefits."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48230, "end_char": 48247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No question of complicating the numbers by any further injection of the population ratio between Malabar and Travancore-Cochin arises because the new formula takes care of the backwardness of Malabar and there cannot be double benefits."}}, {"text": "Council of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52481, "end_char": 52497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TI1e Medical Council of India has an overall control in this field, being the statu-\n\n• •\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Iyer, !.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52629, "end_char": 52661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calicut", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52694, "end_char": 52701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, A the concurrence of the Calicut and the Kerala Universities and the Medical Council of India becomes necessary for working out effective reliefs in terms of adding to the strength on a temporary footing, with a sense of equity and anxiety to do justice to the existing entrants ."}}, {"text": "A. S. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53408, "end_char": 53421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although Shri A. S. Nambiar, appearing for the Unive\"ity, expressed inability to con'sent to any course of addition of strength, lie agreed that the concerned academic bodies were likely to meet shortly and the Universities themselves would abide by any directions this Court issued in the interests of Justice.", "canonical_name": "A. S. Nambiar"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56574, "end_char": 56582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56587, "end_char": 56594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calicut Universities", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57029, "end_char": 57049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala and the Calicut Universities will be bound to expand the strength of the medical colleges concerned for this year in obedience to this direction of the Court and the respective bodies under the Universities will act accordingly."}}, {"text": "31st January 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57772, "end_char": 57789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Selection Committee will make its decision on or before the 31st January 1979."}}, {"text": "27th January 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57975, "end_char": 57992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Universities concerned will convey their approval to the Government for the nceessary addition to the student strength in obedience to the direction of this Court on or before the 27th January 1979."}}, {"text": "ROSHANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58152, "end_char": 58159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We direct the State Government for the coming academic year 1979-80, to allot 166 seats for the students from the colleges affiliated\n~\n\n• • '\n\nKERALA v. ROSHANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 995\n\nto the Calicut University and 317 seats to the students from the colleges affiliated to the Kerala University, the formula regarding every other aspect being as indicated in this Judgment such as for the mandatory admissions, the apportionment between pre-degree students and th~ degree holders and other reservations ."}}, {"text": "31st May 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59387, "end_char": 59400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This process shall be completed on or before 31st May 1979."}}, {"text": "Curzon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59608, "end_char": 59614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Perhaps, we may emphasise the need for guarding against the slow march of bureaucratic movement embodied in Lord Curzon 's lament respecting the administration of his time, a state of affairs wholly opposed to the dynamic fulfilment of the imperatives cast by the Constitution upon the nation and its institutions."}}, {"text": "Indian Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60738, "end_char": 60755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am grappling with this vile system in my own department, but it has seated i{self like the\n\nOld Man of the Sea upon the shoulders of the Indian Government and every man accepts, while deploring the burden.\"(!)"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 61317, "end_char": 61330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The journey to the Supreme Court is not always necessitous for final justice."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 61906, "end_char": 61912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal & Petition allowed."}}, {"text": "David Dike-Curzon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61958, "end_char": 61975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Culled from David Dike-Curzon in India\n\n• ,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_2_997_1001_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• '\n\nMOHD. SHABIR\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nlanuarv I 7, 1979\n\njS, MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nDrugs and Cos1netics Act, 1940, S. 27, \"Stocks or ixizibits for sale\" interpre1:11.un--Pos:, e:,., ior1 sitnpliciter of drug, w!1ctfi,.,. sufficient for conviction.\n\nThe appellant \\Vas apprehended at the Bhusawal railway statitJn, and 17 containers with 17,000 white tablet~ v.rere recovered from him. The tablets were tested by the public analyst, and found to be not in accordance with the\n\nstandard specified under s. 18(a) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The appel- C lant was duly tried and convicted by the Trial Magistrate, under Sections 27(a){ii) and 28 of the Act.\n\nThe appellant pleaded guilty, and in view of his young aae, and that it was his first offence, the Magistrate sentenced him only till the rising of the Court. But in revision, the High Court enhanced the sentence to cine venr\"~ R.l.\n\nIt was contended that as there was no evidence to shov.· that the tablets were ''for sale\", their possession simpliciter, of any quantity whatsoever, 'vould not constitute <1'fl offence under s. 27.\n\nAllowing the appeal as regards the conviction under s. 27, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1.\n\nThr absence of any comma after the word \"stocks\" clearly indi~ cates that the clause \"stocks or exhibit'\\ for sale\" is one indivisible whole and it contemplates not mere stocking the drugs, but stocking the drugs for the purpose of sale, and unless all the in2:redients of this category are satisfied, section 27 of the Act would not be sati..fied. [999 F-Gl\n\n2. There i') no evidence to show that te appellant had either ot these tablets. for sale. or 'vas selling them or had stocked them for s2Ae.\n\nBefore a person can be liable for prosecution or conviction under s. 27(a)(i)(ii) read with s. 18(c) of the Act, it must be proved by the prosecution affirmatively\n\nthat he was manufacturing the drugs for sale or was selling the same, or had F\n\n~!Lcl.:ed lhun or exhibited the articles for sale.\n\nThe pos'.lession si111pliciter of the artiles does not app'ear to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act. f999 G. 1 000 B-Cl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 103 of I 975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12-2-1973 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 774/ 72 ..\n\nU. I'. Sinph for the Appellant.\n\nH. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Re>pondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by H\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-Tn this appeal by special leave the appellant ha!!' been convicted under section 27 (a) (i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics\n\nAct, 1940 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one. year and a fine of Rs. 200/- as modified by the High Court.\n\nThe trial court also convicted the appellant under section 27 (a) (ii) and section 28 of the Act but no separate sentence was awarded under these counts. The trial court had, in fact, imposed a sentence of imprisonment only till the. rising of the Court but the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction enhanced the sentence lo one year's rigorous imprisonment, and hence this appeal by sepcial leave.\n\nAccording to the prosecution, on 5.5.1970 at about 11.30 a.m. the complainant Drugs Inspector, Jalagaon received a telephonic meassage from the Senior Railway Sub-Inspector Bhusawal to the effect that the appellant had been caught at the Bhusawal railway station with 17 plastic containers containing 17,000 white coloured tablets.\n\nOn receiving this message the complainant went to Bhusawal railway station on the next day and after taking permission from the magistrate he took the sample or the tablets and sent it to the public analyst and after receiving his report, he filed a complaint against the appellant under the various sections of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940. The learned trial magistrate framed two charges against the appellant.\n\nOne charge was under section 27 (a) (i) and 27 (a) (ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (hereinafter referred to as the \"Act\") and the other charge related to section 28 read with section 18A of tho Act.\n\nThe appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted all the facts contained in the charge.\n\nThe appellant, however, stated that as this was his first offence, he promised not to commit any offence again and as he was an agriculturist and a young man, he pleaded for mercy.\n\nThe prosecution in support of the case examined the complainant to prove the facts leading to the prosecution of the appellant. The learned magistrate accepted the plea of guilty and convicted the appellant as indicated in the judgment.\n\nThe High Court, however, enhanced the sentence as mentioned above.\n\nMr. U. P. Singh appearing in support of the appeal has raised a short point before us.\n\nHe has submitted that taking the prosecution case at its face value, no offence can be said to have been committed under G section 27 (a) (i) or (ii) of the Act.\n\nIt was submitted that the ingredients reguired by section 27 have not been proved in this case and therefore, even if, the accused pleaded guilty, that will not enable the prosecution to convict him on his plea of guilty.\n\nSection 18 ( c) runs tlius\n\n\"manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accordance with the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose under this Chapter.\"\n\nSection 27 is the penal section under which the offence is punishable and this section runs thus :\n\n\"Whoever himself or by any other person on his behalf manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes-( a) any drug-\n\n(i) deemed to be misbranded under clause, (a), clause (b), clause (e), clause (d), clause (f) or clause (g) of secton 17 or adulterated under section l 7B; or\n\n(ii) without a valid licence as required under caluse (c) of section 18.\"\n\nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.;\n\nProvided that the Court may, for any special reasons to be\n\nrecorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less D than one year;\"\n\nIt was contended by Mr. Singh that in order to fall within the. ambit of this section the accused must manufacture the drugs for sale or stock or exhibit for sale or distribute the same.\n\nThere is no evidence in this case to show that the. appellant had any shop or that he was a distributing agent.\n\nAll that has been shown is that the tablets concerned were recovered from his possession.\n\nIt was urged that possession simpliciter of the tablets of any quantity whatsoever would not fall within the mischief of section 27 of the Act. On an interpretation of section 27, it seems to us that the arguments of Mr. Singh is well founded and must prevail.\n\nThe words used in section 27, name.ly,, \"manufacture for sale\", sells, have a comma after each clause but there is no comma after the clause \"stocks or exhibits for sale\".\n\nThus the section postulate three separate categories of cases and no other. (I) manufacture for sale; (2) actual sale; (3) stocking or exhibiting for sale or distribution of any drugs.\n\nThe absence of any comma after the word \"stocks\" clearly indicates that the clause \"stocks or exhibits for sale'' is one indivisible whole and it contemplates not merely stocking the drugs but stocking the drugs for the purpose of sale and unless all the ingredients of this category are satisfied, section 27 of the Act would not be attracted.\n\nJn the present case there is rio evidence to show that the appellant had either got these tablets for sale or was selling them or had stocked them for sale.\n\nMr. Khanna appearing for the State, however, contended that the word \"stock\" used in section is wide enough to include the possession\n\nof a person with the tablets and where such a person is in the possession of tablets of a very huge quantity, a presumption should be; drawn that they were meant for sale or for distribution.\n\nIn our opinion, the contenton is wholly untenable and must be rejected.\n\nThe interpretation sought to be placed by Shri Khanna does not flow from a true and proper interpretation of section 27.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that before a person can be liable for prosecution or conviction under section 27 (a) (i) (ii) read with section 18 (c) of the Act, it must be proved by the prosecution affirmatively that he was manufacturing the drugs for sale or was selling the same or had stocked them or exhibited the articles for sale.\n\nThe possession simpliciter of the articles does not appear to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nIf, therefort>, the essential ingredients of section 27 are not satisfied the plea of guilty cannot lead the Court to convict the appellant.\n\nAs regards the second charge, it seems to us that the case of the appellant is clearly covered by the language contained in section 18A read D with section 28.\n\nSection 18A runs thus :\n\n\"Every person, not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall, if so required, disclose to the Inspector the same, address and other particulars of the person from whom he acquired the drug or E cosmetic.\"\n\nSection 28 which makes no disclosure of ! 8A punishable reads thus :\n\n\"Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 18A shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.\"\n\nIn this case, there is unchallengable evidence of the complainant that after recovering tablets from the possession of the appellant, he had served a registered notice to him to disclose the source from which he had acquired the tablets and despite this notice the appellant refused to disclose the source.\n\nThus the act of the appellant clearly falls within the ambit of section 28 of the Act.\n\nThe trial court further did not impose any separate. sentence under this section.\n\nBut that will not be a bar to imposing a proper sentence by this Court provided the sentence does not exceed the sentence already imposed under section 27 (a) (i).\n\nWhen the High Court was moved for enhancing the sentence, it wa's moved only under section 27 (a) (ii) of the Act because under that\n\n• •\n\nsection the minimum sentence !o be given was one year.\n\nAs the High Court was not satisfied with the reasons given by the trial conrt for giving sentence less than one year it appears to have enhanced the sentence to one year.\n\nIn view of our finding that section 27 (a) (i) have no application to this case, the charge on this count against the appellant must fail and the appellant must be acquitted of this charge.\n\nSo far as section 28 is concerned the' maximum punishment which can be imposed is only one year.\n\nThe appellant is a young man and comes from a respectable family and had made a very candid confession before the Court in pleading guilty.\n\nIn these circumstances, we therefore do not think that any deterrent sentence is called for.\n\nWe would, therefore, uphold the conviction of the appellant under section 28 but give the sentence till the rising of the Court which he has already undergone. The appellant will now be released forthwith.\n\nThe sentence of a fine of Rs. 200 will be maintained under section 28 and not under section 27\n\n(a) (i).\n\nThe fine if not paid shall be paid within a month from today.\n\nAccordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.\n\nM.R .\n\nAppeal allowed in [Nirf.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "MOHD. SHABIR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. SHABIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 562, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1107, "end_char": 1112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1499, "end_char": 1509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s2A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1692, "end_char": 1695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27(a)(i)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1791, "end_char": 1799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12-2-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2263, "end_char": 2272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12-2-1973 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No."}}, {"text": "U. I'. Sinph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "774/ 72 ..\n\nU. I'."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Re>pondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2388, "end_char": 2400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Re>pondent."}}, {"text": "H\n\nFAzAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-Tn this appeal by special leave the appellant ha!!'"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2554, "end_char": 2564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics\n\nAct, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics\n\nAct, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics\n\nAct, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics\n\nAct, 1940"}}, {"text": "5.5.1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3157, "end_char": 3165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution, on 5.5.1970 at about 11.30 a.m. the complainant Drugs Inspector, Jalagaon received a telephonic meassage from the Senior Railway Sub-Inspector Bhusawal to the effect that the appellant had been caught at the Bhusawal railway station with 17 plastic containers containing 17,000 white coloured tablets."}}, {"text": "Jalagaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3219, "end_char": 3227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution, on 5.5.1970 at about 11.30 a.m. the complainant Drugs Inspector, Jalagaon received a telephonic meassage from the Senior Railway Sub-Inspector Bhusawal to the effect that the appellant had been caught at the Bhusawal railway station with 17 plastic containers containing 17,000 white coloured tablets."}}, {"text": "Bhusawal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3297, "end_char": 3305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution, on 5.5.1970 at about 11.30 a.m. the complainant Drugs Inspector, Jalagaon received a telephonic meassage from the Senior Railway Sub-Inspector Bhusawal to the effect that the appellant had been caught at the Bhusawal railway station with 17 plastic containers containing 17,000 white coloured tablets."}}, {"text": "Bhusawal railway station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receiving this message the complainant went to Bhusawal railway station on the next day and after taking permission from the magistrate he took the sample or the tablets and sent it to the public analyst and after receiving his report, he filed a complaint against the appellant under the various sections of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940."}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3773, "end_char": 3796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4056, "end_char": 4067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4669, "end_char": 4680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh appearing in support of the appeal has raised a short point before us."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4876, "end_char": 4886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5841, "end_char": 5851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6177, "end_char": 6182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provided that the Court may, for any special reasons to be\n\nrecorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less D than one year;\"\n\nIt was contended by Mr. Singh that in order to fall within the."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6666, "end_char": 6676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6713, "end_char": 6723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7465, "end_char": 7475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7674, "end_char": 7680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Khanna appearing for the State, however, contended that the word \"stock\" used in section is wide enough to include the possession\n\nof a person with the tablets and where such a person is in the possession of tablets of a very huge quantity, a presumption should be; drawn that they were meant for sale or for distribution."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8284, "end_char": 8294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8318, "end_char": 8328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8684, "end_char": 8694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8929, "end_char": 8939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8942, "end_char": 8953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9867, "end_char": 9877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10118, "end_char": 10128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10222, "end_char": 10232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10707, "end_char": 10717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11096, "end_char": 11106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11296, "end_char": 11306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11321, "end_char": 11331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1007_1013_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "-- y\n\nVIMAL CHAND JAWANTRAJ JAIN\n\nSHRI PRADHAN AND ORS.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nConservation of Forei,::11 Exchange and Prevention of Sn1ug1-Jing Actil'ities Act, 1974 (Act 52 of 1974)-Representation of the petitioner not considered by the State Govenunent-Confinning the detention order 011 the basi, r of the Advisory Bot1rd's report is inta[id being in contravention of Article 22(5) of\n\nthe Constitu!ion-Subsieque11t consideration and rejection of the repre, entation C could not cure the itnalidity of confirn1ation of detention.\n\nThe detenu under the COFEPOSA challenged the orders detaining him as violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution on the ground that his representa tion was neither considered nor disposed of by the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, though the latter intimated by his letter dated 22nd December\n\n1978, that the issue of copies of relevant documents and statement to him \\Vas D under consideration of the Government and after that issue was decided the petitioner's representation would be considered and a suitable reply would be given. The admitted fact was that the State Government confirmed the order of detention solely on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board.\n\nAllowiI!g the Writ Petition, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The power to preventively detain a person cannot be exercised E except in accordance with the constitutional safeguards provided. in clauses\n\n(4) and (5) of Article 22 and if an order of detention is made in violation of such safeguards, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It is immaterial whether these constitutional safeguards are incorporated in the Jaw authorising preventive detention because even if they are not, they would be deemed to be ro.rt of law as a superimposition of the Constitution which is the supreme la\\v of the laud and they must be obeyed on pain of invalidation of the o: di:T F of detention. [1010 B-D].\n\n2. The constitutional imperative enacted in clause (5) of Article 22 requiring the earliest opportunity to be afforded to the detenu to make a represento.-\n\ntion carries with it by necessary implication a constitutional obligation on the detaining authority to consider the representation as early as possible before making an order confirn1ing the detention. The detaining authority must G consider the representation of the detenu and come to its own conclusion whether it is necessary to detain him. If the detaining authority takes the view, on considering the representation of the detenu, that it is not necessary to detain him, it would be wholly unnecessary for it to place the case of the detenu before thl Advisory Board. The requirement of obtaining opinion of the Advisory Boord is an additional safeguard over and above the safeguard afforded to the detenu of making a representation against the order of detention. The opinion H of the Advisory Board even if given after consideratio~ of thereprese, ntation of the detenu need not necessarily be binding on the detaining authority. [1011 C-E]\n\nSUP>.EME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThere are thus two distinct safeguards provided to a detenu: one is that his\n\ncne n1u5t be referred to an Advisory Ilo.1rd for its opinion if it is sought to ddain him fer a longer period than three months and the other is that he should b:: afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the\n\norl~::r of ct, tcntion and such representation should be conside-red by the detain~\n\ning auth(1J ity as early as possible before any order is m:ide confirming the dctc>!1tion.\n\nNeither safeguard is dependent on th.:! other and both have to be ob'icrvtd by the detaining authority. The detaining authority is therefore, bound to conider the representation of the detenu on its own and keeping in view all the facts and circumstances relating to the case, come to its own deci5icn whether to confirm the order of detention or to release the di.::tenu.\n\nThe subsequent consideration o.nd rejection of the representation could not cure the in\\alidity of the order of confirmation.\n\n[1012C~G, 1013E].\n\nKhudiratn Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 550; Khairul Haque\n\nv. The State of West Bengal, W.P. 246/69 decided on 10-9-69; referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 146 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. Jethmalani and Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner.\n\nU. R. Lalit, J. L. Jain and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nE BHAGWATI, J., This petition is directed against the validity of an order of detention dated 31st November, 1978 made by the lirst respondent who is the Secretary to the Govermnent of Maharas'., tra, Home Department in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 197 4 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nF The petitioner has urged several grounds before us but it is not neces• Fary to refer to them since there is one ground which is in our opinion sufficient to dispose of the petition in favour of the petitioner.\n\nTo appreciate this ground, it is necessary to state a few facts.\n\nOn 13th November, 1978, an order was made by the !st respon-\n\n. G dent in exercise of the power conferred on him under sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Act directing the detention of the petitioner. Pursuant to the order of detention, the petitioner was arrested and he was immediately served with the grounds of detention which were embodied in a communication dated 13th November, 1978 addressed by the !st respondent to the petitioner.\n\nThe grounds of detention were quite\n\n, H elaborate and they alleged various smuggling activit; es against the petitioner and several statements and documents were referred to and relied upon in support of those allegations.\n\nThe petitioner, by hi•\n\nfr'f--\n\n' •\n\nadvocate's Jetter dated 25th November, 1978, requested the ]st respondent to furnish copies of the statements and documents referred to .and relied upon in the grounds of detention and stated that he required the same for the purpose of enabling him to make a representation against the order of -detention.\n\nIt sems that a copy of this letter was also sent by the petitioner to the Collector of Customs.\n\nThe Assistant Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, informed the petitioner's advocate by his letter dated 27th November, 1978 that copies of the relevant documents and statements required by the petitioner for the purpose of making a representation against the order of detention may be obtained from the Collector of Customs. The petitioner thereupon addressed his advocate's letter dated 2nd December, 1978 to the Collector of Customs requesting him to furnish copies of the relevant documents and statements.\n\nThe Assistant Collector of Customs, however, replied by his letter dated 6th December, 1978 stating that copies of the relevant documents and statements would be supplied after a show cause notice under the Customs Act, 1926 was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner was thus unable to get copies of the relevant documents and statements from the Collector of Customs.\n\nThe petitioner obviously could 11ot wait for making a representation since the period of thirty days within which a representation must be made was expiring and he, therefore,\n\nent a representation dated 4 /9th December, 1978 to the Home Secretary and it was received by the Home Department on 12th December 1978. The Asstt. Secretary, Ho; ne Department, by his letter dated 22nd December, 1978, acknowledged that the representation of the petitioner was received on 12th December, 1978 and intimated that the issue regarding the supply of copies of relevant documents and ' statements to the petitioner was under consideration of the Government .and alter this issue was decided, the representation of the petitioner would be considered and a suitable reply would be given.\n\nNow it appears from the affidavit in reply filed by the !st respondent that the case of the petitioner was in the meanwhile referred to the Advisory Board and since the meeting the Advisory Board was fixed on 20th December, 1978, the representation of the petitioner was forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration.\n\nThe Advisory Board reported to the 1st respondent that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detenion of the petitioner, and this report was received by the 1st respondent on 6th January, 1979.\n\nThe !st respondent, .alter considering the report of the Advisory Board made an order dated 15th January, 1979 confirming the detention of the petitioner.\n\nThe petitioner on these facts contended that the order confirming the detention of the petitioner was passed by the 1st respondent without considering the representation of the petitioner and the detention of the petitioner was, therefore, unlawful as being in contravention of Article 22 ( 5) of the Constitution.\n\nThis contention has in our opinion great force and it must result In invalidation of the detention of the petitioner. It is\" now settled Jaw that the power to preventively detain a person cannot be exercised except in accordance with the constitutional safegudards provided in clauses ( 4) and\n\n(5) of Article 22 and if any order of detention is made in vio1ation of such safeguards, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid.\n\nIt is immaterial whether these constitutional safeguards are incorporated in the law authorising preventive detention, because even if they are not, they would be deemed to be part of the law as a superimposition of the Constitution which is the supreme law of the land' and they must be obeyed on pain of invalidation of the order of detention.\n\nThe 1st respondent was, therefore, bound to observe theconstitutional safeguards provided inter alia in clauses ( 4) and ( 5) of Article 22 in detaining the petitioner.\n\nWe are concerned in this; case only with a complaint of violation of the provisions of clause (5) of Article 22 and that clause reads as follows :\n\n\"When any person is detained in pursuance of an order E made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\"\n\nIll\n\nThis Court explained the true meaning and import of this clause 111: Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal(') :\n\n\"The constitutional im!\"'ratives enacted in this article are twofold : (!) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention.\n\nThese are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security.\"\n\n(!)A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 550.\n\n• •\n\nIt will, therefore, be seen that one of the basic requirements of clause (5) of Article 22 is that the authority making the order of detention must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention.\n\nNow this requirement wonld become illusory unless there is a corresponding o!Jligation on the detaining authority to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. It could never have been the intention of the constitution makers that the detenu should be given the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention but the detaining authority should be free not to consider the representation before confirming the order of detention.\n\nThat would render the safeguard enacted by he constitution-makers meaningless and futile.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no doubt that the constitutional imperative enacted in clause (5) of Art. 22 requiring the earliest opportunity to be afforded to the detenu to make a representation carries with it by necessary implication a constitutional obligation on the detaining authority to consider the representation as early as possible before making an order confirming the detention.\n\nThe detaining authority must consider the representation of the detenu and come to its own conclusion whether it is necessary to detain him. If the detaining authority takes the view, on considering the representation of the detenu, that it is not necessary to detain him, it would be wholly unnecessary for it to place the case of the detenu before the Advisory Board. The requirement of obtaining opinion of the Advisory Board is an additional safeguard over and above the safeguard afforded to the detenu of making a representation against the order of detention.\n\nThe opinion of the Advisory Board even if given after consideration of the representation is no substitute for the consideration of the representation by the detaining authority.\n\nThis Court pointed out in Khairul Haque v. The State of West Bengal(')\n\n\"It is implicit in the language of Article 22 that the appropriate Gove_mment, while discharging its duty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the Board on such representation.\n\nIt has to consider the r•epresentation on its own without being influenced by any such view of the Board. There was, therefore, no reason for the Government to wait for considering the petitioner's representation until it had received the report of the Advisory Board.\n\nAs laid down in Sk. Abdul Karim v.\n\nState of West Bengal (AIR 1969 SC 1028) (supra), the obligation of the appropriate Government under Art. 22 ( 5)\n\n(1) W. P. 245 of 1969, dee. on Sept. 10, 1969.\n\nis to consider the representation made by the detenu as expeditiously as possible.\n\nThe consideration by the Government of such representation has to be, as aforesaid, independent of any opinion which may be expressed by the Advisory Board.\n\nThe fact that Art. 22(5) enjoins upon the detaining authority to afford to the dctenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation must implicity mean that such representation, must, when made, be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, otherwise, it is obvious that the obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation loses both its purpose and meaning.\"\n\nThere are thus two distinct safeguards provided to a detenu; one is that his case must be referred to an Advisory Board for iis opinion if it is sought to detain him for a longer period than three months and the other is he should be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention and such representation should be considered by the detaining authority as early as possible before any order is. made confirming the detention.\n\nNeilhc;· safeguard is dependent on the other and both have to be observed by the detaining authority. It is no answer for the detaining authority to say that the representation of the detenu was sent by it to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board has considered the representation and then made a report expressing itself in favour of detention.\n\nEven if the Advisory Board has made a report stating that in its opinion there is sufficient cause for the detention, the State Government is not bound by such opinion and it may still on considering the representation of the detenu or otherwise, decline to confirm the order of detention and release the detenu. The detaining authority is, therefore, bound to consider the representation of the detenu on its own and keeping in view all the facts and circumstances relating to the case, come to its own decision whether to confirm the order of detention or to release the detenu.\n\nHere in the present case, the representation of the petitioner was received by the Home Department on 12th December, 1978 and it was immediately forwarded to the Advisory Board because the meeting of the Advisory Board was fixed on 20th December, 1978. ff The report of the Advisory Board stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner was received by the !st respondent on 6th January, 1979 and on the basis of this report,\n\n...\n\n• •\n\n_)-\n\nthe 1st respondent confirmed the order of detention on 15th January,\n\n1979. There is nothing on the record to show that the 1st respondent considered the representation of the petitioner before making the order confirming the detention of the petitioner. We do not find anywhere in the affidavit of the 1st respondent in reply to the petition any statement that he considered the representation of the petitioner before making the order of confirmation dated 15th January, 1979. On the contrary, there is a positive statement in paragraph 16 of this affidavit that the detention order was confirmed after consideration of the report of the Advisory Board which was of the opinion that the detention should be continued. We called upon the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent to place before us the file relating to the detention of the petitioner and when this file was shown,, we found that there was an endorsement made on 12th March, 1979 which showed that it was only on that date that the representation of the patitim1er was considered by the 1st respondent and rejected. This is also borne out by the letter dated 12th March, 1979 addressed by the Deputy Secretary, Home Department to the petitioner stating that the representation was considered by the \"Advisory Board/Government\" and his\n\nrequest for release from detention could not be granted. It is, therefore, amply clear from the record that the representation of the petitioner WGS not considered by the !st respondent before he confirmed the order of detention. The !st respondent thus failed to comply with the constitutional obligation imposed upon him under clause ( 5) of Art. 22. The subsequent consideration and rejection of the representation could not cure the invalidiy of the order of confirmation.\n\nThe detention of the petitioner must, therefore, be held to be illegal and void.\n\nThese were the reasons for which we made our order dated 11th April, 1979 quashing and setting aside the detention of the petitioner and directing that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith .\n\nS.R.\n\nWrit petition allowed_", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "y\n\nVIMAL CHAND JAWANTRAJ JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIMAL CHAND JAWANTRAJ JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRADHAN AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRADHAN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 4, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 648, "end_char": 658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd December\n\n1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 856, "end_char": 875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22(5) of the Constitution on the ground that his representa tion was neither considered nor disposed of by the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, though the latter intimated by his letter dated 22nd December\n\n1978, that the issue of copies of relevant documents and statement to him \\Vas D under consideration of the Government and after that issue was decided the petitioner's representation would be considered and a suitable reply would be given."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1459, "end_char": 1469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2006, "end_char": 2016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1975 SC 550", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4360, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. Jethmalani and Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4383, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. Jethmalani and Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, J. L. Jain and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "J. L. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4430, "end_char": 4440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, J. L. Jain and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4445, "end_char": 4457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, J. L. Jain and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "E BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nE BHAGWATI, J., This petition is directed against the validity of an order of detention dated 31st November, 1978 made by the lirst respondent who is the Secretary to the Govermnent of Maharas'.,"}}, {"text": "31st November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4618, "end_char": 4637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nE BHAGWATI, J., This petition is directed against the validity of an order of detention dated 31st November, 1978 made by the lirst respondent who is the Secretary to the Govermnent of Maharas'.,"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4818, "end_char": 4893, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "13th November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5223, "end_char": 5242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th November, 1978, an order was made by the !"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6745, "end_char": 6763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner thereupon addressed his advocate's letter dated 2nd December, 1978 to the Collector of Customs requesting him to furnish copies of the relevant documents and statements."}}, {"text": "6th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Collector of Customs, however, replied by his letter dated 6th December, 1978 stating that copies of the relevant documents and statements would be supplied after a show cause notice under the Customs Act, 1926 was issued to the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7075, "end_char": 7092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "4 /9th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7445, "end_char": 7466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner obviously could 11ot wait for making a representation since the period of thirty days within which a representation must be made was expiring and he, therefore,\n\nent a representation dated 4 /9th December, 1978 to the Home Secretary and it was received by the Home Department on 12th December 1978."}}, {"text": "12th December 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner obviously could 11ot wait for making a representation since the period of thirty days within which a representation must be made was expiring and he, therefore,\n\nent a representation dated 4 /9th December, 1978 to the Home Secretary and it was received by the Home Department on 12th December 1978."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7616, "end_char": 7635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary, Ho; ne Department, by his letter dated 22nd December, 1978, acknowledged that the representation of the petitioner was received on 12th December, 1978 and intimated that the issue regarding the supply of copies of relevant documents and ' statements to the petitioner was under consideration of the Government .and alter this issue was decided, the representation of the petitioner would be considered and a suitable reply would be given."}}, {"text": "12th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7708, "end_char": 7727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary, Ho; ne Department, by his letter dated 22nd December, 1978, acknowledged that the representation of the petitioner was received on 12th December, 1978 and intimated that the issue regarding the supply of copies of relevant documents and ' statements to the petitioner was under consideration of the Government .and alter this issue was decided, the representation of the petitioner would be considered and a suitable reply would be given."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent that the case of the petitioner was in the meanwhile referred to the Advisory Board and since the meeting the Advisory Board was fixed on 20th December, 1978, the representation of the petitioner was forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration."}}, {"text": "6th January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8531, "end_char": 8548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Advisory Board reported to the 1st respondent that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detenion of the petitioner, and this report was received by the 1st respondent on 6th January, 1979."}}, {"text": "15th January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8643, "end_char": 8661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent, .alter considering the report of the Advisory Board made an order dated 15th January, 1979 confirming the detention of the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 8995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9325, "end_char": 9335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9933, "end_char": 9943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10075, "end_char": 10085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11333, "end_char": 11343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12172, "end_char": 12179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13322, "end_char": 13332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1969 SC 1028", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13820, "end_char": 13836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13898, "end_char": 13905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14216, "end_char": 14226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17443, "end_char": 17459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We called upon the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent to place before us the file relating to the detention of the petitioner and when this file was shown,, we found that there was an endorsement made on 12th March, 1979 which showed that it was only on that date that the representation of the patitim1er was considered by the 1st respondent and rejected."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18160, "end_char": 18167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1014_1058_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "RAMANA DAYARAM SHETTY\n\nTHE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND\n\nORS.\n\nMay 4, 1979.\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nInternational Airport Authority Act 1971-Whether an instrumentality of State-Authority called for tenders for a iob-lj could accept a tender not confonninR to conditions in notice.\n\nC Administrative law-Statutorybody-When an instnunentality of State.\n\nThe first respondent, by a public notice, invited tenders for putting up and running a second class restaurant and two snack bars at the International Airport, Bombay. The notice stated in Paragraph (1) that. sealed tenders in the prescribed form were invited from registered second class hoteliers having at least five years' experience for putting up and running a second cla-, s restaurant and two snack bars at the Bombay Airport for a period of three years.\n\nParagraph (8) stated that acceptance of the tender would rest v .. ith the Airport Director who does not bind himself to accept ilny tender and reserYe~ to himself the right to reject all or any of the tenders received without as-.igning any reasons therefor.\n\nOut of the six tenders received only the tender of the 4th respoo.dents was complete and offered the highest amount as licence fee.\n\nAll the otheI\" tenders were rejected because they were incomplete.\n\nSince the fourth respondents did not satisfy the description of \"registered second class hoteliers having at least 5 years' experience\" prescribed in paragraph (1) of the tender notice, the 1st respondent called upon the fourth respondents to produce documentary ewidence \\Vhether they were registered second class hotliers having at least 5 years' experience.\n\nThe fourth respondents stated once again that they had considerable experience of catering for various reputed commercial houses, clubs, messes and banks and that they had Eating Houses C.atering Establishment (Canteen) Licence.\n\nSatisfied with the information given by the fourth respondents, the first respondent accepted their tender on the terms and conditions set out in its letter.\n\nThe aiipellant filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the decision of the first respondent in accepting the tender of the fourth respondents.\n\nBut it was rejected.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that ( l) the first respondent which is a public authority 'vas bound to give effect to the most important condition of eligibility and acceptance of the tender by the first respondent was in violation of the standard or norm of eligibility set up by the first respondent and (2) had the appellant known that non-fulfilment of tbe condition of eligibility would be no bar for considering a tender he too would he.ve competed for obtaining the contract.\n\nR. D. SHETTY V. AIRPORT AUTHORITY 1015\n\nThe fourth respondents, on the other hand, contended that the requirement that the tenderer must be a registered second grade hotlier was meaningless because the grading is given by the Bombay City Municipal Corporation only\n\nto hotels or resta1irants and not to persons running them and, therefore there could be no second grade hotlier; (2) the notice Setting out the conditions of eligibility having had no stautory force, even if there was a departure from the standard or norm of eligibility, it was not justiceablc and the first respondent was competent to give the conract to anyone it thought fit; and (3) the Airport Authority reserved to itself the right to reject all or any of the tenders without assigning any reasons and, therefore, it \\\\1as competent to it to reject all the tenders or negotiate with any person it considered fit to enter into a contract.\n\nHELD The action of the first respondent in accepting the tender of the fourth respondents, who did not satisfy the standard or norm, was clearly discriminatory since it excluded other persons similarly situate from tendering for the contract and it was arbitrary and without reason.\n\nAcceptance of the tender was invali4 as being violative of the equality c'Iause of the Constitution as also of administrative la\\V inhibiting arbitrary action. [1056 C]\n\n(a) What paragraph (1) of the notice required was that only a person rum1ing a registered second class hotel or restaurant and having at least 5 years' experience as such should be eligible to submit the tender.\n\nThe test of eligibility laid down in this paragraph was an objective test and not a subjective one..\n\nIf a person submitting the tender did not have atleast five years' expe~ rience of running a second class hotel, he was eligible to submit the tender and it would not avail him to say that though he did not satisfy this condition he was otherwise capable of running a second class restaurant and therefore should be considered.\n\nThis \\Vas in fact how the first respondent unders_tood this condition of eligibility.\n\nThe first respondent did not regard this requirement as meaningless or unnecessary and wanted to be satisfied that the fourth respondents had fulfilled this requirement. The fourth respondents were neither running a second grade hotel or. restaurant nor did they have five years' experience of running such a hotel or restaurant.\n\nTherefore the fourth res- pondents did not satisfy the condition of eligibility ltaid down in paragraph( 1) of the noice. [1028 BH]\n\n(b) It is not possible to justify the action of the first respondent on the ground that it could have achieved the same result by rejecting all the tenders and entering into direct negotiations with the fourth respondents.\n\nAlthough there wa'i no statutory or administrative rule requiring the first respondent to give a contract only by inviting tenders and that on the terms of paragraph 8 of the tender notice, it was not bound to accept any tender, the first respondent did not reject the tenders outright and enter into direct negotiation wit~ the fourth respondents for awarding the contract. The process of awarding a contract by inviting tenders was not terminated or abandoned by the first respondent by rejecting all the tenders but in furtherance of the process the tender of the fourth respondents was accepted by the first respondent. Nor \"'as the contract given to the fourth respondents a.s a result of direct negotiations.\n\n[1029 D-G]\n\n2(a) Today v; rith tremendous expansion of welfare and social service functions, increing control of materi2'1 and economic resources and large scale assumption of industrial and comm'ercial activities by the State, the power of\n\nthe executive Government to affect the lives of the people is steadily growing.\n\nThe attainment of socio-economic justice bein~ a conscious end of State policy, there is a vast and inevitable increase in the frequency with which ordinary citizens come into relatioJ!ship of direct encunter , with State powerholders.\n\nThis renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbitrary application or exercise.\n\nWhatever be the concept of the rule of la\\\\.', there is substantial agreement in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found. It is unthinkable that in o. democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Governn1ent must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement.\n\nAnd to the application of this principle it makes no differene whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some right or denial of some privilege.\n\n[1031 F-H]\n\n(b) Today the Government, in a \\velfare State:, is the regulator and dispenser of special services and provider of a large number of benefits.\n\nThe valuables dispensed by Governn1ent take n1any forms, but they all share one cl1aractcrfa, tic.\n\nThey are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth.\n\nThese valuables which derive from relationshipsto Government are of many D kinds: leases, licences, contracts and so forth.\n\nWith the iOCreasing magnitude and range of governmental functions as we move closer to a welfare State, more and more of our wealth consists of these new forms.\n\nSome of these forn1s of wealth may be in the nature of legal rights but the large majority of them are in the nature of privileges.\n\nBut on that account, it cannot be so.id that they do not enjoy any legal protection nor can they be regarded as gratuity furnished by the State so thnt the State may withhold, grant or revoke E it at its pleasure. [1032 E-H]\n\n(c) The law has not been slow to recognize the importance of this ne\\v kind of wealth and the need to protect individual interest in it and with that end in view, it has developed new forms of protection. Some interests in Government largess, formerly regarded as privileges, have been recognized as rights \\Vhile others have been given legal protilction not only by forging proceJurr.-l safeguards but also by confining/structuring and checking Government discretion in the matter of grant of such largess. The discretion of the Government has been held to be not unlimited in that the Government cannot give or \\vith~\n\nhold largess in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. [1033 C-D]\n\nViterolli v.\n\nSatan 359 U.S. 535: 3 Law Ed. (Second Series) 1012, Erusian Equipn1ent and Chen1icals Lrcl. v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR, 674 referred to.\n\n(d) Therefore, where the Government is dealing \\\\lith the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licence<> or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal \\Vith any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant.\n\nThe power or discretion of the GoverJ?, ment in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck\n\n• •\n\nR. D. SHETTY V, AIRPORT AUTHORITY\n\n1 0 I 7\n\ndown, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not\n\narbitrary, but was based on some valid principle \\Vhich in itself was non-irraticnal, unreasonable or discriminatory. [1034 F-H]\n\n(e) The Government which represents the executive authority of the State may act through the instrumentality or agency of natural persons or it may empk>y the instrumentality or agency of juridicinl persons to carry out its functions. With the advent of the welfure state the civil service, which traditionalJy carried out functions of Government through natural persons, was found inadequate to handle the new tasks of specialised and highly technical character.\n\nTo fill the gap it became necessary to forge a new instrumentality or administrative device for handling these new problems and that is done by public corporations \\vhich has become the third arm of the Government. They are regarded as agencies of the Government. In pursuance of the industrial policy resolution of the Government of India corporations were created by the Government for setting up and management of public enterprises and carrying out public functions. The corporations so created, acting as instrumentality or ogency of Government, would obviously be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as Government itself though in the eye of law they would be distinct and independent legal entities.\n\nJf Government, acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional and public la\\v limitations, it must follow a fortiori that Government, -through the instrumentality or agency of corporations, should equally be subject to the same limitations. But the question is how to determine whether a corporation is acting as instrumentality or agency of Government. [1035 A-C, F-HJ\n\n3(a) The factors for dtermining whether a corporation bas becon1e an instrumentality or agency of the Government are; does the State give any finan~ cial assistance and if so what is the magnitude of such assistance ? Is there any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State, and '~'hat i:oi the nature and extent of such control? Does the corporation enjoy any State conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the functions carried out by the corporation are nublic functions closely related to governmental functions?\n\nIt is not io; e to particularise all the i-elevant factors but no sing]e factor will yield a sansfoctory answer, to the question and the court \\viU have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and stablish it by its decision on the basis of a particularised enquiry into facts and circumstances of each case. [1041 B-EJ\n\n(b) Sukhdev v. Bhagatram [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619 at 658 explained, Kerr\n\nv. Eneck Pratt Free Library, 149 F. 2d 212, Jack:Jon v. Metropolitan Edison Go. 419 U.S. 345; 42 L.ed. 2d 477, Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296; 15 L.•d.\n\n2d 373, Pfizer v. Ministry of Health [1964] 1 Ch. 614, New York v. United\n\n!!tales 326 U.S. 572, Cf. Helvering v. Gerhardt 304 U.S. 405, 426, 427 referred to .\n\n(c) Where a corporation i:i; an irutrumentality or agency of Government it would be subject to some constitutional or public law Jimitations as Government.\n\nThe rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government must apply equaJly where such corporation is dealing with the public and it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person it lit~ at it! sweet will.\n\nIts action must be in conformity with so111e principlt! which meets the test of reason and relevance. (1041 HJ\n\n9'-409 SCI /79\n\n\nA Rajastha11 Electricity Board\n\nv. Mohan Lal\n\n\nSukhdev v. Bhagatram [1975) 3 S.C.R. 619 at 658 followed.\n\n\nv. General lllanager, Hindustan Steel Li1nited [1970] 3 SCR 363, Sarbhajit Tewmi v. Union of India & Ors. [1975) 1 SCC 485; held inapplicable.\n\n(<l) lt is wen established that Art. 14 requires that State action must not be arbitrary and must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is n6n-discriminatory. It must not be guided by extraneous or irrelevant coniiderations. The State cannot act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise, with a third party. Its action must conform to some sta.Rdard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory. [1042 C]\n\nE. P. Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [1974) 2 SCR 348, Maneka Gandhi\n\nv. Union of India [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa [1969) 3 S.C.R. 374, C. K. Achuthan v. State of Kera/a [1959) S.C.R. 78, referred to.\n\n\nv. C. A. lmanuel [1969) 3 S.C.R. 773, Heavy Engineering Mazdaar Union v.\n\nState of Bihar [1969] 3 SCR, 995, S. L. Aggarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Limited [1970] 3 SCR. 363, Sarbhajit Tewari v. Union bf India & ors. [1975) 1 sec 485, held in applicable.\n\n4(a) The lnterne.tional Airport Authority-Act, 1971 empowers the Central Government to constitute an authority called the International Airport Authority. The salient features of the Act are: the Authority, which is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, consists of a Chairmen and certain other Members who are appointed by the Central Government. The Central Government has power to terminate the appointment or to remove a member from the Board of the Authority. Although the Authority bas no share capital of its own, capital needed by it for carrying out its functions is provided wholly by the Central Government. All non-recurring expenditure incurred by the Central Government for or in connection with the purposes of the airports upto the appointed date and dec1a~-red to be capital expenditure by the Central Government shall be treated as capital provided by the Central Government _to the first respondent and all sums of money due to the Central Government in relation to the airports immediately before the appointed date shall be deemed to be due to the first respondent. The functions, which until the appointed date were being carried out by the Central Government, were transferred to the Airport Authority by virtue of s. 16. The first respondent, according to s. 20, should pay the balance of its annual net profits to the Central Government after making provision for reserve funds, bad and doubt ful debts, depreciation in assets and so on. The first respondent, under s. 21, has to submit for the approval of the Central Government a statement of the programme of its activities during the forthcoming financial year. Its accounts are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the audited accounts shall be forwarded to the Central Government. The first respondent is required to submit an account of its activities during a financial year and this report is laid before the Houses of Parliament by the Central Government. The Central Government bas power to divest the first respondent temporarily from\n\n--f-< .•\n\n• .. •\n\nR. D. SHETTY V. AIRPORT AUTHORITY 1019\n\nthe management of any airport and direct it to entrust such manngement to any other person. llo'\\\\'er is conferred under s. 34 on the Central Government to supersede the first respondent under certairi specified circumstances. Section\n\n35 gives pO\\VC'f to the Central Government to give directions in writing te> the Airport Authority on questions of policy and the Airport Authority is bound by such directions. Section 37 empowers the Airport Authority to make regulations.\n\nSection 39 provides that contravention of any regulation made by the Airport Authority is punishable.\n\n[1052B-1054C]\n\n(b) A conspectus of the provisions of the Act clearly sho\\Vs that every test Jaid down by this Court in deciding whether a statutority authority comes within the purview of Art. 12 of the Constitution is satisfied in the case of the first respondent. They leave no room for doubt that it is an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and falls within the definition of State.\n\nTherefore, having regard both to the constitutional mandate of Art. 14 and the judicially evolved rule of administrative la\\v, the first resp'!n<lent \\Vas not -entitled to act arbitrarily in accepting the tender of the fourth respondents but\n\nwas bound to conform to the standard or norm le.id down in paragraph 1 of the notice inviting tenders. The standard or norm Jaid down by the notice waa reasonable and non-discriminatory and once it is found that such a standard or norm is laid down, the first respondent was not entitled to depart from it and award the contract to the fourth respondents who did not satisfy the con dition of eligibility rrescribed by standard or norm. If none of the tenderers satisfied the condition the first respondent could have rejected the tender and invited fresh tenders on the basis of less stringent standard or norm, but it could not depart from the prescribed standard or norm. [1055 E-A]\n\n(c) In the instant case the appellant had no real interest in the result of the litigation. There can be no doubt that the litigation was commenced by the appellant not with a view to protecting his own interest, but had been put up by others for depriving the fourth respondents of the benefit of the contract secured by them. The Writ Petition was filed more than five months after the\n\nacceptance of the tender and the position would have been different had tho appellant filed it immediately after the acceptance of the tender. The fourth respondents have incurred a large expenditure in making necessary arrangements under the bona fide belief that their tender had been legally and validly accepted.. It would be most inequitous to set aside the contract at the instance of the appellant\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 895 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-1-1978 of the High Court at Bombay in Appeal No. 234/77 arising out of Misc. Petition No. 1582/77.\n\nAshnk H. Desai, Y. S. Chitale, Jai Chinai, P. G. Gokhale and\n\n8. R. Agarwal for the Appellant.\n\nG. B. Pai, 0. C. Mathur and D. N. Mishra for Respondent No. 1.\n\nc l\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. H. Dhebar, S. K. bholakia, h H. Yagnik and B. V. Desai for Respondent No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHMWATI, J.-This appeal by special leave raises interesting questions of Jaw in the area of public Jaw. What are the constitutional obligations on the State when it takes action in exercise of its statutory or executi>e power? Is the State entitled to deal with its property in any manner it likes or award a contract to any person it chooses without any constitutional limitations upon it'! What are the parameters of its statutory or executive power in the matter of awarding a contract or dealing with its propery '' These questions fell in the sphere of both administrative law and constitutional law and they assume special significance in a mod.em welfare State which is committed to egalitarian values and dedicated to the rule of law.\n\nBut these questions cannot be decided in the abstract.\n\nThey can be determined only against the back-ground of facts and hence '<;'c shall proceed to State the facts giving rise to the appeal.\n\nOn or about 3rd January, 1977 a notice inviting tenders for putting up and running a second class restaurant and two Snack bars at the International Airpofi at Bombay was issued by the 1st respondent E which is a corporate body constituted under the International Airport Authority Act, 43 of 1971.\n\nThe notice stated in the clearest terms in paragraph (1) that \"Sealed tmders in the prescribed form are hereby invited from Registered IInd Class Hoteliers having at least 5 years' experience for putting up and running a IInd Class Restaurant and two Snack bars at this Airport fol' a period of 3 years\".\n\nThe F 1 iatest point of time upto which the tenders could be submitted to the 1st respondent was stipulated in Paragraph 7 of the notice to be 12 p.m. on 25th January, 1977 and it was provided that th~ tenders would be opened on the same date at 12.30 hours.\n\nParagraph (8) of the notice made it clear that \"the acceptance of the tender will rest with G the Airport Director who does not bind himself to accept any tender and reserves to himself the right to reject all or any of the tenders received without assigning any reasons therefor.\" There were sLx tenders received by the 1st respondent in response to the notice and one of them was from the 4th respondents of offering a licence fee of Rs. 6666.66 per month, and the others were from Cafe Mahim, Cen- H tral Catering Service, one A. S. Irani, Cafe Seaside and Cafo Excelsior\n\noffering progressiveiy oecreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents.\n\nThe tenders were opened in the\n\n• •\n\nR. D. STIETTY v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY (Bhagwati, J.) 1021\n\noffice of the Airport Director at 12.30 p.m. on 25th January, 1977 and at that time the 4th respondents were represented by their sole proprietor Kumaria. A. S. Irani was present on behalf of himself, Cafe Mahim, Cafe Seaside and Cafe Excelsior and there was one representative of Central Catering Service.\n\nThe tenders of Cafe Mahim, Central Catering Service, Cafe Seaside and Cafe Excelsior were not complete since they were not accompanied by the respective income tax certificates, affidavits of immovable property and solvency certificates, as required by cl. (9) of the terms and conditions of the tender form.\n\nThe tender of A. S. Irani was also not complete as it was not accompanied by an affidavit of immovable property held by him and solvency certificates. The only tender which was complete and fully complied with the terms and conditions of the tender form was that of the 4th respondents and the offer contained in that tender was also the highest amongst all the tenders.\n\nNow it is necessary to point out at this stage that while submitting their tender the 4th respondents had pointed out in their letter dated 24th January, 1977 addressed to the Airport Director that they had 10 years' experience in catering to reputed commercial houses, training centres, banks and factories and that they were also doing considerable outdoor catering work for various institutions.\n\nThis letter showed that the 4th respondents had experi2nce only of running canteens and not restaurants and it appeared that they did not satisfy the description of \"registered IInd Class Hotelier having at least 5 years' experience\" as set out in paragraph\n\n(1) of the notice inviting tendern.\n\nThe Airport Officer, therefore, by his Jetter dated 15th February, 1977 requested the 4th respondents to inform by return of post whether they were a \"registered IInd Class Hotelier having at least 5 years experience\" and to produce documentary evidence in this respect within 7 days.\n\nThe 4th respondents pointed out to the Airport Officer by their letter dated 22nd Febrnary, 1977 that they had, in addition to what was set out in their earlier letter dated 24th January, 1977, experience of running canteens for Phillips India Ltd. and Indian Oil Corporation and moreover, they held Eating House Licence granted by the Bombay Munici\n\npal Corporation since 1973 and had thus experience of 10 years in the catering line.\n\nIt appears that before this letter of the 4th respondents could reach Airport Officer, another letter dated 22nd February, 1977 was addressed by the Airport Officer once again requesting the 4th respondents to produce documentary evidence to show if they were '\"a registered IInd Class Hotelier having at least 5 years experience\". The 4th respondents thereupon addressed another letl'er dated\n\n26th February, 1977 to the Director pointing out that they had considerable experience of catering for various reputed commercial houses,\n\nclubs, messes and banks and they also held an Eating House Catering Establishment (Canteen) Licence as also a licence issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.\n\nThe 4th respondents stated that their sole proprietor Kumaria had started his career in catering line in the year 1962 at Hold Janpath, Delhi and gradually risen to his present position and that he had accordingly \"experience equivalent to that of a !Ind Class or even 1st Class hotelier.\" This position was\n\nreiterated by the 4th respondents in a further letter dated 3rd March, 1977 addressed to the Director.\n\nThis information given by the 4th respondents appeared to satisfy the 1st respo1ident and by a letter dated 19ti1 April, 1977 the !st respondent accepted the tender of the 4th respondents on the tei; ms and conditions set out in that letter.\n\nThe 4th respondents accepted these terms and conditions by their letter dated 23rd April, 1977 and deposited with the 1st respondent by way of security a sum of Rs. 39,999.96 in he form of fixed Deposit Receipts in favour of the Ist respondent and paid to the 1st respondent a sum of Rs. 6666.66 representing licence fee for one month and other amounts representing water, electricity and conser vancy charges.\n\nThe 4th respondents thereafter executed and handed over to the Ist respondent an agreement in the form attached to the tender on 1st May, 1977.\n\nThe 4th respondents also got pre pared furniture, counters and showcases as also uniforms for the staff, purchased inter alia deep freezers, water coolers, electrical appliances, icecrea1n cabinets, espresso coffee machines, crockery, cutlery and other article~ ; and things and also engaged the necessary staff for the purpose of running the restaurant and the two Snack bars.\n\nBut the Ist respondent could not hand over possession of the req•1i\n\nsite sites to _!he 4th respondents, since A. S. Irani was rnnning his restaurant and snack bars on these sites under a previous contract with the 1st respondent and though that contract had come to an end, A. S. Irani did not deliver possession of these sites to the Ist respondent.\n\nThe 4th respondents repeatedly requested the 1st respondent and the Airport Director who is the 2nd respondent in the appeal, to hand over possession of the sites and pointed out to them that the 4th reeeondents were incurring losses by reason of delay in delivery of possession, but on account of the intransigence of A. S.\n\nIrani the Ist respondent could not arrange to hand over possession of the sites to the 4th respondents.\n\nMeanwhile one K. S. Irani who owned Cafe Excelsior filed Suit No. 6544 of 1977 in the City Civil Court, Bombay against the res- H pondenls challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents and took out a notice of motion for res'.rair.; ng the !st respondent from taking any further steps pursuant \\o\n\n• •\n\nthe acceptance of the tender. K. S. Irani obtained an ad-interim injunction against the rS'spondents but after hearing the respondents, the City Civil Court vacated the ad-interim injunction and dismissed the notice of motion by a_n order dated 10th October, 1977.\n\nAn appeal was preferred by K. S. Irani against this order, but the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 19th October, 1977. Immediately thereafter, on the same day, the Ist respondent handed over possession of iwo site~ to the 4th respondents and the 4th respondents proceeded to set up snack bars on the two sites and started business of catering at the two snack bars. These two sites handed over to the 4t11 respondents were different from the sites occupied by A. S.\n\nJrani, because A. S. Irani refused to vacate the sites in his occupation.\n\nSo far as the site for the restaural)t was concerned, the Ist respondent could not hand over the possession of it to the 4th respondents presumably because there was no other appropriate site available other than the one occupied by A. S. Irani. Since A. s.\n\nIrani refused to hand over possession of the sites occupied by him to the 1st respondent, even though his contract had come to an end, and continued to carry on the business of running the restaurant :md the snack bars on these sites, the Ist respondent was constrained to file suit No. 8032 of 1977 against A. S. Irani in the City Civil Court at Bombay and in that suit, an injunction was obtairied by the 1st respondent restraining A. S. Irani from running or conducting the restaurant and the snack bars or from entering the premises save and except for winding up the restaurant and the snack bars. A. S. Irani preferred an appeal against the order granting the injunction, but the appeal was rejected and ultimately a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court was also, turned down on 31st July, 1978.\n\nThis was, however, not to be the end of the travails of the 4th respondents, for, as soon as the appeal preferred by K. S. Irani against the order dismissing his notice of motion was rejected by the High Court on 19th October, 1977, A. S. Irani filed another suit being sait\n\nNo. 8161 of 1977 in the City Civil Court, Bombay on 24th October, 1977 seeking mandatory injunction for removal of the two snack bars put up by the 4th respondents.\n\nThis was one more attempt by A. S.\n\nIrani to prevent the 4th respondents from obtaining the benefit of the contract awarded to them by the Ist respondent.\n\nHe, however, did not succeed in obtaining ad-interim injunction and we are told that the notice of motion taken out by him is still pending in the City Civil Court.\n\nIt will thus be seen that A. S. Irani failed in his attempts to prevent the 4th respondents from obtaining the contract and enjoying its\n\nbenefit. The 4th respondents put up two snack bars on the sites\n\nprovided by the !st respondent and started running the two snack bars from 19th October, 1977. 'The restaurant howel<er, could not be put up on account of the inability of the Ist respondent to pro-ride appropriate site to the 4th respondents and, therefore, the licence fee for the two snack bars had to be settled and it was fixed at Rs. 4,500/-\n\nper month by mntual agreement between the parties. But it seems that the 4th respondents were not destined to be left in peace to run the two snack bars and soon after the dismissal of the appeal of A. S.\n\nIrani on 19th October, 1977 and the failure of A. S. Irani to obtain an ad-interim mandatory injunction in the suit filed by him against the !st and the 4th respondents, the appeflant filr l writ petition No. 1582 of 1977 in the High Court of Bobay challenging the decision of the Ist respondent to <tCcept the tender of the 4th respondents. The writ petition was moved before a Single Judge of the High Court on 8th November, 1977 a_fter giving prior notice to the respondents and after hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge sununarily rejected the writ petition.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court against the order rejecting the writ petition and on notice being issued by the Division Bench, the Ist and the 4th respondents filed their respective affidavits in reply showing cause against the admission of the appeal.\n\nThe Division Bench after considering the affidavits and hearing the parties rejected the appeal in limine on 21st February, 1978. The appellant thereupon filed a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court and since it was felt that the questions raised in the appeal were of seminal importance, this Court granted special leave and decided to hear the appeal at an early date after giving a further opportunity to the parties to file their respective affidavits. That is how the appeal has now come before us for fmal hearing with full and adequate material placed before us on behalf of both the parties.\n\nThe main contention urged on behalf of the appellant was that in par..graph (1) of the notice inviting tenders the !st respondoot had stipulated a condition of eligibility by providing that a pecson submitting a tender must be a \"registered Und class Hotelier having at least 5 years experience.\" This was a condition of eligibility to be satisfied by every person submitting a tender and if in case of iiny person, this condition was not satisfied. his tender was ineligible for being considered.\n\nThe 1st respondent, being a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution or in any event a public authority, was bound to give effect to the condition of eligibility set up by it and was not entitled to depart from it at its own sweet will\n\nwithout rational justification.\n\nThe 4th respondents had experience of catering only in canteens and did not have 5 years' experience of running a Ilnd class hotel or restaurant and hence they did not satisfy the condition of eligibility and yet the 1st respondent accepted the tender submitted by them. This was clearly in violation .of lhe standard or norm of eligibility set up by the 1st respondent and the action of the 1st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents was clearly invalid. Such a departure from the standard or norm of eligibility had the effect of denying equal opportunity to the appellant and others of submitting their tenders and being considered for entering into contract for putting up and running the restaurant and two suack bars.\n\nThe appellant too was not a registered 2nd class hotelier with 5 years' experience and was in the same position as the 4th respondents vis-a-vis this condition of eligibility and he also could have submitted his tender and entered the field of consideration for award of the contract, but he did not do so because of this condition of eligibility which he admittedly did not satisfy.\n\nThe action of the 1st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents had, therefore, the effect of denying him equality of opportunity in the matter of consideration for award of the contract and hence it was unconstitutional as being in violation of the equality clause. This contention of the appellant was sought to be met by a threefold argument on behalf of the 1st and the 4th Respondents.\n\nThe first head of the argument was that grading is given by the Bombay City Municipal Corporation only to hotels or restaurants and not persons running them and hence there can be a 2nd grade hotel or restaurant but not a 2nd grade hotelier and the requirement in paragraph (l) of the notice that a tenderer must be a registered 2nd grade hotelier was therefore a meaningless requirement and it conld not be regarded as laying down any condition of eligibility.\n\nIt was also urged that in any event what paragraph ( 1) of the notice required was not that a person tendering must have 5 years' experience of running a 2nd grade hotel, bnt he should have sufficient experience to be able to run a 2nd grade hotel and the 4th respondents were fully qualified in this respect since they had over 10 years' experience in catering to canteens of well known companies, clubs and banks.\n\nIt was further contended in the alternative that paragraph (8) of the notice clearly provided that the acceptance of the tend, er would rest with the Airport Director who did not bind himself to accept any tender and reserved to himself the right to reject all or any of the tenders without assigning any reasons therefor and it was, therefore, competent to the 1st respondent to reject all the tenders and to negotiate with any person it considered fit to enter\n\ninto a contract and this is in effect and substance what the 1st respondent did when he accepted the tender of the 4th respondents.\n\nThe second head of argument was that paragraph (I) of the notice setting out the condition of eligibility had no statutory force nor was it issued under any administrative rules and, therefore, even if there was any departure from the standard or norm of eligibility set out in th, at paragraph, it was not justiciable and did not furnish any cause of action to the appellant. It was competent to the 1st respondent to give the contract to any one it thought fit and it was not bound by the standard or norm of eligibility set out in paragraph (1) of the notice. It was submitted that in any event the appellant had no right to complain that the' !st respondent had given the contract to the 4th respondents in breach of the condition of eligibility laid down in paragraph (I) of the notice.\n\nAnd lastly, under the third head of argument, it was submitted on behalf of the !st and the 4th respondents that in any view of the matter, the writ petition of the appellant was liable to be rejected in the exercise of its discretion by the Court, since the appellant had no real interest but was merely a nominee of A. S. Irani who had been putting up one person after another to start litigation with a view to preventing the award of the contract to the 4th respondents.\n\nThe appellant was also guilty of !aches and delay in filing the writ petition and the High Court was justified in rejecting the writ petition in limine particulr!y in view of the fact that during the period between the date of acceptance of the tender and the date of filing of the writ petition, the 4th respondents had spent an aggregate sum of about Rs. 1,25,000/- in making arrangements for putting np the restaurant and two snack bars.\n\nThese were the rival contentions . urged on behalf of the parties and we shall now proceed to discuss them in the order in which we have\n\nset them out.\n\nNow it is clear from paragraph (I) of the notice that tenders were invited only from \"registered 2nd Class hoteliers having at least 5 years' experience\". It is only if a person was a registered 2nd Class hotelier having at least 5 years' experience that he could, on the terms of paragraph (1) of the notice, submit a tender. Paragraph (!) of the notice prescribed a condition of eligibility which had to be satisfied by e.very person submitting a tender and if, in a given case, a person submitting a tender did not satisfy this condition, his tender was not eligible to be considered. Now it is true that the terms and conditions, of the tender form did not prescribe that the tenderer mnst be a registered Ilnd Class hotelier having at least 5 years' experience nor was any such stipulation to be found in the form of the agreement\n\nannexed to the tender but the notice inviting tenders published in the newspapers clearly stipulated that tenders may be submitted only by ; t; gistercd !Ind Class hoteliers having at least 5 years' experience and this tender notice was also included amongst the documents handed over to prospective tenderers when they applied for tender forms. Now the question is, what is the meaning of the expression \"registered Ilnd Class hotelier\", what category of persons fall within the meaning of this description? This is a necessary enquiry in order to determine whether the 4th respondents were eligible to submit a tender. It is clear from the affidavits and indeed there was no dispute about it that different grades arc given by the Bombay City Municipal Corporation to hotels and restaurants and, therefore, there may be a registered Jlnd Class Hotel but no such grades are given to:persons running hotels and restaurants and hence it would be inappropriate to speak of a perwn as a registered Hnd Class hotelier. But on that account would it be right to reject the expression \"registered Ilnd Class hotelier\" as meaningless and deprive paragraph ( 1) of the notice of any meaning and effect. We do not think such a view would be justified by any canon of construction. It is a well settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to documents as to statutes that, save for compelling necessity, the court should not be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of a document \"and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intnded to have some effect or be of some use\".\n\nTo reject words as insensible should be the last resort of judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary rule based on common sense that no author of a formal document intended to be acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words without a meaning. The conrt must, as far as possible, avoid a construction which would render the words used by the author of the document meaningless and futile or reduce to silence any part of the document and make it altogether inapplicaple. Now, here the expression used in paragraph (1) of the notice was \"registered Ilnd Class hotelier\" and there can be no doubt that by using this expression the Ist respondent intended to delineate a certain category of persons who alone should be eligible to submit a tender.\n\nThe Ist respondent was not acting aimlessly or insensibly in insisting upon this requirement nor was it indulging in a meaningless and futile exercise. It had a definite purpose in view when it laid down this condition of eligibility in paragraph (I) of the notice. It is true that\n\nthe phraseology used by the Ist respondent to express its intention was rather inapt but it is obvious from the context that tlie expression \"registered llnd Class hotelier\" was loosely used to denote a person HI conducting or running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. It may be ungrammatical but it does not offend common-sense to describe a\n\nperson running a registered !Ind grade hotel as a registered Und grade hotelier. This meaning is quite reasonable and does not do any violence to the language and makes sense of the provision contained in paragraph (1) of the notice. We must, in the circumstances, hold that, on a proper construction, what paragraph (1) of the notice required was that only a person running a ref,>istered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and having at least 5 years' experience as such should be eligible to submit a tender. This was a condition of eligibility and it is difficult to see how this condition could be said to be satisfied by any person who did not have five years' experience of running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. The test of eligibility laid down was an objective test and not a subjective one. What the condition of eligibility required was that the person submitting a tender must have 5 years' cxperi, ence of running a II Class hotel, as this would ensure by an objective test that he was capable of running a II Class restaurant and it should not be left to the Ist respondent to decide in its subjective discretion that the person tendering was capable of running such a restaurant.\n\nIf, therefore, a person submitting a tender did not have at least 5 years' experience of running a II Class hotel, he was not eligible to submit the tender and it would not avail him to say that though he did not satisfy this condition, he was otherwise capable of running a Ilnd Class restaurant and should, therefore, be considered.\n\nThis was in fact how the I st respondent itself understood this condition of eligibility.\n\nWhen the 4th respondents submitted their tender along with their letter dated 24th January. 1977. it <1ppeared from the documents submitted by the 4th respondents that thev did not have 5 years' experience of running a II Class restaurant. The 1st respondent by its letter dated 15th February, 1977 required the 4th respondents to produce documentary evidence to show that they were \"registered II Class hotelier having at least 5 years' experience.\" The 1st respondent did not regard this requirement of eligibility as meaningless or unnecessary and wanted to be satisfied that the 4th respondent did fulfil this requirement.\n\nNow, unfortunately for the 4th respondents, they had over 10 years' experience of running canteens but at the date when they submitted their tender, they were not running a II grade hotel or restaurant nor did they have 5 years' experience of running such a hotel or restaurant.\n\nEven if the experience of the 4th respondents in the catering line were taken into account from 1962 onwards, it would not cover a total period of more than 4 years 2 months so far as catering experience in IInd Grade hotels and restaurants is concerned.\n\nThe 4th r, ospondenlli thus did not satisfy the condition of eligibility laid down in paragraph ( 1 ) of the notice and in fact this was impliedly conceded -Oy\n\nthe 4th respondents in their letter dated 26th February, 1977 where they stated that they had \"experience equivalent to that of a 2nd class or even 1st class hotelier.\" The 4th respondents were, accordingly, not eligible for submitting a tender and the action of the 1st respondent in accepting their tender was in contravention of paragraph (1) of the notice.\n\n~ It was suggested on behalf of the 1st and the 4th respondents that there was nothing wrong in the 1st respondent giving the conr tract to the 4th respondents since it was competent to the 1st res- ;. ptmdent to reject all the tenders received by it and to negotiate ' directly with the 4th respondents for giving them the contract and it made no difference that instead of follo.<'ing this procedure, which perhaps might have resulted in t!Je 4th respondents offering a smaller licence fee and the 1st respondent suffering a loss in the process, the 1st respondent accepted the tender of the 4th respondents.\n\nWe do not think there is any force in this argument. It is true that there was no statutory or administrative rule requiring the 1st respondent to give a contract only by inviting tenders and hence the 1st respondent was entitled to reject all the tenders and, subject to tlte constitutional norm laid down in Art 14. negotiate directly for\n\n.~ entering into a contract.\n\nParagraph (8) of the notice also made it clear that the 1st respondent was not bound to accept any tender and could reject all the tenders received by it.\n\nBut here the 1st respondent did not reject the tenders outright and enter into direct negotiations \"with the 4th respondents for awarding the contract. The process of awarding a contract by foviting tenders was not terminated or abandoned by the !st respondent by rejecting all the tenders but in furtherance of the process, the tender of t!Je 4th respondents was accepted by the I st respondent.\n\nThe contract was not given to the I _ 4th respondents as a result of direct negotiations.\n\nTenders were r invited and out of the tenders received, the one submitted by the\n\n~ 4th respondents was accepted and t!Je contract was given to them . . ,..\n\nJt is, therefore, not possible to justify the action of the 1st respon- • dent on the ground that t!Je 1st respondent could have achieved the same result by rejecting all the tenders and entering into direct • negotiations with the 4th respondents.\n\nThat takes us to the next question whether t!Je acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents was invalid and liable to be set aside at the instance pf the appellant.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the 1st and the 4th respondents that the appellant had no locus to maintain t!Je writ petition since no tender was submitted by him and he was a mere stranger.\n\nThe argument was that if the appellant\n\ndid not enter the field of competition by submitting a tender, what did it matter to him whose tender was accepted; what grievance could he have if the tender of the 4th respondents was wrongly accepted.\n\nA person whose tender was rejected might very well complain that the tender of someone else was wrongly accepted, but it was submitted, how could a person who never tendered and who was at no time in the field, put forward such a complaint ?\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, is mis-conceived and cannot be sustained for a moment.\n\nThe grievance of the appellant, it may be noted, was not that his tender was rejected as a result of improper acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents,. but that he was differentially treated and denied equality of opportuni!f with the 4th respondents in submitting a tender.\n\nHis complaint was that if it were known that non-fulfilment of the condition of eligibility would be no bar to consideration of a tender, he also would have submitted a tender and competed for obtaining a contract.\n\nBut he was precluded from submitting a tender and entering the field of consideration by reason of the condition of eligibility, while so far as the 4th respondents were concerned, their tender was entertained and accepted even though they did not satisfy the condition of eligib1lity and this resulted in inequality of treatment which was constitutionally impermissible.\n\nThis was the grievance made by the appellant in the writ petition and there can be no doubt that if this grievance were well founded, the appellant would be entitled to maintain the writ petition. The\" question is whether this grievance was justified in law and the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents was vitiated by any legal infirmity.\n\nNow, there can be no doubt that what paragraph (1) of the notice prescribed was a condition of eligibility which was required to be satisfied by every person submitting a tender.\n\nThe condition of eligibility was that the person submitting a tender must be conducting or running a registered 2nd class hotel or restaurant and be must have at least 5 years' experience as such and if he did not satisfy this condition of eligibility his tender would not be eligible for consideration.\n\nThis was the standard or norm of eligibility laid down by the l st respondent and since the 4th respondents did not satisfy this standard or norm, it was not competent to the 1st respondent to entertain the tender of the 4th respondents. It is a well settled rule of admini.strative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupnlously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them.\n\nThis rule was enunciat-\n\n• • •\n\ned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitera/I; v. Seton(') where the Ieai:ned Judge said :\n\n\"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged.\n\nAccordingly, if dismissal from employment is based op. a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed.\n\nThis judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedurnt sword shall perish with the sword.\"\n\nThis Court accepted the rule as valid and applicable in Jndia In\n\nA. S. Ahluwalia v. Punjab(2 ) and in subsequent decision given in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram,(') Mathew, J., quoted the above-referred observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. It may be noted' that this rule, though supportable also as emanation from Article 14, does not rest merely on that article. It has an independent existence apart from Article 14. It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by' the executive authority. If we turn to the judgment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and examine it, we find that he has not sought to draw support for the rule from the equality clause of the United States Constitution, but evolved it purely as a - rule of .administrative law.\n\nEven in England, the recent trend in administrative law is in that direction as is evident from what is\n\nsted at pages 540-41 in Prof.\n\nWade's Administrative Law 4th edition.\n\nThere is no reason why we should hesitate to adopi this rule as a part of our continually expanding administrative law.\n\nToday with tremendous expansion of welfare and social service functions, increasing control of material and economic resources and large scale assumption of industrial and commercial activities by the State, the power of the executive Government to affect the lives of the people i.s steadily. growing.\n\nThe attainment of socio-economic justice being a conscious end of State poficy, there is a vast and ineVitable increase in the frequency with which ordinary citizens come into relationship of direct encounter with State power-holders.\n\nThis renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbitrary applicatio.n or\n\n(I) 359 U.S. 535 : 3 Law. Ed. (Second series) 1012 :(2) (1975] 3. s. c. R. 82.\n\n; (3)[19751 3. S. C. R. 619.\n\nexercise.\n\nWhatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his \"The Law of the Constitution\" or the definition given by Hayek in his \"Road to Serfdom\" and \"Constitution of liberty\" or the exposition set-forth by Harry Jones in his \"The Rule of Law and the Welfare State\", there is, as pointed out by Mil thew, J., in his article on \"The Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural Justice\" in \"Democracy, Equality and Freedom,\" \"substantial agreement is in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found\". It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Govermnent or any of its officen; should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness.\n\nThat is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege.\n\nTo-day the Government, is a welfare State, is the regulator and dispenser of special services and provider of a large number of benefits, including jobs contracts, licences, quotas, 1nineral rights etc.\n\nThe Government pours forth wealth, money, benefits, services, contracts, quotas and licences.\n\nThe valuables dispensed by Government take many forn1s, but they all share one characteristic.\n\nThey are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth.\n\nThese valuables which derive from relationships to Goven.ment are of many kinds.\n\nThey comprise social security benefits, cash grants for politiCal sufferers and the. whole scheme of State and local welfare.\n\nThen again, thousands of people are employed in the State and the1 Central Governments and local authorities.\n\nLicences arc required •. ......, l. before one can engage in many kinds of business or work.\n\nThe 7 ... power of giving licences means power to withhold them and this gives control to the Government or to the agents of Government on the lives of many people.\n\nMany individuals and many more businesses enjoy largess in the form of Government contracts.\n\nThese contracts often resemble subsidies.\n\nIt is virtually impossible to lose money on them and many enterprises are set up primarily to do business with Government.\n\nGovernment owns and controls hundreds of acres of pubic land valuable for mining and other purposes.\n\nThese resources are available for utilisation by private corporations and individuals by way of lease or licence.\n\nAll these mean growth in the Government largess and with the increamng\n\n.,..\n\n... •\n\n~ I\n\nI I\n\n-·· •\n\nmagnitude and range of governmental functions as we move closer to a welfare State, more and more of our wealth consists of these new forms.\n\nSome of these forms of wealth may be in the nature of legal rights but the large majority of them are in the nature of privileges.\n\nBut on that account, can it be said that they do not enjoy any legal protection?\n\nCan they be regarded as gratuity furnished by the State so that the State may withhold, grant_ or revoke it at its pleasure ? Is the position of the Government in this respect the same as that of a private giver ? We do not think so.\n\nThe law has not been slow to recognise. the importance of this new kind of wealth and the need to protect individual interest in it and with that end in view, it has developed new forms of protection. Some\n\ninterests in Government largess, formerly regarded as privileges, have been recognised as rights while others have been given legal protection not only by forging procedural safeguards but also by confinling/structuring ; tnd checking Government discretion in lhe inatter of grant of such largess.\n\nThe discretion of the Government has been held to be not unlimited in that the Government cannot give or withhold largess in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will.\n\nIt is insisted, as pointed out by Prof.\n\nReich in ari especially. stimulating article on \"The New Property\" in 73 Yale Law Journal 733, \"that Government action be based on standards that are not arbi- ·\n\ntrary or unauthorised.\" \"The Government cannot be permitted to say that it will give jobs or enter into contracts or issue quotas or licences only in favour of those having grey hair or belonging to a particular political party or professing a particular religious faith.\n\nThe Government is still the Government when it acts in the matter of granting largess and it cannot act arbitrarily. It does not stand in the same position as a private individual.\n\nWe agree with the observations of Mathew, J., in V. Punnan Thomas v. State of Kera/a(') that : \"The Gowrnment is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recepients for jts largess.\n\nWhatever its activity, the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society.\n\nA democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards fur the choice of pesons with whom alone it will deal\".\n\nThe same point was made by this court in Erusian Equipment dJld Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Benga/(2) where the question was whether black-listing of a person without\n\n(1) AIR 1969 Kerala 81.\n\n(2) [1975) 2 S.C.R. 674.\n\n10-409 SCI/79\n\nA giving him an opportunity to be heard was bad? Ray, C. J., speaking on behalf of himself and his colleagues on the Bench pointed out that black-listing of a person not only affects his reputation which is in Poundian terms an interest both of personality and substance, but also denies him equality in the matter of entering into contract with the Government and it cannot, therefore, be supported without fair hearing. It was argued for the Government that no person has a right to enter into contractual relationship with the Government and the Government, like any other private individual, has the absolute right to enter into contract with any one it pleases.\n\nBut the Court, speking through the learned Chief Justice, responded that the Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal, but the Government is still a Government when it enters into contract or when it is admin1stering largess and it cahnot, without adequate reason, exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largess arbitrarily.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice said that when the Government is trading with the public, \"the democratic fom1 of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions. The artivities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State nee.d not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly wjthout discrimination and without unfair procedure.\" This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with the public, where the interest songht to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other fotms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or nornis which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant.\n\nThe power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant\n\nof largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by ration~!, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.\n\nNow, it is obvious that the Government which represents the : executive \"\"lhority of the State, may act through the instrumentality\n\n-··\n\nR. D. SHETTY v. AIRPORT AUTllORITY (Bhagwati, J.) 1035\n\nor agency of natural persons or it may employ the instrumentality or agency of juridical persons to carry out its functions. In the early days, when the Government had limited functions, it could operate effectively through natural persons constituting its civil service and they were found adequate to discharge governmental functions, which were of traditional vintage.\n\nBut as the tasks of the Government multiplied with the advent of the welfare State, it began to be increasingly felt that the framework of civil service was not sufficient to handle the new tasks which were often of specialised and highly technical character.\n\nThe inadequacy of the civil service to deal with these new problems came to be realised and it became necessary .to forqe a new instrumentality or. administrtive . device for\n\nhandling these new problems. It was m these clfcumstances and with a view to supplying this administrative need that the public corporation came into being as the third arm of the Government. As early as 1819 the Supreme Court of the United States in Mac Cul/ough\n\nv. MGryfond(') held that the Congress has power to charter corporations as incidental to or in aid of governmental functions and, as pointed out by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (supra) such federal corporations would ex-hypothesi be agencies of the Government.\n\nIn Great Britain too, the policy of public administration through separat~ corporations was gradually evolved and the conduct of basic industries through giant corporations has now become a permanent feature of public life.\n\nSo far as India is concerned, the genesis of the emergence of corporations as instrumentalities or agencies of Government is to be found in the Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy dated 6th April, 1948 where it was stated inter alia that \"management of State enterprises will as a rule be through the medium of public corporation under the statutory control of the Central Government who will assume such powers as may k necessary to ensure this.\" It was in pursuance of the polic; envisaged in this and subsequent resolutions on Industrial Polici that corporations were created by Government for setting up and management of public enterprises and carrying out other public functions.\n\nOrdinarily these functions could have been earrieJ out by Government departmentally through its service personnel, but the instrumentality or agency of the corporations was resorted to in these cases having regard to the nature of the task to be performed.\n\nThe corporations acting as instrumentality or agency of Government would obviously be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as Government itself, though\n\n(1) 4 Wheat 315\n\nA in the eye of the law, they would be distinct and independent legal entities. If Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional and public law limitations, it must follow a fortiori that Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of corporations should equally be subject to the . same limitations. /But the question is how to determine whether a corporation is acting B as instrumentality or agency of Government. It is a question not entirely free from difficulty.\n\nA corporation may be created in one of two ways.\n\nIt may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act 1956 or the Societies Registration Act 1860. Where a Corporation is wholly controlled by Government not .:mly in its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by the law establishing it or by the Charter of its incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of Government.\n\nBut ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous in its working, subject only to a provision, often times made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters.\n\nSo also a corporation incorporated under law is managed by a board of directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under whicn it is incorporated.\n\nWhen does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government ? Is the holding of the entire share capital of the Corporation by Government enough or is it necessary that in addition, there should be a certain amount of direct control exercised by Government and, if so, what should be the nature of such control ? Should the functions which the corporation is charged to carry out poi; sess any particular characteristic or feature, or is the nature of the functi6ns immaterial? Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instru1nentaliy or agency of Government. But, s is quite often the case, a corporation established by statute may have no shares or shareholders, in which case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a board of directors appointed by G; ivernmcnt, though this consideration also may 11ot be determinative, because even where the directors are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from governmental control in the discharge of their functions.\n\nWhat then arc the tests to determine whether a corporation established by statute or incorporated under law is an instrumentality\n\nor agency of Government ? lt is not possible to formulate an allinclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answr this question.\n\nThere is no cut and dried formula, wjiich would provide the correct division of corporations into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not.\n\nThe analogy of the concept of State action as developed in the United States may not, however, be altogether out of place while considering this question.\n\nThe decisions of the court in the United States seem to suggest that a private agency, if suported by extraordinary assistance given by the State, may be subject to the same constitutional limitations as the State.\n\nOf course, it may be pointed out that \"the State's general common law and statutory structure under which its people carry on their private affairs, own property and contrac_t, each enjoying equality in terms of legal capacity, is not such State assistance as would transform private conduct into State action\".\n\nBut if extensive and unusual financial assistance is given and the purpose of the Government in giving such assistance coincides with the purpose for which -the corporation is expected to use the assistance and such purpose is of public character, it may be a relevant circumstance supporting an inference that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. The leading case on the subject in the United States is Kerr v. Eneck Pratt Free Library('). The Library system in question in this case was established by private donation in 1882, but by 1944, 99 per cent of the system's budget was SUJl' plied by the city, title to the library property was held by the city, employees were paid by the city payroll officer and a high degree of budget control was exercised or available to the city government.\n\nOn th\".>e facts the Court of Appeal required the trustees managing the system to abandon a discriminatory admission policy for its library training courses.\n\nIt will be seen that in this case there was considerable amount of State control of the library system in addition to extensive financial assistanoe and it is difficult to say whether, in the absence of such control it would have been possible to say that the action of the trustees constituted State action.\n\nThomas P. Lewis has expressed the opinion in his article on \"The meaning of State Action\" (60 Columbia Law Review 1083) that in this case \"it is extremely unlikely that absence of public control would have changed the result as long as 99% of the budget of a nominally private institution. was provided by government.\n\nSuch extensive governmental support should be sufficient identification with the Government to subject the institution to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment\".\n\n(l) 149 F. 2d. 212.\n\nIt may, therefore, be possible to say that where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. But where fmnncit>l assistance is not so extensive, it may not by itself, without anything more, render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of government, for there are many privaN! institutions which are in receipt of financial assistance from the State and merely on that account, they cannot be classified as State agencies. Equally a mere finding of some control by the Stnte would not be determinative of the question \"since a State has considerable measure of control under its police power over all types of business operations\". But 'a finding of State financial support plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterise an operation as State action\" vide Sukhdev v. Bhagatram ( 1). So also the existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. It may also be a relevant factor to consider whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. There can be little doubt that State conferred or State protected monopoly status would be highly relevant in assessing the aggregate weight of the corporation's ties to the State.\n\nVide the observations of Douglas, J., in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ( 2)\n\nThere is also another factor which may be r<:garded as having a bearing on this issue and it is whether the operation of the corporation is an important public function. It has been held in the United States in a number of cases that the concept of private action must yield to a conception of State action where public functions are being performed.\n\nVide Arthur S. Miller : \"The ConstitutiolUll Law of the Security State\" ( 10 Stanford Law Review 620 at 664). It was pointed out by Douglas, J., in Evans v. Newton( 3 ) that \"when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State\".\n\nOf course, with the growth of the welfare State, it is very difficult to define what functions are governmental and what are not, because, as pointed out by Villmer, L.J., in Pfizer v. Ministry of Health,(') there has been, since mid-Victorian times,' \"a revolution in political thought and a totally different conception prevails today as to what is and what is not within the functions of Gvernment\".\n\n(I) 11975] 3 S. C.R. 619 at 658.\n\n(2) 419 U.S. 345 : 42 L. ed. 2nd 477.\n\n(3) 382 U.S. 296: 15 L. ed 2nd 373.\n\n(4) [1964] 1 Ch. 614.\n\n) \" X'\n\nDouglas, J., also observed to the same effect in New York v. United\n\nStatesC) : \" A State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit.\" Cf. Helvering v. Gerhardt('). A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it own and operate a railroad, a mfll, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges, street lights, or a sewage disposal plant.\n\nWhat might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensible. It may be noted that besides the so called traditional functions, the modern State operates a multitude of public enterprises and discharges a host of other public functions. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.\n\nThis is prcisely what was pointed out by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagatwi (supra) where the learned Judge said that\n\n\"institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or performing public functions are by virtue of the nature of the functions performed government agencies.\n\nActivities which are too fundamental to the society are by definition too important not to be considered government functions.\"\n\nThis was one of the principal tests applied by the United States Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama(') for holding that a corporation which owned a Company town was subject to the same con_stitutional limitations as the State. This case involved the prosecution of Marsh, a member of the Johevah's witnesses sect, under a state trespass statute for refusing to leave the side walk of the company town where she. was distributing her religious pamphlets.\n\nShe was fined $ 5/- and aggrieved by her conviction she carried the matter right upto the Supreme Court contending successfully that by reason of the action of the corporation her religious liberty had been denied. The Supreme Court held that administration of private property such as a town, though privately carried on, was, nevertheless, in the nature of a public function and that the private rights of the corporation must therefore be cxerci5\"d within constitutional limitations and the coniction fo; trespass was reversed.\n\nThe dominant theme of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Black was that the property of the corporation used as a town not recognisably different from other towns lost its\n\n~~:_ati~~-a_s_ purely private property. It was said that a ; own may\n\n(!) 326 u .s. 572.\n\n(2) 304 u. s. 405, 426, 427.\n\n(3) 326 U.S. 501 : 19 L. ed. 265.\n\nbe privately owned and managed but that does not necessarily allow the corporation to treat it as if it was wholly in the private sector and the exercise of constitutionally protected rights on the pablic itreet of a company town could not be denied by the owner. \"The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it ... Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does bis farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation\". Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, reduced the case to simpler terms.\n\nHe found )n the realm of civil liberties the need to treat a town, private or not, as a town. The function exercised by the corporation was in the nature of municipal function and it was, therefore, subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon State action.\n\nWe find that the same test of public or governmental character of !he function was applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in Evans v. Newton (supra) and Smith v. Allwight.(1') But the deci, ions show that even this test of public or governmental character of the function is not easy of application and does not invariably lead to the correct inference because the range of governmental activity is broad and varied and merely because an activity may be such as may legitimately be carried on by Government, it does not mean that a corporation, which is otherwise a private entity, would be an instrumentality or agency of Government by reason of carrying on such activity. In fact, it is difficult to distingui§h betwen governmental functions and non-governmental functions.\n\nPerhaps the distinction between governmental and non-governmental functions is not valid any more in a social welfare State where the laissez faire is an outmoded concept and Herlx:rt Spencer's social statics bas no place.\n\nThe contrast is rather between governmental activities which are private and private .activities which are governmental. (Mathew, J. Sukhdev v. Bhagatram (supra) at p. 652). But the public nature of the function, if impregnated with governmental character or \"tied\n\nor entwined with Government\" or fortified by some other additional factor, may render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government. Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference.\n\n(I) 321 U. S. 649.\n\n> ..\n\n< .\n\nIt will thus be seen that there are several factors which may have to be considered in deNrmining whether a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government. We have referred to some of these factors and they may be summarised as under : whether there is any financial assistance given by the State, and if so, what is the magnitude of such assistance whether there is any other form of assistance, given by the Stare, and if so, whether it is of the usual kind or it is extraordinary, whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and what is the nature and extent of such control, whether the corporation enjoys State conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the functions carried out by the corporation are public functions closely related to governmental functions.\n\nThis particularisation of relevant factors is however not exhaustive and by its very nature it cannot be, because with increasing assumption of new tasks, growing complexities of management and administration and the necessity of continuing adjustment in relations between the corporation and Government calling for flexibility, adapt ability and innovative skills, it is not possible to make an exhaustive enumeration of the tests which would invariably and in all cases provide an unfailing answer to the question whether a corporation is governmental instrumentality or .agency.\n\nMoreover even amongst these factors which we hav'e described, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case. \"The dispositive question in any state action case,\" as pointed out by Douglas, J., in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company (supra) \"is not whether any single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involvement, but rather whether the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a finding of state\n\nresponsibility.\" It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors upon which a corporation is claimed to be an instrumentolity or agency of Government and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding of that effect. It is the aggregate or cumulative affect of all the relevant factors that is controlling.\n\nNow, obviously where a corporation is an instrumentality or agncy of Government, it would, in the exercise of its power or discretion,\n\nbe subject to the saine constitutional or public law limitations as Govermnent. The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government which we have discussed above mnst apply equally where such cor- H poration is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise, and it cannot act arbitrarily\n\nand enter into relationship with any person it likes at its sweetwill, but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance.\n\nThis rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14. It is now well settled as a result of the decisions of this Court in E. P. Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu(') and Mancka Gandhi\n\nv. Union of India(') that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.\n\nIt requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory : il must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations, because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of Jaw or in exercise of executive power without making of law.\n\nThe State cannot, therefore act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory.\n\nThis principle was recognised and applied by a Bench of this Court presided over by Ray, C.J., in Erusian Equipment and ChemicaLY v.\n\nState of West Bengal (supra) where the learned Chief Justice painted out that \"the State can carry on executive function by making a law or without making a law. The exercise of such powers and functions in trade by the State is subject to Part III of the Constitution. Article 14 speaks of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.\n\nEquality of oppartunity should apply to matters of public contracts.\n\nThe State has the right to trade.\n\nThe State has there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can choose not to deal with any person.\n\nThe Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of black-listing has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract.\n\nA person who is on the approved list is unable to enter into advantageous relations with the Governm_!'nt because of the order of blacklisting. . . . A citizen has a right to claim equal treatment to enter into a contract which may be proper, necessary and essential to his lawful calling .... It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the\n\n(I) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 348.\n\n(2) 1978j 2 S. C.R. 621.\n\ny- •\n\ngoods.\" It must, therefore follow as a necessary corollary from the principle of cqualfry enshrined in Article 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons sil)1ilarly c; rcumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non-discrimination and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non-discrimina• tory ground.\n\nIt is interesting to find that this rule was recognised and applied by a Constitut; on Bench of this Court in a case of sale of kendu leaves by the Government of Orissa in Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa.(') The trade of kendu leaves in the State of Orissa was regulated by the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1961 and this Act created a monopoly in favour of the State so far as purchase of kendu leaves from growers and pluckers was concerned. Section 10 of the Act authorised the Government to sell or otherwise dispose of kendu leaves purchased in such manner as the Government might direct. The Government first evolved a scheme under which it offered to renew the licences of those traders who in its view had worked satisfactorily in the previous year and had regularly paid the amount due from them. The scheme was cha!Jenged and realising that it might be struck down, the Government withdrew the scheme and instead, decided .to invite tenders for advance purchase of kendu leaves but restricted the invitation to those individuals who had carried out contracts in the previous year without default and to the satisfaction of the Government.\n\nThis method of sale of kendu leaves was also challenged by filing a writ petition on the ground inter alia that it was violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) and this challenge, though negatived by the High Court, was upheld by this Court in appeal. The Court pointed out that the original scheme of offering to enter into contracts with the old licences and to renew their terms was open to grave objection, since it sought arbitrarily to exclude many persons interested in the trade and the new scheme under which the Government restricted the invitation to make offers to those traders who had carried out their <:ontracts in the previous year without default and to the satisfaction of the Government was also objectionable, since the right to make tenders for the purchase of kendu leaves being restricted to a limited\n\n\nclass of persons, it effectively shut out all other persons carrying on trade in kendu leaves and also the new entrants into that business and hence it was ex-facie discriminatory and imposed unreasonable restrictions' upon the right of persons other than t~Je existing contractors to carry on business. Both the schemes evolved by the Government were thus held to be violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) because they \"gave rise to a monopoly in the trade in kendu leaves to certain traders and singled out other trader. for d; scriminatory treatment\".\n\nThe argument that existing contractors who had carried out their obligations in the previous year regularly and to the satisfaction of the Government formed a valid basis of classification bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the sale, namely, effective execution of the monopoly in the public interest, was also negatived and it was pointed out that : \"exclusion of all persons interes'ted in the trade, who were not in the previous year licencees, is ex facie arbitrary; it had not direct relation to the object of preventing exploitation of pluckers and growers of kendu leaves, nor had it any just or reasonable relation to the securing of the full benefit from the trade, to the State\".\n\nThe Court referred to the offer made by a well known manufacturer of bidis for purchase o..f the entire crop of kendu leaws for a sum of Rs. 3 crores which was turned down by the Government and expressed its surprise that no explanation was attempted to be given on behalf of the State as to why such an offer, from which the State stood to gain more than Rs. 1 crore, was rejected by the Government.\n\nIt will be seen from this judgment that restricting the invitation to submit tenders to a limited class of persons was held to be violative of the equality clause, because the classification did not bear any just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved, namely, selling of kendu leaves in the interest of general public. The standard or norm laid down by the Government for entering into contracts of sale of kendu leaves with third parties was discriminatory and could\n\nnt stand the scrutiny of Article 14 and hence the scheme was held to be inval:d.\n\nThe Court rejected the contention of the Government that by reason of section 10 it was entitled to dispose of kendu leaves in such manner as it thought fit and there was no limitation upon its power to enter into contracts for sale of kendu leaves with such persons it liked.\n\nThe Court held that the Government was, in the exercise of its power to enter into contracts for sale of kendu leaves, subject to the constitutional limitation of Article 14 and it could not act arbitrarily in selecting persons with whom to enter into contracts and discriminate against others similarly situate.\n\nThe Court criticisea\n\n'\"i •\n\nR. D. SllETTY v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY (Bhagwati, J.) 1045\n\nthe Government for not giving any explanation as to why an offer for a Jarcre amount was not accepted, the clearest implication being that the Government must act in the public interest; it cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does so, its action would be liable to be invalidated. This decision wholly supports the view we are taking in regard to the applicability of the rule against arbitrariness in State; action.\n\nWe may also in this connection refer to the decision of this Court in C. K. Achuthan v. State of Kera/a('), where Hidayatullah, J., speaking on behalf of the Court made certain observation which was strongly relied upon on l; chalf of the respondents.\n\nThe facts of this case were that the petitioner and the 3rd respondent Co-operative Milk Supply Union, Canancre, submitted tenders for the supply oE milk to the Government hospital at Cannanore for the year 1948-49. The Superintendent who scrutinised the tenders accepted that of the petitioner and communicated the reasons for the decision to the Director of Public Health.\n\nThe resulting contract in favour of the petitioner was, however, subsequently cancelled by issuing a notice in terms of clause (2) of the tender, in pursuance of the policy of the Government\n\nthat in the mat\\er of supply to Government Medical Institutions the Co-vpcrativc Miik Supply Union should be given contract on the basis of prices fixed by the Revenue Department.\n\nThe petitioner challenged the decision of the Government in a petition llilder Article 32 of the Constitution on the ground inter alia that there had been discrimination against him vis-a-vis the 3rd respondent and as such, there was contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench rejected this contention of the petitioner and while doing so, Hidayatullah, J., made the following observation : \"There is no discrimination, because it is perfectly open to the Government, even as it is to a private party, to choose a person to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed.\n\nWhen one person is choosen rather than another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the protection of Article 14, because the choice of the person to fulfil a particular contract must be left to tfJe Government.\" The respondents relied very strongly on this observation in support of their contention that it is open to the 'State' to ente.r into contract with any one it likes aµd choosing one person in preference to another for entering into a contract does not involve violation of Article 14.\n\nThough the language in which this observation is couched is rather wide, we do not think that in making this observation, the Court intended to Jay down any absolute proposition permitting the state to act arbitrarily in the matter of entering into contract with\n\n(I) [1959] Supp. I S C. R. 787.\n\nthird parties.\n\nWe have no doubt that the Court could not have intended to lay down such a proposition because Hidayatullah J. who delivered the judgment of the Court in this case was also a party to the judgment in Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa (supra) which was also a decision of the Constitution Bench, where it was held in so many terms that the Stale cannot act arbitrarily in selecting persons with whom to enter into contracts. Obviously what the Court meant to say was that merely because one person is chosen in preference to another, it does not follow that there is a violation of Article 14, because the Government must necessarily be entitled to make a choice.\n\nBut that does not mean that the choice be arbitrary or fanciful.\n\nThe choice must be' dictated by public interest and must not be unreasoned or unprincipled.\n\nThe respondents also relied on the decision of this Court in Triloc/1111 Mishra v. State of Orissa & Ors.(') The complaint of the petitioner in that case was that the bids of persons making the highest tenders were not accepted and persons who had made lesser bids were asked to raise their bids to the highest offered and their revised bids were accepted.\n\nThe Constitution , Bench negatived this complaint and speaking through Mitter, J., observed :\n\n'With regard to the grievance that in some cases the bids of persons making the highest tenders were not accepted, the facts are that persons who had made lower bids were asked to raise their bids to the highest offered before the same were accepted. . Thus there was no loss lo Government and merely because the Government preferred one tender tO another no complaint can be entertained. Government certainly has a right to enter into a contract with a\n\nperson well known to it and specially one who has faithfully performed his contracts in the past in preference to an undesirable or unsuitable or untried person. Moreover, Government is not bound to accept the highest tender but may accept a l.ower one in case it thinks tht the person offering the lower tender is on an overall consideratioll to be preferred to the higher 1enderer.\"\n\nWe fai: tc see how this obervation can help the contention of the respondents. It does not say that the Government can enter into contract with any one it likes arbitrarily and without reason.\n\nOn the contrary, it potulates that the Government may reject a higher tender and accept a lower one only when there is valid reason to do so, as for example, where it is satisfied that the person offering the !ewer\n\nI) [19711 3 S. C. C. 153.\n\n) Y'\n\ntcilder is on an overall consideration preferable to the higher tenderer.\n\nThere must be some relevant reason for preferring one tenderer to another, and if there is, the Government ca1_1 certainly enter into contract with the form_er evn though his tender may be lower but it cannot do so arbitrarily or for extraneous reason.\n\nThere was also one other decision of this Court in State of Orissa\n\nv. Hari11Auayan Jaiswal & Ors.(') which was strongly relied upon on behalf of the respondents.\n\nThere the respondents were the highest bidders at an auction held by the Oria Government through the Exdse Commissioner for the exclusive privilege of selling by retail country liquor in some shops.\n\nThe auction was held pursuant to an order dated 6th January, 1971 issued by the Government of Orissa in exercise of the power conferred under section 29(2) of the Bihar & Oris>a Excise Act, 1915 and clause (6) of this Order provided that \"no sale shall be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State Government who shall be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor\".\n\nThe Government of Orissa did not accept any of the bids made at the auction and subsequently sold the privilege by negotiations with some other parties. O; ie of the cont.entions raised on behalf of the petitioners in that case was that the power retained by the Government \"to accept or reject any bid without any reason therefor\" was an arbitrary power violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) (g). This contention was negatived andHegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court observed :\n\n\"The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the\n\nState.\n\nHence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue.\n\nIt is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate.\n\nWhile accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function.\n\nThe correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review.\n\nWe fail to see how the plea of contravention of Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 can arise in these cases.\n\nThe Governmel]!'s power to sell the exclusive privi lcge set out in section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that these privileges could be sold by public auction.\n\nPublic auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges\n\n(1) [1972] 2 s.c.c. 36.\n\nin question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is\n\ninadequate.\"\n\nIt will be seen from these observations that the validity of clause (6) of the order dated 6th January, 1971 was upheld by this Court on the ground that having regard to the object of holding the auction, namely, to raise revenue, the Government was entitled to reject even the highest bid, if it thought that the price offered was inadequate.\n\nThe Government was not bound to accept the tender of the person who offered the highest amount and if the Government rejected all the bids made at the auction, it did not involve any violation of Article .14 or 19(1) (g).\n\nThis is a self-evident proposition and we do not see how it can be of any assistance to the respondents.\n\nThe last decision to which reference was made on behalf of the respondents was the decision in P. R. Quenin v. M. K. Tendel(1) This decision merely reiterates the principle laid down in the earlier decisions in Trilochan Mishra v. State of Orissa (supra) and Stale of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal (supra) and points out that a condition that the Government shall be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor is not violative of Article 14 and that \"in matters relating to contracts with the Government, the latter is not bound to accept the tender of the person who offers the highest amount\". Now where does it say that such a condition permits the Government to act arbitrarily in accepting a tender or that under the guise or pretext of such a condition, the Government may enter into a contract with any person it likes, arbitrarily and without reason.\n\nIn fact the Court pointed out t the end of the jndgment that the act of the Government was not \"shown to be vitiated by such arbitrariness as should call for interference by the Court'', recognising clearly that if the rejection of the tender of the 1st respondent were arbitrary, the Collft would have been justified in striking it down as invaJid.\n\nNow this rule, flowing as it does from Article 14, applies to every State action and since \"State\" is defined in Article 12 to include not only the Government of India and the Government of each of the States, but also \"all local or other authorities within the territory of Iridia or under the control of the Government of India\", it must apply to action of \"other authorities\" and they must be held subject to the same qonstitutional limitation as the Government. But the question arises what are the \"tjther authorities\" contemplated by Article 12 which fall within the definition of 'State'? On this ques-\n\n(1) [19741 3 S. C.R. 64.\n\n• -t.\n\nI!. D. SHETTY v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY (!Jha.gwati, J.)\n\nI 04 9\n\ntion considerable light is thrown by the decision of this Court in Rajasthail Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal('). That was a case in which this Court was called upon to consider whether the Rajasthan Electricity Board was an 'authority' within the meaning of the exe!ession \"other authorities\" in Art. 12.\n\nBhargava, J., delivering the judgment of the majority pointed out that the expression \"other\n\nauthorities\" in Art. 12 would include all constitutional and slatuto1y authorities on whom powers are conferred by law.\n\nThe learned Judge a.lso said that if any body of persons has authority to issue directions the disobedience of. which would be punishable as a criminal offence, that would be an indication that that authority is 'State'.\n\nShah, J., who delivered a separate judgment, agreeing with the conclusion reached by the majoriy, preferred to gjve a slightly different meaning to the expression \"other authorities\".\n\nHe said thJlt authorities, con§!itutional or statutory, would fall within the expres- •ion \"other authorities\" only if they are invested with the sovereign power of the State, namely, the power to mak~ rules and regulations which have he force of law.\n\nThe ra!io of this decision may thus be stated to be that a constitution~! or slatutmy authority would be within the meaning of the expression \"other authorities\", if it has been invested with statutory power to issue binding directions to third parties, the disobedience of which would enlai! penal consequence or it has the sovereign power to make rules and regulations having the force of law. This test was followed by Ray, C.J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagat\n\nRam (supra).\n\nMathew, J., however, in the same case, propounded a broader test, namely, whether the statutory corporation or other body or authority, claimed to fall within the definition of 'State', is an instrumentality or agency of Government : if it is, it would fall within the meaning of the expression 'other authorities' and would be 'State'.\n\nWhilst accepting the test laid down in Rajasthan Electricity Board v.\n\nMohan Lal (supra), and followed by Ray, C. J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (supra), we would, for reasons already discnssed, prefer to adopt the test of Governmental instrumentality or agency as one more test and perhaps a more satisfactory one for determining whether a 11tatutory corporation, body or other authority falls within the definition of 'State'. If a statutory corporation, body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would be an 'authority' .and therefore 'State' within the meaning of that expression in Article 12.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to refer. to a few decisions of this Court which seem to bear on this point and which require a little\n\n(1) [1967) 3 S. C R 377\n\n11-904 SCl/79.\n\nexplanation. The first is the decision in Praga Tools Corporation v. C. A. lmanuel.(') This was a case in which some of the workmen songht a writ of mandamus against Praga Tools Corporation which was a company with 56 per cent of its share capital held by the Central Government, 32 per cent by the Andhra Pradesh Government and 12 per cent by private individuals. The Court held that a writ of mj:lndrimus did not lie, because Praga Tools Corporation \"being a nonstatutory body and one incorporate_d under the Companies Act, there was neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of mandamus, nor was there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty.\" (emphasis supplied). It is difficult to see how this decision can be of any help\n\nin deciding the present issue before us. This was not a case where Praga Tools Corporation claimed to be an instrumentality of government or an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12. The only question was whether a writ of mandamus could lie and it was held !hat since there was no duty imposed on Praga Tool Corporation by statute, no writ of mandamus could issue against it.\n\nThe second decision to which we must refer is that in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar( 2 ). The question which arose in this case was whether a reference of an industrial dispute between the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') and the Union made by the State of Bihar under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was valid. The argument of the Union was that the industry in question was \"carried on under the authority of the Central Government\" and the reference could, therefore, be i:nade only by the Central Governmen!.\n\nThe Court held that the words \"under the authority\" mean \"i:ursuant to the authority, such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master\" and on this view, the Court addressed itself to the qu(!stioo. whether !he Corporatiori could be said to be carrying on business pursuant to the authority of the Central Government.\n\nTh~ answer to this question was obviously 'no' because the Corporation was carrying on business . in virtue of the authority derived from its memorandnm and articles of association and not by reason of any authority granted by the Central\n\nGovernment.\n\nThe Corporatiori, in carrying on business, .was acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Central Government and it was therefore not a servant or agent of the Central Government in B the sense that its actions would bind the Central Government. There\n\n(!) [1969] 3 S. C. R. 773.\n\n(2) [1%9] 3 S. C.R. 995.\n\nR, Q.1SHETTY v. ;\\IRPORT AUTHORITY (Bhagwati, J.) .1051\n\n\\fas no question in: this case whether the Corporation was an instrn- .A mentality of the Central Government and therefore an 'authority' withlh the meaning of Article 12.\n\nWe may point out here that when we speak of a Corporation being an instrwnentality or agency of Govetriment, we do not mean to suggest that the Corporation should be an agent of the Government ii! the sense that whatever it does B should be binding on the Government. It is not the relationship of /\n\nprincipal and agent which is relevant and material but whether the Corporation is an instrumentality of the Governent in the sense that a part of the governing power of the State i$ located in the Corporation and though the Corporation is acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Govel}!_ment, its action is really in the nature of c State action.\n\nTills decision dealing with an altother different point has no bearing on the present issue.\n\nWe may then refer to the decision in S. L. Aggarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Limited. (11) This decision has also no relevance to the point at issue before us, since the on)y question in that case was whether an Assistant Surgeo1;1 in the employment of Hindustan Steel Lintited could be said to be holding a. civil post under the Union or a State so as to be entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Court held that H.industan Steel Limited was not a department of the Government nor were its employees holding posts under the State within the meaning Qf Article 311 (2). The decision was clearly right and indeed it could not be otherwise, since Hindustan Steel Lipiited, which was a distinct and independent legal entity, was not a departmeµt of the Government and could not be regarded as State for the purpose of Article 311 (2). It may be noted that the Court was not concerned with the question whether Hindustan Slee! Limited was an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12.\n\nLastly, we must refer to the decision in Sarbhajit Tewari v. Union of lnd41 & Ors.(2) where the question was whether the Conncil of Scientific and Indutrial Research was an 'authority' within the meanig of Article 12.\n\nThe Court no doubt took the view ori the basis of facts relevant to the constitution and functioning of the Council that it was not an 'authority', but we do not find any discussion in this case as to what are the features which must be present before a corporation can be regrded as an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12.\n\nThis decision 'does not Jay down any principle or test for the, purpose of determining when a corporation can be said to be an 'authority'. If at all any t.est can be gleaned from the decision, it is\n\n(!) !19i0] 3 S. C R. 363.\n\n:~) (1975] I S. C. C. 485.\n\nI 1152\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 1 s.c.tt.\n\nA whether the Corporation is \"reaJly agency of the Governmeat\".\n\nThe Court seemed to hold on the facts that the Council was net an agency of the Government and was, therefore, not an 'authority'.\n\nW c may examine, in the light of this discussion, whether the 1st respondent, name!ly, the International Airport Authority of India, can be said lo be an authority falling within the definition of 'State' in Article 12. It is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the purpose of determining this question. Sub-section ( 1) of section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government shall constitute an authority to be called the International Airport Authority of India, to whom we shall hereafter refer as the 1st respondent. Sub-section (2) states that the 1st respondent shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and sulr'section (3) enacts that the Ist respondent shall consist of a Chairman to be appointed by the Central Government, the Director General of Civil Aviation exoflicio and not less than six and not more than thirteen members to be appointed by the Central Government.\n\nThe term of office of every member of the 1st respondent is prescribed by sub-section ( 1) of section 5 to be 3 years, but the Central Government is given under the Proviso power to terminate the appointment of any member who is not a servant of the Govemn1cnt after giving him notice as also to terminate at any time the appointment of any member who is a servant of the Government.\n\nThe power to remove a member in certain specified cir-. cumstances is also vested b the Central Government under section 6.\n\nSectio~ J 2, sub-section (1) provides that as from the date appointed by the Central Government all properties and other assets vested in the Central Government for the purposes of the airport and administered by the Director General of Civil Aviation immediately before such date shall vest in the 1st respondent and all debts, obligations and liabilities incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the Central Government immediately before such date shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered into and engaged to be done by, with or for the !st respondent. This sub-section also says that all non-recurring expenditure incurred by the Central Government for or in connection with the purposes of the airport upto the appointed date and declared to be capital expenditnre by the Central Govemment shall be treated as the capit\"l provided by the Central Government to the 1st respondent and all sums of money due to the Central Government in relation to the airport immediately before the appointed date shall be deemed to be due to the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent is also given the power to institute or continue all suits\n\n• •\n\n,....,\n\n) • , ,.\n\nand other legal proceedings instituted or which could have been instituted by or against the Central Government for any matter in relation to the airport and every employee holding any office under the, Central Government immediately before the appointed date solely or mainly for or in connection with the affairs of the airport shall be treated as on deputation wlth the 1st respondent. Sub-section ( 1) of section 12 also enacts similar provisions with regard to the air navigation services and the buildings used exclusively for such services immediately before the appointed date. The functions of the 1st r•, spondent are specified 1n\n\nsection 16 : sub-section (1) provides that, subject to the rules, if any, made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the l st respondent to manage the airports efficiently and su]:)..,; ection\n\n(2) casts an obligation on the !st respondent to provide at the airports such services and facilities as are necessary or desirable for the efficient operation of air transport services and certain 'specific functions to be performed by the lst respondent are particularised in sub-s•cction (3).\n\nThestl functions were, until the appointed date, being carried out by the Central Government but now under Section 16 they are transferred to the I st respondent. Section 20 provides that after making provision for reserve funds, bad and doubtful debts, depreciation in assets aud all other matters which are usually provided for by companies, the !st respondent shall pay the balance of its annual net profits to the Central Government. Section 21 requires the !st respondent to submit for the approval of the Central Govermnent a statement of the programme of its activities during the forthcoming financial year as wen as its financial estimate in respect thereof at least three months before the commencement of each financial year and section 24 provides that the accounts of the I st respondent shall be audited annually by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the accounts as certified by the ComptroNer and Auditor General or auy other person~ appointed by him in this behalf, together with the audit report thereon, shall be for; ya:rded to the Central Government and the Central Government shi!ll cause the san1e to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. The 1st respoud•ent is also required by section 25 to prepare and submit to the Central Government, as soon as may be after the end of each finaucial year, a report giving an account of its activities duriT\\g the financial year and this report has to be laid. before both Houses of Parliament by the Central Government.\n\nThe officers and employees of the 1st respondent are deemed by section 28 to be public servants and section 29 gives them immunity from suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding for anything in good faith done or intended to be done in. pursuance of the Act or any rule or regulation made under it.\n\nSection 33 confers power on the central Government\n\n' '\n\n(1979] 3 S.C.R,\n\nto :•cmporarily divest the 1st re5pondent from the management of any\n\nairport and to direct the 1st respondent to entrust such management to any other person.\n\nThe Central Government is also empowered by section 34 to sup\"rsede the 1st respondent under certain 8pecified circumstllnce5. Section 35 gives power to the Central Government to i:ive directions in writing from time to time on questions of policy and provides that the 1st respondent shall in the dischar!je of its functiohs, and duties, be bound by such directions. Section 36 confers rule making power on the Central Government for carrying out the purposes of the Ac: and power to make regulations is conferred on the 1st respondent under section 37. Section 39 provides that any regulation made by the\n\n1st respondent under any of the clauses (g) to (m) of sub-section (2) of section 37 may make it penal to contravene such regulation.\n\nIt will be seen from these provisiorus that there am certain features of the 1st respondent which are eloquent a'nd throw considerable light on the true nature of the !st respondent.\n\nIn the first place, the chairman and members of the !st respondent are all persons nominated by the Central Government and the Ceittral Government has also the power to terminate their appointment as also to remove them in certain 'specified circumstances.\n\nThe Central Government is also vested with the power to take away the management of any airport from the !st respondent and to entrust it to any other person or authority and for certain specified reasons, the Central Government can also supersede the 1st respondent.\n\nThe Central Government has also power to give directions in writing from time to time on questio_!ls of policy and these directions are declared binding on the 1st respondent. The !st respondent has no share capital but the capital needed by it for carrying out its functions is provided wholly by the Central Government.\n\nThe balance of the net profit made by the 1st respondent after making provision for various charges, such as reserve funds, bad and doubtful debts depreciation ia assets etc. does not remain with the 1st respondent and is required to be paid over to the Central Government.\n\nThe 1st respondent is alo required to submit to the Central Government for its approval a statement of the programme of its activities as also the financial estimte and it must follow as a necessary corollary that the 1st respondent can carry out only such activities and incur only such expenditure as is approved by the Ce'ntral Government. The audited accounts of the 1st reSpondent together with the audit rej)ort have. to be forwarded to the Central Government and they are required to be laid before both Houses of\n\nParliamc::rt. So far as the functions of the 1st respondent are concerned, the entire department of the Central Govemmel)t relating tci .the administration. of airports and air nevigation servicel! toiiether with. illl\n\nproperties and assets, debts, obligations and liabilities, contracts, causes of action and pending litigation is transferred to the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent is charged with carrying ont the same functions which were, until the appointed date, being carried out by the Central Government.\n\nThe employees and officers on the 1st respondent are also deemed to be public servants and the 1st respondent as well as its members, officers and employees are given immunity for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of the Act or any rule or regulation made under it. The 1st respondent is also given power to frame Regulations and to provide that contrdvention of certain specified Regulations shall entail penal consequence.\n\nThese provisions clearly show that every test discussed above is satisfied in the case of the 1st respondent and they leave no doubt that the 1st respondent is an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and falls within the definition of 'State' both on the 'narrow view taken by the majority in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (supra) as also on the broader view of Mathew, J., adopted by us.\n\nIt is, therefore, obvious that both having regard to the constitutional mandate of Article 14 as also the judicially evolved rule of administrative law, the 1st respondent was not entitled to act arbitrarily in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents, but was bound to conform to the standard or norm laid down in paragraph 1 of the notice inviting tenders which required that only a person running a registered llnd Class hotel or restaurant and having at least S years' experience as such should be eligible to tender. It was not the contention of the appellant that this standard or norm prescribed by the 1st respondent was discriminatory having no just or re; i.sonable relation to the object of inviting tenders namely, to award the contract to a sufficiently experienced person who would be able to run efficiently a Ilnd class restaurant at the irport. Admittedly the standard or nonn was reasonable and non-discriminatory and once such a standard'or norm for running a Ilnd Class restaurant should be awarded was laid down, the 1st respondent was not entitled to depart f'om it and to awardthe contract to the 4th respondents who did not satisfy the condition . of eligibility prescribed by the standard or norm. If there was no acceptable tender from a person who satisfied the condition of eligibility, the !st Nspondent could have rejected the tenders and invited • fresh tenders on the basis of a less stringent standard or norm, but it could not depart from the standard or norm prescribed by it and arbitrarily. accept the tender of the 4th responde'nts.\n\nWhen the 1st res- : pondent entertained the te!!Jler of the 4th respondents even though -, they did not have 5 years' experience of running a Ilnd Class\n\nrestaurant or hot>el, denied equality of opportunity to others similarly situate in the matter of tendering for the contract. There might have been many other pernons, in fact the appella'nt himself claimed to be one such person, who did not have 5 years' experience of running a llnd Class restaurant, but who were otherwise competent to run such a restaurant and they might also have competed with the 4th respondents for obtaining the contract, but they were precluded from doing so by the condition of eligibility requiring five years' experience. The action of the !st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents, even though they did not satisfy the prescribed condition of eligibility, was clearly discriminatory, since it excluded other person similarly situate from tendering for the contract and it was plainly arbitrary and without reason. The acceptance of the tender of the 4tb respondents was, in the circumstances invalid as being violative of the\n\nC<juality clause of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative law inhibiting arbitrary action.\n\nNow, on this view we should have ordinarily set aside the decision of the 1st respondent accepting the tender of the 4th respondents and the contract resulting from such acceptance but in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not think it would be a sound exercise of discretion on our part to upset that decision and void the contract.\n\nIt does appear from the affidavits filed by the parties that the appellant has no real interest in the result 0f the litigation, but has been put up by A. S. Irani for depriving the 4th respondents of the benefit of the contract secured by them. We find that a number of proceedings have been instituted for this purpose from time to time by A. S. Irni either personally or by instigating others to take such proceedings.\n\nThe first salvo in the battle against the 4th respondents was fired by K. S. Irani, proprietor of Cafe Excelsior, who filed a suit challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents, but in this suit he failed to obtain an interim injunction and his appeal was dismissed by the\n\nHigh Court on 19th October, 1977. It is significant that when the tenders were opened in the office of the Airport Director, Cafe Excelsior was represented by A. S. Irani, which shows that either Cafe\n\nExcelsior was a nominee of A. S. Irani or in any event K. S. Irani, proprietor of Cafe Excelsior, was closely connected with A. S. _Irani.\n\nMoreover, it is interesting to note that though the tender of the 4th respondents was accepted as far back as 19th April, 1977, K.\n\nIrani did not adopt any proceedings immediately but filed the suit only after A. S. Irani W!\\S jnformed by the Airport Director on 22nd August, 1977 that a final order has been received from the Ministry\n\n• •\n\n.....\n\nR. D. SHETTY v. AIR PORT AUTHORITY (Bhagwati, J.) l 057\n\nrequiring A. S. Irani to immediately close dow11 his restaurant and snack bars. It is also a circumstance not without significance that A. S. Irani did not immediately take any proceeding for challenging the acceptance ol the tender of the 4th respondents, but filed a suit in his own name only after the appeal of K. s. Irani was dismissed by the High Court on 19th October, 1977. These circumstances clearly indicate that the suit was filed by K. s: Irani at the instance of A. S.\n\nIran_i or in any event in concert with him and when the suit of K. S.\n\nIrani failed to achieve the dcs_ired result, A. S. Irani stepped into the arena and filed his own suit.\n\nThis suit was for a numdatory injunction seeking removal of the two snack bars which had in the meantime been put up by the 4th respondents pursuant to the acceptance of their tender Qy the 1st respondent.\n\nBut in this proceeding also A. S. Irani failed to obtain an ad-interim injunction. It was only after the failure to obtain interim relief in these two proceedings, one by K. S. Irani and the other by A. S. Irani, that the appellant filed the present writ petition in the High Court of Bombay challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents. Now, it appears from the record that the appellant was at the material time conducting a restaurant called Royal Restaurant and Store which was owned in partnership by three persons, namely, J. K.\n\nIrani. K. M. Irani and G. S. Irani.\n\nG. S. Irani is the brother of A. S.\n\nIrani and he was managing and looking after the restaurant of A. S.\n\nIrani at the airport.\n\nIt would, therefore, be a fair inference to make that the appellant was well connected with A. S. Irani and from the manner in which proceedings with a view to thwarting the attempt of the 4th respondents to obtain the benefit of their contract, have been adopted one after the other in different names, it does appear that the appellant has filed the writ petition at the instance of A. S. Irani with a view to helping him to obtain the CO!ltract for the restaurant\n\n~,1d the snack bars.\n\nIt is difficult to understand why the appellant should have waited until 8th November, 1977 to file the writ petition when the tender of the 4th respondents was accepted as far back as 19th April, 1977.\n\nThe explanation given by the appellant is that he was not aware of. the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents but that is a rather naive explanation which cannot be easily accepted.\n\nIt is not possible to believe that the appellant who was so well connected with A. S. Irani and G. S. Irani did not know that A. S. Irani had failed to obtain the contract for running the restaurant and the •nack bars and that t.his contract had been awarded to the\n\n4th respondents as a result of which A. S. Irani was being pressed B to close down his restaurant and snack bars. We have grave doubts whether this writ peti.tion was commenced by the appellant bona fide\n\nwith a view to protecting his own interest. Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the app$llan\\ more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents and during this period, the 4th respondents incurred considerable expenditure aggregating to about Rs. 1,25,000/- in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bars and in fact set up the snack bars and started running the same. It would now be most inequitous to set aside the contracts of the 4th respondents at the instance of the appellant.\n\nThe position would have been different if the appellant had filed the writ petition immediately after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents but the appellant allowed a period of over five months to elapse during which the 4th respondents altered their position.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case in which we should interfere and grant relief to the appellant in the exercise of our discretion under Article 136 read with Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nWe accordingly dismiss the appeal and confirm the order of the High Court rejecting the writ petition. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no o.rder as to costs throughout.\n\nP. B. R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n,',.\n\nJ 'r f\n\n,. •", "total_entities": 232, "entities": [{"text": "RAMANA DAYARAM SHETTY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMANA DAYARAM SHETTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND\n\nORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 90, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 4, 1979."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "International Airport Authority Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 823, "end_char": 829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sealed tenders in the prescribed form were invited from registered second class hoteliers having at least five years' experience for putting up and running a second cla-, s restaurant and two snack bars at the Bombay Airport for a period of three years."}}, {"text": "Bombay City Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3012, "end_char": 3045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. D. SHETTY V. AIRPORT AUTHORITY 1015\n\nThe fourth respondents, on the other hand, contended that the requirement that the tenderer must be a registered second grade hotlier was meaningless because the grading is given by the Bombay City Municipal Corporation only\n\nto hotels or resta1irants and not to persons running them and, therefore there could be no second grade hotlier; (2) the notice Setting out the conditions of eligibility having had no stautory force, even if there was a departure from the standard or norm of eligibility, it was not justiceablc and the first respondent was competent to give the conract to anyone it thought fit; and (3) the Airport Authority reserved to itself the right to reject all or any of the tenders without assigning any reasons and, therefore, it \\\\1as competent to it to reject all the tenders or negotiate with any person it considered fit to enter into a contract."}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9463, "end_char": 9469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India corporations", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11424, "end_char": 11456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the industrial policy resolution of the Government of India corporations were created by the Government for setting up and management of public enterprises and carrying out public functions."}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S.C.R. 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13178, "end_char": 13197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 345", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13308, "end_char": 13314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 296", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13355, "end_char": 13361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 572", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13462, "end_char": 13468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 405, 426, 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13502, "end_char": 13518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975) 3 S.C.R. 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14110, "end_char": 14129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 363", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14196, "end_char": 14212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14325, "end_char": 14332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "E. P. Rayappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1042 C]\n\nE. P. Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [1974) 2 SCR 348, Maneka Gandhi\n\nv. Union of India [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa [1969) 3 S.C.R. 374, C. K. Achuthan v. State of Kera/a [1959) S.C.R. 78, referred to."}}, {"text": "[1974) 2 SCR 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14784, "end_char": 14800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978) 2 S.C.R. 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969) 3 S.C.R. 374", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14892, "end_char": 14911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969) 3 S.C.R. 773", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14997, "end_char": 15016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR. 363", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15147, "end_char": 15164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 485", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15217, "end_char": 15224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15312, "end_char": 15330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4(a) The lnterne.tional Airport Authority-Act, 1971 empowers the Central Government to constitute an authority called the International Airport Authority."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16511, "end_char": 16516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16553, "end_char": 16558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16764, "end_char": 16769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17190, "end_char": 17200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent is required to submit an account of its activities during a financial year and this report is laid before the Houses of Parliament by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17489, "end_char": 17494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17595, "end_char": 17606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17781, "end_char": 17791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17845, "end_char": 17855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18136, "end_char": 18143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18415, "end_char": 18422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20214, "end_char": 20234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-1-1978 of the High Court at Bombay in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Ashnk H. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20300, "end_char": 20314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashnk H. Desai, Y. S. Chitale, Jai Chinai, P. G. Gokhale and\n\n8."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20316, "end_char": 20329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashnk H. Desai, Y. S. Chitale, Jai Chinai, P. G. Gokhale and\n\n8."}}, {"text": "Jai Chinai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20331, "end_char": 20341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashnk H. Desai, Y. S. Chitale, Jai Chinai, P. G. Gokhale and\n\n8."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20343, "end_char": 20356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashnk H. Desai, Y. S. Chitale, Jai Chinai, P. G. Gokhale and\n\n8."}}, {"text": "R. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20365, "end_char": 20375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Agarwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20396, "end_char": 20405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20410, "end_char": 20419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and D. N. Mishra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20424, "end_char": 20436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and D. N. Mishra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20465, "end_char": 20478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c l\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. H. Dhebar, S. K. bholakia, h H. Yagnik and B. V. Desai for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20480, "end_char": 20492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c l\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. H. Dhebar, S. K. bholakia, h H. Yagnik and B. V. Desai for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. bholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20494, "end_char": 20508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c l\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. H. Dhebar, S. K. bholakia, h H. Yagnik and B. V. Desai for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "h H. Yagnik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20510, "end_char": 20521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c l\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. H. Dhebar, S. K. bholakia, h H. Yagnik and B. V. Desai for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. V. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20526, "end_char": 20537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c l\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. H. Dhebar, S. K. bholakia, h H. Yagnik and B. V. Desai for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "BHMWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20605, "end_char": 20612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHMWATI, J.-This appeal by special leave raises interesting questions of Jaw in the area of public Jaw."}}, {"text": "3rd January, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On or about 3rd January, 1977 a notice inviting tenders for putting up and running a second class restaurant and two Snack bars at the International Airpofi at Bombay was issued by the 1st respondent E which is a corporate body constituted under the International Airport Authority Act, 43 of 1971."}}, {"text": "25th January, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22303, "end_char": 22321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The F 1 iatest point of time upto which the tenders could be submitted to the 1st respondent was stipulated in Paragraph 7 of the notice to be 12 p.m. on 25th January, 1977 and it was provided that th~ tenders would be opened on the same date at 12.30 hours."}}, {"text": "Cafe Mahim", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22893, "end_char": 22903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6666.66 per month, and the others were from Cafe Mahim, Cen- H tral Catering Service, one A. S. Irani, Cafe Seaside and Cafo Excelsior\n\noffering progressiveiy oecreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents."}}, {"text": "Cen- H tral Catering Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22905, "end_char": 22933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6666.66 per month, and the others were from Cafe Mahim, Cen- H tral Catering Service, one A. S. Irani, Cafe Seaside and Cafo Excelsior\n\noffering progressiveiy oecreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents."}}, {"text": "A. S. Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22939, "end_char": 22950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6666.66 per month, and the others were from Cafe Mahim, Cen- H tral Catering Service, one A. S. Irani, Cafe Seaside and Cafo Excelsior\n\noffering progressiveiy oecreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "Cafe Seaside", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22952, "end_char": 22964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6666.66 per month, and the others were from Cafe Mahim, Cen- H tral Catering Service, one A. S. Irani, Cafe Seaside and Cafo Excelsior\n\noffering progressiveiy oecreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents."}}, {"text": "Cafo Excelsior", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22969, "end_char": 22983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6666.66 per month, and the others were from Cafe Mahim, Cen- H tral Catering Service, one A. S. Irani, Cafe Seaside and Cafo Excelsior\n\noffering progressiveiy oecreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents."}}, {"text": "Central Catering Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23464, "end_char": 23488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Irani was present on behalf of himself, Cafe Mahim, Cafe Seaside and Cafe Excelsior and there was one representative of Central Catering Service."}}, {"text": "24th January, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24313, "end_char": 24331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now it is necessary to point out at this stage that while submitting their tender the 4th respondents had pointed out in their letter dated 24th January, 1977 addressed to the Airport Director that they had 10 years' experience in catering to reputed commercial houses, training centres, banks and factories and that they were also doing considerable outdoor catering work for various institutions."}}, {"text": "Phillips India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25384, "end_char": 25403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondents pointed out to the Airport Officer by their letter dated 22nd Febrnary, 1977 that they had, in addition to what was set out in their earlier letter dated 24th January, 1977, experience of running canteens for Phillips India Ltd. and Indian Oil Corporation and moreover, they held Eating House Licence granted by the Bombay Munici\n\npal Corporation since 1973 and had thus experience of 10 years in the catering line."}}, {"text": "Indian Oil Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25408, "end_char": 25430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondents pointed out to the Airport Officer by their letter dated 22nd Febrnary, 1977 that they had, in addition to what was set out in their earlier letter dated 24th January, 1977, experience of running canteens for Phillips India Ltd. and Indian Oil Corporation and moreover, they held Eating House Licence granted by the Bombay Munici\n\npal Corporation since 1973 and had thus experience of 10 years in the catering line."}}, {"text": "Bombay Munici\n\npal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25491, "end_char": 25521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondents pointed out to the Airport Officer by their letter dated 22nd Febrnary, 1977 that they had, in addition to what was set out in their earlier letter dated 24th January, 1977, experience of running canteens for Phillips India Ltd. and Indian Oil Corporation and moreover, they held Eating House Licence granted by the Bombay Munici\n\npal Corporation since 1973 and had thus experience of 10 years in the catering line."}}, {"text": "22nd February, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25700, "end_char": 25719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that before this letter of the 4th respondents could reach Airport Officer, another letter dated 22nd February, 1977 was addressed by the Airport Officer once again requesting the 4th respondents to produce documentary evidence to show if they were '\"a registered IInd Class Hotelier having at least 5 years experience\"."}}, {"text": "26th February, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25987, "end_char": 26006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondents thereupon addressed another letl'er dated\n\n26th February, 1977 to the Director pointing out that they had considerable experience of catering for various reputed commercial houses,\n\nclubs, messes and banks and they also held an Eating House Catering Establishment (Canteen) Licence as also a licence issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act."}}, {"text": "Licence as also a licence issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26218, "end_char": 26296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st May, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27496, "end_char": 27509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondents thereafter executed and handed over to the Ist respondent an agreement in the form attached to the tender on 1st May, 1977."}}, {"text": "A. S.\n\nIrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28563, "end_char": 28575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondents repeatedly requested the 1st respondent and the Airport Director who is the 2nd respondent in the appeal, to hand over possession of the sites and pointed out to them that the 4th reeeondents were incurring losses by reason of delay in delivery of possession, but on account of the intransigence of A. S.\n\nIrani the Ist respondent could not arrange to hand over possession of the sites to the 4th respondents.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "K. S. Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28689, "end_char": 28700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile one K. S. Irani who owned Cafe Excelsior filed Suit No.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "City Civil Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28761, "end_char": 28785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6544 of 1977 in the City Civil Court, Bombay against the res- H pondenls challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents and took out a notice of motion for res'.rair.;"}}, {"text": "10th October, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29268, "end_char": 29286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Irani obtained an ad-interim injunction against the rS'spondents but after hearing the respondents, the City Civil Court vacated the ad-interim injunction and dismissed the notice of motion by a_n order dated 10th October, 1977."}}, {"text": "19th October, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29398, "end_char": 29416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal was preferred by K. S. Irani against this order, but the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 19th October, 1977."}}, {"text": "A. S.\n\nJrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29759, "end_char": 29771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two sites handed over to the 4t11 respondents were different from the sites occupied by A. S.\n\nJrani, because A. S. Irani refused to vacate the sites in his occupation.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "A. s.\n\nIrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30093, "end_char": 30105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since A. s.\n\nIrani refused to hand over possession of the sites occupied by him to the 1st respondent, even though his contract had come to an end, and continued to carry on the business of running the restaurant :md the snack bars on these sites, the Ist respondent was constrained to file suit No.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "City Civil Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30427, "end_char": 30453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8032 of 1977 against A. S. Irani in the City Civil Court at Bombay and in that suit, an injunction was obtairied by the 1st respondent restraining A. S. Irani from running or conducting the restaurant and the snack bars or from entering the premises save and except for winding up the restaurant and the snack bars."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30899, "end_char": 30914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Irani preferred an appeal against the order granting the injunction, but the appeal was rejected and ultimately a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court was also, turned down on 31st July, 1978."}}, {"text": "Bobay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32682, "end_char": 32687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1582 of 1977 in the High Court of Bobay challenging the decision of the Ist respondent to <tCcept the tender of the 4th respondents."}}, {"text": "8th November, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32852, "end_char": 32870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was moved before a Single Judge of the High Court on 8th November, 1977 a_fter giving prior notice to the respondents and after hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge sununarily rejected the writ petition."}}, {"text": "21st February, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33419, "end_char": 33438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench after considering the affidavits and hearing the parties rejected the appeal in limine on 21st February, 1978."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34480, "end_char": 34487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47644, "end_char": 47650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51964, "end_char": 51975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule was enunciat-\n\n• • •\n\ned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitera/I; v. Seton(') where the Ieai:ned Judge said :\n\n\"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52834, "end_char": 52844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52927, "end_char": 52937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53341, "end_char": 53348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in England, the recent trend in administrative law is in that direction as is evident from what is\n\nsted at pages 540-41 in Prof.\n\nWade's Administrative Law 4th edition."}}, {"text": "Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53469, "end_char": 53473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in England, the recent trend in administrative law is in that direction as is evident from what is\n\nsted at pages 540-41 in Prof.\n\nWade's Administrative Law 4th edition."}}, {"text": "S. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54318, "end_char": 54324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dicey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54508, "end_char": 54513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his \"The Law of the Constitution\" or the definition given by Hayek in his \"Road to Serfdom\" and \"Constitution of liberty\" or the exposition set-forth by Harry Jones in his \"The Rule of Law and the Welfare State\", there is, as pointed out by Mil thew, J., in his article on \"The Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural Justice\" in \"Democracy, Equality and Freedom,\" \"substantial agreement is in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found\"."}}, {"text": "Hayek", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54578, "end_char": 54583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his \"The Law of the Constitution\" or the definition given by Hayek in his \"Road to Serfdom\" and \"Constitution of liberty\" or the exposition set-forth by Harry Jones in his \"The Rule of Law and the Welfare State\", there is, as pointed out by Mil thew, J., in his article on \"The Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural Justice\" in \"Democracy, Equality and Freedom,\" \"substantial agreement is in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found\"."}}, {"text": "Harry Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54670, "end_char": 54681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his \"The Law of the Constitution\" or the definition given by Hayek in his \"Road to Serfdom\" and \"Constitution of liberty\" or the exposition set-forth by Harry Jones in his \"The Rule of Law and the Welfare State\", there is, as pointed out by Mil thew, J., in his article on \"The Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural Justice\" in \"Democracy, Equality and Freedom,\" \"substantial agreement is in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found\"."}}, {"text": "Mil thew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54758, "end_char": 54766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his \"The Law of the Constitution\" or the definition given by Hayek in his \"Road to Serfdom\" and \"Constitution of liberty\" or the exposition set-forth by Harry Jones in his \"The Rule of Law and the Welfare State\", there is, as pointed out by Mil thew, J., in his article on \"The Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural Justice\" in \"Democracy, Equality and Freedom,\" \"substantial agreement is in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found\"."}}, {"text": "Reich", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58544, "end_char": 58549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is insisted, as pointed out by Prof.\n\nReich in ari especially."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59196, "end_char": 59202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the observations of Mathew, J., in V. Punnan Thomas v. State of Kera/a(') that : \"The Gowrnment is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recepients for jts largess."}}, {"text": "[1975) 2 S.C.R. 674", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 59849, "end_char": 59868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59935, "end_char": 59938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, C. J., speaking on behalf of himself and his colleagues on the Bench pointed out that black-listing of a person not only affects his reputation which is in Poundian terms an interest both of personality and substance, but also denies him equality in the matter of entering into contract with the Government and it cannot, therefore, be supported without fair hearing."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 63812, "end_char": 63846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As early as 1819 the Supreme Court of the United States in Mac Cul/ough\n\nv. MGryfond(') held that the Congress has power to charter corporations as incidental to or in aid of governmental functions and, as pointed out by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (supra) such federal corporations would ex-hypothesi be agencies of the Government."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64143, "end_char": 64150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Great Britain too, the policy of public administration through separat~ corporations was gradually evolved and the conduct of basic industries through giant corporations has now become a permanent feature of public life."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64369, "end_char": 64374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as India is concerned, the genesis of the emergence of corporations as instrumentalities or agencies of Government is to be found in the Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy dated 6th April, 1948 where it was stated inter alia that \"management of State enterprises will as a rule be through the medium of public corporation under the statutory control of the Central Government who will assume such powers as may k necessary to ensure this.\""}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 64503, "end_char": 64522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as India is concerned, the genesis of the emergence of corporations as instrumentalities or agencies of Government is to be found in the Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy dated 6th April, 1948 where it was stated inter alia that \"management of State enterprises will as a rule be through the medium of public corporation under the statutory control of the Central Government who will assume such powers as may k necessary to ensure this.\""}}, {"text": "6th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64561, "end_char": 64576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as India is concerned, the genesis of the emergence of corporations as instrumentalities or agencies of Government is to be found in the Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy dated 6th April, 1948 where it was stated inter alia that \"management of State enterprises will as a rule be through the medium of public corporation under the statutory control of the Central Government who will assume such powers as may k necessary to ensure this.\""}}, {"text": "may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66104, "end_char": 66199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66207, "end_char": 66238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68675, "end_char": 68688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The analogy of the concept of State action as developed in the United States may not, however, be altogether out of place while considering this question."}}, {"text": "Thomas P. Lewis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70586, "end_char": 70601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thomas P. Lewis has expressed the opinion in his article on \"The meaning of State Action\" (60 Columbia Law Review 1083) that in this case \"it is extremely unlikely that absence of public control would have changed the result as long as 99% of the budget of a nominally private institution."}}, {"text": "Douglas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72581, "end_char": 72588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide the observations of Douglas, J., in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ( 2)\n\nThere is also another factor which may be r<:garded as having a bearing on this issue and it is whether the operation of the corporation is an important public function."}}, {"text": "Arthur S. Miller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72995, "end_char": 73011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Arthur S. Miller : \"The ConstitutiolUll Law of the Security State\" ( 10 Stanford Law Review 620 at 664)."}}, {"text": "Villmer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73489, "end_char": 73496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, with the growth of the welfare State, it is very difficult to define what functions are governmental and what are not, because, as pointed out by Villmer, L.J., in Pfizer v. Ministry of Health,(') there has been, since mid-Victorian times,' \"a revolution in political thought and a totally different conception prevails today as to what is and what is not within the functions of Gvernment\"."}}, {"text": "1975] 3 S. C.R. 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 73741, "end_char": 73760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 345", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73780, "end_char": 73786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 296", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73819, "end_char": 73825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 75338, "end_char": 75365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was one of the principal tests applied by the United States Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama(') for holding that a corporation which owned a Company town was subject to the same con_stitutional limitations as the State."}}, {"text": "Marsh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75551, "end_char": 75556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case involved the prosecution of Marsh, a member of the Johevah's witnesses sect, under a state trespass statute for refusing to leave the side walk of the company town where she."}}, {"text": "Johevah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75574, "end_char": 75581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case involved the prosecution of Marsh, a member of the Johevah's witnesses sect, under a state trespass statute for refusing to leave the side walk of the company town where she."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 75831, "end_char": 75844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was fined $ 5/- and aggrieved by her conviction she carried the matter right upto the Supreme Court contending successfully that by reason of the action of the corporation her religious liberty had been denied."}}, {"text": "Black", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76339, "end_char": 76344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dominant theme of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Black was that the property of the corporation used as a town not recognisably different from other towns lost its\n\n~~:ati~~-as_ purely private property."}}, {"text": "s. 572", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76536, "end_char": 76542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405, 426, 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76556, "end_char": 76572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 501", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76585, "end_char": 76591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 649", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79301, "end_char": 79307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82456, "end_char": 82463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82619, "end_char": 82629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83134, "end_char": 83144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83905, "end_char": 83915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 S. C. R. 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 84901, "end_char": 84922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85060, "end_char": 85070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85751, "end_char": 85771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is interesting to find that this rule was recognised and applied by a Constitut; on Bench of this Court in a case of sale of kendu leaves by the Government of Orissa in Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa.(')"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85857, "end_char": 85863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trade of kendu leaves in the State of Orissa was regulated by the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1961 and this Act created a monopoly in favour of the State so far as purchase of kendu leaves from growers and pluckers was concerned."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86065, "end_char": 86075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86903, "end_char": 86921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87979, "end_char": 88000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89806, "end_char": 89816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89933, "end_char": 89943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90304, "end_char": 90314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91088, "end_char": 91100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also in this connection refer to the decision of this Court in C. K. Achuthan v. State of Kera/a('), where Hidayatullah, J., speaking on behalf of the Court made certain observation which was strongly relied upon on l; chalf of the respondents."}}, {"text": "Cannanore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91411, "end_char": 91420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of this case were that the petitioner and the 3rd respondent Co-operative Milk Supply Union, Canancre, submitted tenders for the supply oE milk to the Government hospital at Cannanore for the year 1948-49."}}, {"text": "Co-vpcrativc Miik Supply Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91863, "end_char": 91893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The resulting contract in favour of the petitioner was, however, subsequently cancelled by issuing a notice in terms of clause (2) of the tender, in pursuance of the policy of the Government\n\nthat in the mat\\er of supply to Government Medical Institutions the Co-vpcrativc Miik Supply Union should be given contract on the basis of prices fixed by the Revenue Department."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92055, "end_char": 92065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92227, "end_char": 92237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 92263, "end_char": 92281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution Bench rejected this contention of the petitioner and while doing so, Hidayatullah, J., made the following observation : \"There is no discrimination, because it is perfectly open to the Government, even as it is to a private party, to choose a person to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92696, "end_char": 92706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93080, "end_char": 93090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93989, "end_char": 93999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution , Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 94593, "end_char": 94613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution , Bench negatived this complaint and speaking through Mitter, J., observed :\n\n'With regard to the grievance that in some cases the bids of persons making the highest tenders were not accepted, the facts are that persons who had made lower bids were asked to raise their bids to the highest offered before the same were accepted. ."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94660, "end_char": 94666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution , Bench negatived this complaint and speaking through Mitter, J., observed :\n\n'With regard to the grievance that in some cases the bids of persons making the highest tenders were not accepted, the facts are that persons who had made lower bids were asked to raise their bids to the highest offered before the same were accepted. ."}}, {"text": "Oria Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96534, "end_char": 96549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the respondents were the highest bidders at an auction held by the Oria Government through the Exdse Commissioner for the exclusive privilege of selling by retail country liquor in some shops."}}, {"text": "6th January, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 96709, "end_char": 96726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The auction was held pursuant to an order dated 6th January, 1971 issued by the Government of Orissa in exercise of the power conferred under section 29(2) of the Bihar & Oris>a Excise Act, 1915 and clause (6) of this Order provided that \"no sale shall be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State Government who shall be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor\"."}}, {"text": "section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96803, "end_char": 96816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96839, "end_char": 96855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97438, "end_char": 97459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "andHegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97495, "end_char": 97503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention was negatived andHegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court observed :\n\n\"The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State."}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98089, "end_char": 98105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98109, "end_char": 98119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98215, "end_char": 98225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99792, "end_char": 99802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100612, "end_char": 100622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100686, "end_char": 100696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101113, "end_char": 101123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jha.gwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101254, "end_char": 101263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jha.gwati, J.)\n\nI 04 9\n\ntion considerable light is thrown by the decision of this Court in Rajasthail Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal(')."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101467, "end_char": 101494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was a case in which this Court was called upon to consider whether the Rajasthan Electricity Board was an 'authority' within the meaning of the exe!ession \"other authorities\" in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101574, "end_char": 101581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101584, "end_char": 101592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava, J., delivering the judgment of the majority pointed out that the expression \"other\n\nauthorities\" in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101694, "end_char": 101701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102021, "end_char": 102025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J., who delivered a separate judgment, agreeing with the conclusion reached by the majoriy, preferred to gjve a slightly different meaning to the expression \"other authorities\"."}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103883, "end_char": 103893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967) 3 S. C R 377", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 104034, "end_char": 104053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Praga Tools Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 104237, "end_char": 104260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was a case in which some of the workmen songht a writ of mandamus against Praga Tools Corporation which was a company with 56 per cent of its share capital held by the Central Government, 32 per cent by the Andhra Pradesh Government and 12 per cent by private individuals."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 104370, "end_char": 104395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was a case in which some of the workmen songht a writ of mandamus against Praga Tools Corporation which was a company with 56 per cent of its share capital held by the Central Government, 32 per cent by the Andhra Pradesh Government and 12 per cent by private individuals."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104582, "end_char": 104595, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105116, "end_char": 105126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Praga Tool Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105243, "end_char": 105265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hat since there was no duty imposed on Praga Tool Corporation by statute, no writ of mandamus could issue against it."}}, {"text": "Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105532, "end_char": 105569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which arose in this case was whether a reference of an industrial dispute between the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') and the Union made by the State of Bihar under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was valid."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105643, "end_char": 105657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which arose in this case was whether a reference of an industrial dispute between the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') and the Union made by the State of Bihar under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was valid."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105664, "end_char": 105674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105682, "end_char": 105711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 106529, "end_char": 106548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in virtue of the authority derived from its memorandnm and articles of association and not by reason of any authority granted by the Central\n\nGovernment."}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 S. C. R. 773", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 106816, "end_char": 106837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107083, "end_char": 107093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel Lintited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108113, "end_char": 108137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11) This decision has also no relevance to the point at issue before us, since the on)y question in that case was whether an Assistant Surgeo1;1 in the employment of Hindustan Steel Lintited could be said to be holding a. civil post under the Union or a State so as to be entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108249, "end_char": 108260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.industan Steel Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108307, "end_char": 108331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held that H.industan Steel Limited was not a department of the Government nor were its employees holding posts under the State within the meaning Qf Article 311 (2)."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108446, "end_char": 108457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel Lipiited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108538, "end_char": 108562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision was clearly right and indeed it could not be otherwise, since Hindustan Steel Lipiited, which was a distinct and independent legal entity, was not a departmeµt of the Government and could not be regarded as State for the purpose of Article 311 (2)."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108708, "end_char": 108719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Slee! Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108800, "end_char": 108823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that the Court was not concerned with the question whether Hindustan Slee!"}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108865, "end_char": 108875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109084, "end_char": 109094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109418, "end_char": 109428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "International Airport Authority of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 110023, "end_char": 110063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W c may examine, in the light of this discussion, whether the 1st respondent, name!ly, the International Airport Authority of India, can be said lo be an authority falling within the definition of 'State' in Article 12."}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110140, "end_char": 110150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110155, "end_char": 110251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110355, "end_char": 110364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971", "statute": "It is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "International Airport Authority of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 110460, "end_char": 110500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section ( 1) of section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government shall constitute an authority to be called the International Airport Authority of India, to whom we shall hereafter refer as the 1st respondent."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111044, "end_char": 111053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971", "statute": "It is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111448, "end_char": 111457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govemment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112300, "end_char": 112317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This sub-section also says that all non-recurring expenditure incurred by the Central Government for or in connection with the purposes of the airport upto the appointed date and declared to be capital expenditnre by the Central Govemment shall be treated as the capit\"l provided by the Central Government to the 1st respondent and all sums of money due to the Central Government in relation to the airport immediately before the appointed date shall be deemed to be due to the 1st respondent."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113084, "end_char": 113094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113317, "end_char": 113327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113947, "end_char": 113957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114003, "end_char": 114013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114278, "end_char": 114288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govermnent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 114351, "end_char": 114369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent to submit for the approval of the Central Govermnent a statement of the programme of its activities during the forthcoming financial year as wen as its financial estimate in respect thereof at least three months before the commencement of each financial year and section 24 provides that the accounts of the I st respondent shall be audited annually by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the accounts as certified by the ComptroNer and Auditor General or auy other person~ appointed by him in this behalf, together with the audit report thereon, shall be for; ya:rded to the Central Government and the Central Government shi!ll cause the san1e to be laid before both Houses of Parliament."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114580, "end_char": 114590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115051, "end_char": 115061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115395, "end_char": 115405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115432, "end_char": 115442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115634, "end_char": 115644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115912, "end_char": 115922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115995, "end_char": 116005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116236, "end_char": 116246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116411, "end_char": 116421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116423, "end_char": 116433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116549, "end_char": 116559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ceittral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 116921, "end_char": 116940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent are all persons nominated by the Central Government and the Ceittral Government has also the power to terminate their appointment as also to remove them in certain 'specified circumstances."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119908, "end_char": 119918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. S. Irni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 123355, "end_char": 123365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find that a number of proceedings have been instituted for this purpose from time to time by A. S. Irni either personally or by instigating others to take such proceedings.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "Cafe\n\nExcelsior", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 123951, "end_char": 123966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that when the tenders were opened in the office of the Airport Director, Cafe Excelsior was represented by A. S. Irani, which shows that either Cafe\n\nExcelsior was a nominee of A. S. Irani or in any event K. S. Irani, proprietor of Cafe Excelsior, was closely connected with A. S. _Irani."}}, {"text": "A. S. _Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124082, "end_char": 124094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that when the tenders were opened in the office of the Airport Director, Cafe Excelsior was represented by A. S. Irani, which shows that either Cafe\n\nExcelsior was a nominee of A. S. Irani or in any event K. S. Irani, proprietor of Cafe Excelsior, was closely connected with A. S. _Irani.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "19th April, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 124207, "end_char": 124223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, it is interesting to note that though the tender of the 4th respondents was accepted as far back as 19th April, 1977, K.\n\nIrani did not adopt any proceedings immediately but filed the suit only after A. S. Irani W!\\S jnformed by the Airport Director on 22nd August, 1977 that a final order has been received from the Ministry\n\n• •\n\n.....\n\nR. D. SHETTY v. AIR PORT AUTHORITY (Bhagwati, J.) l 057\n\nrequiring A. S. Irani to immediately close dow11 his restaurant and snack bars."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nIrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124225, "end_char": 124234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, it is interesting to note that though the tender of the 4th respondents was accepted as far back as 19th April, 1977, K.\n\nIrani did not adopt any proceedings immediately but filed the suit only after A. S. Irani W!\\S jnformed by the Airport Director on 22nd August, 1977 that a final order has been received from the Ministry\n\n• •\n\n.....\n\nR. D. SHETTY v. AIR PORT AUTHORITY (Bhagwati, J.) l 057\n\nrequiring A. S. Irani to immediately close dow11 his restaurant and snack bars.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "K. s. Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124818, "end_char": 124829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also a circumstance not without significance that A. S. Irani did not immediately take any proceeding for challenging the acceptance ol the tender of the 4th respondents, but filed a suit in his own name only after the appeal of K. s. Irani was dismissed by the High Court on 19th October, 1977.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "A. S.\n\nIran_i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124980, "end_char": 124993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These circumstances clearly indicate that the suit was filed by K. s: Irani at the instance of A. S.\n\nIran_i or in any event in concert with him and when the suit of K. S.\n\nIrani failed to achieve the dcs_ired result, A. S. Irani stepped into the arena and filed his own suit.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "K. S.\n\nIrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125051, "end_char": 125063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These circumstances clearly indicate that the suit was filed by K. s: Irani at the instance of A. S.\n\nIran_i or in any event in concert with him and when the suit of K. S.\n\nIrani failed to achieve the dcs_ired result, A. S. Irani stepped into the arena and filed his own suit.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 125641, "end_char": 125661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only after the failure to obtain interim relief in these two proceedings, one by K. S. Irani and the other by A. S. Irani, that the appellant filed the present writ petition in the High Court of Bombay challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents."}}, {"text": "Royal Restaurant and Store", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125861, "end_char": 125887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it appears from the record that the appellant was at the material time conducting a restaurant called Royal Restaurant and Store which was owned in partnership by three persons, namely, J. K.\n\nIrani."}}, {"text": "J. K.\n\nIrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125945, "end_char": 125957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it appears from the record that the appellant was at the material time conducting a restaurant called Royal Restaurant and Store which was owned in partnership by three persons, namely, J. K.\n\nIrani."}}, {"text": "K. M. Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125959, "end_char": 125970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. Irani and G. S. Irani.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "G. S. Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125975, "end_char": 125986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. Irani and G. S. Irani.", "canonical_name": "A. S.\n\nIran_i"}}, {"text": "S. Irani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127088, "end_char": 127096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not possible to believe that the appellant who was so well connected with A. S. Irani and G. S. Irani did not know that A. S. Irani had failed to obtain the contract for running the restaurant and the •nack bars and that t.his contract had been awarded to the\n\n4th respondents as a result of which A. S. Irani was being pressed B to close down his restaurant and snack bars."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128462, "end_char": 128473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128484, "end_char": 128495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1059_1077_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "DALBIR SINGH & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (45 of 1860), S. 302 & Criminal Procedure Code 1973 '(2 of 1974), S. 354(3)-lmposition of death penalty-Court enjoined with -duty to record 'special reasons for awarding extren1e penalty-NaJure of the -crime whether the sole determinant of the punishment.\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Art. 141-Binding nature of Precedents-lngre- C .dients of a decision-Explained-Ratio decidendi-Definition of.\n\nThere was 0t dispute between the appellants and the complainant's party , over the 'turns of water' for irrigation of their agricultural ]ands. The dispute was settled by a patchwork mediation but it was of no avail. On the fate 4 fol day, the compllainant's party were making merry with alcohol in the house .of the prosecution witness when the 3rd appeHant joined them.\n\nHis unwel- D , come presence resulted in frayed tempers, and beatings of the 3rd appellant.\n\nThe latter, bent on reprisal for the flagellation and humilation, waited till sundown and returned armed with friends and weapons.\n\nHe ignited the attack 'by instigation and the 1st and 2nd appe1lants fired with their guns as a result of wluch 3 members of the complainants' party died on the spot. At this situation, PW 14 brought out his licensed gun from his house, and thereupon both sides started firing and a number of _persons sustained gun shot injuries K on their person. In the midst of this firing, the lamPardar of the villtage .appeared on the scene and made an attempt to pacify both the sides, but he -also received gun shot injuries as a result of which he died two days later.\n\nA fourth person made a dying declaration thtat he had been shot by the appel- 1ants.\n\nThe Sessions Court held the appellants guilty under Section 302 I.P.C.\n\nF and sentenced them to death, and the High Court on appeal confirmed the sentence.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this court,\n\nHELD: [Per Krishna Iyer & Desai, JJ.]\n\n1. Death sentence on death sentence is Parliament's function. Interpretative G non-application of death sentence when legislative !alternatives exist is within judicial discretion.\n\n[1065B]\n\n2. The dignity of man, a sublinle value of the Constitution and the heart of. penelogical humanisation, may find expression through culturisation of the judicial art of interpretation and choice from la:lternatives. If the Court '!<ads .the text of s. 302 \"Penal Code, enlightened by the fundamental right H 'lo life which the Founding Fathers of the Constitution made manifest the duditial oath to uphold. the Constitution wi.11 unfold profound implidations ·\n\n.. ,,\n\nA beyond lip service to Form VIII of the Third Schedule and this lofty obligation and cultural Constitutional behest validates the exploration of the meaning of meanings wrapped in the uncharted either/or of the text of s. 302\n\nIPC.\n\n[1065E-F]\n\n3. Courts read the Code, not in judicial cloisters but in the light of societal ethos. Nor does the humanism of our Constitution holistically viewed, subs- B cribe to the hysterical !assumption or facile illusion that a crime free society will dawn if hangman and firing squads were kept feverishly busy.\n\n[1066A-B]\n\n4. The myopic view that public executions backed by judicial sentences will perform the funeral of all criminals and scare away potential offenders is a die-hard superstition of sociologically and psychologically illiterate Jeg{l.}ism\n\nwhich sacrifices cultural values, conveniently turns away from the history of the futility of capital penalty over the ages and unconsciously violates the global reality that half the world has given up death penalty, de ; ure or . de facto, without added calamity. and the other half is being educated out of this State practised lethal violence by pOVi'erful human rights movements at once secular and spiritual.\n\n[1067B-C1\n\n5. The jurisprudence of sentencing iri Free IndiU, has been a Cinderella and the values of our Constitution have not adequately humanised the punitive diagnostics of criminal courts, \\vhich -sometimes, though rarely, remind us of the torturesome and trigger-happy aberrations of the Middle Ages and some gory geographic segments, soaked in retributive blood and untouched by the correctional karuna of our Constitutional culture. [1068Gl\n\n6. After. Ediga Annan1as's case [1974] 4 SCC 443 the law of punishment E under s. 302 !PC has been largely settled by this court and the High Courts are bound thereby. [1068H]\n\n7. Raiendra Prasad's case [19791 3 SCR 78 and Bishnu Deo Shaw's case [1979] 3 SCR p. 355 have indubitably l0 1id down the normative cynosure and untif over ruled by a larger bench of this court that is the law of the land under Art. 141. To discard it is to disobey the Constitution and such sub-\n\n', F versiveness of the rule of law, in a crucial area of life and death, will spell judk .. -ial disorder.\n\nToday, the law is what Rajendra Prasad, in its majority judgment, has laid down and that has been done at unmistakable length.\n\nWilly-nilly, that binds judges and parties alike.\n\n[1068H-1069A, 1069C]\n\n8. Counting the casualties is not the main criterion for sentencing to death, nor recklessness in the act of murder. The sole focus on the crime and the total farewell to the criminal and his social-personal circumstances mutilate sentencing justice.\n\n[1069BJ\n\n9. The forensic exercise at the !entencing stage, despite the purposeful s. 235(2) Cr.P.C., has been a functional failure because of the ctlSUa\\ way the punishment factors are dealt with, a! if the nature of the crime was the sole determinant of the punishment.\n\nIn Ra; endra Prajad'.J case it has bee1texplained how the prosecution must mo1ke out, by special factors, why the graver penalty should be inflicted.\n\nEvidence may be led and arguments addressed by both sides. but in prtlctice s. 235(2) has been frustratin&ly ritua-· u .. d.\n\n[10690-E]\n\n'DALBm SINGH v. PUNJAB :(KrishM Iyer, J.) 1'061\n\n10. Section 302 of the Penal Code, road with s. 354(3) of the Criminal Pro- A cedure Code demands special reasons for awarding the graver sentence. [1070E]\n\n11. Taking the cue from the. English legislation on abolition, the majority opinion suggested that life imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the man's life but in practice amounts to incarceration for a _period between 10 and 14 years mnyt at the option of the convicting court, be subject to the condition that the sentence of imprisonn1ent shall last as B long as life lasts Where there are exceptional indications of murderous recidivllim and the community cannot run the risk of the convict being at large.. This takes care of judicial apprehensions that unless physically liquidated the culprit rr11a:y at some remote time repeat murder.\n\n[1071F-G]\n\n12. The ga1!ows swallbw, in most cases, the social dissenter, the political disiienter, the poor and the under-privileged, the member of minority groups C or one who has turned tough because of brokf:n homes, parental neglect or other undeserved adversities of childhood or later. Judicial error leading to innocent men being executed is not too recondite a reality. Evidence in Court and assessments by judges have human limitation. [107IH-107~B]\n\n13. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Athapa Goundan's case (AIR 1937 Mad. 695) sentenced him to death. He was duly executed as also D seveml others on the ratio of that ruling. This Full Bench decision was, however, over-ruled ten years later by the Privy Council in 1947 PC 67.\n\nHad it been done before Goundan was gallowed many judicial hangings could have been halted. [1072CJ\n\n(A) In the instant case the earlier provocation came from the deceased's side by beating up AppeJlti.'nt No. 3.\n\nThe partie3, incltiding the prosecu- E tion group were tipsy.\n\nThere had been antecedent irrigation irritation between them. There was no pre-planned, Well-laid attack, hell-bent on liquidating the enemy.\n\n[!069EJ\n\n(B) The sentences of death in the pre&ent appeal are liable to be reduced to life imprisonment.\n\n[I07IE]\n\n(Per Sen, J. dissenting)\n\n1. The question of abolition of capitnl punishment is a difficult and controvernial subject, long and hotly debated and it has evoked during the' past , two centuries strong conflicting \"'.iews. [1072H]\n\n2. The question whether the scope of death sentence should be curtailed or not is for the Parliament to decide. The matter is essentially of political expediency and, as such, it is the concern of the statesmen, and, therefore, the domain of the Legislature aod not the Judiciary. [1073AJ\n\n3. It is not within the province of thili Court while dealing with an appeal confined to sentence under Art. 136, to curtail the scope of death sentence under •· 302 I.P.C., 1860 nor is it constitutionally or legally permissible for this Court while hearing such an appeal to lay down that on grounds of compassion and humanism the sentence of death on a conviction for murder under s. 302, es a rule of universal application be substituted by a sentence\n\n'A of imprisonment for life, irrespective of the gravity of the crime and the surrounding circumstances i.e., virtually abolish the extreme penalty. [1072G]\n\n4. Section 302 l.P.C., 1860 confers upon the Court a discretion in the matter of the punishment to be imposed for an offence of murder and the Court has to choose between the sentence of death and a sentence of imprison~ ment for life while under s. 3 54 ( 3) Cr. P .C., 1973 the Court is enjoined with B a duty to record 'special reasons' in case the extreme penalty is n.warded.\n\nBut the question whether the death sentence should be awarded or not must, be left to the discretion of the Judge trying the accused and the question of sentence must depend upon the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case.\n\nA sentence of death when passed, is subject to confirmation by the- High Court under s. 366(1) of the Code. The accused also has a right of appeal to the High Court under s. 374(2) against the sentence. Thereafter an C appeal lies to this Court by special leave under Art. 136 on the question of sentence. It would, therefore, be manifest that it is neither feasible to, define nor legally permissible for this Court to limit or circumscribe the connotation of the expression 'special reasons' occurring in s. 354(3) of the Code so as to bring about a virtual abolition of the death sentence. [1073B-E]\n\n5. A decision on a question of sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can never be regarded as a binding precedent, much less 'law declared' within the meaning of Art. 141 of the Consti tution so as to bind all courts within the territory of India. [1073F]\n\n6. According to the well settled, theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients : (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Jutlge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts, (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts,\n\n(iii) Judgment biased on the combined effect of (i) and (ii). For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient No. (iii) is the material ele ment in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute.\n\nI-Iowever for the purposes of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient No. (ii) is the vital element in the deci~ sion. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. [!073G-!074Bl\n\n7. The ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other elements in the decision are not precedents.\n\n[1074C]\n\nQua/cast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes LR. 1959 A.C. 743 referred to.\n\n8. Even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the Court, the Judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case. [1074D]\n\n• \"\n\n. ~1.: ; DALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, /.)\n\n': .9. There are no rationes decidendi much less any ratio decidendi in Rdie>U!ra Prasad's case. [1074-E]\n\n. (i) In the minority opinion the need for judicial restraint was emphasised and, the duty to avoid encrotJ.chment on the powers conferred upon Parliament. The assessment of public opinion on this difficult and complex question was essentia1ly a legislative, not a judicial, function.\n\n[1074E]\n\n(ii) Buttressed by the belief that Capital punishment served no useful purpose, the majority, asserted that it was morally Unacceptt1 .. ble to the coritemporary society and found it shocking to their conscience and sense of justice. The deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State for an offe1:1ce of murder, was a denial of human dignity and the death penalty was usually inflicted only on a few, i.e. the poor and downtrodden who are outcasts\n\nof a society, which led to the irresistible inference that the punishment was e not foir!y applied.\n\n[1074F]\n\n(iii) This may be 'progressive' stance which is out of place in a judicial pronouncement, which ought to be based on the fucts and circumstances of the case and the law applicable. But the professed view does not stem from a firm belief in dignity of human life for the death penalty is advocated for certain classes of offenders, namely (1) white collar offenders,\n\n(2) anti-social D offenders and (3) h+ardened murderers. This shows that the majority was not against the capital punishment in principle.\n\n[1074G-1075A]\n\n(iv) On the facts, the n1ajority commuted the sentence sentence of imprisonment for life, and the decision cannot, construed as laying down a ratio decidendi.\n\n[107~B]\n\nof death to a therefore, be\n\n10. The majority decision tested in the light of the theory of precedents clearly does not Jay down tlny legal principle applied to any legal problem' disclosed by the facts and, therefore, the majority decision cannot be, said to have 'declared\" any law' within the meaning of Art. 141 so as to bind all courts in the country. General observations ade in the context of sentencing jurisprudene wi11 have to be regarded as the view of the Judge/ Judges concerned-and not 'law declared by this court' under Art. 141 of the Constitution. Any attempt to limit or circumscribe the connotation of 'special reasons' mentioned in s. 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by indulging in classification of murders such as white collar offences and nonwhite collar offences or Jaying down so-called guidelineS for imposition of the extreme penalty, would tlmount to unwarranted abridgement of' the discretion legti.Uy vested in the trial court and constitutionally upheld by this Court.\n\n[!075C-DJ\n\n11. If the general observations on sentencing jurisprudence made in -Rajendra Prasad's case are to be regarded as 'law declared by this Court' Within the meaning of Art. 141 so, as to bind all courts in the country, then the observation or the so-called guidelines to the effect \"'special reasons' neces~\n\nsary for imposing death penalty must relate, not to the crime as such but to the Criminal\" occurring in the majority judgment, it must be stated, would be UD\\varranted and contrarv to s. 302 Of the Tnrli~T\"! P\"'nal Code read with s. 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n[1075E-FJ\n\n1064 SUPREJ\\tE COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c~R.\n\n12. S. 302 of the I.P.C. gives a choice while s. 354(3) of the Code merely requires 'special reasons' to be indicated for .iposing the death penalty.\n\nNothing is stated whether the 'special reasons' should relate to the .criminal or the' crinle. In the \\i:bsence of ally specific indication in that behalf \"special reasons' would relate both to the crime and the crinlinal. Previously, perhaps, more attention was being paid to the nature, gravity and the manner of committing the crime, though extenuating factors concerning the criminal, his age, criminal tendencies etc. wer~ not ignored.\n\n[1075G]\n\n13. In the majority judgment in Rajendra Prasad's case nothing new has been said except that more emphasis on factors concerning the criminal is indicated._ But in the great enthusiasm for doing so, the pendulum has swung to the other extreme and the guideline given is that the 'special reasons' must relate \"not to the Crime aS such. but to the criminal,\" for which there is no C . \"Urrant in s. 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure .. [1075H-1076A)\n\n14. The obsession to get the death penalty abolished from the Statute Book i.e. Indian enal Code 1860 is -so greatthat an interdict against it is- , surprisingly spelt out from the Constitution itSelf because right to life bas been regarded as 'very valuable, sacrosanct and fundamental' therein, though in lagmohan Singh's case {(1973) 1 S.C.C. 20] a constitution bench of this D Court unanimously held -that the death penalty' and the judicial discretion vested in the Court regarding its , imposition on an accused are constitutiorrolly\n\nvalid.\n\n[I076B-C]\n\n15. So long as the extreme penalty is retained on the Statute Book, it would be impermissible for any Jlldge to advocate its abolition in judicial pronouncements. The forum for that is elsewhere.\n\n[1076D]\n\n(a) In the instant case it ronnot be said that the award of death sentence to any of the two appellants, was not proper or uncalled for.\n\nThough the dispute _was over 1he 'turns of water,' that would hardly furnish any justifica tion _for the commission of the pre-planned triple murder. The dastardly act Of the tlppellants resulted in the loss of three precious lives. These were nothing but intentional, cold-blooded and brutal murders.\n\n(1077A. E]\n\n F,\n\n(b) The High Court was justified in confirming the death .entence passed \"-\"-under s. 368(a) of the Code, being satisfied that there were \"Special reasons\"\n\nv.rithin the meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure\n\n1973. :uo11A1\n\n(c) On the facts and circumstances of the case, the award . of death sentence t0 the two appellants who wre trigger happy gentlemen was neither 'erroneous in principle' nor was 'arbitrary or excessive', or 'indicatiVe Of an improper exercise of discretion', and is: well merited.\n\n[1077G] -\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1979.\n\nB Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th October, 1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ct:iminal Appeal No. 735 of 1978 and Murder Reference' No. 6/78.\n\n.,...\n\nDALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nFrank Anthony and Sushi! Kumar for the Appellants.\n\nR. S. Sondhi and Hardev Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer and D. A. Desai, JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. A. P. Sen, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Death sentence on death sentence is Parliament's function.\n\nInterpretative non-application of death sentence when legislative alternatives exist is within judicial jurisdiction.\n\nThe onerous option to spare the lives of the appellants to be spent in prison or to hand them over to the hangman to be jettisoned out of terrestrial life into \"the undiscovered country from whose boum no traveller returns\" is the crucial function this Court has to exercise in the present appeal.\n\nSir Winston Churchill, in his oft-quoted observation, said :\n\n\"The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the m0St unfailing tests of the civilization of any country.\" ( ')\n\nWithout academic aura and maukish sentimentalism the court bas to rise to principled pragmatism in the choice of the penal strategy provided by the Penal Code. The level of culture is not an irrelevant factor in the punitive exercise. So we must be forwamed against deeply\n\nembedded sadism in some sectors of the community, demanding retributive death penalty disguised as criminal justice-a trigger-happy pathology curable only by human rights literacy.\n\nBut the dignity of man, a sublime value of our Constitution and the heart of penological hurnanisatior,, may find expression through culturisation of the judicial art of interpretation and choice from alternatives. If the court reads the text of s. 302 Penal Code, enlightened by the fundamental right to life which the Father of Nation and the(') founding fathers of the Constitution made manifest, the judicial oath to uphold the Constitution will unfold profound implications beyond lip service to Form VIII of the Third Schedule and thls lofty obligation and cultural-constitutional behest validates our exploration of the meaning of meanings wrapped in the uncharted either/or of the text of s. 302 I.P.C.\n\nIt is right to state, to set the record straight, that this Court has in Rajendra Prasad's case(')., exposed the disutility and counter-culture of an obsolescent obsession with crime as distinguished from crime-doer and the sentencing distortion that develops almost into a paranoid preoccupation with death dealing severity as the saviour of society in the land of the\n\n(1) S'n~ and Prob•tion, National College of the Ste.te Judickry Reno, Neveda p.68. '\n\n(2) Acharya Kripalani and the Lok Na yak have condemned death penalty publicly\n\n(3) [1979] 3 S. C.R. 78. 12-409 SCl/79\n\nI 066 SllPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nBuddha and the Mahatma and in a world where humanity has protested against barbaric executions by State aencies even with forell6ic 'rites' Courts read the Code, not in judicial cloisters but in the light of societal ethos.\n\nNor does the humanism of our Constitution ho!irucally viewed subscribe to the hysterical assumption or facile illusion that a crime-free society will dawn if hangman and firing squads were kept feversishly busy.\n\nWe may remind the intractable rctentionists that the British Royal Commission, after studying statistics from six abolitionist counlries, namely, Switzerland, Belgium. The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, observed : \"The evidence that we ourselves received in these countries was to the effect that released murderers who commit further crimes of violence are rare. and those who become useful citizens are common.''\n\nNo Indian is innocent of the insightful observations of the Father of the Nation over 40 years ago in the Harijan :\n\n\"I do regard death sentence as contrary to ahimsa. Only he taks life who gives it.\n\nAll punishment is repugnant to ahimsa.\n\nUnder a state governed according to the principles of ahimsa, therefore, a murderer would be sent to a penitentiary\n\nad there given every chance of reforming himself. All crime\n\n1s a kind of disease and should be treated as such.\"( 1)\n\nWith this exordial exercise we may get back to the macabre episode in this appeal which has blown up into four murders, typical of the syndrome of village violence triggered off by tremendous trifles when viewed in retrospect.\n\nWhen a psychic stress, left to smoulder and flame up, is fuelled by factions a'nd firearms, social irritants and economic discontents, ubiquitous in rural India, it suddenly flares as showdowns and shootings, taking many precious lives in haywire fury. The solution for explosive tensions and return to tranquility is curing the inner man through proven mcditational, mental-moral neural technology, cli1uination of social provocation and economic injustice and of addiction to inebriants which dement the consumer. Timely vigilance of policing agencies to nip in the bud burgeoning confrontations and prompt and potent enforcement of the Arms Act the failure to do which makes weapons freely available also account for escalating violence. The social autospsy of murders is more significant than the medical post-mortem of cadavers or the forensic close-up of crime after it has occurred. The escapation of violence cannot be arrested\n\n(I) Harijan, March 19, 1937\n\n• •\n\n., . \"\n\nDALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 067\n\nby inert police presence going into action after tragic clashes, but only by a holistic ministering to the inner man as well as collective consciousness. It is obvious, yet obscure, that a crime-firee society is beyond the gift of severe judges or heavy-handed policemen. And the myopic view that public executions backed by judicial sentenc~ will perform the funeral of all criminals and scare away potential offenders is a die-hard superstition of sociologically and psychologically illiterate legalism which sacrifices cultural values, conveniently turns away from the history of the futility of capital penalty over the ages and unconsciously violates the blobal reality that half the world has given up death penalty de jure or de facto, without added calamity. and the other half is being educated out of this State-practised lethal violence by powerful human rights movements at once secular and spiritual.\n\nThese observations, not meant to be polemical or pontifical, gain functional relevance as we proceed to narrate the minimal facts, as found by the High Court, since we l:tave set our face against reopening cvidcntiary re-appreciation after concurrent findings have already been rendered by the court's below.\n\nPunjab villagers are good agriculturists and know the value of water for golden harvests.\n\nThe scene of the four murders, the victims and the villians, the main witnesses to the case and the prosecution scenario take us to the village Sarhali Mandan in Amritsar District which has irrigation facilities and consequent irritation potential.\n\nA new scheme, regulating the turns for taking irrigation water, was introduced, about the time of occurrence which affected thei accused and benefitted Kapur Singh, a leading prosecution witness.\n\nTilis switch in irrigationed turns sparked off friction.\n\nHad it been wholesomely resolved by imaginative official handling this murder, perhaps, could have been obviated. Many ,..--iuurders in the Punjab have been caused by social bungling regarding\n\n~' turns of water which tragically convert the passion for production of the farmer into passion for removal of the obstructor by murder. Governments have some times been deaf and dumb about this etiology. A stitch in time savcs nine, is good criminology. •\n\nAway, the dispute on the turn of water between the two was settled by a patchwork mediation which did not finally extinguish the fires of fury earlier ignited.\n\nFor a group, mainly of proseicution witnesses, was making merry with alcohol in the afternoon of October 13 1977 at the ' ' house of Karaj Singh, a prosecution witness, when one of the appellants, Jarnail Singh went in. His unwelcome presence resulted in fraved tempers, heated tantrums and beating of the 3rd appellant. The latter, bent on reprisal for the flagellation and humiliation, waited till sundown\n\nand returned armed with friends and weapons from outside.\n\nAbuses were the provocative invitation for the fracas.\n\nThe tipsy response broi; ght the opposite party out.\n\nJarnail Singh, the 3rd appellant, who was the victim of the earlier beating, ignited the attack by instigation and his party went into violent action. Guns boomed, dangs, dived, three men and later a fourth,. fell dead and the curtain was drawn after the catastrophe was complete.\n\nProbably, the accused party was also drunk.\n\nAnd alcohol makes men beside themselves and buries sanity.\n\nThe role of intoxicating drinks and drugs in aggressive behaviour and explosive crime bas not been the subject of sufficient criminological research in the country.\n\nJmpresionistically speaking, half of violent crime., explosive sex and reckless driving, has its 'kick' in alcohol and the gains of 'prohibition' have new dimensions.\n\nThat apart, in the case on hand, the High Court analysed the evidence, liberaliy applied the rule of benefit of doubt and climaxed its judgments with sentences of death and imprisonment for life on the various accused who were eventually held gnilty.\n\nWe are concerned only with those who received capital penalty, and the court expressed itself thus on this momentous issue of death sentence :\n\nAs both Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh, accused, fired at Jagir Singh, Sardul Si'ngh and Piara Singh who were absolutely unarmed recklessly and without provocation of any kind, the sentence of death awarded to each of them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also hereby affirmed.\"\n\nWe propose to deal only with this punitive crisis limited to its lethal aspect.\n\nThe judgment under appeal is a hint of the judicial confusion even i'n this grave area of death penalty.\n\nTrue, the jurisprudence of sentencing in Free India bas been a Cinderella and the values of our Constitution have not adequately humanized the punitive diagnostics of criminal courts, which sometimes, though rarely, remined us of the torturesome and trigger-happy aberrations of the Middle Ages and some gory geographic segments, soaked in retributive blood and untouched by the correctional karuna of our constitutional culture.\n\nBut after Ediga Annama's case('), the law of punishment under s. 302 I.P.C. has been largely settled by this Court and the High Courts are bound thereby.\n\nRajendra Prasad's case (supra) and Blshnu Deo Shaw's(') case, have indubitably laid down the normative cynosure\n\n(I) [1974] 4 s. c. c. 443\n\n(2) [19791 3 S. C.R. 355\n\n.....\n\nDALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 069\n\n'\"-, and until over-ruled by a larger bench of this court that is the Jaw of the land under Art. 141. To discard it is to disobey the Constitution and such subversiveness of the rule of law, in a crucial area of life and death, will spell judicial disorder.\n\nOne thing is clear.\n\nCounting the casualties is not the main criterion for sentencing to death; nor recklessness in the act of murder.\n\nThe sole focus on the crime and\n\n• the . total farewell to the criminal and his social-personal circurns- \"' lances mutilate sentenci'ng justice.\n\nWe express ourselves in this ex- / p!icit fashion since the deep-rooted Rai criminological prejudices 5tiJl '\"\" . haunt Free India's courts and govern our mentations from the grave. ''f -To-day, the law is what Raiendra Prasad (supra), in its majority judgr ~\n\nment, has laid down and that has been done at unmistakable length, Willy-nilly, that binds judges and parties alike.\n\nThe problem in the present case, going by those canons, is easy of resolution.\n\nDeath sentence in this case is indefensible.\n\nWe can surely understand how the courts below have fallen into this fatal error.\n\nThe forensic exercise at the sentencing stage, despite the purposeful s. 235 (2) Cr.P.C., has been a functional failure because of the casual way the punishment factors are dealt with, as if the nature of the crime was the sole determinant of the punishment. We have explained in Rajendra Prasad'.' case how the prosecution must make out, by special factors, why the graver penalty should be i'nllicted.\n\nEvidence may be led and arguments addressed by both sides, but in practice ' 235 (2) has been frustratingly ritualised.\n\nNor do we think that the court's attention been drawn to Ediga Annamma's case.\n\nThe two recent decisions of this Court could not have been within the ken of the Court because they were delivered later. Be that as it may, one has only to read the ratio in these three cases side by side with facts of the present case to hold that death penalty is unmerited.\n\nHere, the earlier provocation came from the deceased's side by beating up Appellant No. 3. The parties, including the prosecution group, were tipsy.\n\nThere had been antecedent irrigation irritation between them.\n\nThere was no preplanned, welllaid attack, hell-bent on liquidating the enemy.\n\nA quarrel over turn of water; a pacification pro tempore; an afternoon exuberance with jocose and bellicose potions, beating up one appellant leading to a reprisal vi et armis.\n\nIn Raiendra Prasad's case (supra) the court, in its majority judgement, observed :\n\n\"It is not the number of deaths caused nor the situs of the stabs that is telling on that decision to validate the non-\n\nA .\n\napplication of i!s ratio. It is a mechanistic art which courts the cadavers to sharpen the sentence oblivious of other crucial criteria shaping a dynamic, realistic policy of punishment.\n\nThree deaths are regrettable, indeed terrible.\n\nBut it is no social solution to add one more life lost to the list.\n\nIn this view, we are satisfied that the appellant has not received reasonable consideration on the question of the appropriate sentence.\n\nThe criteria we have laid down are clear enough to point to the softening of the sentence to one of life imprisonment.\n\nA family feud, an altercation, a sudden passion, although attended with extra-ordinary cruelty, young and malleable age, reasonable prospect of reformation and absence of any conclusive circumstances that the assailant is a habitual murderer or given to chronic violence-these catena of circumstances bearing on the offender call for the lesser sentence.\n\n1 '\n\nThe olher criteria have been set out at some length in the same judgment and, going by them, there is hardly any warrant for judicial extinguishment of two precious Indian lives.\n\nSection 302 of the Penal Code, read with Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, demands special reasons for awarding the graver sentence, and to borrow the reasoning in Rajendra Prasad's case.\n\n\" 'Special reasons' necessary for imposing death penalty mu•t relate, not to the crime as such but to the criminal.\n\nThe crime may be shocking and yet the criminal may not dererve death penalty.\n\nThe crime may be less shocking than other murders and yet the callous criminal, e.g. a lethal \\ economic offender, may be jeopardizing societal existence by his act of murder.\n\nLikewise, a hardened murderer or dacoit or armed robber who kills and relishes killing and raping and murdering to such an extent that he is beyond rehabilitation within a reasonable period according to current psycho-therapy or curative techniques may deserve the terminal sentence.\n\nSociety survives by security for ordi- nary life. If officers enjoined to defend the peace an; treacherously killed to facilitate perpetuation of murderous and often plunderous crimes social justice steps in to demand penalty dependent on the totality of circumstances.\"\n\n... '.\n\n• •\n\nDAI.BIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, J.}\n\nI 071\n\nWe sec no need to expand on the narrow survival of death sentence in our Code confined to those exceptional situations explained in Rajendra Prasad's case. It is heartening, though unheeded that the framers of the Code themselves stated :\n\n\"We are convinced that the Death penalty shou:d be very sparingly inflicted.\n\nTo a great majority of mankind nothing is so dear as life.\"(')\n\nDeath sentence on death sentence is the upsurge of world opinion and Indian cultural expression. In Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata, Prince Satyavana in the discussion on the capital penalty says :\n\n\"Destruction of the individual by the king can never be a virtuous act.\n\nBy killing the wrong-doer the ki'ng kills a large number of innocent persons, wife, father, mother and children arc killed. A wicked person is seen to imbibe good conduct from a pious person.\n\nGood children spring from wicked persons.\n\nThe extermination of the wicked is 'not in consonance with eternal law.\"(')\n\nwhile such unanimity in sublimity may not, by itself, repeal the ' legislated text, judicial dispensers do not behave like cavemen but hreathe the fresh air of finer culture.\n\nThe sentences of death in the prese'nt appeal are liable to be reduced to life imprisonment. We may add a footnote to the ruling in Rajendra Prasad's case.\n\nTaking the cue from the English legislation on abolition, we may suggest that life imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the man's life, but in practice amounts to incarceration for a period between 10 and 14 years may, at the option of the convicting court, be subject to the condition that the sentence of imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts where there are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the community cannot run the risk of tbe convict being at large.\n\nThis takes care of judicial apprehensions that unless physically liquidated the culprit may at some remote time repeat murder.\n\nAnother sombre fact of history, not often stressed in court sentences save by judges like Douglas and Thurgod Marshall, is that the gallows &wallow, in most cases, the social dissenter, the political\n\n(I) inclla11 Penal Code-Object., and reasons.\n\n(2) Chapter 13, Shanti Parva, Mahabharata, translated by Shri K. G. Subrahman\n\nyam, Advocate in \"Can The State kill its Citizens\" Pub. by ML. J. O!lkc, Madras.\n\nprotester, the poor and the under-privileged, the member of minority groups or oue who has turned tough because of broken homes, parental neglect or other undeserved adversities of childhood or later. And a sobering thought which eminent judge and jurist M. C. Chagla told the country over the national T.V. the other day judicial error leading to innocent men being executed in not too recondite a reality.\n\nEvidence in court and assessments by judges have human limitations.\n\nIt is worth recalling that a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Athapa Goundan's case (AIR 1937 Mad. 695) sentenced him to death.\n\nHe was duly executed as also several others on the ratio of that ruling.\n\nThis Full Bench decision was, however, over-ruled 10 years later by the Privy Council in 1947 P.C. 67.\n\nHad it been done before Goundan was gallowed many judicial hangings could have been hailed.\n\nBut dead men tell no tales and judicial 'guilt' has no temporal punishment.\n\nParenthetically, it may be right to observe, before we conclude, tliat modem neurology has unrevelled through research the traumatic truth that agressive behaviour, even brutal murder, may in all but not negligible cases be traced to brain tumour.\n\nIn such cases cerebral surgery, not hanging until he is dead, is th~ rational recipe. This factor is relevant to conviction for crime, but more relevant to the irrevocable sentence of death.\n\nWe allow the appeal in regard to appellants Nos.\n\nOne and Two and reduce their death sentence to one of life imprisonment.\n\nSEN, J.--I do not see, any reason to differ from the view expressed by me in my dissenting opinion in Rajendra Prasad's case('). I sfill adhere to the view that it is not within the province of this Court while dealing \\vith an appeal ccmfined to sentence under Art. 136, to curtail the scope of death sentence under s. 302 I.P.C., 1860, nor is it constitutionally or legally permissible for this Court while hearing such an appeal to Jay down that on grounds of compassion and humanism the sentence of death on a conviction for murder under s. 302, as a rule of universal application, be substituted by a sentence of imprisonment for life, irrespective of the gravity of the crime and the surrounding circumstances i.e., virtually abolish the extreme penalty.\n\nThe question of abolition Of capital punishment is a difficult and controversial subject, long and hotly debated and it has evoked during the past two centuries strong conflicting views, as was pointed out by me in Rajendra Prasad's case (supra). The question whether\n\n{l) (1979]3 S.C. R. 78.\n\n• •\n\nDALB!R SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sen, J.) 1073\n\nA', the scope of death sentence should be curtailed or not is for the Parliament to decide. The matter is essentially of political expediency and, as such, it is the concern of the statesman and, therefore, the domain of the Legislature, and not the Judiciary.\n\nSection 302 I.P.C., 1860, confers upon the Court a discretion in the matter of the punishment to be imposed for an offence of murder and the Court has to choose between a sentence of death and a sentence of imprisonment for life; while under s .. 354(3) Cr.P.C., 1973, the Court is enjoined with a duty to record 'special reasons' in case the extreme penalty is awarded.\n\nBut the question whether the death sentence should be awarded or not must, in my view, be left to the discretion of the Judge trying the accused and the question of sentence must depend upon the facts and circumstances obtaining in such case.\n\nWhen a sentence of death is passed it is subject to confirmation by the High Court under s. 366(1) of the Code and the accused also has a right of appeal to the High Court under s. 374(2) against the sentence.\n\nThereafter an appeal lies to this Court by special leave under Art. 136 on the question of sentence.\n\nIt would, therefore, be manifest that it is neither feasible to define nor legally pennissible for this Court to limit or circumscribe the connotation of the expression 'special reasons' occurring in s. 354(3) of the Code so as to bring about a virtual abolition of the death sentence.\n\nWith greatest respect, the majority decision in Rajendra Prasad's case (supra) does not lay down any legal principle of general applicability.\n\nA decision on a question of sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can never be regarded as a binding precedent, much less 'law declared' within the meaning of Art. 141 of the constitution so as to bind all Courts within the territory of India'. According to the well-settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients :\n\n(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;\n\n(ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and\n\n(iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and\n\n(ii) above.\n\nFor the purposes of the partie, s themselves and their privies, ingredient No. (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines\n\nfinally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action.\n\nIt is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute.\n\nHowever, for the purposes of the doctrine of precedents. ingredient No. (ii) is the vital element in the decision.\n\nThis indeed is the ratio decidendi('). It is not every thing said by a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent.\n\nThe only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.\n\nIn the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampto11) Ltd. v. Haynes(') it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts '\" found, upon which the decision is based. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents.\n\nThe judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties themselves), nor are the findings of facts.\n\nThis means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case befqre the Court, the Judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case.\n\nOne would find that in the decision in Raj<'ndra Prasad's case, there are no rationes decidelldi, much less any ratio decidendi. In a minority opinion, I emphasised the need for judicial restraint and the duty to avoid encroachment on the powers conferred upon Parliament.\n\nIn my view, the assessment of public opinion on this difficult and complex question was essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function.\n\nThe majority expressed their personal distas\\e for the capital punishment, butteressed by the belief that it served no useful purpose. They asserted that the capital punishment was morally uriacceptable to the contemporary society and found it shocking to their conscience and sense of justice.\n\nThe deliberate extinguishment of human lire by the State for an offence of murder, they reasoned on metaphysical theories of punishment, was a denial of human dignity. They concluded by stating that the death penalty was usually inflicted only on a few, i.e., the poor and down-trodden who are outcastes of a society, which led to the irresistible inference that the punishment was not fairly applied.\n\nThis may be a 'progressive' stance, which is out of place in a judicial pronouncement, which ought to be based on the facts and circumstances of the case and U1e law applicable. But the professed view docs not stem from a firm belief in dignity of human life for they themselves advocate the death penalty for certain classes of offenders,\n\n(t) R. J. Walker & M. G. Walker, The English Legal System, Butte1worths 1972 3rd Edn., pp. 123-124.\n\n(2) L. R.119591 A.C. 743.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\n• J.\n\nDALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sen, J.)\n\nI 075\n\nnamely (I) white-collar offenders, (2) anti-social offenders, and (3) hardened murderers. This show that the majority was not against the capital punishment in principle. On the facts before them they commuted the sentence of death to a sentence of imprisonment for life, and the decision cannot, therefore, be construed as laying down a ratio deci<lendi.\n\nTesting the majority decision in Rajendra Prasad's case (supra) in light of theory of precedents as expounded above it seems to me clear that it does not lay down any legal principle applied to any legal problem disclosed by the facts and, therefore the majority decision cannot be said to have 'declared any Jaw' within the meaning of Art. J 41 so as to bind all Courts in the country. General observations made in the context of sentencing jurisprudence will have to be regarded as the view of the Judge/ Judges concerned-and not 'law declared by this Court' under Art. 141 of the Constitution.\n\nAny attempt to limit or circumscribe the connotation of 'special reasons' mentioned in s. 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by indulging in classification of murders such as white collar offences and nonwhite collar offences or laying down so-called guidelines for imposition of the extreme. penalty, would amount lo unwarranted abridgement of the discretion legally vested in the trial court and constitutionally upheld by this Court.\n\nJf the general observations on sentencing jurisprudence made in Rajendra Prasad's case (supra) are to be regarded as 'law declared by this Court' within the meaning of Art. 141 so as to bind all Court's in the country, then the observation or the se>-called guideline as to the effect \" 'special reasons' necessary for imposing death penalty must relate, not to the crime as such but to the criminal\" occurring in the majority judgment, it must be pointed out, if I may say so, with respect, would be unwarranted and contrary to s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSection 302 of the Indian Penal Code gives a choice while s. 354(3) of the Code merely requires 'special reasons' to be indicated far imposing the death penalty. Nothing is stated whether the 'special reasons' should relate to the criminal or the crime.\n\nIn the absence of any specific indication in that behalf 'special reasons' would relate both to the cri111f and the criminal.\n\nPreviously, perhaps more attention was being paid to the nature, gravity and the manne.r of committing tf\\e crime, though extenuating factors concerning the criminal, his age, criminal tendencies etc. were not ignored. In the majority judgment in Rajendra Prasad's case (supra), nothing new has been said except that more emphasis on factors concerning tbe criminal is indicated.\n\nBut in the great .enthusiasm for doing so, the pendulum has swung to\n\nA the other extreme and the guideline given is that the 'special reasons' must relate \"not to the crime as such but to the criminal\" for which there is no warrant ins. 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nI may also venture to say, the obsession to get the death penalty abolished from the Statute Book, i.e., Indian Penal Code, 1860, is so great that an interdict against it is surprisingly spelt out from the Constitution itself because right to life has been regarded as 'very valuable, sacrosanct and fundamental' therein, though in Jagmohan Si11gh's case(') this Court by unanimous judgment of five Judges held that the death penalty and the judicial discretion vested in the Court regarding its imposition on an accused arc constitutionally valid. That decision, it may incidentally be pointed out, has adverted to the \"wellsettled principles· which have all these years governed the exercise of proper judicial discretion.\n\nIn my view, therefore, so long as the extreme penalty is retained on the Statute Book, it would be impermissible for any Judge to advocate its abolition in judicial pronouncements.\n\nThe forum for that is elsewhere.\n\nThere is increasing concern today about the judiciary transgressing its limits by usurping the function of the legislatmc.\n\nMany critics think that the courts should 'apply', but not 'make', the law and that they should not intrude into the field of policy-making. The problem appears to be also acute in the United States of America. In a recent article, a learned writer(') views the complex situation with deep concern, stating :\n\n\"Today many Americans do resent an ever-more activist judiciary. Beware, warns a vocal group of scholars : Tht Imperial Presidency might have faded, but now an Imperial Judiciary has the Republic in its clutches\" (Emphasis supplied).\"\n\nHe then goes on to say :\n\n\"For all their power, Judges remain remarkably unaccountable and unknown.\" Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, Associated Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Roosevelt and Truman years, delineates the correct picture :\n\n\"We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are final.\" In the end, that means relying on Judges themselves to exercise selfrestraint. ---\n\n(!) (1973] I S. C. C. 20\n\n(2) Evan Thomas, \"Have the Judges Done Too Much?'' Time Essay, Timc,\n\nJanuary 22, 1979, pp. 49-50.\n\n.l.. -\n\n. ).\n\n• •\n\nDALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sen, !.) 1077\n\nReverting to the appeal before me, I cannot say that the award of death sentence to any of the two appellants, Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh was not proper or uncalled for.\n\nThough the dispute was over the 'turns of water', that would hardly furnish any justification for the commission of the pre-planned triple murder.\n\nThe appellant Dalbir Singh fired two gun shots hitting the deceased Sardul Singh on the chest, resulting in his instantaneous death.\n\nWhen the deceased Jagir Singh stooped forward to lift Sardul Singh, he was fired at by the appellant Kulwant Singh with his gun which hit him on the forehead. This also resulted in his immediate death. When the deceased Piara Singh came forward to rescue Jagir Singh, both the appellants Kulwant Singh and Dalbir Singh again fired at him from their guns, as a result of which he fell down and succumbed to his injuries on the spot. Thereafter, both the appellants continued firing their guns at the complainant's party and Kapoor Singh PW 14 and no other alternative but to bring out his licensed gun from his house.\n\nThereupon, both sides started firing and a number of persons sustained gun shot injuries on their person. Baga Singh, lambardar of the village in the midst of this firing appeared on the scene and made an attempt to pecify both the sides, but he also received gun shot injuries as a result of which he died two days later.\n\nThe dastardly act of the appellants resulted in the loss of three precious Jives.\n\nThat leaves out of account the fourth, Baga Singh, who made a dying declaration that be had also been shot by the appellants, but the High Court felt that he might have been caught between the cross-fire which subsequentJy ensued after the three had fallen.\n\nThese were nothing but intentional, coldblooded and brutal murders.\n\nJn my view, the High Court was justified in confirming the death sentences passed under s. 368(a) of the Code, being satisfied that there were \"special reasons\" within the meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, I would say that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the award of death sentence to the two appellants was neither 'erroneous in principle' nor was 'arbitrary or oxcessive', or 'indicative of an improper exercise of discretion'.\n\nFor my part, I have no sympathy for these trigger-happy gentlemen and the sentence imposed on them is well-merited.\n\nI would, therefore, dismiss the appeal leaving the appellants to Executive clemency.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 172, "entities": [{"text": "DALBIR SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DALBIR SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. 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expressed itself thus on this momentous issue of death sentence :\n\nAs both Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh, accused, fired at Jagir Singh, Sardul Si'ngh and Piara Singh who were absolutely unarmed recklessly and without provocation of any kind, the sentence of death awarded to each of them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also hereby affirmed.\"", "canonical_name": "DALBIR SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Kulwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28413, "end_char": 28426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned only with those who received capital penalty, and the court expressed itself thus on this momentous issue of death sentence :\n\nAs both Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh, accused, fired at Jagir Singh, Sardul Si'ngh and Piara Singh who were absolutely unarmed recklessly and without provocation of any kind, the sentence of death awarded to each of them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also hereby affirmed.\"", "canonical_name": "Kulwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28446, "end_char": 28457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned only with those who received capital penalty, and the court expressed itself thus on this momentous issue of death sentence :\n\nAs both Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh, accused, fired at Jagir Singh, Sardul Si'ngh and Piara Singh who were absolutely unarmed recklessly and without provocation of any kind, the sentence of death awarded to each of them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also hereby affirmed.\""}}, {"text": "Sardul Si'ngh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28459, "end_char": 28472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned only with those who received capital penalty, and the court expressed itself thus on this momentous issue of death sentence :\n\nAs both Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh, accused, fired at Jagir Singh, Sardul Si'ngh and Piara Singh who were absolutely unarmed recklessly and without provocation of any kind, the sentence of death awarded to each of them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also hereby affirmed.\"", "canonical_name": "Sardul Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "Piara Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28477, "end_char": 28488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned only with those who received capital penalty, and the court expressed itself thus on this momentous issue of death sentence :\n\nAs both Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh, accused, fired at Jagir Singh, Sardul Si'ngh and Piara Singh who were absolutely unarmed recklessly and without provocation of any kind, the sentence of death awarded to each of them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also hereby affirmed.\""}}, {"text": "Ediga Annama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29307, "end_char": 29319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But after Ediga Annama's case('), the law of punishment under s. 302 I.P.C. has been largely settled by this Court and the High Courts are bound thereby.", "canonical_name": "Ediga Annan1as"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29359, "end_char": 29365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29366, "end_char": 29371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Blshnu Deo Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29487, "end_char": 29502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajendra Prasad's case (supra) and Blshnu Deo Shaw's(') case, have indubitably laid down the normative cynosure\n\n(I) [1974] 4 s. c. c. 443\n\n(2) [19791 3 S. C.R. 355\n\n.....\n\nDALBIR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 069\n\n'\"-, and until over-ruled by a larger bench of this court that is the Jaw of the land under Art.", "canonical_name": "Bishnu Deo Shaw"}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29767, "end_char": 29775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30874, "end_char": 30880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30885, "end_char": 30891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ediga Annamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31387, "end_char": 31400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor do we think that the court's attention been drawn to Ediga Annamma's case.", "canonical_name": "Ediga Annan1as"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33473, "end_char": 33484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33492, "end_char": 33502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33514, "end_char": 33528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Parva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35151, "end_char": 35163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata, Prince Satyavana in the discussion on the capital penalty says :\n\n\"Destruction of the individual by the king can never be a virtuous act."}}, {"text": "Satyavana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35191, "end_char": 35200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata, Prince Satyavana in the discussion on the capital penalty says :\n\n\"Destruction of the individual by the king can never be a virtuous act."}}, {"text": "Douglas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36701, "end_char": 36708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another sombre fact of history, not often stressed in court sentences save by judges like Douglas and Thurgod Marshall, is that the gallows &wallow, in most cases, the social dissenter, the political\n\n(I) inclla11 Penal Code-Object.,"}}, {"text": "Thurgod Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36713, "end_char": 36729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another sombre fact of history, not often stressed in court sentences save by judges like Douglas and Thurgod Marshall, is that the gallows &wallow, in most cases, the social dissenter, the political\n\n(I) inclla11 Penal Code-Object.,"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36825, "end_char": 36835, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. G. Subrahman\n\nyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36921, "end_char": 36941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Chapter 13, Shanti Parva, Mahabharata, translated by Shri K. G. Subrahman\n\nyam, Advocate in \"Can The State kill its Citizens\" Pub."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37275, "end_char": 37287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And a sobering thought which eminent judge and jurist M. C. Chagla told the country over the national T.V. the other day judicial error leading to innocent men being executed in not too recondite a reality."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38546, "end_char": 38549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J.--I do not see, any reason to differ from the view expressed by me in my dissenting opinion in Rajendra Prasad's case(')."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38808, "end_char": 38816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38863, "end_char": 38869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38870, "end_char": 38875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38981, "end_char": 38984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136, to curtail the scope of death sentence under s. 302 I.P.C., 1860, nor is it constitutionally or legally permissible for this Court while hearing such an appeal to Jay down that on grounds of compassion and humanism the sentence of death on a conviction for murder under s. 302, as a rule of universal application, be substituted by a sentence of imprisonment for life, irrespective of the gravity of the crime and the surrounding circumstances i.e., virtually abolish the extreme penalty."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39088, "end_char": 39094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39908, "end_char": 39919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39920, "end_char": 39925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40162, "end_char": 40168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 366(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40613, "end_char": 40622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40702, "end_char": 40711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40798, "end_char": 40806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41037, "end_char": 41046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41463, "end_char": 41471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raj<'ndra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43389, "end_char": 43405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One would find that in the decision in Raj<'ndra Prasad's case, there are no rationes decidelldi, much less any ratio decidendi.", "canonical_name": "-Rajendra Prasad"}}, {"text": "R. J. Walker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44810, "end_char": 44822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the professed view docs not stem from a firm belief in dignity of human life for they themselves advocate the death penalty for certain classes of offenders,\n\n(t) R. J. Walker & M. G. Walker, The English Legal System, Butte1worths 1972 3rd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "M. G. Walker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44825, "end_char": 44837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the professed view docs not stem from a firm belief in dignity of human life for they themselves advocate the death penalty for certain classes of offenders,\n\n(t) R. J. Walker & M. G. Walker, The English Legal System, Butte1worths 1972 3rd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45915, "end_char": 45923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46033, "end_char": 46042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46050, "end_char": 46076, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46558, "end_char": 46566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46919, "end_char": 46925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46933, "end_char": 46950, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46961, "end_char": 46970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46978, "end_char": 47004, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47007, "end_char": 47018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47026, "end_char": 47043, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47065, "end_char": 47074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48022, "end_char": 48048, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48156, "end_char": 48179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jagmohan Si11gh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48383, "end_char": 48398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I may also venture to say, the obsession to get the death penalty abolished from the Statute Book, i.e., Indian Penal Code, 1860, is so great that an interdict against it is surprisingly spelt out from the Constitution itself because right to life has been regarded as 'very valuable, sacrosanct and fundamental' therein, though in Jagmohan Si11gh's case(') this Court by unanimous judgment of five Judges held that the death penalty and the judicial discretion vested in the Court regarding its imposition on an accused arc constitutionally valid."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49302, "end_char": 49326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The problem appears to be also acute in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "Robert Jackson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49776, "end_char": 49790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, Associated Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Roosevelt and Truman years, delineates the correct picture :"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49818, "end_char": 49852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, Associated Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Roosevelt and Truman years, delineates the correct picture :"}}, {"text": "Evan Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50126, "end_char": 50137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1973] I S. C. C. 20\n\n(2) Evan Thomas, \"Have the Judges Done Too Much?''"}}, {"text": "Dalbir Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50391, "end_char": 50403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1077\n\nReverting to the appeal before me, I cannot say that the award of death sentence to any of the two appellants, Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh was not proper or uncalled for.", "canonical_name": "DALBIR SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Kulwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50408, "end_char": 50421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1077\n\nReverting to the appeal before me, I cannot say that the award of death sentence to any of the two appellants, Dalbir Singh and Kulwant Singh was not proper or uncalled for.", "canonical_name": "Kulwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Sardul Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50671, "end_char": 50683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Dalbir Singh fired two gun shots hitting the deceased Sardul Singh on the chest, resulting in his instantaneous death.", "canonical_name": "Sardul Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "Kapoor Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 51260, "end_char": 51272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, both the appellants continued firing their guns at the complainant's party and Kapoor Singh PW 14 and no other alternative but to bring out his licensed gun from his house."}}, {"text": "Baga Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51461, "end_char": 51471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baga Singh, lambardar of the village in the midst of this firing appeared on the scene and made an attempt to pecify both the sides, but he also received gun shot injuries as a result of which he died two days later."}}, {"text": "s. 368(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52178, "end_char": 52187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52273, "end_char": 52279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52299, "end_char": 52331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52774, "end_char": 52780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1078_1106_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "M. N. SAMRA1H\n\nMAROTRAO AND ORS.\n\nAND VICE VERSA\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nUfe Insurance Corporation of Jnditl (Staff) Regulations 1960, Regulations 25 and 39 vis-a-vis Section 15(g) of the City of Nagpur G'orporation Act, 1948, arnbit and limit and the imporl and interpretation of - Whether Rl!gu lation 25(4) read with Section 15(g) of the Corporation Act 1948 constitutes or amounts to an ineligibility or disqualification for a whole ti111e salaried employee oj L.I.C. to become a member of any local authority.\n\nClause (g) of Section 15 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 l•ys down that \"no person shall be eligible for election as a Councillor if he is under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, ineligibie to be a member of any local authority. Under sub-!ection (4) of the Iife Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, \"No employee shall canvass D or otbenvise interfere or use his influence in connection' with or take part in an election to any legislature or local authority\".\n\nHowever proviso (iii) to the,\n\naid sub-section lays down that \"the Chairman may permit an employee to offer hintself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the employee so permitted shall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this regulation so as to attract punishment under Regulation 39, ibid.\n\nThe appellant (in C.A. 2406/77) and a returned candidate as :i councilk1r from ward No. 34 of Nagpur was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation. lie had not sought or got the Chairman's pern1ission to stand for the election, 'Nith the result the election petition filed by his nearest rival respondent I and appellant in C.A. 356 o.f 1978 on this sole ground of taboo was accepted by the Court's. below.\n\nThe direction given by th'e trial court declaring respondent 1 as an elected candidate was however set aside by the High Court and hence C.A. 356 of 1978 against that part of the decision by respondent 1 in C.A. 2406/77.\n\nAllowing C.A. 2406/77 and dismissing CA. 356178. the Court\n\nHELD'\n\nIPcr Krishna Iyer, ].]\n\n1. The impact of Regulation 25(4) is not to impose ineligibility on an L.I.C. employee to be a member of a Municipal Corporation. Its effect is not on the candidature but on the employment itself.\n\nThe sole and whole object of Regulation 25 read with Regulation 39, is to lay down a rule of conduct for the 1 .. .1.C. employees.\n\nAmong the 01any things forbidden are for instauce prohibition or acceptance of gifts or speculation in stocks and share. Obviously neither Regulation 32 can be read as invalidating a gift to an L.I.C. employee under the law of gifts, nor Regulation 33 as nullifying transfer of stocks and shares speculatively purchased by the L.l.C, employee. Lik'e1.vise, Regulation\n\n.le -\n\n• •\n\n.; j\n\nM. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO 1079\n\n25 while it does n1andate that the employee shall not participate in an election A to a local authority cannot be read as nullifying the election or disqualifyin: the candidate.\n\nThe contravention of the Regulation invites dWciplina.ry aclioa which may range from censure to dismissal. [lOBBH, 1089A-B, 1091G]\n\n2. Section I5(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 relates to the realm oi election law and eligibility to be a member of a local autbodty.\n\nJneliglbility nuist flow from specific provision of laV.1 designed to deny eligi bility or to lay down disqualification. [l089C]\n\n3. If a rule of conduct makes it undesirable, objectionable or punishable for an employee to participate in election to a local authority, it is a distortion, even an exaggeration out of proportion. of that provision to extract out of it a prohibition of a citizen's franchise to be a member in the shap! of a disqualification from becoming a member of a loc:il authority.\n\nThe thrust of Regulation 25 is disciplinary and not disqualificatory.\n\nIts intent imposes its limit, language U!!ed by a legislature being only a means of communicating its\n\nwill in the given environment This is clear from the fact that t.hb Chairman is ghen the power under Proviso (iii) to Section 25(4) to permit such participation by an en1ployee depending on the circumstances of each case.\n\nEven the range of punishment is variabl'e.\n\n{1089C-E]\n\n4. There is no ground in public policy to suppott the plea to magnify lhe disciplinary prescription into a disenfranching taboo. To revere the word to reverse the sense is to do injustice to the art of int.erpretation. Permission is\n\na won.1 of wide import and may even survive the death of the person who permits.\n\nEqually clearly, where a statute does not necessarily insist on pre~ viQUi permission, it may be granted even later to have retrospective effect, or permission once granted may be retracted. [1089E, H, 1090A]\n\n5. The strictly literal construction may not often be logical if the context indicates a contrary legislative intent.\n\nCourts are not victims of verbalism but are agents of the functional success of legislation, given flexibility of meaning, if the law will thereby hit the target intended by the law-maker.\n\nA polkyorien.ted understanding of a legal provision which does not do violence to the text or the context gains preference as against a narrow reading of the words used. So viewed, the core purpose of Regulation 25(4) is not to clamp down disqualifications regarding elections but to lay down disciplinary forbid.dance on conduct of government servants qua government servants contravention of which would invite punishment.\n\nThis is a purpose oriented interpretation. [1087H, lOBBA, 1090E-FJ\n\nDr. Hui/on '' f'/1ilfips, 45 Del. 156, 160, 70A. 2d 15, 17 (1949); quoted with approval.\n\nSamfatulla Sarkar v. Surja Krunar Mo11dal, A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 382\n\n(DB); Utlam Si11Rh , .. S. Kripa/ Si11gh, A.LR. 1976 Punj. & Har. 176, approved .\n\n. Naraya11a.rn>a1ny Naidu v. Krishnan1urthy and Anr., I.L.R. (1958) Mad. 513; explained.\n\n6. Another persua55ive factor bas'ed on a broader constitutional principle supporting the se_mantic attribution is this : The success of a democracy to\n\nA 'tourniquet' excess of authority depends on citizen participation.\n\nAn inert citiz.enry indifferent to the political process is an 'enemy of the Republic's vitality.\n\nIndeed, absolutism thrives on inaction of the members of the polity.\n\nTherefore activist involvement in various aspects of public affairs by a5 many citizens as can be persuaded to interest themselves is a sign of the health and strength of our democratic system. Local self-Government and adult fran\n\nchise give constitutional impetus to the citizens to take part in public ad- B minis:ration.\n\nOf course, this does not n1ean that where a plain conflict of interests between holding an office and taking part in the political affairs of government exists, a disqualification cannot be imposed in public interest. The rule ia participation, the exception exclusion.\n\nViewed from that angle if a government servant or an employee of the L.I.C. participates in local ad m.jnistration or other election it may well be that he may forfeit his position as government servant or employment, if dual devotion is destructive of effi C ciency as employee and be subject to disciplinary action-a matter which depends on a given milieu and potential public mischief.\n\n[1091C.F]\n\n7. In election law, a defeated candidate cannot claim a seat through an election petition, merely out of speculative possibilities of success. [1092B]\n\n8. It is true that there is no common law rule applicable in this area and election statutes have to be strictly construed, but that does not doctrinally drive the Court to surrender to bizarre verbalism when a different construction may inject teasonableness into the provision.\n\nSection 428 of the Corporation Act aims at sense and when a plurality of contestants are in the run other tha.n\n\nthe one whose selection is set aside predictability of the next highest becomes a misty venture. The ru1e in section 428 contains the corrective in such situatiortsi and the pregnant expr'ession against whose election no cause or objection i.9: found' gives jurisdiction to the Court to deny the declaration by the next highest and to direct n fresh election when the constituency will speak.\n\n[1092C-B]\n\nPyare Saheb Guizar Chhotumiyan Sawazi v. Dashrath Was11deo and Ors.,\n\n1977 Mah. LJ. p. 246; approved.\n\nSukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; [1975] l SCC 421, held inapplicable.\n\nF Per Tult.apurkar J. (contra)\n\n1. 'fhe words \"any law for the time being in force\" occurring in Section 15(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 in the context refers to the law in force at the relevant time, that is, at the time of nomination or election when the question of disqualification or ineligibility arises for consideration.\n\n[10970-B]\n\nOn proper construction Regulation 25(4) of the LI.C. (Staff) Regulations 1960 read with Section 15(g) of the Corporation Act imposes a disqualification on or creates an ineligibility for the employees of Life Insurance Corporation to stand for election to any local authority. [10980]\n\n(a) In the first place the heading of the Regulation clearly shows that it d'eals with the topic and intends to provide a prohibition against standing for election.\n\nSecondly, cl. ( 4) of the said Regulation in plain and expre>s terms provides : (No employee shall .... take part in an election to any local. authority\").\n\nIn other words, by using negati•e language it puts a compkte\n\n• •\n\n• -\n\n.r •\n\n. ,\n\nM. N. SAMRATII V. MAROTRAO 1081\n\nembargo rubject to proviso (iii)] upon every e111ployee from taking part in .an election to any local authority.\n\n[1097F-H)\n\n(b). To say that Regulation 25(4) merely creates a prohibition aga::rrst 'Standing for election but does not create any ineligibility or disqualification to\n\nstand for an election is merely to a quibble at words.\n\nThere is no <listinclion be-tween a legal prohibition against a person standing for election and the imoosition of an ineligibility or disqualification upon him so to stand.\n\n[1097H, 1098A]\n\n(c) It i:~ true that the purpose of framing Staff Regulations was and is to define the terms and conditions of service of the en1ployees of the L.lC. and that being the purpose it is but natural that a provision for imposition of penalties for breach of such Regulations \\vould also be made therein.\n\nIn fact the validitv of such prohibition contained in the concerned Regulation rests upon the ostulate that it prescribes a code of conduct for the employees and as such it \\Vould be within the Regulation making po\\ver conferred on the L.J.c. under s. 49 of the, L.I.C. Act, 1956 but while prescribing a cod~· of conduct the Regulation simultaneously creates a disqualification or ineligibility for the e1nploy'cc to s'<!•:ld for ele::tion to any local authority.\n\n[1098A-C]\n\n(d) 'fo construe Regulation 25(4) as rnere!y p, rescrib'.ng a code of con::!uct D breach whereof is made punishable under Regulation 39 and not itnposing a disqualification. or ineligibility upon the employees to stand for election to a 'local authority would amount to rendering a residuary provision like s. 15(g) in the Corporafion Act otiose.\n\n[1098C-D]\n\n3. The caes falling within the aspecls emerging from Regulation ::ind proviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) nrc completely taken out of the prohibition contained in Regulation 25(4).\n\nProviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) is similar to the proviso tcs. 15 of the Corporation Act under which a disquaiification under els. (e), (f), (g), or (i) could be removed by an order of the Provincial Go\\--ernn1ent in that behalf and obviously when any one of those disqualifications is removed by an order of the Provincial Government under the proviso the case \\l.'OU!d clearly be outside s. 15.\n\nJn other words, the two aspects (i) that certain employees under Regulation 2 would not be governed by the Stan Regulations at all and would not, therefore, he hit by the prohibition and (ii) that upon permission being obtained from the Chairman under proviso (iii l the employee would be outside the prohibition have no bearing on the queslith' of proer constn1ction of Regulation 25(4).\n\n[1098E-F]\n\nIn the intant case the returned candidate suffered a disqualification or ratht.:.r •.vas under an ineligibility under Regulation 25(4) read with s. 15(g) of the Corporation Act, 1948 \\.Vhch vitiated his election; if he were keen on active participation in the democratic process it \\Vas open to h.lm to do so lby either resigning his post or obtaining the Chairman's permission before offrina his -candidature. ut. his . right as a citizen to keep up the Republic'<; vitaiit; by\n\nactiYe parttc1pat1on 1n the political process cannot be secured to him by a purpose-ori'entated construction of the relevant Rer::lation.\n\n[11010-FJ\n\nG. /\\larayanaswa1ny Naidu v. C. Krishnan1urtli} ... nd dnr.\n\nI.L.R. 1938, Mad. 513; explained 2nd approved.\n\n13-409 SCI/79\n\n108:?\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~TS\n\n(1979] J S.G.1C\n\nAid. Su; ufatulla Sarkar v. Suia. Kumar Monda/, A.~.R. 195,5 D_I.\n\n.J~·~~ distinguished. , /\n\nUttc.ni Sir.gh v. S. Kripal Singh a11d Anr., A.I.R. 1976 P & H 176; di3\n\napproved.\n\nHELD FURTHER (Concurring) \" u .. 4. C.A 356 of 1978 should be dismissed. The declaration granted to the appellant by the learned Assist<:mt Judge under s. 428(2) of the Corporation Act, 1948 should never have been granted. It is truo that the election-petitioner\n\nsecured the next highest number of votes but that by itself would not enlitlo him to get a declaration in his favour that he be deemed to have been duly elected as r Councillor from Ward No. 34. [l 102G-H]\n\n5. sction 428(2) is not t.hat absolu.te for the relevant part of sub-s. ' (2) . .. provides that if the election of the returned candidate is eith.:r declared to bcnuU :ind . void or is set aside the District Court \"shall direct that the caodid:it:~ if any, in whose favour next highest number of valid votes is recorded afte.._, the said person or after all the persons who have returned at the s:iid election. and again.ti whose election no cause or objection is found shall deemed tohavc been elected\". The words \"against whose election no cause or objr.ction.\n\nD is foundft give jurisdiction to the District Court to deny the declaration to the cand.idate who bas secured the next best vofes. [l 103A-B] .\n\n6. The High Court has rightl}\"'taken the view that there was 00 material ORrecord to show how the voters, who had voted for the returned candida!e, would have cast th ir votes bad they known about the disqualification . . [11038-C]\n\nE Obsen•ation\n\n 1. Judges and lawyers always clamour for legislative simplicity and when legislative simplicity is writ large on the concerned provision and the text of th! provision is unambiguous and not susceptible to dual interpretation, it would not be permissible for a court, __ by indulging in nu.ances semantics and inter-·\n\npre!ative acrobatics to reach the opposite conclusion than is Warranted by its plain text and make it plausible or justify it by spacious referenc.es to the object, purpose or schem'e of the legislation or in the name of judici2.I activism ..\n\n[1093AB]\n\ni. Prefaces and exodial exe.rcises, perorations .. and s.!rmons as also the5es almost every judgment irrespective of wheth'er the subject or the context or languag: that needs simplification, have ordinarily no proper place . in judicial' pronou:icements.. In any case. day in and day out indulgence in th<!sein\n\nalmost every judment irrespective of whether the subjec't or the . . Context or the oc:::i.sion demands it or not, serves little purpose, and surely such indulgence becomes indefensible when matters are to be disposed of in terms of settle-· meat arrived at between the parties or for the sake of expounding the law while\n\neje::tiog the approach to the Court at the threshold on prelirnin:lry grounds\n\nsuch :is non-maintainability laches and the like. Judicial activism in m:lay\n\ncases Is the result of legislative inactivity and the role of a Judge as a law-maker has been applauded but it h:ls been citicised also lauded-when it is played within the common law tradition but criticised when it is carried to extremes. _ • , , [1101F-H, 1102ABl\n\n• ..\n\nM. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO 1i)8 J\n\nPathak, I. (Concurring)\n\n1. Section 15 of the N<\\:; pur Curporation Act declares a person ineligible for election as a Councillor on any one of the several grounds. Ile may be ineligi!Jle because he ic:. not a citizen of India, that is t0 say, he lacks in point of legal stJ-; us.\n\nHe mey alsQ be ineligible in point of lack of capac\\ty defined bY referenc~ to disqualifying circumstances, for exan1ple,' he may nave beep adjudged by a competent court to be cf unsound mind The disqualification may be found, by nature of clause (, g) under the piovisions of anv subsistffit, Jaw.\n\nBut the Jaw must provide that he is ineligible to be a member of any\n\nJoc~1l authority.\n\nThe law n1ust deal with ineligibility for men1bership, and in the context of section 15, that must be ineligibility for election.\n\nIl must be a law concerned with eiections.\n\nC!ause (g) is a residual clause, not UllCt)ffin1only found \\Vrever provision of an election law sets forth specified category of disquaiified or ineligible person and thereafter includes a residual clause, leaving the <lefinition of remaining categories of the other laws. These other laws must also be election laws.\n\nAn example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951 Y.ihich is relevant to Article 102(1)(e) a.nd Article 191 (l)(e) of tl:ie C'..onstitution.\n\nSince section 15 of the Nagpur Corporatioo Act is a provision of the election Iaw, clause (g) must be so construed that the la\\v pro\\•iding for ineligibility contemplated therein must also be of the same nature, that is to say. cledion law.\n\n[1104G-H, 1105A-C]\n\n2. Regulation 25(4) of the (Staff) }{egulations is not a law, dealing with tlections.\n\nChapter III of the (Staff) Regulations, in which Regulation 25 is found, deals with 'conduct, discipline and appeals' in regard to employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. A conspectus of the provisions contained in t.be Chapter, from section 20 to 50 shows that it deals with nothing else. This is a body of provisions defining and controlling the co\"J.duct of en1ployEea in order to ensure efficiency and discipline in the Corporation, and providing for penalt:es (Section 39) against erring employees.\n\nRegulation 25 prohibits participation in politics and standing for eJections.\n\nRegulation 25(4) forbids an employee not only from taking part in an election to any 1egi~1atnrc or local authority, but also from C?; nvassing or otherwise interfering or using his influence, in connection with such an election. If . he does, be will be guilty of a breach of discipline, punishable 11nder Regulation 39.\n\nReeulation 25(4) is a norm of discip!ine.\n\nIn substance it is nothing else. In sub;; tancf', it is not a pro, ision of election la\\v. It cannot be construed as defining a ground of electoral ineligibility, All that it says to the employee is: \"while you n1ay\n\nb~ eiigible for election to a legislature or Jocal authority, by virtue of your local status or capacity, you shall not exercise that right if you wish to conform to the discipline of your service.\" [1105D-G]\n\n3. The right to stand for election flows from the election law-Reoulation 25(4) does not take away or abrogate the right; it merely seeks to rest; ain the employee from exercising it in the interest of service discipline. If in fact the employee exercises the right, he may be punished under Regulation 39 \\Vih any of the penalties visited on an employee-a penalty V/hich takes its colour from the relevance of 'employment, and has nothing to do with the election law. No\n\npenalty under Chapter III of the (Staff) Regu]la, tions can provide for invali- H dating the election of an employee to a legislature or a local authority.\n\n[1105G-H, 1106A]\n\nV/hen the restraint on standing for election imposed by Regulation 25(4) has to be removed, it is by the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation of India under the third proviso.\n\nWhen he does so, it is as a <:uperior in the\n\nhirarchy of service concerned 'vith service discipline.\n\nHe does not do so as an authority concerned \\\\-'ith elections.\n\nTherefore Regulation 25 ( 4) of the Slaff Pegulations is not a law within the contemplation of Section 15(g) of the l'\\'agpnr Corporation Act.\n\nSc.marth n1ust, therefore, succeed in his app'eal.\n\nfhat being so, Marotrao must fail in his.\n\nSamarth having been July el-ectd to the office of Councillor Marotrao cannot claim the same office tor himsdf. [l 106A.C, D]\n\nG. 1\\!arayanaswan1y Naid11 v. C. Krishnan111rthy & Anr. TLR [1958] Mad. 513, di:-.approved.\n\n!i1d. Sorafatulla Sarkar v. Suraj Kumar Manda!, A.l.R. 1935 Cal. 302: llttcun Singh v. S. Kirpnl Singh, AIR 1976 Punj. & Har. 176; approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2406,177 and 356;78.\n\nn Appeal~ by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-9 .. /7 of the Bombay High Court i11 SCA No. 1/77.\n\nA. P. Deshpande and M. S. Gupta for the Appellant in CA No. 2406/77 and Respondent in CA No, 356178.\n\nH JV. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellant in CA No.\n\nE 356/78 ar.d for the Respondent in CA No. 2406/77.\n\nThe following Judgments of the Court were delivered\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.\n\nA tricky issue of statutory construction, beset with semantic ambiguity and pervasive possibility, and a prickly pro- Yision which, if interpreted literally, leads to absurdity and if construed liberally, leads to rationality, confront the court in these dual app8als by special leave spinning around the eligibility for candidature of an employee under the Life Insurance Corporation and the declaration of his rival, 1st respondent, as duly returned in City Corporation c'ection.\n\nA tremendous trifle in one sense, since almost the whole tcnn has run out.\n\nAnd yet, divergent decisions of Division Benches cf Madras and Calcutta and a recent unanimous ruling of a Bench of five judges of Punjab and Haryana together with the Bombay High Court's decision under apoeal have made the precedential erudition s•1fliciently conflicting for this Court to intervene and declare the Jaw, guided by the legislative text but informed by the imperatives of our ccmtitutional order. The sister appeal filed by the respondent relates to thot part of the judgment of the High Court reverses the declaration grunted by the trial judge that he be deemed the returned candidate.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishna Iyer, !.) 10 85\n\nThis little preface leads us on to a brief narration of the admitted facts.\n\nThe appellant (in C.A. 2406 of 1977) was a candidate for election to the Corporation of the City of Nagpur from Ward 34 and his nearest rival was the I st respondent, although there were other candidates also. Judged by the plurality cl votes, the appellant secured a large lead over his opponents, and wos declared elected. The Ci'd of the poll process is often the beginning of the forensic process at the instance of the defeated candidates with its protracted trial a\"d ap~1eals upon appeals, thus making elections doubly expensive and terribly traumatic. The habit of accepting defeat with grace, save in gross cases, is a sign of country's democratic maturity. J\\nyway, in the present case, when the appellant was declared the returned candidate the respmcdent challenged the verdict in court on a simple legai ground of ineligibility of the !ormer who was, during the election, a development officer under the Li [e Insurance Corpora ti en (for short. the UC) . The leth<el legal infirmity, pressed with success, by the respondent was that under Regulation 25 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (briefly, the Regulations) framed by the LIC, all its employees \\Vere under an en1bargo on taking part in n1unicipal elections, save with the permission of the Chairman. Therefore, the appellant who was such ar: employee and had not sought or got the Chccirman's permission laboured under a legal ineligibility as contempfated in s. 15(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Both the Courts below shot down the poll verdict with this statutory projectile and the aggrieved' appellant urges before us the futility of this invalidatory argument.\n\nSection 15 ( g) is seemingly simple and reads :\n\n15. No person shall be eligible for election as a Councillor if hexx xx xx\n\n(g) is under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, ineligible to be a men1ber o( any local authority;\n\nSo, the search is for any provision of law rendering the returned candidate ineligible to be a member.\n\nThe fatal discovery of ineligibility made b; the respondent consists in the incontestable fact that the appellant was at the relevant time an LIC employee bound by the Regulations, which have the force of Law, having been framed under\n\ns. ~9 of the LIC Act, 1956. The concerned clause is Regulation 25 ( 4) which reads thus :\n\nSUP:~L:\\.JE COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA \"25(4) No employee shall canvass or otherwise interfere\n\nor use his infinence in connection with or take part in an elect; on io any legislature or local authority.\n\nProvided thatxx xx xx\n\n(iii) the Chairman may permit an employee to offei; himself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the employee so permitted shaU not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this regulation.\n\nxx xx\n\nA complementary regulation arming the Management with power to take action for breach of this ban is found in Regulation 39 wliich states :\n\n39(1). Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations. any one or more of the following penalties for good and sufficient reasons. and as hereinafter provided be imposed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule on an employee who commits a breach of regulations of the Corporation, nr . ..... \"\n\nE The crucial issue is whether this taboo in Regulation 25(4) spells electoral ineligibility or merely sets mies of conduct and discipline for employees .. violation of which will he visited with punishment but does not spill over into the area of election law,\n\nTwo decisions, one of Calcutta Sarafatulln Sarkar v. Surja Kumar F Mon~1l(') and the other of Punjab & Haryana Uttam Singh v. S. Kirpal Singh(') support the appellant's position that mere mies regulating service discipline and conduct, even though they have the force of law, canno'. operationally be expanded into an interdict on candidature or amount to ineligibility for standing for election.\n\nChakravarthi, C.J., speaking for a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, upheld the G stand : Cl\n\n\"ft appears to me to be 'abundantly' clear that in so l'ar as the Government Servants' Conduct Rules provide tor discipline and document (conduct?) and, in doing so, forbid conduct of certain varieties their aim is merely regn- H Jation of the conduct of Government servants, as such\n\n(1) A.T.R. 1955 Cal. 382.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1976 P. &. H. 176.\n\n• \\. ..\n\n• •\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1087\n\nservants, and that aim is sought to be attained by prescribing certain rules of correct conduct and laying down penalties for their breach. If a Government .servant disregards any of the Rules which bear upon discipline and conduct and conducts himself in a manner not approved by the JI. ulcs c r forbidden by them, he mm incur the penalties\n\n?or which the Rules provide. It cannot, however, be that any of his other rights as a citizen will be affeded.\n\nTaking the present case, if a Government servant violates the prohibition against offering himself as a candidate for election to one or another of the bodies mentioned in Rule 23, he may incur dismissal or such other penalty as the authorities may consider called for, but the breach of the conditions of service committed by him cannot disenfranchise or take away from him any of the rights which he has in the capacity of the holder of franchise.\n\nWhile, therefore, a Government servant offering himself for ele.ction to one of the bodies mentioned in Rule 23. may bring upon himself disciplinary action, which may go as far as dismissal, the consequence cannot also be that his e:ection will be invalid or that the validity of his election will be affected bv the breach. The disqualification imposed by Rule 2 3 is of the nature of a personal bar which can he overstepped only at the Government servant's peril as rerards his membership of a service under the Government.\n\n[t ls not nnd cannot be an absolute disqualification l'n the nature of ineligibility.\n\nWhat the Rule enjoins is that a GoV'crnment servant shall not take part in any election and that he shall also not take part in the form of offering himself as a candidate ....\n\nThe prohibition is directed at peroonal conduct and not at rights owned by the Government servant concerned. Illustrations of an absolute prohibition of tho nature of a real disqualification or ineligibility will be found in Sections 63- E(l) and 80-B, Government of India Act, 1915-19 and Article l 02 and 19 J of the present Constitution which deal, in both cases. with gualificaticin for election, to the Central or the S1ate Legislature.\"\n\nIn his view. the core purpose of Regulation 25 ( 4) is not to H clamp down disqualifications regarding elections but to lav down disciplina:y forbiddance on conduct f government ser; ants qua\n\nA go>'-\"rnme'nt servants contravention of which would invite punishment.\n\nIf we may say so, this is a purpose-oriented interpretation.\n\nA FiveJ udge Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court adopted this reasoning in a situation akin to ours and repelled the further submi\"ion that tho disqualification was founded on the policy that an employee of the Corporation, if he became a memhcr of the Legislature or City Corporatio'n would not be able to carry out his functions.\n\nThe court also dissen:ed from a Division B .. :nch decision of the Madras High Court which took a contrary view.\n\nlt is fair to notice the Madras ruling before we discuss the fund 1 mentals and declare the law as we read it to qc.\n\nIn th•: Madras case Narayanaswamy v. Krishnamurth,(') which related to an Assembly scat) r'1e court felt that the point was not free from difficulty but reached !he conclusion that the Regubtion made by the UC was perhaps intended to ensure undivided attention upon their duties as such employees but it also operated as a disqualification. The contention before the court was somewhat different. The question posed was whether the concerned Regulation could be treated as law which fulfilled the requirements o[ Art. J 91 (1) (e) of the Constitution.\n\nThe major eosideration of the court was as to whether a regulation to ensure proper performance of duties by the employees of the Corporation cculd also he treated as a law imposing disqualification.\n\nEven so. making a liberal approach to the line of reasoning of the court we may consider the observation as striking a contrary note.\n\nWe do not examine, not having been invited to do so, whztl1cr Parliament or its drlegat•e could enact a law relating to elections to local bJdies, a topic which falls within the State List.\n\nWe confine ourselves to the sole question debated at the Bar as to the ambit and limit, the impoct and in\"crpretation of Regulatio\"n 25 ( 4) of the UC Regulations, vis a vis s. 15 (g) of the Act.\n\nThe Regulations have been framed under s.49 of the UC Act and a conspectus of the various chapters convincingly brings home the purpose thereof. All the Regulations and the Schedules exclusively dev0te thcms2vcs to defining the terms and conctitions of service of the staff.\n\nRegulation 25 concs within chap'er !IT dealing with conduct and discipline of the employees.\n\nRegulaticm 39 deals with penalties for misconduct and Regulation 40 deal' with appeals.\n\nThe inference is irresistible that the sole and whole object of Regulation 25, read 'vith Rcgu1aticn 39. is ; o 1'1y do\\\\\"n a ru:c of conduct for the\n\n1 .. R. (1958) Mnd. 51).\n\n... •\n\n.....\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishn.a Iyer, !.) 1089\n\nLIC cmployoes.\n\nAmong the many things forbidden are, for instance, prohibition of acceptance ot gifts or speculation in stocks and shares.\n\nObviously. \\Ve cannot read Regulation 32 as invalidating a gift to an UC employee under the law of gifts, or Regulation 33 as nullifying transfer of stocks and shares speculatively purch<>\\•cd by an LlC employee. Likewise, Regulation 25 while it docs mandate tha:t the employee shall not participate in an election to a local authority cannot be read as nullifying the election or disqualifying the candidate.\n\nThe contravcntio'n of the Regulation invites disciplinary action. \\Vhich n1ay range fro1n censure to dismissa1.\n\nS•oction 15 ( g) relates to the realm o[ election low and eligibility to be a member of a local authority.\n\nIneligibility must flow from a specific provisinn Of a\\V drigncd to deny eligibility Of to luy dO\\Vll disqualification. If a rule of conduct makes it undesirable, objectionable or punishable for an cmploye•c to participate in electio'ns to a local authority. it is a distortion, even an exaggeration out of proportion, of that provision to extract out o[ it a prohibition of a citizens franchise to he member in the 1shapc of a disqualification from becoming a memkr o[ a local authority.\n\nThe thrust of Regulation 25 is discip1inary not disqua1ificatory. lts intent irr1poses its 1in1it, language used by a egi~:aurc being only a mc:ins of co1n1nunicating its \\Vill in the given environmcnt. This is obvious from the fact that the Chairman is given the po\\\\\\?r to pcnnit such participation by an employee depending o'n the circun1:stanccs of each case.\n\nEven the range of punish111ents is variable.\n\nNo ground rooted in public policy compels us to inagnify he disciplinary prescription into a disinfranchising taboo.\n\nTo rev-ere the v.'ord to reverse the sense is to do i'njustice to the art of interpretation.\n\nReed Dickerson quotes a passage, from an American case to highlight the guideline : ( ')\n\n\"Th.:: meaning of son1c \\'v'Ords in a statute may be enlarged or restricted in order to harmonize them with the legislative intent of the entire statute .... lt is the spirit .... of the statute which should ovcrn over the literal mccning.\"\n\nrhcre 1s a further dit1icultv in construing the Regulation c:s stipulating U!1 inLhgibility for candidµture because there is a prov; so therein for tho C:1airmai~ t~ grant pcnilission to the employe to participate in elections.\n\nPcnn1ss1011 is a \\.Vor<l of wide import and inay even survive the death of _the person who permits (Kally v. Cornhill Inswance Co.\n\n(1) The Interpretation and Applic.ation of Statutes by Recd n:ckcr.<; cn. p. 199.\n\nI 0 90 SUPRE~IE CCUr!T Rr:~O:{TS\n\n\nLtd.(') Equally clearly, where a statute does not necessarily insist on previous per!!J.ission it may be granted even later to have retrospective efft:ct.\n\nOr permission once granted may be retracted. These legal pessibilitics will create pnzz!cso.me anomalies if we .treat the Reguh!ion as a ban on participation in election.\n\nAn employee may stand as a candidate after securing permission, but in the course of the election the Chairman may withdraw the permission.\n\nWhat happens then ? An employee may be refused permission in the beginning and if he still contests and wins it is conceivable that the Chairman may grant him permission which may _remove the disability. In such a cae,., one who was ineligible at one stage becomes eligible at\n\n~ -· . . a later stage.\n\nOther odd consequences may also be conceived of, although it is not necessary to figure them cut. The rationale of the Regulation, rather, its thrust, is diciplinary_ 11_otdisqi:alificatcry.\n\nIt is quite conceivable, if the legislature so expresses itself unequivocally, that even in a law dealing with disciplinry control, to enforce electoral disqualifications provided the legislature l1os competence.\n\nThe prese.tit provision do.s not go so far.\n\nEv\"n assuming that !iterality in construction has tenability in given circumstances, the doctrinal clevelopmont in the nature of _judicial interpretation takes us to other methods like the teleological, the textual, the. co,..tcxtual and the functional.\n\nThe strictly literal may ot often be logicJl if the context indicates a contrary legislative intent. Courts are net victims of verbalism but are agents of th~ functional success of legislation, given flexibility of mcar.ing, if the. law will thereby hit the target intended by the law-maker.\n\nHere the emphasis lies on the function, utility, aim and purpose which the provision !1as to fulfil. A policy-oriented understanding of a legal provision which does not' do violence to the text or the context gains preference as against a narro\\V reading of the words used.\n\nIndeed, this approach is a version of the plain meaning rule,(') and has judicial sanction. In Hutton v. Phillips the Supreme Court of Delaware said : (')\n\n\"(Interpretation) involves far more than picking out d:ctionary definitions of words or -expressions used.\n\nConsideration of the context and the setting is ind!spensable properly to ascertain a .meaning.\n\nIri saying th?J a verbal expression is plain or unambiguous. we mean little mere than that we are convinced that virtually anyone competent to\n\n(t) [1964] 1 All. E. R. 321, H.L. per Lord Dilhorne, L. C. at p. 323.\n\n('.!) The Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed Dickerson p. 231.\n\nCl) 45 Del .156, 160, 70 A. 2nd 15, 17 (1949).\n\n...,..\n\n,.._\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishna Iyer, !.)\n\nunderstand it, and desiring io'rly and impartially lo ascertain its dgnification, would attribute to the expression i;1 its con· text a meaning such as the one we derive, rather than any other; and would consider any different meaning, by companson, strained, or far-fetched, or unusual, or unlikely.\"\n\nThis perceptive process leaves us in no doubt about the soundness of the interpretation whkh has appealed to the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.\n\nThere is a broader comtitutional principle which supports this semantic attribution.\n\nThe success of our demoracy to 'tourniquet' zenry indifferent to the political process is an enemy of the Republic's vitality.\n\nIndeed, absolutism thrives on inaction of the members of the polity. Therefore, activist involvement in various aspects of public affairs by as many citizens as can be persuaded to interest themselves is a sign of the health and strength of our democratic system. Local self-government and adult franch.se give constitutional impetus to the citizens to take part in public adn1i11i~!ration. Of course. thi-: does not mean that where a plain conflict of i:itercsts between holdin~ an office and taking part in the political affair~ of government exists, a disqualification cannot be imposed in public interest.\n\nThe rule is participation. the exception exclusion.\n\nViewed from that angle, if a government servant or an employee of the LIC participates in local administration or other election it may well be that he may forfeit his position as government servant or employment, if dual devoticn is destructive of efficiency as employee and be subject to disciplinary actiona matter which depends on a given milieu and potential nublic mischief.\n\nI am not resting my decision on this general consideration but mention this persuasive factor as broadly supportive of our conclusion .\n\nI hold that the impact of Regulation 25 ( 4) is not to impose ineligibility on an LIC employee to be a memher of a municipal corporation. Its effect is not on the C<!ndidature but on the employment itself.\n\nIn the present C<!se, I am told that the appellant has since resigned his post.\n\nThe ultimate result of the reasoning that appeals\n\nto us is that the judgment of the Hioh Court must be revered and H\n\n~ ,. the appellant restored to the poll verdict and be regarded as validly returned member of the Nagpur City Corporation.\n\nIn this view, the next appeal by the first respondent does not fall to be considered although e<iunsel has pressed his contention that the High Court was wrong.\n\nI do not think it necessary to discuss elaborately the legal issue except to state that the view taken by tho Bombay High Court in Pyare Saheb's case(') is concct. I am constrained to state that the draftsmanship of the provision is dubious and the court in this decision has had to salvage sense out of alternative absmdity flowing from fidelity to pedantry. It is clear, :n election law, that a defeated candidate cannot claim a seat through an election petition merely out of speculative oossibilities of success.\n\nThe reason; ng of the Bombay High Court not merely accords with the wellknown criteria incorporated in the Representaj:ion of the People Act, 1951 as well as in the rulings thereon by this Court but also is in\n\ncorsono., ce with the election sense.\n\nIt is true that there is no common !ow rule applicable in this area and election statute3 have to be strictly construed but that does not doctrinally drive lhe Court to surrcncler to bizarre verhalism when a different construction may mject reasonableness into the provision.\n\nSection 428 of the Corporation Act aims at sense and when a plurality of contestants are in the run other than the one whose election is set aside, predictability of the next highest becomes a misty venture.\n\nThe rule in s. 428 contains the correctlvc in such situations E and the pregnant expression \"igainst whose election no cause or objection is found' gives jurisdiction to the court to deny the declaration by the next highest and to d; rcct a fresh election when the constituency will speak.\n\nWe concur in the reasoning of Masodkar, J. in the said ruling.I')\n\nThe reliance on Sukh Dev'' case(\") by the counsel is inept. I am satisfied that the view of the High Court on this branch o( the case is correct.\n\nJ would therefore allow appeal No. 2406 of 1977 and dismiss appeal No. 356 of 1978.\n\nParties will bear their costs at this late stage when long litigation has kept in suspended nnhr1aticn the co:; stitucncy's right to representation.\n\nrutZAPURKAR, J.-T have had the benefit of reading the judgn1ent of 1ny esteemed brother Krisl1na Tyer in these. appeals v, rhereby he prcposes \\o allow the returned candidate's appeal (C.A. No. 2406 0f\n\n1')77) and dismiss the election petitioner's appeal (C.A. No. 356\n\n(1) Py1r(' Saheb G11lcar ('hh1111.rniya Sar.::ci v. Dcshratl: Wost'deo Doff & Others 1977 Mah. L. J. 246\n\n(2) IJJ7 ivlah. L. J. 246.\n\n(3) S , f..frde-' Singh v. Bhar, a/1tm1 [\\01~1 3 S C.H 619=[19:75] 1SC.C'421.\n\nM. N. SAMRATI! v. MAROTRAO (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1093\n\nOf 1978) but I regret my inability to agree with him as in my view both the oppeals deserve to be dismissed.\n\nJudges and lawyers always clamour for .legislative simplicity an~. when, as is the case here, legislative simplicity is writ large on the concerned provision and the text of the provision is unambiguous and not susceptible to dual interpretation, it would not be permissible for a Court, by indulging in nuances, semantics and interpretative aero-·\n\nbatics, to reach the opposite conclusion than is warranted by its plain text and make it plausible of' justify it by spacious references to the\n\nobject, purpose or scheme of the legislation or in the name of judicial -activism.\n\nElection of Councillors to the Municipal Corporation of City of Nagpur was held on January 29, 1975, whereat from Ward No. 34 Manohar Samarth (Appella_nt in Civil Appeal No. 2406/77), Marotrao Jadhav and three others (being respondent\" 1 to 4 in the scid\n\nCivil Appeal) were the contesting candidates.\n\nAfter the polling was over Manohar Samarth (hereinafter called 'the returned candidate') was declared successful, he having secured 1428 votes as ag<linst 943 secured by Marotrao Jadhav, 849 by respondent No. 2, 572 by respondent No. 3 and 748 by respondent No. 4.\n\nMarotrao Jadhav (hereinafter referred to as 'the election petitioner') challenged the election of the returned candidate from the said ward by filing an ,-\\ection petition (being Election Petition No. 6 of 1975) before the District Judge, Nagpur under s. 428 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, (for short 'the Corporation Act.') principally on the ground that the returned candidate being a Development Officer and a salaried employee in the Life Insurance Corporation (for short the L.I.C.)\n\nhad neither sought nor obtained the Chairman's permission fer offering his candidature and as such was disqualified from standing at the election under s. 15 (g) of the Corporation Act read with Regulation 25 I 4) of L.I.C. (Staff) Regulations, 1960.\n\nThe election was also t:hallenged on grounds of currupt practices, communal propaganda and distribution of malicious and defamatory hand-bills on the part of the returned candidate. In h's written statement the returncJ candidate refuted all the grounds on which his election was ch21lenged.\n\nOn the evidence and materials produced by the parties the icarned Assistant Judge, who heard the matter came to the conclusion that the returned candidate who was working as a Development Officer in the L.I.C. was its whole-time salar:ed employee and since he had contested\n\nihe election without seeking or obtaining the permission of the Chairn11n of the L.I.C. he suffered a disqualification under s. 15(g) of the\n\nSUPRE1-IE COURT REPORTS\n\n\nCorporation Act read with Regulation 25 ( 4) of the L.LC. (Staff) Regulatipns, 1960 which vitiated his election.· On the other ground of challenge, namely, commission of corrupt practices and indulgence in communal propaganda and disribution of malicious and defamatory hand-bills a finding was recorded in favour of the returned candidate and against the election petitioner.\n\nIn the result by her order dated Doc(!mber 21, 1976, the learned Assistant Judge set aside the election of the returned candidate as being null and void and acting under s. 428(2) granted a further declaration that since the election-petitioner had secured second highest votes, he shall be deemed to have been dec\\ed as a Councillor from that ward. ' - ... ,\n\nThe decision of the learned Assistant! Judge was challenged by the returned candidate by filing a writ petition (Special Civil Application No. 1 of 1977) before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the view of the learned Assistant Judge that the returned candidate suffered a disqualification which vitbted his election but quashed the de~!aration gral)ted in favour cf the election-petitioner on the ground that though he had secured the next highest votes there was no material on record from which it could l{e inferred that had the disqualification of the . returned candidate been known to the voters they (the voters) would have definitely returned him s their Councillor t_o the Municipal Corporation from Ward No.\n\n34. The High Court, therefore, directed that a fresh election to fill the\n\nvacancy be held in accordance with law.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2406/77 hos beerr preferred by the returned candidate challenging the High Court's view on his disqualification while Civil Appeal No. 356/7& has been filed by the election petitioner against that part of the decision which has gone against him.\n\nDealing first with Civil Appeal No. 2406/1977 counsel for the returned candidate (the appellant) pressed only one contention in support of the appeal.\n\nHe contended that Regulation 25 ( 4) framed under s: 49(b) & (bb) of the L.I.C. Act, 1956, upon proper construc- G tion was a mere prohibition and not a measure laying down any disqualification. According to. him the L.I.C. (Staff) Regulations 1960\n\nmerely laid down the terms and conditions. of service of the staff or-· the L.I.C. and Regulation 25(4) prescribes a code of conduct for the staff, a breach whereof would entail any of the penalties specified in Regulation 39 and since in the insfant C'\\SC the returned candidate had H offered his candidature without seeking or obtaining permission of the.\n\nChairman he could be said to have committed a breach cf 'one of the terms or conditions of his service for which any penalty ranging\n\n• •\n\nl\\~. N. SA1\\.1RATH )'. NI.AROTRAO (Tulzapur.ar, !.) '\\)')\",\n\nfrom censure to dismissal could be imposed upon him but che purp0se A of Regulation 25 ( 4) was not the c11actment of any disqualification an.d as such the terms of s.15(g) of the Corporation Act were not answered by the inere fa.ct that the ret~; rncd candidate was an c1np· loyee of the L.I.C. and was subject :o Regulation 25 ( 4). Re[crencc\n\nwas ah• made to Regulation 2 and poviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) B to lend Sllpport to the said contention. lt was pointed out that Regulation No. 2 made the Staff Reguht'.ons applicable to every whole·\n\ntime salaried employee of the L.I.C. in India \"unless othcrwis\" provided by the terms of acy contract. a8reem .. cnt :ir letter of appointment\" which clearly suggested tha' certain whole-time salaried emp- .,..,..__ loyees of the L.T.C. whose terms and condiion, of service were other- C wise governed by a contract, agreement or letter of appointment would b<! outside the purview of these Regulations and the prohibition contained in Regulation 25(4) would not apply to such employees; similarly, it was pointed out that the prohibition under Regulation 25(4) itself was not absolute inasmuc_h as under proviso (iii) thereto the employee could offer himself as a candidate for election to a local D authority with the permission of the Chair!!ian.\n\nIt was contended that these aspects also showed that the prohibition under Regulation 25 I 4) did not amount to a disqualification.\n\nIn support of the construction sought to be placed on Regulation 25 ( 4) counsel relied upon two decisicns one of the Calcutta High Court in Md.\n\nSarafatulla Sarkar v. Surja Kumar Mondal and Ors. Cl and the other a Full E Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Uttam Singh\n\nv. S. Kripal Singh & Anr.(') On the other hand, counsel for the election-petitioner (first respondent) supported the view of the High Court that Regulation 25(4) read with s. 15(g) of the Corporation Act clearly amounted. to a disqualification or ineligibility which vitia F ted the election of the returned candidate. He relied upon the Madras ~. ' High Court's decision in G. Narayanaswamy Naidu v.\n\nKrishnar murthi & Anr.( 3) and urged that the Calcutta decision was clearly distinguishable and as against the Fu!! Bench decision of Punjab aed Haryana High Court which merely followed the Calcutta decision he pressed !lw Madras High Court's view for our acceptance. Accord- G • • ing to him the aspects emerging from Reeulation 2 and prnviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) had no relevance to the issue of the proper construction cf Regulation 25(4) read with s. 15(~) of the Corporation Act.\n\nHe pointed out that cases fallin!! within the two aspects emerging from Regulation 2 and proviso (iii) to Regulation 25 ( 4) were ----~- H (!)A. r. R. 1935 Cal. 382.\n\n(2) A. J. R. 1976 P. & H. 116.\n\n(3) I. L. R. 1958 Mad. 513.\n\nl09G SUPREJ\\1E COUR'l REPORTS tl979J .I ;, l;, H.\n\nA compktciy outside the prohibition, wh'1e the real issue was whethBr or not a cas'~ properly fal\\i.ng within the prohibition contained in Regulation 25 (l) would entail a disqualifica!ion or ineligibility.\n\nSince the question turns upon the proper construction af Regulation 25(4) of the L.I.C. (Staff) Regulation 1960 read withs. lS(g/) of the Corporation Act it will be desirable to set out the material prov1s:ons.\n\nSection 15 of the Corporation Act enumerates in els. (a) to (i) the several disqualifications of candidates for elcction and S.\n\n15(g), wbich is by way of a residuary provision, runs thus:\n\n\"l 5. No person shall be eligible fer election, selection, or Dppointment as a Councillor if he--\n\n( g) is under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, ineligible to be '\\member of any local authority,\n\nProvided that a disqualification under clause ( c ), (f),\n\n(g) or (i) may be removed by an order of the Provincial Government in this behalf.\"\n\nRegulation 25 ( 4) together with proviso (iii) runs thus :\n\n''25. Prohibition against p_Qrticipation in Politics and stauding for Elections :\n\n(•lJ No employee shall canvass or otherwise interfere or\n\nuse his influence in connection with or take part in an election to any legislature or local authority.\n\nProvided that-\n\n(iii) the Chairman may permit an employee to offer himself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the employee so permitted 'hall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this regulation.\"\n\nIt tnay be stated that Regulation 39 provides for imposition of several penalties ranging from censure to dismissal upon a'n en1poyee if he were to commit a breach of any of the Staff Regulations.\n\nThe simple question is whether Regulation 25 ( 4) read with s. 15 (g) constitutes or amounts to an ine!'gibility or disqualification for H a whole-time salaried employee of L.l.C. to become a member of any local authority.\n\nIn otber words, is Regulation 25 ( 4) a. provision of law for the time being in force that renders a whole-time salaried\n\nM, N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nI 097\n\nemployee of L.I.C. ineligible to be a member of the Municipal Cor- A poration within the mea_ning of s. 15(g) of the Corporation '\\ct?\n\nBefore I consider this question of construction certain positions which were not disputed during the course of the arguments may be stated.\n\nIt was not disputed that at the relevant time, that is, at the time of the no1!'!nation as well '\\S the time of election the returned candidate was a whole-time salaried employee of the L.I.C. working as its Development Officer and as such he was subject to the Staff Regulations .\n\nIt was also not disputed that under proviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) he did not obtain the permission from the Chairman of the L.I.C. for the purpose of offering himself as a candidate at the election of the Municipal Corporation. It was further not disputed that Regulation 25(4) being a statutory regulation framed under s. 49(2) of the L.I.C. Act 1956 had the force of law.\n\nFurther, though before the High Court a contention was strenuously urged that the words \"any law for the time being in force\" occurring in s. 15 (g) must in the law which ought to h:; ve been in existenc\\' at the commencement date of th.: Corporation Act, such a contention was not pressed before us and it wa,. conceded by the counsel for the returned candidate that the said words would include Regulation 25 ( 4) as being the law for the time being in force.\n\nIndeed, the concession, in my v'.ew, 'vas rightly made by counsel for the returned candidaJe for the words \"any\n\nlaw for the time being in force\" occurring in s. 15 (g) .must in the context refer to the law in force at the relevant time. that is, at the time of ;; ominatiol} or election when the question of disqualification or ir.cligibility arises for consideration. It is in light of these undisputed pooition that the question set out above will have to he considered. The contention is that on proper construction Regulation 25 ( 4) merely creates a prohibition but does not amount to a disqualification or ineligibility because the Staff Regulations were and are intended to define the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the L.I.C. It is not possible to accept such construction for more than one reason.\n\nIn the first place the heading of the Regulation clearly shows that it deals with the topic and intends to provide a prohibition against standing for election.\n\nSeco'ndly, cl. ( 4) of the said Regulation in plain and express terms provides~ \"No employee shall ....... . take part in an election to any local authority''. In other words, by using negative language it puts a complete embargo (subject to proviso (iii) upon every employee from taking part in an election to any local authority.\n\nHow else could a d; squalification or ineligibility be worded ? To sav that Regulation 25(4) merely creates a prohibition\n\nagainst standing for election but do 0 s not create any ineJigjbiltv or disqualification to stand for an election is merely to quibble at words.\n\n14-409 SCT/79\n\nIn my view, there is no distinction between a legal prohibition against a person standing for election and the imposition of an ineligibility or disqualification upon him so to stand. It is true that the purpose of framing Stafi Regulations \"'.as and is to define the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the L.I.C. and that being .the purpose it is but natural that a provision for imposition of penalties for breach of such Regulations would also be made therein. In fact the validity of such prohibition contained in the concerned Regulation rests upon the postulate that it prescribes a code of conduct for the employees and as such it would be within the Regulation making power conferred on the L.I.C:tirioeiS: 49 of the L.I.C. Act, 1956 but while prescribing a code of conduct the Regulation simultaneously creates a disqualification or Ct ineligibility for the employee to stand for election to any local authority.\n\nMoreover, to construe Regulation 25(4) as merely prescribing a code of conduct breach wherepf is made punishable under Regulation 39 and not imposing a disqualification or ineligibility upon .the employee\\ ,\n\nto stand for election to a local authority would amount to rendering a residuary provision like s. 15 (g) in the Corporation Act otiose. In my view, ther.efore, on proper construction Regulation 25(4) .read with s. 15(g) of the Corporation Act imposes a disqualification or creates atJ ineligibility for the employee of L.I.C. to stand for election to any local authority.\n\nReliance on the aspects emerging from Regulation 2 'Ind proviso\n\n(iii) to Regulation 25 ( 4) cannot avail the returned candidate at all, for it is obvious that cases falling within those aspects are completely taken out of the prohibition contained in Regulation 25 ( 4) while the real issue is whether a case properly' falling within the prohibition contained in Regulation 25 ( 4) on its proper construction entail~ a disqualification/ineligibility or not? In fact, proviso (iii) to Regulation 25 ( 4) is similar to the proviso to s. 15 of the Corporation Act under 'which .. a disqualification under els. (e), (f), (g) or (i) could be removed by an order of the Provincial Government in that behalf and obviously when any one of those disqualifications is removed by an order of the Provincial Government under the pro; viso the rase would ckarly be outside s. 15. Iii other words, the two aspects (i) that certain employees under Regulation 2 would not be governed by the Stafi Regulations at all and would not, therefore, be bit by the prohibition 11nd (ii) . that upon permission being obtained from the Chairman under proviso, (iii) the employee would be outside the prohibition have no bearing on the question of proper construction of Regulation 25(4).\n\nTurning to the decided cases, it may be observed that a construe tion similar to the one which I have placed on Regulatioi; i 25 ( 4) of\n\nt • •\n\n• ..\n\n' • ..\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1099\n\nL.I.C. (Staff) Regulations 1960 was placed by tbe Madras High Court 'On a similar L.l.C. Staff Regulation No. 29 read with Article 191 (1)\n\n(e) of the Constitution in G. Narayanaswamy Naidu's case (supra) and tbe very argument that Regulation 29 was merely a rule of conduct prescribed for the employees of the L.I.C., the breach of which might result in disciplinary action being taken against them but it did not render the employees disqualified for standing for election was in terms negatived. t p_age 549 of tbe report the relevant observations run thus;\n\n' \"Though the point is not free from difficulty, we have reached the conclusion that this argument of the respondents must be rejected.\n\nWe see no distinction between a legal prchibition against a person standing for election, and the imposition of a disqualification on him so to stand.\n\nIt might be that the object of the regulation was to ensuce that the employees of the Corporation bestowed nndivided atteution upon their duties as such employees, but this does not militate against the prohibition operating as a disqualification. If a person is disabled by a lawful command of the Legislature, issued directly or mediately, from standing for election, it is tantamount to disqualifying him from so standing.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that regulation 29 framed by the Life Insurance Corporation constituted a law which disqualification C. Krishnamurthi (?) from standing for election under Article 191 ( 1) ( e) of the Constitution.\"\n\nThough the observations have been prefaced by the words \"though the point is not free from difficulty\", it seems to me clear that those r words were used out of deference to the arguments advanced by learn- •. ed counsel for the respondents in that case but the Court construed ,., tbe Regulation as imposing a disqualification because its plain language • warranted it without getting boggled by the object or purpose of the staff Regulation that had been framed under s. 49(2) of the L.I.C.\n\n> Act 1956.\n\nThe Calcutta decision in Md. Sarafatulla Sarkar's case (snpra) relied on by the counsel for the returned candidate 1s clearly distinishable. It was a case dealing with an election to Union Board 1l!lder the Bengal Village Self-Government Act (5 of 1919) and the question was whether Rule 23 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1926 made under Rule 48 of the Civil Services (Classification.\n\nControl and Appeal) Rules framed by the Secretary of State under s. 96B of the Government of India Act, 1915-19, imposed a disqualification on a Government servant against offering himself ior an election to one of the bodies mentioned in Rule 23 and the Calcutta High Court took the view that it did not so as to render his dcction invalid but that the prohibition contained therein was of a nature of a personal bar which could be overstepped by the Government servant at his own peril as regards his membership of a service w1der the Govern- • ment. It must be pointed out that s. 10-A of the Bengal Village Self-Government Act (5 of 1919) which provided disqualifications ::i..._.J for car, didates from being a member of Union Board did not contain-~·• either a specific disqualification for a Government servant or any residuary provision similar to s. 15(g) of the Corporation Act, 1948 or Article 191 (l )( e) of the Constitution and it was in the absence of any such provision, either specific or residuary that the Calcutta High Court considered the imp.act of the prohibition contained in Rule 23 of the Government ervants' Conduct Rules.\n\nIn fact, this asped of the matter has been emphasised by the learned Chief Justice in para 5 of his judgment where he observed :\n\n\"The learned Single Judge considered it immaterial that the ho:ding of a post under the Government had not mentioned as one of the disqualifications for election in <. lOA.\n\nBengal Village Self Government Act, 1919 because in his view, the enumeration of disabilities in that section was not cxhnustive.\"\n\nIn other words, it is clear that had s. JOA of the Bengal Village Self- Governmcnt Act, contained either a specific disqualification or a residuary provision of the type th. at is to be found in s. 15 (g) of th.:~ Corporation Act, 1948 or Article 191 (1 )( e) of the Constitution. !,...\n\nRule 23, it appears, might have been differently construed. Construing Ruic 23 b} itself the learned Chief Justice came to the conclusion that tl1e prohibition therein was directed at personal conduct and not at right owned by the Government servant concerned.\n\nIn the instant case Regulation 25 ( 4) has to be read with s. 15 (g) oE the Corporation Act, 1948. The learned Chief Justice referred to Rule 8 of the said Rules, which forbade a Gazetted Officer to lend money to any person possessing land within the local limits of his authority and pointed out that even so if a Gazetted Officer were to knd money to a person of the specified category, none could say that the officer shall not be entitled to recover tqe amount of the loan.\n\nThe test so suggested by the learned Chief Justice may hold good if Rule 8 sim-\n\nM. N. SAMRA TH v. MAROTRAO (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1101 •\n\n\"' pliciter were to be construed.\n\nBut, if in addition to Rule 8 there was simultaneously in operation a usury law which made certain loans\n\nirrecoverable including a loan prohibitd by any law for the time being in force then obviously Rule 8 read with such usury law would render rhc loan given by the Qazetted Officer irrecoverable. Similar would be the position regarding the two Regulations No. 32 and • No. 33 referred to by my learned brother Krishna Iyer, J. in his • judgment.\n\nTherefore, the Calcutta decision is clearly distinguishable ( mainly on the ground that Rule 23 of the Government Servants' Con- • ...& duet Rules standing by itself came up for construction before that • -~Court in the absence of any specific disqualification or a general disqualification of a residuary nature being enacted in s. 1 OA of the Bengal Village Self-Government, Act, 1919. The Full Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in my view, merely follows the reasqning of the Coleutta decision without considering lhe distinction indicated above and, therefore, it is clear to .me that the construction placed b\\ that High Court on Regulation 25(4) of the L.l.C. (Staff) Regulations (1960) read with Article 191 (!) (e) of the Constitution should be rejected as an erroneous one and the construction placed by t]le Madras High Court deserves to be approved.\n\nHaving regard\n\n~ to the above discussion I am clearly of the view that the returned candidate suffered a disqualification or rather was under a11 ineligibility under Regulation 25(4) read with s. 15(g) of the Corporation Act, 1948 which vitiated his election; if he were keen on active participation in the democratic process it was open to him to do so by either resigning his post or obtaining the Chirrnan's pcrm1s1on before offering his candidature but his right as a citizen to keep up the Republic's vitality by active partici\\)ation in the political process cannot be secured to him by a purpose-oriented construction of the rele-\n\n..,...-~ vant Regulation.\n\nHis appeal, therfore, deserves to be dismissed.\n\nBefore parting with this appeal I feel constrain_ed, as a part of my duty, to give vent to my feelings of discomfiture and distress over one thing \\vhich is exercising my mind for a considerable tin1e in this Court.\n\nIn all humility I would like to point out that prefaces and G exordial exercises, perorations and sermons as also theses and philosophies (political or social), whether couched in flowery language or language that needs simplification, have ordinarily no proper place in _judicial pronouncements.\n\nIn any case, day in and day out indul gence in these in almost every judgment, irrespective of whether the subject or the context or the occasion demands it or not, serves little H purpose, and surely such indulgence becomes indefensible when matters are to be disposed of in terms of settlement arrived at between\n\nthe parties or for the sake of expounding the law while rejecting the approach to the Court at the threshold on preliminary grounds such as non-maintainability, !aches and the like.\n\nI am conscious that judicial activism in many cases is the result of legislative inactivity and the role of a Judge as a lawmaker has been applauded but it has been. criticised also--Iauded when it is played within the common law tradition but criticised when it is carried to extremes. Lord Radcliffe in his address titled 'The Lawyer and His Times' delivered at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of the Harvard Law School observed thus :\n\n\"I do not believe that it was ever an important discovery that judges are in some sense lawmakers. It is much more important to analyse the relative truth of an idea so farreaching; because, unless the analysis is strict and its limitations observed, there is real danger in its elaboration.\n\nWe cannot run the risk of finding the archetypal image of the judge confused in men's minds with the very different image of the legislator.\" And the risk involved is the possible destruction of the image of the judge as \"objective, impartial, erudite and experienced declarer of the law that is\" which \"lies deeper in the consciousness of civilization than the imJge of the lawmaker, propounding what are avowedly new rule.§ of human conduct ...... Personally I think that judges will serve the public interest better if they keep quiet about their legislative function.\n\nNo doubt they will discreetly contribute to changes in the law, because as I have said, they cannot do otherwise, even if they would. But the judge who shows his hand, who advertises what he is about, may indeed show that he is a strong spirit, unfettered by the past; but I doubt very much whether he is not doing more harm to the general confidence in the law as a constant, safe in the hands of the judges, than he is doing good to the law's credit as a set of rules nicely attuned to the sentiment of the day.\"\n\nTurning to the election-petitioner's appeal (C.A.\n\nNo. 356 of\n\n1978) I am in complete agreement with the view expressed by the High Court that the declaration granted to him by the leamed Assistant Judge under s. 428 (2) of the Corporation Act, 1948 should never have been granted. It is true that the election-petitioner secured the next highest number of votes but that by itself would not entitle him to get a declaration in his favour that he be deemed to have been duly elected as a Councillor from Ward No. 34.\n\nI may point out\n\n• ' ·' ..,,.\n\n...\n\n• ' . ·~\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Pathak, J.) 1103\n\nthat s. 428(2) is not that absolute as was suggested by counsel for the election-petitioner, for, the relevant part of sub-s. (2) provides that if the election of the returned candidate is either declared t0 be null , md void or is set aside the District Court \"shall direct that the candidate, if any, in whoe favour next highest number of valid votes is recorded after the said person or after all the persons who have returned at the said election f!nd against whose election no cause or objection is found shall be deemed to have been elected.\" The underlined words give jurisdiction to the District Court to deny tl:e declaration to the candidate who has secured the next best 1otes.\n\nThe High Court has rightly taken the view that there was no material en record to show how the voters, who had voted for the returned candidate, would have cast their votes had they 1'nown about the disqualification.\n\nTherefore, this appeal also deserves to be dismissed.\n\nIn the result I propose that both the appeals should be dismissed with no order as to costs in each.\n\nPATHAK, J. Manohar Nathurao Samrath was a Development Officer in the service of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. His employment was governed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India\n\n(Staff) Regulations, 1960 [shortly referred to as the \"(Staff) Regulations]\". Desirous of being a Councillor in the Corporation of the City of\n\nNagpur (to which I shall refer as the \"Nagpur Corporation\"), he stood for election to that office, and was elected. But Regulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regulations forbade him from taking part in any election to a local authority. He could have taken part in the election if he had sought and obtained the permission of the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation of India under the third proviso to Regulation 25 ( 4). He did not obtain permission.\n\nHis election as Councillor was challenged by an election petition filed by an unsuccessful candidate, Marotrao. It was said that Samrath was ineligible to stand for election because of section 15 (g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (to be referred hereinafter as the \"Nagpur Corporation Act\" 5) read with Regulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regulations. The ground found favour with the learned Assistant Judge trying the election petition, and she declared the election void.\n\nShe also granted a declaration that Marotrao was the duly elected candidate.\n\nSamrath filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The High Court agreed with the learned Assistant Judge that Samrath was not eligible for election and that his election was void. But it also set aside the declaration granted in favour of Marotrao, and directed a fresh election. The Judgment of the High Conrt has been challenged by these two appeals, one by Samrath and the other by Marotrao.\n\nThe central question is whether Samrath is ineligible for election as a Councillor of the Nagpur Corporation because of Section 15(g) of the Nagpur Corporation Act read with Regulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regulations.\n\nSection 15(g) of the Nagpur Corporation Act provides :\n\n\"15.\n\nNo person shall be eligible for election as a Councillor if he-\n\n(g) is, under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, ineligible to be a member of any local authority ;\n\nAnd Regulation 25 ( 4) of the Staff Regulations declares :\n\n\"(25) (1) (2)\n\n(3) ................\n\n( 4) No employe\"' shall canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or take part in an election to any legislature or local authority.\n\nProvided that-\n\n( i) ............... .\n\n(ii) ................\n\n(iii) the Chairman may permit an employee to offer himself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the employee so permitted shall not be deemed F to have contravened the provisions of this regulation\".\n\nThe Nagpur Corporation Act contains a number of prov1s1ons concerned with holding elections to the Nagpur Corporation. Sections\n\n9 to 22 deal with various matters, electoral roll, the qualification of candidates, disqualification of candidates, term of office, filling up of casual vacancies, and so on.\n\nThere is an entire Code of election law.\n\nAnd Section 15 is one of its provisions.\n\nNow, section 15 of the Nagpur Corporation Act' declares a person ineligible for election as a Councillor on any one of several grounds.\n\nHe may be ineligible because he is not a citizen of India, that is to say, he lacks in point of legal status.\n\nHe may also be ineligible in point of lack of capacity defined by reference to disqualifying circumstances, for examole, he may have been adjudged by a competent court to be of unsound mind.\n\n• '\n\nM. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Pathak, J.) 1105\n\n~ • The disqualification may be found, by nature of clause (g), under the provisions of any subsisting law.\n\nBut the law must provide that he is ineligible to be a member of any local authority.\n\nThe law must deal with ineligibility for membership, and in the context of section 15, that must be ineligibility for election. It must be a law concerned with elections.\n\nClause (g) is a residual clause, not uncommonly\n\nT found wherever a provision of an election law sets forth specified ' category of disqualified or ineligible person and thereafter includes a\n\n1 residual clause leaving the definition of remaining categories of two • ..A. other laws.\n\nThese other laws must also be election laws.\n\nT ~-example is the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951 which is relevant to Article 102(1) (e) and Article 191 (1) (e) of the Constitution.\n\nSince Section 15 of the Nagpur Corporation Act is a provision of the election law, clause (g) must be so construed that the law providing for ineligibility contemplated therein must also be of the same nature, that is to say, election law.\n\nRegulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regulations is not a law, dealing with elections.\n\nChapter III of the (Staff) Regulations, in which Regulation 25 is found, deals with \"conduct, discipline and appeals\" in regard to employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India.\n\nA conspectus of the provisions contained in the Chapter, from sections 20 to 50, shows that it deals with nothing else.\n\nThis is a body of provisions defining and controlling the conduct of employees in order to ensure efficiency and discipline in the Corporation, and providin~ for penalties (Section 39) against erring employees.\n\nRegulation 25 prohibits participation in politics and standing for elections. Regulation 25 ( 4) forbids an employee not only from taking part in an election to any legislature or local authority, but also from canvassing or otherwise interfering, or using his influence, in connection with such an election. If he does, he will be guilty of a breach of discipline, punishable under Regulation 39.\n\nRegulation 25(4) is a norm of service discipline.\n\nIn substance, it is nothing else.\n\nIn substance, it is not a provision of election law. It cannot be construed as defined a ground of electoral ineligibility.\n\nAll that it says to the employee is : \"While you may be eligible for election to a legislature or local authority, by virtue of your legal status or capacity, you shall not exercise that right if you wish to conform to the discipline of your service.\" The right to stand for election flows from the election law.\n\nRegulation 25 ( 4) does not take away or abrogate the right; it merely seeks to restrain the employee from exercising it in the interests of service discipline. If in fact the employee exercises the right, he may be punished under Regulation 39 with any of the penalties visited on an\n\nemploye~-a penalt'y which takes its colour from the relev.mce of employment, and has nothing to do with the election law.\n\nNo penalty. under Chapter III of the (Staff) Regulations can provide for invalidating the election of an employee to a legislature or a local authority.\n\nThat would be a matter for the election law.\n\nIt is significant that when the restraint on standing for election imposed by Regulation 25 ( 4) has to be removed, it is by the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation of India under the third proviso. When he does so, it is as a superior in the hierarchy of service concerned with service discipline. He does not do so as an authority concerned with elections.\n\n• •\n\n,,; Therefore, in my judgment, Regulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regu- ... • lation is not a law within the contemplation of section 15 (g) of the Nagpur Corporation Act.\n\nIn reaching that view, I find myself, with regret, unable to subscribe to what has been observed by the Madras High Court in Narayanaswamy v. Krishnamurthi.(1) I would say that the Calcutta High Court in Saraf,1tulla Sarkar v. Surja Kumar Mondal( 2 ) and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Uttam Singh v. S. Kirpal Singh(') appear to have come a more accurate conclusion.\n\nSamrath must, therefore, succeed in his appeal.\n\nThat being so,.\n\nMarotrao must fail in his.\n\nSamrath having been duly elected to the Office of Councillor, Marotrao cannot claim the same office for himself.\n\nIn the result, Civil Appeal No. 2406 of 1977 is allowed and Civil Appe-al No. 356 of 1978 is dismissed.\n\nThe judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside and the election petition filed by Marotrao is dismissed.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs.\n\nORDER\n\nBy majority\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2406 of 1977 is allowed.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 356/78 is dismissed unanimously.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nG in each of the appeals.\n\nV.D.K.\n\n(I) I. L. R (1958) Mad. 513.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 382.\n\n(3) A. I. R. 1976 Pb. & Haryana. rn>.\n\nOrdered accordingly ..", "total_entities": 169, "entities": [{"text": "M. N. SAMRA1H", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAROTRAO AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAROTRAO AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND VICE VERSA\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nUfe Insurance Corporation of Jnditl (Staff) Regulations 1960, Regulations 25 and 39 vis-a-vis Section 15(g) of the City of Nagpur G'orporation Act, 1948, arnbit and limit and the imporl and interpretation of - Whether Rl!gu lation 25(4) read with Section 15(g) of the Corporation Act 1948 constitutes or amounts to an ineligibility or disqualification for a whole ti111e salaried employee oj L.I.C. to become a member of any local authority."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 373, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corporation Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 394, "end_char": 414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583, "end_char": 593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Corporation Act 1948", "statute": "the Corporation Act 1948"}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1505, "end_char": 1511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of Nagpur was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation."}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1535, "end_char": 1561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of Nagpur was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation."}}, {"text": "IPcr Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2112, "end_char": 2129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court\n\nHELD'\n\nIPcr Krishna Iyer, ].]"}}, {"text": "M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2853, "end_char": 2878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j\n\nM. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO 1079\n\n25 while it does n1andate that the employee shall not participate in an election A to a local authority cannot be read as nullifying the election or disqualifyin: the candidate.", "canonical_name": "M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO"}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3220, "end_char": 3256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 25(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "L.I.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7018, "end_char": 7024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viewed from that angle if a government servant or an employee of the L.I.C. participates in local ad m.jnistration or other election it may well be that he may forfeit his position as government servant or employment, if dual devotion is destructive of effi C ciency as employee and be subject to disciplinary action-a matter which depends on a given milieu and potential public mischief."}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7783, "end_char": 7794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8005, "end_char": 8016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8404, "end_char": 8417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; [1975] l SCC 421, held inapplicable."}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S.C.R. 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8432, "end_char": 8451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8588, "end_char": 8601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8609, "end_char": 8645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8938, "end_char": 8951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10655, "end_char": 10660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11189, "end_char": 11197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11813, "end_char": 11818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12367, "end_char": 12375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12383, "end_char": 12404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 428(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13353, "end_char": 13362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13370, "end_char": 13391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. N. SAMRATH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16270, "end_char": 16283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1101F-H, 1102ABl\n\n• ..\n\nM. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO 1i)8 J\n\nPathak, I. (Concurring)\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16304, "end_char": 16310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1101F-H, 1102ABl\n\n• ..\n\nM. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO 1i)8 J\n\nPathak, I. (Concurring)\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16332, "end_char": 16342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17052, "end_char": 17062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17472, "end_char": 17525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 102(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17549, "end_char": 17566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17572, "end_char": 17583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17624, "end_char": 17634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18115, "end_char": 18150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter III of the (Staff) Regulations, in which Regulation 25 is found, deals with 'conduct, discipline and appeals' in regard to employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "section 20 to 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18215, "end_char": 18231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18447, "end_char": 18457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "An example is the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20451, "end_char": 20464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Marotrao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20567, "end_char": 20575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhat being so, Marotrao must fail in his.", "canonical_name": "MAROTRAO AND ORS"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20956, "end_char": 20984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "A. P. Deshpande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21142, "end_char": 21157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. Deshpande and M. S. Gupta for the Appellant in CA No."}}, {"text": "M. S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21162, "end_char": 21173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. Deshpande and M. S. Gupta for the Appellant in CA No."}}, {"text": "H JV. Dhabe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21244, "end_char": 21255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H JV."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21260, "end_char": 21277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellant in CA No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21413, "end_char": 21425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments of the Court were delivered\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.\n\nA tricky issue of statutory construction, beset with semantic ambiguity and pervasive possibility, and a prickly pro- Yision which, if interpreted literally, leads to absurdity and if construed liberally, leads to rationality, confront the court in these dual app8als by special leave spinning around the eligibility for candidature of an employee under the Life Insurance Corporation and the declaration of his rival, 1st respondent, as duly returned in City Corporation c'ection.", "canonical_name": "Krisl1na Tyer"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22042, "end_char": 22048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet, divergent decisions of Division Benches cf Madras and Calcutta and a recent unanimous ruling of a Bench of five judges of Punjab and Haryana together with the Bombay High Court's decision under apoeal have made the precedential erudition s•1fliciently conflicting for this Court to intervene and declare the Jaw, guided by the legislative text but informed by the imperatives of our ccmtitutional order."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22053, "end_char": 22061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet, divergent decisions of Division Benches cf Madras and Calcutta and a recent unanimous ruling of a Bench of five judges of Punjab and Haryana together with the Bombay High Court's decision under apoeal have made the precedential erudition s•1fliciently conflicting for this Court to intervene and declare the Jaw, guided by the legislative text but informed by the imperatives of our ccmtitutional order."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22121, "end_char": 22127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet, divergent decisions of Division Benches cf Madras and Calcutta and a recent unanimous ruling of a Bench of five judges of Punjab and Haryana together with the Bombay High Court's decision under apoeal have made the precedential erudition s•1fliciently conflicting for this Court to intervene and declare the Jaw, guided by the legislative text but informed by the imperatives of our ccmtitutional order."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22158, "end_char": 22175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet, divergent decisions of Division Benches cf Madras and Calcutta and a recent unanimous ruling of a Bench of five judges of Punjab and Haryana together with the Bombay High Court's decision under apoeal have made the precedential erudition s•1fliciently conflicting for this Court to intervene and declare the Jaw, guided by the legislative text but informed by the imperatives of our ccmtitutional order."}}, {"text": "LIC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23911, "end_char": 23914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leth<el legal infirmity, pressed with success, by the respondent was that under Regulation 25 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (briefly, the Regulations) framed by the LIC, all its employees \\Vere under an en1bargo on taking part in n1unicipal elections, save with the permission of the Chairman."}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24200, "end_char": 24208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24216, "end_char": 24252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24461, "end_char": 24471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "LIC Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25059, "end_char": 25072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chakravarthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26713, "end_char": 26725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravarthi, C.J., speaking for a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, upheld the G stand : Cl\n\n\"ft appears to me to be 'abundantly' clear that in so l'ar as the Government Servants' Conduct Rules provide tor discipline and document (conduct?)"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26761, "end_char": 26780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravarthi, C.J., speaking for a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, upheld the G stand : Cl\n\n\"ft appears to me to be 'abundantly' clear that in so l'ar as the Government Servants' Conduct Rules provide tor discipline and document (conduct?)"}}, {"text": "Sections 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29141, "end_char": 29152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29169, "end_char": 29198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29339, "end_char": 29341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29715, "end_char": 29742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A FiveJ udge Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court adopted this reasoning in a situation akin to ours and repelled the further submi\"ion that tho disqualification was founded on the policy that an employee of the Corporation, if he became a memhcr of the Legislature or City Corporatio'n would not be able to carry out his functions."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30094, "end_char": 30111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court also dissen:ed from a Division B .. :nch decision of the Madras High Court which took a contrary view."}}, {"text": "UC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30466, "end_char": 30468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he conclusion that the Regubtion made by the UC was perhaps intended to ensure undivided attention upon their duties as such employees but it also operated as a disqualification."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31210, "end_char": 31220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not examine, not having been invited to do so, whztl1cr Parliament or its drlegat•e could enact a law relating to elections to local bJdies, a topic which falls within the State List."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31513, "end_char": 31518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31575, "end_char": 31579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reed Dickerson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34123, "end_char": 34137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reed Dickerson quotes a passage, from an American case to highlight the guideline : ( ')\n\n\"Th.::"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Delaware", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37098, "end_char": 37123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hutton v. Phillips the Supreme Court of Delaware said : (')\n\n\"(Interpretation) involves far more than picking out d:ctionary definitions of words or -expressions used."}}, {"text": "Dilhorne", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37528, "end_char": 37536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. R. 321, H.L. per Lord Dilhorne, L. C. at p. 323."}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38178, "end_char": 38207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This perceptive process leaves us in no doubt about the soundness of the interpretation whkh has appealed to the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Nagpur City Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40162, "end_char": 40185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant restored to the poll verdict and be regarded as validly returned member of the Nagpur City Corporation."}}, {"text": "Pyare Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40481, "end_char": 40492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not think it necessary to discuss elaborately the legal issue except to state that the view taken by tho Bombay High Court in Pyare Saheb's case(') is concct."}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40998, "end_char": 41014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41395, "end_char": 41406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41616, "end_char": 41622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Masodkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41925, "end_char": 41933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We concur in the reasoning of Masodkar, J. in the said ruling."}}, {"text": "Sukh Dev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41978, "end_char": 41986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I')\n\nThe reliance on Sukh Dev'' case(\") by the counsel is inept."}}, {"text": "rutZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42344, "end_char": 42355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rutZAPURKAR, J.-T have had the benefit of reading the judgn1ent of 1ny esteemed brother Krisl1na Tyer in these.", "canonical_name": "rutZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "Krisl1na Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42432, "end_char": 42445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rutZAPURKAR, J.-T have had the benefit of reading the judgn1ent of 1ny esteemed brother Krisl1na Tyer in these.", "canonical_name": "Krisl1na Tyer"}}, {"text": "Marotrao Jadhav", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43751, "end_char": 43766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2406/77), Marotrao Jadhav and three others (being respondent\" 1 to 4 in the scid\n\nCivil Appeal) were the contesting candidates.", "canonical_name": "MAROTRAO AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Manohar Samarth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43897, "end_char": 43912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the polling was over Manohar Samarth (hereinafter called 'the returned candidate') was declared successful, he having secured 1428 votes as ag<linst 943 secured by Marotrao Jadhav, 849 by respondent No."}}, {"text": "Marotrao Jadhav", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44040, "end_char": 44055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the polling was over Manohar Samarth (hereinafter called 'the returned candidate') was declared successful, he having secured 1428 votes as ag<linst 943 secured by Marotrao Jadhav, 849 by respondent No.", "canonical_name": "MAROTRAO AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Marotrao Jadhav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44136, "end_char": 44151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Marotrao Jadhav (hereinafter referred to as 'the election petitioner') challenged the election of the returned candidate from the said ward by filing an ,-\\ection petition (being Election Petition No.", "canonical_name": "MAROTRAO AND ORS"}}, {"text": "District Judge, Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44359, "end_char": 44381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1975) before the District Judge, Nagpur under s. 428 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, (for short 'the Corporation Act.')"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44388, "end_char": 44394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44402, "end_char": 44438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44791, "end_char": 44796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45584, "end_char": 45592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corporation Act read with Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45627, "end_char": 45663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 428(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46175, "end_char": 46184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IE COURT REPORTS\n\n\nCorporation Act read with Regulation", "statute": "IE COURT REPORTS\n\n\nCorporation Act read with Regulation"}}, {"text": "Nagpur Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46531, "end_char": 46543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1977) before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "NI.AROTRAO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48425, "end_char": 48435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NI.AROTRAO (Tulzapur.ar, !.) '\\)')\","}}, {"text": "s.15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48628, "end_char": 48635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49054, "end_char": 49059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 made the Staff Reguht'.ons applicable to every whole·\n\ntime salaried employee of the L.I.C. in India \"unless othcrwis\" provided by the terms of acy contract."}}, {"text": "L.T.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49244, "end_char": 49250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "loyees of the L.T.C. whose terms and condiion, of service were other- C wise governed by a contract, agreement or letter of appointment would b<!"}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50358, "end_char": 50366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab aed Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50722, "end_char": 50751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bench decision of Punjab aed Haryana High Court which merely followed the Calcutta decision he pressed !"}}, {"text": "s. 15(~)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51045, "end_char": 51053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51778, "end_char": 51788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.\n\n15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51903, "end_char": 51912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53126, "end_char": 53131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53439, "end_char": 53450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In otber words, is Regulation 25 ( 4) a. provision of law for the time being in force that renders a whole-time salaried\n\nM, N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nI 097\n\nemployee of L.I.C. ineligible to be a member of the Municipal Cor- A poration within the mea_ning of s. 15(g) of the Corporation '\\ct?", "canonical_name": "rutZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53565, "end_char": 53573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Development Officer and as such he was subject to the Staff Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53949, "end_char": 54020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 49(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54348, "end_char": 54356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Development Officer and as such he was subject to the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Development Officer and as such he was subject to the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54542, "end_char": 54547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Development Officer and as such he was subject to the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Development Officer and as such he was subject to the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55025, "end_char": 55030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57719, "end_char": 57724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57835, "end_char": 57843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58530, "end_char": 58535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58858, "end_char": 58863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59592, "end_char": 59603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. Narayanaswamy Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59636, "end_char": 59658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 read with Article 191 (1)\n\n(e) of the Constitution in G. Narayanaswamy Naidu's case (supra) and tbe very argument that Regulation 29 was merely a rule of conduct prescribed for the employees of the L.I.C., the breach of which might result in disciplinary action being taken against them but it did not render the employees disqualified for standing for election was in terms negatived."}}, {"text": "C. Krishnamurthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60868, "end_char": 60884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, hold that regulation 29 framed by the Life Insurance Corporation constituted a law which disqualification C. Krishnamurthi (?)"}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60922, "end_char": 60933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61437, "end_char": 61445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Md. Sarafatulla Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61499, "end_char": 61521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta decision in Md. Sarafatulla Sarkar's case (snpra) relied on by the counsel for the returned candidate 1s clearly distinishable."}}, {"text": "Conduct Rules, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61793, "end_char": 61812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 96B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61937, "end_char": 61943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conduct Rules, 1926", "statute": "Conduct Rules, 1926"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61951, "end_char": 61980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62453, "end_char": 62458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62728, "end_char": 62736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62744, "end_char": 62765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62769, "end_char": 62780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bengal Village Self Government Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63327, "end_char": 63367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "JOA of the Bengal Village Self- Governmcnt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63499, "end_char": 63545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63654, "end_char": 63659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JOA of the Bengal Village Self- Governmcnt Act", "statute": "JOA of the Bengal Village Self- Governmcnt Act"}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63673, "end_char": 63694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63698, "end_char": 63709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64068, "end_char": 64073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64085, "end_char": 64106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65071, "end_char": 65083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 referred to by my learned brother Krishna Iyer, J. in his • judgment.", "canonical_name": "Krisl1na Tyer"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65438, "end_char": 65442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coleutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65604, "end_char": 65612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in my view, merely follows the reasqning of the Coleutta decision without considering lhe distinction indicated above and, therefore, it is clear to .me that the construction placed b\\ that High Court on Regulation 25(4) of the L.l."}}, {"text": "High Court on Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65746, "end_char": 65770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65828, "end_char": 65839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Court on Regulation", "statute": "High Court on Regulation"}}, {"text": "s. 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66180, "end_char": 66188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Court on Regulation", "statute": "High Court on Regulation"}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66196, "end_char": 66217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68008, "end_char": 68017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Radcliffe in his address titled 'The Lawyer and His Times' delivered at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of the Harvard Law School observed thus :\n\n\"I do not believe that it was ever an important discovery that judges are in some sense lawmakers."}}, {"text": "Harvard Law School", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68120, "end_char": 68138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Radcliffe in his address titled 'The Lawyer and His Times' delivered at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of the Harvard Law School observed thus :\n\n\"I do not believe that it was ever an important discovery that judges are in some sense lawmakers."}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69748, "end_char": 69754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69766, "end_char": 69787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 428(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70152, "end_char": 70161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "the Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71212, "end_char": 71218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J. Manohar Nathurao Samrath was a Development Officer in the service of the Life Insurance Corporation of India.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Manohar Nathurao Samrath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71223, "end_char": 71247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J. Manohar Nathurao Samrath was a Development Officer in the service of the Life Insurance Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "Samrath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72134, "end_char": 72141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that Samrath was ineligible to stand for election because of section 15 (g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (to be referred hereinafter as the \"Nagpur Corporation Act\" 5) read with Regulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regulations."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72190, "end_char": 72200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72212, "end_char": 72248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagpur Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72285, "end_char": 72307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagpur Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73063, "end_char": 73081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The central question is whether Samrath is ineligible for election as a Councillor of the Nagpur Corporation because of Section 15(g) of the Nagpur Corporation Act read with Regulation 25 ( 4) of the (Staff) Regulations."}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73093, "end_char": 73106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nagpur Corporation Act", "statute": "Nagpur Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Section 15(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73195, "end_char": 73208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nagpur Corporation Act", "statute": "Nagpur Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Sections\n\n9 to 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74102, "end_char": 74119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74334, "end_char": 74344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74377, "end_char": 74387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75133, "end_char": 75143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Represeniation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75580, "end_char": 75618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 102(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75640, "end_char": 75654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75663, "end_char": 75674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75711, "end_char": 75721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "sections 20 to 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76279, "end_char": 76296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76511, "end_char": 76521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Represeniation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78580, "end_char": 78590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Marotrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 79401, "end_char": 79409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside and the election petition filed by Marotrao is dismissed.", "canonical_name": "MAROTRAO AND ORS"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1107_1120_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "METALWARE & CO. ETC.\n\nBANSILAL SHARMA AND ORS. ETC.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]\n\nTamil Nadu Building (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960-Sections 14(1)- (b). 14(2)(b). 15 and 16-Scope of.\n\nThe appellant, a proprietary concern, has been a tenant of a shop in the C premises in dispute. The respondent had purchased the building in 1975 and filed eviction applications against all the tenants on the ground that ( 1) the building being very old and dilapidated required immediate demolition and reconstruction, (ii) the appellants bona fide required it for their own occupation, (iii) they possessed of sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction and lastly they obtained from the Municipal Corporation sanction for reconstruction. The appellants disputed the above allega- & tions.\n\nThe Rent Controller held that the respondent had sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction, (ii) the intention to demolish the e1tisting structure and to reconstruct another building on the same site was honest but did not give a definite finding on the question \"whether the building was in a dilapidated condition and required immediate demolition and reconstn1ction. The Rent Controller took the view that it was not always essential to prove that the building was decrepit before an application for possession could be made and that E the respondent had right to demolish his property in order to build a new struc ture on the site with a view to improve his business. He therefore, ordered eviction of the appellant. Their appeal against the decision of the Rent Controller was dismissed. The appellants filed a civil revision in the High Court which\n\nwas also dismissed on the ground that the only thing to be looked into in such cases is whether the intention to demolish the building was present, with the future intention to reconstruct and whether the same is bona fide and all thes'e were F' found in favour of the respondent-landlord.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHEW: I. The phrase used in s. 14(1) (b) of the Act is \"the building is bona fide required by the landlord\" for the immediate purpose of demoli- G tion and reconstruction and the.· same clearly refers to the bona fide require .. ment of the landlord. The requirement in the terms is not that the building should need immediale demolition and reconstruction. The state or condition of tbe. building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate den1olition and reconstruction in futur'e would not be a totalJy irrelevant factor while determining \"the bona fide requirement of the landlord.\" If the Rent Controller\n\nhas to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which must H mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller 'vill have to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the\n\nfactor~ of the landlord being possessed of sufficient n1eans or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use <1fter reconstruction. All these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Con1roller oi the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord, under s. 14( 1) (b). Tn a sense if the building happens. to be decrepit or dilapidated it will readily 1nak;? fur the bona fide requirement of th'e landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient.\n\nConversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition 2.ridl reconstruction by itself 1nay r:ot be sul1lcient to establish his hona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent consti uctiotl it1 a perfectly sound condition and its .situation may prevent ils being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. In any case these latter factors n1ay i.,:; i_.., t a scriou:) doubt on the landlord's. bona fide requirement.\n\nIt i'i. th'eref'orc, clear that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a rcle\\'ant fa\".:tor which will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fidL' requiren1ent of the landlord under s. 14( 1) (b) of the AcL ;1nd the sanh.: cannot be ignored.\n\n[I !14C-H. 1115A-B]\n\n2. The age and existing condition of the building whether it i.;; a recent construction or very old and whether it is in a good and sound condition or has become decrepit or dilapidated-are relevant factors forming pa 1rt of 'all the circumstances' that have to be considered while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act and in the totality of the circumstances these factors may assun1c lesser or greater significance depending upon whether in the scheme of the concerned ena.::tincnt there is or there is not a provision for reinduction of the evicted tenant into the new construction.\n\nSuch a view would be in accord \\V\"ith the main objective of the benign legislation enacted 'vith the avowed intention of giving protection to the tenant. [!l 15E-F]\n\n3. 'The existing condition of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a vital factor which will have to be considered -\\vhile pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement or the landlord under that provision which !ms to be done by having regard to \"all the circumstances\" and since in the instant case all the courts have totally ignored this vital factor their conclusion on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord deserves to be set aside.\n\nThe Court accordingly set aside the said Concluion of the Courts 'beJO\\V and remanded the matter back to the Rent Controller to di.;; pose of the landlord's application in light of this judgment. f1120 A-B]\n\nNe&i Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] Suppl, 2 SCR 623; The Pt1tiala and Ea.rt Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, (Section 13) :2006 B. K.\n\nMehsin Bhai v. Hale & Con1pany, G. T. Madras, (1964) 2 !\\.f.LJ. 147. affirmed.\n\nPancha1nal Narayan Shenoy v. Bast/ii Ve11katesha Shenoy, [19701 3 S.C.R. 734, distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION 78.\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 2087-2088/\n\n• •\n\nMETAL WARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1109\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated 4-8-1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 1723/78 and 1727 /78.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1301OF1978\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4-8-1978 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P.No. 1054/78.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1381OF1978\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated 19-6-1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision No. 1102/78.\n\nAND\n\nWRIT PETITION NO. 4428 OF 1978\n\nUnder Article 32 ol the Constitution.\n\nS. K. Dhingra for the Appellant in CA No. 1301 /78 and for the Petitioner in W.P. 4428/78.\n\nA. K. Sen and E. C. Agarwala for the Appellant in CA No. 1381/78 and 2087-2088/78.\n\nK. S. Ramamurthy, P. N. Ramalingam, A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondents in C. A. 2087-2088/78.\n\nY. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. Bhandari for RR in CA 1381/78 and RR in C.A. 1301/78.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTuLzAPURKAR, J.-These appeals preferred by tenants by special\n\neave raise a con1mon question \\vhether while considering the bona fult: requirement of the building by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction under s. 14(1) (b) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 (as amended by Act 23 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the condition of the building is wholly irrelevant factor?\n\nSince the facts giving rise to the aforesaid question in all these appeals are almost similar it will suffice if the facts in C.A. Nos. 2087- 2088/78 are stated.\n\nThe appellant Metalware & Co., a proprietary concern has been a tenant of the premises in dispute, namely, a shop on the ground floor of door No. 425, Mint Street, George Town, Madras-! since 1953.\n\nThe respondents\n\n(landlord) purchased the\n\nbuilding from its erstwhile owner some time in 1975 and filed applications against all the tenants thereof including the appellant for evict ing them under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act alleging that the building being very old and dilapidated required immediate demolition and reconstruction and they bona fide required it for the said purpose for their occupation.\n\nThe respondents further alleged that they were possessed of sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction and had applied for and obtained from the Municipal Corporation sanctioned plans in that behalf and after dnly terminating the tenancies had sought vacant possession.\n\nThe application was resisted by the appellant on several grounds. Inter alia, the claim of the landlords that the build-' ing was bona fide required by them for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction was seriously disputed; in particular it was emphatically denied that the building was in a dilapidated condition requiring immediate demolition and reconstruction; so also the allegation that the respondents had sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction.\n\nAdmittedly the building was over 70 years old but as regards the existing condition thereof the landlords were able to produce merely one Notice (Ex. Pl) received from the Municipal Corporation requiring them to carry out repairs specified therein which clearly showed that the building could not be said to be in any dilapidated condition needing demolition.\n\nThe Rent Controller (7th Judge Small Causes Court, Madras) on the evidence led before him by the parties came to the conclusion that the responddents had sufficient means to undertake the demolition and reconstruction, had got their plans approved by the Municipal Corporation and had an honest intention to demolish the existing structure and to reconstruct another on that site. On the question whether the building was in a dilapidated condition and required immediate demolition and reconstruction no definite finding one way or the other was given but he took the view that it was well settled that it was not always essential to prove that the building was decrepit before an application for possession could be made under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act and that the landlord had a right to demolish his property in order to build a new structure on the site with a view to improve his business or get better returns out of investments and that since in the instant case the respondents had purchased the building for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction and had obtained the municipal sanction in that behalf and were found to be possessed of sufficient means, they satisfied the condition of s. 14 (1 )(b) of the Act. He, therefore, ordered the eviction of the appellant. In the appeal preferred by the appellant under s. 23 of the Act, the appellate authority (2nd Jude of Small Causes Court, Madras) confirmed the view of the Rent Controller that the respondents bad\n\n• • .! -->--.\n\n• •\n\nMETALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1111\n\n.established their bona fide requirement under s. 14(1) (b) and dismisi>ed the appeal. The appellant preferred a Civil Revisional Application to the High Court specifically contending that the decision of the lower authorities on the question of bona fide requirement was wrong inasmuch as the factor whether the building itself required demolition and reconstruction or not had been regarded as irrelevant and completely ignored. The High Court dismissed the Revisional Application by observing that \"the only thing to be looked into in such cases is whether the intention to demolish the building is there and\n\n~ • whether such an intention is for the purpose of demolishing the same\n\n•~, with a future intention to reconstruct and whether it is a bona fide intention; all these have been found in favour of the landlord.\" The appellant has challenged the correctness of the view adopted by the Rent :Controller, the appellate authority and the High Court before us .\n\nIt will be desirable to set out the material provisions of s. 14 of the Act\n\n\"14. Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction . .. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of sections 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied-\n\n( a) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated; or\n\n(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.\n\n(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed-\n\n( a) on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section ( 1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building shall, on completion of the repairs, be offered to the tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under sub-section (1) for his re-occupation before the expiry of three months from the date of recovery of possession by the landlord, or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded .in writing, allow; or\n\n(b) on the ground specified in clause (b) of sub-section ( 1), unless tbe landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing allow.\n\nIt may be stated that under s. 15 provision has been made whereby the tenant has been given the right to reoccupy the premises from which he has been evicted under s. 14 (I) (a) after all the repairs are carried out by the landlord while s. 16 makes a provision enabling the tenant to reoccupy the premises from which he has been evicted under s. 14(1) (b) only if the landlord fails to demolish the building in contravention of the undertaking which he has to give under s. 14(2)\n\n(b) but it will be significant to note that there is no provision in the Act whereby the tenant is entitled to be reinducti; d in the recons•ructed building. The question at issue is what is meant by the phrase \"the building is bona (idc required by tho landlord\" for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction occurring in s. 14(1) (b)? It is true that the phrase refers to the bona (ide requirement of the landlord and not that the building requires demolition and reconstruction but even so the question is whether while considering the bona fide requirement of the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction the aspect as to what is the existing condition of the building, whether it requires demolition and reconstruction is totally irrelevant or whether the said aspect forms part of the surrounding circumstances and should be taken into account while determi'ning the bona (ide requirement of the landlord ?\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that the words \"bona fide reqwred\" occurring in the phrase must be interpreted to have reference to the conditio'n of the building. the demolition of which is sought by the landlord and those words cannot refer to the honest or bona (ide intention entertained by the landlord to demolish the building a'1d to reconstruct the same with a view to putting the property to a more profitable use after reconstruction. He urged that if mere entertaining of a desire or intention on the part of the landlord to demolish the building and reconstruct the same were to satisfy the requirement of s.14(1) (b) then several tenants could be evicted even from building\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nMETALWARE & co. v. BANSJl.AL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 11 13\n\nwhich may be in a very good and sound condition simply because the landlord wishes to demolish and reconstruct the same with a view to render his investment more profitable. Counsel emphasized the aspect that unlike other Rent Control enactments, as for instance, the Mysore Rent Control Act (22 of 1961) or the Bombay Rent Act (57 of 1947) there was no provision in the Madras Act entitling the tenant evicted under s. 14(1) (b) to get reinducted into the reconstructed building .\n\nHe, therefore, urged that apart from the landlord's honest desire or intention to undertake demolition and reconstruction, the Rent Controller must be satisfied that the building sought to be demolished is in. such a condition that it requires demolition and reconstruction before the application under s.14(1) (b) could be granted by him. In any case, he urged that the aspect whether the building needs demolition or not was most vital and could not be ignored while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(l){b) and since all the Courts below had pronounced upon the landlord's bona fide requirement by totally ignoring the most vital factor their decision was liable to be set aside. In support of his contention strong reliance was placed by him on a decision of this Court in Neta Ram v. I iwan Lal(') and a decision of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai v.\n\nHale and Company, G. T. Madras(').\n\nOn the other hand, counsel for the respondents (landlords) contended that both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority had recorded certain findings which were impliedly confirmed by the High Court, namely, that the building was more than 60 years old, that the landlords had purchased the building with a view to demolish it and reconstruct another at the same site for their own use '\\fld occupation, that their intention of demolition and reconstruction was backed by sufficient funds as well as sanctioned plans from the Municipal Corporation and above all ho oblique motive had been found in making the application under s.14(1) (b) and on the basis of these facts it had been held that their bona fide requirement under s.14(1) (b) was established which conclusion should not be disturbed by this Court.\n\nHe urged the Iangnage of section 14(1)(b) clearly showed that the existing condition of the building whether it was sound or dilapidated was not a relevant factor for determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord. He pointed out that the Madras High Court has in several decisions consistently taken the view that under s.14(1) (b) a bona fide desire or intention of the landlord was essential but not the requirement that the building\n\n(1) [1962] Suppl. 2 S. C. R. 623.\n\n(2) (1964) 2 M. L. J. 147\n\nIS-409 SCI/79\n\nshould be old and decrepit and that in any case the age and dilapidated condition of the building was not a sine qua non for eviction of the tenant under the said provision. Reference in this behalf was made to two decisions of the Madras High Court, one in Mahboob Badsha v. M. Manga Devi and Anr.(') and the other in R. P. David & Anr. v. N. Daniel & Ors.(') and it was pointed out that the view of the learned Single Judge in Mehsin Bhai's case (supra) had not been approved in subsequent decisions of that Court. Reliance was also placed upon a decision of this Court in 1'anchamal Narayan Shenoy v.\n\nBast hi Venkatesha Shenoy( 3) and certain observations made by this Court in S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty v. Ganeshan & Ors(').\n\nAs stated earlier it cannot be disputed that the phrase used in s.14(1) (b) of the Act is \"the building is bona fide required by the landlord\" for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the same clearly refers to the bona fide requirement of the landlord; it is also true that the requirement in terms is not that the building should need i=ediate demolition and reconstruction. But we fail to appreciate how the state or condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction in future would be a totally irrelevant factor while determining \"the bona fitk requirement of the landlord\". If the Rent Controller has to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which must mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller will have to take • into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the factors of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and sitnation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction.\n\nAll these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Controller on the question of the bona fide require ment of the landlord under s.14(1)(b). In a sense if the building happens to be decrepit or dilapidated it will readily make for the bona fide requirement of the l_andlord, though that by itself in the G absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient.\n\nConversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition and reconstruction by itself may not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent construction in a perfectly sound condition\n\n(1) 1965 (2) M. L. J. 209 ..\n\n(2) 1967 (!) M. L. J. 110.\n\n(3) (1970] 3 S. C. R. 734.\n\n(4) (19761 1 S. C. R. 273.\n\n• •\n\n.. _\n\n• •\n\n1 '\n\n-~ '•\n\nMETALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1115\n\nand ils situation may prevent its being put to a more profitable use\n\nA.\"· after reconstruction. In any case these latter factors may cast a serious doubt on the landlord's bona fide requirement. It is, therefore, clear to us .that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a. relevant factor which Will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s.14(1)(b) of the Act and the same ca'nnot be ignored~ D;\n\n. We would like to observe that each side has adopted an extreme stand on the question at issue which is obviously incorrect.\n\nOn the one hand counsel for the appellant urged that the words \"bona fide required\" refor to the condition of. the building and not to the honest or bona fide i'ntention entertained by the landlord to undertake demolition and reconstruction, suggesting thereby thai the condition of the building should be a decisive factor while counsel for the .respondent on the other hand contended that that aspect was totally irrelevant and ' the bona fide requiremel:! t of the landlord should be determined on the basis of factors such as the financial capacity of the landlord to undertake the project and whether he had taken any steps in that behalf etc.\n\nWe do not agree that old age and dilapidated condition of the building is a sine qua non or a decisive factor for eviction under s. 14(1) (b) 'nor is it possible to accept the view that the said circumstance is totally irrelevant in pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the land- \\ lord. We are clearly of the view that the age and existing condition of the building-whether it is a recent construction or very old and. whether it fa in a good a'nd sound condition or has become decrepit or dilapidated-are relevant factors forming part of 'all the circumstances' that have to be considered while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act and in the. totality of the circumstances these factors may assume lesser or greater significance depending'upon whether in the scheme of the concerned enactment there is or there is not a provision for reinduction of the evicted tenant into the new cpnstruction. Such a view would be in accord with the main objective of (he benign legislation enacted with the avowed intention of giving protection to the tenant.\n\nTurning to the decided cases cited by counsel on either side w;: might mention that our aforesaid view receives support from them., In Neta Ram's case (supra) the landlord had sought eviction of his te'nants from a building owned by him, inter alia,_ on the ground that the shops occupied by ti>~ tenants were in a state of great disrepair and were dilapidated and he wishes to rebuild the same after dismantling the structures. Section 13 of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union UrbanRent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 B.K. provided that a land,\n\nlord may apply for eviction \"in the case .of any building if he (landlord) requires it for re-erection of that building or for its replacement\n\nby another building or for the erection of other building.\" It also\n\np(OVided that the Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.\n\nOil the question Of the construction of the provisions of the Ordinance this Court observed that according to the provisions it should be established that a claim of the landlord that he required the building for reconstruction and re-erection, must be bona fide, that is to say, \"honest in the circumstances\" t.. \"'' At pp. 629-630 of the report the relevant observations run thus : _.,_ •\n\n.. The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on.\n\nIt is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that be entertains a particular intention, however, strongly, said to be entertained by him. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . The very purpose of the Rent Restriction Acts would be defeated, if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they want to reconstruct the houses, without first establishing that the plea is bona fide with regard to all the circumstances, viz., that the houses need reconstruction or that they have the means to reconstruct them, etc.\" (Emphasis iUpplied).\n\nIt is true that in the last sentence of the above observations this Court has used the disjunctive \"or\" whe11 referring to the condition of the building and the means of the landlord to reconstruct the houses but that does not mean that this Court wanted to suggest that if the landlord established that he had means to reconstruct the houses the existing state of the building becomes irrelevant.\n\nThis is clear from the fact that this Court has emphasized at two places in the above observations that the landlord's plea of bona fide claim is rejquired to. be established by having regard to \"all the surrounding cir H l<:umstances\".\n\nThe observations quoted above clearly suggest that amongst the several circumstances which would go to establish the bona fide requirement of the landlord the existing condition of the ' ~\n\n• ..\n\nMETALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapur/;; ar, I.) [ 117\n\nbuilding and its situation play an important part. Incidentally, it may be stated that there was no provision entitling the evicted tenant to get reinducted in the reconstructed building in the concerned Ordinance.\n\nIn Mehsin Bhai's case (supra) Mr. Justice M. Ananthanarayanan of the Madras High Court has taken the view that in order to decide the\n\nbona fide of the landlord in an application under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act, the Courts have to apply several criteria and judge upon the totality of the Acts and that even though a building may be old stil its present condition may be such as to involve no danger whatsoever , of any breaking up so as to necessitate a decision by the landlord that • -\"\"\" it is in his interest to demolish it immediately; the condition of the building and extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition anrl reconstruction in future are all relevant considerations in assessing the bona {ides of the landlord.\n\nHis observations, which meet with our approval, have been put in negative language. 1bis is what he has observed :\n\n\"What the section really requires is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that the building was bona filie required by him, for the immediate purpose of demolition. I am totally unable to see how the present state of the building, and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction, in the future, are not relevant considerations in assessing the bona {ides of the landlord.\"\n\nThe decisions on which reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents, in our view, do not go to the extent of saying that the existing condition of the building is a totally irrelevant factor. In PanchamaJ Narayan Shenoy's case (supra), a case arising under r s.21(1)(j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, an extreme contentiOD.\n\n' was urged on behalf of the tenant that unless the landlord was able to establish that the condition of the building was such that it immediately required demolition and reconstruction no tenant could be ordered to be evicted under the provision, in other words, the contention was that the words \"reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord\" occurring in cl. (j) of s. 21 (1) of that Act must be interpreted to have reference to the condition of the building, the demolition of which was sought to be made, and that those words had no reference to any intention entertained by the landlord. Such an extreme contention was negatived by this Court. And this Court went on to observe; \"no doubt, whether the landlord's requirement is\n\neasoab!1~ and bona fide has to be judged in the light of the 5urroundmg crrcumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of\n\nthe building, and other steps taken by him in that regard''. It is true that this Court also observed as follows :\n\n\"In our opinion, it is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition.\"\n\nThis observation, in our view, was made by this Court because of two\n\n• •\n\naspects which emerged from the two other specific provisions con- ..,; tai:ned in the Mysore Act. First, that in cl. (k) of s. 21 (1) another ~, r ground of eviction had been provided to a landlord to obtain eviction of his tenant, namely, that the condition of the property was such as required immediate demolition and secondly, that under s. 27 of the Act the tenant had been given the right to occupy the new building on its reconstruction provided he satisfied the provision contained in that section. In other words, it was in light of the such scheme of the Act, which contained cl. (k) of s. 21(1) and s. 27 that this Court made that particular observation.\n\nThat particular observation on which strong reliance was placed by counsel for the respondent\n\nwill have to be read in the context of scheme of the Mysore Rent Control Act.\n\nCounsel for the respondent attempted to argue that purely on question of construction the identical words occurring in the two Acts should receive the same construction and it must be held that under s. 14(1)(b) of the Act it is not necessary for the landlord to establish that the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. It is not possible to accept his contention for the simple reason that though the words employed in two enactments may be the same or identical their construction may not be the same and would vary depending upon other cognate provisions of and the scheme of each enactment. ~\n\nThe next decision relied upon by counsel for the respondents is S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty's case (supra), the ratio of which is clearly different and does not touch the issue arising before us in these appeals.\n\nThe question which arose for determination in that case was whether a landlord who had life interest in the property in question could seek eviction of his tenant for bona fide requirement of demolition and reconstruction and this Court took the view that the definition of the word \"landlord\" under s. 2 ( 6) was wide enough to include the appellant who had a life-interest in the premises. Counsel however, relied upon the general observation made by this Court in that case to the effect \"A landlord has every right to demolish his property in order to build the new structure on the site with\n\n-,#'\n\nMETALWARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1119\n\na view to improve his business or to get better return on his investment. Such a step per se cannot be characterised as ma/a fide on the part of the landlord. In the first place these observations were made in the context of the contention that was strongly urged before the Court that a person (landlord) having merely a life interest could not be allowed to demolish the property in order to reconstruct it as that action would per se be not bona fide for the purposes cl s . 14(1)(b). It was while rejecting this contention that the aforesaid observation was made by this Court.\n\nSecondly, all that the said observation indicates is that in the view of this Court if a landlord were to exercise his right to demolish his property in order to build a new strncturc at the site with a view to improve his business or to get better return on his investment such a step per se could not be regarded as ma/a fide on the part of the landlord. This has nothing to do with the question whether while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act, the condition of the building is or is not a relevant factor.\n\nThe Madras decision in Mahboob Badsha's case (supra) merely takes the view that the age and the dilapidated condition of the building is not a sine qua non\n\nfor eviction under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act. That is far from saying that it is a totally irrelevant factor. In fact, in that case the relevancy of this factor has in one sense been accepted, for, the Court has observed that a decrepit building may call for immediate demolition and without anything more the landlord could be said to have satisfied the condition of his bona fide requiring the building for immediate demolition but according to the Court the terms of s. 14(1 )(b) are wide enough to cover cases where landlord bona fide requires a building for the expanse of his own business or for legitimate purpose.\n\nIrt David v. Denial (supra) also the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has proceeded on the basis that under s. 14 ( 1) (b) of the Act bona fide desire or intention on the part of the landlord was essential and that it was not essential requirement of the provision that the building should be old and decrepit.\n\nBut it is the alternative con./ tention of the counsel for the appellant which we have accepted, namely i that the age and decrepit condition of the building is a relevant facto ! amongst several others which will have to be considered while ad judicating upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under that provision and might receive greater emphasis in a case where the enactment, as is the case here, contains no provision for reinductin the evicted tenant into the new building than where the concerned enactment has such a provision.\n\nHaving regard to the above discussion, on the construction of s. 14 (1) (b) of the Act, particularly in the light of its scheme, we are\n\n1120 SUPREMl! COURT REPORTS 119 79] 3 s.c.R.\n\nclearly of the view that the existing condition of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a vital factor which will have to be considered while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under that provision which has to be done by having regard to\n\n\"all the circumstances\" and since in the instant case all the Courts have totally ignored this vital factor to feel that their conclusion on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord deserves to be set aside. We accordingly set aside the said conclusion of the Courts below and remand the matter back to the Rent Controller to dispose of the landlord's application in light of our judgment.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 1301 of 1978 and Civil Appeal No. 1381 of 1978 which are by two tenants against the same landlord and attempt was made by counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord to show that the tenants in their written statements had made an admissicm that the building which was sought to be demolished was not merely old but in a dilapidated condition. After going through the written statements of the tenants in these appeals we are not satisfied that any such clear admission has been made by the tenants in their written statements. Further, in these matters also the Rent Controllex, the Appellate Authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the footing that even if it were assumed that the building was not old nor dilapidated even then the landlord was entitled to an order of eviction as his honest intention to demolish the building and to reconstruct the same was backed by sufficient funds and the stepi; which he took by applying for sanction of plan for demolition and reconstruction and, therefore, the applications of the landlord \"ill have to go back to the Renf Controller and we accordingly set aside the orders of the High Court and remand the applications to the Relllt Controller for disposal according to law in the light of our judgment.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in all these appeals.\n\nIn view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 2087-2088, 1301 and 1381 of 1978 the writ petition is allowed to be withdrawn since the same is not pressed.\n\nN.K.A. 4 ppeals allowed.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "METALWARE & CO. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "METALWARE & CO. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BANSILAL SHARMA AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BANSILAL SHARMA AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2053, "end_char": 2061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4304, "end_char": 4313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5986, "end_char": 5996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance", "statute": "Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION 78", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6185, "end_char": 6218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION 78."}}, {"text": "METAL WARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1109", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2087-2088/\n\n• •\n\nMETAL WARE & co. v. BANSILAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1109\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated 4-8-1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6804, "end_char": 6814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance", "statute": "Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6837, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dhingra for the Appellant in CA No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6929, "end_char": 6938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and E. C. Agarwala for the Appellant in CA No."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and E. C. Agarwala for the Appellant in CA No."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7013, "end_char": 7029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy, P. N. Ramalingam, A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondents in C. A. 2087-2088/78."}}, {"text": "P. N. Ramalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7031, "end_char": 7047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy, P. N. Ramalingam, A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondents in C. A. 2087-2088/78."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7049, "end_char": 7065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy, P. N. Ramalingam, A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondents in C. A. 2087-2088/78."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7110, "end_char": 7123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. Bhandari for RR in CA 1381/78 and RR in C.A. 1301/78."}}, {"text": "L. N. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7125, "end_char": 7138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. Bhandari for RR in CA 1381/78 and RR in C.A. 1301/78."}}, {"text": "J. S. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7140, "end_char": 7151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. Bhandari for RR in CA 1381/78 and RR in C.A. 1301/78."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7153, "end_char": 7163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. Bhandari for RR in CA 1381/78 and RR in C.A. 1301/78."}}, {"text": "B. Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7168, "end_char": 7179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, L. N. Singhvi, J. S. Sinha, K. J. John and B. 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ETC"}}, {"text": "Madras-", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8064, "end_char": 8071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "425, Mint Street, George Town, Madras-!"}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8285, "end_char": 8293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10368, "end_char": 10376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10840, "end_char": 10845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10967, "end_char": 10972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11237, "end_char": 11245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12220, "end_char": 12225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12402, "end_char": 12420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14233, "end_char": 14238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14307, "end_char": 14312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14413, "end_char": 14421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14541, "end_char": 14549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14887, "end_char": 14895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16127, "end_char": 16134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16683, "end_char": 16691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17052, "end_char": 17059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17278, "end_char": 17286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17605, "end_char": 17622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention strong reliance was placed by him on a decision of this Court in Neta Ram v. I iwan Lal(') and a decision of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai v.\n\nHale and Company, G. T. Madras(')."}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18319, "end_char": 18326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18419, "end_char": 18426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18529, "end_char": 18545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18832, "end_char": 18839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mehsin Bhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19455, "end_char": 19466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it was pointed out that the view of the learned Single Judge in Mehsin Bhai's case (supra) had not been approved in subsequent decisions of that Court."}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19822, "end_char": 19829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.14(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21126, "end_char": 21136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1970] 3 S. C. R. 734", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21720, "end_char": 21741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.14(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22272, "end_char": 22282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23237, "end_char": 23245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23774, "end_char": 23782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Neta Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24349, "end_char": 24357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Neta Ram's case (supra) the landlord had sought eviction of his te'nants from a building owned by him, inter alia,_ on the ground that the shops occupied by ti>~ tenants were in a state of great disrepair and were dilapidated and he wishes to rebuild the same after dismantling the structures."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24643, "end_char": 24653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patiala and East Punjab States Union UrbanRent Restriction Ordinance, 2006", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24661, "end_char": 24735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Oil the question Of the construction of the provisions of the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25164, "end_char": 25235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. Ananthanarayanan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27736, "end_char": 27755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mehsin Bhai's case (supra) Mr. Justice M. Ananthanarayanan of the Madras High Court has taken the view that in order to decide the\n\nbona fide of the landlord in an application under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act, the Courts have to apply several criteria and judge upon the totality of the Acts and that even though a building may be old stil its present condition may be such as to involve no danger whatsoever , of any breaking up so as to necessitate a decision by the landlord that • -\"\"\" it is in his interest to demolish it immediately; the condition of the building and extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition anrl reconstruction in future are all relevant considerations in assessing the bona {ides of the landlord."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27879, "end_char": 27887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PanchamaJ Narayan Shenoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29170, "end_char": 29194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In PanchamaJ Narayan Shenoy's case (supra), a case arising under r s.21(1)(j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, an extreme contentiOD."}}, {"text": "s.21(1)(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29234, "end_char": 29244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29675, "end_char": 29680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30684, "end_char": 30689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30902, "end_char": 30907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31157, "end_char": 31165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31170, "end_char": 31175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31601, "end_char": 31612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32081, "end_char": 32107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nThe next decision relied upon by counsel for the respondents is S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty's case (supra), the ratio of which is clearly different and does not touch the issue arising before us in these appeals."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32530, "end_char": 32534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33941, "end_char": 33949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34033, "end_char": 34039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras decision in Mahboob Badsha's case (supra) merely takes the view that the age and the dilapidated condition of the building is not a sine qua non\n\nfor eviction under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Mahboob Badsha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34052, "end_char": 34066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras decision in Mahboob Badsha's case (supra) merely takes the view that the age and the dilapidated condition of the building is not a sine qua non\n\nfor eviction under s. 14(1) (b) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34205, "end_char": 34213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34654, "end_char": 34666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34922, "end_char": 34927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35735, "end_char": 35740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1121_1132_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• •\n\nTHE AUTIIORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR & ANR.\n\nS. NAGANATHA AYYAR\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nThe Tamll Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961- Ss. 7 and 22-Scope of-Sale, gift, transfer etc. of land made between certain\n\ndates void-Bona fide transfers if exempt by s. 22.\n\nSection 7 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961, provides that on and from the date of commencement of the Act no\n\nperson shall, except as otherwise provided in the Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIlI, be entitled to hold land in 'excess of the ceiling area.\n\nSection 22 provides that where on or after the date of commencement of the Act (6th April, 1960) but before the notified date (2nd October, 1962) any\n\nperson has transferred any l•nd held by him by sale, gift etc. the Authorued D Officer within whose Jurisdiction such land holding of the major part thereof is situated may, after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer or partition and after such inquiry as he thinks fit to make, declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition, as the case may be, defeats any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe alienations in all the cases took many forms ranging from 3tridl1ana to bona fide !ale and they were executed between the date of commencemnt ot. the Act and notified date.\n\nThe Land Tribunal held that the alienations were void because but for the alienations the holders would have had the lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act.\n\nOn the interpretation of s. 22 of the Act, the ){igh Court was of tile view thn.t the section covered only those sham, nominal and bogus transfers which are intended to defeat the provisions of the Act and which are inconsistent with the object provid'ed in s. 7. It was also held that transactions entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act would not be hit by the provisions prevent ing such transfers except where they were mala fide or colourable; and that the word \"defeat\" in s. 22 should be taken as having been used to import a sinister motive. It was therefore held that under s. 22 the Authorised Officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are skam and nominal entered into with the avowed object of defeating the provisions of the Act without any bona fide intention to transfer title.\n\nHELD: (I) If any transfer defeats the'provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such transaction, bona fide or not, is void in the matter of computation of the permissible area and the surplus area.\n\nThe Authorised Officer is within hia p:ower if he ignores it as void for purposes of s. 22, s. 7 and other ceiling related provioions. [l132C]\n\n{2) Looking at the words of s. 22 in the light of the scheme of prohibition of transfers to preserve the surplus land for distribution there is no justification for importing into s. 22 more than its words convey. The section says what it means.\n\nA simple scan of the provision reveals that any transfer, gift, surrender, settlement or other alienations may be declared void by the Authorized Officer, if he finds that the transfer or the partition defeats any of the provisions of this Act. fhe trichotomy is obvious : There must be a transfer or other alienation; it must have taken place during 1he period mentioned in the section; it must have the effect of defeating any of the provisions of the Act. If these three elements are present, the Authoris'ed Officer must void the transfer. There is no rule for importing a fourth principle that the transfer should be sham, nominal or bogus nor is there any additional consideration that if the transfer is bona fide for family necessity or other urgency then it is good even though\n\nit' defeats the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe provision seeks to provide social justice for the landless and it defeats the purpose if, by the interpretative process, soft justice to large !andholder. is brought bout. [I 130B-D]\n\n(3) The literal meaning of the section is that any transfer or other alienation mentiOilfd in it which reduces or impairs the otherwise available extent of surplus land beyond the ceiling defeats the provisions of the Act. This is the plain meaning of the section which gives no room for doubt or justification for D importation of any further condition like sham, bogus etc.\n\n(4) The High Court was wrong in its view that the Act being a confiscatory one, the public authority \"invested with the power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act reasonably, and that such a power should bo construed beneficially in favour of the subject who is affected by the statute.\" The approach of the High Court is inept and inapplicable when one considers agrarian reform legislation whose avowed purpose is to take away as much extent of land as policy dictates so that distribution thereof among the landless may be achieved.\n\nWhen a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property, rules which have frowned upon confiscatory legislation cannot apply at all.\n\nThe jurisprudential principles in such a situation cannot be the same as have be'en inherd from a culture which postulates the State v. the subject.\n\n[1126E-0]\n\n(5) While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental a character as agrarian reform, the.Court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgI'image to destination socir.J justice should be helped, not hampered, by judicial interpretation.\n\nIt is true that Judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters; but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution. The judiciary, in its sphere, shares the revolutionary pur pose of the constitutional order and when called upon to decode social legisla• tion it must be animated by the goal-oriented approach.\n\n[1123E-H]\n\nOVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal 2544 of 1972.\n\nNos. 2542\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 11-12-1970 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1824 and 1825/65.\n\nV. P. Raman, Adv. Genl. and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant.\n\n' ..\n\nA. T. M. Sampath tor Respondent in C.A. 2542172.\n\nK. S. Ramilmurthi, Mrs. Saroja Gopalkrishnan for Respondent in\n\nC.A. 2542172.\n\nK. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar for R. 1 in CA 2544172.\n\nK. Rajendra Chaudhry for R. 2 in C.A. 2544172.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. The short point of Jaw. decided in the Jong judgment under appeal may justly be given short shrift. But the batch of Civil Revision Petitions allowed by the High Court involves a legal issue of deep import from the angle of agrarian reform and surplus land available for distribution under its scheme that we deem it proper to discuss the core question at some length. If the statutory construction which found favour with the High Court be correct the risk of reform legislation being condemned to functional futility is great, and so the State has come up in appeal by Special Leave challenging the High Court's interpretation of s. 22 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms\n\n(Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act, 1961 (for short, the Ceiling Act).\n\nPresently, we will set out the skeletal facts relating to the civil appeals and the scheme of the Act designed for distributive. justice in the field of agricultural land ownership, sufficient to disclose the purpose of the legislation, the mischief it intends to suppress, the reverse effect of the construction put on the key section (s. 22) in the judgment under appeal and the consequeut stultification of the objective of the Ceiling Act. While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental a character as agrarian reform, t.he court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgrimage to 'destination social justice' should be helped, and not hampered, by judicial interpretation. For, the story of agrarian re-distribution in Tamil Nadu, as elsewhere, has been tardy and zigzag, what with legislative delays, judicial stays and invalidations, followed by fresh constitutional amendments and new constitutional challenges and statutory constructions, holding up, for decades, urgent measures of rural economic justice which was part of the pledges of the Freedom struggle. It is true that judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters; but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution being one of the trinity of the nation's appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio-economic order.\n\nThe judiciary in its sphere, shares the revolutionary purpose of the Constitutional order, and when called upon to decode social legislation must be animated by a goal-oriented approach. This is part of the dynamics of statutory intretation in the developing countries so that courts are not converted into rescue shelters for those who seek to defeat agrarian justice by cute transac-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nA lions of many manifestations now so similar in the country and illustrated by the several cases under appeal.\n\nThis caveat has become necessary because the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme.\n\nThe Ceiling Act, in its structure and process, follows the common pattern.\n\nThe object is equitable distribution of land to the land!~ by relieving those who hold more than the optimum extent fixed by the law.\n\nThe success of the scheme depends on maximisation of' surplus land to be taken over by the State from large landholders. The strategy of fixing a severe ceiling on land holdings was expected to be paralysed by anticipatory strategems by landholders and so legislature sought to outwit them and clamped down pre-emptive restrictions on transfer whereby the surplus takeover would be sabotaged, Chapter II prescribes the ceiling on land holdings and Chapter III proscribes certain types of deleterious transfers and future acquisitions.\n\nOne such provision is s. 22 which falls for immediate dissection. The machinery for working out the scheme includes 'authorised officers'\n\naS defined in s. 3 (5) of the Ceiling Act.\n\nThe rest of the infra structure for implementation of the statutory scheme is not material foc our case nor the other chapters relating to compensation, exemptions and the like Chapter XI provides for appeals and revisions and the High Court, by virtue of s. 83 read with s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has jurisdiction to entertain revisions against orders of Land Tribunals which enjoy appellate powers over orders of authorised officers in the manner provided.\n\nThe present appeals are against a common order of the High Court allowing several revision petitions under s. 115 C.P.C.\n\nN0w, the respondents before us in the several appeals are persons whose transfers have been held void by the authorised officer and the land Tribunal but upheld by the High Court on a narrow construction of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act. The alienations took many fonns ranging from stridhana tu bona fide sale but shared one common attribute that they were executed during the suspect spell, if one may say so, between the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date.\n\nThe legislature, in its realistic anxiety and pragmatic wisdom, demarcated a lethal zone viz., the period between the two dates stated above when all landholders with lands in excess of the ceiling would desperately salvage their surplus by resort to devices, some bona fide, some not, but all having the effect of frustrating the legislative objective of freezing holdings as on the date of commencement of the Act and seizing the surplus in terms of the Act for eventual equitable distribulion, after payment of statutory compensation.\n\nBefore embarking on any further discussion of the project of inter- A dieting transfers, as spelt out in s. 22, we may read the provision :\n\n\"Where on or after the date of commencement of this Act, but before the notified date, any person has transferred any land held by him by sale, gift (other than gift made in contemplation of death), exchange, surrender, settlement or in any other manner except by request or, has effected a partition of his holding or part thereof, the Authorised\n\nOfficer within whose jurisdiction such land, holding of the major part thereof is situated may, after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer on partition and after such enquiry as he thinks fit to make declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition as the case may be, defeats any of the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nThree semantic alternatives compete for judicial acceptance. The first, which appealed to the Land Tribunal is that all alienations during the dubious period specificated in s. 22, if executed by a holder who, but for such shedding operation or alienation, would have had lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act, are void because they are sure to defeat the 'surplus' provisions of the Act. The second alternative, which swings to the other extreme but has met with the High Court's approval, virtually salvages all such transfers save sham and mala fide ones, for only if they are obnoxious in that sense\n\ncan they be caught in the coils of s. 22. The third possible construction, which is in between the two extremes and has been forcefully pressed before us by Shri K. S. Ramamurthy, validates bona fide transfers even during the offending period, the reason being that regardless of thdr impact on the scheme of the Act or its provisions, the primary object is bona fide fulfilment of the alienor's purposes such as discharge of pressing debts or borrowing to perform necessitous obligations and not to defeat or thwart the purposes or provisions of the Act.\n\nThe judicial choice from among these triple possibles depends on the rules of statutory interpretation. In the present case the basic facts are beyond dispute. The legislature had a defined plan of providing for a ceiling on land holding, taking over the balance and distributing it among the landless according to priorities.\n\nIn this perspective it defined the \"date of the commencement of this Act in s. 3(11) Its meaning the 15th day of February, 1970. It also defined in s. 3(31) the notified date. As stated earlier, the Ceiling Act had\n\na chequered caree.r in court and, indeed, at one stage the whole Act was struck down as unconstitutional.\n\nHowever, now it is immune to attack having been included in the Ninth Schedule and there is no challenge to its vires before us.\n\nOn account of extensive mischief done by alienations on a co!'siderble scale calculated to undo the public policy behind agrarian reform the legislature felt the necessity to provide in s. 22 that transfers made between 6-4-1960 and 2-10-1962 would be void if they defeated the provisions of the Act.\n\nIn all the cases before us the transfers which have been ignored by the Authorised Officer fall within this interregnum. That being admitted, the only question is whether the lethal effect of s. 22. operates only in the case of transfers which are sham and specifically intended to defeat the Act or does not affect transfers which are otherwise bona fide or is so pervasive that if the effect of the transfer is to defeat the provisions of the Act, whatever the intent of the parties, the transfer is void and can be ignored vis-a-vis the Ceiling Act and the Authorised Officer may legitimately proceed to compute the surplus D a'rea on this basis.\n\nThe learned judge adverted to an argument that the Act being a confiscatory one, the public authority \"invested with the power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act reaspnably, and that such a power should be construed beneficiently in favour of the subject who is affected by the statute (emphasis added). This approach, sanctified by tradition and vintage jurisprudence, is inept and inapplicable when we consider agrarian reform legislation whose avowed purpose is to take away as much extent of land as policy dictates so that distribution thereof among the landless may be achieved.\n\nWhen a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property, subject to payment of compensation, rules which have frowned upon confiscatory legislation cannot apply at all. We are concerned with a Republic created by the people of India, with a social transformation where the State is 'not antagonistic to the cti7, en but harmonises individual interest with community good. The jurisprudential principles in such a situation cannot be the same as have been inherited from a culture which postulates the State versus the subject.\n\nWe do not explore the aspect df the law further as we are satisfied that the answer to the specific question raised before us flows directly from a reading of the Section in the light of we11-established rules of interpretation.\n\nSection 7 is a key provision and runs as follows :\n\n\"On and from the date of commencement of this Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act but\n\n' ,) .. r\n\nsubject to the provisions of Chapter VIII be entitled to hold laud in excess of the ceiling area;\n\nProvided that in calculating the total of land held by any person, any extent in excess of the ceiling area and not exceeding half an acre in the case of wet land and one acre in the case of dry land shall, irrespective of the assessment of such land, be excluded.\"\n\n\\, Section 8 directs every person who holds land in excess of 30 , _ , i(_ standard acres to submit a return with specified particulars. Section 18\n\n' is the culmination and provides for the publication of a notification to the effect that the surplus land with each landholder is required for a public purpose. Thereupon such land shall be deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and shall vest in the Government.\n\nChapter III is a protective armour created by the statute with prohibitions and proscriptions. In particular, s. 22, which we have quoted earlier, contains an interdict.\n\nIf any transfer, contrary to its tenor, is createtl it can be voided by the Authorised Officer.\n\nThe whole purpose is to make available land with Government for its equitable dispensation according to the statutory plan. Section 94 is relevant in this context.\n\n6-4-1960 is the date of commencem\"nt of the Act. 2-10-62 is the notified date. Transfers in between these two dates have been executed by the respondents in the various appeals before us.\n\nThe concrete question is whether s. 22 has the effect of rendering such transfers invalid ipso facto or whether there is need for further proof that such transfers are \"sham, nominal and bogus''.\n\nThe view taken by the High Court is that :\n\n\" ... Section 22 seems to cover only those sham,· nominal and bogus transfers which are only inte'nded to defeat the provisions of the Act. If the Legislative intention is also to invalidate all bona fide transactions during the relevant period, it would have made certain consequentia1 pravisions as to what arc the rights of the transferor and the transferee in relation to the property conveyed, and how the resultant equities between th~ transferee and the transferor have to be worked out.\n\nThis view that section 22 will cover only transactions of sham, nominal and bogus character which are intended only to defeat the provisions of the Act will not be inconsistent with the object provided in section\n\n7.\"\n\nA The learned judge seems to take a liberal view that transactions\n\nentered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act will not be hit by the provisions preventing such transfers except where they are 1JID/a fide or colourable.\n\nThe reason partly turns on semantics and the conrt argues with lexical support:\n\n\"The word \"defeat\" normally means overcome, thwart, evade, frustrate, circumvent, bypass, disappoint, prevent, the accomplishment of the word \"defeat\" in Section 22 is one to be taken as having been used to import sinister, motive.\n\nMaxwell on the interpretation of statutes, twelfth edition, after stating that the Courts will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to escape its net, that the statute has to be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions thus defeating any shifts and contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope of falling outside the Act.\"\n\nD The conclusion categorically reached by the High Court virtually\n\nemasculates s. 22 as we understand its object and import.\n\nThe learned judge winds up with these words:\n\n\"On a due consideration of the matter, I hold that under section 22 of the Act the authorised officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are sham and nominal entered into with the avowed object of defeating the provisions of the Act, without any bona fide intention to transfer title. So in the light of the view expressed above the facts of each case have to be considered.''\n\nSection 22, literally read leads only to one conclusion, that any transfer, bona fide executed or not, is liable to be declared void by the Authorised Officer \"if he finds that the transfer defeats any of the provisions of this Act.\" There is not the slightest doubt that severally and cumulatively the provisions of the Act seek to make available the maximum extent of land, in excess of the ceiling, to be vested in Government for fulfilment of its purposes.\n\nChapter II contain\\; a fasciculus of provisions in this behalf and if any transfer carves out of the surplus area some land, pro tanto, the provisions of the Act are defeated.\n\nIndeed, it is not seriously disputed that such will be the conclusion if we do not read into the provisions either the condition that it does not apply to bona fide transfers, as Shri Ramamurthy would have it, or does not apply to any transfers other than sham, nominal or bogus transfers, as the High Court would have it.\n\nA policy-oriented interpretation tallies with the literal construction in the\n\n~··· ...\n\npresent case. The mischief rule in Heydon's case and the grammati- A cal construction which is the Golden Rule converge to the same conclusion in the present case.\n\nThe policy of the law of land reform with drastic limit on holdings often drives large holders to evade by manouvres. They make gifts, execute sales or settlements, enter into other dealings to save their properties from being taken by the State.\n\nMay be in a few cases, the ow'ner has real necessity.\n\nBnt why sell only on !he eve of land legislation? Why execute deeds, !hongh for good purposes, only where the bill fixing ceilings is round the corner?\n\nBy a'nd large, the strategies of extrication of holdin!11' from the arm of the law is the reason that prompts sudden affection for making gifts, sudden realisation of debts due and sudden awareness of family necessity.\n\nThe legislature, astute enough not to be outwitted in its objective, puts a blanket ban on transfers wbich, in effect, Cbfeat its provisions.\n\nThis may cause hardship to some but every cause claims martyrs.\n\nIndividual trauma is inevitable while ushering in a new economic order.\n\nThis is the rationale of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act. To alloy the sense of the text and to mix alien concepts is to debase the statutory metal.\n\nLikewise, laws are not value-free and so he reads the symbols of words best who projects i'n the process the values of the legislation as distinguished from his own.\n\nReading other valuos into the legislators' words may judicially demonetize the statute and break the comity between constitutional instrumentalities.\n\nThe current and correct view of the interpretative process is that words must be given their 'literal' or 'ordinary' meaning unless there are compelli'ng reasons, recognised by canons of construction, to the contrary. It must be remembered that the jndicial rule of law for interpreting statutes applies the grammatical approach, thereby to bring out the value judgment incorporated in the statute itself. Some times it is called the 'equity of the statute'. As Prof. R. B. Stevens\n\nof the Yale University bas pointed out:\n\n\"Whenever the judges support to depart from the literal or ordihary meaning, and apply the mischief rue or the golden rule, there is danger that in place of those irrelevant criteria, the canons of construction, they have more obviously substituted their own (perhaps more harmful) impressions views, prejudices or predispositions.\n\nSuch conflicts betwee~ what Parliament intended and what the judges asi; umed Parliament to have intended have long bt\"Clll appreciated.\"(')\n\n(l) Modern Law Review, Vol. 28, 1%5, p. 525.\n\n16--409 SCI/79\n\nThose who have reflected on the meaning of meaning have said that words. . . . \"mean\" nothing by themselves .. (').\n\nThey convey policy and the judge who interprets must seek the intent of the legis lature by gaining an insight ihto this policy and making it manifest through the process of construction.\n\nLooking at the words of s. 22 in the light of the scheme of prohibition of transfers to preserve the surplus lands for distribution, we find no justification for importing into s. 22 more than its words convey.\n\nThe Section says what it means, nothing more, nothing else.\n\nA simple scan of the provision reveals that any transfer, gift, surrender, settlement or other alienation referred to in the Section may be declared void by the Authorised Officer \"if he finds that the transfer or the partition .... defeats any of the provisions of this Act.\".\n\nThe trichotomy is obvious.\n\nThere must be a transfer or other alienation.\n\nIt must have taken place during the period mentioned in the Section.\n\nIt must have the effect of defeating any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nIf these three elements are present, the Authorised Officer must void the transfer.\n\nThere is no room for importing a fourth principle that the transfer should be 'sham, nominal or bogus'.\n\nNor indeed is there any additional consideration that if the transfer is bona fide for family necessity or othr urgency then it is good, even though it defeats the provisions of the Act.\n\nWe cannot amend the Section or dilute its imperatives, scared by the consequences or moved by extraneous sympathies. Sub-conscious forces and individual prepossessions have a subtle way of entering the interpretative verdict of the judge. We have to be constantly careful to exclude such intrusions. Moreover, when the whole purpose of the Section is to prevent any alienation which defeats any of the provisions of the Act, it is impermissible to introduce any requirement, other than is mentioned in the Section, as a condition for its operation.\n\nObviously, the provision seeks to provide social justice for the landless and it defeats the purpose if, by the interpretative process, soft justice to large landholders is brought about.\n\nWe consider the 'literal' meaning of the Section to be that any transfer or other alienation mentioned in the Section which reduces or impairs the otherwise available extent of surplus land beyond the ceiling \"defeats ...... the provisions of this Act.\" This is the plain meaning of the Section which gives no room for doubt or justiftcation for importation of any further condition like sham, bogus elc.\n\nH A return to the rules of strict construction, when the purpose of\n\n(I) C. Ogden and I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 9 (10th Edn. 1956)\n\nthe statute needs it, is desirable, especially with a view to give effect to the intention of the legislature. We are reminded of Lord Denning's interesting remarks in his recent book \"The Discipline of Law\" under heading \"I am a Portia Man\".\n\nIn justification of his view Russe]] Ll quoted a passage from Shakespearo. It is worth recording becausv there are lessons to be drawn from it-as there often are from Shakespeare.\n\n'I may perhaps be forgiven for saying that it appears to me that Lord Denning MR has acceded to the appeal of Bessanio in the Merchant of Venice.\n\nBessanio\n\n\"And, I beseech you,\n\nWrest once the law to your authority:\n\nTo do a great right, do a little wrong.\"\n\nBut Portia retorted :\n\n\"It must not be; there is no power in Venice\n\nCan alter a decree established : It will be recorded for a precedent,\n\nAnd many an error, by the same example,\n\nWill rush into the State : it cannot be.\" Then said Russell LJ.\n\n'I am a Portia man'.\n\nI cannot believe that Russell Ll wonld be a 'Portia man' if it meant aligning himself with Shylock-in support of a strict law of penalties which could not be relieved by equity.\n\nTo be truly a 'Portia man' the lawyer should follow the way in which Portia avoided an unjust decree.\n\nNot to let the words of the deed be the masters: but so construe them--<ldapt them as the occasion demands-so as to do wha.t iustice and equity require.\n\nThis is how she turned the tables on Shylock:\n\nIt is in this denouement that I would follow the example of Portia-I too am a Portia man.\n\nIn the interpretation of s. 22 we too are Portia men.\n\nFor this H reason we reverse the view of the High Court that s. 22 will not apply to nullify any transaction of transfer or partition unless it is further\n\nshown that it is sham, nominal or bogus.\n\nNor do we' agree with Shri Ramamurthy that even if a transaction defeats the ceiling provisions, it may still be valid if the transfer is, from an individual point of view, bona fide. The short reply is that from the cormnnnity's angle, especially the landless community's angle hungering for allotment, the alienation, however necessary for the individual, is not bona fide visa-vis the cormnunity.\n\nTherefore, we allow the appeal in the light of the interpretation we have adopted, restore the tribunal's holding and rule that if any '\n\ntransfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of sur- ,/ plus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such trans- __.M._. r action bona fide or not, is void in the matter of computaticm of the ·\n\npermissible aea and the surplus area.\n\nMay be, that the transaction may be good for other purposes or may ilot be.\n\nThe Authorised Officer is within his power if be ignores it as void for purposes of s. 22, s. 7 and other ceiling-related provisions.\n\nD The detailed discussion of the High Court on many other aspects of the Act do not affect the core of the matter and cannot deflect us from the conclusion we have arrived at.\n\nThe appeals are allowed but in the light of the earlier direction of the Court. the State. will pay the costs of the respondent.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "THE AUTIIORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE AUTHORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 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P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. P. Raman, Adv."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6192, "end_char": 6204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6231, "end_char": 6247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ..\n\nA. T. M. Sampath tor Respondent in C.A. 2542172."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ramilmurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6281, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramilmurthi, Mrs. Saroja Gopalkrishnan for Respondent in\n\nC.A. 2542172.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Ramilmurthi"}}, {"text": "Saroja Gopalkrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramilmurthi, Mrs. Saroja Gopalkrishnan for Respondent in\n\nC.A. 2542172."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar for R. 1 in CA 2544172."}}, {"text": "K. Ram Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6375, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar for R. 1 in CA 2544172."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajendra Chaudhry for R. 2 in C.A. 2544172."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6505, "end_char": 6517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. The short point of Jaw."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7154, "end_char": 7159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7600, "end_char": 7605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8004, "end_char": 8014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For, the story of agrarian re-distribution in Tamil Nadu, as elsewhere, has been tardy and zigzag, what with legislative delays, judicial stays and invalidations, followed by fresh constitutional amendments and new constitutional challenges and statutory constructions, holding up, for decades, urgent measures of rural economic justice which was part of the pledges of the Freedom struggle."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10219, "end_char": 10223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10505, "end_char": 10510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10521, "end_char": 10527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10531, "end_char": 10558, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10829, "end_char": 10835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10836, "end_char": 10841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N0w", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10844, "end_char": 10847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeals are against a common order of the High Court allowing several revision petitions under s. 115 C.P.C.\n\nN0w, the respondents before us in the several appeals are persons whose transfers have been held void by the authorised officer and the land Tribunal but upheld by the High Court on a narrow construction of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11051, "end_char": 11056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11963, "end_char": 11968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12908, "end_char": 12913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13389, "end_char": 13394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13516, "end_char": 13532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third possible construction, which is in between the two extremes and has been forcefully pressed before us by Shri K. S. Ramamurthy, validates bona fide transfers even during the offending period, the reason being that regardless of thdr impact on the scheme of the Act or its provisions, the primary object is bona fide fulfilment of the alienor's purposes such as discharge of pressing debts or borrowing to perform necessitous obligations and not to defeat or thwart the purposes or provisions of the Act.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Ramilmurthi"}}, {"text": "s. 3(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14315, "end_char": 14323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14387, "end_char": 14395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14626, "end_char": 14640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14878, "end_char": 14883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6-4-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14912, "end_char": 14920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On account of extensive mischief done by alienations on a co!'siderble scale calculated to undo the public policy behind agrarian reform the legislature felt the necessity to provide in s. 22 that transfers made between 6-4-1960 and 2-10-1962 would be void if they defeated the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "2-10-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14925, "end_char": 14934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On account of extensive mischief done by alienations on a co!'siderble scale calculated to undo the public policy behind agrarian reform the legislature felt the necessity to provide in s. 22 that transfers made between 6-4-1960 and 2-10-1962 would be void if they defeated the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15186, "end_char": 15191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16485, "end_char": 16490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned with a Republic created by the people of India, with a social transformation where the State is 'not antagonistic to the cti7, en but harmonises individual interest with community good."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17016, "end_char": 17025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17562, "end_char": 17571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17696, "end_char": 17706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18095, "end_char": 18100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18377, "end_char": 18387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2-10-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18467, "end_char": 18474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2-10-62 is the notified date."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18640, "end_char": 18645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18854, "end_char": 18864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19359, "end_char": 19369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19549, "end_char": 19559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20024, "end_char": 20034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20103, "end_char": 20110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes, twelfth edition, after stating that the Courts will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to escape its net, that the statute has to be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions thus defeating any shifts and contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope of falling outside the Act.\""}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20599, "end_char": 20604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20749, "end_char": 20759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21093, "end_char": 21103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21916, "end_char": 21926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, it is not seriously disputed that such will be the conclusion if we do not read into the provisions either the condition that it does not apply to bona fide transfers, as Shri Ramamurthy would have it, or does not apply to any transfers other than sham, nominal or bogus transfers, as the High Court would have it."}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22180, "end_char": 22186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mischief rule in Heydon's case and the grammati- A cal construction which is the Golden Rule converge to the same conclusion in the present case."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23292, "end_char": 23297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. B. Stevens", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24196, "end_char": 24209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Prof. R. B. Stevens\n\nof the Yale University bas pointed out:\n\n\"Whenever the judges support to depart from the literal or ordihary meaning, and apply the mischief rue or the golden rule, there is danger that in place of those irrelevant criteria, the canons of construction, they have more obviously substituted their own (perhaps more harmful) impressions views, prejudices or predispositions."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25119, "end_char": 25124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25272, "end_char": 25277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. Ogden", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27460, "end_char": 27468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H A return to the rules of strict construction, when the purpose of\n\n(I) C. Ogden and I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 9 (10th Edn."}}, {"text": "I. Richards", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27473, "end_char": 27484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H A return to the rules of strict construction, when the purpose of\n\n(I) C. Ogden and I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 9 (10th Edn."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27664, "end_char": 27671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are reminded of Lord Denning's interesting remarks in his recent book \"The Discipline of Law\" under heading \"I am a Portia Man\"."}}, {"text": "Shakespearo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27835, "end_char": 27846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In justification of his view Russe]] Ll quoted a passage from Shakespearo.", "canonical_name": "Shakespearo"}}, {"text": "Shakespeare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27940, "end_char": 27951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is worth recording becausv there are lessons to be drawn from it-as there often are from Shakespeare.", "canonical_name": "Shakespearo"}}, {"text": "Bessanio", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28064, "end_char": 28072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'I may perhaps be forgiven for saying that it appears to me that Lord Denning MR has acceded to the appeal of Bessanio in the Merchant of Venice."}}, {"text": "Venice", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28092, "end_char": 28098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'I may perhaps be forgiven for saying that it appears to me that Lord Denning MR has acceded to the appeal of Bessanio in the Merchant of Venice."}}, {"text": "Portia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28218, "end_char": 28224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Portia retorted :\n\n\"It must not be; there is no power in Venice\n\nCan alter a decree established : It will be recorded for a precedent,\n\nAnd many an error, by the same example,\n\nWill rush into the State : it cannot be.\""}}, {"text": "Russell LJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28447, "end_char": 28457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then said Russell LJ."}}, {"text": "Shylock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28573, "end_char": 28580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I cannot believe that Russell Ll wonld be a 'Portia man' if it meant aligning himself with Shylock-in support of a strict law of penalties which could not be relieved by equity."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29081, "end_char": 29086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29172, "end_char": 29177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30280, "end_char": 30285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30287, "end_char": 30291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1133_1164_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL) CALCUTTA A\n\nB. N. BHATTACHARJEE & ANR.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961)-Ss. 245A-245M-Scope, purpose and \\, /. obiect of-Procedure and powers of Settlement CommiJsion-Settlen1ent Com-\n\n<1 mLuioner whether a tribunal. '\n\nWords & Phrases-'Preferred an appeal'-S.245M(l) proviso !11co1ne Tax\n\nAct, 1961-Meaninz of.\n\n'Interpretation of Statutes-Fiscal philosophy and interpretation technoloo to be on same wave length for legislative policy to find fulfilment in th~ enacted text.\n\nA large sum of Rs. 30 lakhs in cash having been recovered from the responde-nt in pursuance to a search by the Income Tax Officials his assessments f0r the yearn 1962-63 to 1972-73 were reopened by the Department. The total tax burden on the respondent was over Rs. 30 Iakhs and an additional sum of Rs. 35 lakhs was a..sessed for the year 1973-74. The respondent was also prosecuted under s. 277 of the Income Tax Act.\n\nAppeals by the respondent to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner brought down the assessable inrome by about Rs. 10 Iakhs.\n\nThe resuondent and the department both appealed to the Income Tax E Appellate Tribunal, the former filing 12 appeals and the latter 10 appeal~.\n\nThe respondent moved the Settlement Commission for composition under s. 245M.\n\nThe assessee withdrew his appeals and the revenue deciar'ed their asse&Sments and appeal!! 'weak' and withdrew them.\n\n, The Settlem'ent Commission on receipt of the application under s. 245C acted under s. 245D ( 1) and called for a report from the appellant.\n\nThe ap~ pellant reported that prosecution proceedings for concealment of income and also false verification in the return by the respondent were pending against the reipondcnt in the Magistrate's Court and that it was not a fit CMe to be pro~ ceeded with by the Commission.\n\nThe Settlement Commission after some correspondence with the respondent and v;1ithout giving a hearing informed him that as the @Pellant had objected under s. 245D (1), the Settlement Commission did not allow the application to be proceeded with.\n\nThe appellant thereupon moved the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for restoration of its appeals although no specific provision enable uch a restoration, the asssessee being entitled to apply for restoration under ~. 245M.\n\nThe respondent urged the Settlement Commission to review its order as no hearing as such was given to him. The Settlement Commission yielded to hit;\n\nA submission, reached the reverse oonclusion that the appellant's opposition to the composition notwithstanding, the application for settlement be considered on merits.\n\nThe core controversy in the appeals to this Court were whether in vie'W of the withdrawal of the departmental appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Commissioner is estopped from making a report under s. 2450(1) B proviso 2 to the Settlement Commission objecting to the application fro1n )' being proct:eded with. ,...\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was contended tha.i: (a) th'ere was no ./ po\\vcr of review for the Commission, sinc'e it had declined to proceed with \\ , the application for settlement and consequently the re-opening of the Settle-~-~ t\n\nn1ent proceedings was invalid, (b) even though the C.I.T. had withdrav.:n bis C appeals and thus facilitated the filing of an application under s. 245C no bar of cstoppel could be spelt out to forbid the Commissioner from exercising his statutory po\\ver of withholding consent to the settl'ement proceedings and\n\n(c) the C.l.T.'s veto Wfl6 not subject to review or invalidation by the Settl~: ment Commission.\n\nAllowing the appeals\n\nD l-lELD 1.\n\nThe Settlement Commission should be inhibit'ed from proceeding with the application of the assessee and the appeals by the assessee before the lncon1e Tax App'ellatc Tribunal must be revived and disposed of expeditiou, Jy.\n\n[1164FJ\n\n2. The departmental appeals, having been admitted by the Commissionfr of Income Taix himself to be very weak and frivolous, should not be revived E as it \\vill be only a waAte of public time <ind money.\n\n[1164G]\n\n3. If the Department files an appeal \\'Chich it drops to enable an application before the Commission, then the proviso to s. 245M(l) does not debar the motion for settlement. [1l56C]\n\n4. Functionally speaking, Chapter XIXA in the Income1 Tax Act, 1961,\n\nF enacted by the Taxa.tion Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, engrafted in partia! implementation of the Wanchoo Committee Report, provides for settlement of ' huge tax disputes _and immunity from criminal proceedings by a Commission\n\n- L~\n\nto be constituted by the Central Government when approached without objection from the Tax Department. [1138E]\n\n5. Fiscal philosophy and interpretation technology must be on the same wavelength if legislative policy is to find fulfilment in the enacted text.\n\n[1138 HJ\n\n6. The mechanics of s. 245D provides that the application for settlement, when filed, shall be forwarded to the Commissioner for a report and is only on the basis of the mate.rial contained in such report that the Settlement Commission may allow th'e application to be proceeded \\vith or reject the appli cation.\n\nTo reject an application is to refuse relief outright and affects the applica'nt adversely.\n\nSo it is provided \"that an application shall not be re jected unless an opportunity has been given to the applicant of being heard .• An applicant before the S'ettlement Commission is therefore entitled to a hearin'i before hi' application for composition is rejected\n\n[1146G-H]\n\n• •\n\n....\n\nC. I. T. V. B. N. BHATTACHARJEE 1135\n\n7. The rule of fairplay incorporated in the first proviso to s. 245D(l) obligates the Commission to hear the applicant before reljection. EYen apart from any specific provision, it is legal fairplay not to hurt any party without\n\nheaxing him unless the Act expressly excludes it.\n\nNoing is lost by hearing a petitioner whose application for settl'ement is being rejected and much may be gained by such hearing in properly processing the application in the spirit of Chapter XIXA.\n\nS. 245D(l) docs. not negate natural justice and in the absence of an express exclusion of the rule of audi afteram partem, it is fair, indeed fundarnental, that no man is prejudiced by action without opportunity to show to the' contrary.\n\nLaw leans in favour of natural justice where statutory interdict does not forbid it.\n\n[1147A-D, F]\n\nMohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner. [1978] 1 SCC 405; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 1 SCC 248; referred to.\n\nIn the instant case, the Settlement Commission in the first instance rejected the pplication because the Commission'er of Income Tax objected to it.\n\nThe rule of fairplay incorporated in the first proviso to s. 245(1) obligates the Comn1ission to hear the applicant, before rejection. The Settlement Commission's decision to re-hear and pass a de novo order cannot, therefore, be .aid to be illegal.\n\n[1147E]\n\n8. The second proviso to s. 2450(1) is compulsive in tune and import, for it mandates \"that an a.pplication shall not be proceeded with under this sub-section if the Com.missioner objects to the application being proceeded with on the ground that concealment of particulars of income on the part of the applicant or perpetration of fraud by him for evading any tax .... haS' been esta.blish'cd or is likely to be established by any income tax authority, in relation to the case.\" There is little difficulty in holding that the application for settlement, having been rejected by the Commissioner, could not be proceed- ed with.\n\nThe veto of the Commissioner was the Waterloo of the application.\n\n[1147G-1148A, DJ\n\n9. Section 245H is of great moment from the angle of public interest and public morals at it immunises white collar offenders again&t criminal prosecutions and, in unscrupulous circumstances, becomes a suspect instru1nent of negotiable corruption.\n\nMore than the prospect of monetary liability and mounting penalty is the dread of traumatic prison tenancy that a tax-dodging F tycoon is worried about.\n\nAnd if he can purchase freedom from criminal prosecution and incarceratory sentence he maiy settle with the Commission. and towards this end, try to lay those who remotely control the departmental echelons whose veto or green signal, opens the prosecutions.\n\nThus, s. 245H, which clothes the Commission with the power to grant immunity from prose- cution for \"any offence under this Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act .... \" is a magnet which attract3 large ta.x-dodgers G and offers, indirectly an opportunity to the highest departmental and political authorities a suspect poWer to barga.in.\n\n[1150.C-E]\n\n10. Section 245M 'enables certain persons who ha.ve filed appeals to the Appe1late Tribunal to make applications to the Settlement Commission.\n\nTue section (a) enables withdrawal of appeals before tribunals by assessee as con- dition prec'edent to applications for composition by the Settlement Commission. (b) applies, by a legal fiction, Section 245C and D to such applications, H and (c) where the proceedings before the Commission is not entertained -allows revival of the withdra-wn appeals thus restoring th'e Status quo ante'.\n\nA The proviso to &. 245M(l) places an embargo on the right of the assessee to move the Commission where the income tax officer has preferred an appeal under sub-s.(2) of s. 253 against the order to which the assessee's appeal relates.\n\nThe proviso interdicts entertainment of a settlement application if departmental appeals are filed. [l 150F, 1151G, 1152C, !153F]\n\n11. Purposefully interpreted preferring an appeal means. more tha.n formally filing it but effectively pur.Yuing it.\n\nIf a party retreats before the contest begins it is as good as not having entered the fray.\n\nAfter all, Chapter XIXA is geared to pron1otion of settlernent and creation of road-blocs in reasonable composition.\n\nThe teleokgical method of interpretation leads to the view that early withdrawal of the LT.O's appeal removed the bar of the proviso.\n\n[1153C-D]\n\n12. The purpose of substituting the method of inves.tigativc negotiation, just scttletnent and ea.rly exigibility by a high powered Commission for a tier-upon-tier of long protract\"ed litigation, where victory may be phyrrhic and futile, is ill-served by keeping out cases solely for the reasons that departmental appeals have been filed.\n\n[1153H-1154A]\n\n13. 'fhe obvious object of the clause, \"the assessee shall not be deemed to have withdrawn the a.ppeal from the appellate tribunal,\" is to restore the parties to .status quo ante, and in fairness, must apply to the Department as to the assesse'e.\n\nThis non-discriminatory import can be reaoonably read into the clause if we construe th'e expression \"the assessee in a. wider way so as to include all parties affected by the subject matter of the asressment. In that case, the clause may mean that no one who is aggrieved by the assessment shall be deemed to have withdrawn th'e aippeal from the appellate tribunal.\" An equitable and purpose oriented construction of the clause means that the assessee will be put back in the s-ame position vis-a-vis his app'eals and if, to facilitate his moving the Comm.is.5ion the I.T.O. has withdrawn the departmental appeals, the Commission's rejection of the application shall not prejudice the Rvenue. Actus curie neminem gravabit is the principle of wider import and is a tool of construction too.\n\nThis perhaps may be making up for a lacuna. by a res-tructuring of the clause so as to work out justice to the Department.\n\n[1154E-G]\n\n14. The scheme of s. 253(4) contemplates filing of memorandun1 of crossobjections by the ITO on receipt of notice of the appeal by the as-sessee.\n\nSo much so it is also possible, alternatively to read into s. 245 (7) the right of the department to file an appeal de novo on receipt of notice of the revival of the aiss'essee's appeal, within the period specified in s. 253 ( 4).\n\nThis does not do violence to the language of s. 245M(7) and affords equitable relief to the: Department by enabling it to bring its appeal back to life notwithstanding the earlier withdrawal. when the ass'essee's appeal reinc21rnates s. 245M (7).\n\n[1154H-1155B]\n\n15. The judicial process does not stand helples& with folded hands but engineers its way to discern meaning when a new construction with a view to rationlisation is needed.\n\n[1155C]\n\nSeaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB 481, referred to.\n\n16. A casual perusal of Chapter XIXA convin,.:es the discerning eye that the Settlement Commiss.ion exercises many powers which affect, for good or oth'erwise, the rights of the parties before it and vests in it powers to grant\n\nC. I. T. V. B. N. BHATTACHARJEE 1137\n\nimmunity from prosecution and penalty, to investigate into any matters and to A enjoy conclusiveness regarding its orders or settlenient.\n\nSection 245L declares all proceedings before th'e Settlement Comrniss-ion to be judicial proceedings.\n\nSettlement Commission are therefore tribunals.\n\n[1157D-E, 1156E]\n\nAssociated Cement Co1npa11ies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma and another [1962] 2 SCR 266; referred to.\n\n17. The Commissioner has a duty to the public Revenue and more im portantly, a duty to object to any assessec who is prima facie guilty of grave crimin2.1 conduct in the shape of concealment of income or perpetration of \"- fraud getting away with it bY invoking chapter XIXA.\n\nThe gravity of thi!t\n\n\"'- _ public policy cam.1ot be undermined by interpretative softness of second \"'proviso to s. 245D(l).\n\nTo whittle down the imperative nature of this veto power is to undo the expectations of the Wancboo Committee and amounts to stultify the rule of 1aVv', an integrad µart of which is that the law shall not let the greater felon loose.\n\n[1158E; 1158H-1159A]\n\n• ,\n\n18.\n\nSection 245D by the 2nd Proviso, cas.ts a public duty on the Com missioner of Income Tax to consider in the light of th'e ;::ase made out in the assessee's application whether \"concealment of particulars of income on the part of the applicant or perpetra.tion of fraud by him for evading any tax or other sum chargeable or imposabl'e under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922). or under this Act, has been established or is likely to be es.tablished by any Income.tax authority, in relation to the case,\" and exercise his veto po-wer to prevent esca.pe of macro.....::riminals prima facie guilty of grave eoonomic crimes.\n\nHe Ca'tlnot bargain over this interdict in advance or barter away a legal mandate in anticipation.\n\nHe may permit or even assist the. filing of ai conciliation n1otion of the assesse'e but when the Com mission intimates him under s. 245D(1) he shall, with statutory &eriousness, exercise his discretion.\n\nHe cannot enter into a 'deal' over this power without betraying the statutory trust.\n\nThe plea that the Commissioner of Income-taJC, by conduct and understanding has 'irredeemably mortgaged' his staitutory duty to object if the case deserves such objection has to be negativt!d.\n\nEstoppel then is. both odious and omnius and discretion the door to corruption.\n\n[11600-G]\n\n19. In th'e instant case, the ClT \\vithdrew 1he appeals but it is not correct that he made representations to the al'3sessee to act in a particular manner with a provision of doing something to his advantage leading to the assessee jn turn acting to his own prejudice by withdrawing his app'eals.\n\nHis withdrawal of the appeals \\\\TJ5 independently decided upon by him so that he could move the Commission.\n\nThereafter he moved the departm'ent to withdraw ifs appeals so as to entitle him to make an application to the Commission.\n\nThe canons that govern the application of the principle of estoppel contradict its extension to 2' situation like the present.\n\nThe plea of estoppel which has found favour with the Commission has therefore to be ov'er-ruled.\n\nThe objection raised by the CIT is a potent interdict on the jurisdiction of the Commission.\n\n[1163H\n\n1164A, CJ\n\n20. The policy of the law a.:; disclosed in Chapter XIXA is not to provide a....rescue shelter for big tax-dodgers who indulge in criminal activities by approaching the Settlement Commission.\n\nThe Settlement Commission will certainly take due note of the gravity of economic offenc'es on the wealth of the nation which the Wanchoo Committee bas ernphas.is'ed and will exercise\n\nA :ts power of immunisation against criminal prose.:utions by us-ing its power only sparingly and in deserving cases, otherwise such orders may become vulnerable if properly challenged.\n\n[1164 E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 454-465 of 1979.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Order dated 9-5-1978 of the Settlemrnt Commissioner (LT. & W.T.) Govt of India, New Delhi in Application No. 7/1120-77-11.\n\nS. T. Desaz, J. Ramamurthi and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appel- . ,1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No. 1\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. A nascent Chapter (Chapter XIXA) in the Income Tax Act, 1961, enacted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, whose beneficiaries are ordinarily those whose tax liability is astronomical and criminal culpability perilous, falls for decoding by this Court in this appeal by the C.I.T.(') (Central), Calcutta, against an adverse order made by the Settlement Commission. Functi<mally speaking, this Chapter, engrafted in partial implementation of the Wanchoo Committee Report, provides for settlement of huge tax disputes and immunity from criminal proceedings by a Commission to be constituted by the Central Government when approached without objection from the Tax Department. It is based on the debatable policy, fraught with dubious potentialities in the context of Third World conditions of political peculium and bureaucratic abetment, 1hat composition and collection of public revenue from tycoons is better than prosecution of their tax-related crime and litigation for total revenue . recovery. A social audit of the working of this Chapter in action and ' its fall-out may benefit the nation by information about who the true ,-, beneficiaries of this legislation are and whether there is more than meets the eye. The Wanchoo Committee which recommended this step titled its Chapter meaningfully as \"Black Money and Tax Evasion\" and the Act itself was passed and brought into force during the era of Emergency which was marked by speed and silence and bushed politico-official operations.\n\nBe that as it may, fiscal philosophy and interpretative technology must be on the same wavelength if legislative policy is to find fulfilment in the enacted text. That is the challenge lo judicial resourcefulness the present appeals offer, demanding, as it does, a holistic perspective and\n\n(1) Commissioner of Income 'Fax.\n\nharmonious construction of a whole chapter, especially a complex provision therein, so that a balance may be struck between purpose and result without doing violence to statutory language and social values.\n\nThe Chapter is fresh and the issue is virgin; and that makes the judicial adventure hazardous, compounded by the involved and obscure drafting of the bunch of provisions in Chapter XIXA.\n\nA few facts must be narrated and the anatomy of the Chapter projected at this stage, so that a hang of the controversy may be got and its just resolution sought.\n\nThe respondent, an elderly but apparently immense businessman,\n\nwas the cynosure of suspicion of the Income Tax Officials which led c to search and seizure of around Rs. 30 lakhs in cash from him. A chain reaction set in and assessments froni 1962-63 to 1972-73 were re-opened. The total tax burden so fixed ran into well over Rs. 60 Jakhs pins around Rs. 35 lakhs assessed for 1973-74. The stakes thus ran into a crore or so plus awesome prosecutions under s. 277 of the Act with unpredictable prospects of sentences.\n\nThe respondentassessee and his version or explanation had hopes of averting the Waterloo; but the Income Tax Officer (I.TO) rejected his case.\n\nIndeed, we arc neither called upon nor disposed to examh1e the merits of either side and, maybe, the assessee has a presentable case.\n\nAppeais to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner\n\n( A.A.C.) were carried by the assessee against the colossal imposts, which marginally brought down the assessable income by around Rs. 10 lakhs. Both the dissatisfied assessee and the partially injured Department appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (I.T.A.T.) against the A.A.C's decisions. During their pendency, prudence dawned on the respondent to seek sanctuary before Settlement Commission abandoning his appeal to the Tribunal attended with litigative uncertainties and penal potentialities. At seventy, with understandable high blood pressure to boot, he preferred negotiated peace to judicial justice heartful of quest for quiet although hopeful of winning his cases. These motivations do not call for our comment but are being mentioned as part of the narrative which ostensibly induced him to go before the Commission under Chapter XIXA.\n\nTo compress the long story without crippling the fonndationitl facts, what happened after the assessee decided upon offering himself to the Settlement Commission was to prepare the ground to enable him to institute a proceeding in this behalf.\n\nThe deck had to be cleared before moving the Settlement Com- 1nission. The conditions for entitlement to make an applicatioR to the\n\nSettlement Commission are set out in s. 245M.\n\nWe may have to examine closely the connotation of the expressions used in this Section\n\nbut for the nonce it is sufficient to state that it is obligatory for the assessee to withdraw any appeal that may be pending at his instance before being qualified to make an application to the Settlement Commission. Another condition stipulated in the same Section is that an assessee shall not be entitled to make an application \"in a case where the I.T.0. has preferred an appeal nnder sub-section (2) of section 253 against the order to which the assessee's appeal relates.\" Without meticulous dissection of the provision, we may broadly draw the conclusion that the assessce must withdraw his appeal before the Tribunal before moving the Settlement . Commission.\n\nLikewise, the I.T.O. should not have preferred an appeal. Therefore, the respondent-assessee engaged himself in complying with these conditions. He expected to achieve this objective by moving for withdrawal of his own 12 appeals before the Tribunal and by persuading the Income Tax Department to withdraw i(s 10 appeals pending before the Tribunal. At the moment, we do not discuss the finer issue of crucial significance as to whether an appeal preferred by the Revenue but later withdrawn by it would have the effect of total obliteration so as to fulfil the condition of no appeal having been preferred by the Income Tax Department. The narrative alone need be continued. On 23-8-1976 the assessee addressed a letter to the Appellate Tribunal seeking to withdraw his appeals under s. 245M of the Act. On the same day he moved Mr. Kuruvilla, Member, Central Board of Direct Taxes requesting the Board to instruct the concerned ofljcer of the Department to withdraw all the pending appeals filed by the Department before the Tribunal. The letter stated :\n\n\"Though I am sure that I shall win all these appeals filed by me with the Court of the Appellate Tribunal but just to buy peace at my old age I wanted to place myself in the hands of the Settlement Commission and seek full justice and mercy.\n\nIn view of all these facts explained above I pray for undernoted point for your kind consideration and necessary action. I shall be grateful, if you would kindly ask your Department to withdraw all the pending applications filed by the Department with the I.T.A.T.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nThe somewhat ambivalent terminology and incongruous stances taken in the letter are striking. For instance, he asserted that he was\n\n' h\n\nure to win all his appeals but still he sought mercy from the Commjssion. He put forward old age and hypertension for desisting from litigation and gratefully desired the Department to cooperate with him by withdrawing its appeals. Before knowing the open response of the Department, he addressed the Tribunal for withdrawal of his appeal which, perhaps, suggests that he was rnre of the reaction of the Department or did not loss much by withdrawing his appeals. However, when the LT.AT. posted the withdrawal application for hearing on 24th September, 1976, the assessee wrote a letter asking for adjournment wherein he stated :\n\n\"With regard to the above I beg most respectfully to submit that one petition was filed for withdrawing all the above appeals only to have those cases settled before the Settlement Commission, New Delhi but the Department had also preferred appeals for those years. Unless the Department also withdraws their appeals there will be no purpose for our withdrawal of appeals. As such my client is pursuading the Central Board of Direct Taxes to do something effectively in\n\nthe matter, but for consultations with their councils, etc., it would take a:t least two months' time.\"\n\nProbably the assessee felt that the Central Board could be persuaded \"to do something effectively in the matter\", given some time.\n\nThe anticipations of the assessec were not belied because the addressee Member of the Central Board, with celerity, consulted the Commissioner, who, in tum, sought and got affirmative reports from those below him and at the end of this rapid departmental exercise, reached the conclusion in October/November (i.e. in about a month) that the\n\nappeals of the Departments were very weak, even frivolous(') and that, therefme, nothing was lost by withdrawing them from the Tribunal. In keeping with this conclusion, the tempo was accelerated by the Board Member issuing necessary instructions to withdraw its appeals, and the C.I.T. hastened to write to the assessee-respondent in December, 1976.\n\n\"I am to inform you that the Departmontal appeals pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta against you will be withdrawn provided all the appeals filed\n\nby you for the assessment year 1962-63 to 1973-74 are with- H drawn by you.\"\n\n(l) See para 5 2 and 5.3 of the Settlement Commission's Order.\n\nA A consequential representation was made before the I.T.A.T.\n\n\"I have been directed to withdraw the above Departmental appeals on condition that the assessee's appeals for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1973-74 are also withdrawn.\" I.T.A.T. was persuaded to pass orders dismissing the appeals from both sides as withdrawn. The obvious purpose of the Department's withdrawal of its appeals was to enable the assessee to move the Settlement Commission. From the Member of the Central Board down to the I.T.0. they conveniently discovered, at this critical sfaiie late in 1976, that their appeals were weak and frivolous.\n\nThe plea of the appellant that the decision to withdraw the appeals by the Revenue was independent of the respondent's request that he be helped to move the Commission needs for its acceptance a degree of naivete which we do not possess, as we will later show.\n\nWe revert to the further factual developments to catch up with the legal questions argued before us. On the Tribunal dismissing all the appeals as withdrawn, the asscssee-respondent applied to the Settlement Commission on January 6, 1977 under s. 245C. The C01nmissi0n in its order, has recorded that as a prelude to this application :\n\n\"the Commissioner of Income Tax and the applicant had arrived at an understanding or an arrangement, mutually satisfactory and in the public interest to settle the tax liability in a forum where decisions would be conclusive and not drag on for years.\" .. _., Secret understandings between high tax officials and big assesseebusinessmen are potential pollutants and convert Settlement Commis sions into cover-ups-a consummation farthest from the Wanchoo Committee's intentions and Parliament's expectations! It is not demoralising that the heirarchy of officials in the Income Tax Department declared . their assessments and appeals 'weak' and self-condemned themselves \"! before the Commission by confessing that the Central Government's -... appeals were frivolous ? \"But if the salt hath lost its savour wherewith ,. shall it be salted?\"\n\nOnce the statutory operation for settlement was switched on, the machine moved on. The Settlement Commission, on receipt of the > application under s. 245C, acted under s. 245D(l) and called for a report from the Commissioner, mindless of the movement. of the calender.\n\nFor, the ides of March came in the meanwhile and the C.I.T., for reasons we do not know, took a stiff look at the case and reported on 1st April, 1977.\n\n\"that prosecution proceedings for concealment of income and also false verification in the return were already\n\npending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, and that he did not consider this as a fit case to be proceeded with by the Settlement Commission\".\n\nAfter some correspondence with the applicant, and without giving a hearing, the Settlement Commission by its order dated the 3rd February, 1978 informed the applicant that, as the Commissioner had objected under section 2450( 1), Settlement Commission did not allow the application to be proceeded with. \" . • Parenthetically though,· it must be stated that on the first rejection ·of the application by the Settlement Commission, the Revenue moved the I.T.A.T. for restoration of its appeals although no specific provision enables such a restoration. The assessee can apply for restoration of his appeals since s. 245M enables it.\n\nThis order of the Commission shows that some correspondence with the applicant' did take place before the order not to proceed with his composition petition. No hearing as such was given to him though, before making this adverse decision of February 3, 1978. The assessee urged that the order be reviewed as natural justice had not been complied with. The Settlement Commission yielded to this submission and, after elaborate argument and reasoning, reached the rever.s'\"- conclusion that the C.I. T's opposition to the composition notwithstanding, the application for settlement shall be considered on the merits.\n\nThe Union of India, through the C.I. T. concerned, has challenged the Settlement Commission's decision on jurisdictional and other legal grounds. The statutory scheme, the semantics of the expressions used, ,. the jurisdictional limitations of the Settlement Col!lmission and allied _ issues, have been debated at the bar and the declaration of law on these aspects has seminal significances because it relates to a sensitive area where Big Business may operate at high politico-official levels and the court mnst invigilate so that the law keeps its promises . •\n\n< This perspective of the litigation brings into focus the high points of the debate before us, largely reflected in the Tribunal's long order Sri S. T. Desai, for the appellant-Revenue concentrated his fire on three vulnerable aspects of the judgment under attack. There was no power\n\nof review for the Commission, once it had declined to proceed with the application for settlement. Therefore, he argued that the reopening of H the Settlement proceedings was invalid. Secondly, he submitted that even though the C.I. T. had withdrawn his appeals and thus facilitated\n\nthe filing of an application under s. 24SC no bar of est6ppel could at all be spelt out to forbid the Commissioner from exercising his statutory power of with-holding consent to the settlement proceedings.\n\nThirdly, he pressed the position that the C.I.T.'s veto was not subjech to review or invalida'.ion by the Settlement Conunission and so the order under appeal was bad and beyond power. Of course, subsidiary issues did crop up and Shri A. K. Sen, appearing for the respondcntassessee, not only joined issue with Shri Desai but also took a preliminary objection that Art. 136 was unavailable against an order of the\n\nSettlement Conunission. It is necessary _to mention that an argument .,,/ which was mooted at our instance as the arguments proceeded \\•iz., __}., that withdrawal by the Revenue of an appeal once filed did not have the effect of not preferring an appeal, was not pursued by the appellant before us but we are not bound by counsel pressing or cold-shouldering a point of law if attention of the advocates has been drawn thereto, as in this case it was.\n\nThe scheme of Chapter XIXA must be grasped before we embark on the discussion.\n\nThe incarnation of Chapter XIXA was in the wake of the Wanchoo Conunittee Report. The vampirish vices of black money and colossal tax evasion, both together using money power to prevent action against white-coller offender, had been a terrible menace to the health and wealth of the nation.\n\nIn particular, black money, whose constant companion was ta.x evasion, posed a challenge to the country's economy and the Wanchoo Committee was appointed to make recommendations with a view to arrest this evil. That Committee made a wealth of recommendations, but we are concerned only with Chapter 2 of the Report which, under -~ the title \"Black Money and Tax Evasion\", proposed a compromise measure of a statutory settlement machinery where the bi~ evader could make a disclosure, di•gorge what the Commission fixes and thus buy quittance for himself and accelerate recovery of taxes in arrears by the State, although less than what may be fixed after long protracted litigation and recovery proceedings. We are not concerned with the merits of the recommendation except to state that if it works according to plan, it may \"ensure that the settlement i• fair, prompt and independent'', given \"a high level machinery for admini•tering the provisions\". The risk of adverse criticism of escape by tax dodgers was adverted to by the Committee, but was silenced by the counter-argument that if the Commission was composed of officers with integrity,\n\nc.I.T. v. B. N. BHATTACHARJBB (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1145\n\nwide knowledge and experience and high status and emoluments, the A rill: was minimal. A precautionary step against possible misuse by evaders of the settlement machinery was thought of by the Wanchoo Committee which made the circumspect observation.\n\n\"However, we wish to emphasize that the Tribunal will proceed with the petition filed by a taxpayer only if the Department raises no objection to its being so entertained.\n\nWe consider that this will be a ialutary safeguard, because othel'Wise the Tribunal might become an escape route for tu evadors who have been caught and who are likely to be\n\nhea vii y penalised or prosecuted.\"\n\n('The Tribunal', in tho Wanchoo Committee Report was rechristened 'the Settlement Commission' in the Act when it was passed by Parliament).\n\nThe Commission was vested with full power to investigate cases on its jurisdiction being invoked and to quantify the amount of tax, penalty and interest that it may eventually fix as payable.\n\nA strategic provision which held out fascination for the criminal tu evaders was contained in the report.\n\nThe Wanchoo Committee recommended conferment on the Settlement Commission of a discretion to \"grant immunity from criminal prosecution in suitable cases\".\n\nThe detailed mechanics of application, investigation, consideration, bearing and disposal are contained in the report and have eventually been translated into statutory provisions in Chapter\n\nXIXA.\n\nThii legislative history leads us on to a broad unfoldment of the actual provisions of ss. 245A to 245M which constitnte a fasciculus of provisions designed for settlement of taxes in dispute. Section 245A is the definition clause even as 11. 245B is the clause constituting the Settlement Commission.\n\nApplications for settlement of cases by assessees are regulated by s. 245C which reads\n\n245C. Application far uttkment of cares.\n\n(1) An assessee may, at any stage of a: case relating to . him, make an application in such form and in such manner and containing such particulars as may be prescribed to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled and any such application shall be disposed ot in the manner hereinafter\n\nproYided.\n\n(2) ........... .\n\n(3) ........... .\n\n. 17-<409SCI/79\n\nIts meaning can be understood fully ooly when we read the definition of \"case\". According to the definition in s. 245A(a), a •case means any proceeding under the income tax law in connection with the assessment or reassessment of any person which may be pending before an income tax authority on the date of application under ection .•\n\n245C(l). It is common knowledge that I.T.A.T. is not an income tax authority, which expression, it is settled, includes the I.T.O. and A.AC. and others.\n\nTherefore, when an appeal pends before the Tribunal, it cannot be said that a case pends before an income tax authority.\n\nIn the present case, we are concerned with a stage when appeals are pending before the Tribunal. Section 245C(I) may not enable an assessee to move the Commission in such cases but for the provision in s. 245M Indeed, we are intimately coocerned with the express provisions in and implications of s. 245M which specifically deal with persons who have filed appeals to the Appellate Tribunal and seek to apply to the Settlement Commission.\n\nSub-section (6) of s. 245M is a deeming provision. Any application under s. 245M will be deemed to be an application under s. 245C( 1) and all provisions of Chapter XIXA [except s. 2450(7)] shall apply to such proceedings.\n\nThe question then arises whether and subject to what conditions can an assessee take advantage of s. 245M and move the Commission.\n\nOnly if he can validly move the Commission under s. 245M can his . application be processed under s. 245C, 2450 and other Sections of the Chapter.\n\nAn intensive examination of s. 245M(l) to (S) ud\n\n(7) thus becomes imperative.\n\nAny assessee may make an application to have his case settled, but it is one thing to make an application proceeded with.\n\nFor, on receipt of an application the Commission is not empowered automatically to proceed with it.\n\nThe mechanics of s. 2450 must be remembered in this context.\n\nThe application for settlement, when filed, shall be forwarded to the Commissioner for a report and it is only on the basis of the material contained in such report that the Settlement Commission may allow the application to be proceeded with or reject the application.\n\nTo reject an application is to refuse relief outright and affects the applicant adversely.\n\nSo it is provided \"that an application shall not be rejected unless an opportunity has been given to the applicant of being heard.\" We are clearly of the view that an applicant before the Settlement Commission is entitled to a hearing before his application for composition is rejected.\n\nIn the present case, on the facts stated earlier, the Settlement Commission in the first instance rejected the application because\n\n• •\n\nthe C.l.T objected to it. Maybe, the objection of the Commissioner has lethal potency but the rule of fairplay incorporated in the first proviso to s. 245D(l) obligates the Commission to hear the applicant before rejection.\n\nEven apart from any specific provision, it is legal fairp!ay not to hurt any party without hearing him unless the Act expressly excludes it. One may conceive pf many reasons why a hearing, even at this stage, may be useful.\n\nThe Commissioner or his representative may, in the light of the circumstances which the applicant may point out, withdraw his objection. Likewise, the applicant may point out that what appears to the Settlement Commission to be an objection by the Commission is not an objection to proceed with the application, but only a clarification of some aspect or other.\n\nNothing is lost by hearing a petitioner whose application for settlement is being rejected and much may be gained by such hearing in properly processing the application in the spirit of Chapter\n\nXIXA.\n\nAnyway, s. 245D(l) does not negate natural justice and in the absence of an express exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem,\n\ni~ is fair, indeed fundamental, that no man is prejudiced by action without opportunity to show to the contrary.\n\nWithout expounding any inflexible rule of natural justice of universal validity we cannot fault the Settlement Commission for what it has done.\n\nWe take the view that, having regard to the rulings of this Court in M. S.\n\nGill's case(') and Maneka Gandhi case(2), the Settlement Commission's decision to re-hear and pass a de nova order cannot be said to be illegal.\n\nThe Commissioner's objection to the application being proceeded with may prove fatal or may not, but without entering into that controversy we think it correct to hold that the Settlement Commissioner did not act without jurisdiction by affording a hearing and passing a fresh order in the presence of both parties.\n\nWhether that fresh order is valid or not depends on the consideration of the merits which we will presently examine.\n\nLaw leans in favour of natural justice where statutory interdict does not forbid it.\n\nTI1e question now arises as to the course of the exercise of the Settlement Commission on receipt of an application for composition.\n\nThe second proviso to s. 245D(l) is compulsive in tone and import for it mandates \"that an application shall not be proceeded with under this sub-section if the Commissioner objects to the application being proceeded with on the ground that concealment of particulars of income on the part of the applicant or perpetration of fraud by him\n\n(!) Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner [1978]1 S. C. C. 405.\n\n(2) Maneka Gandhi v. Union a/India [1978j l. S. C. C. 248.\n\nfor evading any tax. . . . . . has been established or is likely to be established by any income tax authority, in relation to the case.\" In the present case, the Commission did raise an objection on April 1, 1977 that\n\n\" .... prosecution proceedings for concealment of income and also false verification in the returns were pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and that in the circumstances he did not consider this as a fit case to be proceeded with by the Settlement Commission.\"\n\nThis objection was in the normal course neither foolish nor futile but fatal, being in functional fulfihnent of the requirements of the second proviso to s. 245D(l).\n\nIndeed, when we observe that the C. I. T. had, with full responsibility, prosecuted the assessee in a number of cases then pending for offences which attract the conditions required by the second proviso, there is little difficulty in holding that the application for settlement, having been rejected by the Commissioner, could not be proceeded with. The veto of the Commissioner was the Waterloo of the application.\n\nThe Settlement Commission, however, took the view that the Commissioner was estopped from exercising his power to object and for this reason ignored the veto of the Commissioner and proceeded to process the application in terms of sub-ss. (2) to (5) of s. 245D.\n\nThe core controversy in this appeal is as to whether the view of the Settlement Commission that the veto is unavailable for the Commissioner in view of his earlier stand in regard to the withdrawal of appeals is valid or not.\n\nAfter setting out the course of events and earlier readiness of this Department to withdraw its appeals to enable the Commission to be moved by the assessee notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal case,; and having regard to the absence of any new material, having been discovered justifying a reversal of the C.I. T's stand, the Commission took the view that the rule of estoppel forbade the appellant from objecting to the Commission's proceedings with the application of this assessee. It argued itself into that conclusion thus :\n\nIn this particular case, in view of the withdrawal of the Departmental appeals before tbe Income Tax Appellate Tri- H bunal, the Commissioner is estopped from making a report under section 245D(l) Proviso 2 to the Settlement Commission objecting to the application from being proceeded\n\nywith. The objection raised by the Co=issioner is thus invalid in law and any objection which is invalid in law, for the reason discussed earlier, is no objection under the second proviso to section 245Dtl) and the Co=ission is competent to ignore it applying the principles of law, equity and natural justice. The Settlement Commission, is therefore, entitled to proceed with the application .\n\nIn this case it is not shown before us nor it is the Department's case that between 24th December, 1976 and 7th January, 1977, the Commission had brought on record any fresh materials to come to the conclusion under which he could legitimately raise the objection under the second proviso to section 245D(l) once having entitled the assessee to make the application under s. 245M ( 1) proviso.\n\nFiling of a complaint for launching a prosecution earlier is not a relevant matter for the exercise of jurisdiction under the eecond proviso to section 245D(l) at this stage in the light of the f11cjs brought before us and elaborately discussed in the earlier paragraphs. This is a clear case in which the applicant was prevailed upon to withdraw the appeals for the additional two assessment year 1972-73 and 1973-74 where very large and substantial s_ums were involved compared to the ten assessments: from 1962-63 to 1971-72 where crOis\n\nappeals were agreed to be withdrawn by either side.\n\nOn the admission of the learned Departmental Representative himself, the Departmental appeals were frivolous and not likely to succeed on appeal.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that for a harmonious construction of the statute, in a caie falling under Section 245M the second proviso to section 245D(l) cannot be read in isolation but only in conjunction with the 1st proviso to Section 245M(l). Under Section 245D(l) the Commission has to decide lhe admission on the basis of the materials contained in the report of the Commissioner and havigg regard to the nature and circum- £tances of the case or the complexity of investigation involved therein. The entire facts of the case clearly indicate that the Revenue came t9 an understanding with the applicant to have the subsequent exercise of the power under the second proviso to Section 245D ( 1) without any fresh material is, therefore, no ground to dislodge the right of the assessee to come before the Commission.\n\nWe have earlier clarified that an I.T.A.T. is not an income-tax authority and proceedings pending before such tribunals are not cases.\n\nBut s. 245M takes care of assessees whose appeals pend before the I.T.A.T. but are anxious to square up their litigl!_tion through the Settlement Commission. A close-up of this provision is necessitous and a reading of its full range of meaning is decisive of the subject of this appeal.\n\nWe may skip ss. 245E, F and G but dwell for a moment on s. 245H which is of great moment from the angle of public interest and public morals as it immunises white collar offenders against criminal prosecutions and, in unscrupulous circumstances, becomes a uspect instrument of negotiable corruption.\n\nMore than the prospect of monetary liability and mounting penalty is the dread of traumatic prison tenancy that a tax-dodging tycoon is worried out.\n\nAnd if he can purchase freedom from criminal prosecution and incarceratory sentence he may settle with the Commission; and, towards th; s end, try to buy those who remotely control the departmental echelons whose veto or green signal closes or opens the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission and hushes or pushes the prosecutions.\n\nThus, s. 245H, which clothes the Commission with the power to grant immnnity from prosecution for 'any offence under this Act or under Che Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act. ... .' is a magnet which attracts large tax-dodgers and offers, indirectly an opportunity to the highest departmental and political authorities a suspect power to bargain.\n\nWe may now move straight on to s. 245M which we reproduce :\n\n245M. Certain persons who have filed appeals to the Appellate Tribunal entitled to make application to che Settlement Commission.-\n\n(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, any assessee who has filed an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under this Act which is pending before it shall, on withdrawing such appeal from the Appellate Tribunal, be entitled to make an application to the Settlement Commission to have his case settled under this Chapter :\n\nProvided that no such assessee shall be entitled to make an application in a case where the Income-tax Ofli- H cer has preferred an appeal under snb-section (2) of section '.253 against the order to which the assessee's appeal relates.\n\nJ,...::\n\n(2) Any assessee referred to in sub-section\n\n(1) may make an application to the Appellate Tribunal for permission to withdraw the appeal.\n\n( 3) On receipt of an application under sub-section ( 2) , the Appellate Tribunal shall grant permission to withdraw the appeal.\n\n( 4) Upon the withdrawal of the appeal, the proceeding in appeal immediately before such withdrawal shall, for the pnrposes of this Chapter, be deemed to be a\n\nproceeding pending before an Income--tax authority.\n\n(5) An application to the Settlement Commission under this section shall be made within a period o!f thirty days from the date on which the order of the Appel late Tribunal permitting the withdrawal of the appeal is communicated to the assessee.\n\n( 6) An application made to the Settlement Commission under this section shall be deemed to be an application made under sub-section ( l) of section 245C and the provisions of this Chapter (except sub-section (7) of section 245 (D) shall apply accordingly.\n\n(7) Where an application made to the Settlement Commission under this section is not entertained by the Settlement Commission, then, the assessee shall not be deemed to have withdrawn the appeal from the Appellate Tribunal and tbe provisions contained in section 253, section 254 and section 255, shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly.\n\nBriefly, the section (a) enables withdrawal of appeals before Tribunals by assessees as condition precedent to applications for composition by the Settlement Commission. (b) applies, by a legal fiction, ss. 245C and D to such applications and ( c) where the proceeding belore the Commission is not entertained, allows revival of the withdrawn appeals thns restoring the status quo ante.\n\nThis is but fair because the assessee should not suffer if the Settlement Commission bars its doors.\n\nThe facts of onr case show that the assesseei hail filed appeals be--\n\nfore the Tribunal and had later moved for their withdrawal in terms H of s. 245M(l), (2) and (3). Sub-s. (4) thereupon opened and by virtue of sub-s. ( 6) the mechanics of ss. 245C and D spraing into\n\naction. It would have been s; nooth sailing but for tho proviso to s. 245M ( 1), whlch runs thus :\n\nProvided that no such assessee shall be entitled to make an application in a case where the Income-tax Officer has preferred an appeal under sub-section (2) of section 253 against the order to which the assessee' a appeal relate.\n\nThus there is an embargo on the right of the assessee to move the Commission 'where the Income-tax Officer has preferred an appeal\n\n\\ 'A under sub s. (2) of s. 253 against the order to which the assessee's ...>-·• appeal relates'. The Revenue had preferred appeals here but later withdrawn them. Does such withdrawal amount to not having preferred an appeal at all ?\n\nThe crucial question, therefore, ii Iii to whether the liSsesilee is disentitled altogether to make an application before a Commission\n\n D because the Income Tax Officer has already preferred an appeal to the I.T.A.T. although he has subsequently withdrawn it.\n\nDoes filing the appeal ipso facto imply that the die is cast and withdrawal thereof can.no( whittle down its preventive impact? We will presently discuss this point.\n\nWe must clarify that this legal bar to the Settlement Commission's jurisdiction contained in the proviso to s. 245M was not urged by the applicant's counsel before us consistently with the stand the Department had throughout taken in this case. But law, as laid down by this F Court, transcends the facts of a given case or stances of parties or counsel.\n\nHere the Department did file appeali and later withdrew them before the application for settlement was made. the time the application before the Settlement Commission was moved no departmenlel G appeal was pending. Indeed, the documenli in this case clearly point to the assumption by the C.I.T. and the assessee that if the Revenue withdrew its appeal the disentitlement in the proviso would disappear.\n\nEven so, when an appeal is filed by the I.T.Q., does not the prolnbition operate? This turns on the meaning of the words \"preferred an appeal\". \"Preferred\" is a word of dual import : its semantics H depend on the scheme and the context; its import must help, not hamper, the object of the enactment even if liberty with language may be necessary.\n\nThere is good ground to think that an appeal means an elfective A appeal.(') appeal withdrawn is an appeal non et as judicial thinking suggests. (2- 3)\n\nBlack's Law Dictionary gives the following meaning :\n\nPREFER : To bring before; to prosecute; to try to proceed with. Thus, preferring an indictment signifies prosecuting or trying an ingictment.\n\nTo give advan.ta_ge, priority, or privilege; to select for first pay!Ilent, as to prefer one creditor over others.\n\nThus it may mean 'prosecute' or effectively pursue a proceeding or merely institute it. Purposefully interpreted, preferring an appeal\n\nmeans more than fonnally filing it but effectively pursuing it. If a party retreats before the contest begins it is as good as not having entered the fray.\n\nAfter all, Chapter XIXA is geared to promotion of settlement and creation of road-blocs in reasonable compositions.\n\nThe teleological method of interpretation leads us to the view that early withdrawal of the I.T.O's appeal removes the bar of the Proviso.\n\nThe problem that troubles us arises from s. 245M(7). , If a settle-· ment application is not entertained and is rejected in limine there is a statutory revival of the assessee's appeal before the I.T.A.T. because of the deeming provision, but what happens to the appeal of the I.T.O. which he withdraws to enable the assessee to file an application before the Commission?\n\nLiterally read, s. 245M(7) covers the revival of the assessee's appeals bnt not the I.T.O's appeals.\n\nThe inference from this omission is that no occasion arises for revival of the I.T.O's appeals because once he files an appeal no application for settlement can be made.\n\nThat is to say, the proviso to s. 245M (1) interdicts entertainmmt of a settlement application if departmental appeals are filed.\n\nThis interpretation narrows the benign amplitude of the Chapter of attracting as many big assessees with disputed claims as are ready to settle their liabilities through the Commission. There may be cases where the A.A.C. has given partial relief to the assessee and both sideg may be aggrieved. Both sides may have filed appeals.\n\nThere is no understandable ground to exclude the possibility of such cases being settled merely because the I.T.O. has, perhaps for good reasons, filed an appeal. The purpose of substituting the method of investigative negotiation, just settlement and early exigibility by a high-powered -----·\n\n(l) 31 S. T. C. 434.\n\n(2)21S.TC.154,52 I.LR. 780;\n\n(3) 1973 31 S.\"l'.C. 434.\n\nCommission for a tierup-tier of long-protracted litigation, where victory may be phyrrhic and futile, is ill-served by keeping out cases solely for !he reason that departmental appeals have been filed. To truncate the operation of the salutary provisions of Chapter XIXA more substantial reasons must be present.\n\nOf course, if no alternative interpretation is possible, it is not for the court to explore the intendment of the legislation beyond the language in which the Section is couched. ../\n\n, However, there is an alternative meaning which reconciles the \\ ' rationale of settlement with the embargo of the Proviso. If we react.->--' c into the words \"prefer an appeal\" the sense of effectively prosecuting an appeal, then mere institution followed by withdrawal will cancel the effect result in non-prosecution and obliteration of the appeal, which is the same as not preferring an appeal. The meaning of \"prefer\" as given in the Black's law Dictionry supports this construction.\n\nAmong available semantic options law prefers that which furthers the D statutory objective.\n\nThe posble obstacle in adopting this interpretation is that while the assesee's appeal gets revived when the Commission rejects an application, the I.T.O.'s appeal is not resuscitated under s. 245M(7).\n\nEven this is more imaginery than real and depends on over-emphasis on verbalism. After all, the clause we have to decode is \"the assessee\n\nshall not te deemed to hav!' withdrawn the appeal from the appellate tribunal\".\n\nThe obvious object of this clause is to restore the parties to status quo ante, and in fairness, must apply to the Department as to the assessee.\n\nThis non-discriminatory import can be reasonably read into the clause if we construe the expression the \"assessee\" in a wider way so as to include all parties affected by the subject matter of the assessment.\n\nIn that case, the clause may m!'an that no one who is aggrieved by the assessment shall \"be deemed to have withdrawn the appeal from the appellate tribunal.\" An equitable and purposeoriented construction of the clause means that the assessee will be put back in the same position vis-a-vis his appeals and if, to facilitate\n\nhis moving the Commission, the l.T.O. has withdrawn the departmental appeals, the Commission's rejection of the application shall not Prejudice the Revenue.\n\nActus curie neminem gravabit is the principle of wider import and is a tool of construction too. This perhaps may be making up for a lacuna by a restructuring of the clause so at to work out justice to the Department.\n\nThe scheme of s. 253 ( 4) contemplates filing of memorandum of cross objections by the I.T.O. on receipt of notice of an appeal by the assessee.\n\nSo much so, it is\n\nalso possible, alternatively, to read into s. 24SM(7) the right of the Department to file an appeal de nova on receipt of notice of the revival of the assessee's appeal, within the period specified ins. 253(4). This does not do violence to the language of s. 24SM(7) and affords equitable relief to the Department by enabling it to bring its appeal back to life notwithstanding the earlier withdrawal, when the assessee's appeal reincarnates under s. 24SM(7) .\n\nWe ore mindful that a strictly grammatical construction is depart-\n\n,, I ed from in this process and a mi\\dly legislative flavour is imparted by • ·~ this interpretation. The judicial process does not stand helpless with folded hands but engineers its way to discern meaning when :t new construction with a view 10 rationalisation is needed.\n\nLord Deuning, C in his recent book \"The Discipline of Law\"(') made a seminal observation on \"Ironing out !.he creases\" by quoting a passage from Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher(').\n\n• •\n\n\"Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity.\n\nThe English language is not an mstrument of\n\nmalbetical precision.\n\nOnr literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised.\n\nA judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he J!lust look to the language and n9thing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draf(l; man.\n\nHe must set to work orr the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which give rise to it, and of the mischif which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the inte_ntion of the legislature.\n\nThat was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon's case, and it is the afest guide today.\n\nGood practical advice on the subject was given about the same time\n\n(1) p. 12.\n\n(2\\ (1949) 2 K. B. 481.\n\nby Plowden .... Pnt into homely metaphor it is this : A judge should ask himself the qnestion : If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done.\n\nA judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.\" • The upshot of the discussion is to hold that if the Department , files an appeal which it drops to enable an application before the \\ ' Commission, then the Proviso to s. 245M ( 1) does not debar the.>\"- • motion for settlement.\n\nThe preliminary objection raised by Shri A. K. Sen need not detain use because we are satisfied that the amplitude of Art. 136 is wide enough to bring within the jurisdiction orders passed by the Settlement Commission.\n\nAny judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any case or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal, comes within the correctional cognizance and review power of Art. 136.\n\nThe short question, then, is whether the Settlement Commission cannot come within the category of \"Tribunals\".\n\nTo clinch the issue, s. 245L declares all proceedings before the Settlement Commission to be judicial proceedings.\n\nWe have hardly any doubt that it is a tribunal.\n\nIts powers are considerable; its determination affects the rights of parties; its obligations are quasi-judicial; the orders it makes at every stage have tremendous impact on the rights and liabilities of parties.\n\nWhen a body is created by statute and clothed with authority to determine rights and duties of parties and to impose pains and penalties on them it satisfies the test laid down in Associated Cement Co. case(').\n\nA Constitutional Bench of this Court in that case has indicated the quintessential test in this regard and we need only extract a portion of the head-note relevant to this aspect :\n\n\"In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a tribunal under the article, the consideration about the presence of all or some of !be trappings of a court is really not decisive.\n\nThe presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possessed the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The main and basic test, however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been\n\n(I) Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma & Anr. [196512 S. C.R. 366\n\nconferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function.\"(')\n\nThe expanding jurisprudence of administrative tribunals to which some eminent judges, cradled in Dicean concepts in the early days of English law, has come to stay whether we call it the new despotism or the pragmatic instrumentality of dispensing justice untram- • melled by the complexities and mystiques which are part of the , processual heredity of courts.\n\nThe Franks Committee rightly :-../,,:aid : (2)\n\n,..\n\n- \"Reflection on the general social and economic changes of recent decades convinces us that tribunals as a system for adjudication have come to stay.\"\n\n\"The advantage which tribunals had over courts\" states Seervai in his classic work ou the Constitution of India \"lay in cheapness, accessibility, freedom from technicality expedition and expert knowledge of their particular subject.\"(') A casual perusal of Chapter XIXA convinces the discerning eye that the Settlement Commission exercises many powers which affect, for good or otherwise, the rights of the parties before it and vests in it powers to grant immunity from prosecution and penalty, to investigate into many matters and to enjoy conclusiveness regarding its orders or settlement. In short, Settlement Commissions are Tribunals.\n\nThe preliminary point fails and we proceed to consider the triple substantial questions set out earlier.\n\nThe two gut issues that must now engage us take us to the turn of events surrounding the withdrawal of appeals by both sides.\n\nTo complete the story-and this fact has a bearing on one of the legal , questions-it must be stated that wheh the Settlement Commission ·,.-first acted under the Second Proviso to s. 245D(l), the Department, eV\\ln like the assessees, appled to the I.T.A.T. for revival of its appeals although s. 245M(7) does not make any such provision for revival of the LT.O's appeals.\n\nIn ordinary circumstances the 2nd Proviso to s. 245D ( 1) is easy of construction and the exercise is also simple.\n\nThe assessee applies to the Commission, thereupon the Commission shall call for a report from the Commissioner. The Commissioner may object to the appli-\n\n( 1) Ibid. p. 366\n\n(2) Franks!Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries p. 8\n\n(3) Franks Committee Report, p. 9, quoted by Seervai inhis Constitutional Law of India p. 1226.\n\nA cation being proceeded with on the grounds specified in the second Proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 245D. If he so objects the application \"shall not be proceeded with\". This is express, explicit and mandatory.\n\nWhere an application is allowed to be proceeded with under subs. (1), the Settlement Commission may call for the relevant records\n\n8 from the Commissioner and hold further enquiry.\n\nThus, the Commission's power to proceed with the application can be paralysed by the Commissioner objecting to the application being proceeded with.\n\nIn our case the Commission called for a report from the Commissioner and the Commissioner objected to the application being proceeded with , ' whereupon the Commission declined to proceed with the application._..}.-,, C But on the assessee's motion for review of that order which was passed without hearing him, fresh consideration after hearing both sides followed and the Commission decided to proceed with the application holding that the Commissioner was estopped from objecting. The crucial question is whether the Commissioner's statutory power to object to the Settlement proceedings on the gronnd of the presence D of grave deviances mentioned in Proviso 2 to s. 245D(l) can be nullified by the doctrine of estoppel and if it can be whether there are grounds to hold that a iXea of estoppel is sustainable in the circumstances.\n\nWe must realise that the CommiSsioner has a dnty to the public Revenue and, more importantly, a duty to object to any E assessee who is prima facie guilty of grave criminal conduct in the shape of concealment of income or perpetration of fraud getting away with it by invoking Chapter XIXA. The Wanchoo Committee was mindful of the benefits of a policy of collection of tax without protracted litigation through the machinery of the Settlement Commission F but the potential for escape by the big whales of economic crime by resort to the Settlement Commission engaged the Committee conscience. So it expressed the view that it was \"of paramount importance that only persons who are known for their integrity and high sense of ' justice and fairness are selected for appointment on the Tribunal (Settlement Commission).\n\nThis was a pious wish and the Committee G went further to guard against fraud and to uphold the paramount principles, more important than physical gains and losses, of economic offenders being punished by arming the Commissio'ner with the right to object to the very entertainment of the application. \"We consider that this will be a salutary safeguard, because otherwise the Tribunal (Settlement Commission) might become an escape route for tax H evaders who have been caught and who are likely to be heavily penalised or prosecuted.\" The gravity of this public policy cannot be undermined by interpretative softness of Second Proviso to\n\ns. 245D(l). To whittle down the imperative nature of this veto power is to undo the expectations of the Wanchoo Committee and amonnts to stultify the rule of law an integral part of which is that the law shall not let the greater felon loose. Can the rule of estoppet override a statutory mandate of a prohibitory character calculated to inhibit/escapt from the coils of the law crime?\n\nr Moreover, we to have to examine, assuming the application of the ' rule of estoppel, where the basics of that rule of a clear representation having been made by A to B and th~ latter on the face of representa tion acting to his detriment can be spun out of the_ circumstances be fore w.\n\nNow we come to the meat of the matter-the plea of esfoppel or -• its variants.\n\nThe C.I.T.'s objection to the jurisdiction of the. Com mission to proceed with the matter has been shot down by the artillery of estoppel.\n\nThe order under appeal proceeds to hold that a conspectus of the circumstances of the case compels the conclnsion that an understandin: had been reached between the assessee and the C.I.T., evidenced by mutual withdrawal of their respective appeals before the I.T.A.T., that the Co=ission would be permitted to explore a settlement; and so, the statutory veto available to the C.I.T. to interdict the enquiry by the Commission could not be exercised because he was estopped. from so doing, resiling from his earlier stand.\n\nThe argument has a; n attractive veneer or cosmetic charm but law is moce than skin-deep and courts peep beneath to see the principle of ...- cqcity and justice thereby promo_t_ed.\n\nWhat, in essence, is estoppel? Estoppel is a rule of equity which forbids truth being pleaded or representation, on which faith another has acted to his deteriment, being retracted. Even extending the rule i'nto the new-fangled empire of promissory estoppel, it cannot go . beyond the limits of the Law Revision Committee in England which Lord Denning allowed to blossom in the High Trees care.(')\n\n\"We therefore recommend that a promise which the pro miser knows, or reasonably should !mow, will be relied upon\n\n by the promisee; shall be enforceable if the promisee bas G altered his position to his detriment in reliance oil the promise.\"\n\nThe soul of estoppel is equity, not facility for inequity. Nor is estoppel against statute permissible because public policy animating a c\n\nstatntory provision may then become the casualty. Halsbury has H noted this sensible nic_ety.\n\n(1) [1947) l KB 130-also see \"Discipline of Law\" by Lord Denning, p. 202.\n\n\"Where a statute, enacted for the benefit of a section of the public, imposes a duty of a positive kind, the person charged with the performance of the duty cannot by estoppel be prevented from exercising his statutory powers.\"(')\n\n\"A petitioner in a divorce suit cannot obtain relief simply because the respondent is estopped from denying the charges, as the court has a statutory duty to inquire into the truth of a petition.\"(2)\n\n• ' The luminous footnote cites rulihgs and states that\n\n\"This rule probably also applies where the statute bestows a discretion rather than imposing a duty.\"(•)\n\n.. ~\n\nTo sum up, where public duties cast by statute are involved, private parties cannot prevent performance by invoking estoppel.\n\nWe do not discuss further since the facts here exclude estoppel.\n\nIn the present statutory situation s. 245D by the 2nd Proviso, casts a public duty on the Commission of Income Tax to consider, in the light of the case made out in the assessee'~ application, whether\n\n\"concealment of particulars of income on the part of the applicant or perpetration of fraud by him for evading any ta\"t or othr sum chargeable or imposable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under this Act, has been established or is likely to be established by any Income-tax authority, in relation to the case\", md exercise his veto power to prevent escape of macro-criminals prima facie guilty of grave economic crimes.\n\nHe cannot bargain over this interdict in advance or barter away a legal mandate in anticipation.\n\nHe may permit or even assist the filing of a conciliation motion by the assessee but when the Commission intimates him under s. 245D r.._\n\n(1) he shall, with statutory seriousness, exercise his discretion.\n\nHe -. cannot enter into a 'deal' over this power without betraying the statu- \" tory trust. We cannot therefore accept the plea that the Commissioner of Income Tax, by conduct and 'understandings' has 'irredeemably mortgaged' his statutory duty to object, if the case deserves such objection.\n\nEstoppel then is both odious and ominous and discretion the door to corruption.\n\nEven otherwise, there must be an active representation proceeding from the functionary sought to be muzzled by estoppel. and the\n\n(1) Maritime E/ec. Co Ltd. v. General Diaries Ltd.[19371AC610 and Halsburys Laws of England para 1515.\n\n(2) Hudson v. Hudson (19481 p. 292 and Halsburys Law of England para 1515.\n\n(3) Halsbury, 4th Edn. p. 1019. ,\n\n: ' '\n\nC.I.T .. v. B. N. BHATTAGHARJEE (Krishna Iyer,!.) 1161\n\npleading., party must have actedto his detriment on the faith of the said representation or futuristic promise.\n\nHere; the ·. C.I. T. made no representation to the assessee.. He merely yielded to the latter's persuasion; Nor did the assessee act on any representation of the\n\nC.I.T.\n\nThe withdrawal of his appeal was not because of or induced by the C.I.T.\n\nThe Commissioner never asked him to withdraw his appeals but when asked by the assessee to withdraw the departmental appeals did so on condition that the other also withdrew his appeals,\n\nGranting that the C.I.T. did facilitate the motion before the Commis- ,, j sion, it did not mean that the assessee did anyhing. to his detriment. .. --..c..._ Moreover, there was and could not be any repentation or even 'negotiation, (except illicit) regarding the exercise of the statutory function under the 2nd Proviso in advance of the filing of the application for settlement.\n\nEven on grounds of public policy, it will be lending legal colour to hushing up prosecutions of high-placed offenders by an unjust extension of the rule of estoppel.\n\nBargaining between tax authorities and big assessees over criminal prosecution~ and the like is beset with corrupt potential that a court of conscienct1 cannot succumb to such a rule of estoppel.\n\nApart from the jural untenability of the contention let us see if the factual matrix supports the claim. A close look at the foundational facts will reveal the fallacy of the plea of estoppel.\n\nIs mere 'understanding' or ambiguous conduct the stuff of W°'hich the fabric of estoppel is made? We find the case of the respondent a rope of sand, a route to fraud., a permit for non-performance of public duties.\n\nThe assessee takes the initiative and beseeches the Income Tax Department to help him, move the Settlement Commission by withdrawing its appeals. The story, wheI!. unfurled, shows how the assessee acted on his own independently of the Department, never had any blanket assurance from the .fatter about non-objection to the later stages of the application whatever be the guilt of the assessee vis-a-vis the 2nd.proviso to s. 2450(1), defeating the statutory efficacy of the provision.\n\nIt all begins chronologically with the assessee--respondent representing to I.T, A.T. on 23-8•1976, the following:\n\nRe: I. T. appeals in the name of Sri B. N. Bhattacharjee for the Asst. years 1962-63, 63-64, 64-65, 65-66, 66-67,\n\n67\"68; 68-69, 69-70, 70-71, 71-12, 72-73 and 73-74 l8-409SC1179 .\n\nSub: Prayer u/s 245M of the LT. Act, 1961 for withdrawal of appeals.\n\nWith regard to the above I beg to submit that all the above appeals I have filed on 12-9'-75 but now I like to have my cases settled by the settlement Commission and as such I may kindly be allowed to withdraw all the above twelve appeals u/s 245M of the I.T. Act, 1961.\n\nThe matter is very much urgent and the settlement petition is to be filed within a day or two before the Settlement Commission, New Delhi. ,,\n\nPray that an early order of the appellate Tribunal permitting the~ withdrawal of all the above appeals may kindly be issued to me and for this act of kindless I shall ever pray.\n\nDt. 23-8-76.\n\nsd. S. N. Manda!\n\nD At this time the Department had done nothing to induce him to withdraw his appeals or move the Commission to that effect.\n\nIt was a unilateral act of his and if the I.T.A.T. allowed him to withdraw, that was rwt because of the C.I.T's conduct but the compulsion of s. 245M(3). If at all, the assessee was chasing the Department and\n\nfalling at its feet seeking mercy and praying for withdrawal of its E appeals as is evident from Annexure E which runs thus:\n\nDear Sir.\n\nI have instructed my counsel to withdraw all my Tribunal appeals to e'nable me to file petition before the Settlement Commission stop 1 seek your mercy and sympathy by withdrawing APPEAL FILE by the Department so that I can file my Settlement Petition here for settlement stop I assure you my full co-operation and I want settlement bonafide and I am acting in good faith stop I pray for your kind consideration and cooperation stop\n\n25-5-76.\n\nEsteem Regards B. Bhattacharjee Camp : New Delhi\n\nHow can this craven attitude be converted into a conduct induced by the Department detrimental to the assessee's interest?\n\nEven the H latter letter to Shri Kuruvilla, Member Central, Board of Direct Taxes is plaintive and supplicative and not indicative of any representation by the Department to the assessee leading to the latter's action to his\n\n• ..\n\nown prejudice.\n\nIn fact, Annexure F dated September 10, 1976 winds up:\n\n\"1. I shall be grateful, if you would kindly ask your department to withdraw all the pending appeals filed by the Department with I. T.A. T.\n\nLastly if the Department find any technical difficulties I am prepared to swear my affidavit to protect the interests of the department.\n\nI assure you my full cooperation with the department in arriving at a reasonable settlement of the cases.\n\nI am writing this in a good faith.\n\nI am enclosing herewith the photostat copies of the correspondences for your kind and benign consideration.\"\n\nWe have earlier recounted the further developments and all that has happened is a communication from the C.I.T. to the assessee dated December 16, 1976 which is cryptic in tenns:\n\n\"I am to inform you that the departmental appeals D pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta against you will be withdrawn provided all the appeals filed by you for the assessment year 1962-63 to 1973-74 are withdrawn by you.\"\n\nIt is incredible that the tone, sequence and the context and pouring subjective wine into the vessel of words used, the Commission should interpret this communication to reflect an understanding of wocds a representation by the department to the assessee to do a thing to bis prejudice whereupon he acted that way laying the basis for a plea of estoppel.\n\nFar from the Revenue making any poiitive representation to the assessee it was a case of concession shown to him to try his chance before the Commission.\n\nThis is clear from the asso;- see's petition to the Tribunal dated 17-12-76 wherein he states-\n\n\" ..... now the learned C.I.T., Central, Calcutta has very kindly agreed to withdraw their Departmental appeals for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1971-72 on condition that your petitioner would also withdraw all the appeals for 1962-63 to 73-74 assessments.\"\n\nIt is true that the C.I.T. withdrew the appeals of the Department, but it is not true that he made any representations to the assessee to act in a particular manner with a promise of doing something to his advantage leading to the assessee in turn acting to his own prejudice by withdrawing his appeals. His withdrawal of the appeals was in-\n\nSUPJ!.EME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R..\n\ndependently decided upon by him so that he could move the Commission. Thereafter he moved the Department to withdraw its appeals so as to entitle him to make an application to the Commission.\n\nThe order of the I.T.A.T. dated 24-12-76 makes it clear that it granted permission to withdraw appeals because:\n\n\"The learned departmental representative Shri Narayanan also had no objection to permission being granted for withdr(lwal of the appeal.\"\n\nWe need not overload this judgment with more extracts from ,.• letters and petitions because it is abundantly clear that the basics of \\ equitable estoppel are blissfully absent and the canons that govern the ,.>-~\" application of the principle contradict its extension to a situation like c\n\nthe present. We, therefore, overrule the plea of estoppel which has found favour with the Commission and hold that the objection raised by the C.I.T. is a potent interdict on the jurisdiction of the commission.\n\nD It is not inappropriate to state that the policy of the law as disclosed in ChaEter XIXA is not to provide a rescue shelter for big tax-dodgers who indulge in criminal activities by approaching the Settlement Commission.\n\nThe Settlement Commission will certainly take due note of the gravity of economic offences on the wealth of the nation E which the W anchoo Committee had emphasised and will exercise its power of immunisation against criminal prosecutions by using its power only sparingly and in deserving cases; otherwise such orders may become vulnerable if properly challenged.\n\nThus, a holistic perspective in the correct statutory setting makes the conclusion irresistible that the appeal must be allowed, that the F Settlement Commission should be inhibited from proceeding with the application of the assessee and the appeals by the assessee before the I.T.A.T. must be revived and disposed of expeditiously.\n\nThe departmental appeals, having been admitted by the C.I.T. himself to be very weak and frivolous, should not be revived as it will be ouly a waste of IG public time and public money.\n\nThe appeals are allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 190, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL) CALCUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL) CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nB. N. BHATTACHARJEE & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. N. BHATTACHARJEE & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 245A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "S.245M(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 969, "end_char": 975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax\n\nAct, 1961", "statute": "Tax\n\nAct, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax E Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1180, "end_char": 1211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The resuondent and the department both appealed to the Income Tax E Appellate Tribunal, the former filing 12 appeals and the latter 10 appeal~.\n\nThe respondent moved the Settlement Commission for composition under s. 245M.\n\nThe assessee withdrew his appeals and the revenue deciar'ed their asse&Sments and appeal!! '"}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1339, "end_char": 1346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax\n\nAct, 1961", "statute": "Tax\n\nAct, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1532, "end_char": 1539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1552, "end_char": 1559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2041, "end_char": 2048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2450(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3390, "end_char": 3397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4376, "end_char": 4389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "implementation of the Wanchoo Committee Report, provides for settlement of ' huge tax disputes _and immunity from criminal proceedings by a Commission\nL~\n\nto be constituted by the Central Government when approached without objection from the Tax Department. ["}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4916, "end_char": 4923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6113, "end_char": 6123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6795, "end_char": 6804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2450(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7022, "end_char": 7032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245H", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7714, "end_char": 7726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245H", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8379, "end_char": 8386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8497, "end_char": 8562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act", "statute": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act"}}, {"text": "Section 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9092, "end_char": 9104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act", "statute": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9457, "end_char": 9463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act", "statute": "Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 253(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11677, "end_char": 11686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11865, "end_char": 11871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12084, "end_char": 12094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12273, "end_char": 12280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245L", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12959, "end_char": 12971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 266", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13191, "end_char": 13207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13614, "end_char": 13624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13894, "end_char": 13906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14238, "end_char": 14265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 245D(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14755, "end_char": 14765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16647, "end_char": 16675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1164 E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desaz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16872, "end_char": 16883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desaz, J. Ramamurthi and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appel- . ,", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desaz"}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16885, "end_char": 16898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desaz, J. Ramamurthi and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appel- . ,"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16908, "end_char": 16921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desaz, J. Ramamurthi and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appel- . ,"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16949, "end_char": 16958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Dinesh Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16960, "end_char": 16971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Manuia/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16973, "end_char": 16980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16982, "end_char": 16994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. R. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16996, "end_char": 17007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nMudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17009, "end_char": 17019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. Munda/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17025, "end_char": 17034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ~- .~· A. K. Sen, Dinesh Vyas, Manuia/, P. H. Parekh, C. R. Singh, M.\n\nMudgal, and N. Munda/ for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17105, "end_char": 17117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. A nascent Chapter (Chapter XIXA) in the Income Tax Act, 1961, enacted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, whose beneficiaries are ordinarily those whose tax liability is astronomical and criminal culpability perilous, falls for decoding by this Court in this appeal by the C.I.T.(') (Central), Calcutta, against an adverse order made by the Settlement Commission."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17162, "end_char": 17182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19966, "end_char": 19972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (I.T.A.T.)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20585, "end_char": 20625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the dissatisfied assessee and the partially injured Department appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (I.T.A.T.) against the A.A.C's decisions."}}, {"text": "A.A.C", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20638, "end_char": 20643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the dissatisfied assessee and the partially injured Department appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (I.T.A.T.) against the A.A.C's decisions."}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21630, "end_char": 21637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22137, "end_char": 22148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.T.O.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22412, "end_char": 22418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise, the I.T.O. should not have preferred an appeal."}}, {"text": "s 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22706, "end_char": 22710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23-8-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23077, "end_char": 23086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23-8-1976 the assessee addressed a letter to the Appellate Tribunal seeking to withdraw his appeals under s. 245M of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23183, "end_char": 23190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kuruvilla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23232, "end_char": 23241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day he moved Mr. Kuruvilla, Member, Central Board of Direct Taxes requesting the Board to instruct the concerned ofljcer of the Department to withdraw all the pending appeals filed by the Department before the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "24th September, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24660, "end_char": 24680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "posted the withdrawal application for hearing on 24th September, 1976, the assessee wrote a letter asking for adjournment wherein he stated :\n\n\"With regard to the above I beg most respectfully to submit that one petition was filed for withdrawing all the above appeals only to have those cases settled before the Settlement Commission, New Delhi but the Department had also preferred appeals for those years."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24947, "end_char": 24956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "posted the withdrawal application for hearing on 24th September, 1976, the assessee wrote a letter asking for adjournment wherein he stated :\n\n\"With regard to the above I beg most respectfully to submit that one petition was filed for withdrawing all the above appeals only to have those cases settled before the Settlement Commission, New Delhi but the Department had also preferred appeals for those years."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26225, "end_char": 26264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"I am to inform you that the Departmontal appeals pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta against you will be withdrawn provided all the appeals filed\n\nby you for the assessment year 1962-63 to 1973-74 are with- H drawn by you.\""}}, {"text": "I.T.A.T.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26522, "end_char": 26530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A A consequential representation was made before the I.T.A.T.\n\n\"I have been directed to withdraw the above Departmental appeals on condition that the assessee's appeals for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1973-74 are also withdrawn.\""}}, {"text": "January 6, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27575, "end_char": 27590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the Tribunal dismissing all the appeals as withdrawn, the asscssee-respondent applied to the Settlement Commission on January 6, 1977 under s. 245C. The C01nmissi0n in its order, has recorded that as a prelude to this application :\n\n\"the Commissioner of Income Tax and the applicant had arrived at an understanding or an arrangement, mutually satisfactory and in the public interest to settle the tax liability in a forum where decisions would be conclusive and not drag on for years.\" .. _.,"}}, {"text": "s. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27597, "end_char": 27604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28171, "end_char": 28181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secret understandings between high tax officials and big assesseebusinessmen are potential pollutants and convert Settlement Commis sions into cover-ups-a consummation farthest from the Wanchoo Committee's intentions and Parliament's expectations!"}}, {"text": "s. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28680, "end_char": 28687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28701, "end_char": 28711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.I.T.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28856, "end_char": 28862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For, the ides of March came in the meanwhile and the C.I.T., for reasons we do not know, took a stiff look at the case and reported on 1st April, 1977."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28938, "end_char": 28953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For, the ides of March came in the meanwhile and the C.I.T., for reasons we do not know, took a stiff look at the case and reported on 1st April, 1977."}}, {"text": "3rd February, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29344, "end_char": 29362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence with the applicant, and without giving a hearing, the Settlement Commission by its order dated the 3rd February, 1978 informed the applicant that, as the Commissioner had objected under section 2450( 1), Settlement Commission did not allow the application to be proceeded with. \" . •"}}, {"text": "section 2450( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29431, "end_char": 29447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29831, "end_char": 29838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 3, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30093, "end_char": 30109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No hearing as such was given to him though, before making this adverse decision of February 3, 1978."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30472, "end_char": 30486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India, through the C.I. T. concerned, has challenged the Settlement Commission's decision on jurisdictional and other legal grounds."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31180, "end_char": 31191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "< This perspective of the litigation brings into focus the high points of the debate before us, largely reflected in the Tribunal's long order Sri S. T. Desai, for the appellant-Revenue concentrated his fire on three vulnerable aspects of the judgment under attack.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desaz"}}, {"text": "s. 24S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31638, "end_char": 31644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32045, "end_char": 32054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, subsidiary issues did crop up and Shri A. K. Sen, appearing for the respondcntassessee, not only joined issue with Shri Desai but also took a preliminary objection that Art.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32126, "end_char": 32131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, subsidiary issues did crop up and Shri A. K. Sen, appearing for the respondcntassessee, not only joined issue with Shri Desai but also took a preliminary objection that Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32175, "end_char": 32183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 245A to 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35774, "end_char": 35790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35880, "end_char": 35892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36057, "end_char": 36064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245A(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36593, "end_char": 36603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.T.A.T.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36856, "end_char": 36864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common knowledge that I.T.A.T. is not an income tax authority, which expression, it is settled, includes the I.T.O. and A.AC."}}, {"text": "A.AC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36954, "end_char": 36958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common knowledge that I.T.A.T. is not an income tax authority, which expression, it is settled, includes the I.T.O. and A.AC."}}, {"text": "Section 245C(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37192, "end_char": 37207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37297, "end_char": 37304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37392, "end_char": 37399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37554, "end_char": 37561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37608, "end_char": 37615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245C( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37658, "end_char": 37669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2450(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37713, "end_char": 37723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37857, "end_char": 37864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37940, "end_char": 37947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245C, 2450", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37989, "end_char": 38002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38067, "end_char": 38077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2450", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38360, "end_char": 38367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39341, "end_char": 39351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40216, "end_char": 40226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. S.\n\nGill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40667, "end_char": 40678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We take the view that, having regard to the rulings of this Court in M. S.\n\nGill's case(') and Maneka Gandhi case(2), the Settlement Commission's decision to re-hear and pass a de nova order cannot be said to be illegal."}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40693, "end_char": 40706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We take the view that, having regard to the rulings of this Court in M. S.\n\nGill's case(') and Maneka Gandhi case(2), the Settlement Commission's decision to re-hear and pass a de nova order cannot be said to be illegal."}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41497, "end_char": 41507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42153, "end_char": 42166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the Commission did raise an objection on April 1, 1977 that\n\n\" .... prosecution proceedings for concealment of income and also false verification in the returns were pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and that in the circumstances he did not consider this as a fit case to be proceeded with by the Settlement Commission.\""}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42603, "end_char": 42613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43287, "end_char": 43294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44245, "end_char": 44260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44542, "end_char": 44554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44831, "end_char": 44850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case it is not shown before us nor it is the Department's case that between 24th December, 1976 and 7th January, 1977, the Commission had brought on record any fresh materials to come to the conclusion under which he could legitimately raise the objection under the second proviso to section 245D(l) once having entitled the assessee to make the application under s. 245M ( 1) proviso."}}, {"text": "7th January, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44855, "end_char": 44872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case it is not shown before us nor it is the Department's case that between 24th December, 1976 and 7th January, 1977, the Commission had brought on record any fresh materials to come to the conclusion under which he could legitimately raise the objection under the second proviso to section 245D(l) once having entitled the assessee to make the application under s. 245M ( 1) proviso."}}, {"text": "section 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45039, "end_char": 45054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45119, "end_char": 45126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45286, "end_char": 45301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45992, "end_char": 46004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46027, "end_char": 46042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245M(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46119, "end_char": 46134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46142, "end_char": 46157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46572, "end_char": 46584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46852, "end_char": 46859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 245E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47149, "end_char": 47157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245H", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47193, "end_char": 47200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245H", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47930, "end_char": 47937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act or under Che Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48046, "end_char": 48111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48317, "end_char": 48324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or under Che Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act", "statute": "Act or under Che Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49930, "end_char": 49942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50005, "end_char": 50016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50302, "end_char": 50313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50315, "end_char": 50326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 255", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50331, "end_char": 50342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50592, "end_char": 50600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51023, "end_char": 51033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 245C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51122, "end_char": 51130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51218, "end_char": 51225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51411, "end_char": 51422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51639, "end_char": 51645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52387, "end_char": 52394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.I.T.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52924, "end_char": 52930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the documenli in this case clearly point to the assumption by the C.I.T. and the assessee that if the Revenue withdrew its appeal the disentitlement in the proviso would disappear."}}, {"text": "I.T.Q.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53080, "end_char": 53086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, when an appeal is filed by the I.T.Q., does not the prolnbition operate?"}}, {"text": "Black", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53541, "end_char": 53546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2- 3)\n\nBlack's Law Dictionary gives the following meaning :\n\nPREFER : To bring before; to prosecute; to try to proceed with."}}, {"text": "s. 245M(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54445, "end_char": 54455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54793, "end_char": 54803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55081, "end_char": 55088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.A.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55396, "end_char": 55402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There may be cases where the A.A.C. has given partial relief to the assessee and both sideg may be aggrieved."}}, {"text": "s. 245M(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57159, "end_char": 57169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58465, "end_char": 58471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58659, "end_char": 58665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58872, "end_char": 58878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59064, "end_char": 59070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deuning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59426, "end_char": 59433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Deuning, C in his recent book \"The Discipline of Law\"(') made a seminal observation on \"Ironing out !"}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60988, "end_char": 60994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon's case, and it is the afest guide today."}}, {"text": "Plowden", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61145, "end_char": 61152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Plowden .... Pnt into homely metaphor it is this : A judge should ask himself the qnestion : If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out?"}}, {"text": "s. 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61678, "end_char": 61685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61858, "end_char": 61866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62139, "end_char": 62147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 245L", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62283, "end_char": 62290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Associated Cement Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 62822, "end_char": 62843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a body is created by statute and clothed with authority to determine rights and duties of parties and to impose pains and penalties on them it satisfies the test laid down in Associated Cement Co. case(')."}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64433, "end_char": 64440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The advantage which tribunals had over courts\" states Seervai in his classic work ou the Constitution of India \"lay in cheapness, accessibility, freedom from technicality expedition and expert knowledge of their particular subject.\"(')"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64468, "end_char": 64489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65433, "end_char": 65443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 245M(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65546, "end_char": 65556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65671, "end_char": 65678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66176, "end_char": 66183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67291, "end_char": 67301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 245D(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68921, "end_char": 68931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70849, "end_char": 70856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "beyond the limits of the Law Revision Committee in England which Lord Denning allowed to blossom in the High Trees care.(')"}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70868, "end_char": 70875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "beyond the limits of the Law Revision Committee in England which Lord Denning allowed to blossom in the High Trees care.(')"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71357, "end_char": 71365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Halsbury has H noted this sensible nic_ety.", "canonical_name": "Halsbury"}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72307, "end_char": 72314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72640, "end_char": 72667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 245D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73141, "end_char": 73148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73912, "end_char": 73920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Halsbury, 4th Edn.", "canonical_name": "Halsbury"}}, {"text": "s. 2450(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76131, "end_char": 76141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. N. Bhattacharjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 76348, "end_char": 76367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It all begins chronologically with the assessee--respondent representing to I.T, A.T. on 23-8•1976, the following:\n\nRe: I. T. appeals in the name of Sri B. N. Bhattacharjee for the Asst."}}, {"text": "s 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76507, "end_char": 76513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 245M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76804, "end_char": 76810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Settlement Commission, New Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 76940, "end_char": 76972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter is very much urgent and the settlement petition is to be filed within a day or two before the Settlement Commission, New Delhi. ,,"}}, {"text": "23-8-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77161, "end_char": 77168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23-8-76."}}, {"text": "S. N. Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77175, "end_char": 77186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Manda!"}}, {"text": "s. 245M(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77456, "end_char": 77466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25-5-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78095, "end_char": 78102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have instructed my counsel to withdraw all my Tribunal appeals to e'nable me to file petition before the Settlement Commission stop 1 seek your mercy and sympathy by withdrawing APPEAL FILE by the Department so that I can file my Settlement Petition here for settlement stop I assure you my full co-operation and I want settlement bonafide and I am acting in good faith stop I pray for your kind consideration and cooperation stop\n\n25-5-76."}}, {"text": "17-12-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80120, "end_char": 80128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from the asso;- see's petition to the Tribunal dated 17-12-76 wherein he states-\n\n\" ..... now the learned C.I.T., Central, Calcutta has very kindly agreed to withdraw their Departmental appeals for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1971-72 on condition that your petitioner would also withdraw all the appeals for 1962-63 to 73-74 assessments.\""}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 80190, "end_char": 80198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from the asso;- see's petition to the Tribunal dated 17-12-76 wherein he states-\n\n\" ..... now the learned C.I.T., Central, Calcutta has very kindly agreed to withdraw their Departmental appeals for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1971-72 on condition that your petitioner would also withdraw all the appeals for 1962-63 to 73-74 assessments.\""}}, {"text": "24-12-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81021, "end_char": 81029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the I.T.A.T. dated 24-12-76 makes it clear that it granted permission to withdraw appeals because:\n\n\"The learned departmental representative Shri Narayanan also had no objection to permission being granted for withdr(lwal of the appeal.\""}}, {"text": "Narayanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81148, "end_char": 81157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the I.T.A.T. dated 24-12-76 makes it clear that it granted permission to withdraw appeals because:\n\n\"The learned departmental representative Shri Narayanan also had no objection to permission being granted for withdr(lwal of the appeal.\""}}, {"text": "F Settlement Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82474, "end_char": 82497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, a holistic perspective in the correct statutory setting makes the conclusion irresistible that the appeal must be allowed, that the F Settlement Commission should be inhibited from proceeding with the application of the assessee and the appeals by the assessee before the I.T.A.T. must be revived and disposed of expeditiously."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1165_1192_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• •\n\nSFiANKAR cHAKRA.v An.TI\n\nBRITANNIA BISCUIT CO. LTD. & ANR.\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRrsHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ]\n\nI11dus1rial Disputes Act, 1947, Sectio11 33(2)(b)-Whether the IndUJtrial \" j T; ibunal, not deciding the validity of the enquiry aga. inst a workman but' a.dju .. ,,._ -~ dicating preliminary issue that the enquiry was in accordance with the princi-\n\n- pies of natural justice, should necesSarily given an opportunity to the employer to adduce further evidence as to Charges, irrespective of the fact whether such o'pportunity was sought.\n\nIn the ex parte departmental enqu.iry c6nducted against the appellt who was under detention under th'e Prevention of Violence Act, 1970 the Enquiry\n\nofficer held the alleged charges proved and on the report .of the enquiry Officer, the management of th'e Ist respondent comp3.ny. terminated the services of the appellant and gave one month's wage in lieu of notice. Since an industrial dispute was then pending before the. Tribunal, an application was made unc!er section 33 (2 )(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 seeking approval of the Industrial Tribunal to the action of the management terminatiitg the services of the appellant.\n\nOn a notice issued by the Tribunal to the appellant in the Jail, h:e submitted bis written statement.\n\nThe Tribunal was of the opinion that the enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural\n\ntice and hence vitiated.\n\nAccordingly by its AWaird dated 15th September 1973, the Tribunal rejected the application for approval of the action terminating service of the appellant made by the Company.\n\nThe Writ Petition preferred by the Company a.gainst the said Award was dismissed and the decision of the Tribunal was upheld.\n\nIn the Letters Patent Appeal No. 80j74, preferred by the Company, a Division Bench of !he Calcutta High Court held that after the Industrial Tribunal . adjudicated upon the pr'eliminary issue whether the enquiry was in aocofdance with 'the principles of natural ju9tice and having held against the company it was incumbent upon the Industrial Tribunal to give an opportunity to the employer to lead evidence to . prove the charg'cs alleged against the workm3o and as the issue about the validity of the enquiry was not decided as a preliminary issue and as ther'eafter no opportunity was given to tho employer it would be necessary to remand the matter to the Industrial Tribunal\n\nfur giving an opportunity to the employer for further evidence, if so advis'cd, and then finally dispose of the application made by the employer under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nAllowing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. Both on precedent and on principle, it is undeniable that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudicating Upon a penal termination or\" service of a workman either under Section 10\n\nor under Section 33 to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct by giving some specific opportunity after decision on the preliminary is.we whether the domestic enquiry was at all held, or if held, was defective in favour of the workman. Cooper Engi neering Ltd. case is not an authority for the proposition that every case coming before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 or Section 33 of the Act complaining about th'e punitive termination of service following a\n\n• (\n\ndomestic enquiry that the Coun or Tribunal as a matter of law must frame a preliminary issue and proceed to decide the validity or otherwise of the enquiry and then serve a ftesh notice on the employer to adduce further evidente to sustain tho charges if it so chooses to do. Cooper Ettginetri1t1 Ltd. ca>e [1976] 1 SCR 361 merely speeifieo the stage at which such an oppor!llDity \\ v is to b'e given, if sought. It is both the right and obligation of the employer, ,.>---'\"\"\n\nif it so cboos'es to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charses of .misconduct. It is f'or the employer to avail of such opportunity by a specific pleading or by a specific request.\n\nIf such an opportunity is sought in the oour.ie of proceeding, th'c Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, a~ the case may be, should grant the opportunity to lead additional evidence to substantiate the charges.\n\nBut if no such opportunity is sought nor there is any pleading to that effect no duty is cast on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal suo motu to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to sumtantiate the charges.\n\n[1192B-EJ\n\nIn the present case, there was neither a pleading in which any such claim for adducing additional evidence was made, nor any request was made before tlie Industrial Tribunal till the proceedings were adjourned for making the Award and till the Award wa• made.\n\nThe case squarely falls within the ratio of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co., [1972] 3 SCR 29 which laid to rest the ghost of any obligatory duty cast on a quasi-judicial authority viz. Labour Coun or Industrial Tribunal to notify one of the parties to the proee'edings before it, what it should do or 'What are its rights and by what procedure it should prove its case, even when the party is a well entrenched 'employer ably assisted by the best available talent in the legal profession.\n\nTherefore, the\n\nDivion Bench of the High Court V.'as clearly in error in granting such a non-sought opportunity at the stage of the Letters Patent Appeal.\n\n[11830-H, 1192F-G]\n\n2. Precedents make it clear that a quasijudicial Tribunal is under no such obligation to acquaint parties appearing before it about their rights more 110 in an adversary system which these quasi-judicial Tribuna.ls have adopted. There~ fore, it is crystal clear that the rights which the employer has in law to adduce additional evidence in a proceeding before th'e Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal either un.der Section 10 or Section 33 of the Act questioning the legality of the order terminating the service must be availed of by the employer by making a proper request at the time wh'en it files its statement of claim or written statement or makes an application seeking either permis.o; ion to take a certain action or seeking approval of the action taken by it. If such a request is mad'e in the statement of claim, application or written statement, the Labour Court or the lndustria.1 Tribunal must give such an opportunity.\n\nIf the request is n1ade before the proceedings are concluded, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal should ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evid'ence.\n\nBut if no such reque!!it is made at af!y stage of the proceedings, there is no duty in Jaw cast on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give such a.n opportunity and if there is no such obligatory duty in law,\n\nS. CHAKRAVARTI V. BRITANNIA BISCUIT 1167\n\nfailure to give any such opportunity cannot and would not vitiate the pro- A ceedings.\n\n[1188D-H]\n\nBharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sri lai Singh and Ors.,\n\n[1962] 3 SCR 684; Manag<ment of Ritz Theatres (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1963] 3 SCR 461;\n\n1¥orkmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory, [1965] 3 SCR 588; State Bank of India v. R. K. lain and Ors., [1972] 1 SCR\n\n755; Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh [1972] J SCR 29; B • Workmero of Mis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v.\n\n~ Managcnient and Ors., [1973] 3 SCR 587; Cooper Engineering Ltd. v.\n\nP. f.\n\nMuTU/he, [1976] I SCR 361; explain<4.\n\n3. The challenge to penal' tcrmrnauon of s'crVice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act is likely to come before a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Tri bunal for adjudication either by way of a reference under Section 10 or by way of an application by the employer under Section 33.\n\nPreceding domestic enquiry is implicit in both the situation!..\n\nWhere a workman ill. accused of misconduct a domestic enquiry has to be held against him in accordance with the provisions contained in the Standing orders governing the industrial establishment or in the absence of such Standing Orders in accordance with the principles of natural justice.\n\nAfter such a domestic enquiry is held it would be upen to the employer to impose a pcilalty including one of termination of service hoMoever atyled.\n\nIf' at the time of imposition of penalty no other industrial dispute between the employer and its workman as comprehended by s. 33 is pending before any of the authorities. mentioned in that section it would be open to the workman to approach the appropriate Government to refer the industrial dispute arising out of termination of his s'ervice to an appropriate\n\nauthority under the Act.\n\nBut if at the relevant time a .situation obtains such as is comprehended by s. 33, namely, pendency of a conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proce'eding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute touching the workman of the employer, the employer before his order terminating service of the workman becomes effective has to seek either prior permiS&ion or subsequent approval of' the .action, as the case may be, under s. 33.\n\n[1172D-H]\n\nWhen the dispute comes before th'e Industrial Tribunal by way of a reference under s. 10 it is the aggrieved workman who has sought adjudication of the industrial di9{)ute arising from the termination of' his service. When tho matter comes b'efore the appropriate authority under s. 33 it is the employer who\n\nhas mD\\'Cd for permission or approval of its intended action.\n\n[1173A-B]\n\nWhere the reference is at the instance of a ¥.'Orkman under s. 10 the Tribuna1 would call upon the workman to file his statement of claim and tb'ereafter the employer would be called upon to file its written statement.\n\nRule JOB of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rule>, 1957 provides that wtthin two weeks of the date of receipt of the 'order of reference, the party representing workmen and the employer involved in the dispute shall file with th'e concemed authority a statement of demands relating only to the is.mes as are included in the order of reference and shall also forward a copy of such statement to each one of the opposite parties involved .in the said dispute.\n\nSimilarly, when the 'employer seeb permission for taking the intended action or seeks approval of the action taken by it under s. 33 it has to make an\n\nA application as provided by rule 60 in either Form J or K as the case may be.\n\nBoth the forms require that the n'ecessity for a.nd circumstances 1n which the proposed action is taken or is intended to be taken must be clearly aild -.....,,.._.. specifically set out and either express permission should be sought before taking the intended action or an approval of the already taken action must be sought.\n\n[11738-EJ\n\n4. The Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal to which either a reference under Section 10 or an application under Section 33 for permission to take an intended action. or approval of an action already taken is made, would be exercising quasi-judicial powers, which would imply that a certain content ot the judicial power of the State is vested in it and it is called upon to ex'crcise it. '\n\n[!189A-B] ,\n\nC Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., [1950] SCR 459;\n\nreferred to. -\n\n 5, A. quasi-jlldicia.1 decision presupposes an existing dispute betw.een two or more parties and involves presentation of their caee by the parties to the dispute and if the dispute b'etween them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evide.nce adduced by the parties to the dispute and often With!. the istanc'e of arguments by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence.\n\nParties a.re arrayed before these quasi judicial Tribunalseither upon a reference under s. IO ors. 33. There is: thus a /is between the parties. There would be assertion and denial of facts on either side.\n\nWith the permission of the Tribunal and consent of the opposite sid'e, parties are entitled to appear through J'egal practitionel'9 before these quasi-judicial Tribunals.\n\nThe system adopted by these Tribunals is an adversary system, a word as understood in contra-distinction to inquisitorial system. The Labour Court or Tribunal has to decide the /is between the parties on the -evidence adduced before it. While it may not be hide bound by the rules prescribed in the Evidence Act it is nonetheless a quasijudicial Tribunal proceeding to adjudicate up<?D a /is between the parties arrayed before it and must decide the matter on the evidence produced by the parties before it. It would not be open to it to decide the /is on any extraneous consideration.\n\nJustice, equity and good con.Science will inform its adjudication. Therefore, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has all the trapping, of a Court.\n\n[1189B-D, 1190C-E]\n\nIf such be the duties and functions of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour\n\nCou~ any party appearing before it must make e. claim or demur the claim of the other: side and wh\"en there is 0. burden upon it to prove or establ~ the fact 50 as to invite a decisioD: in its favour, it has to lead evidence. [l 190E-F]\n\nCooper v. Wilson, [1937] 2 K.B. 309; quoted with approval.\n\nMis. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1970] Labour and Ind~ trial Cases 350; referred to.\n\n6. The quasi-judicial Tribunal is not required to fldvise the party either -~ about its rights or what it should do or om.it to do. Obligation to lead evidence. to establish an allegation made by a party is on the' party making the e.Uegation. The test would be who would fail if no evidence is led.\n\nIt must seek an opportunity to lead evidence. Allegation which is not pleaded, even if there\n\nis evidence in support of it,- cannot be eiamined because the other side has not .notice of. it and if entertained it would tantamount to granting an \\lllfair\n\n• '\n\nS. CHAKRAVARTI V. BRITANNIA' BISCUIT 1169\n\nadvantage to the first mentioned party. The pleadings before such Tribunals have not to be read strictly, but the pleadings must:! be such as to give sufficient notice to the other party of the case it is called upon to meet. The rules of fair play dem0:nd that where a party seeks to establish a contention 1Which if provccl would be s'ufficient to deny relief to the opposite side, such a contention has to be specifically pleaded and then proved. But if there is no pleading :tllere isno question of proving something which is not pleaded. [1190 FH,\n\n1191 AB]\n\n'Ibis elementary principle does inform industrial adjudication. If an application is made by the employer under Section 33, as it is required to _be made U.1.be prescribed form all factsare required to be pleaed. If aTClief is' asked for\"in 'the alternative that has to be pleaded. In Im application Wider s. 33 tbe employer has to plead that a domestic enquiry hes been held 'ilnd it iS legal ud.valid. In the alternative it must plead that if the Labour Court or Ind.ustrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that either there was no enquiry or the one held was defective, the employer would adduce evidence t.o sU.bstantillte tbe charges of misconduct alleged against tbe workman. Now, 'if lio such pleading is put forth either at tbe initial stage or during tbe peiidency of the proceedings there arises no question of a sort of advisory role of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal unintended by the Act to advise the employer, a party n1uch better off than the workman, to inform it about its rights, namely, the right to lead additioool evidence and then give an Opportu4 nity ·\"Which was never sought. -This runs counter to the grain 'Of iD.dustrial jurisprudence.\n\nUndoubtedly if such a pleading is raised and en opportunity is, SOllght, it is to be given but if there is no such pleading either in the original application or in the statement of claim or written statement or by way of an application during the pendency of the proceedings there is no duty cast by law or by the rules of justice, reason and fe.ir play that a quasi judicial Tribu- Bal like the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court should adopt an advisory role by iriforming the employer of its rights, namely, the right to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges when it failed to make good the domestic enquiry Qlld then to give an opportunity to it to adduce additional evidence.\n\nThis, apart from being unfair to the work.man, is against the prin .. ciPJ:es of rules, governing the procedure to be adopted by quasi judicial Tribunal, against the grain of adversary system and against the principles governing the de-cision of a /is between the parties armyed before a quasi judicial Tribunal.\n\nTin Printers (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal,\n\n1%7 LLJ 677 @ 680; approved.\n\nCMl. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1978.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1168 of G\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-4-1976 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 80/74. ·\n\nP. Das Gupta and Mrs. L. Arvind1 for the Appellant.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, Anand Prakash, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, Mukul Mudgal and Mrs. Anand Prakash for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. The hollow plea of the employer of an alleged denial of an opportunity (never claimed at any stage except in Letters Patent Appeal) to subsantiate an alleged misconduct of the workman by evidence aliurule has been responsible fur dragging a tiny dispute rendering the workman jobless for an unusually long period of more than 7 years to this apex court.\n\nFacts now beyond the pale of controversy are few and may lie briefly stated.\n\nAppellant joined service with the first respondent company ('company' for short) in August 1963 and was confirmed in March 1964. In October 1970 appellant was drawing a composite salary of Rs. 180/-. An industrial dispute touching the workman ol the company was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, when the\n\nevent leading to the present appeal occurred. On 1st October 1970 around 5 p.m. appellant is alleged to have hoisted two red flag! atop the Branch Office building simultaneously shouting inflammatory slogans. He is alleged to have threatened the shift Manager Shri Manik Mukherjee who was on duty at the relevant time.\n\nThe incident was reported to police. Respondent employer felt aggrieved by such indi.!cipline exhibited by the appellant and decided to hold a disciplinary enquiry, as a first step towards which, a chargsheet dated 1st October\n\n1970 was served upon the appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation within three days from the receipt of the charge-sheet. In the meantime on 3rd October 1970 first respondent company declar\\'(l a lock out. Appellant submitted his explanation on 10th October 1970 denying all the charges and complaining that as he is a trade union leader he is being singled out for victimi8atiou.\n\nOn the same day appellant was arrested by poli'oe and some criminal case, waslodged\n\nagainst him' in which he was discharged by the Magistrate on 2nd December 1970.\n\nSomehow or the other the Management did not proceed with the enquiry till as late as 30th June 1971 when the appellant was informed that the enquiry wonld be held on July 8, 1971.\n\nIn the meantime the appellant was detained under the Prevention of Violence Act, 1970, with the result that when he received the intimation of the date on which the enquiry wa8 to be held, he informed the company: that as he is in detention he would not be able to attend the enquiry and sought an adjournment. Adjournment appears to have\n\nbeen granted but a fresh notice was served upon the appellant in the Jail intimating to him to appear before the enquiry officer on 15th September 1971 but as the appellant wai; still in deteniion, he could not avail of this opportunity. Consequently on 16th September 1971 the enquiry proceeded ex parte. Enquiry Officer held the charges.\n\n• >\n\ns. CHAKRAV ART! v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) l 1 71\n\nproved and on the report of the enquiry officer the management of the first respondent company tenninated the service of the appellant and gave one month's wages in lieu of notice. Since n industrial dispute between the workmen of the company and the company .was then pending before the Industrial Tribunal, an application was made under section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('Act' for short) seeking approval of the Industrial Tribunal to the action of the management terminating service of the appellant. This case came to be registered\n\nas Case No. 128/71 under s. 33(2) (b) of the Act bmore the III Industrial Trjbunal, West Bengal.\n\nOn a notice issued by the Industrial Tribunl appellant was produced before the Tribunal from the Jail custody and be submitted his written statement. The Tribunal then proceeded to adjudicate upon the dispute.\n\nThe Tribunal was of the opinion that the enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence vitiated. Accordingly, by its Award dated 15th September 1973, the Tribunal rejected the application for approval of the action terminating the service of the appellant made by the company and declined to grant approval.\n\nThe company preferred a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to the High Court of Calcutta. The learned single Judge of the High Court before whom the writ petition came up for hearing dismissed the petition observing that the enquiry was not held according to the principles of natural justice and the order temrinating the service maiJe in such an enquiry is invalid and of no effect and the Industrial Tribunal was fully justified in declining to grant approval of such an action. It may specifically be mentioned that no contention was raised before the learned single Judge that no opportunity was afforded to the first respondent company to lead evidence in proof of charge$ after the domestic enquiry was found to be defective.\n\nThe company preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 80/74. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that after the Industrial Tribunal adjudicated upon the preliminary issue whether the enquiry was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and ha, ing held against the company it was incumbent upon the Industrial Tribunal to give an opportunity to the employer to lead evidence to prove the charges alleged against the workman and as the issue about the validity ol the enquiry Wll.S not decided as a preliminary issue and as thereafter no opportunity was given to the employer it would b.e necessary to remand the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for giving\n\n!2\\ an opportunity to the employer to adduce further evidence, if so advi$ed,' and then to finally dispose of the llpplication made by the employer under s. 33(2)(b).\n\nThe present appeal by special leave is filed by the aggrieved W'oekman.\n\nWhile granting leave this Con rt limited it to the question ; as to whether the principle in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mwiahe,(') llP!>lies to a situation where the management seeks approval of an or'der\n\n• (\n\nof dismissal under s. 33 (2)(b) of the Act.\n\nThat necessitates ascer- \"' tainment of the principle enunciated by this Court in Cooper Engitieer- ~\"\" ing Ltd. case.\n\nBefore the contention raised in this appeal is adverted to, the limited natlire of the controversy must be put in focus to avoid deviation from !he central issue.\n\n1'he challenge to penal termination of service of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Act is likely to come before a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication either by way of a reference under s. 10 or by way of an application by the employer under s. 33. Preceding domestic enquiry is implicit in both the situations.\n\nWhere a workman is accused of misconduct a domestic enquiry has to be held against him in accordance with the provisions contained in the Standing Orders governing the industrial establishment or in the absence of such Standing Orders in accordance with the principles of natural justice.\n\nAfter such a dotitestic enquiry is held it would be open to the employer to impose a penalty\n\nincluding one of termination of service howsoever styled. If at that time of imposition of penalty no other industrial dispute between the emplciyer and its workmen as comprehended by s. 33 is pending before iity of the authorities mentioned in that section it would be open to the Wbrkman to approach the appropriate Government to refer the industrial dispute arising out of termination of his service t'o an appropriate authority under the Act.\n\nBut if at the relevant time a situation obtains such as is comprehended by s. 33, namely, pendency of a conciliation proceooing before! a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before\n\naa arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in resPec:t of an industrial dispute touching the workmen of the employer, the employer before his order terminating service of the workman becomes effective has to seek either prior permission or subsequent approval of the action, as the case may be, under s. 33.\n\n(I) l!976] l S. C.R. 361.\n\ns. CH!U(RAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, /.) 117 3\n\nWhn the dispute comes before the Industrial Tribunal by way of a reference under s. 10 it is the aggrieved workman who has sought ad-1 judication of the industrial dispute arising from the termination of his service.\n\nWhen the matter comes before the appropriate authority under s. 33 it is the employer who has moved for permission or approval of its int~µded action.\n\n• '\n\nWhere the reference is at the instance of a workman under s. 10 the Tribunal would call upon the workman to file' his statement of claim and thereafter the employer would be called upon to file its written state..o \" ment.\n\nRule lOB of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 pr().; ~-.l_ vides that within two weeks of the date of receipt of the order of refe-\n\n- rence, the party representing workmen and ¢e employer involved in the dispute shall file with the concerned authority a statement of demands relating ouly to the issues as are included in the order of reference and{ shall also forward a copy of 'such statement to each one of the opposite\n\nparties involved in the said dispnte.\n\nSimilarly,. when the employer seeks permission for taking the intended action or seeks approval of the action taken by it under s. 33 it has to make an application as provided by nlle 60 in either Form J or K as .the case may be•.\n\nBoth the forms require that the necessity for and circumstances in which the proposed action is taken or is intended to be taken mut be clearly and specifically set out and either express permis'sion should be sought before taking the intended action or an approval of the already taken action must be songht.\n\nThe matter in this case came before the Tribunal upon an applica. lion made by the company under s. 32(2) (b) seeking approval of its action terminating service of the appellant. A copy of the application is not put on record of this appeal. However, it was stated. at the Bar that in the application charges preferred against the appellant were set out.\n\nThe fact that an enquiry and upon the findings recorded in the enquiry, order terminating the service of the workman was passed was also being set out in the application. TI1e Tribunal was called upon to accord its approval to the action.\n\nThe appellant appeared before the Tribunal and contested this application totally denying the charges.\n\nIt must be specifically noticed that the first respondent company in its appliation seeking apPl'.oval of its action has set out in its application the charges preferred by it and the dome'sticenquiry held in respect\n\nof the charges. A prayer was rna\\fe .in the application that its action ff terminating service of the appellant be approved.\n\nNo wh!:ce .. in this application either in express terms or by implication it was averred. that\n\nin the event tl)e Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was defective the mployer first respondent company proposes to offer evidence for substantiating the charges.\n\nNeither such an averment was made in the application made to the Industrial Tribunal but tiM the Industrial Tribunal concluded its proceedings by saying that the matter is set down for making the Award any oral or written application was made on behalf of the company that over and above the record of enquiry it proposed to lead evidence in its possession in respect of the charges to substantiate the same to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. Not only no such request was made at any time before the Award was made by the Industrial Tribunal but no such contention appears to have been taken before the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Writ Petition filed by the company quesljoning the validity and correctness of the Award made by the Industrial Tribunal declining to grant approval. Such an opportunity was sought for the first time before the appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Court at the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the company.\n\nMr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the company formulated his contention thus : When an industrial dispute touching the punitive termination of service of a workman is brought before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, either under s. 10 or s. 33 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether the employer has made any express or implied request in its application or in the course of proceedings either orally or in writing, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal must as an obligation in Jaw at the initial stage of the proceeding frame a preliminary issue as to whether the domestic enquiry was in fact held and if held, was in accordance with the Standing Orders or the principles of natural justice or was in any manner defective. If this issue, urged Mr. Tarkunde, is answered in favour of the workman and against the employer, a preliminary finding to that effect should be recorded and then notwithstanding the fact that the employer has not made any request in its original application or in the course of proceedings before the Tribunal it is the duty and obligation of the Tribunal to call upon the employer by giving it a specific opportunity to lead evidence if it so chooses to do to substantiate the charges preferred against the workman. Failure to give such an opportunity either on request or\" the employer or suo motu by the Tribunal, the proceedings would be vitiated. According to Mr. Tarkunde this proposition is no more res integra and is concluded by the decision of this Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case (supra).\n\nB As this contention was sought to be substantia•ed on some of the cases decided by this Court it would be advantageous to examine the prnpooition first on precedent and then, if it is open, on principle.\n\n• (\n\n• •\n\ns. CHAKRAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, !.) 117 5\n\nJn Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shri Jai Singh & Ors.,(') the matter A came before this Court questioning an Award of the Industrial Tribunal by which the Tribunal declined to grant permission under s. 33 except in respect of one workman holding that the domestic enquiry was not proper and that the employer was guilty of ma/a fide conduct and victimisation. Before this Court the workman contended that once the domestic enquiry was found to be improper, the Tribunal had to dismiss the application and it could not take independent evidence and arrive at a finding of its own as to the guilt of the workman. It may be mentioned that there was no preliminary issue framed in this case by the Tribunal about the validity of the eµquiry. Yet the employer had adduced evidence to substantiate the charges against the workman simuJtaneously relying upon the papers of domestic enquiry. Negativing this contention of the workman this Court observed as under :\n\n\"Where there has been a proper enquiry by the management itself the Tribunal, it has been settled by a number of decisions of this Court, has to accept the findings arrived at in that enquiry unless it is perverse and should give the permission asked for unless it has reason to believe that the management is guilty of victimisation or has been guilty of unfair labour practice or is acting ma/a fide. But the mere fact !bat no enquiry has been held or that the enquiry has not been properly conducted cannot absolve !be Tribunal of its duty to decide whether !be case that the workman has been guilty of the alleged misconduct has been made out. The proper way for performing this duty where there has not been a proper enquiry by the management is for the Tribunal to take evidence of both sides in respect of the alleged misconduct.\n\nWhen such evidence is adduced before the Tribunal the management is deprived of the benefit of having the findings of the domestic tribunal being accepted as prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct unless the finding is perverse and has to prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal itself that !be workman was guilty of the alleged misconduct. We do not think it either just to the management or indeed even fair to the workman himself that in such a case the Industrial Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and thereby drive the management to make a further applicaon for permission after holding a proper enquiry and deprtve the workman of the benefit of the Tribunal itself being satisfied on evidence adduced before it that he was guilty of the alleged misconduct\".\n\n(I) tl962J 3 S. C. R. 684.\n\nThis, question agaiu surfaced in Management of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen.(') The matter came! before this Court challeJJg ing an Award of tl:\\e Iudustrial Tribunal by which the Industrial Tribunal in a reference under s. 10 directed reinstatement of two workmen who were dismissed after holding a domestic enquiry agaiust them.\n\nWhen the matter was before the Tribunal the employer relied not only on the papers of domestic enquiry but 11 witnesses were examined on behalf of the employer and an equal number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the workmen. In the appeal by the employer a contention was raised , on behalf of the workmen that once the employer adduced evidence before the Industrial Tribunal to substantiate the charges agaiust the workmen, that by itself would amount to a concession on behalf of the employer that the enquiry held by it was not proper or was defective and, therefore, the employer cannot then rely upon the fact that the enquiry being proper the Tribunal cannot go into the merits of the case. Negativing this contention after referring to Bharat Sugar Mills case, (supra) this Court expressed an opinion that there is no authority for the proposition that whenever the employer seeks to lead additional evidence before the Tribunal in respect of dismissal of its employee it must necessarily follow that he has given up his stand based on the previous departmental enquiry and the Tribunal is entitled to examine the dispute on merits itself and on the priuciples of fair play aud justice the proposition is unsound.\n\nIn reachiug this conclusion this Court made some pertinent observations which may be extracted :\n\n\"If the view taken by the Tribunal was held to be correct, it would lead to this anomaly that the employer would be precluded from justifying the dismissal of his employee by leading additional evidence unless he takes the risk of inviting the Tribunal to deal with the merits for itself, because as soon as he asks for permission to lead additional eV, idence, it would follow that he gives up his stand based on the holding of the domestic enquiry. Otherwise, it may have to be held that in all such cases no evidence should be led on the merits unless the issue about the enquiry is tried as a preliminary issue, If the finding on that preliminary issue is in favour of the employer, then, no additional evidence need be cited. by the employer; if the finding on the said issue is agaiust him, permission will have to be given to the employer to cite additional evidence, iustead of following such an elaborate and somewhat cumbersome procedure; if the employer seeks to\n\n(!) (1963] 3 S. C. R. 461.\n\n• '\n\ns. Cl'IAU\\AYARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1177\n\nlead evidence in addition to the evidence adduced at the A departmental enquiry and the employees are also given an opportunity to lead additional evidence, it would be open to the Tribunal first to consider the preliminary issue and then to proceed to deal with the merits in case the preliminary issue is decided against the employer. That, in our opinion, is the true and correct legal position in this matter\".\n\nIt may be noted that in this case evidence was adduced by the employer before any preliminary finding was recorded on the validity of the enquiry. In fact, application for adducing additional evidence was made by the employer much before the Tribunal proceeded to examine the validity of the enquiry and evidence was recorded before recording a preliminary finding that the enquiry was improper or defective. The observations in this case have to be understood in the context of the facts found.\n\nIn Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private) Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory(') the workmen contended before this Court that as respondent employer held no enquiry as required by the Standing Orders before dispensing with the services of the appellants by way of discharge on the ground that the appellants had resorted to go-slow in the Sugar Factory, the Tribunal in a reference under s. 10 of the Act was in error in holding that the appellants had in fact resorted to go-slow tactics and the respondent was justified in discharging them from service. The specific contention raised was that where no domestic enquiry is held before terminating the service of a workman as required by the Standing Orders all that the Tribunal was concerned with was to decide whether the discharge of the workman was justified or not and that it was no part of the duty of the Tribunal to < decide that there was go-slow which would justify the order of di<;- ..!\"(' charge. Negtiving this contention, the Court held as under :-\n\n\"It is now well-settled by a number of decisions of this Court that where an employer has faile_d to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him to justify the action before the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. In such a case the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where domestic inquiries have been held. The entire matter would be open before the tribunal which will have jurisqiction not only to go into the limited questions open to a tribunal where domestic inquiry has been properly held (see Indian Iron & Steel B Co. v. Thdr Workmen, (1958] SCR 667), but also to\n\n(!) [1965] 3 S. C. R. 588.\n\n19-- 409SCI/79\n\n'atisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the dismissal or discharge was justified. We may in th:s connection rcftT 10 lW /s. Sasa Misa Sugar Works (P)\n\nUd. v. Shobrati Khan, I 1959] Supp. SCR 836; Phulbari Tea Estute v. Its Workmen, [1960] 1 SCR 32; anc the Punjab National Bank Limited v. Its Workmen, [1960] l SCR 806. These three cases were further considered by this Court in Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shri Jai Singh, [1962] 3 SCR 684, and reference was also made to the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Shri Ram Swarath Sinha\n\nv. Belaund Sugar Co., (1954) L.A.C. 697. It was pointed out that ,\"the important effect of commission to hold an enquiry was merely this: that the tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case but would decide for itself on the evidence adduced whether the char\" ges have really been made out\". It is true that three of these cases, except Phulbari Tea Estate's case, were on applications under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, But in principle we see no difference whether the matter comes before the Tribunal for approval under s. 33 or on a reference under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. In either case if the enquiry is defective or if no enquiry has been held as required by Standing Orders, the entire case would be open before the tribunal and the employoc would have to justify on facts as well that its order of dismissal or discharge was proper. Phulbari Tea Estate's was on a reference under s. 10, and the same principle was applied there also, the only difference being that in that case, there was an enquiry though it was defective. A defective enquiry in our opinion stands on the same footing as no enquiry and in either case the tribunal wonld have jurisdiction to go into the facts and the employer would have to satisfy the tribunal that on facts the order of dismissal or discharge was proper\".\n\nThis Court rejected the contentiou that as there was no enquiry G in this case it was not open to the respondent company to justify the discharge before the Tribunal. It may be noted that in the situation as was disclosed ln this case there was no question of deciding a preliminary issue and then giving an opportunity to the employer to ad- • duce additional evidence justifying the punitive action on merits. This Court went into the allegations of go-slow tactics resorted to by the H workmen as canvassed on behalf of the employer and agreed with the finding of the Tribunal that the allegations were proved and accordingly upheld the order of discharg; e and affirmed the Award.\n\n• '\n\n• '\n\ns. CHAKRAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1179\n\nIn State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain & Ors.,(') in a reference made by the Central Government the Industrial Tribunal !Jeld that the respondent R. K. Jain was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to produce evidence his defence during the enquiry and that the management was not justified in terminating his service on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer. This Award was questioned in an appeal to this Court, inter alia, on the ground that even assuming that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Bank was in any manner vitiated, --. the Tribunal erred in law in not giving an opportunity to the manage- • . / ment to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to establish the validity of the order of discharge. The contention in terms raised was that the Tribunal has first to consider whether the domestic enquiry on the basis of which the order of termination bas been passed has been conducted properly and bona fide by the management and if it comes to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry is vitiated, it is only then that the stage is set for giving an opportunity lo the management to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to support the order of termination. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in M/ s.\n\nHindustan Steel Ltd. v. Their Workmen.( 2 ) A contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Industrial Court. Madhya Pradesh,(\") was also brought to the notice of the Court.\n\nAttention of the Court was also drawn to a decision of a learned single Judge of lhe Delhi High Court in Prem Nath Motors Workshop Pvt. Ltd. v. buiustrial Tribunal Delhi,(-1) which accepted the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.\n\nThe conflict of decisi011s may be noticed first.\n\nThe Orissa High Court was of tbe opinion that there was no obligation in law 011 the part of . the Labour Court to indicate its mind about the infirmities in the en- ~· quiry at any stage before it. gave its findings and the Award. Contrary view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh and Delhi High Courts was thit it is a healthy practice that after coming to the conclusion that ., the domestic enquiry was not proper the Industrial Tribunal or Labour ' Court should give an opportunity to the employer to produce evidence\n\nto satisfy the authorityJhat the action taken by it is justified. Thus this Court in R. K. Jain's case was clearly seized of the conflict of opinion and the controversy raised was whether there was any obligation in Jaw on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, notwithstanding that no such request was made by the employer, to call upori\n\n(I) [1972] 1 S.C.R. 755.\n\n(2) (1970) Labour & Industrial Cases, 102. -(3) (1970) Labour & Industrial Cases. 510.\n\n(4) (1971) I. F. & L. R. 370.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt..\n\nthe employer to adduce additional evidence to sustain \\he charges after a formal preliminary order is recorded that either there was no domestic enquiry or the. one held was defective. Negativing this contention.\n\nthis Court held as under :\n\n\"It shoul_d be remembered that when order of punishment by way of dismissal or termination of service is effected by the management, the issue that is referred is whether the management was justified in discharging aJ!d terminating the service of the workman concerned and whether foe workmen is entitled to any relief.\n\nIn the present case, the actual issue that was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal has already been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment. There may be cases where an inquiry has been held preceding the order of termination or there may have been no inquiry at all.\n\nBut the dispute that will be referred is LOt whether the domestic inquiry has been conducted properly or not by the management, but the larger question whe_ther the order gf termin.ation, dismissal or the order imposing punishment on the workman concerned is justified.\n\nUnder these circumstances it is the right of the workman to plead all infirmities in the domestic inquiry, if one has been held and also to attack the' order on all grounds available to him in law and on facts.\n\nSimilarly the management has also a right to defend the action taken by it on the ground' that a proper domestic inquiry has been held by it on the basis of whic)l the order impn!llli'd has been passed. It is also open to the management to justify on facts that the orde!:\n\npassed by it was proper.\n\nBut the point to be noted is that the inquiry that is conducted by the Tribunal is a composite inquiry regarding the order which is under challenge.\n\nIf the mangement defends its action solely on the basis thatthe domestic inquiry held by it is proper nd valid and it the Tribunal bolds against the management on that point, the management will fail.\n\nOn the other hand, if the management relies not only on the validity of the domestic inquiry, but also adduces evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action, it is open to the Tribunal to accept the evidence adduced by the management and hold in its favour even if its finding is against the management regarding the validity of the domestic inquiry. It is essentially a mat!er for the management to decide about the stand that it proposes to take before the Tribunal. It may be emphasised that it is the •\n\ns. CHAKRAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1181\n\nright of the management to sustain its order by adducing also independent evide11ce before the Tribunal. It is a right given to the manageme.nt and it is for the management to avail itself of the said opportunity\".\n\nThe Court also in terms held that by and large this Court was iri • agreement with the vi•ow exprcs\"d by the Orissa High Court meaning ' thereby that no such obliga.ti()n in law is fastened op. the Labour Court .... or the Industrial Tribunal to indicate it~ mind about ll\"!e infirmities in\n\n~ . j the enquiry before it gave its finding and the Award and then call- -~- ing upon the employer to start the next roun_d of leading evidence in its attempt to sustain the charges alleged against the workman.\n\nIf the matter were to rest here, !he. contentioJ! of !lie appellant must fail on precedent. But it was urged that the point has been re-examineu in later cases to which we may now turn.\n\nIn Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh,(') the appellant company questioned the coqectness of the decision of the Industrial TribunaJ refusing permission to dismiss the respondent as he was held guilty of misconduct in a domestic enquiry conducted by the appellant.\n\nThe question of seeking permission arose because s. 33 was attracted as an industrial dispute !>etween the apllap.t company and its workmen was then pending before the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nBefore the Tribunal pronounced its order jecting the application for permission under s. 33, an application was ll!ade on the day next after t11e date on which the respoQdent filed his written statement before the Tribunal requesting in clear and unambiguous terms the Tribunal\n\n*at in ca•e the Tribu!Jal held that the enquiry conducted by it was defective, it should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to justify !he action propos-'d to be taken against the respondent.\n\nNeither party\" examined. any witness. before the Tribunal.\n\nThe appellant merely produced the papers of enquiry. The Tribunal reached the conclusiOQ that the enquiry proceedings had not been conducted against the respondent in accordance with the principles of\n\n118.tural justice and that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer were not in accordance with the evidence adduced before him.\n\nIn accordance with these findings the Tribunal concluded that the appellant had not made out a case for permission for dismissing the respondent and the application was rejected. It may be noticed that 'tliere was no Peference to the application made by the appellant for adducing additional evidence in the order rejectiqg permission and\n\n(!) [1972] 3 S. C R, 29.\n\nI!.\n\nno order appears to have been made on the application whether it was\n\ngranted or rejected Before this Court the appellant contended that the Tribunal was in error in law in not permitting the appellant to adduce evidence before it, to justify the actiou proposed to be taken against the respondent.\n\nAfter an exhaustive review of the decisions bearing on the question and affirming the ratio in R. K. Jain's case\n\n(supra) this Court extracted the emerging principles froiµ. the review of decisions.\n\nPropositions 4, 5 and 6 would be relevant for the pre-- sent discussion.\n\nThey are as under : \"( 4).\n\nWhen a domestic enquiry has been held by the management and the management relies on the same, it is open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue and also ask for an opportunity to dducc evidence before the Tribunal, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management.\n\nHowever elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be, under such circumstances, it is open to rhe Tribunal to de_al, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of_thc management, then no additional evidence need be cited by the !]lanagement. But, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against \\he nw.nagement, the Tribunal wi1! have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence contra, as the request to adduce evidence had been made by the management to the Tribunal dnrigg the course of the proceedings and before the trial has come to an end.\n\nWhen the preliminary issue is decided against the management and the latter leads evidence before the Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be, that the management is deprived of the benefit of having the finding of the domestic Tribunal being accepted as prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct.\n\nOn the other hand, the m'!]l_agement wilt have to prove, by adducing proper evidence, that the workman is guilty of misconduct and that the action taken by it is proper. It will not be just and fair either to the manage-- me\"nt or to the workman that the Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and thereby ask the management to make a further application, after holding a proper enquiry, and deprive the workman of 'the benefit of the Tribunal itself being satisfied, on evidence adduced before it, that he was er was not guilty of the alleged misconduct.\n\n• (\n\ns. CHAKRAV~RTI v. BRITAN1'1A BhCli!T (Desai, J.) 1183\n\n(5).\n\nThe management has got a right to attcmvt tu sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal. But the management should vai\\ itself of the said opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has been available of, or asked for by the management, before the proceedings are closed, the employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity.\n\nThe Tribunal will have before it only the enquiry proceedings and it has to decide whether the procecdin~ h.ive been held properly and the findings recorded therein are also proper-\n\n( 6). If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ak for an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribun(tl is onlv to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as well '\" the findi'ng record•od therein and decide the matter.\n\nIf the Tribunal decides that the domestic enquiry has riot been held properly, it is not its function to invite suo moto the empkyer to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it.\"\n\nThe point worthy of note is that the contention of the appellant that there is something like an obligatory duty of the Industrial Tribunal to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence if it so choose,, after recording a specific finding on the preliminary issue whether there was no enquiry or the one held was defective has been, in terms\n\na, nd derncnstrably negatived.\n\nAs a corollary a principJe was enunciated that such an opportunity should be availed of by the employer by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings\n\nare closed. If no such opportunity has been asked for by the management before the proceedings are closed the employer can make no grievance 1hat the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity.\n\nThe ghos: of any obligatory duty cast on a quasi-judicial authority, viz., Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal to notify one of the parties to the proceedings before it, what it should do or what are its rights and by what procedure it should prove its case, even when the party is a well entrenched employer, ably assisted by the best available talent in the legal profession. was laid to rest We would presently examine Cooper E11gi11eeri11g Ltd. case (supra) where the employer made some attempt to infuse life into that ghost but that decision rests on the facts of the case.\n\nIn this case the fact that before the final order\n\nA was pronounced by the Tribunal a written requet was made on behalf of the employer for adducing additional evidence to sustain the charge on which the Tribunal appears to hav~ passed no :>rder, wrui held insufficient by this Coun to £._ntertain a contention that the employer was denied any such opportunity.\n\nReference was next made to Workmen of Messrs. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Management & Ors.(') Contention raised therein was that by the introduction of s. l lA with its proviso in the Act the legislature has once and for ever put its final seal upon the controversy whether the employer who hai failed to hold proper, legal and valid domestic enquiry before takin.!, puniti•e action, was entitled to adduce fresh evidence when the matter iJ brought before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal eithe.r under s. 10 or under s. 33 of the Act.\n\nThe proviso to S llA provides that the Labour Coun or the Industrial Tribunal in a proceeding\n\nunder e. llA shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter. This contention was in terms negatived by this Court observing that at the time of introducing s. l lA in the Act legislature must have been aware of the long line oi decisions of this Court enunciating several principles bearing on the subject and therefore it is difficult to accept that by a single stroke of pen by the expression used in the proviso to s. 11 A all these principles were set at naught.\n\nThis Court then exhaustively reviewed all the previous decisions bearing on the subject r.nd iormulated the principles emerging therefrom. The relevant principles\n\nare 4, 6, 7 and 8.\n\nThey read as under :\n\n\" ( 4). Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found 1 to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give an opportunity io the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action; and\n\n(5). x x x x x x x x x x x x\n\n( 6).\n\nThe Tribu.al gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justificatiot of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after tlte H enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective.\n\n01 [1973] 3 S. C.R. 587.\n\n• \\\n\ns. CHAKRAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1185\n\n(7) It has never been recognised that the. Tribunal A should straightaway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it jg found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective.\n\n(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, thy Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the Management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct\".\n\nThe noticeable feature of principle 8 is that an employer who wants D to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If any such opportunity has been asked for the Tribunal has no power to refuse. But it is not for a moment suggested that there is some duty or obligation as a matter of law cast upon the Tribunal to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence even if F. no such opportunity is sought by the employer. At page 610 the Court has observed that the stage at which the employer has to ask foe such au opportunity has been pointed out by the Court in D.elhi Cloth .& General Mills Co. case (supra) and the ratio of the decision was affirmed\n\nIn the quest of the principle bearing on the subject we come to the last decision relying on which the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Letters Patent Appeal allowed a contention to be raised for the first time and remanded the matter back to the Industrial Tribunal. It was said that the point decided by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is no more res integra and is concluded by the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case (supra) In that case the workman was dismissed by the employer and an industrial dispute arising out of the termination of service was referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court found that the domestic enquiry was defective and directed reinstatement of the workman. In appeal by the employer company it was contended that the Labour Court failed to give an opportunity to the employer to adduce additional evidence to\n\nsustain the charge after recording a finding that the domestic enquiry held by the employer was defective. This Court referred to propositions nos. 4, 5 and 6 in the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case and propositions Nos. 4. 6, 7 and 8 in the case of Workmen of Messrs. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. case and posed to itself a question as to what is the appropriate stage, specifically adverted to in the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case when the Court is now required to seriously consider that the opportunity should be given to the employer to adduce evidence. The Court then recorded its opinion as under :\n\n\"We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy betwee1' the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounce<l it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue\".\n\nlt was contended that this Court has in unambiguous and incontrovertible terms laid down that there is an obligatory duty in Jaw fastened on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal dealing with a case of punitive termination of service either under s. 10 or s. 33 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there is any such request to _\n\n• '\n\nthat effect or not, to raise a preliminary issue as to whether domestic .. enqniry alleged to have been held by the employer is proper or defec- _ ,. live and then record a formal finding on it and if the finding is in favour of the workman the employer should be called upon which must demonstrate on record, without waiting for any such request or demand or pleading from the employer, to adduce further evidence to sustain the charge of misconduct if it so chooses to do. We are afraid that much is being read into the observation of this Court which is not either expressly or by necessary implication stated. There is nothing to suggest that in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case this Court specifically overruled the decision in R. K. Jain's case where the Court in terms negatived the contention of the employer that there is an obligatory duty in law on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give an opportunity to the employer irrespective of the fact whether it is.\n\ns. CHA.KRAVARTI l'. BRITANN!A BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1187\n\nasked for or not to adduce additional evidence after recording a finding on the preliminary issue that either no domestic enquiry was held or the 0ne held was defective. It would be advantageous to refer to an observation of this Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case at page 53. where after examining the ratio of the decision in R. K. Jain's case thi> Court held that there was no question of opportunity to adduce evidence having been denied by the Tribunal as the appellant therein had made no such request and that the contention that the Tribunal should have given an opportunity sllo motu to adduce evidenct was not accepted in the circumstances of that case. This observation in fact rejects the contention that there is any such obligatory duty cast by law on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give such an opportunity to the employer and then leave it to the sweet will of the employer either 10 avail it or not.\n\nThis view in R. K Jain's case was re-affirmed in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case and there is nothing in the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case that that case overrules the two earlier decisions. It was not possible so to do because the decision in the Management of Ritz Theatre wherein even though the application for adducing additional evidence was given before the Tribunal passed its final order, this Court declined to interfere saying that such a request was made at a very. late stage and that is the decision of three judges and the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case is equally a decision of three judges.\n\nFurther, the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case does not propose to depart from the ratio of the earlier decisions because this Court merely posed a question to itself as to what is the appropriate stage at which the opportunity has to be given to the employer to adduce additional evidence, if it so chooses to do. Merely the stage is indicated, namely,' the srage after decision on the preliminary issue about the validity of the enquiry. Cooper Engineering Ltd. case is not en authority fur the proposition in every case coming before the I , abour Court or Industrial Tribunal under s. 10 or s. 33 of the Arf complaining about the punitive termination of service following a domestic enquiry that the Court or Tribunal as a matter of low must first frame a preliminary issue and proceed to decide the velidi!Y or otherwise of the enquir) and then serve a fresh notice on the employer by calling upon the employer to adduce further evidence to sustain the charges if it so chooses to do. No section of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder was read to pin-point such an obligatory duty in law upon\n\nthe Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. No decision was relied upon; to show that such is the duty of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. This Court merely indicated the stage where such oppor- H tunity should be given meaning thereby if and when it is sought. This reading of the ision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case is consistent\n\n!188 SUPl!.EME COUAT REPORTS\n\n\nwith the decision in Ritz Theatre case because there as the application for permission. to adduce additional evidence was made at a late stage the Tribunal rejected it and this Court declined to interfere. Now, if the ratio of the Cooper Engineering Ltd. case is to be read to the effect that in every case as therein indicated it is an obligatory duty of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to giYe an opportunity after recording the finding on the preliminary issue adverse to the employer to adduce additional evidence it would run counter to the decision in Ritz Theatre case. Such is not the ratio in Cooper Engineering case. When read in the context of the propositions called out in Delhi Cloth & General 'Mills Co. case and the Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. case, the deision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely indicates the stage at which an opportunity is to be given but it must not be overlooked that the opportunity has to be asked for. Earlier clear cut pronouncements of the Court in R. K. Jain's case and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case that this right to adduce additional evidence is a right of the management or the employer and it is to be availed of by a request at appropriate stage and there is no duty in Jaw cast on the Industrial Tribunal 01 the Labour Court to give such an opportunity notwithstanding the fact that none was ever asked for are not even departed from. When we examine the matter on principle we would point out that a quasijudicial Tribunal is under no such obligation to acquaint parties appearing before it about their rights more so in an adversary system which these quasi-judicial Tribunals have adopted. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the rights which the employer has in law to adduce additional evidence in a proceeding before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. either under s. 10 or s. 33 of the Act questioning the legality of the order terminating service must be availed of by th.e employer by making a proper request at the time when it files its statem.ent of claim or written statement or makes an application seeking either permission to take a certain action or seeking approval of the action taken by it. If such a request is made in the statement of claim, application or written statement, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal must give such an opportunity. If the request is made before the proceedings are concluded the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal should ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evidence.\n\nBut if no such request is made at any stage of the proceedings, there is no duty in Jaw cast on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give such an opportunity and if there is no such obligatory duty in law failure to give any such opportunity cannot and would not vitiate the proceedins.\n\n• '\n\n• ,. -\n\ns. CHAKRAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1189\n\nHaving examined the matter on precedent it would he worthwhile to examine the matter on principle. The Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal to which either a reference under s. 10 or an application under s. 33 for permission to take an intended action or approval of an action already taken is made, would be exercising quasi-judicial powers, which would imply that a certain content of the judicial power of the State is vested in it and it is called upon to exercise it (see Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.).(') A quasi judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves presentation of their case by the parties to\n\nthe dispute and if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties . C to the dispute and often with the assistance of arguments by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence (see Cooper v. Wilson) ,(2) Parties are arrayed before these quasi judicial Tribunals either upon a reference under s. lO ors. 33. There is thus a lis between the parties.\n\nThere would be assertion and denial of facts on either side. With the permission of the Tribunal and consent of the opposite side, parties are entitled to appear through legal practitioners before these quasijudicial Tribunals. The system adopted by these Tribunals is an adversary system, a word as understood in contradistinction to inqnisitorial system. This also becomes clear from rule lOB(l) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which provides that when a reference is made to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, within two weeks of the date of receipt of the order of reference the parties representing workmen and the employer involved in the dispute shall file with the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal a statement of demands relying only upon issues which are included in the order of reference and shall also forward a copy of such statement to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute. Sub-rule (2) provides that within two weeks of receipt of the statement referred to in sub-rule ( 1) the opposite party shall file its rejoinder with the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal as the case may be and simultaneously forward a copy thereof to the other party. Sub-rule ( 4) provides that the hearing of the dispute shall ordinarily be continued from day to day and arguments shall follow immediately after the closing of the evidence. Sub-rule ( 6) casts a duty on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, to make a memorandum of the substance of the proceedings of what the witnesses depose and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Presiding Officer.\n\n(i) [1950] SCR 459.\n\n(2) [1937] 2 KB 309\n\nRule 15 confers power to admit a call for evidence.\n\nRuic 16 enables the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal to administer oath.\n\nRule 60 prescribes the form of application to be made under s .. 33. The application has to be in Form J or K, as the case may be, and has to be on verification. The cause-title in the prescribed form requires that the applicant and the opposite party should be specifically described in the application. These forms are more or less analogous to a plaint iu a suit and the reply to be filed would take more or less the form of a written statement. Where the parties are at variance for facility of disposal issues will have to be framed. It is open to it to frame an issue and dispose it of as a preliminary issue as held in MI s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. v. Its Workmen('). Parties have to lead evidence. Section\n\n11 C confers power of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure on the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal in respect of matters therein specified. The Labour Court or Tribunal would then proceed to decide the /is between the parties. lt has to decide the /is on the evidence adduced before it. While it may not be hide bound by the rules prescribed in the Evidence Act it is nontheless a quasi-judicial Tribunal proceeding to adjudicate upon a /is between the parties arrayed before it and must decide the matter on the evidence produced by the parties before it. It would not be open to it to decide the /is on any extraneous considerations. Justice, equity and good conscience will inform its adjudication. Therefore, the Labour Court or the Jndustrial Tribunal bas all the trappings of a Court.\n\nIf such be the duties and functions of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, any party appearing before it must make a claim or demur th<~ claim of the other side a\"nd when there is a burden upon it to prove or establish the fact so as to invite a decision in its favour, F it has to lead evidence. The quasi-judicial tribunal is not required to advise the party either about its rights or what it should do or omit to do. Obligation to lead evidence or establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would he who would fail if no evidence is Jed. It must seek an opportunity to lead\n\nevidence and lead evidence. A contention to substantiate which evidence is necessary has to be pleaded. If there is no pleading raising a contention there is no question of substantiaing such a non-exiting contention by evidence. It is well settled that allegation which is not pleaded, even if there is evidence in support of it, cannot be examined because the other side has no notice of it and if entertained it would tantamount to granting an unfair advantage to the first mentioned party. We are not unmindful of the fact that pleadings before such tribunals have not to be read strictly, but it is equally true that the pleadings must be (i)(197o)Lr, bour & Incustrial CLscs 350.\n\n• '\n\ns. CHAKRAVARTI v. BRITANNIA BISCUIT (Desai, J.) 1191\n\n• •\n\n:; uch as to give sufficient notice to the other party of. the case it is called upon to meet. This view expressed in Tin Printers (Private)\n\nLtd. v. Industrial Tribunal,(') commends to us. The rules of fair play demand that where a party seeks to establish a contention which if proved would be sufficient to deny relief to the opposite side, snch a contention has to be specifically pleaded and then proved. But if there is no pleading there is no question of proving something which is not pleaded. This is very elementary .\n\n- Can it for a moment be suggested that this elementary principle ~·~ does not inform industrial adjudication ? The answer must be an emphatic 'no'. .\n\nThe employer terminates the service of a workman. That termination raises.an i.ndustrial dispute either by way of an application under s. 33 of the Act by tl1e employer or by way of a reference by the appropriate Government under s. 10. If an application is made by the employer as it is required to be made in tbc prescribed form all facts are required to be pleaded. If a relief is asked for in the alternative that has to be pleaded. In an application under s. 33 the employer has to plead that a domestic enquiry has been held and it is legal and valid.\n\nIn the alternative it must plead tl1at if the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that either there was no enquiry or the one held was defective, the employer would adduce evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct alleged against the workman.\n\nNow, if no such pleading is put forth either at the initial stage or during the pendency of the proceedings there arises no question of a sort of advisory role of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal unintended by the Act to advise the employer, a party much better off than the workman, to inform it about its rights, namely, the right to lead addi-\n\n,..,~- tionaI evidence and then give an opportunity which was never sought. .l This runs counter to the grain of industrial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, if such a pleading is raised and an opportunity is scught, it is to be given but if there is no such pleading either in the original application or in the statement of claim or written statement or by way of an application during the pendency of the proceedings there is no duty \" •\n\ncast by law or by the rules of justice, reason and fair play that a quasijudicial Tribunal like the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court should adopt an advisory role by informing the employer of its rights, namely, the right to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges when it failed to make good the domestic enquiry and then to give an opportunity to it to adduce additional evidence. This, apart from being unfair to the workman, is against the principles of rules\n\n(I} 1957 L. L. J. 677 at p. 680.\n\ngoverning the procedure to be adopted by quasi-judicial Tribunal,. against the grain of adversary system and against the principles governing the decision of a Us between the parties arrayed before a quasijudicial Tribunal.\n\nHaving given our most anxious consideration to the question raised before us, and minutely examining the decision lin Cooper Engineering Ltd. case (supra) to ascertain the ratio as well as the question raised both on precedent and on principle, it is undeniable that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudi- - eating upon a penal termination of service of a workman either under _> ... .,.. s.10 or under s. 33 to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct by giving some specific opportunity after decision on the preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was at all held, or if held, was defective, in favonr of the workman. Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely specifies the stage at which such opportunity is to be given, if sought. It is both the right and obligation of the employer, if it so chooses, to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct. It is for the employer to avail of such opportunity by a specific pleading or by specific request. If such an opportunity is sought in the course of the proceeding the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, should grant the opportunity to lead additional evidence to substantiate the charges.\n\nBut if no such opportunity is sought noi' there is any pleading to that effect no duty is cast on the Labour Court•or the Industrial Tribunal suo motu to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges.\n\nViewed from this angle. in the present case there was neither a pleading in which any such claim for adducing additional evidence was made, nor any request was made before the Industrial Tribunal till the~' proceedings were adjourned for making the Award and till the Award t' was made. The case squarely falls within the ratio of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case. Therefore, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was clearly in error in granting such a non-sought opportunity at the stage of the Letters Patent Appeal.\n\n, - Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 80/74 is set aside and the Award of the Industrial Tribunal is restored with costs quantified at Rs. 2,000/-.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 138, "entities": [{"text": "TI\n\nBRITANNIA BISCUIT CO. LTD. & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BRITANNIA BISCUIT CO. LTD. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 4, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRrsHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ]\n\nI11dus1rial Disputes Act, 1947, Sectio11 33(2)(b)-Whether the IndUJtrial \" j T; ibunal, not deciding the validity of the enquiry aga."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRrsHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violence Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 677, "end_char": 709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1038, "end_char": 1048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violence Act, 1970", "statute": "Prevention of Violence Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "15th September 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1482, "end_char": 1501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly by its AWaird dated 15th September 1973, the Tribunal rejected the application for approval of the action terminating service of the appellant made by the Company."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Calcutta High Court held that after the Industrial Tribunal ."}}, {"text": "section 33(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2931, "end_char": 2941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Cooper Engi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cooper Engi neering Ltd. case is not an authority for the proposition that every case coming before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 or Section 33 of the Act complaining about th'e punitive termination of service following a\n\n• (\n\ndomestic enquiry that the Coun or Tribunal as a matter of law must frame a preliminary issue and proceed to decide the validity or otherwise of the enquiry and then serve a ftesh notice on the employer to adduce further evidente to sustain tho charges if it so chooses to do."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3359, "end_char": 3369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3373, "end_char": 3383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "[1976] 1 SCR 361", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3775, "end_char": 3791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 SCR 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4940, "end_char": 4955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5945, "end_char": 5955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 SCR 684", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 SCR 461", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1965] 3 SCR 588", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7207, "end_char": 7223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1972] 1 SCR\n\n755", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7269, "end_char": 7286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 SCR 587", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7457, "end_char": 7473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7594, "end_char": 7688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7887, "end_char": 7897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8532, "end_char": 8537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Vice of a workman by the employer whose undertaking is governed by the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8873, "end_char": 8878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9422, "end_char": 9427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9619, "end_char": 9624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9783, "end_char": 9788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10531, "end_char": 10536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11052, "end_char": 11062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11087, "end_char": 11097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "While it may not be hide bound by the rules prescribed in the Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12483, "end_char": 12557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14765, "end_char": 14775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14959, "end_char": 14964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. Das Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17111, "end_char": 17123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Das Gupta and Mrs. L. Arvind1 for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "L. Arvind1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17133, "end_char": 17143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Das Gupta and Mrs. L. Arvind1 for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17164, "end_char": 17178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, Anand Prakash, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, Mukul Mudgal and Mrs. Anand Prakash for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Anand Prakash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17180, "end_char": 17193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, Anand Prakash, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, Mukul Mudgal and Mrs. Anand Prakash for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17195, "end_char": 17207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, Anand Prakash, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, Mukul Mudgal and Mrs. Anand Prakash for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "C. B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17209, "end_char": 17220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, Anand Prakash, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, Mukul Mudgal and Mrs. Anand Prakash for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17222, "end_char": 17234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, Anand Prakash, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, Mukul Mudgal and Mrs. Anand Prakash for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17323, "end_char": 17328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. The hollow plea of the employer of an alleged denial of an opportunity (never claimed at any stage except in Letters Patent Appeal) to subsantiate an alleged misconduct of the workman by evidence aliurule has been responsible fur dragging a tiny dispute rendering the workman jobless for an unusually long period of more than 7 years to this apex court."}}, {"text": "apex court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17675, "end_char": 17685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. The hollow plea of the employer of an alleged denial of an opportunity (never claimed at any stage except in Letters Patent Appeal) to subsantiate an alleged misconduct of the workman by evidence aliurule has been responsible fur dragging a tiny dispute rendering the workman jobless for an unusually long period of more than 7 years to this apex court."}}, {"text": "1st October 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18127, "end_char": 18143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st October 1970 around 5 p.m. appellant is alleged to have hoisted two red flag!"}}, {"text": "Manik Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18343, "end_char": 18358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is alleged to have threatened the shift Manager Shri Manik Mukherjee who was on duty at the relevant time."}}, {"text": "1st October\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18613, "end_char": 18630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent employer felt aggrieved by such indi.!cipline exhibited by the appellant and decided to hold a disciplinary enquiry, as a first step towards which, a chargsheet dated 1st October\n\n1970 was served upon the appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation within three days from the receipt of the charge-sheet."}}, {"text": "3rd October 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18779, "end_char": 18795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on 3rd October 1970 first respondent company declar\\'(l a lock out."}}, {"text": "10th October 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18883, "end_char": 18900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant submitted his explanation on 10th October 1970 denying all the charges and complaining that as he is a trade union leader he is being singled out for victimi8atiou."}}, {"text": "2nd December 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19166, "end_char": 19183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day appellant was arrested by poli'oe and some criminal case, waslodged\n\nagainst him' in which he was discharged by the Magistrate on 2nd December 1970."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19352, "end_char": 19364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somehow or the other the Management did not proceed with the enquiry till as late as 30th June 1971 when the appellant was informed that the enquiry wonld be held on July 8, 1971."}}, {"text": "meantime the appellant was detained under the Prevention of Violence Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19374, "end_char": 19452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20449, "end_char": 20459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the meantime the appellant was detained under the Prevention of Violence Act, 1970", "statute": "In the meantime the appellant was detained under the Prevention of Violence Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20475, "end_char": 20504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20695, "end_char": 20703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20754, "end_char": 20765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "128/71 under s. 33(2) (b) of the Act bmore the III Industrial Trjbunal, West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21368, "end_char": 21388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21416, "end_char": 21438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company preferred a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "s. 33(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22915, "end_char": 22926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23238, "end_char": 23243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23801, "end_char": 23806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23857, "end_char": 23862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24496, "end_char": 24501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24835, "end_char": 24840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25282, "end_char": 25287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25454, "end_char": 25459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25652, "end_char": 25657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25806, "end_char": 25811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26576, "end_char": 26581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27088, "end_char": 27096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29296, "end_char": 29304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the company formulated his contention thus : When an industrial dispute touching the punitive termination of service of a workman is brought before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, either under s. 10 or s. 33 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether the employer has made any express or implied request in its application or in the course of proceedings either orally or in writing, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal must as an obligation in Jaw at the initial stage of the proceeding frame a preliminary issue as to whether the domestic enquiry was in fact held and if held, was in accordance with the Standing Orders or the principles of natural justice or was in any manner defective."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29532, "end_char": 29537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29541, "end_char": 29546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooper Engineering Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30809, "end_char": 30832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Tarkunde this proposition is no more res integra and is concluded by the decision of this Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case (supra)."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31316, "end_char": 31321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33948, "end_char": 33953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharat Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34811, "end_char": 34829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Negativing this contention after referring to Bharat Sugar Mills case, (supra) this Court expressed an opinion that there is no authority for the proposition that whenever the employer seeks to lead additional evidence before the Tribunal in respect of dismissal of its employee it must necessarily follow that he has given up his stand based on the previous departmental enquiry and the Tribunal is entitled to examine the dispute on merits itself and on the priuciples of fair play aud justice the proposition is unsound."}}, {"text": "(1963] 3 S. C. R. 461", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36367, "end_char": 36388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37751, "end_char": 37756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1965] 3 S. C. R. 588", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39033, "end_char": 39054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sasa Misa Sugar Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39227, "end_char": 39248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sasa Misa Sugar Works (P)\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "[1960] 1 SCR 32", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39335, "end_char": 39350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 SCR 684", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39525, "end_char": 39541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Phulbari Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40019, "end_char": 40038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that three of these cases, except Phulbari Tea Estate's case, were on applications under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, But in principle we see no difference whether the matter comes before the Tribunal for approval under s. 33 or on a reference under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40074, "end_char": 40079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40087, "end_char": 40116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40220, "end_char": 40225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40250, "end_char": 40255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40263, "end_char": 40286, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40607, "end_char": 40612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41846, "end_char": 41864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in a reference made by the Central Government the Industrial Tribunal !"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41915, "end_char": 41925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jeld that the respondent R. K. Jain was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to produce evidence his defence during the enquiry and that the management was not justified in terminating his service on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43042, "end_char": 43059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in M/ s.\n\nHindustan Steel Ltd. v. Their Workmen.("}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43143, "end_char": 43168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 ) A contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Industrial Court."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43391, "end_char": 43407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attention of the Court was also drawn to a decision of a learned single Judge of lhe Delhi High Court in Prem Nath Motors Workshop Pvt."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh and Delhi High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43853, "end_char": 43889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Contrary view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh and Delhi High Courts was thit it is a healthy practice that after coming to the conclusion that .,"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44195, "end_char": 44205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus this Court in R. K. Jain's case was clearly seized of the conflict of opinion and the controversy raised was whether there was any obligation in Jaw on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, notwithstanding that no such request was made by the employer, to call upori\n\n(I) [1972] 1 S.C.R. 755.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "[1972] 1 S.C.R. 755", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44460, "end_char": 44479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44601, "end_char": 44638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt..\n\nthe employer to adduce additional evidence to sustain \\he charges after a formal preliminary order is recorded that either there was no domestic enquiry or the."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48435, "end_char": 48440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48662, "end_char": 48667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooper E11gi11eeri11g Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54844, "end_char": 54870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was laid to rest We would presently examine Cooper E11gi11eeri11g Ltd. case (supra) where the employer made some attempt to infuse life into that ghost but that decision rests on the facts of the case."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55906, "end_char": 55911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55921, "end_char": 55926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56513, "end_char": 56518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 S. C.R. 587", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 57427, "end_char": 57447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D.elhi Cloth .& General Mills Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58964, "end_char": 58997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 610 the Court has observed that the stage at which the employer has to ask foe such au opportunity has been pointed out by the Court in D.elhi Cloth .&"}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60097, "end_char": 60128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 5 and 6 in the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case and propositions Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61575, "end_char": 61580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61584, "end_char": 61589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CHA.KRAVARTI l'. BRITANN!A BISCUIT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62655, "end_char": 62689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. CHA.KRAVARTI l'."}}, {"text": "R. K Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63666, "end_char": 63675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view in R. K Jain's case was re-affirmed in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. case and there is nothing in the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case that that case overrules the two earlier decisions.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64881, "end_char": 64886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64890, "end_char": 64895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ritz Theatre", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66346, "end_char": 66358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, if the ratio of the Cooper Engineering Ltd. case is to be read to the effect that in every case as therein indicated it is an obligatory duty of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to giYe an opportunity after recording the finding on the preliminary issue adverse to the employer to adduce additional evidence it would run counter to the decision in Ritz Theatre case."}}, {"text": "Cooper Engineering", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66390, "end_char": 66408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such is not the ratio in Cooper Engineering case."}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth & General 'Mills Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66474, "end_char": 66506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When read in the context of the propositions called out in Delhi Cloth & General 'Mills Co. case and the Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. case, the deision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely indicates the stage at which an opportunity is to be given but it must not be overlooked that the opportunity has to be asked for."}}, {"text": "Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66520, "end_char": 66565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When read in the context of the propositions called out in Delhi Cloth & General 'Mills Co. case and the Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. case, the deision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely indicates the stage at which an opportunity is to be given but it must not be overlooked that the opportunity has to be asked for."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67646, "end_char": 67651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67655, "end_char": 67660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68851, "end_char": 68856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68881, "end_char": 68886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72301, "end_char": 72312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72352, "end_char": 72379, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "While it may not be hide bound by the rules prescribed in the Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72611, "end_char": 72685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75316, "end_char": 75321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75411, "end_char": 75416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75642, "end_char": 75647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lin Cooper Engineering Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 77672, "end_char": 77699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having given our most anxious consideration to the question raised before us, and minutely examining the decision lin Cooper Engineering Ltd. case (supra) to ascertain the ratio as well as the question raised both on precedent and on principle, it is undeniable that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudi- - eating upon a penal termination of service of a workman either under _> ... .,.."}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77991, "end_char": 77995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78005, "end_char": 78010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1193_1216_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "~ 1193\n\nBACHAN SINGH S/0 SAUDAGAR SINGH A\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND P. S, KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nPenal Code'-Death penalty-When can be imposed-Judges-If have power to reduce sentence of death to one of life imprisonment-Raiendra\n\n.::-~·:Prasad's case-If a valid precedent.\n\n...\n\n...\n\nHELD : (Per Sark>1ria, J.)\n\nThe records of this case be submitted to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench which would resolve the doubts, difficulties and inconsistencies pointed out by Kailasam J. in his order, particularly in its last\n\nparagraph.\n\n(Per Kailasam, J.)\n\n1. Before the amendment of Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1955 (Act 26 of\n\n1955) was introduced, the normal sentence for an offence of murder was death and the lesser sentence was the exception. After the introduction of the amendment it was not obligatory for the court to state the reasons as to why the sentence of death was not passed.\n\nBy the amendment the discretion of the court in deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or imprisonment for life became wider. The court was bound to exercise its judicial discretion in awarding one or the other of the sentences. By the introduction of Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the normal sentence is the Jesser sentence of imprisonment for life and if the sentence of death is to be awarded, special reasons will have to be recorded. In other words, the court, before imposing a sentence of death, should be satisfied that the offence is of such a nature that the extreme penalty~ called for. [1203A-C] .-(\n\n2. In a number of decisions, this court has reiterated the position that under section 354(3) of the 1973 Code, the court is required to state the reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death special reasons are required to be stated. [1203D]\n\nBalwant Singh v. State of Punjab [1976] 2 S.C.R. 684; Ambaram v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1976] 4 S.C.C. 298; and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma\n\n\nthat the Judges are invested with very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment and that discretion in the matter of sentence is liable 20-409SCij79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nto be corrected by superior courts, that exercise of judicial discretion on well recognized principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused.\n\n[1204C-D]\n\n4. Section 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code which came into force on April 1, 1974, after the judgment in Jagmohan Singh's case, provides that the judgment shall state the special reasons where a sentence of death is awacd- ..-b ed fo~ an oenc: punishable with d'eath or in the alternave with im.pruonment\\.,\n\nfor life or tmpnsonment for a term of years.\n\nThe reqmrement that courts~-.,.. should state the special reasons for awarding the death sentence would indicate that the normal sentence for an offence punishable either with death or with imprisonment for life is imprisonment for life and that if the court considered that sentence of death is appropriate on the particular facts of the case it should give special reasons. [1204 G-H]\n\n5. But in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916, the majority of a Division Bench of this Court held that \"special reasons\" necessary for imposing the death penalty must relate not to the crime as such but to the . criminal. The death sentence can be awarded only in certain restricted categories where a crime holds out a durable and continuing threat to social security in the setting of a developing country and poses a grave peril to soCiety's survival and when an economic offender intentionally mixes poison in drugs and knowingly and intentionally causes death for the sake of private profit and so on. The decision is in many respects contrary to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Jagmohan Singh's case.\n\nThe court in this case has proceeded to make law as regards the conditions that are necessary for imposition of a sentence of death under section 302 I.P.C. and to canalisation of sentencing discretion and has embarked on evolving working rules on punishment bearing in mind the enlightened flexibility of social sensibility. In Joing so the Court has exceeded its power conferred on it by law.\n\nCourts have no power to legislate and to frame rules to guide the infliction of death penalty.\n\n[1205C-F} )'--\n\n6. So far as the enacted law is concerned, the duty of the court is to interpret and construe the provisions of the enactment.\n\nCom1s must take it absolutely for granted that the Legislature has said what it meant and meant what it has said. Judges are not at liberty to add or to take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe the true sentence legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it.\n\nThough the courts are free to interpret, they are not free to overlook or disregard the constitution and the laW9.\n\n[1207B-DJ\n\n7. It is for the court to administer the law as it stands. In awarding sentence of death, the court has to take into consideration the various aspects regarding a crime and the reason for committing the crime and pass the appropriate sentence, and if it is death sentence, to give reasons as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. If in deciding a case on particular facts a principle is stated, it would be binding as a precedent. If courts resort to rulemaking, it will not be binding as a precedent. If the courts are to embark on rule-making the question arises whether the responsibility can be undertaken by a bench of three Judges with majority of 2 : 1. There is no machinery by which the court could ascertain the views of the various cross-sections of the society, which is a pre-requisite before any law-making is resorted to. In\n\n.,.\n\nBACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB\n\nJ.] 95\n\nRajendra Prasad's case the court embarked on framing rules prescribing conditions for the imposition of -death sentence. The view of the majority that in awa1ding a sentence the criminal is mon: important than the crime is not warranted by the law as it stands today.\n\nThe general principles laid down in Rajendra Prasad's case are not the ratio decidendi of the case. The enunciation of the reasons or the principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding betwen the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidndi ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. Statements which are not necessary to the decision, which go beyond the occasion and lay down a rule that is unnecessary for the purpose in hand have no binding authority on another court, though they may have merely persuasive efficacy. Decisions upon matter~ of facts are not binding on any other court.\n\n[1207G-H; 1202D-F]\n\n• Tribhuvandas v. R.atilal A.I.R.\n\n1968 S.C. 372 = 70 Bom.\n\nL. R. 73; Amritsar .Municipality v. Hazara Singh - A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1087; and Quinn y. Leqtham--19~01 A.C. 495 at p. 506; referred to ..\n\n8. In Rajendra Prasais cast the conclruion of the majority wa.~ that as nothing. on record suggested that the accused was beyond redemption and since the record did not iji.nt that uch an attempt was made inside the prison there was no special reason to award death sentence.\n\nThe utmost to which this ce can. b~ considered as an authority is that if in similar circumtances when , a person stabs two persons several times it would not furnish special reasons for infli<; f; ing tlw .. death penalty.\n\nIn tqe second case (Kunjukunju) the majority :was of the. vie~ that the test sl;10uld e. whether the accused was a social security risk altogether beyond salvage by therapeutic life sentence was neither in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Prucedl; lre nor. Jw laid down by. the Constitution Bench.\n\nTherefore, it cannot be followed as a predent.. Similarly, in the third case (Dubey's case) also the majority view that it would be illegal to award capital punishment without considering the correctional possibilities inside the _prison and that the accustd being young and of malleable age and other circumstances bearing on the offender called for the lesser sentence is not in conformity with the deci sions of this Court or the requirements of the law .. [1213H; 1214A-HJ ··\n\n9. In the instant case the appellant was released after undergoing a term\n\nof imprisonment for the murder of his wife.\n\nAfter release he lived with his cousin. When his cousin's son and wife objected to his stay with the family inflicted a fatal. injury on the son and two daughters of his cousin when they G were asleep and caused grievous injury on another daughter.\n\nThe courts below camo to the conclusion that the appellant acted in a very cruel manner.\n\nThey have rightly characterised the offence as heinous and held that the only appropriate sentence was the extreme penalty of death.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court were right in their conclusions. [1215 C-EJ\n\n!Rajendra Prasad's case cannot be treated as a binding precedent yet as it is a decision of a division bench of this Court. The papers were directed to be H placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench to rlecide the case.]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 273\n\nof 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-8-1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. A No. 234/78 and Murder Reference No. 3 j78.\n\nH. K. Puri, Amicus Curiae for the Appellant.\n\nR. S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSARKARIA, J.-While reserving my own opinion on the various question raised in this case including the one with regard to the scope, amplification and application of Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, I would, i:Q_ agreement with my learned brother, direct that the records of this Cl!.§.e be submitted the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, for constituting a larger Bench which would resolve the doubts, difficulties and inconsistencies pointed out by my learned brother in his 0rder, particularly, in its hist paragraph.\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This special leave petition is filed by Bachan Singh son of Saudagar Singh from jail against the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.\n\nThis Court ordered notice to the State and heard the counsel for the petitioner and the State and granted special leave.\n\nThe appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh.\n\nThe learned Judge found the appellant guilty o£ the three charges under s. 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to death on each count. He also found him guilty under s. 326, I.P.C., for causing grievous hurt with a sharp cutting weapon to Vidya Bai and sentenced him to tbree years' rigorous imprisonment and a fi'ne of Rs. 5001-. Against the convictions and sentences passed the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1978 to the High Court.\n\nThe appeal along with the Reference No. 3 of 1978 made by the trial Judge for confirmation of sentence of death were heard together by the High Court.\n\nThe High Court rejected the appeal and confirmed the convictions and sentenses passed on 1.he appellant.\n\nThe case for the prosecution briefly is that the appellant Bachan Singh was convicted under s. 302 I.P.C. for the murder of his wife ,..\n\n...\n\nBACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB (Kai/asam, J.) 1197\n\nand sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nAfter undergoing the term of imprisonment he was released.\n\nAfter the release he lived with his cousin(?) Hukam Singh P. W. 5 for about six months.\n\nHukam Singh's wife and son objected to the appellant living in their house.\n\nA few days prior to the occurrence Hukam Singh and his wife went to Nainital in connection with the marriage of their son Desa Singh.\n\nOn the night of the occurrence 4th July, 1977 Desa Singh son of Hukam Singh, Durga Bai, Veeran Bai ami Viuya. Bai the daughters of Hukam Singh were in the house.\n\nAfter taking their meals the three daughters slept in tbe inner courtyard, Durgabai in one cot and Veeran Bai and Vidya Bai in another cot near each other. Desa\n\nSingh, the son of Hukam Singh, and the appellant slept in the outer courtyard on two separate cots near each other.\n\nAt about midnight Vidya Bai P.W. 2 was awakened by the alarm and saw the appellant inflicting Kulhari (axe) blow on the face of her sister Veeran Bai.\n\nWhen Vidya Bai tried to get up the appellant gave Kulhari blow on her face and ear.\n\nShe was unable to speak and fell unconscious.\n\nDiwan Singh P.W. 12 who was sleeping at a distance of 3/4 Karms from the cots of Desa Singh and the appellant also woke up on hearing a shriek. He saw the appellant striking Desa Singh with a Kulhari.\n\nHe raised an alarm and Gulab Singh P.W. 3 who was sleeping at a distance of 50 feet from the cot of Desa Singh woke up and saw\n\nthe appellant hitting Desa Singh on the neck with a Kulhari. On an alarm qcing raised by the witnesses the appellant threw the Kulhari in the courtyard and ran away. Gulab Singh and Diwan Singh P.Ws. 3 and 12 gave a chase to the appellant but could not apprehend him. Soon after Kansbi Singh P.W. 4 and others arrived at th~ place of occurrence and heard from the wltnesses the deta.lls of the occurrence.\n\nA tractor was brought in which Durga Bai, Veeran Bai and Vidya were t_aken to the hospital at Fazilka. The Doctor who examined the dead bodies and the injured person gave the necessary certificates.\n\nHe also sent information to the A.S.I. P.W. 13 who went to' the hospital and recorded the statement from P.W. 12 on the basis of which the F.LR. was recorded at the police station at 4-20 a.m. on 5th July,\n\n1977. The police officer conducted the inquest and proceeded with his investigation.\n\nThe courts below found that the medical evidence fu1ly corroborated the testimony of the injured eye-witness P.W. 2 and two other eye-witnesses P.Ws. 3 and 12 and found that the prosecution had established its case beyor:d reasonable doubt.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court on a consideration of the evidence found that P.W. 2 Vidya Bai the daughter of Hukam Singh\n\n\nwho was sleeping along with her sisters in the house and suffered serious injuries, saw the attack by the appellant whe-n she woke up.\n\nThere is evidence that it was a moonlit night and there was sufficient light by which the assailant would have been identified. The trial court accepted the evidence of P.W. 2.\n\nThe High Court also found that the evidence of P.W. 2 is trustworthy. Both the courts below also relied on the testimony of the other two eye-witnesses P.Ws. 3 and\n\n12. P.W. 3 Gulab Singh was sleeping at a distance of 50 Karmas and got up after hearing the alarm and rushed to the scene. P.W. 12 was sleeping at a distance of 15 feet of Desa Singh.\n\nThe trial court as well as the High Court accepted the testimony of the two eye-witnesses\n\nP.Ws. 3 and 12.\n\nOn a consideration of the evidence of the eye-witnesses the High Court observed that the \"evidence provided by the eye-witnesses is of very high order in the case and was rightly accepted by the learned trial Judge.\" We have no hesitation in agreeing with the concurrent findings of the courts below and holding that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the death of the three deceased Desa Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai and grievous hurt to Vidya Bai P.W. 2.\n\nRegarding the sentence, the High Court observed \"The objection by Desa Singh, his mother and other family members was of a triffing nature on which the appellant acted in a very cruel manner. The vic:- tims had no cause to suspect the inttntions of the appellant and went to sleep. Taking advantages of the situation, when the victims could not defend, the appellant killed three and seriously wounded the fourth. It was by sheer luck that Vidya Bai survived. The manner in which the appellant perpetrated these crimes by killing these persons in their sleep is heinous. Under these circumstances, the case of the appellant for reduction of the sentence cannot be considered and in our view the sentence awarded by the learned trial Judge was the only appropriate sentence.\"\n\nThe crime is diabolic and \\rery cruel.\n\nHukam Singh, a cousin, accommodated the appellant in spite of the protests of his wife and son.\n\nWhile enjoying the hospitality at the dead of night when nobody had any suspicion the appellant committed in the most dastardly manner the crime.\n\nDesa Singh was sleeping in a cot by the side of the appellant. The appellant at the dead of night while the others were sleeping unsuspectedly hacked three persons to death.\n\nIt is only providential that the third daughter Vidya Bai escaped.\n\nThe crime in our view is one of the foulest that could be imagined and we are\n\nin entire agreement with the courts below about their assessment of the gravity of the crime-the only question for consideration is whether\n\n. )\n\nBACHAN SINGH v PUNJAB (K '/ . at asam, J.) 1199\n\nthe facts found would be special reasons fa d' tegcc as required under sec. 354(3) of ther ~ar 1?Crit?e .death sendure 1973. e 0 llllllal Procc-\n\nSection 302 I.P.C. and sub-sec. (3) of sect' a 354 f th d I 'I tl . ..\n\nIn o e Cr PC 197~ ea w1t 1 te Imposition of death sentence. Section 30., i p. provides :- -\n\n .C.\n\n''Whoever commits murder shall be punished wthd th · f lif 1 ca • or 1mpnsonment or e, and shall also be liable to fine.\"\n\nSub-sec. (3) of sec. 354 of the Code of Cr. Procedure, 1973,\n\n(Oats ·\n\n''When the conviction is for an offence punishable with dcJth or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for lire or imprisonment for a term of years, the Judgment shall smte the reasons for the scnt.:nce awarded, and, in the case of\n\nsentence o( death, tlic special reasons for such sentence.\"\n\nBefore the amendment of ec. 367(5} Cr. P.C. by the Criminal Proccdur.: Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act XXVI of 1955) which came into force on 1st January, 1965, on a conviction for an offence\n\nr:unishablc with dc!Jth if th~: Court sentenced the accused to any punishment other than death, the reason. :t'PY sentence of death .,.,'liS not passed had to be stated in the iudgment. Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 provided that \"if the accused is convicted of an offence punishable w1th death, !J.nd the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall, in its judgment state the reasons why sentence of\n\ndeth was not passed.\" This sub-section was construed bdvre the Amendment Act Act 26 of 1955 as meaning that the extreme sen~ tence is the nor~1al sentence and the mitigated sentence is the exception.\n\nL'l Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab,(') it was held tl1at in a case of murder, the death sentence should ordinarily be imposed unless the trying Judge,: for reasolLS which should norm:illy _be recorded consid<:rs it 12.roper to award the lesser penalty. Vazvdu Th.:var\n\nv. The State of Madras,(•) this Court c:\\presscd Its vtc:w at the qutstion or ~; entencc has to be determined, not with ufc:rcnce !0 te ':olumc or character of the evidence adduced by the prosecutiOn 10\n\nupport of the prosecutillll case, but with reference to the_ fact w?thcr th-· . . 1 1·h can be said to rotllgate - -.c arc any cxtcnuaung ctrcuntslances w t ~\n\n(I) A. J. R. 1953 S.C. 364\n\nQ) A. l. R. l'>S1 S. C. 61·1.\n\n\" G\n\nI Jl\n\n~\"\"'= I ' ,; ;) . ' ; i .' t r\n\n'; I\n\n,, '\n\n' I I\n\ni ~\n\nI J I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthe enormity of the crime. If the Court is satisfied that there are such\n\nt¢tigati!}_g circumstances, only then, it would be justified in imposing the lesser of the two sentences provided by law.\n\nThese two cases were rendered in relation to offences which were committed before the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act 26 of 1955 was enacted.\n\nThe law therefore prior to the amendment was that unless there are extenuating circumstances the punishment for murder should be death and not imprisonment for life.\n\nBy the Amendment Act 26 of 1955 a new sub-section, sub-section (5), was substituted for the former sub-section (5) by Act 26 of 1955 which does not contain the provision making it incumbent for a J lldge to record his reasons for imposing a lesser penalty. After the amendment which omitted the provision requiring the recording of reasons for imposing the lesser penalty, the Court is not under a statutory duty to record the reasons. Still as the Courts have to impose one of the two penalties, namely death or imprisonment for life, the Courts will have to exercise their judicial discretion in deciding which of the two pe_nalties shoulp be imposed. The resuit is that after the amendment though the Court is not required to record the reasons for imr.osing the lesser penalty it was bound to exercis~ its discretion judicially.\n\nTo show that the discretion has been judicially exercised, reasons are given for imposing the particular sentence. This makes it necessary for the court t9._ give its reasons for imposing the particular sentence though by the Amending Act the court was not required to give reasons for not imposing any punishment other than death.\n\nThe effect of the amendment has been stated by this Court in Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P., C) that after the amendmnt of section 367(5), Criminal Procedure Code, by Act 26 of 1955 the discretion of the court in deciding whether to impose the sentence of death or of imprisonment for life J.llis become wider.\n\nBy the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) sub. section (3) to section 354 was introduced regarding tl_!e contentc; of the judgment relating to imposition of a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years.\n\nSulJ..sec. (3) which deals with the conviction for an offence punishable with death or in the alternative with imprisonment for life or for a term of years in sentencing a person on conviction for such an offence the judgme!lt is required to state the reasons for the sentence awarded H and In the case of sentence of death the special reasons for such sentence. When the court in its discretion imposes either a sntence\n\n(1) {1972] 3 s. c. c. 79\n\n.. t\n\nBACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.) 1201\n\nof death or imprisonment for life or for imprisonment for a term of years, the Court is required to record reasons for imposing one or the other sentence which it can legally impose. As the Court has a discrtion to award a sentence of death or imprisonment for llf~ or imprisonment for a term of years and as the discretion is very wide the law - . requires that reasons sh!!ll be stated for awarding one or other of the\n\nsentencs. In the case of an offence under sec. 132, I.P.C., the punishment provided for is death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine.\n\nThere are other offences like the one under s. 131 I.P.C. which is punishabl~ with imprisonment for life or impriso\"nment for 10 years and fine.\n\nSections 121 (a), 122, 125, 12.8, !30, 131 IPC and other sections provide for the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years. In such cases under s. 3 54 ( 3) the Court is required to state reasons why one or other of the sentences is imposed.\n\nIn the case of offences punishable with death the sub-section requires that special reasons for imposing such 5entenc..:~ should be given.\n\nThis requirement makes it clear that where the punishment provided for _is death or imprisonment for life the sentence that should be imposed as of rule should be one of imprisonmen!- for life. But if he oence is of such a grave nature that he court thinks the higher of the penalties, namely the death sentence, should be imposed special reaSOJlS should be given.\n\nThus while.: the legislature retined the imposition of death sentence it laid clown that if the court awarded the death sentence it should furnish special reasons.\n\nIn Chapter 27 which relates to 'Judgments' there are other section~ which require that rea!'Olls should be given for imposing or not imposing a particular sentence. Sub-section\n\n( 4) to s. 354 requires that when the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year or more, but the Court imposes Sl sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months, it shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence.\n\nSuch reasons need not be recorded if the sentence is one of imprisonment till the rising of the court or unless the case was tried summarily under the provision of Cr. P.C. Section 361 requires that when the court could have dealt with (a) an accused person under s. 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, or\n\n(b) a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960, or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rhabi\n\nlitation of youthful offenders, but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons for not having done so. This section also requires special reasons to be given if the court has not dealt with the accused under the provisions mentioned.\n\nThe object of requiring the reasons to be given regarding the sentence could be\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS .\n\n[1979} 3 S.C.R.\n\nfound in tlie Law Commission's Report and the Report of the Joint\n\nParliamentary cOmmittee. -The Law Commission in \"vol I. 35th Report on the Capital Punishment expressed that a considerable\n\nbody of opinion is in favour of a provision requiring the Court to state it~ 'reasons for imposing the pullishme!!t either of death' or imprisonment for life.\n\nThe Commission was of the View that this would be a safeguard to ensure that the lower courts ~,-.amine the case as elaborately from the point of view of sentence as from the\n\npoint of Vlew of guilt and that it WOuld provide good matcmi at the time w11en a recommendation. for mercy is to be madeby the court\n\no~ _a p_<:ti!ionfor mercy is considered and _that it :would increase the confidence of; the people in courts by showing that the discretion is judicially exercised. t wo_!Ild also facilitate the task of High Court in appc~ -or in proceedings for confirmation in respect of the setttcnce (where the sentence awarded is that of death), or in proceed ings in_ revision for enliancement of the sentence (where the sentence awarded is one of .imprisonl!!ent for life). In its 41st Re-port on the Cr. P.C. the Law Commission recommending the amendment , . ' - also observed that there were certain offences for which the Penal Code prescribes the punishment as -death or in the alterri.ative \"life\n\nimprisonmt or imprisonment for term of years and therefore the amendment n; commended should cover these cases also.\n\nThe Joint Committee of Parliament added that a sentence of death is the extreme penalty of law and it is but fair that when a court -awards that sentence in a case where the alternative sentence of imprisonment for life is also available,· it should give special reason~ in support of the sentence. For giving effect to the recommendation of the Law Conlmission and the Joint Committee of Parliament sub- - - -F section (3) to section 354 was-amended in the present fonn. e object .·.of the mendmerit therefore is to insist on th~ lower courts to exaiiD_ne , te 'se' at elaborately from th~ point'\"of view of sentence as fl:o!ll th.e\n\npaint~_cf iew' f guilt and state i!s reasons for impoing the sentence. which \"wod help the High Court in discharging its functioru; patti-\n\n- Cularly in confirming ? sentence of death or enhancing a sentence of G imprisonment-for life to death. Thi(object is further sought to be achieved by the introduction of sub-section 2 . to s. 235 which provides an opport\\mity of hearing the accused on the question of sentence.\n\nThe provisio!l, requiring special_ reasons for awarding death sentence ,, __ ..\n\nmakes it also Clear that the normal sentence when punishment of death H or impriSonment for life cciuld be awarded is only imprisonment for life nd if the court imposes death sentence it. should give -special\n\nreasons.\n\n.,.\n\n• ...\n\n.J..\n\nBACIIAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Kailasam, /.) 1203\n\nThe development o{ law regarding the imposition of death sen:- :tcnce can be summariSed as follows. While before the Amending. Act 26 of 1955 was introduced the normal sentence for an offence of murder was death and that the lesser sentence is the exception, after the introductian of sub-s. {5) to s. 367 by Act 26 of 1955 it was ' not obligatory for the Court to state the reasons as to why the sentence\n\nof death was not passed. By the amendment the discretion of the Court in . deiding whether to impose a sentence of death or imprisonment for life became wider. The court was bound to exercise its judicial -discretion in awarding one or the other of the sentences. By the intro- duction of s. 354(3) the normal sentence is the !esser sentence of imprisonment for life and if the sentence of death is to be awarded special reasons will have to be recorded. In other words, the court before imposing a sentence of death should be satisfied that the offence is of such a nature that the extreme penalty is called for. The decisions rendered by this Court after the introduction of the amendment to s. 354(3) by Act 2 of 1974 have reiterated this position. In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab(') this Court summing up the position observed that under s. 354(3) of the Cr. P.C., 1973, the ouit is Tequired to state the reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death si>ecial reasons are required to be stated.. It -would thus be n .... oticed that awarding of the sentence other than the\n\nsentence of death is the general rule now and only special reasons, 1hat is to say, special facts and circumstances in. a given case, will warrant the passing of the death sentence. This view was reiterated by this Court in Ambaram v. The State of Madhya Pradesh.(2 ) In Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma v. State of Madliya Pradesh(3 ) it was observed that this Court has in several cases indicated guidelines in this problem area of life and death. as a result cf judicial verdict but none -of .these guidelines can be cut and dry nor. exhaustive and ea.Ch case will depend upon the totality of the facts and ciicumstances and other 111atters revealed.\n\nThe validity of imposition of death sentence was challenged on the ground that the sentence puts an end to all Fundamental Rights .-• guaranteed by clauses (a} to (g) of sub-clause (I) of Art. 19 of the Constitution and therefore the law with regard to capital sentence is . \"\" 'wueasonable and not in the interest of the general public. It was • _ _ futther contended that the discretion invested. in the Judges to impose r -. :capital punishment is not based on any standard or policy required by\n\n'the Legislature for imposing capital punishment in preference .. to\n\n(I) [1976] 2 S.C. R. 684.\n\nCl) !1976] 4 S. C: C. 298\n\n(3) ti978]1_S. C. R. 560\n\n\nimprisonment for life. Further it was submitted that the uncontrolled and unguided discretion in the) Judges to impose capital punislm1ent or imprisonment for life is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution. Lastly, it was contended that the provisions of the law do not provide a procedure for trial of factors and circumstances crucial for making the choice between the capital penalty and imprisonment for life and therefore Art. 21 is violated. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P.C) rejected all these contentions.\n\nIt was held that the deprivation of life is constitutionally permissible _._ if that is done according to procedure established by law and that it~ cannot be bel~ that capital sentence is per se unreasonable or not in..6fll' the public interest. It was further held that the impossibility of laying - down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment. That discretion in the matter of sentence is liable to be corrected by superior Courts. The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the finat analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused. The challenge under Art. 14 was also negatived on the ground that the facts and circumstances of a crime are widely different, and, since a decision of the court as regards punishment is dependent upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, there is hardly any ground for a\n\ncl)allenge under Art. 14. The Court also negatived the plea that the provisions of law do not provide a procedure for trial of factors which are crucial for making the choice between the capital penalty and imprisonment for life. The Court rejected aU the challenges against the award of death sentence on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Constitution. It also upheld the investment of wide discretion\n\nin he matter of fixing the degree of punishment on the Judges as the\n\nexrcise of judicial discretion on well-recognise~ pr_inciples is the _safest -\"- possible safeguard for the accused. The Constltutwn Bench delivered I .1r its judgment on the 3rd October, 1972. Subsequently amendment to\n\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (Act 2 of 1974) came into fmce on 1st April, 197 4.\n\nThe only change by the new Act is the introduction of s. 367 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that the judgment shall state the special reasons where a sentence of death is awarded for an offence punishable with death or in the alternative with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years. The requirement that the courts should state the special reasons for awarding the death sentence would indicate that the normal sentence for an offence punishable either with death or with imprisonment for life is imprisonment for life and that if the court considered\n\n(I) [1973] 2 S C. R. 541\n\nBACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.) 1205\n\nthat sentence of death is appropriate on the particular facts of the case it should give special reasons. Apart from the emphasis that the normal sentence is imprisonment for life and that special reasons should be given for awarding the death sentel)ce there is no further alteration in the law relating to awarding of the death penalty. As already noticed the effect of the amendment was considered by this Court in [1976]\n\n2 S.C.R. :\n\n\n(supra) and it was held that the awarding of sentence other than the sentence of death is the general rule now only special reasons, that is .._ to ay, special facts and circumstances in a given. case will warrant the\n\n.... ...,-passing of the death sentence.\n\n A recent decision of this Court Rajendra Prasad's case in Cr. As.\n\nNos- 512, 511 and 513 of 1978 was delivered on 9th February, 1979.(') The decision by the majority was delivered by Krishna Iyer J. held that \"special reasoos\" necessary for imposing the death penalty must relate not to the crime as such but to the criminal. It further held that death sentence can be awarded only in certain restricted categories.\n\nThe tests that are prescribed are to find out whether the murderer holds out a terrible and continuing threat to social security in the setting of a developing country and poses a grave peril to society's survival. The other circumstances which would justify imposition of death sentence are when an economic offender intentionally mixes poison in drugs, professionally or wilfully adulterates intoxicating 5Ubstances injuriously, and knowingly or intentionally causes death for the sake of private profit or when a murderous band of armed dacoits intentionally derail a train and large number of people die in consequence or when the style of violence and systematic corruption and deliberately planned economic offences by corporate top echelons are often a terrible technology of knowingly causing death. Likewise when a _,__murderer is so hardened and so blood-thirsty that withi!l the prison\n\n-~-. \\., and without, he makes no bones about killing others or carries on a\n\n. prosperous business in cadavers, then he becomes a candidate for death ,.\n\nsentence.\n\nI have read through the judgment of the Court with utmost care.\n\nThe decision is in many respects contrary to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Jagmohan Singh's case.\n\nThe Court has proceeded to make law as regards the conditions that are necessary for imposition of a sentence of death under s. 302 I.P.C.\n\nIt has proceeded to canalisation of sentencing discretion and has embarked on evolving working rules on punishment bearing - in mind the enlightened flexibility of social sensibility. In doing so I feel the court has exceeded its powers conferred on it by law.\n\n\nTo su~tantiate my statement, I proceed to give a few extracts from tbe judgment. At the outset of the judgment it is stated that the precise issue before it was \"the canalisation of the sep.tencing discretion in a competing situation .......... Therefore this jurisprudential exploration, within the framework of s. 302 I.P.C., has become necessitous, both because.the awesome 'either/or' of the Section spells out ..,.... no !>pecific indicators and law in this fatal area cnnot afford to b~ conjectunil'' ......... \"The flame of life cannot flicker uncertain; and._. so s. 302 IP.C. must be invested with pragmatic concreteness that inhibits ad hominem responses of individual judges and is in penal conformance with constitutional norms and world conscience.\" \"Within the dichotomous frame-work of s. 302 I.P.C., upheld in Jagmohan Singh, we have to evolve working rules of punishment bearing the markings of enlightened flexibility and societal sensibility.\" ......... . \"Therefore, it is no heresay to imbibe and inject the social philosophy of the Constitution into the Penal Code to resolve the tension between .fhe Past and the Present.\" ........ \"That is the essay we undertake\n\nbere\". \"But if legislative undertaking is not in sight judges who have toimplement the code cannot fold up their professional hands but must make the provision viable by evolution of supplementary principles, even if it may appear to possess the flavour of law-making'' ... \"This Court's tryst with the Constitution obligates it to lay down general rules, not a complete directory, which will lend predictability to the law vis--a-vis the community and guide the judiciary in such a grim verdict as choice between life and death.\" ...... \"Therefore, -until Parliament speaks, the court cannot be silent\" .......... \"Thi~\n\nCourt must extrica!e, until Parliament legislates, the death S~!l~nce f'- -'secfor from .judicial subjectivism arid consequent uncertainty.\" ..... \" \"\" \"Having stated the area and object of investigation we address ourselves to this grave penological issue purely as judges deciding a legal problem, putting aside views, philosophical or criminologicaL one holds.\n\nBut law, in this area, canno~ go it alone; and cross-fertilisation ftom sociology, history, cultural anthropology and current national perils and dvelopmental goals and, above all constitutional currents, canoat be e.schewed.\"\n\nThe aboveare few of the passages in the \"prolix and diffuse\" judgment as the learned Judge has chosen to call it.\n\nThe passages clearly indicate that the Court in the absence-of legislative undertaking has embarked on law making as in its view the Judges cannot fold H up their professional hands but must make tJte provision viable by evolution of supplementary principles, even if it may appear to po::tsess the flavour of lawmaking, and that until Parliament speaks the Court\n\nBACHAN SINGH v. l'UNJAB (Kailasam, J.) 1207\n\ncannot be silent.\n\nWith utmost respect I feel that the courts have no such power to legislate and to frame rules to guide the infliction of death penalty. ·\n\nThe duty of the court so far as enacted law is concerned, is to interpret and construe the provisions of the enactment. By interpretation or construction is meant the process by which the courts seek to -ascertain the meaning of the legiltur~ through the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expressed. The courts must bke it absolutely for granted that the legislature has said what is meant and meant what it has said.\n\nJudges are not at liberty to add or to take from or modifythe letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe the true sentence legis is not cogJ.pletely or correctly expressed by it. (Salmod on Jurisprudence, 11th Ed. by Glanville Williams, P 153 ). The Constitution and the laws bind every court in India and that though the courts are free to interpret they are no\\ free to overlook or disregard the Constitution and the laws. As held in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(') the Court is not entitled to disregard the statutory provisions and to follow a decision of its own when that provision was not present in its mind.\n\nIt is equally beyond the functions of a Court to evolve working rules for imposition of death sentence bearing the markings of enlightened flexibility and social sensibility or to make law by cross fertilisation from sociology, history, cultural anthropology and current nationa! perils and developll!ental goals and, above all,- constitutional currents. I am of the view that it is the function of the Parliament to frame Jaws consistent with the needs of the society. If the grounds for award of a sentence of death has to be more sifically stated than that it is found in theJ Indian Penal , Code and the Cr. P.C., it is foc the Parliament to do so.\n\nVarious legislative measures were introduced but were withdrawn from time to time.\n\nAt pre§_ent there is a Bill before the Parliament. U is for t-h_e Parliame12t to clarify the circumstances under which a sentence of death could be awarded. It is for the court to administer the law as it stands. In <!_Warding s_entence of death, the Court has to take into cnsideration the various aspects regarding the crime apd the person that committed the crime and pass an appropriate sentence and if it is death sentence to give special reasons as requird by the Cr. P.C. If in deciding a case on particular facts a principle is stated it may be binding as a precedent. If the Courts resort to rule making it will not be binding as. precedent. If\n\nthe Courts _are to embark on rule making the ques_!i.on arises whether\n\nfll r1~71l K.B. 718.\n\nG~ .\n\n-SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nthe responsibility can be undertaken by a bench of 3 Judges with a majority of 2 to 1. Is it permissible for another bench to proceed to make laws and prescribe an entirely different sets of ru:es ? There is no machinery by which the Court could ascertain the views of the various cross sections of the society which is a prerequisite before any_ la_w making is resorted to.\n\nThe Court has embarked on framing rules prescribing conditions for imposition of death sentence taking into account \"crossfertilisation from sociology, history, cultural anthropology and current national perils and developmental goals, and above all, constitutional currents\".\n\nSo far as constitutional currents are cqncerned the Constitution Bench has upheld the validity of awarding of the death sentence. The Court has proceeded on the basis that the earlier decisions of this Court have taken into account only the crime and not the criminal.\n\nThe emphasis according to the judgment sho1,11d be on the criminal and not on the crime.\n\nThe mode of sentencing as envi!iaged in the Penal Code and the Cr. P.C. requires that every fact that is relevant to the determination of the sentence including the crime, the criminal and other environmental circumstances will have to be taken into account.\n\nThe view of Lhe learned Judge that in a.warding a sentence the criminal is more important than the crime is not warranted by the law as it stands today.\n\nI will now refer to various points dealt with in the judgment which are contrary to the decision of the constitutional Bench.\n\nJustice Krishna Iyer says : \"The rollin focus. of our judgment is on this poignant gap in 'human rights jurisprudence' within the limits of the Penal Code, impregnated by the Constitution.\n\nTo put it pithily, a world order voicing the worth of the human person, a cultural legacy\n\nchrged with compassiol!, an interpretative liberation from colonial callousness lo life and liberty, a concern for social justice as setting the sights of individual justice, interest with the inherited text of the Penal Code to yield the goals desiderated by the Preamble and Articles 14, 19 and 21.\" The challenge to the award of the death sentence as violative of Articles 19, 14 and 21 was repelled by the Constitution Bench by holding that the death sentence is a permissible punishment and that deprivation of life is co!!_sti!u_tionally permissible if that is according to procedure established by law.\n\nRegarding laying down staudards in imposing the punishment the Court observed tl:-.at the impossibility of laying down stagdards is at the very core of criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a very wide\n\ndiscretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment and that\n\n,. ..\n\nBACRAN SINGH V, PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.) 12 09\n\nthis discretion in the matter of sentence is liable to be corrected by superior Courts. It was .held that the exercise of judicial discretion on well recognised principles is in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused.\n\nJustice Krishna lyer would comment on the observations of the Constitution Bench above quoted as follows : \"The acceptance of the invulnerability of discretionary power does not end the journey : it inaugurates the search for those 'well-recognised\n\npr.incipes Palekar, J. speaks of in the lagmohan case.\n\nIncident& observapons without concentration on the sentencing criteria are not the ratio of the decision- Judgments are not Bible for every line to be venerated,\" with respect I aJl! unable to agree with the characterization of Palekar J's judgment as \"incidental observations without concentration on the sentencing criteria\". At p. 559 of the Reports Palekar J. observes : In India ¢is. onerous duty is cast upon Judges asd for more thl!_n a century the juds are carrying out this duty under e I_ndian Penal Code.\n\nThe imp_ossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges wi!h a very wide discretion in the matter of :fi.-\"<:ing the degree of punishment.\n\nThat discretion m the matter of sentence is, as alredy pointed out, liagle to be corrected by superior courts.\n\nLaying down of standards to the limited extent possible as wa$ done in the Model Judicial Code would not ~:erve tile purpose.\" After disapproving laying down of standards the learned Judge proceeded \"The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is_, in the final analysis, the safest possible seguard for the accused.\" (Emphasis supQ.lied;) The learned Judge quoted with approva1 the view of this Court in Budhan Chowdhary v. State of Bihar(') which is as follows :-\n\n\"The judicial decision must of nece~sity depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal app1ication of the law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional and purposeful discrimination.-Further, the discretion of judicial officers is not arbitrary and the law provides for revision by superior courts of orders passed by the subordinate courts.\n\nIn such circumstances, there is hardly any ground for apprehending any capricious discrimination by judicial tribunals.\"\n\n. Palekar, , J. continued \"Crime a~ crime may appe&r to be super- 11 fic•ally the same but the facts and crrcumstances of a crime are widely\n\n(1) [1955) S. C. R. 1045 2l-409SCII79\n\n\n[ 1979_1 3 S.C.'R.\n\ndifferent and since a decision of the court as regards punislm1ent is dependent upon a consideration of all the facts, and circumstances, there is hardly any ground for challenge under Article 14.\" At page 560 of the reports, Palekar, J, explains the procedure that is followed by the Courts which enables to bring into focus all the circumstances that are relevant to be taken into account in awarding the sentence.\n\nOn a reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench I regret my\n\ninability to share the view of Krishna Iyer J. that Palekar J's observations are incidental and without concentration. It may be noted that the laying down of the standards which was deprecated is being attempted in this decision.\n\nKrishna Iyer J. would state \"It is constitutionally permissible to swing a criminal out of corporeal existence only if the security of State and society, public order and the interests of the general public compel that course as provided in Art. 19(2) to (6)\". This view again is inconsistent with the law laid down by the Constitution Bench wl1ich has held that deprivatjon of life is constitutionally permissible if that is done according to procedure established by law.\n\nKrishna Iyer J. has observed that \"no Code can rise higher than the Constitution and the Penal Code can survive only if it pays homage to the suprema lex.\n\nThe only correct approach is to read into s. 302 I.P.C. and s. 354(3) Cr. P.C., the human rights and human trends in the Constitution. So examined, the right to life and to fundamental freedoms is deprived when he is hanged to death, his' dignity is defiled when his neck is noosed and strangled,\" the only change after the Constitution Bench delivered its judgment is the introduction of s. 354(3) which requires special reasons to be given if the court is to award the death sentence. If without the restriction of stating sufficient reasons death sentence could be constitutionally awarded under the I.P.C. and Cr.\n\nP.C. as it stood before the amendment, it is difficult to perceive how by requiring special reasons to be given the amended section would\n\nbe unconstitutional unless the ''sentencing s'ector is made most restrictive and least vagarious\". Krishna lyer J. has held that \"such extraordinary grounds alone constitutionally qualify as 'special reasons' as leave no option to the court but to execute the offender if State and society are to survive.\n\nOne stroke of murder hardly qualifies for this drastic requirement, however gruesome the killing or pathetic the situation, unless the inherent testimony oozing from that act is i.n:esistible that the murderous appetire of the convict is too chronic and deadly that ordered life in a given locality or society or in prison itself would be gone if this man were now or later to be at large. If be is an irredeemable murderer, 1ike a blood-thirsty tiger, be bas to quit his terrestrial tenancy.\" The Constitution Bench dealing wit~ the.\n\nBACHAN SIKGH v. PUNJAB (Kaifasam, J.) 12 i 1\n\n:aw<rd of death sentence observed: \"But some at least are diabolical in conception and cruel in ex, ccution.\n\nIn some others where the victim is a person of high standing in the country, soclety is liable to be rocked to its very foundation.\n\nSuch murders cannot be simply wished away by finding alibis in the social mal-adjustment of the murderer.\n\nPrevalence of such crimes speaks, in the opinion of many, for the inevitability of death penalty not only by way of deterrence but as a token of emphatic disapproval by the society.\" After referring to the Law Commission's Report the Court observed : \"A very responsible\n\n~,. body has come to the conclusion after considering all the relevant\n\nfactors. On the conlusions thus offe:ed to us, it win be difficul~ to\n\n .hold that capital pumshment p.s such 1s unreasonable or (lOt reqmred .in the public interest.\" I find it difficult to reconcile the law stated :by the Constituion Bench with the view expressed by Krishna Iyer J.\n\nThe judgment delivered by Krishna Iyer J. for the Court and the minority judgment of Justice A. P. Sen have dealt at considerable length with various aspects and desirability or otherwise of imposing a sentence of death.\n\nThe controversy over capital punishment is not new.\n\nFor several centuries the , debate is going on.\n\nI am conscious that it is a highly controversial subject on which much can be sid on both sides.\n\nForlunately, for the Judges it is neither necessary nor desirable to subscribe to one of the two views.\n\nAll that the Judges are expected to do is to administer the law as it stands.\n\nIn fact, if I am strong be1iever of abolition of death sentence or supporter of 'life for life' and 'tooth for tooth' doctrine I would have excused myself from deciding a case invblving confirmation of death sentence.\n\nJustice Krishna Iyer has. not concealed his abhorrence at the infliction of death sentence.\n\nHe pleads that death sentence should be\n\n-abolished. He has expressed his view in unmistakable trms :\n\n- \"Every sombre dawn a human being is hanged by the legal process,\n\n.the flag of human justice shall be hung half-mast\".\n\nAgain \"The right to life and to fundamental freedoms is deprived when he is hanged to death, his dignity is defiled when his neck is noosed and strangled\" . . . . . \"The Indian cultural current also counts and so does our spiritual chemistry, based on divinity in everyone, catalysed by the Budha- Gandhi compassion\" ..... \"This ax.iom is a vote against 'death' and hope in 'life'.\" I have great respect for tl1e views of the learned Judge.\n\nHe is strongly espousing a cause but I feel embarrassed when I am required to follow his views for I consider it is my solemn duty to ad minister the law of the land as it stands. According to my conception my duty is to administer the law as it stands. It is not for me to say what the law should be. If I am satisfied that the trial Judge and the\n\n\n~- A High Court have given special reasons as required under the law it is\n\nmy duty to confirm the sentence of death. Vide observations of this Court in Ram Narain and Ors. v. State of U.P.C) quoted with appro-- val in J agmohan' s case.\n\nI do not feel it necessary to refer to the various points dealt with by Krishna Iyer J. in his long and learned 'essay'.\n\nI hav~ quoted in extenso from his judgment and also from the judgment of the Constitution Bench in order to show that the two views are irreconcilable and that I am bound to follow the law laid down by the Constitution Bench. \\Vith respect I find myself in complete agreement with the views ..... expressed by the Constitution Bench. I am therefore unable to follow r\n\nthe decision of the Bench.\n\nI have discussed the general principles laid down in Ra_ie11dra Prasad's case regarding the circumstances that are necessary for the imposition of the death sentence. Apart from being w1able to agree with the guidelines prescribed, I am of the view that the general principles laid down are not the ratio decidendi of the case.\n\nThe courts are not bound to follow them.\n\nHalsbury's Laws of England (3rd Ed.\n\nVol. 22 at p. 796) explains what ratio decidendi is. The enunciation of the rpason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent.\n\nThe concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone! has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding.\n\nStatements which are not necessary to the decision, which go beyond the occasion and lay down a rule that is unnecessary for the purpose in hand hve no binding authority on another court, though they may have some merely persuasive efficacy.\n\nDecisions upon matters of fact are not binding . on any other court.\n\nTlris Court has held that precedents which -~ enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our system. (Tribhuvandas v. RaJilal).(2) It has also been held in Amritsar Municipality v. Hazara Singh(3 ) that the decisions of even the highest court on questions of fact cannot be cited as precedents.\n\nLord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem(4 ) said that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 757.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1968 S.C. 372=70 Born. L. R. 73.\n\n(3) A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1087\n\n(4} 1901 A. C . 495. at p. 506\n\nBACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.) 1213\n\n.--\n\nwi!:ich such e1::pressiom are to be found. The leaned Judge proceeds to obsen:e ••.; .. a case is only an. authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny thatit can be quoted for a proposition that\n\nmay seem to follow logically from it.\n\nThe courts are not bound by the observations in decisions beyond the point actually decided. The courts can say \"We cannot know that the House of Lords woUld carry this determination further than they have carried it\". {per Best C.J. in Fletcher v. Lord Sondes.(')\n\nApplying the principles above quoted, I will now proceed to find out what are the points decided in the case and to wha; t extent it \\Vill be binding on courts. In Rajendra Prciad's case the three appeals in which death sentences were imposed came up before the Court for consideration of the. question whether the death sentence awarded should be confirmed or not. After appreciation of the facts of the case the Court' came to the unanimous conclusion that the concerned accused have been found guilty of the offence of murder and confirmed the conviction.: Regarding the imposition of the death sentence the majority ,,; as of the view that there were no sufficient reasons for imposing the extreme penalty while the minority difiered from that conclusion.\n\nToo priricie thctt can be derived in the case is tha't on the facts and circumstances established in the case there are not 'sufficient reasons' for imposing the death sentence.\n\nOnly to this limited extent if at all is the decision binding on the courts. It is common knowledge tht the facts are rarely similar in two cases.\n\nThe root of the doctririe of precedent is that alike cases must be decided alike. Only\n\nthen i.t is possible to ensure that the court bound by a pre,'ious case d.eddes the nw case in the same way as the other court would have decided it. It is all a question of probabilities, but the probability that a court will decide a new case in the same way as would the court which decided one of the cas cited becomes le~ and less as the differences between the facts of the two cases increase.\n\nAs every judgment will. have to ro read as applicable to the particular facts proved will refer to the facts found in Rajendra Prasad's case. The accused in Rajendra Prasad's. case a youngman after some years served in prison, was r<!leased on Gandhi Jayanti Day.\n\nSome minor incident ignited his latent feud and he stabbed Ram Bharosey \"* .. and his friend Mansukh several times and the latter succumbed. He was , sentenced to death by the Sessions Court which was confirmed. hy the High Court. This Court applying the canons which it had laid down came to the conclusion that as nothing on record suggested that\n\nRajendr:i Prasad was beyond redemption and the record does not\n\n.(1) [1826] 3 Bing, 501 at p. 560\n\n\nhint that such an attempt wa~ made inside the prison they did not see\n\nany special reason to hang him out of corporeal existence.\n\nAs pointed out earlier I am unable to subscribe to the canons laid down in the case.\n\nThe utmost to which this case can be considered as an authority is that if in similar circumstances when a person's latent feud gets ignited and stabs two persons se*ral times it would not furnish special reasons for inflicting the extreme penalty.\n\nIn the .{\n\necond case relating to Kunjukunju the accused cut to death the inno--\n\ncent wife and the immaculate kids in the secrecy of night.\n\nThe trial .,... court as well as the High Court found it was a deliberate and cold~,. blooded act performed with considerable brutality.\n\nThe majority ' expressed its opinion that if the crime alone was the criterion the sentence. was proper but if the criminal was the target it was not proper.\n\nThe Cr. P.C. requires the courts to take into accomit the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the particulars about the criminal and all relevant circumstances relating to the commission of the crime by the criminal.\n\nThe trial court is required to give rea .. sons and they are to be scrutinised by the High Court on a reference to it for con.firmation of the death sentence.\n\nThe High Court also has to satisfy 1 itself that there are special reasons for inflicting the extreme penalty.\n\nThe view of. the majority that the test should be ,.. whether Janardanan is a social security risk, altogether beyond salvage by therapeutic life sentence is neither in accordance with the requirements of the Cr.P.C. nor law laid down by this Court.\n\nTho decisions of this Court insist not only on a consideration of the cri. minal but also the nature of the crime and all other relevant circumstances.\n\nAs the view expresed in the case is not in conforniity w:th the decisions of this court it cannot be followed as a prccc•.1ent. At the most the decision may be taken as authority that in s:milar cir-~\n\ncustances the cutting to death of the innocent wife and th.:! imma~ ...- }- cula; e kid~ in the secrecy of th~ night may not amount to special reasons as required under the Cr.P.C.\n\nIn the third appeal the appellant flung the vessels over the division of which the wrangle arose, went inside the house, emerged armed, picked up an altercation\n\neventuating the young man (whose. age was around 18 or 20) stabbing to death three members of the other branch of the r~:mily. He chased and killed, excited by the perverted sense of injustice at the partition, The majority was of the view that it is illegal to award capital punishment without considering the correctional possibilities inside the prison.\n\nThe court was of the view that although the crime was attended with extraordinary cmelty, the accused being young and malleable age and their reasonable prospect of reformation and absence of any conclusive circumstance that the assailant is a habitual\n\nBACHA!>< SINGH V. I'U0JJAB (Kailasam, /,) 1215\n\nmurderer or given to chronic violence-these catena of circumstances bearing on the offender call for the lesser sentence.\n\nHere again it is difficult to agree with the test applied for it is not in conformity with the decisions of this Court or the requirements of the law. Ii at all it may be an authority only for te proposition that under identical circumstances the stabbing of three prsons by a young tnan in an altercation when he was excited by a perverted sense of injustice would not be SfJecial reasons for ::twarding the extreme penalty.\n\nIn the case before us the facts are not identical with any of the cases in the appeals.\n\nThe appellant was released after undergoing a t..::rm of imprisonment for the murder of his wife.\n\nAfter release he lived wi1h his cousin Hukam Singh for about six months.\n\nThe wife and wn obiccted.\n\nOn the night of the occurrence when he was sleeping with Desa Singh son of Hukam Singh in the outer courtyard and. thr.:c daughters of Hukam Singh in the inner courtyard at about\n\nmidnight th<: petitioner got up, inflicted fatal injuries on the son Dcs; l Singh and the two daughters Durga Bai and Veeran Bai and c::tused g:icvous injuries to Vidya Bai while they were sleeping. The trial court as well as the High Court on. a consideration of the entire\n\nbets regarding the crime and the criminal came to the conclusion that the appellant acted in a very cruel manner. The victims had no caust: iO suspect the intentions of the petitioner and went to sleep.\n\nTaking advantage of the situation, when the victims could not defend,\n\nthe appdiant killed three and seriously wounded the fourth.\n\nThe courts below rightly characterised the offence as heinous and in the circum<; lances of the case they were of the view that the only approprbk f,:.:ntence is the extreme penalty.\n\nI have no hesitaion in agreei:Jg with that conclusion.\n\nThe facts of the case may have some resemblance to Kunjukunju case in that the accused in that case cut hi~ innocent wife and the kids under the secrecy of the night.\n\nBut the other circumsJanccs namely his cold calculated (!nd deliberate murrler of :mnocent children of Huk:am Singh who had given shelter lo him when they were sleeping discloses that the crime is an extremely brutal and heinous one calling for imposition of deathsentence.\n\nI agree with the tdal Court and the High Court rnd find 'special reasons' required for imposition of death has been clearly made out.\n\nln the result I find myself unable to agree with the reasoning or H conclusion arrived at by this Court in Rajendra Prasad's case mainly on the ground that it is not in conformity with the decision of the\n\n\nCcmtitutional Hench of this Court in Jagmohan's case and that the\n\npropositiom laid down are not within the competence of the Court.\n\nThough the decision cannot be treated as a binding precedent yet as it is a decision of a bench of this Court I direct the matter be P-laced\n\nbefore Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench to tkdde th,, cast\n\nPB.R", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "BACHAN SINGH S/0 SAUDAGAR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BACHAN SINGH S/O SAUDAGAR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. 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State of Punjab [1976] 2 S.C.R. 684; Ambaram v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1976] 4 S.C.C. 298; and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma\n\nthat the Judges are invested with very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment and that discretion in the matter of sentence is liable 20-409SCij79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2234, "end_char": 2271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1203D]\n\nBalwant Singh v. State of Punjab [1976] 2 S.C.R. 684; Ambaram v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1976] 4 S.C.C. 298; and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma\n\nthat the Judges are invested with very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment and that discretion in the matter of sentence is liable 20-409SCij79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Section 367(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2536, "end_char": 2549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code which came into force on April 1, 1974, after the judgment in Jagmohan Singh's case, provides that the judgment shall state the special reasons where a sentence of death is awacd- ..-b ed fo~ an oenc: punishable with d'eath or in the alternave with im.pruonment\\.,\n\nfor life or tmpnsonment for a term of years."}}, {"text": "Jagmohan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2573, "end_char": 2587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code which came into force on April 1, 1974, after the judgment in Jagmohan Singh's case, provides that the judgment shall state the special reasons where a sentence of death is awacd- ..-b ed fo~ an oenc: punishable with d'eath or in the alternave with im.pruonment\\.,\n\nfor life or tmpnsonment for a term of years.", "canonical_name": "Jagmohan Singh"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3907, "end_char": 3925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision is in many respects contrary to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Jagmohan Singh's case."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4105, "end_char": 4116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5375, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5893, "end_char": 5915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB\n\nJ.] 95\n\nRajendra Prasad's case the court embarked on framing rules prescribing conditions for the imposition of -death sentence.", "canonical_name": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB\n\nJ.] 95\n\nRajendra Prasad's case the court embarked on framing rules prescribing conditions for the imposition of -death sentence.", "canonical_name": "Rajendra Prasais"}}, {"text": "Quinn y. Leqtham--19~01", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7177, "end_char": 7200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. R. 73; Amritsar .Municipality v. Hazara Singh - A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1087; and Quinn y. Leqtham--19~01 A.C. 495 at p. 506; referred to ..\n\n8."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasais", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rajendra Prasais cast the conclruion of the majority wa.~ that as nothing.", "canonical_name": "Rajendra Prasais"}}, {"text": "Kunjukunju", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7759, "end_char": 7769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tqe second case (Kunjukunju) the majority :was of the."}}, {"text": "Dubey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, it cannot be followed as a predent.. Similarly, in the third case (Dubey's case) also the majority view that it would be illegal to award capital punishment without considering the correctional possibilities inside the _prison and that the accustd being young and of malleable age and other circumstances bearing on the offender called for the lesser sentence is not in conformity with the deci sions of this Court or the requirements of the law .. [1213H; 1214A-HJ ··\n\n9."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. K. Puri, Amicus Curiae for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9773, "end_char": 9784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9789, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9865, "end_char": 9873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSARKARIA, J.-While reserving my own opinion on the various question raised in this case including the one with regard to the scope, amplification and application of Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, I would, i:Q_ agreement with my learned brother, direct that the records of this Cl!.§.e be submitted the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, for constituting a larger Bench which would resolve the doubts, difficulties and inconsistencies pointed out by my learned brother in his 0rder, particularly, in its hist paragraph."}}, {"text": "Section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10052, "end_char": 10084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10402, "end_char": 10410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASAM, J.-This special leave petition is filed by Bachan Singh son of Saudagar Singh from jail against the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.", "canonical_name": "KAILASAM, JJ."}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASAM, J.-This special leave petition is filed by Bachan Singh son of Saudagar Singh from jail against the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.", "canonical_name": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB"}}, {"text": "Saudagar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASAM, J.-This special leave petition is filed by Bachan Singh son of Saudagar Singh from jail against the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASAM, J.-This special leave petition is filed by Bachan Singh son of Saudagar Singh from jail against the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Ferozepur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh."}}, {"text": "Desa Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10828, "end_char": 10838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh."}}, {"text": "Dura Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10852, "end_char": 10860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh.", "canonical_name": "Durga Bai"}}, {"text": "V eern Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10865, "end_char": 10875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh."}}, {"text": "Hukam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10888, "end_char": 10899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh.", "canonical_name": "Huk:am Singh"}}, {"text": "Vidya Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10934, "end_char": 10943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh.", "canonical_name": "Vidya Bai"}}, {"text": "4th and 5th July, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11011, "end_char": 11033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on three charges of causing the death of three persons Desa Singh the son and\n\nDura Bai and V eern Bai daughter of Hukam Singh a11d causing grievous injuries to Vidya Bai, another daughter of Hukam Singh, at about 12 midnight between the 4th and 5th July, 1977, in the courtyard of the house of Hukam Singh."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11154, "end_char": 11160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11242, "end_char": 11248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11250, "end_char": 11255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11845, "end_char": 11857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution briefly is that the appellant Bachan Singh was convicted under s. 302 I.P.C. for the murder of his wife ,..\n\n...\n\nBACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB (Kai/asam, J.) 1197\n\nand sentenced to imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11878, "end_char": 11884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11885, "end_char": 11890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hukam Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12120, "end_char": 12131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hukam Singh P. W. 5 for about six months."}}, {"text": "Nainital", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12308, "end_char": 12316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few days prior to the occurrence Hukam Singh and his wife went to Nainital in connection with the marriage of their son Desa Singh."}}, {"text": "4th July, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12406, "end_char": 12420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of the occurrence 4th July, 1977 Desa Singh son of Hukam Singh, Durga Bai, Veeran Bai ami Viuya."}}, {"text": "Durga Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12452, "end_char": 12461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of the occurrence 4th July, 1977 Desa Singh son of Hukam Singh, Durga Bai, Veeran Bai ami Viuya.", "canonical_name": "Durga Bai"}}, {"text": "Veeran Bai ami Viuya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12463, "end_char": 12483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of the occurrence 4th July, 1977 Desa Singh son of Hukam Singh, Durga Bai, Veeran Bai ami Viuya.", "canonical_name": "Veeran Bai ami Viuya"}}, {"text": "Durgabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12613, "end_char": 12621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After taking their meals the three daughters slept in tbe inner courtyard, Durgabai in one cot and Veeran Bai and Vidya Bai in another cot near each other.", "canonical_name": "Durga Bai"}}, {"text": "Veeran Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12637, "end_char": 12647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After taking their meals the three daughters slept in tbe inner courtyard, Durgabai in one cot and Veeran Bai and Vidya Bai in another cot near each other.", "canonical_name": "Veeran Bai ami Viuya"}}, {"text": "Desa\n\nSingh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12694, "end_char": 12705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desa\n\nSingh, the son of Hukam Singh, and the appellant slept in the outer courtyard on two separate cots near each other."}}, {"text": "Vidya Bai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12835, "end_char": 12844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about midnight Vidya Bai P.W. 2 was awakened by the alarm and saw the appellant inflicting Kulhari (axe) blow on the face of her sister Veeran Bai."}}, {"text": "Diwan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13101, "end_char": 13112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Diwan Singh P.W. 12 who was sleeping at a distance of 3/4 Karms from the cots of Desa Singh and the appellant also woke up on hearing a shriek."}}, {"text": "Gulab Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13326, "end_char": 13337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He raised an alarm and Gulab Singh P.W. 3 who was sleeping at a distance of 50 feet from the cot of Desa Singh woke up and saw\n\nthe appellant hitting Desa Singh on the neck with a Kulhari."}}, {"text": "Kansbi Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after Kansbi Singh P.W. 4 and others arrived at th~ place of occurrence and heard from the wltnesses the deta.lls of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Vidya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13895, "end_char": 13900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A tractor was brought in which Durga Bai, Veeran Bai and Vidya were t_aken to the hospital at Fazilka.", "canonical_name": "Vidya Bai"}}, {"text": "Fazilka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13932, "end_char": 13939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A tractor was brought in which Durga Bai, Veeran Bai and Vidya were t_aken to the hospital at Fazilka."}}, {"text": "5th July,\n\n1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14234, "end_char": 14249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was recorded at the police station at 4-20 a.m. on 5th July,\n\n1977."}}, {"text": "sec. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17628, "end_char": 17639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17703, "end_char": 17714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17715, "end_char": 17720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17835, "end_char": 17845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18013, "end_char": 18021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "1st January, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18505, "end_char": 18522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act XXVI of 1955) which came into force on 1st January, 1965, on a conviction for an offence\n\nr:unishablc with dc!Jth if th~: Court sentenced the accused to any punishment other than death, the reason. :"}}, {"text": "Section 367(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18742, "end_char": 18756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18764, "end_char": 18790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Madras,(•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19521, "end_char": 19539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vazvdu Th.:var\n\nv. The State of Madras,(•) this Court c:\\presscd Its vtc:w at the qutstion or ~; entencc has to be determined, not with ufc:rcnce !"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19921, "end_char": 19923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 367(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21854, "end_char": 21868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21870, "end_char": 21893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22050, "end_char": 22082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22119, "end_char": 22130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "sec. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23259, "end_char": 23267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23269, "end_char": 23274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23423, "end_char": 23429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23430, "end_char": 23435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23525, "end_char": 23537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23568, "end_char": 23571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23700, "end_char": 23704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24656, "end_char": 24662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25094, "end_char": 25105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25185, "end_char": 25191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25223, "end_char": 25255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Children Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25295, "end_char": 25313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27059, "end_char": 27069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27278, "end_char": 27288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Joint Committee of Parliament added that a sentence of death is the extreme penalty of law and it is but fair that when a court -awards that sentence in a case where the alternative sentence of imprisonment for life is also available,· it should give special reason~ in support of the sentence."}}, {"text": "section 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27682, "end_char": 27693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28206, "end_char": 28215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28221, "end_char": 28227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28974, "end_char": 28980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29371, "end_char": 29380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29776, "end_char": 29785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29928, "end_char": 29937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31023, "end_char": 31030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 S.C. R. 684", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31409, "end_char": 31429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31660, "end_char": 31667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31909, "end_char": 31916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32414, "end_char": 32419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further held that the impossibility of laying - down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32771, "end_char": 32778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33056, "end_char": 33063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd October, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33703, "end_char": 33720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constltutwn Bench delivered I .1r its judgment on the 3rd October, 1972."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33753, "end_char": 33785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1st April, 197 4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33821, "end_char": 33837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently amendment to\n\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (Act 2 of 1974) came into fmce on 1st April, 197 4."}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33894, "end_char": 33900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "[1973] 2 S C. R. 541", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34435, "end_char": 34455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35316, "end_char": 35334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nos- 512, 511 and 513 of 1978 was delivered on 9th February, 1979.(')"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35385, "end_char": 35397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision by the majority was delivered by Krishna Iyer J. held that \"special reasoos\" necessary for imposing the death penalty must relate not to the crime as such but to the criminal.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37003, "end_char": 37009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37010, "end_char": 37015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37594, "end_char": 37600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37601, "end_char": 37606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37853, "end_char": 37859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IP.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37860, "end_char": 37864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38082, "end_char": 38088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IP.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38089, "end_char": 38094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38357, "end_char": 38367, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Glanville Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41036, "end_char": 41054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Glanville Williams, P 153 )."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44020, "end_char": 44030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44661, "end_char": 44671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45013, "end_char": 45023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45075, "end_char": 45097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 19, 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45165, "end_char": 45187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BACRAN SINGH V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45719, "end_char": 45733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BACRAN SINGH V, PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.) 12 09\n\nthis discretion in the matter of sentence is liable to be corrected by superior Courts.", "canonical_name": "BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB"}}, {"text": "Krishna lyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46018, "end_char": 46030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Krishna lyer would comment on the observations of the Constitution Bench above quoted as follows : \"The acceptance of the invulnerability of discretionary power does not end the journey : it inaugurates the search for those 'well-recognised\n\npr.incipes Palekar, J. speaks of in the lagmohan case.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46544, "end_char": 46551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "unable to agree with the characterization of Palekar J's judgment as \"incidental observations without concentration on the sentencing criteria\"."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46820, "end_char": 46830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48656, "end_char": 48666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49430, "end_char": 49440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code can rise higher than the Constitution and the Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49702, "end_char": 49763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49862, "end_char": 49868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code can rise higher than the Constitution and the Penal Code", "statute": "Code can rise higher than the Constitution and the Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49869, "end_char": 49874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49880, "end_char": 49889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50209, "end_char": 50218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50423, "end_char": 50428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. P. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52540, "end_char": 52549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I find it difficult to reconcile the law stated :by the Constituion Bench with the view expressed by Krishna Iyer J.\n\nThe judgment delivered by Krishna Iyer J. for the Court and the minority judgment of Justice A. P. Sen have dealt at considerable length with various aspects and desirability or otherwise of imposing a sentence of death."}}, {"text": "J agmohan'", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54602, "end_char": 54612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of U.P.C) quoted with appro-- val in J agmohan' s case.", "canonical_name": "Jagmohan Singh"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56672, "end_char": 56680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem(4 ) said that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 757."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prciad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57864, "end_char": 57879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rajendra Prciad's case the three appeals in which death sentences were imposed came up before the Court for consideration of the.", "canonical_name": "Rajendra Prasais"}}, {"text": "Ram Bharosey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59601, "end_char": 59613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some minor incident ignited his latent feud and he stabbed Ram Bharosey \"* .. and his friend Mansukh several times and the latter succumbed."}}, {"text": "Mansukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59635, "end_char": 59642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some minor incident ignited his latent feud and he stabbed Ram Bharosey \"* .. and his friend Mansukh several times and the latter succumbed."}}, {"text": "Rajendr:i Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59892, "end_char": 59908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court applying the canons which it had laid down came to the conclusion that as nothing on record suggested that\n\nRajendr:i Prasad was beyond redemption and the record does not\n\n.(1) [1826] 3 Bing, 501 at p. 560\n\nhint that such an attempt wa~ made inside the prison they did not see\n\nany special reason to hang him out of corporeal existence.", "canonical_name": "Rajendra Prasais"}}, {"text": "Janardanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61462, "end_char": 61472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the majority that the test should be ,.. whether Janardanan is a social security risk, altogether beyond salvage by therapeutic life sentence is neither in accordance with the requirements of the Cr."}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61609, "end_char": 61615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62179, "end_char": 62185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kunjukunju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64932, "end_char": 64942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case may have some resemblance to Kunjukunju case in that the accused in that case cut hi~ innocent wife and the kids under the secrecy of the night."}}, {"text": "Huk:am Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65152, "end_char": 65164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nd deliberate murrler of :mnocent children of Huk:am Singh who had given shelter lo him when they were sleeping discloses that the crime is an extremely brutal and heinous one calling for imposition of deathsentence.", "canonical_name": "Huk:am Singh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1217_1270_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "KEW AL KRISHAN PURI & ANR.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\nfY. V. CHANDRACHUD, CJ., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA, B\n\nS. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nPunjab AgriculJural Produce Mnrkets Act, 1961 Ss. 23, 26 and 28 i: Punjab Agricultural Produce (General) Rules, R 29-Marketing Developtt1ent Fttnd & fee-ValidiJy-Principlcs for satisfying the test for a valid levy of market fees.\n\nPunjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 Ss. 23. 26 and 28 &: Punjab Agricultural Produce (General) Rules, R29-Marketing Development Fund &\n\n.41<;1'keting Conunittr:e Fund-,-UtilLation of market fees---Validity of purpvses enumerated in clauses of Ss. 26 and 28 examined.\n\nThe Punjab Agricultural Produce J,1arkets Act, 1961 which \\\\'as passed by the composite State of Punjab is an Act for the better regulation of the purchase, sale, storage and procesing of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the Stnte.\n\nSection 3 envisages the establishn1ent of the State Agricultural Marketing Board for the entire State and it is provided in sub-sec, (9) that \"The Board shall exercise superintendence and <'.ontrol over the Committees\".\n\nSection 6(1) provides for \"declaration of notified 1narket area\" and the State Government is empo\\\\'ered to declare the area notified under s. 5 or any portion thereof to be a notified market area for the purpose of the Act in respect of the agricultural produce notified under s. 5 or any part thereof. The market area<; and n1arket yards \\Vere dclared. putting restriction on the traders to carry on their trade under a licence granted by the various J\\.farkets Committees established amci. constituted within the specified boundaries or ureas.\n\nAfter the declaration of the nol ified 1narket area no person can establish or continue any place for the purchase, sale, storage and processing of the a-gricultural produce except under a licence granted in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Bye-laws.\n\nSection 23 empowers the committ'ee to levy, the fees subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government in thi~ behalf on the agricultural prcxluce broui:ht or sold by licensees in the notified market area at a certain percentage. Uader s. 27(1), all rnoneys received by a Committee shall be pa.id into a fund to be called the Market Committeo Fund and all expenditure incuned hall be defrayed out of such fund, while under s. 25 all receipts of the Board are to be credited iA.to a fund to be called the Marketing Development Fund and the purposes for \\Vhich it mny be expended are enumerated in s. 26 viz. better marketing of agricultural produce on co-operative lines, collection and dissemination of market rates and news, gr~1ding and standardisalion of agricultural produce etc.\n\nSection 28 rntalogues the purposes for which the Marketing Committee Fl.lnd nlay 1--e utilised viz. acquisition of sites for the market, maintenan'.:e and improvement of the nlaiket, constn1ction a.nd repair of buildings \\Vhich are necessary for the pt1rp0se of. the n1arkt!t etc.\n\nJn the composite State of Punjab and even after the .bifurcation of the State for about a period of three years the n1axin1un1 rate of market fee which could\n\nA be levied br the various market com1nittees under s. 23 was 50 paise for ..:very one hundred rupees.\n\nThe fee \\ .. .:as thereafter raised from time to tinie.\n\nA number of wril petitions werl.! filed in the High Court challenging the po\"'er of the Board to in..:::rease the levy of fee.\n\nAll the writ petitions were heard togeth'er and the in-::rease and levy of fee up!o Rs. 2/- by the various Market Committees in the State of Harynna \\Vas upheld and the writ petitions of the llaryana dealers were dis1nisscd while tho.'e of the Punjab dealers were allowed and thei increase of rate brought about by Act 13 of 1974 to the extent of Rs, 2.25 WM struck down. [Mjs. Hanunzan Dall & General Mills, His01 v.\n\nState of Haryana & others AIR 1976 P & H l]\n\nJn Punjab, by C:•!nendn1ent .Act 14 of 1975, s. 23 of the Act \\.Vas again amended authorising the imposition of market fee at a rate not exceeding Rs. 2.20 per hundred rupees only, and this increae in the rates of fee was agaifl challenged in the High Court and a Full Bench upheld the increase. [Kewal Kri.d1an Puri & Anr. v. State of P1111j11b & Ors., AIR 1977 P & H 347].\n\nThi-. view \\\\as challenged in the appeal to this Court.\n\nBoth in the State of Punjab and the State of 1-Iaryana the rate of market fee y, as further raised from R5. 2/- to Rs. 3.'-. It was un5uccessfully challenged\n\nin tf1e High Court by the dealers of ea-ch of the States, who thereafter preferred appeals to this Court against the Judgment of the IIigh Court and also chaltengeCl the increases in fee, in writ petitions in this Court.\n\nTn the appeals and writ petitions it was contended that the Jevy of the 111arkrt fee realised from the buyers under s. 23 of the Act could not be correlated with the service to be rendered to the payers of the fees, and therefore cannot be justified and sustained on the well kno\\vn concept of fee as pointed out by this Court in scverJI decisions. and that the iten1s of expenditure authorised and enun1erated in ss. 26 nnd 28 of the Act, go beyond the scope of the purpose of the utiliation of the market fees.\n\n(Jn the question of the validity of the fixation of n1arket fees under s. 23 of the Act fron1 time to time and the1 scope and the purpose of the utilisa•tion of such fl\"es_:\n\nHELD : 1. The impost of fee and th'e liability to pay it is on a particular individual or a class of individuals.\n\nThey arc under the obligation to submit accot; nts, returns or tile like to the authorities concerned in cases where quantification of the amount of fee depends upon the same.\n\nThey have to undergo the botherations and harasn1enls, sometimes justifiably and sometimes even unjustifiably. in the process of discharging their liability to pay the fee. 1'he authorities levying the fee deal with thern and renlise the fee from them.\n\nBy operation of the economic l&ws in certain kinds of imposition of fee the burden may be passed on to different other persons one after the other. [1229H-1230B]\n\nIn the instant case, the Market Committees and the Market Board assumed to then1selves the liberty of utilising and spending the realisations from market fee<; to a considerable extent, as if it \\Vas a tax, altbouglJ. in reaility it was not H so. [l240DJ\n\n2. Rendering some service. however remote the service may be, cannot strictly speaking satisfy the element of quid pro quo required to be established in cases\n\n-4\n\nK. K. l'URI V. PUNJAB 1219\n\nof the impost of fee.\n\nRegistration fee, however has to be taken to. stand on\n\nA.. a c..Li.fferent footing altogether. In tl\\e case of such a fee the test of quid pro quo is not tu be satisfied with such direct close or proximate relationship as in the ca8e of many other fees.\n\nBy an<l large registration fee is charged as a regul<.tory measure.\n\n[1241B]\n\n3. This Court in a large number of cases had the' occasion. to exan1in.c the nature of fee and tax anJ from a conspectus of the various authorities the following principles for .satisfying the test for a valid levy of market fees on\n\nthe agricultural produce bought or oh.I by licences in a notified market area ar'e deducible :-\n\n(i) That the amount of fee realised must be carm::irked for rendering services to the Jiccncees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended for thispurpose.\n\n[1243H]\n\n(ii) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale of the agricultural produce. [12448]\n\n1(iii) Thz.t while rendering services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transactions of purchase and sale with a view to achieVe the objects of the marketing legislation it is not fl;!CCssary to confer the whole of\n\nthe bene'tit on the Iicenees but some special benefits must lie conferred on thm D \\\\hich have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between the 1icensee, s and th!! transa1; tons.\n\n[1244C]. \\\n\n(iv) That while conferring some special benefilo; on the licensees it is perffiissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with the transaction taking place in the. market.\n\n[I244DJ E\n\n(v) lhat spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its fa::ility of transport in village9 and to provide other facilities meant n1ainly or exclusively for the benefit of agriculturists is not permi1\\ible on the ground -that such services in the long run go to increase the vclume (>f transnctions in the market ultimately benefiting thei traders also.\n\nuch an indirect and remote benefit to the t1t.1tlers is in no sense a special benefit to them: [l244E-F]\n\n(vi) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even .necessary, to be established \\vith arithmetical exactitude but even broa<lly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities v.ho charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to these on ,., horn flls the burden of the fee.\n\n[1244G] ·\n\n:(\\'ii) A.t least a good and substantial portion of the amount oo11ected on accoont of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must j3e shown \\.\\ith reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the \"-ind mentioned above. [t 244 HJ\n\nl\"he Conuni.s.sioncr llindu Religious Enc/!jwmentl, .Afadras v. Sri Lal.s.11111~;;:/ra '.lliirtha SH\"an1iar of Sri Shirur Mutt. 11954] SCR 1005; Matthews v.\n\nClticorv M<1rl.eting Board. 60 CLR. 263: Allorney General for British Col11111bia &\n\nEsquirnalt & Nanailno Railway Co. & Ors., (1950) Appeal Cases, 87; H. _II.\n\nSud/tundra Tlrirtha Swaniiar v. Conunissioner for llhulu Religiout. & Charitable E1, downrents, Mysore, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 302; J1ahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj\n\nDas & Anr. v. The State of Orissa & Anr., [1954] SCR 1046; Rati!al Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and Ors\" [1954] SCR 1055; The Hingir-&mpur Cold Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. 1 he State of Orissa & Ors., [,1961] 2 SCR 537; Parton v.\n\nA1ilk Botird (Victoria), 80 CLR 229; Corporation of Caicutta & Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, [1965] 2 SCR 477; Har Shankar & Ors. etc. ere. v. The Dy. Ei:ise & Taxation Commr. & OrJ., f1975J 3 SCR 254; Nagar ,\\laliapaiika Vara,-1asi v.·\n\nDurga Das Bhattacharya & Ors., [1968] 3 SCR 374; The Delhi Cloth & General .ftJills co. Ltd. v. Chief Co1n111is.1ioner, Del/d & Ors., [1970} 2 SCR 348; Indian Mica & Micanite Indu:1tries Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1971] Suppl. SCR 319; Secretary, Government of Madras, Horne Departn1ent & Anr. Y. Zenith Lamp & Electrical Ltd., [1973] 2 SCR 973; State of Afaharoshtra & Ors. 't. The\n\nSa/ration Army, Western India Territory, [1975] 3 SCR 475; Govt. 11/ ..--lndhra Pradesh &: Anr. v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., Ll975] Suppl. SCR 394; The Municjpaf Council, Madurai, v. R. Naray(111a11 etc., [1976] 1 SCR 333; .The Chief Coo1n1i.ssioner, Delhi and Anr. v. The Delhi Cloi/1 & G'enera[ Mills Co.\n\nLtd. & Anr. AIR 1978, SC 1181; P, P. Kutti Keya &Ors. v. The State of Madras & Ors., AIR 1954 Madras, 621; MCVS Arunachala 1\\'adar etc. v. The State of\n\nAtadras & Ors., [1959] Suppl. 1 SCR 92~ Mohmn1ad llussain Gulam & Anr. v.\n\nState of Bo111bay & Or.1., fl962J 2 SCR 659; Lek/tan l.nl & Or~. c'fc. v 7 !>.'State of Bil1ar & Or~., [1968] 3 SCR 534; referred to.\n\n4. (i) A dispute arose between th~ parties as to whether the lic1..-ne is g1anted for the whole of the area or for particular places therein.\n\nOn examining Form B in the Rules meant for grant of licence under s.10, it i\" found that the licence is granted for one or more places of business spe .. :ified in col. 6 situated in a particular notified market area named at the top of the licence.\n\nThere will be no sense in specifying the place of busines~ in the licence if the licensee is to be permitted to establish his place of business any where in a notified ma.rket area which i~ too big and extensh:e for the control and supervision of a particular 1\\.Iarket Committee.\n\nMarket yards are declared under s. 7.\n\nFor each notified market area there can be one principal market yard 21nJ. one or more sub-market yards as may be neces-sary.\n\nThe marginal note of sec. 8 is, \"No private market to be opened in or near places declared to be markets.\"\n\n[1246D-E]\n\n(ii) There is no special prov1s1on in this Statute for an establishment of markets or markets proper as per the definition contained in cl. (i) and (k) of s. 2 of the Act, it is reasonable to assume that the intention of the le£i8'lature\n\nis to constitute the n1arket yards as the market proper and ordinarily and generally the market would be the same but may include some other places where transactions of purchase of ngricultural produce by the traders from the producers has been allo\\\\-ed in order to avoid rush in the precincts of the riarket\n\nproper.\n\nBut one thing is certcJiR that the whole of the marJ...et ai c~1 in rio\n\nen<; c can be equated with 1narket or market proper.\n\nNobody can b:: a:!o\\Vc(i to cstnblish a purchasing centre of his own at any place he likes in the market <irea without there being such a permission or authority from the Market Comtnittees.\n\nAfter all the whole object of the Act is the supervis-ion and control cf the transactions of purch2.se by the traders fron1 the ngriculturists ir.. order to rr~·:-ent exploitation of the latter by the former.\n\n[1240H-1247A)\n\n·---).\n\nK. K. PURI V. PUNJAB 1n1\n\n5. The whole obJect of the Act is the supervision and control of the A tiansactions of purchase by the traders from the agriculturists in order to prevent exploitation of the latter by the former. The supervision and control can be effective only in specified localities and places and not throughout the ex tensive market area.\n\n[1247B]\n\n6. Rule 24(1) in both the States framed under the Act provides that \"all agricultural produce brought into the market for sale shall be sold by open auction in the principal or sub-market yard\", which indicates that market is generally the principal and sub-markets yards. The benefit of market fee, therefore, has to be correlated with the transactions ta.king place at the specified place in the market area and not in the whole of the area. [1247D]\n\n7. The duties and pcnvers of a market committee are enumerated in s. 13 aiid this indicates that the Committee is primarily concerned with the establishing of a market in the notified area and with providing facilities in the market for persons visiti11g it and in connection with the transactions taking place there. [l247F]\n\n8. Reading s. 23 along with r. 29 it would be noticed that the power of the Committee to le\\-y fees• is subject to the Rules as may be made by the State\n\n<3-0vernment The fee is levied on ad valorem basis at a rate ~:hich cannot txceed the maximum mentioned in s. 23 by the legislature. But the power to fix the rate from time to time within the maximum limit has been conferred on tht Board and the Committee is merely bound to follow it.\n\n[12480-H]\n\n9. Section 23 in express language controls the power of the Committee to levy fees subject to the rules. The power given to the Board to fix the rate of market fees from titne to time under rule 29 is not ultra vires the provisions of the Act, as sub-sec. (a) of s. 3 confers power on the Board to exercise superintendence and control over the committees, which power, in the context and the scheme of the marketing law, will take within its ambit the power conferred on the Board under rule 29(1). [l249C]\n\nState of Punjab & Anr. v. Hari Krishan Sharma, [1966] 2 SCR 982; distinguished.\n\n10. The fee levied is not on the agricultural produce in the sense of imposing any kind of tax or duty on the agricultural produce. Nor is it a tax on the transaction of purchase or sale. The levy is an impost on the buyer of the agricultural produce in the market in relation to transactions of his purchase. The agriculturists are not required to share any portion of the burden of this fee. In CMe the buyer is not a licensee then the responsibility of paying the fees is of the seller who may realise the same from the buyer.\n\nBut such a contingency cannot arise in respect of the transactions of sale by an agriculturist of his agricultural produce in the market to a dealer who must be a licensee. Probably such an alternative provision was meant to be made ft>r outside buyers who are not licensees when they buy the agricultural proclce from or through the licensees.\n\n[1249D-E]\n\nII. Every Market Committee is obliged under sub-sec.\n\n(2) (•) of s. l7 H to pay ont of its funds to the Marketing Board as contribution such percelltage\n\nof its income derived from licence fee, market fee and fines levied by the\n\nc.c:urts as spec.i_fied in sub-cl. (i) and _(ii).\n\nThe purpOse of this contribution\n\n'.l\" mentioned in sub-sec.(2)(a) is to enable the Board to defray expenses of th.: office, establishment of the Board and such other expenses incurred hy it\n\ni-;1 the interest of the Committees in general. The income of almost all the ,\\larket Committees were several lakhs of rupees per year and, therefore, each is required to pay 30 per centum of its income to the Board by \\!irtue of the amendment brought about by Punjab Act 4 of 1978. Under s. 25 , all receipts of the Board are to be credited into a fund to be called thi larketing Development Fund: Purposes for which the Marketing Development Fund may be experided are enuIDerated in s. 26 and the puiposes for which the hfket Committee Funds may be expended are c™-alogued in s. 28. [1250A-C]\n\n12~ No serious objection tothe items of expenditure mentioned in clauses (xii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) can be taken. Clause (x) and clause (xi) cannot -C form the items of expenditure of the market fees.\n\nThe whole of the State is d, ivided into market areas.\n\nThe propaganda in favour of agricultural improvement and expenditure for production and betterment of -agricultural produce will be in the general interest of agriculture in the market area. So lung as the concept of fee remains distinct and limited in contrast to tax such expen diture out of t~ market fee cannot be countenanced in law.\n\n[1252FG]\n\n13. The first part of cl. (xiii) may be justified in the sense of imparting education in marketing to the staff of the 1farket Committee.\n\nBut imparting education in agriculture in general cannot be correlated with the market fee.\n\n(1252H]\n\n14. How ill-conceived the second part of clause (xvii) is?\n\nIsit permissible to spend the market fees realised from the traders for any purpose calculated to promote the national or public interest? Obviously not. No market Com mittee can be permitted to utilise the fund for an ulterior purpose how; oever benevolent, laudable and charitable th.e object may be. The v.-hole concept of fee will collapse if the amount realised by market fees could be permitted to be spent in this fashion.\n\n[1253A-B]\n\nTechnically and legally, one may _not have any objection to the expenditure of such money for the purposes mentioned in clauses (x), (xi), (xiii) and .F (xvii). [12530]\n\n, __ JS. It is not necessary to strike down any clauses of s. 28 as being uncons titutional merely on the ground that the expenditure authorised therein goes beyond the scope of the purpose of the utilisation of the market fees. The authorities ha.Ye to bear this in mind aitd on a proper occasion the matter will have to be dealt with by courts in the light of this Judgment v1here a concrete case comes of raiSing of a loan, spending thi money so raised which cannot be reasonably connected with the purposes for \"'bich the market fee can be spent, as to whether such a loan can be repaid or interest on it can be paid out of the realisations of the market fees.\n\n[1253G)\n\n_16. The Board in the State is the Central Controlling and superintending • authority over all the }rfarket Committees, the primary function of which i! to render service in the market. Parting with 30% income by a 1farket Com\n\nmittee in favour of the Board is not so exCessive or unreasonable so as to warrant any interference with the law in this regard on the ground of violation of the principle of quid Pro quo in the utilisation of the market fee realised\n\n• • •\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB 1223\n\nfrom the traders in the inarket area.\n\nEn1phasised that the Marketing Development Fund can only be expended for the purposes of the :rtfarket Com· mittees in a general way, or to L'e more accurate, as far as practicable, for the purposes of the particular Market Committee which n1akes the contribution.\n\n[1254C-DJ\n\n17. Section 26 of the Act provides for purposes for \\vhich the Marketing Development Fund may be expended.\n\nThe Marketing Development Fund constituted primarily and mainly out of the contributions by the Market Con1mittees from realisation Of market fee can also be expended for the purposes , of the market in the notified n1arket area in relation to the transactions of pur-\n\n-::1 chase and sale of agricultural prcxluce and for no other general purpose or in -~ the general interest of the agriculture or the agriculturists. The purposes ' ~{ mentioned in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), Hrst part of clause (v), clauses (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (xii), first part of clause (xiii), clauses (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) held valid.\n\nThe Marketing Development Fund constituted out of the J\\.!arket fees cannot be eJtPended for the purposes nlentioned in second part of clause (v), clauses (x), (xi), second part of clause (xiii) and clause (xvii). As the purpose of the law will be sen'ed by restricting the operation of s. 26, it is not necessary to strike down those provisions as being constitutionally invalid. [l254E, 1255F-l256A]\n\n18. The High Court has extracted s. 28 of the Act but has failed to scan the effect of the various purposes in some of the clauses.\n\n[1256H-1257A]\n\n19. The High Court seems to be of the vie\\V that since transportation is very essential for the development of a market and to enable the growers of the agricultural produce to bring the same to the market, the construction of link roads becomes an essential purpose of the n1a.rket committe'es.\n\nIt may be so but the purpose cannot be allowed to be achieved at the cost of the market fee realised fron1 the dealers.\n\n[1257G]\n\n20. The impost must be correlated with the service to be rendered to the payers of the fees in the sense and to th'e extent pointed out.\n\n[1260A]\n\n21. Everybody seems to have allowed hi1nself to be carried too far by the sentiment of the laudable object of the Act of Uoing whatever is possible to do under it for the amelioration of the conditions and the uplift of the villagers ....-- and the agriculturists.\n\nUndoubtedly the Act is primarily meant for that purpose and to the extent it is permissible under the Jaw to achieve that object of utilising the money collected by the n1arkct fee, it should be done.\n\nBut if the la\\v does not permit carrying on the sentiment too far for achieving of all the laudable objects under the A.ct, then primarily it becomes the duty of the Court to allow the la~' to have an upper hand over the sentiment and not vice versa.\n\n[1263G-H]\n\n22. If insecticides and pesticides are for use at the place \\Vhere actually the marketing operations are carried on it \\VouJd be a justifiable expenditure. But .if they are meant to be supplied to the agriculturists for use at their village homes or in their fields surely they cannot be valid expenditure out of the col-\n\nJectio!lB of the n:iarket fee.\n\n[1267G-H]\n\nIn the instant cases the authorities took full liberty to treat the realisation itom inarket fee as a general realisation of tax which they were free to spend in any manner they liked for the purposes of the Act, the development of the aroo, for giving a fillip to agricultural prod11ction and so forth and so on. The\n\nsooner the authorities are made to reatise the correct position in la.\\V the better it will be for all concerned. [1269FJ\n\n23. Taking a reasonable and practical vie\\v of the matter and on appreciation of the true picture of justifiable and legal expenditure in relation to the market fee income, even though it had to be done on the basis of some reasonable gue11!il work, the court did not disturb the raising of an imposition of the rate of market fee upto Rs. 2 /- per hundred by the various Market Committees and the Boards both in the State of Punjab and Haryana. After all, considerable deTelopment work seen1s to have been done by tnany Market Committees in their reipective markets. The charging of fee @ Rs. 21therefore, is justified and fit to be sustained.\n\n[1269G-1270A]\n\n24. The dealers of Haryana <lid not feel aggrieved when the High Court maintained the raising of the mark'et fee to the extent of Rs. 2/- per hundred , rupees. The court did not uphold the raising of the fee from Rs. 2/- to R~. 3/- as on the materials placed before it, it is clear that this has been done chiefly because of the worng impression of la\\v that the amount of market fee can be spent for any developn1ent work in the notified n1arket area and especially for the development of agriculture and the welfare of the agriculturists. The High Court was wron& in maintaining this use on an erroneous vie\\V of the matter.\n\n[1270B-C]\n\n25. In fw.ture if the market f ce is sought to be raised beyond the rate of Rs. 21 per hundred rupees, proper budgets, estimates, balance-sheets showing the balance of the n1oney in hand and in deposit, the estimated income and expenditure, etc. should carefuly be prepared.\n\nOn drawing the correct balancesheets and framing of the correct estimates and budgets the authorities as also the State Government will be able to know the correct position and to decide reasonably as to what extent the raising of the market fee can be justified taking an oTer-all picture of the matter and keeping in view the reason behind the restrictions of sales tax laVi'S concerning the transactions of foodgrai.as and the other agricultural produce. Then, and then only, there may be a legal justification fur raising the rate of the market fee further to a reasonable extent.\n\n[1270E-GJ\n\nF CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1083 of 1977. --4\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28-1-1977 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 5697/75)\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO: 1616 OF 1978\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-9-1978 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in CWP No. 3849/ 78)\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS :1700-1761 OF 1978 H (Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-8-1978 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 3351, 2662, 3094, 3221, 3303, 3330, 3347, 3348, 3349, 3350-,\n\n• .. •\n\nK. K. PURI V. PUNJAB 122 5\n\n3384, 3390, 3393, 3459, 3460, 3489, 3517, 3533. 3548, 3551, 3563, 3570, 3576, 3598, 3615, 3665, 3673, 3773. 3775, 3776, 3826, 3827, 3883, 4024, 4171/77, 37/78, 178, 212, 283, 335, 381, 423, 483, 577, 666, 751, 887, 976, 1021, 1058, 1104, 1164, 1280, 1469/78, 2625/77, 1556/78, 1578/78, 1635, 1859, 1980, 1997 and 2095/78.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1762-1773 OF 1978.\n\n(Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order d; ted 30-8-1978 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in, Civil Writ Petition\n\n~ Nos. 45/78, 888, 1251 1451, 1556 3300, 3330, 3293/77, 329'.:', \"'--(' 3337, 3385 and 3426/77)\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1626-1627 OF 1978.\n\n(Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-8-1978 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 4171/77 and 1356/78)\n\nAND\n\nWRIT PETITION NOS. 4436, 4470, 4472, 4481, 4485,4564, 4420, 4450, 4460, and 4484 OF 1978\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nFor the Appellants in CA No. !083/77:A. K. s,:11 Mr. Ra, inder Bana, and Bhal Singh Malik For the RR. 1-2 in CA No. 1083/77 :\n\nS. N. Kackar, Sol. Genl., Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi, For the Intervener-State Agricultural Market Board and Market Committee, Nai Mandi in CA No. 1083/77: V. M. Tarkunde, and S. C. 1 Patel. For the Applicant Intervener: in CA No. 1083/77 Mrs. Urmila Kapoor.\n\nFor the Respondent No. 3 in CA No. 1083/77 H. L. Sibbal, G. G.\n\nF .• : ... ,., Parv and Mr. Atma Ram. For the Petitioner in the W.P. excoe111 in , ...\n\nWPs. Nos. 4481, 4470, 4564 Bhal Singh Malik, B. Datta and K. K.\n\nManchanda. For the Petitioners in W. P. Nos. 4481, 4564, and for the Appe!Jams in CA No. 1616/78 S. K. Wa!ia, and Mr. M. P. Jha. For the Petitioner in W. P. No. 4470/78 Sarva Mitter. For the Respondents in WP. 4430, 4472, 4481, 4485/78 and CA 1616/78 W.P. 4564/78: G Hardev Singh, G. C. Garg and R. S. Sodhi. For the Appel/ants in CA Nos. 1700-1761/78 Anil Diwan, (1703) Adarsh Kumar Goel (in all\n\nappeals) Prav*'1 Knmar, Adv.\n\n(1703) Miss Bina Gupta, Adv.\n\n(1703) Madan Gopal Gupta (1703 to 1752) Sarva Mitter (1751~\n\n1761 and all other) For the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4420, 4450, 4460, 4484/78: A K. Sen, (4420) Dr. L. M. Singhvi, (4460) B.\n\nH Dutta, K. K. Manchanda and Bhal Singh Malik, For R. 1 in Appeai Nos. 1700-1761/78 and WP Nos. 4420, 4450, 4460 and 4484/78: 22--4f!)SCJ./79\n\nP. N. Lekhi, (FP 4420) and R. N. Sachthey, For RR. 2-3 in Appeal Nos. 1760-1761/78 and WP Nos. 4420, 4450, 4460 and 4-184/78:\\1. M. Tarkunde, (in CA 1700 and WP 44~0) Gian Singh, (WPs. 4420. 4450 4460, 4484 and CAs 1760-1761) S. C. Patel, Fer the Appellants in CA Nos. 1626-1627 /78Mrs. Urrnila Kapoor, For the Appellants in CA Nos. 1762-1773/78 : K. K. Mohan.\n\nFor the o!her appearing l<R. in CA Nos. 1762-1763 : S. C. Patel,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-In these groups of Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions, broadly speaking, the question which falls for determination is the validity of certain provisions of the Pnnjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Punjab Act No. 23 of 1961), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the Rules framed by the State of Pnnjab and Haryana under the said Act as also the validity of the fixation of market fees from time to time by the various Market Committees in the States aforesaid under the direction of the Punjab State Agricultural Produce Marketing Board and the Haryana State Agricultural Produce Marketing Board.\n\nAll these cases have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.\n\nIn the erstwhile composite State of Punjab the Act was passed in the year 1961 to consolidate and amend the law relating to the better regulation of the purchase, sale, storage and processing of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State.\n\nUnder section 3 of the Act the State Agricultural Marketing -.:i Board was constituted for the entire area of the composite State, :\"'!\"\"- T which later, in the year 1966 came to be bifurcated into the States of Punjab and Haryana.\n\nUnder the various provisions of the Act, which will be noticed shortly hereinafter, market areas and market yards were declared putting restrictions on the traders to carry on their trade under a licence granted by the various Market Committees established and constituted in accordance with sections 11 and 12, within the specified boundaries or areas. The traders were required to take out licences on payment of a licence fee.\n\nUnder section 23 of the Act a Market Committee was required and authorised to levy on ad-valfJrem basis fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licoosees in the notified market area at a rate not exceeding the rate mentioned in section 23 from time to time for every one hundred rupees.\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1227\n\nIn the composite State of Punjab and even after the bifurcation of the States for about a period of three years the maximum rate of market fee which could be levied under section 23 was 50 paise for every one hundred rupees.\n\nVarious Market Committees levied a fee\n\nof 50 paise per hundred rupees and no dealer made any murmur of grievance of it.\n\nTn the bifurcated State of Punjab by Act 25 of 1969 the rate of 50 paisc was raised to Re. 1/-. It was further raised to Rs. 1.50 by Act 28 of 1973. Thereafter by Ordinance 4 of 1974 which was replaced by Act 13 of 1974 the rate was raised to Rs. 2.25.\n\nSeveral dealers filed a number of Writ Petitions in the High Court of \"' Punjab and Haryana challenging the increase in the rate of market fee \"\"-rfrom time to time, the !&st one being by Act 13 of 1974. Similarly\n\nin the State of Haryana the rate of 50 paise was raised to Re. 1/- by Haryana Amendment Act 28 of 1969. It was further raised to\n\nRs. 1.50 by Act 21 of 1973. By Ordinance 2 of 1974 which was replaced by Act 17 of 1974 in the State of Haryana the fee was raised to Rs. 2/- for every one hundred rupees, as against the rise of Rs. 2.1* in the State of Punjab. Several dealers of the State of Haryana als<l challenged in the High Court the levy and increase of market fee frOft•\n\ntime to time.\n\nAll the Writ Petitions were heard together.\n\nThe mcrease and levy of fee upto Rs. 2 /- by the various Market Committees in the State of Haryana was upheld and the Writ Petitions of the Har-\n\n• yana dealers were dismissed while those of the Punjab dealers were allowed atKI the increase of rate brought about by Ordinance 4 and Act 13 of 1974 to the extent of Rs. 2.25 was struck down.\n\nThis decision of the High Conrt is reported in M/s. Hanuman Dall & General Mills, Hissar v. The State of Haryana and others.(') The date of the decision is November 8, 1974. In Punjab by Amendment Act 14\n\n-0£ 1975 section 23 of the Act was again amended authorising the imposition of market fee at a rate not exceeding Rs. 2.20 per hundred\n\npees. Telegraphic instructions were issued by the Punjab Board to 'I the various Market Committees directing them to charge Rs. 2/- only with effect from August 23, 1975 after the passing of the Act 14 of • 1973 on August 8, 1975.\n\nThe increase in the rates of fee, the last one being in August, 1975, were again challenged in the High Conrt. • But the Full Bench which finally heard the Writ Petition npheld the increases by its judgment delivered on January 28, 1977, which is reported in Kewal Krishan Puri and another v. The State of Punjab and others.(') Civil Appeal 1083 of 1977 has been preferred in this Court from the said judgment of the High Court.\n\n(I) A I. R. 1976 Punjab and Haryana J.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1977 Punjab and Haryana 347 .\n\nBoth in the Staoo of Punjab d the State of Haryana the rate of market fee was further raised from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3 /-. It was unsuccessfully challenged in the High Court.\n\nThe dealers have preferred appeals from the judgments of the High Court as also filed Writ Petitions in this Court. In the State of Punjab the fee was raised to Rs, 3/- by Ordinance 2 of 1978 which must have been replaced by an Act. The Ordinance was promulgated on April 28, 1978. The Writ Petition 4436 of 1978 has been filed in this Court challenging the pre- vious increases in the fee along with the last increase of Rs. 3/-- The High Court upheld it by its judgment dated May 18, 1978. Special v.\n\nLeave Petition (Civil) 2768 of 1978 wa> preferred from this judgme~.,..\n\nWrit Petition No. 3849 of 1978 was filed in the High Court by a large} number of dealers, which was dismissed in I/mine by order dated September 18, 1978. Civil Appeal 1616 of 1978 arises out of this Writ Petition.\n\nSeveral other dealers have filed separate Writ Petitions also being Writ Petitions 4470, 4472, 4481, 4485 and 4564 of 1978 challenging in the increase of market fee in the State of Punjab.\n\nIn the State of Haryana the rate of fee was raised from Rs. 2 /- to Rs. 3/- with effect from September S, 1977 by Ordinance 12 of 1977 replaced by Act 22 of 1977.\n\nThe Haryana State Marketing Board directed all the Market Committees in that State to collect market flOC\n\n@ Rs. 3/- with effect from 5-9-1977.\n\nA number of Writ Petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the said increai; e and the High Co4rt dismissed all the Writ Petitions by its judgment dated August 30, 1978.\n\nCivil Appeals 1700 to 1773 of 1978 and Civil Appeals 1626 and 1627 of 1978 are from the judgment of the High Court dated August 30, 1978.\n\nThe said increase has also been challenged by filing Writ Petitions in this Court and they are Writ Petitions 4420, 4450, 4460 and 4484 of 1978.\n\nAlthough by now there is a catena of cases of this Court pointing out the difference between \"tax\" and \"fee\" with reference to the constitutional provisions and otherwise also, the problem before us has presented some new angles and facets.\n\nWe, therefore, think it advisable and necessary to review many of the earlier decisions to pin-point the precise difference as far as practicable in order to resolve the rival contentions of the parties. The arguments of the learned counsel for the parties whenever thought necessary would be referred to at the appropriate places hereinafter in this judgment.\n\nClause (2) of Article 110 and clause (2) of Article 199 of the Constitution, the former occurring in the Chapter of Parliament and the\n\n' •\n\n. \"\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Ulltwalia, !.) 1229\n\nbtter in relation to the State Legislature, are in identical terms as A . follows:-\n\n\"A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides •..... for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered . ... : ..... \"\n\nThe Constitution, therefore, clearly draws a distinction between the imposition of a tax by a Money Bill and the impost of 'fees by any other kind of bill. . So also in the Seventh Schedule both in List I and II a distinction has been maintained in relation to the entires of tax\n\nand fees. In the Union List entries 82 to 92A relate to taxes and C duties and entry 96 carves out the legislative field for fees in respect of any of the matters in the said list except the fees taken in any Court.\n\nSimilarly in the State List entries relating to taxes are entires 46 to 63 . and entry 66 provides for fees in respect of any of the matters in List n but not including fees taken in any Court. Entry relating to .fees\n\nin List III is entry 47: Our Constitution, therefore, recognises a D , different and distinct\" connotation between taxes and fees. . . .\n\nThe leading case of this Court which has been referred and follow- rd in many subsequent decisions is the 'case 'of The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Elldowments, Madras .v. Sri. Lakshmindra. Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.(') The point decided therein was that the provision relating to the payment of annual contribution contained in section 76(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 is a tax and not a fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras State Legislature to enact . such a provision.\n\nThe meaning given to the word \"tax\" by Latham C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board(') has been quoted with approval at page 1040 and has been Often repeated in many other decisions. Generally. speaking a fee is defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency.\n\nA question arises--\"specia\\ service\" rendered to whom which kind of individuals?\n\nMr. V. M. Tarkunde who appeared for the Haryana Marketing Board stressed the argument that service rendered must be correlated to those on whom the ultimate burden of the fee falls. In our opinion this argument is neither logical . nor sound.\n\nThe impost of fee and the liability to pay it is on a parti- .cular individual or a class of individuals.\n\nThey arc under the obliga-'\n\n(I) [1954] S. C. R. 1005.\n\n(2) 60 C. L. R. 263.\n\nSUPRE~!E COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntion to submit accounts, returns or the like to the authorities concerned in cases where quantification of the amount of fees depends upon the same.\n\nThey have to undergo the botherations and han.ssments, sometimes justifiably and sometimes even unjustifiably, in the process of discharging their liability to pay the fee._ The authorities levying the fee deal with them and realize the fee from them.\n\nBy operation of the economic laws _in certain kinds of impositions of fee the burden may be passed on to different other persons one after the other. A few lines occurring at page 1_19 in the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Attorney-General for Br_itish Columbia and Esquima/t and\n\nNanaimo Railway Company and others(') may be quoted withi advantage.\n\nThey are as follows :-\n\n\"It is probably true of many forms of tax which are indisputably direct that the assessee will desire, if he can, to. pass the bnrden of the tax on to the shoulders of another but this is only an economic tendency. The assessee's D efforts may be conscious or unconscious, successful or unsuccessful; they may be defeated in whole or in part by other economic forces.· This type of tendency appears to their Lordships_ to be something fundamentally different from the \"passing on\" which is regarded as the hall-mark of ari indifect tax.\" E\n\nThe authorities, more often than not, almost invariably, will nor be able to know .the individual or individuals on whom partly or wholly the ultimate burden of th<> fee will fall.\n\nThey arc not concerned to investigate and find out the position of the ultimate burden. It is axiomatic that the special service rendered must be to the poyer of the fee. The element of quid pro quo must bo establ\"shcd between the\n\n__ payer of the fee and the authority charging it. It may not be the exact equivalent of the fee by a mathematical precision, yet, by and large:' or predominantly, the authority collecting the fee must show that the service which they are rendering in lieu of fee is for some special benefit of the payer of the fee. r It may be so intimately connected or interwoven with the service rendered to others that it may not be possible to do a complete dichotomy and analysis as to what amount of special service was rendered to the payer of the fee and what pro-- pcrtion went to others. _ But generally and broadly speaking it must be shown with some amount of certainty, reasonableness or preponderance of probability that quite a substantial portion of the amount of fee realised is spent for the special benefit of its payers.\n\n(1) (19501 Appeal Cases 87.\n\n• •\n\n~· •\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1231\n\nWe may now extract some very useful and leading principles from A the decision of this Court in Shirur Mutt's (1954 S.C.R., 1005, supra) pciintmg out the difference between tax and fee.\n\nAt pages 1040-41 says Mukherjea J., as he then was:\n\n'The second characteristic of tax is that it is an impositron made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax.\n\nThis is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State.\n\nAs the object of a tax is not te confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no element of quid pro quo between the tax-payer and the pnblic authority ........ \"\n\n\"a 'fee' is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency.\"\n\nAt page 1042 the learned Judge enunciates-\"The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden, while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege ....... Public interest seems to be at the basis of\n\nall impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit which (he individual receives.\" After pointing out that ordinarily there are two E classes of cases where Government imposes 'fee' upon persons, the first being the type of cases of the licence fees for Motor V chicles or the like and in the other class of case' \"the Government does some posi'ive work for the benefit of persons and the money is taken as the return for the work done or services rendered\" ( vide page I 043), it is said further--\"If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public, iP could be counted as fees and not a tax.\n\nThere is really no generic difference between lhe tax and fees and as said by Seligman, the taxing power of a State may manifest itself in three different forms known respectively as special assessments. fees and taxes.'' Finally at page 1044 the striking down by the High Court of the imposition of fee under section 76 of 1he Madras Act was upheld on the ground-\"It may be noticed, however, that the contribution that has been levied under section 76 of the Act has been made to depend upon the capacity of the payer and not upon the quantum of benefit that is supposed to be conferred on any particular religious institution.\" Benefit conferred or ny particular religious institution would have been undoubtedly benefit conferred on the payer of the fee.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA After the decision of this Court in Shirur Mutt's case (supra) st:ction 76 of the Madras Act was amended.\n\nThe effect of the amendment came to be considered by this Court in the case of H. H. Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious & Charituble Endowments, Mysore.(') Pointing out the various differences between the earlier law and the amended one at pages 320-21 the imposi'ion of fee was upheld.\n\nIn two other cases of this Court following the ratio of Shirur Mutt\"s deci:; ion the imposition of fee was upheld, vide, Mahant Sri Jagcaznath Ramanuj Das and another v. The State of Orissa and another(\") and Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and others. (3)\n\nWe now proceed to coosidcr some more decisions of this Court in which apparently some different phrases were used for explaiaing the meaning of the word 'fee' and its distinction from 'tax'.\n\nBoth sides placed reliance upon those decisions.\n\nBut if the phrases are understood in the context they were used and with reference to the facts of those cases it would be noticed that the leading principle has not basically undergone any change.\n\nIn the case of The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co., Ltd. & Ors. v. The Slate of Orissa and others(') the challenge was to the cess levied by the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952. The petitioners\" stand in the first instance was that the cess levied was not a lee but a duty of excise on coal and hence beyond the competence of the State Legislature. Alternatively they contended that even if it was a fee it was beyond the competence of the State Legislature for some other reasons not necessary to be mentioned here.\n\nThe cess imposed was upheld as a 'f cc' re la table to Entry 23 of List II read with Entry 66.\n\nIn other words it was upheld as a 'fee' in respect of regulatioFl of mines and mineral development.\n\nGajendragadkar J., as he then wa•, delivered the judgment on behalf of the majority and discussed the point at some length.\n\nAt page 545 arc to be found a few words which go directly against the contention of Mr. Tarkunde.\n\nSays the learned Judge :-\" ...... a fee is levied essentially for scrvic~ rendered and as such there is an clement of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it.\"\n\n(I) [1963] Suppl. 2 S. C. R. 302.\n\n(2) [1954] S. C. R. 1046.\n\n(3) [1954] S. C. R. 1055.\n\n(4) _[1961] 2 S. C.R. 537.\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUN.TAB (Untwalia, J.) . 1233\n\n(Emphasis supplied). Mr. Tarkunde, however, relied upon a passage at the same page which runs thus :-\n\n\"If specific services are rendered to a specific area or to a specific cl= of persons or trade or business in any local area, and as a condition precedent for the said services or in return for them cess is levied against the said area or the said class of persons or trade or business the cess is distinguishable from a tax and is described as a fee.\"\n\n~ ~· The above passage does not mean that the service rendered is un-\n\n~ connected with or not meant for the payer of the fee.\n\nAs pointed out earlier, service rendered to an institution like a Malh is a service rendered to the payer of the fee. Similarly services rendered to a specific area or to a specific class of trade or business in any local area must mean, and cannot but mean, that it is for the special benefit of the person operating in that area. The service rendered was to the mining area for the benefit of the mine owners of that area. Th~ area or trade does not pay the fee nor does it get the benefit in vacuum. The fee is paid by the person who is liable to pay it and service to the payer does not mean any personal or domestic service to him but it means service in relation to the transaction, property or the institution in respect of which he is :made to pay the fee.\n\nSays the learned Judge at page 549 :-\n\n\"It is true that when the Legislature levies a fee for rendering specific services to a specified area or to a specified class of persons or trade or business, in the last analysis such services may indirectly form part of services to the public in general. If the special service rendered is distinctly and primarily meant for the benefit of a specified class or area the fact that in benefitting the specified class or area the State as a whole may ultimately and indirectly be benefitted would not detract from the character of the levy as a fee. Where, however, the specific service is indistinguishable from public service, and in essence is directly a part of it, different considerations may arise. In such a case it is necessary to enquire what is the primary obiect of the levy and the essential purpose which it is intended to achieve. Its primary object and the essential purpose must be distinguished from its ultimate fJr incidental results or co11Sequences.\n\nThat is the true test in determining the character of the levy.\" (underlining, ours)\n\nAt pages 549-50 in the decision of The Hingir-Rmnpur Coal Co.\n\nLl<I. (supra), reference has been made in passing to the decision of\n\nthe Australian High Court in Patron v. Milk Board (Victoria).(') The majority which, amongst others, included Dixon J., held the purported levy to be invalid because it was the imposition of a duty of excise, there being no element of quid pro quo to the per.on on whom the levy had been imposed.\n\nSince a few lines from the judgment of Dixon J., occurring at pages 258-259 will be very helpfu~ in tackling with the problem we are faced with, we may quote them here.\n\nThey are as follows :-\n\n\"It is an exaction for the purposes of expenditure out oi a Treasury fund.\n\nThe expenditure is by a government agency and the objects are governmental. It is not a charge for service.\n\nNo doubt the administration of the Board is regarded as beneficial to what may loosely be described as the milk industry.\n\nBut the Boord performs no particular_ service for the dairyman or the owner of a milk depot for which his contribution may be considered as a fee or recompense. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . ..... ..\n\nOn the other hand it is a trading tax. \"Customs and excise duties are, in their essence, trading taxes, and may be said to he more concerned with the commodity in respect of which the taxation is imposed than with the particular person from whom the tax is exacted\": Attorney General for.\n\nBritish Columbia v. Kingcome Navigation Co. [1934] A.C. 45, at p. 59.\"\n\nAt page 554 is to be found the final conclusion of Gajendragadkar J., which is the crux of the matter. It runs :-\n\n\"Thus the scheme of the Act shows that the cess is levied against the class of persons owning mines in the noti{ii!d area and it is levied to enable the State Government to render specific services to the said class by developing the notified mineral area.\n\nThere is an element of quid f\"'8 quo in the scheme. the ce>s collected is constituted into a specific fund and it has not become a part of the consolidated fund, its application is regulated by a statute and is confined to its purposes, and there is a definite correlation between the impost and the purpose of the Act which is to render service to the notified area.\" (underlining, ours).\n\nIn the case of Corporation of Calcutta and another' v. Liberty H Cinema(') the respondent was charged by the Calcutta Corporation a\n\n(!) 80 C. L. R. 229.\n\n(2) (1965] 2 S .. R. 477.\n\nK. K. PURI l'. PUNJAB (Vntwalia, !.) 12 35, • very high licence fee assessed according to the sanctioned seating capacity of the Cinema house.\n\nThe High Court quashed the imposition.\n\nIn appeal to the Supreme Court the stand of the appellant Corporation was that the levy was a tax and section 548(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act did not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation; while the respondent cinema contended that the levy was a fee and had to be jus.ilicd as being imposed in return for services to be rendered.\n\nAlternatively the respondent submitted that if it was a tax it was invalid as it amounted to an illegal delegation of legislative functions.\n\nThe majority view was expressed by Sarkar J., as he then was, and the impost was upheld as a tax.\n\nIn the minority opinion delivered by Ayyangar J., it was held that even in the case of a licence fee a correlation between the fee charged and the service rendered was uocessary to be established. It was, therefore, held to be a tax but invalidly imposed under a power suffering from the vice of unconstitutional legislative delegation.\n\nIn the cases before us the licence fee& charged from the various traders in the market areas are not excessive and ha, e not been attacked on any ground whatsoever.\n\nWe are, therefore, not concerned to find out whether an element of quid pro quo is necessary in cases of all kinds of licence fees.\n\nSome licences are imperative to be taken 9nly by -v.1ay of regulatory measure, some are in the nature of grant of exclusive right or privilege of the State, such as, excise cases noticed by this Court in the case of Har Shankar & Ors. etc. etc. v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr. & Ors.(') Some may be cases of licence fees where element of quid pro quo is necessary to be established.\n\nBut what is important to be pointed out from the case of Liberty Cinema (supra) is that in the case of a fee of the kind with which we are concerned in this case the element of quid pro quo must be established.\n\nOtherwise the imposition of fee will be had. In the majority opinion. it is stated at page 490 :-\n\n\"The conclusion to which we then arrive is that the levy under s.548 is not a fee as the Act does not provide for any\n\nsenicc to him.\n\nNo question here arises of correlating the to the person on whom it is imposed.\n\nThe work of inpcc tion done by the Corporation which is only to s•\"e that the terms of the licence arc observed by the licensee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any serv:cc.\n\nThe Lw :s a tax.\"\n\nIll [1975] 3 S. C. R. 254.\n\n.A Ayyangar J., also said at page 526 that there being no correlation between the fee charged and the service rendered the impugned ·. tlevy was not authorised.\n\nMr. Tarkunde \"ii one stage of the hearing endeavoiired: to submit, although. the Sol'citor-General appearing for the State of Punjab'and :B . l\\lr. H. L. Sibbal for, the Punjab Marketing Board had made n~ such submissions, that the impugned impost could be justified as a tax.\n\nThere was no lack of legislative competence in imposing a tax of the kind under issue. Counsel furiher submitted that in almost all the\n\ncases-hi.absrice of quid pro quo the :levy was held to be bad\"'and unsustainable as a tax for want of legislative competence: On the\n\nother hand learned counsel for the appellans am1 the petitioners M/s. ·+ A. K. Sen, Anil Dewan, B. S. Malik and A. K. Goel pointed out that c\n\nat no point of time the respondent sought to justify the impost as a tax obviously because it would have then violated the provisions of the Sales Tax law which did not authorise the imposition of such a tax beyond a certain percentage, and as a tax it could not be but a sales tax.\n\nFinally this controversy was not pursued when we pointed out that at no stage_ the question was raised and no attempt 1t any stage was made to justify it as a tax.\n\nObviously the Market Committees could not . be competent under the Act to impose any tax on the sale and purchase of the agricultural produce in the market nor did it ever purport to do so.\n\nThe nature of the impost and the power under which it was levied squarely and uniformally remained within +· the realm of the fee and fee of the kind which could not but be sustained on the establishment of the element of quid pro quo l:>otween the authority charging the fee arid its payer.\n\n. The next case to be considered is the decision of this Court in , Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharya & Ors.(') in \\vhich it was held that the annual licence fee charged from the rickshaw owners and the .drivers by the Varanasi Municipal Board -could be justified only on the basis of the clement of quid pro quo.\n\nThe fee was held to be ultra vires afld illegal because after excluding certain items o( expenditure the balance did not constitute sufficient quid pro quo for the amount of the licence fee charged. It could not be sustained as a tax.\n\nCertain major items of expenditure in:::urre<l by the Mun'cipal Board were ttributable to the discharge of its statutory duty and, therefore, at page 386 it was said by Ramaswami\n\nJ.,-\";( is manifest that the licence fee cannot be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary mun:cipal scrv.iccs \\vhich the_ Municipal\n\n(l) \\ 1968]3 S. C.R. 374.\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB ( Untwalia, J.) 1237\n\nBoard was bound under the statute to provide to the general public.\" The expenditure incurred by the Municipal Board for the benefit of the licensees constituted 44% of the total income of the Municipal Board and hence it was held that there was no sufficient quid pro quo established in the circumstances of the case.\n\nIn Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi & Ors.(') the High Court had found that 60% of the amount of licence fees charged from the mills was actually spent on services rendered to the factory owners.\n\nOn LI-tat basis sufficient quid pro quo was found to exist and the impost was upheld by this Court also.\n\nWe may, however, add that the rule of 60% cannot be of universal application. It is not a static rule.\n\nThe cases of licence fees are, generally speaking, on some different footing.\n\nThere is a substantial element of regulatory measure involved in them.\n\nOver and above that a good portion of the fee, may be in the neighbourhood of 60% or more, must be correlated to the service rendered to the person from whom the fee is charged.\n\nBut there may be cases where, as in the instant one, the licence fee charged by way of regulatory measure is not exorbitant or excessive.\n\nBut the other kind of fee charged has got to be justified on the ground of existence of sufficient quid pro .qw1 between the payer of the fee and 1be authority charging it.\n\nIn such a case from a practical point of view it may be difficult to find out with arithmetical exactitude as to what amount of fee has gone in incurring the expenditure for the\n\nservices.\n\nBut, broadly speaking, a good and substantial portion of it must be shown as being spent for the services rendered.\n\nNow we come to the decision of this Court in Indian Mica & Mican; te lndustrie~ Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2 ) wherein Hegde J ., speaking on behalf of a Constitution Bench of this Court, reviewed all the earlier cases and pointed out at page 323 that-\"While a tax invariably goes into the consolidated fund, a fee is earmarked for the speciiied services in a fund created for the purpose.\" Concludes the learned Judge at pages 324-25 :-\n\n\"From the above discussion it is clear that before any levy can be upheld as a fee, it must be shown that the levy has reasonable correlationship with the services rendered by the Government.\n\nIn other words the levy must be proved to be a quid pro quo for the services rendered.\n\nBut in 1hese matters it will be impossible to have an exact correlationship.\n\nThe correlationship expected is one of a general character and not as of arithmetical exactitude.\"\n\n(I) [1970] 2 S. C, R, 348.\n\n(2) J197l] Suppl. S. C. R. 319.\n\n12JS SUPRE~1E COURT RFPOi.TS\n\n[197'1] 3 S.C.R.\n\nDifierence betwocn a licence to regulate a trade, business or profession in public interest and in a case where a Government which is the owner of a particular property may grant permit or licence to some one to exploit that property for his benefit for cons; deration has been pointed out at page 325.\n\nThe State of Bihar had failed to place materials in the High Court to establish the reasonable correlationship between the value of the services rendered with the fee charged.\n\nFor some special reasons the case was remanded.\n\nBut one thing may be pin-pointed from a passage occurring at page 327 that the expenses of maintaining an elaborate staff by the Excise Department were not only for the purposes of ensuring that denaturing is done properly by the manufacturer but also for the purpose of seeing that the subsequent possession of denatured spirit in the hands either of a wholesale dealer or retail seller or any other licensee or permit-holder is not misused by converting the denatured spirit into alcohol fit for human consumption and thereby evade payment of heavy duty. But the appellant before the Supreme Court or other similar licensees had nothing to do with the manufacturing process. They were only the purchasers of manufactnred denatured spirit. In that context it was said-\"Hence the cost of supervising the manufacturing process or any .ssistance rendered to the manufacturers cannot be recovered from the consun1ers. like the appellant.\" When we come to discuss even from the admitted facts in relation to the levy of impugned market fees, we shall point out that the authorities concerned as also the High Conrt laboured under the impression that the fee realized from the traders in the market could be spent for any purpose of development of agriculture by providing all sorts of facilities to the agriculturists including the facilities of link roads for the purpose of transport of their agricultural produce to the markets how so ever distant these link roads may be from the market proper or any other purchasing centre in the market.\n\nIn the case of Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department and another v. Zenith Lamp & Electrical Ltd.(') the character of Court fees came up for consideration as to whether they are taxes or fees or whether they are sui genen's.\n\nAlthough after referring to the various Entries of the Seventh Schedule in the different lists it was noticed that Court fees were not taxes and they were covered by separate Entries of fees exclusively meant for Courts, yet the broad principles of the requirement of quid pro quo were made applicable in the cases of Court fees also. Even so, Sikri C.J. speaking for the Coart pointed out at page 982-\"But even if the meaning is the same,\n\n(!) [1973] 2 S. C. R. 973.\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwa/ia, !.) 1239\n\nwhat is 'fees' in a particular case depends on the subject-matter in relation to which fees are imposed.\" The learned Chief Justice further observed at the same page-\"ln other words, it cannot tax litigation, and make litigations pay, say for road building or education or other beneficial schemes that a State may have.\n\nThere must be a broad correlationship with the fees collected and the cost of _administration of civil justice.\" If the view taken by the High Court in the market fee cases were to hold good, then pushing it to the logical conclusion one will have to say that giving all sorts of facilities -\" _to the litigants for their travel from the village homes to the Courts ' --r would also be a service of them. In cases of court fees one has to take a broad view of the matter to find out whether there exists a broad\n\ncorrelationship with the fees collected and the cause of administration\n\nof justice. Even mixing the amount of court fee collected with the general fund will be permissible. It may not be kept in a separate fund or earmarked separately. The very fact that in relation to court fees there are separate Entries in the Seventh Schedule e.g. Entry 77 List I and Entry 3 of List 11, indicates that even though the character -of the levy is not very much different from that of the general types of fees, in the matter of approach for finding out the element of quid pro quo quite a different test has not to be applied as indeed, to some extent it has to be applied in many kinds of fees depending upon the totality of the facts and circumstances. Each case has to be judged from a reasonable and practicaM point of view for finding out the element of oquid pro quo.\n\nIn the case of State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. The Salvation Army, Western-India Territory(') Mathew J., speaking for the Court after resume of some earlier decisions of this Court upheld to a certain extent the fee charged under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 on r the ground that taking precautionary measures to see that Public Trusts are administered for the purpose intended by the authors of the Trust and exercising control and supervision with a view to preserve the trust properties from being wasted or misappropriated by trustees are certainly speciat services for the benefit of the trust. Thus special benefits for the payer of the fee were established, as benefits to the trust were benefits to the trustees who are required to ay the fees out of the trust income. But then it was further pointed_ out that in spite of accumulation of the surplus from 19 5 3 onwards the authorities went on charging the fee of 2 % which has assumed the character of a tax.\n\nAfter giving certain guidelines the levy was declared to be without the authority of law after 31st March, 1970.\n\n,(!) [1975] 3 S. C. R. 475 .\n\nA Observations of one of us (Chandrachud J., as be then was),\n\nspeaking for the Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Hi/ldustan Machine Toolp Ltd.(') at page 401 are quite apposite and may be usefully quoted here :-\n\n\"One cannot take into account the sum total of the activities of a public body like a Gram Pancbayat to seek justification for the fees imposed by it.\n\nThe expenses incurred by a Gram Panchayat or a Municipality in discharging its obligatory functions are usually met by the imposition of a variety of taxes.\n\nFor justifying the imposition of fees the public authority has to show that services are rendered or intended to be rendered individually to the particular person on whom the fee is imposed.\n\nThe Gram Pancbayat here has not even prepared an estimate of what the intended services would cost it.\"\n\n)\"·r c\n\nThe levy of house-tax was held to be lawful but the levy of Permission D Fee had to be struck down as being illegal.\n\nIn the instant case also it would be noticed that the Market Committees and the Market Boards assumed to theljlselvcs the liberty of utilizing and spending the realizations from market fees to a considerable extent, as if it was a tax, although in reality it was not so. In The Municipal Coun\n\ncil, Madurai v. R. Narayanan etc. (2) endeavour was made as in the case of Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi (supra) to justify the impost by the Municipal Council as a tax.\n\nKrishna Iyer J., speaking for the Court repelled that argument and since the impost could not be justified as fee the resolution of the Municipal Council was held to be invalid. In The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and another v. The Delhi Cloth and Genera/ Mills Co. Ltd. and others(') the question for consideration was whether the registration fee charged on the document '-; I satisfied the two conditions of fee which were enumerated in the following language :-\n\n\" ( i) there must be an element of quid pro quo that is to\n\nsay the authority levying the fee must render some service for the fee levied however remote the service may be;\n\n(ii) that the fee realised must be spent for the purposes of the imposition and should not form part of the general revenues of the State.\"\n\n(I) [1975) Supp. S. C.R. 394.\n\n(2) [1976) I S. C.R. 333.\n\n(3) A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 1181.\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUN.JAB (Untwalia, !.) 1241\n\nThe second condition was found not to be fulfilled and hence the impost was held to be bad.\n\nWe wnuld like to point out that the first condition is rather couched in too broad and general a language.\n\nRendering some service, however 'remote the service may be, camiot\n\nstrictly speaking satisfy the element of quid pro quo required to be established in cases of the impost of fee.\n\nBut then, as pointed out, in some of the cases noticed earlier the registration fee has been taken to stand on a different footing altogether.\n\nIn the case of such a fee the test of quid pro quo is not to be satisfied with such direct, close or proximate correlationship as in the case of many other kinds of fees.\n\nBy and large registration fee is charged as a regulatory measure.\n\nThe history of the marketing legislation was traced by Venkatarama Aiyar J. in the case of P. P. Kutti Keya and others v. The State of Madras and others.(') A number of Writ Petitions were disposed of by one judgment delivered on 10-7-1953. Appeals in some of these Writ Petitions were brought to this Court in the case of M.C.V.\n\nS. Arunachala Nadar etc. v. The State of Madras & others.(\") Although the Courts were concerned mainly with the question of the constitutional validity of the marketing law which is beyond any pale of challenge now, it would be interesting to note that the Madras High Court had taken the view that the funds raised from the merchants for constrnction of a market in substance amounted to an exaction of a tax.\n\nWe are not going to approve such a narrow view in relation to the application of the amounts realized by market fees, yet we are not going to make it too broad either, so as to take within its sweep any remote service which may ultimately or tarigentically be of some benefit to the grain trade in the market. Subba Rao J., as he then was, speaking for the Court in Arunacha/a Nadar's case (supra) traced the history of the marketing legislation at pages 95-96 and p-' , pointed out at page 98 :-\"The Act, therefore, was the result of a \" long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by pro- -. viding snitable and regulated markets by eliminating middlemen and ,,_ bringing face to face to the producer and the bnyer so that they may\n\n~ meet on equal terms, thereby eradicating or at any rate reducing the scope for exploitation in dealings.\" At page 102 is to be found some discussion with regard to the licence fees which, says the learned Judge, \"do not appear to be so high as to cripple t11e tradds business.\" The question of charge of the market fee apart from the licence fee did not fall for consideration in this case.\n\nThe Bombay\n\n...\n\n(!) A. I. R, 1954, Mr.drcB 621.\n\n(2) [1959] Suppl. 1 S. C. R. 92 .\n\n23-409SCI/79\n\nMarketing Statute came to be considered in the case of Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammad and another v. The State or Bombay and another.(') Wanchoo J., as he then was, speaking for the Court repelled the attack at page 669 on section 11 of the Bombay Act which gives power to the Market Committee subject to the provisions of the rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed to levy fees on the agricultural produce bought and sold by licensees in the market area. The attack was that the impost was in, the nature of sales tax. It was repelled on the ground that :-\n\n\"Now there is no doubt that the market committee which is authorised to levy this fee renders services to the licensees, particularly when the market is established. Under the circumstances it cannot be held that the fee charged for services rendered by the market committee in connection with the enforcement of the various provisions of the Act and the provisions for various facilities in the various markets established by it, is in the nature of sales tax. It is true that the fee is calculated on the amount of produce bought and sold but that in our opinion is only a method of realising fees for the facilities provided by the Committee.\"\n\nSince the market was not found to have been properly established it was held that the market committee could not enforce any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws. Therefore, the question of the rate of market fee did not fall for consideration. The Bihar Statute came up for consideration of this Court in the case of Lakhan Lal and others etc. v. The State of Bihar and others.(2) Bachawat J .• upheld the validity of the various actions taken by the State Government under the Act and the Rules and finally said at page 539 :-\"But there is no material on the record to show that the Government acted unreasonably or that the market is so wide that thQ sale and purchase of agricultural produce within it cannot be effectively controlled by the market committee or that the growers within the area cannot conveniently bring their produce to the market yards.\" In contrast in the present case the whole of the State has been divided into different market areas, although the principal market yard is only one in one area with some sub market yards appertaining to it. We do not mean to suggest in pointing out this difference that the declaration of the whole market area is unreasonable. But the market fee has to be realized from the traders on the purchase of the agricultural produce in the market which consists of the market yards and some purchas-\n\n(1) [1962] 2 S. C. R. 659.\n\n(2) [1968] 3 S. C. R. 534.\n\n. ''<fl!#\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.)\n\nI 24 3\n\ning centres established at some other places in the area due to the urgency or exigency of the situation. Such a fee cannot be utilised for the purpose of rendering all sorts of facilities and services for the benefit of the agriculturists througbout the area. It may be very necessary to render such services to the agriculturists; rather, they must be rendered. But the laudable and in itself cannot justify the means to achieve that end if the means have got no sanction of the law. In the Bihar case it was found at page 540 :-\n\n\"The market committee has appointed a dispute subcommittee for quick settlement of disputes. It has set up a market intelligence unit for collecting and publishing the daily prices and information regarding the stock, arrival and despatches of agricultural produce. It has 'Provided a grading unit where the techniques of grading agricultural produce is taught. The contract form for purchase and sale is standardised. The provisions of the Act and the Rules are enforced through inspectors and other staff appointed by the market committee. The fees charged by the market committee arc correlated to the expenses incurred by it for rendering these services. The market fee of 25 naya paise per Rs. 100/- worth of agricultural produce and the licence fees prescribed by Rules 71 and 73 are not excessive. The fees collected by the market committee form part of the market committee fund which is set apart and earmarked for the purposes of the Act. There is sufficient quid pro quo for the levies and they satisfy the test of \"fee\" as laid down in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endownments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt-[1954] S.C.R., 1005.\"\n\nIt would, be noticed that even the rate of 25 paise per hundred F -'rupees had to satisfy all these tests. In the instant cases we are con- \"') ' cemed with the rates of market fee which are much higher than the Bihar rate. Correlative service also, therefore, must satisfy the tes!E -. of rendering more services in the market area. The fund cannot be ., permited to be utilised for an end, such as, augmenting the agricul-\n\n~ tural produce etc., if it has no reasonably direct or close connection G with the services rendered to the payers of the fee.\n\nFrom a conspectus of the various authorities of this Court we deduce the following principles for satisfying the tests for a valid levy of market fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in a notified market area :- H\n\n(1) That the amount of fee realised must be eatmarked for rendering services to the licensees in the notified\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS [19i9] 3 s.C.R.\n\nA market area and a good and substantial portion ol it must be shown to be expanded for this purpose.\n\n(2) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale ol the agricultural produce.\n\n(3) That while render.ing services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transactions of purchase and sale with a view to achieve the objects of the marketing legislation it is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees but some special benefits must be conferred on them which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between the licensees and the transactions.\n\n( 4) That while conferring some special benefits on the licensees it in permissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with the transactions taking place in the market.\n\n(5) That spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of the agriculturists is not permissible on the ground that such service in the long run go to increase the volnme of transactions in the market ultimately benefitting the traders also. Such an indirect and remote benefit to the traders is in no sense a special benefit to them.\n\n(6) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee.\n\n(7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above.\n\nK, K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, !.) 124 5\n\nIn the light of the principles culled out and enunciated above, we now proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the Act and the\n\nrules framed thereunder as in force in the States of Punjab and Haryana. We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules and will only refer to those of Haryana when some difference of some significance or consequence has got to be pointed out.\n\nUnder clause (f) of section 2 of the Act \"dealer\" is defined to mean:-\n\n\"any person who within the notified market area sets up, establishes or continues or allows to be continued any place for the purchase, sale, storage or processing of agricultural produce notified under sub-section ( 1) of section 6 or purchases, sells, stores or processes such agricultural produce.\"\n\nClause (hh) inserted by Punjab Act 40 of 1976 says :-\n\n\"licensee\" means a person to whom a licence is granted D under section 10 and the rules made under this Act and includes any person who buys or sells agricultural produce and to whom a licence is granted as Kacha Arhtia or commission agent or otherwise but docs not include a person licensed under section 13.\"\n\nAs per clause (i) :-\n\n\"market\" means a market established and regulated under this Act for the notified market area, and includes a market proper, a principal market yard and sub-market yard.\"\n\n- -- The definition of \"market proper\" is to be found in clause (k) to F\n\n\"' mean :-\n\n\"any area including all lands with the buildings thereon, within such distance of the principal market or sub-market yard, as may be notified in the official gazette by the State Government, to be a market proper.\"\n\n'\"Notified market area\" in clause (b) means any area notified under section 6 and clause (n) provides :-\n\n\" \"principal market yard\" and \"sub-market yard\" mean an enclosure, building or locality declared to be a principal market yard and sub-market yard under section 7.\"\n\nAs. already stated the State Agricultural Marketing Board is constituted under section 3 and while enumerating the powers and duties of the\n\nBoard it is provided in sub-section (9) that \"The Board shall exercise superintendence and control over the Committees.\" The provision of \"Declaration of notified market area\" is to be found in section 6(1) which empowers the State Government to declare the area notified under section 5 or any portion thereof to be a notified market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of the agricultural produce notified under section 5 or any part thereof. As already pointed out the whole of the State was intended to be divided in various market areas and was also declared as such under section 6. Under sub-section (3) of section 6 after the declaration of the notified market area no person can establish or continue any place for the purchase, sale, storage and processing of the agricultural produce except under a licence granted in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the byelaws. A dispute arose between the parties before us as to whether the licence is granted for the whole of the area or for particular places therein. On examining Form B in the Rules meant for grant of licence under section 10 we find that the licence is granted for one or more places of business specified in column 6 situated in a particular notified market area named at the top of the licence. There will be no sense in specifying the place of business in the licence if the licensee is to be permitted to establish his place of business any where in a notified market area which is too big and extensive for the control and supervision of a particular market committee. Market yards are declared under section 7 and for each notified market area there can be one principal market yard and one or more sub-market yards as may be necessary. The marginal note of section 8 is \"No private market to be opened in or near places declared to be markets.\" There is some difference in the provisions of the Act as introduced by the Haryana Amendment in relation to the establishment of notified market area, .__, declaration of market yards and the inhibition on any person to estabr lish or continue any place for the purchase \"sale, storage and processing of any agricultural produce.\" There was also a controversy before\n\nus as to the exact interpretation of the language of the two Statutes in relation to such inhibition. But for the purposes of the cases before us it is not necessary to further encumber the judgment by attempting to. reconcile by harmonious construction the various provisions of the two Acts in relation to this matter. Suffice it to say that there is no special l\" provision in the Statute for establishment of markets or markets proper as per the definition contained in clauses ( i) and (k) of section 2 of the Act, yet it is reasonable to assume that the intention of the legislature is to constitute the market yards as the market proper and ordinarily and generally the market would be the same but may\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Uritwalia, !.) 1247\n\ninclude some other places where transactions of purchase of agri~ tural produce by the traders from the producers has beeu allowed in order to avoid rush in the precincts of the market proper. But one thing is certain that the whofo of the market area in no sense can be equated with market or market proper. No body can be allowed to establish a purchasing centre of his own at any place he likes in the market area without there being snch a permission or authority from the Market Committees. After all the whole object of the Act is the supervision and control of the transactions of purchase by the traders from the agriculturists iu order to prevent exploitation of the latter by the former.\n\nThe supervision and control can be effective only in specified localities and places and not throughout the extensive market area.\n\nWe have already pointed out that there is no separate notification or declaration establishing a market or market proper. But Rule 24(1) in both the States framed under the Act provides that :-\"All agricultural produce brought into the market for sale shall be sold by open auction in the principal or sub-market yard.\" This also indicates that market is generally the principal and sub-market yards. The benefit of market fee, therefore, has to be correlated with the transactions taking place at the specified place in the market area and not in the whole of the area.\n\nSections 9 to 1 OA deal with the procedure of taking out licences,\n\nc ..\n\nThe State Government is empowered under section 11 to establish a E market committee for every notified market area and to specify its headquarters. The question of constitution of committees is dealt within section 12. The duties and powers of a market committee are enumerated in section 13. It would be seen from clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 13 that it is the duty of the committee to ~- establish a market in the notified market area \"providing such facilities F\n\n,·~ for persons visiting it in connection with the purchase, sale, storage, weighment and processing of agricultural produce concerned as the • Board may from time to time direct.\" This also indicates that the .., Committee is primarily concerned with providing facilities in the\n\n~ market for persons visiting it and in connection with the transactions taking place there.\n\nNow we come to the most important section viz. section 23. It reads as follows :-\n\n\"A Committee shall, subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf, levy on ad-valorem basis fees on the airricultnral produce bought or sold by H licensees in the notified market area at a rate not exceeding Hiree rupees for every one hundred rupees :-\n\nProvided that-\n\n(a) no fee shall be leviable in respect of any transaction in which delivery of the agricultural produce bought or saction iu which delivery is actually made.\"\n\n(b) a fee shall be Ieviable only on the parties to a transaction in which delivery is actually made.\"\n\nThere is a _slight variation in section 23 as amended by Haryana Act 21 of 1973. Therein some market fee may be charged on the agricultural produce even brought for processing by licensees in the notified area. But we are not concerned with the charge of such a fee in any of these cases.\n\nRule 29 of the Punjab Rules says :-\n\n\"Levy and collection of fees on the sale and purchase of agricultural produce.\n\n(1) Under section 23 a Committee shall levy fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in the notified market area at the rate to be fixed by the Board from tiine to tin1c.\n\nProvided that no such fees shall be levied on the same E agricultural produce more than once in the same notified market area. A list of such fees shall be exhibited in some conspicuous place at the office of the Committee concerned :\n\n..........................................\n\n(2) The responsibility of paying the fees prescribed under sub-mlc (1) shall be of the buyer and if he is not a licensee then of the seller who may realise the same from the buyer. Such fees shall be leviable as soon as an agricultural produce is bought or sold by a licensee.\"\n\nThe Haryana Rule is substantially the same.\n\nReading section 23 along with Ruic 29 it would be noticed that the power of the Conunittee to levy fees is subject to the Rules as may be made by the State Government. The fee is levied ou ad-valorem basis at a rate which cannot exceed the maximum, mentioned in section 23 by the legislature. But the power to fix the rate from time to time within the maximum limit has been conferred on the Board and the Committee is merely bound to follow it. One of the arguments before us on behalf of the appellants and the petitioners was that it was the Board which fixed the rate of Rs. 2/- first and thereafter Rs. 3 /-\n\n---j r\n\n• ,..\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAil (Untwalin, J.) 1249\n\nper hundred rupees. The Committee abdicated its function in this regard and, therefore, the levy of fee is contrary to the principle of Jaw laid down by this Court in the case of State of Punjab and another v.\n\nHari Krisha11 Shanna('). But the distinction between the said case and the present one is that nnder the former there was no provision in section 5(1) of the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act of 1952 that the power of the licensing authority to grant licence was subject to any rule, the rule in its turn providing an over-'fiding power in the State . Government in the matter of grant of licence. The control of the Government provided in sub-section (2) was of a limited kind. On the other hand section 23 in express language controls the power of Committee to levy fees subject to the rules. The power given to the Board to fix the rate of market fees from time to time under rule 29 is not ultra vires the provisions of the Act, as in our opinion snb-section (9) of section 3 confers power on the Board to exercise superintendence and control over the Committees, which power, in the context and the scheme of the marketing law, will take within its ambit the power conferred on the Board under rule 29 ( 1).\n\nIt is further to be pointed out that the fee levied is not on the agricultural produce in the sense of imposing any kind of tax or duty on the agricultural produce. Nor is it a tax on the transaction of purchase or sale. The levy is an impost on the buyer of the agricultural produce in the market in relation to transactions of his purchase. The agriculturists re not required to share any portion of the burden of this fee.\n\nIn case the buyer is not a licensee then the responsibility of paying the fees is of the seller who may realise the same from the buyer. But such a contingency cannot arise in respect of the transactions of sale by an agriculturist of his agricultural produce in the market to a dealer who . mnst be a licensee. Nor was any such eventuality occurring in any of - the cases before us was brought to our notice.\n\nProbably such an alternati\\\"e provision was meant to be made for outside buyers who are not licensees when they buy the agricultural produce from or through the licensees. Any way we arc not concerned with that question.\n\nUnder section 27(1) :-\n\n\"All moneys received by a Committee shall be paid into a fund to be called the Market Committee Fund and all expenditure incurred by the Committee under or for the purposes of this Act shall be defrayed out of such fund, and any surplus remaining after such expenditure bas been met shall be inve.ted in such manner as may be prescribed.\"\n\n(I) [1966]2S.C.R.982.\n\nEvery Market Committee is obliged under sub-section (2) (a) of section 27 to pay out of its fund to the Marketing Board as contribution such percentage of its income derived from licence fee, market fee and fines levied by the courts as specified in sub-clauses (i) and (ii). The purpose of this contribution as mentioned in sub-section 2(a) is to enable the Board to defray expenses of the office establishment of the Board and such other expenses incurred by it in the ' interest of the Committees in general. The income of almost all the Market Committees were several lokhs of rupees per year and, there- \"'- fore, each is required to pay 30 per centum of its income to the Board r by virtue of the amendment brought about by Punjab Act 4 of 1978. ' Under section 25 all receipts of the Board are to be credited into a fund to be called the Marketing Development Fund. Purposes for which the Marketing Development Fund may be expanded are enumerated in section 26 and the purposes for which the Market Committee Funds may be expended are catalogued in section 28. We think we shall have to read both the sections in full one by one. First we refer to section 28, which runs as follows :-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of section 27, the Market Committee Funds shall be expended for the following purposes:-\n\n(i) acquisition of sites for the market;\n\n(ii) maintenance and improvement of the market;\n\n(iii) construction and repair of buildings which are necessary for the purposes of the market and for the health, convenience and safety of the persons using it;\n\n(iv) provision and maintenance of standard weights and measures;\n\n(v) pay, leave allowances, gratuities, compassionate allowances and contributions towards leave allowances, compensation for injuries and death resulting from accidents while on duty, medical aid, pension or provident fund of the persons employed by the Committee;\n\n(vi) payment of interest on loans that may be raised for purposes of the market and the provisions of a sinking fund in respect of snch loans;\n\n(vii) collection and dissemination of information regarding\n\nall matters relating to crop statistics and marketing in respect of the agricultural produce concerned;\n\n.__,\n\n• ,.\n\n' -(\n\n....\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1251\n\n(viii) providing comforts and facilities, such as shelter, shade, parking accommodation and water for the persons, draught cattle, vehicles and pack animals coming or being brought to the market or on construction and repair of approach roads; culverts,\n\n(ix)\n\n(x)\n\n(xi)\n\n{xu)\n\n(xiii)\n\n{xiv)\n\nbridges aud other such purposes;\n\nexpenses incurred in the maintenance of the offices and in auditing the accounts of the Committees;\n\npropaganda in favour of agricultural improvements and thrift;\n\nproduction and betterment of agricultural produce;\n\nmeeting any legal expenses incurred by the Committee;\n\n' imparting education in marketing or agriculture;\n\npayments of travelling and other allowances to the members and employees of the Committee, as prescribed;\n\n(xv) loans and advances to the employees;\n\n(xvi) expenses of and incidental to elections; and\n\n(xvii) with the previous sanction of the Board, any other purpose which is calculated to promote the general interests of the Committee or the notified market area or with the previous sanction of the State Government, any purpose calculated to promote the national or public interest.\"\n\nLet us first scan these clauses one by one on the footing that the Market Committee Fund will ordinarily and generally and almost wholly will be created out of the income 9f a particular Market Committee on account of market fees realised by it from the traders in the market. A portion of it may be on account of fines, licence fees, from weighrnent, arbitration fees etc. But those amounts compared to the huge realisations on account of market fees would be almost negligible.\n\nBy and large the purposes enumerated in clauses (i) to (ix) are relatable tO the service to be rendered in the market in relation to the transactions of purchase and sale of the agricultural produce. We shall deal with the problem of payment of interest on loans that may be\n\nraised for purposes of the market as mentioned in clause (vi) shortly hereinafter. Apropos clause (viii) the attention of all concerned must be focussed here because; the last part of this clause had led the authorities and also the High Court to think that construction of link roads culverts and bridges any where in a notified market area is covered b; this clause. In our opinion it is not so. In the context of the language of all the clauses preceding clause (viii) and clause (viii) itself it is plain that what is meant by \"construction and repair of approach roads; culverts, bridges\" is only for the purpose of the facility of going into the market from the nearest public road. Supposing a market has ,.\n\nbeen established consisting of principal market yard or sub-market '- yards at a particular place where there is no facility for the carts or the trucks and other vehicles to go, then approach roads, and if necessary r even culverts and bridges may be constructed, or repaired ont of the i Market Committee Fund. Such an expenditure within the limited limit will be with the object of facilitating the taking place of the transactions of purchase and sale in the market and will confer some special benefits to the traders apart from a share of the benefit going to the agriculturists who arc not required to share any burden of the market fee. But as we have pointed out above, if one were to give a very wide meaning to this phrase of construction and repair of approach roads, culverts and bridges to say that such construction can be permitted any where in the market area for the facility of the agriculturists which ultimately will benefit the traders also, then the whole concept of correlation of fee and its character of having an clement of quid pro quo will dwindle down and become an empty formality.\n\nUplift of villages and helping the agriculturists by all means is the duty and the obligation of the State no doubt and it has to' do it by incurring expenses out of the public exchequer consisting of the income from various kinds of taxes etc.\n\nOne may not have any serious objection to the items of expendi- ---, - turc mentioned in clauses (xii), (xiv). (xv) and (xvi). But the other ' clauses do require some careful cxaminotion. Obviously clause (x) r\n\nand clause (xi) cannot form the irems of expenditure 01.lt of the market fees. In face of the view of the law expressed by us above the propaganda in favour of the agricultural improvement and expenditure for production and betterment of agricultural produce will be in the general interest of' agriculture in the market area. The whole of the State is divided into market areas. So long as the concept of fee under our Constitution remains distinct and limited in contrast to tax such expenditure out .of the market fee cannot be countenanced in Jaw. The first part of clause (xiii) may be justified in the sense of imparting education in marketing to the staff of the Market Committee. But imparting education in agriculture in general cannot be correlated with tl1e market fee. The first part of clause (xvii) is too vague to merit any\n\n• ,..\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUN.TAB (Vntwalia, !.) 1253\n\ndiscussion on the language of the clause itself until and unless we are faced with concrete examples of such expenditure. But how ill-conceived the second part of clause (xvii) is, is abundantly clear from the decisions of the Punjab High Court mentioned above and to be discussed shortly herdnafter. ls it permissible to spend the market fees realised from the traders for any purpose calculated to promote the national or public interest? Obviously not. No Market Committee can be permitted to utilise the fund for an ultenor purpose howsoever benevolent, laudable and charitable the object may be. The whole con- _, cept of fee will collapse if the amount realised by market fees could , . _,-- be permitted to be spent in this fashion. We may, however, mention\n\n\\ one matter pointedly in connection with the Market Committee Fund.\n\nUnder section 32 the Committee may borrow money for carrying on the purposes for which it is established on the security of any property vested in and belonging to the Committee. It may obtain a loan from the State Government or the Board. In the various figures and charts submitted before us it was shown that the Market Committees had raised money by loan and other methods. That also will form the market committee fund. Technically and legally, therefore, one may not have any objection to the expenditure of such money for the purposes mentioned in clauses (x), (xi) (xiii) and (xvii). As we indicated above clause (vi) provides for payment of interest on loans, but that is confined to loans that may be raised for purposes of the market and not for any other purpose, whereas, the power of the Committee to raise loans under section 32 is very wide. The Act, however, is silent as to where from interest will be paid or the principal will be returned in regard to the amount of loan raised for a purpose other than the purpose of the market. Since we find that the matter has proceeded at various stages in the High Court as also in this Court under . a great confusion of the correct position of law, we do not propose to ,..-express any opinion in this regard at this stage. Nor do we propose to\n\nstrike any clause of section 28 as being unconstitutional merely on the ground that the expenditure authorised therein goes beyond the scope of the purpose of the utilisation of the market fees. The authorities have to bear this in mind and on a proper occasion the matter will have to be dealt with by courts in the light of this judgment where a concrete case comes of raising of a loan, spending the money so raised whlch cannot be reasonably connected with the purposes for which the market fee can be spent, as to whether such a loan can be repaid or interest on it can be paid out of the realizations of the market fees.\n\nOne of the points mooted before us was as to how far the market H committees can be compelled to part with 30% of their income in -· favour of the Marketing Board. If so, for what purposes the Board\n\n1254 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs\n\n\nfund, namely, the Marketing Development Fun\\! can be expande(I . .It is to be remembered that market fee is Jeyied by each and every JY,!arket Committee separately in its own area and if a good and snbstantial portion of this fee has got to be expancJ.ed for rendering services in the area to the payers of the fee in relation to the transaction~ taking plarn therein, then logically speaking it flows from it that any money paid to the Board out of the collections of the market fee has also got to be expended in the very same area of the particular Market Committee.\n\nBut such a strict construction from a practical point of view is not possible. The Board in the State is the Central Controlling and superintending authority over all the Market Committees, the primary function of which is to render service in the market. Parting with 30% income by a Market Committee in favonr of the Board is not so excessive or unreasonable so as to warrant any interference with the law in this regard on the ground of violation of the principle of quid pro quo in the utilisation of the market fee realised from the traders in the market area. We would, however, like to emphasise that the Marketing Development Fund can Ollly be expended for the purposes of the Market Committees in a general way, or to be more accurate, as far as practicable, for the purposes of the particular Market Committee which makes the contribution.\n\nWe shall now read section 26 of the Act providing for purposes for which the Marketing Development Fund may be expended. It reads as\n\nfollows:-\n\n\"The Marketing Development Fund shall be utilised for the following purposes :-\n\n(i) better marketing of agricultural produc~;\n\n(ii) marketing of agricultural produce on cooperative lines;\n\n(iii) collection and dissemination of market rates and news;\n\n(iv) grading and standardisation of agricultural produce;\n\n(v) general improvements in the markets or their respective notified market areas;\n\n(vi) maintenance of the office of the Board and construction and repair of its office buildings, rest-house and staff quarters;\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 12 55\n\n(vii) giving aid to financially weak Committees in the shape of loans and grants;\n\n(viii) payment of salary, leave allowance, gratuity, compassionate allowance, compensation for, injuries or death resulting from accidents while on duty, medical aid, pension or provident fund to the persons employed by the Board and leave and pension contribution to Government servents on deputation;\n\n(ix) travelling and other allowances to the employees of the Board, it:; members and members of Advisory Committees;\n\n(x) propaganda, demonstration and publicity in favour of agricultural improvements;\n\n(xi) production and betterment of agricultural produce;\n\n(xii) 'meeting any legal expenses incurred by the Board;\n\n(xiii) imparting education in marketing or agriculture; I}\n\n(xiv) construction of godowns;\n\n(xv) loans and advances to the employees;\n\n(xvi) expenses incurred in auditing the accounts of the Board; and\n\n(xvii) with the previous sanction of the State Government, E any other purpose which is calculated to promote the general interests of the Board and the Committee; or the national or public interest.\n\nOn a parity of the reasoning which we have applied in the case of Market Committee Fund we may point out that the Market Deve- ,.._Jopment Fund constituted primarily and mainly out of the contribu-\n\n. tions by the Market Committees from realisations of market fees, can also be expended for the purposes of the market in the notified market area in relation to the transactions of purchase and sale of the agricultural produce and for no other general purpose or in the general interests of the agriculture or the agriculturists. On that basis we may, as at present advised hold as valid the purposes mentioned in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), first part of clause (v) clauses (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (xii), first part of clause (xiii), clauses (xiv), (xv) and (xvi).\n\nAt the same time we hold that the Marketing Development Fund constituted out of the Market fees cannot be expended for the purposes mentioned in second part of clause (v), clauses (x), (xi), second part of clause (xiii) and clause (xvii). We do not propose to strike down these provisions as being constitutionally invalid as the purpose of the\n\n1256 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS\n\n[1979] '.: S.C.R.\n\nlaw will be served by 1'estricting the operation of section 26 ·~ the manner we have done.\n\nWe now proceed to examine the decisions of the Hh Cour: in the light of the principles of law enunciated above. The first decision in the case of M/s Hanuman Dall & General Mills (supra) is the deci, ion of a Division Bench of the High Court. It should be recalled that :1y this judgment delivered 'on 8-11-1974 the High Court maintained the f raising of the market fee from Rs. 1.50 to Rs. 2/- in Haryana but struck down the rise from Rs. 1.50 to Rs. 2.25 in Punjab. In the cases before us a lot of new materials contained in n, ew statements and charts \"'--· ,. were filed before ns on either side. We shall examine only a fow of j those materials and that too very cursorily as in our view nc useful purpose will be served, nor is it possible to do so for the first time in this Court, by their thorough examination. The very basis of the materials submitted on either side seems to be not well grounded on a correct appreciation of law. Too many disputes of facts have been raised before us. It is not possible to resolve all of them nor do we find that it will be useful to do that exercise. We shall presently show that even on the materials placed before the High Court and on the findings recorded by it, many of which do not seem to be in dispute, the requirement of law is not satisfied to the extent it is essential in a case of this nature.\n\nIn the case of Hanuman Dall and General Mills (supra) the High Court examined many of the leading and importaut judgmen!.3 of this Court which we have reviewed, earlier and also placed reliance upon an earlier Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Ram Sarup v. The Punjab State('). In para 31 of the judgment at page 12 the view of the High Court-\"that the amount of fees 80' collected are not to be spent exclusively for rendering services to the paF:-s of the-....i., fees but can also be utilised for carrying out the purposes er objects of the Act under which they are levied,\" is not quite corre~'.. In the same paragraph the High Court felt constrained to add that the amount cannot, however, be utilised for purposes which have no connection with the main purposes of the Act for which fee is levied, nor can it be spent for carrying out the governmental functions of the State. If many of the purposes mentioned in the Act, as we have shown above, are outside the ambit of the service clement and fall within the 'realm of the governmental functions; then it is plain that to say by generalisation that the fee money can be spent for the purposes or objects of the Act is not quite correct. The High Court has extracte•:' eection\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1969 Ptmj\"b & H ryano 756.\n\n.,.\n\n• ...\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, ].) 1257\n\n28 of the Act but has failed to scan the effect of the various purposes in some of the clauses.\n\nAfter referring to the income and expenditure statements of Market Committee, Hissar from 1969-70 to 1973-74 the conclusion of fact drawn at page 15 is that the market fee constitutes more than\n\n80% of the income of the Market Committee and the amount spent on \"works\" is nearly one-half of the total expenditure. The further finding is. \"the major item on which the amount has been spent under the head 'works' consists of the amount deposited with the public works department, Hissar, as contribution for construction of village link roads.\" On that finding itself it is menifest that Public Works Department was carrying out the governmental functions of construction of roads including village link roads spread throughout the whole of the no'.ified market area of Hissar. The said link roads could net be taken to be approach roads within the meaning of clause (viii) of section 28 of the Act as seems to be the view of the High Court. The error of law becomes writ large in the last sentence occurring in paragraph 34 of the judgment at page 15 which says :-\n\n\"In any case, the construction of roads within the notified market area is a work of Public importance and promotes the general interest of the committee and the notified market area which is one of the purposes enumerated in Cl.\n\n(xvii) of Section 26 of the Act.\" E\n\nThe High Court further proceeds to say :-\n\n. \"After giving my careful consideration, I am of the opinion that the expenditure on the construction of link roads for which amounts were deposited with the Public Works Department is fully justified as it is for the benefit of the growers, the licensed dealers and the general public and promotes the interests of the notified market area.\"\n\nThe High Court seems to be of the view that since transportation is very essential for the development of a market and to enable, the growers of the agricultural prod.uce to bring the same to the market, the construction of link roads becomes an essential purposes of the market committees. It may be so but the purpose cannot be allowed to be ach'eved at the cost of the market fee we realised from the dealers. The High Court point out that the money cannot be spent in construction of the government activities for providing main roads in the State.\n\nHow, then, the Market Committees can be made to contribute a very big chunk of their market fee income in construction of the link roads throughout all villages ? To push the matter logically,\n\n24--409SCI J19\n\nif a link road is to be constructed from a village to the main road for enabling an agriculturist to transport his produce upto the main road then the Market Committee should be under an obligation to construct or at least to maintain the main road also in order to enable that agriculturist to react the market which may be at distance of say 20 miles from the link road. ft is plain that construction of such link roads is as much part of the governmental activity as that of the main roads.\n\nIt is_ interesting to find out from paragraph 36 of the judgment that the Market Committees were made to pay donations to educational institutions imparting general education. The Market Committee, Hissar, spent Rs. 1,07,794/- on the water supply schcm' for a village. Even the High Conrt was constrained to disapprO\\'e of this.\n\nIt also spent a sum of Rs. 6,00,000jfor the constructica of a Panchayat Bhawan. Many other instances arc mentioned in 1nragraph\n\n37 of the judgment which show that the Market Committes were getting enormous income from market fees and they were made to squander away a good portion of that money unauthorisedly, although none of the purposes in itself was objectionable or bad. Rather, they were very laudable. But taking an overall view of the matter the High Court felt persuaded in the case of Haryana to uphold the maximum limit of Rs. 2/- by adding \"no interference seems to be called for at this time.\" In the case of Punjab, however, the allegation of the petitioners before the High Court was that the market committees were collecting lakhs of rupees every month and the Marketing Board was collecting crores of rupees. The Marketing Board was aske-0 to contribute one crcire of rupees to the Guru Gobind Singh Medical College which had been recently establishe-0 at Faridkot. A good portion of the money was already paid and the High Conrt was constrained to observe that \"the State Government shall be well advised to compensate the Agricultural Marketing Board and the Market Committees for the misutilisation of their funds for this unauthorised purposes\". The High Court held at page 19, column 2 :-\n\n\"In the historical background, set out above, I am convinced that the enhancement in the amount of fee from one rupee and fifty paise to two rupees and twenty-five paise per one hundred rupees was not genuine and it was made with a view to enable the market committees and tha Agricultural Marketing Board to reimburse themselves for the amounts which they were directed to contribute to Guru Govind Singh Me-Oical College at Faridkot. The Market Committees were having enough income and could meet their legitimate requirements from the amounts of fees which were being realised prior to the enhancement.\"\n\n...\n\nx. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwa/ia, l.) 1259\n\nThe enhancement of fee from Re. I/- to Rs. 1.50 was upheld but the A further increase to Rs. 2.25 was knocked down.\n\nWe may note here that in the batch of appeals we heard there was no appeal from the judgment of the High Court in the case of Hanuman Dall & General Mills. We may reasonably assume, therefore, that the dealers of Haryana were reconciled for payment of the market fees upto tlie maximum limit of two rupees per hundred rupees. In the case of Punjab, as we traced the history at the very outset, the maximum fixed later was Rs. 2.20 by Act 14 ol 1975. But by telegraphic instructions issued by the Board the Market Committees were asked to charge Rs. 2/- only with effect from 23-8-1975. This was challenged before the High Court but unsuccessfully in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri and another v. The State of Punjab and others (supra). Civil Appeal\n\n1083 of 1977 is from this judgment of the High Court. The Full Bench judgment in this case also suffers more or less from the same kind of error in the approach of the legal problem as is to be found in the earlier Division Bench decision. In paragraph 13 of the judgment at page 352 the High Court repelled the attack on clauses (x), (xi) and\n\n(xiv) of section 26 of the Act on the ground :-\n\n\"The broad object of the legislation like the present one is only to protect the producers of _agricultural produce from being exploited by middlemen and profiteers and to enable them to secure a fair return of their produce. The Legislation like the present one has its root in the attempt on the part of the nation to provide a fair deal to the growers of crops and also to find a market for its sale at proper rates without reasonable chances of exploitation. If this object is kept in view, then the clauses of which the constitutionality has been chanllenged, would certainly fall within the ambit of Entry\n\n28. Clauses (x), (xiii), and (xiv) would help the growers to make improvements1 in the production of agricultural produce with the result that their agricultural produce would find a better market resulting in getting them high price for their agricultural produce.\"\n\nIt is to be emphasised at this stage that the question is not of the legislative competence to enact those clauses, nor is there a question of the fee assuming the character of a tax and therefore, its imposition being beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The precise and the short question is whether the Market Committees and\n\nthe Board can be authorised to spend the amount realised by market e\n\nfees, as fee and fee alone, for achieving all the objects of the Act when such expenditure cannot be justified and sustained on the well-known\n\nA concept of fee as pointed ont by this Court in several decisions. The impost must be correlated with the service to be rendered to the payers of the fees in the sense and to, the extent we have pointed out above.\n\nAgain the High Court fell into an error in paragraph 15 of the judgment when, while upholding the construction and repair of approach\n\nroads, culverts and bridges in the larger sense of the term it said :-\n\n\"If the approach roads, culverts or bridges are in such a bad shape that they would become hindrance iu the mobility of the produce from one part ot me nouried market area to the principal market yard, then the worst sufferer would be the grower for whose benefit the Act has been enacted.\"\n\nThe Full Bench approved the view of the Division Bench in the earlier case as is apparent from paras 1 7 and 18 of the judgment at pages 352 and 353.\n\nWe have said a bit earlier that the Market Committee and the Board laboured nnder a mistaken notion that they could spend the income from the market fee for all good purposes and objects of the Act in the general interest of agriculture and agriculturists in the village. We are going to extract some of the averments made in the affidavit of the Secretary of the Market Committee of Moga from the judgment of the High Court at pages 354 and 355 :-\n\n\"Besides the above, the answering-respondent has undertaken the cleaning of mandis, lining of village khals (water courses), link roads; constructions of culverts and bridges; supply of pesticides and spray pumps on subsidized basis as also the electrification of villages. All these activities are going to cost the answering-respondent an amount of several lakhs of rupees.\"\n\n\"Para 8 of the writ petition is denied. It is wrong to suggest that the Board and the answering-respondent have already given Rs. 5 crores to the Markfed without charging any interest. The fact of the matter is that on account of the withdrawal of the Cotton Corporation of India from the various markets, the price of cotton came down suddenly. In order to provide and ensure a reasonable price to the farmer, the Government asked the Markfed to enter the market. For this purpose, the Board contributed some amount of money.\n\nSo far as the answering-respondent is concerned, it has not contributed any money at all. The answering-respondent believes that the Board has contributed only an amount of Rs. 1.43 crores and not 5 crores.\"\n\n..........................................\n\n)'r\n\no....., j,,,\n\n-'< I\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, !.) 1261\n\n\"It may, however, be submitted that the entire money A. collected by the Market Committees is being uSEd for the purposes envisaged under the Act.\"\n\n\"The Market Committees have to provide facilities as envisaged under the Act. The petitioners had asked for the copies of balance sheets. The balance sheets were originally prepared when the accounts of the Committees were being audited by \"the Chartered Accountants.\" Now, the accounts are being audited by the Examiner, Local Fund Accounts which is a Government Agency. The preparation of balance sheets involved unnecessary expenditure and wastage of time and energy. Consequently, the practice of preparing balance sheets was given up a few years back.\"\n\nThese paragraphs were placed before us also from the records of Civil Appeal 1083 of 1977. After quoting the various paragraphs from counter-affidavit the High Court says in paragraph 20 of the judgment at page 355 :-\n\n\"From the aforesaid specific avenueuts made in th(' written statement, referred to above, it is clear that to carry out the purposes of the Act it had become necessary to enhance the rate of the market fee and such an enhancement stands fully justified.\"\n\nWhen certain documents were placed before the High Court to show that the Board was indulging in activities which had no coffelation to the object to be achieved under the Act and that the enhancement of the market fee could not be justified the High Court, in the first instance, did not feel inclined to put absolute reliance upon those documents as they were filed with the replication of the petitioners.\n\nBut it did not stop there. H proceeded further at page 356, para 22 to say, on an impression of law which we have not countenanced, that :-\n\n\"So far as Annexures W-11 and W-12 are concerned, any expenditure incurred by the, Marketing Board on the setting up of the rice shellers or ginning factories or by the Market Committees on the construction of the link roads would not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the object to be achieved .under the Act. The setting up of the rice shellers would be for the benefit of the producers and, as earlier observed, construction of the link roads also would be for their advantage.\n\nSo far as Annexure W-10\n\nis concerned, there can be no gainsaying that giving of donation for the Chief Minister's Flood Relief Fund by the Board or the Market Committee would not be justified as the same has no correlation with the object to be achieved under the Act and in case any respect, it would certainly be unauthorised and illegal. But, in the instant case, the petitioners have failed to show that any amount was contributed towards the Chief Minister's Flood Relief Fund and that the enhancement in the fee had any correlation with such a contribution.\n\n0In this view of the matter, on the basis of Annexures W-10, W-11 and W-12, the enhancement in the fee to be levied by the Committees cannot be struck down.\"\n\nIn several Civil Writ Petitions filed in the High Court by lhe dealers of the various Market Committees of Haryana the challenge, was to the raising of the rate of market fee from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/-.\n\nThe High Court rejected all those petitions by the judgment dated 30-8-1978 which is the subject matter of appeal in Civil Appeal No. 1708 of 1978 and the analogous ones. After referring to the earlier judgments of the Court this judgment of the Division Bench also proceeds on the same lines at it was bound to. To a large extent we are saved from the unnecessary botheration of examining the voluminously new materials placed before ns in view of the counter filed on behalf of the Haryana Marketing Board in the High Court portions of which are extracted in the judgment. It will be useful to give the whole of the extract from the judgment of the High Court. It runs as follows:-\n\n\"It is well known to every one that the recent floods in Haryana were unprecedented and created havoc in the State.\n\nAlmost one-third of Haryana was submerged under water damaging the standing crops and uprooting the inhabitants making them homeless.\n\nThe State has to resort to quick measures, for removing the miseries of the people and to rehabilitate them ....... , . , .. , ... , ................ .\n\nThe projected income from market-fee in the year 1977-78 was Rs. 9 crores.\n\nBut due to the floods at the old rate of 2 % it is expected to be Rs. 7. 77 crorcs. The Committees will only be able to achieve the projected income of 1977- 78 as anticipated in the beginning of the year only if the H fee is charged at enhanced rate of 3 % . Only with the projected income the Board will be able to provide the services envisaged by it to the farmers of the area. The Board allot-\n\n- \\\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1263\n\nted works amounting to Rs. 8.53 crores in the year 1976-77, od of which the Board will be able to complete the development works worth Rs. 5.62 crores upto 31st March, 1978, leaving a spill over of Rs. 2.91 crorcs for the year 1978-79.\n\nIn addition to this spill-over, Board also anticiapted to take new development works amounting to Rs. 3 crores during 1978-79.\n\nThe projected income during the year 1978-79 taking into account the enhanced rate of market-fee will be Rs. 6.20 crores whereas the expenditure will be to the tune of Rs. 8.97 crores including the development works, miscellaneous other services and the cost of establishment.\n\nThe deficit of Rs. 2.77 crores had to be met by the Board by raising loan from other sources. Thus even this enhanced fee will not be sufficient to meet the expenditure which the Board proposes to incur for the purposes under the Act.\n\nThus the enhancement of market-fee from 2 % to 3 % is wholly reasonable and justified and has a reasonable correlation with the services rendered or to be rendered.\"\n\nQuoting passages from the earlier judgments of the High Court, it upheld the levy of the fee @ Rs. 3/- per hundred rupees and dismissed all the writ petitions.\n\nThe challenge by the dealers of the Moga Market Committee by Civil Writ Petition No. 2015 of 1978 filed in the High Court failed as per the judgment of the High Court delivered on 18-5-1978 wherein the FLill Bench decision was (allowed.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition No. 2768 of 1978 has been filed from the said judgment. The purposes enumerated in the Full Bench decision and repeated in this judgment also for the purpose of justifying the increase in the rate of fee from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/- per hundcred rupees are the stereo-type ones including Rural Integrated Development Scheme, night-shelter, link roadli and bridges. Every body seems to have allowed himself to be carried 'Oo far by the sentiment of the laudable object of the Act of doing whatever is possible to do under it for the amelioration of the conditions and the uplift of the villagers and the agriculturists.\n\nUndoubtedly the Act is primarily meant for that purpose and to the extent it is permissible under the law to achieve that object of utilising the money collected by the market fee, it should be clone.\n\nBut if the law does not permit carrying on of the sentiment too far for achieving of all the laudable objects under the Act, then primarily it becomes the duty of the Court to allow the law to have an upper hand over the sentiment and not vice versa. We must not be misunderstood to say that we are against the sentiment expressecl in the interests of the\n\nagriculturists.\n\nNor are we opposed in the least to the achievement of all the laudable objects envisaged under the Act. Let them all be achieved by all means known to law by meeting the expenses after augmenting the public revenue or by diverting the expenditure from wasteful or unimportant channel to the more important oneunder the Act. But surely we cannot countenance the achievement of all those objects by utilising a good and substantial portion of the market fee collections when the utilisation goes against the concept of quid pro quo which is very essential in case of fees.\n\nAs we have already stated Civil Appeal 1616 of 1978 arised from the order of the High Court dated 18-9-1978 dismissing the connected Writ Petition filed by a few hundred dealers of various Market Committees in the State of Punjab challenging the increase of the market fee from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/-.\n\nBefore us in the Writ Petitions not only the increase of the rate from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/- has been challenged but the previous increases have also been challenged. For the reasons to be briefly stated hereinafter we do not feel persuaded to interfere with the charging of the market fee Rs. 2/- per hundred rupees by the various Market Committees in the States of Punjab and Haryana.\n\nBut surely on the facts as they arc, the increase of the rate from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/- is not justified in law by any of the Market Committees in either of the two States.\n\nMr. Tarkunde drew our attention to the report of the Royal Commiss'.on submitted in 1928 and the recent Report of the National Commission on Agriculture.\n\nIt has been emphasised in those reports that in order to make the marketing system efficient and useful link and village roads should be constructed providing transport facilities for the transport of the agricultural produce to the marketing centres.\n\nThere cannot be any doubt that in any scheme of development of Agriculture and marketing in a wide sense, a chain of connections may ........ be found between one activity or the other. It is not only in regard to agriculture but it is so in any other kind of production, distribution and marketing. Our attention was drawn also to the use of the word ''secondary\" or \"indirect\" in some of the decisions in relation to the element of quid pro quo. But in our opinion there is a misconception in understanding the true scope of the matter and not drawing the dividing line at the appropriate place for determining the real controversy.\n\nFxamples of trust cases were given before us that control of the trustees is not for the personal benefit of the trustees but for the beneficiaries, although the liability to pay the fee is of the trustees.\n\nThe misconception lies in the fact that the impost af fee is not a personal impost on any person in the sense that unconnected with any undertaking or property or the like, it is just an impost on his person.\n\nIt is not so.\n\nWhen the trustee is charged fee for the benefit of the\n\n\" ..\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1265\n\nreligious institutions and the beneficiaries it is a benefit to the trustee.\n\nSimilarly, as pointed out in the Mining Act and the factory cases charge of fee from the mine owners in the area or the factory owners in the factory for the purpose of developing and protecting the mines and the factories is a service to the owners. If one were to push the example of a factory beyond the limit of the conception of fee, one could say that the fee charged from the factory owners can be utilised for pushing end augmenting the output of the raw-materials required in the manufacturing process in the factory, it is also a benefit to the factory owner.\n\nIs it reasonably possible to travel as wide as that?\n\nNeither the Royal Commission nor the National Commission suggested as to how the integrated development of marketing and the agricultural produce is to be financed.\n\nThey were not concerned with that aspect of the matter.\n\nNone can have any objection to the carrying out of the integrated development but it must be carried out by lcgal means raising the finance in a way known to law.\n\nThe improvements, checks, controls and regulations must be carried out in the market or in its vicinity. Much of the facilities provided in the market yards or around it will also be for the direct benefit of the producers.\n\nBut then, being intimately connected with marketing operations the benefit to the producers must be 'kerned to be special or direct benefit to the traders also. Under the Marketing Rules the auction cannot be conducted by any person other than the person engaged by the Committee. [Ruic 24(5)], and weighments and measurements of agricultural produce intended for sale are to be made through licenced weighments or measures in the principal or a sub-market yard [vide Rule 28(2)]. Reading these Rules in the background of the recommendations of the Commissions, and even otherwise, it is plain they are meant for thB protection of the agriculurists. But since they are intimately connected with the marketing operations, just like factory cases, they are also meant for the special benefit of the traders.\n\nThe literal meaning of the phrase \"quid pro quo\" is \"one for thb other\" meaning thereby--\"you charge the fee for the service.\" Service to the mining area, factory, market or marketing operations are services to the payer of the fee.\n\nMr. P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel for the State of Haryana placed some new materials before us to show that big projects of development\n\nof marketing had been undertaken in India with the help of the World Bank loans.\n\nAll very good, we wish God speed to all these projects. The only cheek which the law has to put is-·\"please don't spread your net too wide only on the traders. Keep it within bounds so long your levy has got the character of fee.\n\nYou may raise funds by any other means known to law or to the economic world.\"\n\nSUPJ\\£;1E COURT REPORTS\n\n\nNow we refer to some additional documents placed before us. But before we do so we repeat what we have said above that the materials placed on either side before us is so voluminous and cumbersome that no definite finding with any accuracy could be arrived at on that basis as there seems to be disputes in regard to the nature and accuracy of many of the figures either on the receipt side or on the exP\"nditure side. We have, however, referred to some of the admitted facts even from the judgments of the High Court. We may refer to a few more.\n\nIn the amdavit of Shri R. K. Singh, Director of Marketing, Punjab and Secretary of Punjab State Agricultural Board filed in the High Court giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 1083/77, which is not a new material in that sense. lt was stated in paragraph 6 :-\n\n\"It is submitted that respondent No. 3 is duty bound to bring about general improvement of a.notified market area, production and betterment of agriculture etc. Under the Act and the answering-respondent is duty bound to approve such expenditure under the Act.\n\nIt is also submitted that electricity plays a major role in the production and bettermeitt\n\nof agriculture and for the general improvement of area. fu view of its importance respondent No. 3 sought and respondent No. 2 approved the expenditure on the electrification of the villages situate within the jurisdiction of respondent No. 3.\"\n\nIn the Writ Petition, respondent No. 2 was the Marketing Board aud respondent No. 3 was the concerned Marketing Committee. fa the same case in the High Court additional affidavit was filed by Shri Tirath Singh, Chairman of the Punjab Board.\n\nIt is stated in para\" graph 7 that apart from development works in !lie budget estimates in the year 1975-76, there were oher development projects to be taken in hand some of which were enumerated in that paragraph. We may take up only two or three items out o4 the same to show in contrast how one will be within the limits of law and the others will widely beyond it. Item No. (iii) reads as follows :-\n\n\"To provide Rest Houses, Cattle Sheds, Cart Sheds, Light and VVater arrangements in a11 the 111arket yards.\"\n\nA good portion of these facilities will be utilised by the agriculturists who would be coming to the market yards for sale of their pro- H duce. Yet in the view we have expressed above it will be a service to the trader directly connected with the marketing operations. In con trast we quote items (x) and (xii) :-\n\nK. K. PURl \\'. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1267\n\n(x) Continuation of programme of link-roads.\n\n(xii) Improvement of agricultural production by providing improved seeds, green manuring seeds, plant protection equipment insecticides and pesticides.\"\n\nOne has to stretch one's imagination almost to a breaking point to say that the programme of link roads and improvement of agricultural production by the means mentioned in item (xii) can all be carried out by the impost of fee in the market. _,/'- In a new afiidavit of Shri N. S. Bakshi filed in this Court in Civil • \\ Appeal 1083 of 1977 it is stated in paragraph 6 that in the entire Khanna market notified area there is one principal yard; two sub-yards and oniy two purchase centres and no weighing bridge or any weighing facilities has bow provided by the Committee.\n\nIt is stated in paragraph 7 that \"amount of Rs. 3/- lacs lying with the Khanna Market Cmomittec during March, 1978 in Banks was got deposited in the Government Treasury under the orders and directions of the Board.\" These facts arc disputed.\n\nBut we are merely stating them for the future guidence of the authorities that they should proceed in the matter cautiously keeping in view the law laid down by this Court\n\n,-\"(\n\nin earlier cases, such as, Saivation Army case, and in the light of this judgment. In the additional affidavit of Shri K. K. Puri it is stated that from the information gathered it was learnt that the Punjab Board had spent about a crore of rupees by way of subsidy @ 75% for the metallic bins for the use of the villagers for their domestic nse; a crorc for air sprny; five crores to the Punjab State Electricity Board, one crore given to MARKFED, one and a hall crore to Soil Conservation Department and yet nine crores were lying surplus with the various Market Committees.\n\nThe figure may be exaggerated but are not quite .-.J groundless. We are merely quoting them for the future caution of the authorities concerned. Puri has further pointed out in paragraph 17 of his affidavit that in the Estimated Expenditure in the proposed lludget of the Moga Committee for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78 seve' ra! lakhs of rnpees wer'~ shown for insecticides and pesticides apart from other inadmissible expenses.\n\nWe may again pin-point the difference.\n\nIf insecticides and pesticides are for use at the place where actually the marketing operations are carried on it would be a justifiable expenditure. But if they are meant to be supplied to the agriculturists for use at their village homes or in their fields surely they cannot be valid expenditure out of the collections of the market fee.\n\nMr. Tarkunde filed an abstract of the statement of income from market fee and licence fee and expenditure incurred thrcfrom by\n\nthe Market Committee, Hissar as worked out from Annexure R-I to R-V filed in the High Court. It would be seen from this abstract that in the year 1974-75 the income from market fee was Rs. 24,08,141 /- and from licence fee about Rs. 6,000/- only.\n\nA sum of Rs. 7,89,670/- was contributed under section 27 of the Act to the Board and a sum of Rs. 14,73,732/- was spent on Works including link roads. Similar was the position in the year 1975-76. In , 1976-77 income from licence fee was only Rs. 16,000/- and odd and incomes from market fee was Rs. 38,27,233 /-.\n\nA big chunk to '/' • the tune of Rs. 12,19,383 /- went as contribution to the Board and\"\\.. Rs. 24,47,408/- were spent on works including link roads.\n\nSimilar J abstracts were given in respect o, f other Market Committee,; showing exactly the same position.\n\nAbstracts were also given to us by Mr.\n\nTarkunde showing the income of the Haryana Board by contribution made by the various Market Committees and the expnditure incurred therefrom.\n\nIn the abstract statement figures of expenditure both of admissible and inadmissible items had reen clubbed together.\n\nIt is, therefore, not possible to get any correct picture from these abstracts.\n\nHow admittedly the authorities concerned have travelled wide be yond limit for the application of the fee money will be apparent from the counter affidavit of the Haryana Board filed in the High Court giving ris<> to Civil Appeal 1700 of 1978.\n\nJn paragraph IO(i) it is stated :-\n\n\"The construction o{ link roads within the notified market area is a work of public importance and promotes the general interest of the farmers, traders and the notified market area which is one of the purposes enumerated in clause XVII of section 28 of the Act.\"\n\nIn para IO(ii) it is admitted :-\n\n'Thus the enhancement of market fee from 2 % to 3 % is wholly reasonable and has co-relation with the services rendered or to be rendered. 65% of its income had to be rightly deposited with the P.W.D. and the Government, as the Committee had got its link roads constructed through Government Agency and is still getting so constructed.\"\n\nIt is thus a clear admission that 65% of the income has gone by way of contribution to the P.W.D. fund for construction of the link roads.\n\nH It is in substance a contribution to the Public Exchequer for helping the Government Agency in performing its governmental functions and duties. In no way such a contribution can be justified out of the mar-\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, !.) 1269\n\nket fee income. From Annexure R-II appended to the aforesaid affidavit of the.Board it would be seen that in the year 1974-75 a sum of Rs. 1,07,338/- was given as aid to animal husbandry for the uplift of cattle wealth and its product.\n\nThis illustrates to what extent the concept of fee in lieu of service has been stretched.\n\nA sum of Rs. o,00,000/- and odd was spent for improving the quality of cotton seeds for seeds purposes.\n\nIn a Gober Gas Plant Rs. 15,55,000/\" were invested.\n\nThis item was sought to be explained before us by\n\n:y Mr. Tarkuncle that this expenditure was incurred with the help of the\n\n~ bsidy received from the State and the Central Governments.\n\nThe • scheme of the Gober Gas Plant was launched for the promotion of interest of market area.\n\nIt is not explained as to how it was connected with the marketing operations in the area and how much was the subsidy and what portion of the amount was spent out of the market fee mcome.\n\nSimilarly in Annexure R-III from the statement of income and expenditure of the Haryana Board for the year 1975-76 it would appear that a sum o( Rs. 1,28.70,662/- was spent \"ou general improvement in M.C. and other notified area and construction of F.A.C.C.\" Apart from that the other items of expenditure are a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- in purchase and acquisition of land for new mandies and Rs. 10,00,000/- and odd for puchase of land, construction of building for Board's office and staff quarters in the mandies. Again in this year a sum of Rs. 95,00,000/- and odd is shown to have been spent on Gober Gas plant. It may be inclusive of the figure of the earlier year. Then from Annexure R-IV, the. statement for the year 1976-77, it will be found that a sum of rupees one crore was given as\n\nloan to Haryana Electricity Board.\n\nWe have taken some of these items just by way of example to illustrate that the authorities took full liberty to treat the realisation from market fee as a general realisation\n\nf tax which they were free to spent in any manner they liked for\n\n~-- ', the purposes of the Act, the development of the area', for giving a fill- 1 in !.o agricultural production and so forth and so on. The sooner the authorities are made to realise the correct position in law the better it will be for all concerned.\n\nBut taking a reasonable and practical view of the matter and on appreciation of the true picture of justifiable and legal expenditure in •• relation to the market fee income, even though it had to be done on the basis of some reasonable guess work, we are not inclined to disturb the raising of an imposition of the rate of market fee upto Rs. 2/- per hundred rupP, es by the various Market Committees and the Boards both in the State of Punjab and Haryana. After all, considerable development work seems to have been done by many Market\n\n1270 SUPREr., IE COURT REP OR rs\n\n[1979] 3 >.C.R.\n\nA Con1n1ittecs in their respective markets.\n\nThe charging of £.-::e @ Rs. 2/-, therefore, is justified and fit to be sustained. We accordingly do it.\n\nAs pointed out earlier the dealers of Haryana did not feel aggrieved when the High Court maintained the raising of markt fee to the extent of Rs. 2/- per hundred rupees. We are, however, not inclined to uphold the raising of the fee from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/-, as B\n\non the materials placed before us it is clear that this has been done ' chiefly because of the wrong impression of law that the amount of market fee can be spent for any development work in the notified\n\n'I'~ market area and specially for the dc, elopment of agriculture ar.d thi'\\._... welfare of the agriculturists. On the basis of the facts and figures} placed before us from the High Court records and also some new ma'erials filed here we have come to the conclusion that there was no justification in raising the fee from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/-. The High Court was wrong in maintaining this rise on an erroneous view of the matter.\n\nWe, therefore, allow the appeals and the writ Petitions to the extent and in the manner indicated above and direct the Market Committees and the State Marketing Boards not to realize market f, e at tl\".e rate of Rs. 3 /- per hundred rupees on the basis of their impugned decisions and actions which have been found to be invalid by us.\n\nWe leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout\n\nBefore we part with these cases we would like to observe ; hat in future if the market fee is sought to be raised beyond the rate of Rs. 2/- per hundred rupees, proper budgets, estimates, balance-sheets showing the balance of the money in hand and in deposit, the estimated income and expenditure, etc. should carefully oo prepared in the light of this judgment. It may be, as was submitted before us, that it is not imperative either for the Market Committees or the Board to prepare balance-sheets because their accounts are audited by governm~ auditors but for the purposes of raising the market fee any further, the .• balance-sheets will give a true picture O!f the position also with t'1e budgets and estimates.\n\nThen, and then only there may be a legal justification for raising the rate of the market fee further to a reasonable extent. On drawing of the correct balance-sheets and framing of the correct estimates and budgets the authorities as also the State Government will be able to know the correct position ancl to decide reasonably as to what extent the raising of the market fee can be justified taking on overall picture of the matter and keeping in view the reason behind the restrictions of sales tax law concerning the transactions of foodgrains and the other agricultural produce.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals and petitions allowed.", "total_entities": 269, "entities": [{"text": "KEW AL KRISHAN PURI & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KEWAL KRISHAN PURI & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\nfY. 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Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28143, "end_char": 28157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1083/77: V. M. Tarkunde, and S. C. 1 Patel.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "S. C. 1 Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28163, "end_char": 28176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1083/77: V. M. Tarkunde, and S. C. 1 Patel.", "canonical_name": "S. C. 1 Patel"}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28231, "end_char": 28244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1083/77 Mrs. Urmila Kapoor.", "canonical_name": "Urrnila Kapoor"}}, {"text": "H. L. Sibbal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28290, "end_char": 28302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1083/77 H. L. Sibbal, G. G.\n\nF .• : ... ,.,"}}, {"text": "Atma Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28339, "end_char": 28347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parv and Mr. Atma Ram."}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28444, "end_char": 28452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4481, 4470, 4564 Bhal Singh Malik, B. Datta and K. K.\n\nManchanda."}}, {"text": "K. K.\n\nManchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28457, "end_char": 28473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4481, 4470, 4564 Bhal Singh Malik, B. Datta and K. K.\n\nManchanda.", "canonical_name": "K. K.\n\nManchanda"}}, {"text": "S. K. Wa!ia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28561, "end_char": 28572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1616/78 S. K. Wa!ia, and Mr. M. P. Jha."}}, {"text": "M. P. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28582, "end_char": 28591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1616/78 S. K. Wa!ia, and Mr. M. P. Jha."}}, {"text": "G Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28729, "end_char": 28743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4430, 4472, 4481, 4485/78 and CA 1616/78 W.P. 4564/78: G Hardev Singh, G. C. Garg and R. S. Sodhi."}}, {"text": "G. C. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28745, "end_char": 28755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4430, 4472, 4481, 4485/78 and CA 1616/78 W.P. 4564/78: G Hardev Singh, G. C. Garg and R. S. Sodhi."}}, {"text": "Adarsh Kumar Goel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28835, "end_char": 28852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1700-1761/78 Anil Diwan, (1703) Adarsh Kumar Goel (in all\n\nappeals) Prav*'1 Knmar, Adv."}}, {"text": "Prav*'1 Knmar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28871, "end_char": 28884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1700-1761/78 Anil Diwan, (1703) Adarsh Kumar Goel (in all\n\nappeals) Prav*'1 Knmar, Adv."}}, {"text": "Bina Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28904, "end_char": 28914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1703) Miss Bina Gupta, Adv."}}, {"text": "Madan Gopal Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28929, "end_char": 28946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1703) Madan Gopal Gupta (1703 to 1752) Sarva Mitter (1751~\n\n1761 and all other) For the Petitioners in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Sarva Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28962, "end_char": 28974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1703) Madan Gopal Gupta (1703 to 1752) Sarva Mitter (1751~\n\n1761 and all other) For the Petitioners in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "A K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29063, "end_char": 29071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4420, 4450, 4460, 4484/78: A K. Sen, (4420) Dr. L. M. Singhvi, (4460) B.\n\nH Dutta, K. K. Manchanda and Bhal Singh Malik, For R. 1 in Appeai Nos.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Goel"}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29084, "end_char": 29097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4420, 4450, 4460, 4484/78: A K. Sen, (4420) Dr. L. M. Singhvi, (4460) B.\n\nH Dutta, K. K. Manchanda and Bhal Singh Malik, For R. 1 in Appeai Nos."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nH Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29106, "end_char": 29117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4420, 4450, 4460, 4484/78: A K. Sen, (4420) Dr. L. M. Singhvi, (4460) B.\n\nH Dutta, K. K. Manchanda and Bhal Singh Malik, For R. 1 in Appeai Nos."}}, {"text": "K. K. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29119, "end_char": 29134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4420, 4450, 4460, 4484/78: A K. Sen, (4420) Dr. L. M. Singhvi, (4460) B.\n\nH Dutta, K. K. Manchanda and Bhal Singh Malik, For R. 1 in Appeai Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. K.\n\nManchanda"}}, {"text": "P. N. Lekhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29253, "end_char": 29264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4420, 4450, 4460 and 4484/78: 22--4f!)SCJ./79\n\nP. N. Lekhi, (FP 4420) and R. N. Sachthey, For RR.", "canonical_name": "P. N. Lekhi"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29280, "end_char": 29294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4420, 4450, 4460 and 4484/78: 22--4f!)SCJ./79\n\nP. N. Lekhi, (FP 4420) and R. N. Sachthey, For RR."}}, {"text": "M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29382, "end_char": 29393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Tarkunde, (in CA 1700 and WP 44~0) Gian Singh, (WPs.", "canonical_name": "M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Gian Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29420, "end_char": 29430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Tarkunde, (in CA 1700 and WP 44~0) Gian Singh, (WPs."}}, {"text": "S. C. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29479, "end_char": 29490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4450 4460, 4484 and CAs 1760-1761) S. C. Patel, Fer the Appellants in CA Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. C. 1 Patel"}}, {"text": "Urrnila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29540, "end_char": 29554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Urrnila Kapoor, For the Appellants in CA Nos.", "canonical_name": "Urrnila Kapoor"}}, {"text": "K. K. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29601, "end_char": 29612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1762-1773/78 : K. K. Mohan."}}, {"text": "S. C. Patel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29667, "end_char": 29678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1762-1763 : S. C. Patel,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-In these groups of Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions, broadly speaking, the question which falls for determination is the validity of certain provisions of the Pnnjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Punjab Act No.", "canonical_name": "S. C. 1 Patel"}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29725, "end_char": 29733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1762-1763 : S. C. Patel,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-In these groups of Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions, broadly speaking, the question which falls for determination is the validity of certain provisions of the Pnnjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Punjab Act No.", "canonical_name": "UNTWALIA"}}, {"text": "Pnnjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29897, "end_char": 29942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Pnnjab and Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30036, "end_char": 30063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 of 1961), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the Rules framed by the State of Pnnjab and Haryana under the said Act as also the validity of the fixation of market fees from time to time by the various Market Committees in the States aforesaid under the direction of the Punjab State Agricultural Produce Marketing Board and the Haryana State Agricultural Produce Marketing Board."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30733, "end_char": 30742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Pnnjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961", "statute": "the Pnnjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "State Agricultural Marketing -.:i Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30758, "end_char": 30797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 3 of the Act the State Agricultural Marketing -.:i Board was constituted for the entire area of the composite State, :\"'!\"\"-"}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31252, "end_char": 31270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31397, "end_char": 31407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31630, "end_char": 31640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31903, "end_char": 31913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tn the bifurcated State of Punjab by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32080, "end_char": 32120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of \"' Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32390, "end_char": 32425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several dealers filed a number of Writ Petitions in the High Court of \"' Punjab and Haryana challenging the increase in the rate of market fee \"\"-rfrom time to time, the !&"}}, {"text": "Haryana Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32619, "end_char": 32640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32930, "end_char": 32946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several dealers of the State of Haryana als<l challenged in the High Court the levy and increase of market fee frOft•\n\ntime to time."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33641, "end_char": 33651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 23, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33922, "end_char": 33937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2/- only with effect from August 23, 1975 after the passing of the Act 14 of • 1973 on August 8, 1975."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34220, "end_char": 34236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Full Bench which finally heard the Writ Petition npheld the increases by its judgment delivered on January 28, 1977, which is reported in Kewal Krishan Puri and another v. The State of Punjab and others.(')"}}, {"text": "April 28, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34952, "end_char": 34966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ordinance was promulgated on April 28, 1978."}}, {"text": "September 18, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35398, "end_char": 35416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3849 of 1978 was filed in the High Court by a large} number of dealers, which was dismissed in I/mine by order dated September 18, 1978."}}, {"text": "Haryana State Marketing Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35837, "end_char": 35866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Haryana State Marketing Board directed all the Market Committees in that State to collect market flOC\n\n@ Rs."}}, {"text": "5-9-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35967, "end_char": 35975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3/- with effect from 5-9-1977."}}, {"text": "August 30, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36279, "end_char": 36294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Appeals 1700 to 1773 of 1978 and Civil Appeals 1626 and 1627 of 1978 are from the judgment of the High Court dated August 30, 1978."}}, {"text": "Article 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37061, "end_char": 37072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37091, "end_char": 37102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37674, "end_char": 37690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38696, "end_char": 38709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38717, "end_char": 38775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras State Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38854, "end_char": 38878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point decided therein was that the provision relating to the payment of annual contribution contained in section 76(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 is a tax and not a fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras State Legislature to enact ."}}, {"text": "Latham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38948, "end_char": 38954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The meaning given to the word \"tax\" by Latham C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board(') has been quoted with approval at page 1040 and has been Often repeated in many other decisions."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39343, "end_char": 39357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V. M. Tarkunde who appeared for the Haryana Marketing Board stressed the argument that service rendered must be correlated to those on whom the ultimate burden of the fee falls.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Haryana Marketing Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39379, "end_char": 39402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V. M. Tarkunde who appeared for the Haryana Marketing Board stressed the argument that service rendered must be correlated to those on whom the ultimate burden of the fee falls."}}, {"text": "Nanaimo Railway Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40507, "end_char": 40530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few lines occurring at page 119 in the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Attorney-General for Br_itish Columbia and Esquima/t and\n\nNanaimo Railway Company and others(') may be quoted withi advantage."}}, {"text": "Shirur Mutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42562, "end_char": 42573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\n~· •\n\nK. K. PURI v. PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1231\n\nWe may now extract some very useful and leading principles from A the decision of this Court in Shirur Mutt's (1954 S.C.R., 1005, supra) pciintmg out the difference between tax and fee."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42675, "end_char": 42684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At pages 1040-41 says Mukherjea J., as he then was:\n\n'The second characteristic of tax is that it is an impositron made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax."}}, {"text": "Seligman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44439, "end_char": 44447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is really no generic difference between lhe tax and fees and as said by Seligman, the taxing power of a State may manifest itself in three different forms known respectively as special assessments."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44671, "end_char": 44681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44803, "end_char": 44813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46435, "end_char": 46481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47020, "end_char": 47034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar J., as he then wa•, delivered the judgment on behalf of the majority and discussed the point at some length."}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47233, "end_char": 47241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 545 arc to be found a few words which go directly against the contention of Mr. Tarkunde.", "canonical_name": "M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S. C.R. 537", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47550, "end_char": 47570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hingir-Rmnpur Coal Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50106, "end_char": 50128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "underlining, ours)\n\nAt pages 549-50 in the decision of The Hingir-Rmnpur Coal Co.\n\nLl<I. (supra), reference has been made in passing to the decision of\n\nthe Australian High Court in Patron v. Milk Board (Victoria).(')"}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50310, "end_char": 50315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority which, amongst others, included Dixon J., held the purported levy to be invalid because it was the imposition of a duty of excise, there being no element of quid pro quo to the per.on on whom the levy had been imposed."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52442, "end_char": 52462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Corporation of Calcutta and another' v. Liberty H Cinema(') the respondent was charged by the Calcutta Corporation a\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52716, "end_char": 52729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal to the Supreme Court the stand of the appellant Corporation was that the levy was a tax and section 548(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act did not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation; while the respondent cinema contended that the levy was a fee and had to be jus.ilicd as being imposed in return for services to be rendered."}}, {"text": "section 548(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52801, "end_char": 52815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53220, "end_char": 53226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority view was expressed by Sarkar J., as he then was, and the impost was upheld as a tax."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53321, "end_char": 53329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the minority opinion delivered by Ayyangar J., it was held that even in the case of a licence fee a correlation between the fee charged and the service rendered was uocessary to be established."}}, {"text": "Liberty Cinema", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54366, "end_char": 54380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But what is important to be pointed out from the case of Liberty Cinema (supra) is that in the case of a fee of the kind with which we are concerned in this case the element of quid pro quo must be established."}}, {"text": "s.548", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54683, "end_char": 54688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S. C. R. 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55104, "end_char": 55125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".A Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55128, "end_char": 55139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".A Ayyangar J., also said at page 526 that there being no correlation between the fee charged and the service rendered the impugned ·."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab'and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55407, "end_char": 55426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Sol'citor-General appearing for the State of Punjab'and :B ."}}, {"text": "Punjab Marketing Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55460, "end_char": 55482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Sibbal for, the Punjab Marketing Board had made n~ such submissions, that the impugned impost could be justified as a tax."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 55912, "end_char": 55921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel furiher submitted that in almost all the\n\ncases-hi.absrice of quid pro quo the :levy was held to be bad\"'and unsustainable as a tax for want of legislative competence: On the\n\nother hand learned counsel for the appellans am1 the petitioners M/s. ·+ A. K. Sen, Anil Dewan, B. S. Malik and A. K. Goel pointed out that c\n\nat no point of time the respondent sought to justify the impost as a tax obviously because it would have then violated the provisions of the Sales Tax law which did not authorise the imposition of such a tax beyond a certain percentage, and as a tax it could not be but a sales tax.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Goel"}}, {"text": "Anil Dewan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55923, "end_char": 55933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel furiher submitted that in almost all the\n\ncases-hi.absrice of quid pro quo the :levy was held to be bad\"'and unsustainable as a tax for want of legislative competence: On the\n\nother hand learned counsel for the appellans am1 the petitioners M/s. ·+ A. K. Sen, Anil Dewan, B. S. Malik and A. K. Goel pointed out that c\n\nat no point of time the respondent sought to justify the impost as a tax obviously because it would have then violated the provisions of the Sales Tax law which did not authorise the imposition of such a tax beyond a certain percentage, and as a tax it could not be but a sales tax."}}, {"text": "B. S. Malik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55935, "end_char": 55946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel furiher submitted that in almost all the\n\ncases-hi.absrice of quid pro quo the :levy was held to be bad\"'and unsustainable as a tax for want of legislative competence: On the\n\nother hand learned counsel for the appellans am1 the petitioners M/s. ·+ A. K. Sen, Anil Dewan, B. S. Malik and A. K. Goel pointed out that c\n\nat no point of time the respondent sought to justify the impost as a tax obviously because it would have then violated the provisions of the Sales Tax law which did not authorise the imposition of such a tax beyond a certain percentage, and as a tax it could not be but a sales tax."}}, {"text": "A. K. Goel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 55951, "end_char": 55961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel furiher submitted that in almost all the\n\ncases-hi.absrice of quid pro quo the :levy was held to be bad\"'and unsustainable as a tax for want of legislative competence: On the\n\nother hand learned counsel for the appellans am1 the petitioners M/s. ·+ A. K. Sen, Anil Dewan, B. S. Malik and A. K. Goel pointed out that c\n\nat no point of time the respondent sought to justify the impost as a tax obviously because it would have then violated the provisions of the Sales Tax law which did not authorise the imposition of such a tax beyond a certain percentage, and as a tax it could not be but a sales tax.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Goel"}}, {"text": "Varanasi Municipal Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57152, "end_char": 57176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in \\vhich it was held that the annual licence fee charged from the rickshaw owners and the .drivers by the Varanasi Municipal Board -could be justified only on the basis of the clement of quid pro quo."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57653, "end_char": 57662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain major items of expenditure in:::urre<l by the Mun'cipal Board were ttributable to the discharge of its statutory duty and, therefore, at page 386 it was said by Ramaswami\n\nJ.,-\";( is manifest that the licence fee cannot be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary mun:cipal scrv.iccs \\vhich the_ Municipal\n\n(l) \\ 1968]3 S. C.R. 374."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59706, "end_char": 59711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 ) wherein Hegde J .,"}}, {"text": "Difierence betwocn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60594, "end_char": 60612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TS\n\n[197'1] 3 S.C.R.\n\nDifierence betwocn a licence to regulate a trade, business or profession in public interest and in a case where a Government which is the owner of a particular property may grant permit or licence to some one to exploit that property for his benefit for cons; deration has been pointed out at page 325."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60902, "end_char": 60916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar had failed to place materials in the High Court to establish the reasonable correlationship between the value of the services rendered with the fee charged."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62957, "end_char": 62973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63246, "end_char": 63251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, Sikri C.J. speaking for the Coart pointed out at page 982-\"But even if the meaning is the same,\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "[1973] 2 S. C. R. 973", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 63347, "end_char": 63368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64564, "end_char": 64580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66180, "end_char": 66196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After giving certain guidelines the levy was declared to be without the authority of law after 31st March, 1970."}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S. C. R. 475", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 66204, "end_char": 66225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66258, "end_char": 66269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Observations of one of us (Chandrachud J., as be then was),\n\nspeaking for the Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr."}}, {"text": "Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67571, "end_char": 67596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) endeavour was made as in the case of Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi (supra) to justify the impost by the Municipal Council as a tax."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67663, "end_char": 67675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer J., speaking for the Court repelled that argument and since the impost could not be justified as fee the resolution of the Municipal Council was held to be invalid."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69395, "end_char": 69412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The history of the marketing legislation was traced by Venkatarama Aiyar J. in the case of P. P. Kutti Keya and others v. The State of Madras and others.(')"}}, {"text": "10-7-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69570, "end_char": 69579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of Writ Petitions were disposed of by one judgment delivered on 10-7-1953."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 69928, "end_char": 69945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the Courts were concerned mainly with the question of the constitutional validity of the marketing law which is beyond any pale of challenge now, it would be interesting to note that the Madras High Court had taken the view that the funds raised from the merchants for constrnction of a market in substance amounted to an exaction of a tax."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70393, "end_char": 70402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao J., as he then was, speaking for the Court in Arunacha/a Nadar's case (supra) traced the history of the marketing legislation at pages 95-96 and p-' , pointed out at page 98 :-\"The Act, therefore, was the result of a \" long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by pro- -."}}, {"text": "Arunacha/a Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70449, "end_char": 70465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao J., as he then was, speaking for the Court in Arunacha/a Nadar's case (supra) traced the history of the marketing legislation at pages 95-96 and p-' , pointed out at page 98 :-\"The Act, therefore, was the result of a \" long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by pro- -."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 71305, "end_char": 71311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay\n\n...\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71538, "end_char": 71545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wanchoo J., as he then was, speaking for the Court repelled the attack at page 669 on section 11 of the Bombay Act which gives power to the Market Committee subject to the provisions of the rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed to levy fees on the agricultural produce bought and sold by licensees in the market area."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71624, "end_char": 71634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73026, "end_char": 73034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State of Bihar and others.(2) Bachawat J .• upheld the validity of the various actions taken by the State Government under the Act and the Rules and finally said at page 539 :-\"But there is no material on the record to show that the Government acted unreasonably or that the market is so wide that thQ sale and purchase of agricultural produce within it cannot be effectively controlled by the market committee or that the growers within the area cannot conveniently bring their produce to the market yards.\""}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S. C. R. 659", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 74004, "end_char": 74025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 S. C. R. 534", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 74032, "end_char": 74053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 74605, "end_char": 74610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bihar case it was found at page 540 :-\n\n\"The market committee has appointed a dispute subcommittee for quick settlement of disputes."}}, {"text": "shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78965, "end_char": 79049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79195, "end_char": 79204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules", "statute": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79470, "end_char": 79479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules", "statute": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79668, "end_char": 79678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules", "statute": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79903, "end_char": 79913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules", "statute": "We shall examine the relevant provisions with reference to the Punjab Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80481, "end_char": 80490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80672, "end_char": 80681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Agricultural Marketing Board", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80708, "end_char": 80742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "already stated the State Agricultural Marketing Board is constituted under section 3 and while enumerating the powers and duties of the\n\nBoard it is provided in sub-section (9) that \"The Board shall exercise superintendence and control over the Committees.\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80764, "end_char": 80773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81020, "end_char": 81032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81104, "end_char": 81113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81248, "end_char": 81257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81412, "end_char": 81421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81448, "end_char": 81457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "On examining Form B in the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81876, "end_char": 81908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81942, "end_char": 81952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On examining Form B in the Rules", "statute": "On examining Form B in the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82434, "end_char": 82443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On examining Form B in the Rules", "statute": "On examining Form B in the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82592, "end_char": 82601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On examining Form B in the Rules", "statute": "On examining Form B in the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83546, "end_char": 83555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 9 to 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85205, "end_char": 85220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85319, "end_char": 85329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85487, "end_char": 85497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85561, "end_char": 85571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85627, "end_char": 85637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86180, "end_char": 86190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86812, "end_char": 86822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87197, "end_char": 87207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87991, "end_char": 88001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88245, "end_char": 88255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89004, "end_char": 89016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89361, "end_char": 89371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89634, "end_char": 89643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90944, "end_char": 90957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91388, "end_char": 91398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91654, "end_char": 91666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92085, "end_char": 92095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92282, "end_char": 92292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92381, "end_char": 92391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92480, "end_char": 92490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92548, "end_char": 92558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 98899, "end_char": 98916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But how ill-conceived the second part of clause (xvii) is, is abundantly clear from the decisions of the Punjab High Court mentioned above and to be discussed shortly herdnafter."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99514, "end_char": 99524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100341, "end_char": 100351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100836, "end_char": 100846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103113, "end_char": 103123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106136, "end_char": 106146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hanuman Dall & General Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 106326, "end_char": 106354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first decision in the case of M/s Hanuman Dall & General Mills (supra) is the deci, ion of a Division Bench of the High Court."}}, {"text": "8-11-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 106478, "end_char": 106487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be recalled that :1y this judgment delivered 'on 8-11-1974 the High Court maintained the f raising of the market fee from Rs."}}, {"text": "Hanuman Dall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107545, "end_char": 107557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Hanuman Dall and General Mills (supra) the High Court examined many of the leading and importaut judgmen!.3 of this Court which we have reviewed, earlier and also placed reliance upon an earlier Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Ram Sarup v. The Punjab State(')."}}, {"text": "Hissar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 109740, "end_char": 109746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that finding itself it is menifest that Public Works Department was carrying out the governmental functions of construction of roads including village link roads spread throughout the whole of the no'.ified market area of Hissar."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109847, "end_char": 109857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110278, "end_char": 110288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Market Committee, Hissar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112132, "end_char": 112156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Market Committee, Hissar, spent Rs."}}, {"text": "Guru Gobind Singh Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 113184, "end_char": 113217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Marketing Board was aske-0 to contribute one crcire of rupees to the Guru Gobind Singh Medical College which had been recently establishe-0 at Faridkot."}}, {"text": "Faridkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 113258, "end_char": 113266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Marketing Board was aske-0 to contribute one crcire of rupees to the Guru Gobind Singh Medical College which had been recently establishe-0 at Faridkot."}}, {"text": "Guru Govind Singh Me-Oical College at Faridkot", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 113985, "end_char": 114031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held at page 19, column 2 :-\n\n\"In the historical background, set out above, I am convinced that the enhancement in the amount of fee from one rupee and fifty paise to two rupees and twenty-five paise per one hundred rupees was not genuine and it was made with a view to enable the market committees and tha Agricultural Marketing Board to reimburse themselves for the amounts which they were directed to contribute to Guru Govind Singh Me-Oical College at Faridkot."}}, {"text": "23-8-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 114944, "end_char": 114953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2/- only with effect from 23-8-1975."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115473, "end_char": 115483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Market Committee of Moga", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118190, "end_char": 118214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are going to extract some of the averments made in the affidavit of the Secretary of the Market Committee of Moga from the judgment of the High Court at pages 354 and 355 :-\n\n\"Besides the above, the answering-respondent has undertaken the cleaning of mandis, lining of village khals (water courses), link roads; constructions of culverts and bridges; supply of pesticides and spray pumps on subsidized basis as also the electrification of villages."}}, {"text": "Markfed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118800, "end_char": 118807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 crores to the Markfed without charging any interest."}}, {"text": "Cotton Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118906, "end_char": 118933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact of the matter is that on account of the withdrawal of the Cotton Corporation of India from the various markets, the price of cotton came down suddenly."}}, {"text": "30-8-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 122728, "end_char": 122737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rejected all those petitions by the judgment dated 30-8-1978 which is the subject matter of appeal in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Moga Market Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125518, "end_char": 125539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The challenge by the dealers of the Moga Market Committee by Civil Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "18-5-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 125662, "end_char": 125671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2015 of 1978 filed in the High Court failed as per the judgment of the High Court delivered on 18-5-1978 wherein the FLill Bench decision was (allowed."}}, {"text": "18-9-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 127604, "end_char": 127613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have already stated Civil Appeal 1616 of 1978 arised from the order of the High Court dated 18-9-1978 dismissing the connected Writ Petition filed by a few hundred dealers of various Market Committees in the State of Punjab challenging the increase of the market fee from Rs."}}, {"text": "National Commission on Agriculture", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 128480, "end_char": 128514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarkunde drew our attention to the report of the Royal Commiss'.on submitted in 1928 and the recent Report of the National Commission on Agriculture."}}, {"text": "Royal Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 130658, "end_char": 130674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither the Royal Commission nor the National Commission suggested as to how the integrated development of marketing and the agricultural produce is to be financed."}}, {"text": "P. N. Lekhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 132303, "end_char": 132314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel for the State of Haryana placed some new materials before us to show that big projects of development\n\nof marketing had been undertaken in India with the help of the World Bank loans.", "canonical_name": "P. N. Lekhi"}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 132340, "end_char": 132356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel for the State of Haryana placed some new materials before us to show that big projects of development\n\nof marketing had been undertaken in India with the help of the World Bank loans."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 132471, "end_char": 132476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel for the State of Haryana placed some new materials before us to show that big projects of development\n\nof marketing had been undertaken in India with the help of the World Bank loans."}}, {"text": "R. K. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 133425, "end_char": 133436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the amdavit of Shri R. K. Singh, Director of Marketing, Punjab and Secretary of Punjab State Agricultural Board filed in the High Court giving rise to Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Punjab State Agricultural Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 133485, "end_char": 133516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the amdavit of Shri R. K. Singh, Director of Marketing, Punjab and Secretary of Punjab State Agricultural Board filed in the High Court giving rise to Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Tirath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 134455, "end_char": 134467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fa the same case in the High Court additional affidavit was filed by Shri Tirath Singh, Chairman of the Punjab Board."}}, {"text": "Punjab Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 134485, "end_char": 134497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fa the same case in the High Court additional affidavit was filed by Shri Tirath Singh, Chairman of the Punjab Board."}}, {"text": "K. K. PURl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135332, "end_char": 135342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In con trast we quote items (x) and (xii) :-\n\nK. K. PURl \\'.", "canonical_name": "K. K. PURI"}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135355, "end_char": 135363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB (Untwalia, J.) 1267\n\n(x) Continuation of programme of link-roads.", "canonical_name": "UNTWALIA"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bakshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 135851, "end_char": 135863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a new afiidavit of Shri N. S. Bakshi filed in this Court in Civil • \\ Appeal 1083 of 1977 it is stated in paragraph 6 that in the entire Khanna market notified area there is one principal yard; two sub-yards and oniy two purchase centres and no weighing bridge or any weighing facilities has bow provided by the Committee."}}, {"text": "K. K. Puri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 136692, "end_char": 136702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the additional affidavit of Shri K. K. Puri it is stated that from the information gathered it was learnt that the Punjab Board had spent about a crore of rupees by way of subsidy @ 75% for the metallic bins for the use of the villagers for their domestic nse; a crorc for air sprny; five crores to the Punjab State Electricity Board, one crore given to MARKFED, one and a hall crore to Soil Conservation Department and yet nine crores were lying surplus with the various Market Committees.", "canonical_name": "K. K. PURI"}}, {"text": "Punjab State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 136962, "end_char": 136992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the additional affidavit of Shri K. K. Puri it is stated that from the information gathered it was learnt that the Punjab Board had spent about a crore of rupees by way of subsidy @ 75% for the metallic bins for the use of the villagers for their domestic nse; a crorc for air sprny; five crores to the Punjab State Electricity Board, one crore given to MARKFED, one and a hall crore to Soil Conservation Department and yet nine crores were lying surplus with the various Market Committees."}}, {"text": "MARKFED", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 137013, "end_char": 137020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the additional affidavit of Shri K. K. Puri it is stated that from the information gathered it was learnt that the Punjab Board had spent about a crore of rupees by way of subsidy @ 75% for the metallic bins for the use of the villagers for their domestic nse; a crorc for air sprny; five crores to the Punjab State Electricity Board, one crore given to MARKFED, one and a hall crore to Soil Conservation Department and yet nine crores were lying surplus with the various Market Committees."}}, {"text": "Soil Conservation Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 137046, "end_char": 137074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the additional affidavit of Shri K. K. Puri it is stated that from the information gathered it was learnt that the Punjab Board had spent about a crore of rupees by way of subsidy @ 75% for the metallic bins for the use of the villagers for their domestic nse; a crorc for air sprny; five crores to the Punjab State Electricity Board, one crore given to MARKFED, one and a hall crore to Soil Conservation Department and yet nine crores were lying surplus with the various Market Committees."}}, {"text": "Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 137296, "end_char": 137300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puri has further pointed out in paragraph 17 of his affidavit that in the Estimated Expenditure in the proposed lludget of the Moga Committee for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78 seve' ra!"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138387, "end_char": 138397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 138955, "end_char": 138963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abstracts were also given to us by Mr.\n\nTarkunde showing the income of the Haryana Board by contribution made by the various Market Committees and the expnditure incurred therefrom.", "canonical_name": "M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Haryana Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 139461, "end_char": 139474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How admittedly the authorities concerned have travelled wide be yond limit for the application of the fee money will be apparent from the counter affidavit of the Haryana Board filed in the High Court giving ris<> to Civil Appeal 1700 of 1978."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139819, "end_char": 139829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkuncle", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 141153, "end_char": 141162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This item was sought to be explained before us by\n\n:y Mr. Tarkuncle that this expenditure was incurred with the help of the\n\n~ bsidy received from the State and the Central Governments.", "canonical_name": "M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Central Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 141260, "end_char": 141279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This item was sought to be explained before us by\n\n:y Mr. Tarkuncle that this expenditure was incurred with the help of the\n\n~ bsidy received from the State and the Central Governments."}}, {"text": "Gober Gas plant", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 142165, "end_char": 142180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "95,00,000/- and odd is shown to have been spent on Gober Gas plant."}}, {"text": "Haryana Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 142369, "end_char": 142394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "statement for the year 1976-77, it will be found that a sum of rupees one crore was given as\n\nloan to Haryana Electricity Board."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1271_1275_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "H. D. DEV ASIA & CO., KERALA\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF Jl\\:C0,\\1E TAX, KERALA\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n12 71\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nJncon1e Tax Act, 1961, Sections 73 and 75-Scopc of-Losses in specula- 1ion business-A registrred [inn is not entitled tO ha1e its losses in spec11fatio11 business carried forward for set off agoint future profits in sprcufation business.\n\nAny such loss sludl be apportionrd between the partners of the firn1 and they (the partners) alone shall be entilled to ha\\\"e thr a111ount of the loss set -0f/ and carried forward for set off under Section 73.\n\nThe assessee-appellant is a registered firn1 carrying on business at several places in the State of Kerala. Apart from it'i regular trade in various commodities, the assessee \\Vas also carrying on a business in speculation.\n\nIn respect of the loss'esduring the Msessment years 1964-65, 1965-66 and the profit during the assessment year 1966-67, the Income Tax Officer apportioned the aforesaid losses and profits amongst the partners and rejected the assessee's contention that the losses in speculation business should be canied forward and set off against the profit in the said business made in the assessment }'ear 1966-67.\n\nBut the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, following the decision of th; is Court in C.I.T., Gujarat v. Kantilal Nathuchand Sarni, [1967] 1 SCR. 813 accepted the assessee's stand. The Tribunal on second appeal answered in favour of the Revenue and the High Court also answered the reference against the assessee.\n\nDismissing the appc&ls by special leave the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The case of Kantilal Nathu Chand was decided on a true inter-\n\n<111 ) pretatioa of Section 24(1) of the Income Tax Act 1922 and the two provisions\n\n~-., ar>pended thereto.\n\nBut the provisions of law contained in Chapter VI of the • \\ 1961 Act have made a considerable departure from the corresponding provisions of the 1922 Act.\n\n[1274A, B-D]\n\nIt is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of the 1961 Act that the assessee's loss in speculation business cannot be set off except against profits and gains, if any, of another sp'eculation business.\n\n[1275B[\n\n2. For the purpose of set off it is permissible to carry forward the losses to the following assessment year or years subject to the limit of eight years as provided in Section 73 of the 1961 Act.\n\n[1275C]\n\n:i. The provision contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 73 of the 1961 Act is \"subject to the other provisions of this Chapter\", which includes section\n\n15. Under section 15 where the assessee is a registered firm, for the purpose of set off and carry forward of the loss apportionment between the: partners of the finn has got to be made and they alone are entitled to have tfo' amount of the loss set off and carried forward for set off. The m•tter is put beyond any\n\nA pale of dOubt and challenge in sub-section (2) of section 75 when it says. that nothing contained in sub section (2) of section 73 shall entitle any assessee, being a registered firm to have its loss carried forward and set off under the . provisions of Section 73(2).\n\n[1275DE]\n\nC.l.T., Gujarat v. Kamila/ Nat/111 Chand, 63 !TR 318=[1967] 1 SCR 813; distinguished.\n\nC.l.T., Gujarat Ill v. Dhanji Shamji, 97 I.T.R. 173 Chowdary Cotton ' Ginning and Processing Factory v. C./.T., Punjab 109, l.T.R. p. 6; approved.\n\nM. G. De\\asia & Co. v. C.l.T., Kera/a, 90, I.T.R. 523; affirmed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION'. Civil Appeals Nos. 2716-2718 ot 1972.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 14-7-1972 of the Kerala High Court in Income Tax Reference Nos. 100, 101 and 102 of 1970.\n\nWITH\n\nCIVIL APPEAL Nos. 365-367 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 24th May, 1977 of the Kerala High Court in I.T.R. Nos. 55, 56 and 57 of 1975 .\n\n.I. L. Nain and Mrs. Saroja Gopalakrishnan for the Appellant in E all the appeals.\n\nP. !. Francis, S. P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent in all the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These six appeals have been heard together as a \"4 common question of law in relation to the assessment of the same assessee ari$es 1in them.\n\nCivil Appeals 2716-2718 of 19(2 relate to the assess_ment years 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1966-67. The assessee appellant is a regitered firm carrying on business at several places in the State of Kerala. Apart from its regular trade in various commodities, the assessee was also carrying on a business in speculation.\n\nApropos the speculation business of the assessee the Income- Tax Officer determined a loss of Rs. 40,510/-; a loss of Rs. 598/- and a profit of Rs. 1,36,264/- for the assessment years 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1966-67 respectively.\n\nH In apportioning the assessee's income amongst its partners under section 67 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, he also apportioned the losses in speculation business in\n\n• \"\n\nw the, two assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66. The profit in spe- A culalion business as computed for the assessment year 1966-67 was also apportioned by the Income-Tax Officer amongst the partners.\n\nThe assessee contended before the Income-Tax Officer that the losses in tbe specularion business could not be apportioned between the partners but should .be carried forward and set off against the profit ' in the said business made in the assessment year 196-6-67.\n\nThe Income-Tax Othcer rejected this contention. But the Appellate Assistant ,:tr, Commissioner in appeal following the decision of this Court in Cc>m-\n\n~ -¥/ missioner of Income-Tax, Gujrat v. Kantdal Nat/iuchand SamzC)\n\n\\ accepted the asscssee's stand. 1 he dcpartment took the matter m second appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal pointed out the distinction between the provisions of section 24 of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 under which the case of Kantila/ Nathuchand (supra) had been decided and those of sections 73 and 75 of\n\ntbe 1961 Act. It, therefore, allowed the department's appeal.\n\nOn being asked by the assessee to state a case and make a reference to the High Court, the Tribunal referred the following qrnstion of law for its opinion :-\n\n\"Whether, on the facts and in the circwnstanccs of the case, and on a true interpretation of the various provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal was correct in holding that a registered firm was not entitled lo have its' losses in speculation business carried forward for s_ct off against future profits in speculation business.\"\n\nThe High Court of Kcrala on a consideration of the relevant pro- visions of the Act contained in Chapter VI has answered. the refer- , cnce in favour of the Revenue and agllinst the assessce.\n\nThe decision of the High Court is reported in M. D. Devasia & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kera/a,(') Civil Appeals 2716 to 2718 of 1972 have been filed in this Court by special leave.\n\nIdentical questions arose in respect of the assessment years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70. The High Court answered the references made in respect of those three years also against the assessee by its judgment and order dated the 24th May, 1977. Civ] Appeals 365 to 367 of 1978 have been preferred from the said decision of the High Court.\n\n(!) 63 I. T. R. 318=[1967] 1 S. C. R. 813.\n\n(2) 90 I. T. R. 525.\n\n2S-409SC1/79\n\nIn the case of Kantilal Nathuchand (supra) the question for consideration was wnether on a true interpretation of the various provisions ul the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 speculation losses of the assessce tlrm tor ti1e assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 should be set oil against its speculation profit in its assessment fer the assessment yeJ1 1960 61.\n\nThe provisions contained in section 24(1) and the twu provisos appended thereto were not very clear and some apparent cunllict arose between the first and the second proviso.\n\nOn a consideration of the same . this Court held that speculation losses of a registered firm kept apart under the first proviso to section 24(1) in compu.ing its total rncome [or one year could not be apportioned between the partners, and the registered firm could claim to carry forward sucii losses and have it set off against speculation profits of the firm of a later year in accordance with_section 24(2).\n\nBut the provisions of law contained in Chapter VI of the Act have made a con\"derable dcparturc irom the correspond:ng provisions of the 1922 Act.\n\nIn these cases we are only concerned with the question of set off ol speculation losses again.§_! the profits of a<1y other specnlation business.\n\nIn this connectiop it would suffice to ead only the relevam provisions of sections 73 al!fl 75 as they stood at the rcle-\n\n'l'ant tiine.\n\nThey are as follows :-\n\n\"73. Losses in speculat:on business-(1) Any loss, computed in respect of a speculation business carried on by the assessee, shall not be set of! except against profits and gains, if any, of another speculation business.\n\n(2) Where for any assessment year any loss computed in respect of a speculation business has not been wholly set off under sub-section (1), so much of the loss as is not so set off or the whole loss where the assessee had no income from any other speculation business, shall, svbject to the other pru\\'isions of this Chapter, be carried forwarcj to the following assessment year, a_!1d-\n\n(i) it shall be set off against the pro.fits and gains, if any, of any speculation business carried on by him assessable for that assessment year; and\n\n(ii) if the loss cannot be wholly so set off, the amount of\n\nloss not so set off shall be carried forward to the following assessment year and so on.\"\n\n\"75. Losses of registered firms-(!) Where the assessee is a rej; istered firm, any loss which canuot be set off against\n\nany ether income of tb, e firm shall be apportioned between the partners of the firm, and they alone shall be entitled to have the amount of the loss set off and carried forward for set off under sections 70, 71, 72, 73 and 74.\n\n(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) of section 72, sub-section (2) of section 73 or sub-section (1 )' of section 74 shall entitle any assessee, being a registered firm, to have its loss carried forward and set off under the provisions of the aforesaid sections.''\n\nOn reading the above provisions of section 73 it is manifest that the assessee's loss in speculation business cannot be set off except against profits and gains, if any, of another speculation business. For the purpose of set off it is permissible to carry forward the losses to the following assessment year or years subject to , the limit of 8 years as provided in sub-section ( 4) of §ection 73.\n\nBut it is to be noticed that the provisiop, contained in sub-section (2) is \"subject to the other provisions of this Chapter\", which includes section 75_.\n\nIn the latter section it is clearly provided that where the assessee is a registered firm, for the purpose of set off and carry forward of the loss apportionment between the partners of the firm has got to be made and they alone are entitled to have the amount of. the Joss set off and carrieo forward for set off under section 73.\n\nThe matter is put beyond any pale of doubt and challenge in sub-section (2) of section 75 when it says that nothing contained in sub-section (2) of section 73 shall entitle any assessee, being a registered firm, to have its loss carried forward and set off under the provisions of section 73(2). The Tribunal and the High Court, therefore, were right in holding that t!Ic ratio of the decision of this Court in Kantilal Nathuchand's case\n\n(supra) cannot be applied in respect of the assessment made under the Act.\n\nIdentical views have been expressed by the High Conrt of Gujarat in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat ITT v. Dhanji Slwmji(') and the .High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Choudhary Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Punjab. (2)\n\nFor the reasons stated above, we dismiss all the appeals with costs.\n\nHearing fee one set only.\n\nV.D.K.\n\n(!) 97 I. T. R. 173\n\n(2) 109 I. T. R 6\n\n26-409SCI/79\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "H. D. DEV ASIA & CO., KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. D. DEVASIA & CO., KERALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KERALA\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF Jl\\:C0,\\1E TAX, KERALA\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n12 71\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nJncon1e Tax Act, 1961, Sections 73 and 75-Scopc of-Losses in specula- 1ion business-A registrred [inn is not entitled tO ha1e its losses in spec11fatio11 business carried forward for set off agoint future profits in sprcufation business."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 73 and 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 701, "end_char": 707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee-appellant is a registered firn1 carrying on business at several places in the State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR. 813", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1360, "end_char": 1377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kantilal Nathu Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1617, "end_char": 1637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of Kantilal Nathu Chand was decided on a true inter-\n\n<111 ) pretatioa of Section 24(1) of the Income Tax Act 1922 and the two provisions\n\n~-.,", "canonical_name": "Kantilal Nathu Chand"}}, {"text": "Section 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1688, "end_char": 1701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1709, "end_char": 1728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1984, "end_char": 1994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2333, "end_char": 2343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2421, "end_char": 2431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "section\n\n15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2517, "end_char": 2528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2536, "end_char": 2546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2895, "end_char": 2905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2965, "end_char": 2975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 73(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR 813", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".I. L. Nain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".I. L. Nain and Mrs. Saroja Gopalakrishnan for the Appellant in E all the appeals."}}, {"text": "Saroja Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".I. L. Nain and Mrs. Saroja Gopalakrishnan for the Appellant in E all the appeals."}}, {"text": "P. !. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3894, "end_char": 3907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. !."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Francis, S. P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Francis, S. P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J.-These six appeals have been heard together as a \"4 common question of law in relation to the assessment of the same assessee ari$es 1in them."}}, {"text": "section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4789, "end_char": 4799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4807, "end_char": 4827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 he dcpartment took the matter m second appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5809, "end_char": 5819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5827, "end_char": 5847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 73 and 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6298, "end_char": 6318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Kcrala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Kcrala on a consideration of the relevant pro- visions of the Act contained in Chapter VI has answered."}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 S. C. R. 813", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kantilal Nathuchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2S-409SC1/79\n\nIn the case of Kantilal Nathuchand (supra) the question for consideration was wnether on a true interpretation of the various provisions ul the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 speculation losses of the assessce tlrm tor ti1e assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 should be set oil against its speculation profit in its assessment fer the assessment yeJ1 1960 61.", "canonical_name": "Kantilal Nathu Chand"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7991, "end_char": 8004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 24(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8256, "end_char": 8269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "provisions of law contained in Chapter VI of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8280, "end_char": 8332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8640, "end_char": 8651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the provisions of law contained in Chapter VI of the Act", "statute": "But the provisions of law contained in Chapter VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 70, 71, 72, 73 and 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9958, "end_char": 9988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10035, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10066, "end_char": 10076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10101, "end_char": 10111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10296, "end_char": 10306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10803, "end_char": 10813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11137, "end_char": 11147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11229, "end_char": 11239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11298, "end_char": 11308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11431, "end_char": 11444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Conrt of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11708, "end_char": 11729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Identical views have been expressed by the High Conrt of Gujarat in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat ITT v. Dhanji Slwmji(') and the .High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Choudhary Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Punjab. ("}}, {"text": ".High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11801, "end_char": 11834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Identical views have been expressed by the High Conrt of Gujarat in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat ITT v. Dhanji Slwmji(') and the .High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Choudhary Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Punjab. ("}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1276_1278_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HUSSAIN ARA KHA TOON & ORS.\n\nHOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR,\n\nGOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950-Art. 21- Jllecessity of Speedy trial of undertrial prisoners.\n\nOrdinarily when a person is accused of more than one ojfence, the sen~ tences of imprisonment imposed are directed to run concurrently but assuming C the sentences of imprisonment be coru; ccutive, the undertrial prisoners here have suffered incarceration for the 01aximum period for which they could be sent to jail on conviction for multiple offences.\n\nThere is absolutely no reason why the under trials be allowed to continue in jail for a moment longer since such continuance of detention would be violative not only of human dignity but also of their fundamental right und'er Art. 21 of the Constitution. [1277A-C]'\n\n[The Court directed the High Court to subn1it information regarding the location of Courts, the number of cases pending in eachj of them and the reasons for the delay in disposal of cases to enable it to give necessary direction for setting up more Courts, appointing additional Judges and providing more facilities by way of staff and equipment so as to ensure fulfilment of the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial under Art. 21 of the Constilution.]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 57 of 1978.\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners.\n\nU. P. Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBllAGWATI, J.-This Writ Petition has come up for further directions.\n\nMr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted.\n\nWe. therefore recall our Order directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad. 'Their cases will be condered by us again when the Writ Petition is taken up for final hearing on the reopening of the Court after the summer vacation.\n\n• \\\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwati, !.) 1277\n\nMrs. Hingorani has handed over to us a list of under-trial prisoner< who are accused of multiple offences and who have already been in jail for the maximum term for which they could be sentenced on conviction, even if the sentences awarded to them were consecutive and not concurrent.\n\nNow ordinarily when a person is accused of more offences than one, the sentences of imprisonment imposed on him arc directed to run concurrently, but even on the assmnption that the sentences of imprisonment may be consecutive, these undertrial prisoners, mentioned in the list of Mrs. Hingorani, have already suffered incarceration for the maximum period for which they could 'have been sent to jail on conviction.\n\nThere is absolutely no reason why they should be allowed to continue to remain in jail for a moment longer, since such continuance of detention would be clearly violative not only of human dignity but also of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nWe, therefore, direct that these under-trial prisoners he released forthwith.\n\nWe have also before us a list of under-trial prisoners furnished by Mrs. Hingorani, which gives the names and particulars of those undertrial prisoners who are accused of multiple offences and who have been in jail for a period longer than the maximum for which they could be sentenced on conviction on the basis of the sentences being concurrent, though, if the sentences of imprisonment impose<l on them on conviction \\Vere directed to run consecutively, their detention as under-trial prisoners could not be said to have exceeded the max:nrnm\n\nterm.\n\nW c do not for the time being, direct them to be ccleased unconditionally but when they are produced before the Magistrates or the Court> of Session, they may be released on bail on executing a personal bond of Rs. 50/- only, without any surety and without any verification of financial solvency.\n\nW c direct that a copy of this Order, may be sent through the High Court of Patna to the Magisifates and Courts of Session before whom the cases of these undertrial prisoners are pending, so that the necessary orders granting bail may be passed by them in favour of these under-trial prisoners at the\n\ncarkst. The High Court may obtain a compliance report from the Magistrates and Courts of Session and submit the same to us by the middle of June, 1979.\n\nWe pointed out in our earlier Judgment dated 9th March, 1979\n\nthat speedy trial is a part of the fundamental right guaranteed under H Article 21 and in order to enforce this fundamental right. il was necessary to have particulars as to the location of the CO'\"; ts of Magistrates\n\nE •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand Courts of Session in the State of Bihar together with the total number of cases pending in each of these courts as on 31st December, 1978 giving yearwise break-up of such pending cases and also explaining why it has not been possible to dispose of such of those cases as have been pending for more then six months.\n\nWe, therefore, by our order dated 9th March, 1979 called for these particulars from the High Court of Patna and pursuant to our directions, the High Court has sent these particulars in a detailed chart and also intimated to us what are the norms of disposals fixed by the High Court for each Court of Magistrate and Sessions Judge.\n\nBut this information given to us by the High Court is not enough. We should also like to know from the High Court how many more Courts and Judges are necessary and at which places, for ensuring the fundamental right of speedy trial to the accused in the State, having regard to the pending file and the average inflow of cases and the norm of disposals fixed for each Court of Magistrate and Sessions Judge by the High Court.\n\nThe High Court should also inform us what further facilities by way of staff and equipment are necessary in the Courts of Magistrates and Courts of Session, the lack of which is responsible for delays in disposal of criminal cases and is hampering the realisation of the fundamental right of speedy trial.\n\nThis additional information, which of course would have to be worked out on the basis of a proper and careful analysis and appraisal of the existing and anticipated filing of cases, should be forwarded to this Court by the High Court by 30th June, 1979 in five sets and out of these five sets, one should be handed over to Mrs. Hingorani and the other to Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar. If the State of Bihar wishes to contest the correctness of the information supplied by the High Court or the validity of the proposal made by the High Court, the State of Bihar may file an affidavit in reply on or before 20th July, 1979.\n\nThis Court will'\"\"\"\" then decide, on the basis of the material placed before it, as to what directions <1_re necessary to be given for setting up more courts, appointing additional judges and providing 1nore facilities by way of staff and equipment, so as to ensure fulfilment of the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Writ Petition will now come up for final hearing on 24th July, 1979.\n\nJ\\l.K.A.", "total_entities": 26, "entities": [{"text": "HUSSAIN ARA KHA TOON & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR,\n\nGOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 96, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nMay 4, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND 0."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 816, "end_char": 823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1292, "end_char": 1299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1383, "end_char": 1395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "K. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1418, "end_char": 1429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1566, "end_char": 1577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "19th April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1657, "end_char": 1673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted."}}, {"text": "Sukhan Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1695, "end_char": 1705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted."}}, {"text": "Ganga Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1710, "end_char": 1722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted."}}, {"text": "Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1832, "end_char": 1841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted.", "canonical_name": "K. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "16th April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar, has pointed out that the Order made by us on 19th April, 1979 directing release of Sukhan Sah and Ganga Prasad, being under-trial prisoners detained in Bhagalpur Central Jail and mentioned in the list furnished by Mrs.\n\nHingorani on 16th April, 1979, is not correct, since on further scrutiny it is found that they do not fall within the category of under-trial prisoners who have boen in jail for a period longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if convicted."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3336, "end_char": 3346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4362, "end_char": 4381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W c direct that a copy of this Order, may be sent through the High Court of Patna to the Magisifates and Courts of Session before whom the cases of these undertrial prisoners are pending, so that the necessary orders granting bail may be passed by them in favour of these under-trial prisoners at the\n\ncarkst."}}, {"text": "9th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4800, "end_char": 4815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We pointed out in our earlier Judgment dated 9th March, 1979\n\nthat speedy trial is a part of the fundamental right guaranteed under H Article 21 and in order to enforce this fundamental right."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6705, "end_char": 6720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This additional information, which of course would have to be worked out on the basis of a proper and careful analysis and appraisal of the existing and anticipated filing of cases, should be forwarded to this Court by the High Court by 30th June, 1979 in five sets and out of these five sets, one should be handed over to Mrs. Hingorani and the other to Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This additional information, which of course would have to be worked out on the basis of a proper and careful analysis and appraisal of the existing and anticipated filing of cases, should be forwarded to this Court by the High Court by 30th June, 1979 in five sets and out of these five sets, one should be handed over to Mrs. Hingorani and the other to Mr. U. P. Singh, on behalf of the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the State of Bihar wishes to contest the correctness of the information supplied by the High Court or the validity of the proposal made by the High Court, the State of Bihar may file an affidavit in reply on or before 20th July, 1979."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "24th July, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7540, "end_char": 7555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Writ Petition will now come up for final hearing on 24th July, 1979."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_12_17_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "l B\n\nS. MOHAN LAL v.\n\nR. KONDIAH\n\nFebruary 5, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.j\n\nAndhra Pradesh Building (Lea.e, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960,\n\n6. 10(3) (a) (iii), \"business,\" interpretation, whether includes practice of legal profession-Construction of expressions, principles.\n\n' •\n\n• The respondent, an advocate, sought to evict his tenant, the appellant, under s. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) ., j-.-..\n\nControl Act, 1960, on the ground that he required the disputed premises for \"--- carrying on his profession. The court of small causes, Hyderabad, finding ,.__ that the requirement was bon.a fide, passed an eviction order against the appellant. In revision, the High Court negatived the contention that the expression \"business\" used in s. 10(3) (a) (iii), - did not include the 'profession' of an advocate.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. \"Business\" is a word of large and wide import, capable of a variety of meanings. In a broad sense it is taken to mean 'everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men, for the purpose of livlihood . or profit'. The practice of law is 'business' within the meaning of that expression in s.10(3)(a)(iii). The Act is of general application, and its protection is not confined to any classes of tenants, nor is the right to evict under the Act, limited to any class of landlords. There is no reuon why a landlord who is a member of the legal or medical professions and who requires the premises for carrying on the practice of his profession, ihould be wholly debarred from obtaining possession of the premises. It 1NOuld be anamolous to bold that all the provisions of the Act apply to non-midential buildings owned by an Advocate, excepting s. 10(3)(a)(iii).\n\n[14D, E, l6A-B, C.D]\n\nWilliams' Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China arul A11r. v. Williams and Ors., [1953] 1 All. ELR 536; Taramal v. Laxman Sewak Surcy & Ors. 1971 MPU 888, approved.\n\nM. P. Sethurama Menon v. Thaiparambath Kunhukutty A.mma's daught•r, .\n\nMeenakshi Amma &: Ors., AIR 1967 Kerala 88; Bangalore Water~Supply S.werage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & Ors .• [1978] 3 SCR 207; Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Carp. Ltd., (194'] 2 KBD 256; distinguished.\n\n2. It is a sound principle of construction that, meaning of words and expressions used in an Act, muat take their colour from tho context in whieb. they appear. Neither the meaning, nor tho definition of a term in one statute, affords a guide to tho construction of tho same term in another statute, more so, if the two Acts in Which the same word is used, a.re not cognate Acta\n\nand the sense in which a term has been understood in ieveral statute&:, deos not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which it •hould be understood aenerally. [14GH &: 15AJ . /\n\nMOHAN LAL v. R KONDIA!l: (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 13\n\nC!vn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2047 of 1969.\n\nA Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25-6-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 346/67.\n\nY. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for the Appellant.\n\nA. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for the Respondent. • . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by '+\"-- CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The short question for consideration in this <' appeal is whether the practice of the legal profession is 'business' within the meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (jii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease,, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.\n\nThe question arises this way.\n\nThe respondent, an Advocate filed an application before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of the appellant, his tenant, from the premises in question on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate.\n\nThe appli cation was contested by the appellant who was carrying on the business of manufacturing art jewellery in the premises.\n\nWe are not coucemed in this appea!l with the several defences which were raised by th~ appellant. Nor are we concerned with the vicissitudes which the case underwent.\n\nFor the purposes of this appeal it is sufficient to say that the final Court of fact, namely the Chief Judge of the Court of Small causes, Hyderabad, found that the respondent bona fide required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate and that the tenancy was not such as could be split up.\n\nThe Appellate authorities passed an order of eviction against the appellant. _Before the High Court, in revision, it was contended by the appellant that the practice of the profession of an Advocate was not business within the meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (iii) and, therefore, the respondent could not seek the eviction of the\n\n' l\n\nappellant on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate. it was contended that Section 10(3) (a) (iii) used the expression 'business' only and not the expression 'profession.' The contention was negatived by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh consisting of Gopalrao Ekbote and Ramachandra Rao, JJ.\n\nThe tenant has appealed by spe dal leave to this Court.\n\n_, Dr. Chitaley learned counsel for the appellant argued that there was H a clear distinction between 'business' and 'profession' and that the practice of a liberal profession like that of an Advocate or a Doctor which\n\nhad nothing commercial abont it was not business within the meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh :Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960. He argued that though the Andhra Pradesh Act broadly classified buildings into residential and nonresidential buildings, the landlord of a non.residential building could not seek to evict hii tenant on the ground of his requirement unless it wa& for the purpose of carrying on a business. According to the learned Counsel this indicated that the expression business was to be given a narrow meaning and was to be confined to activities of a commercial nature.\n\nThe learned Counsel also urged that the Court should favour a constrution which would be beneficient to the tenant.\n\nDr. Chitaley relied on M. P. Sethut/Jma Menbh v.\n\nThaiparambath kunhukutty Amma'.1\" daughter, Meenakshi Amma and Ors.(') Btmgalore Woter- Supply & Sewerage Board, etc. v.\n\nR. Rajappa & Ors. (2) and Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life lllsurance Cotpotation Ltd.(')\n\nThe e:tpression business has not been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is a\n\ncommon p:pression which is sometimeii used by itself and sometimes in a collocaflon of words as in \"business, trade or profession\".\n\nIt is a word of large and wide import,, capable of a variety of meanings.\n\nIt is needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the various Dictionaries except to say that everyone of thetn notices a large number of meanings of the Wotd.\n\nIn a broad sense it is taken to mean everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the irurpose of livlihood or profit'.\n\nIn a narrow sense it is confined to commercial activity.\n\nIt is obvious that the meaning of the word must be gleaned from ihe context in which it is used.\n\nReference to tile provlsians df the Constitution or othet statutes where' the expression is used cannot be of any assistance in determining its meaning in Secti.on 10 ( 3 )(a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh• Building '(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,\n\n1960. ft is not a spund princip!e of construction to interpret exprcssions used in one Act with reference to their Use in another Act; more so, if the two Acts in which the same word is used ate not cognate Acts.\n\nNeither the meaning, rtor the definition of the term in one statute affotds a guide to the construction of the sanie term in another statute and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light on the matiher in which the term should be understood generally.\n\nOn the other hand it is a\n\n(I) A.I.R. 196'7 i<erala 88.\n\n(2) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 207.\n\n(3) [1949] 2 K. B. l:J. 256.\n\n'\"1 '\n\n' /\n\nr •\n\nMb'!iAN LAL v. R. Kol'1iJrA!l' (Chinnappa F.eiidy, J.) 15\n\nsound; and, irideed, a well known priritip1e bf construction that meaning of words anti expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context iri which they appeat. Dr. Chitaky very frankly arid\n\nfairly conceded as much .\n\nNow tlie Ai:idhta Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act; 196o, i• aii 'Act to consolidate, and amend the law relating to the reguaiion of leasing of buildings, the control of rent thereof and the prevehticin of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the Slate of Aridhra Pradesh. it applies to the cities of Hyderabad and Secundefabatl and to all fuunieipalities in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 'flie provisions ol ihe Ad, however, do not apply to buildings owned by the Governriierit and to liuiJdirigs cilrisiiuded Oil or after 26th August,\n\n1957.\n\nBriiiding is broadly defined as meaning any house or hut or a part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or nonresidential purposes.\n\nLandlord is defined as the owner of a building, including a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, on his own account or on behalf of another person etc. Tenant _ is defined as a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building.\n\nSection 4 prdvides for the de!erniiii<itioh of a fair rent of a building on the applicaiinn of the tenant or landlord.\n\nSection 10(1) provides that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution ot a decree or othef\\vise except in accordance with the prvisioris ol Sections 10, 12 and 13.\n\nSection io(i) rileritioris several gtouiids on which a landlord may seek to evict a tenant.\n\nThe grounds are default of payment of rent, sub-Jetting of premises, used for a purpose other than that\n\ntor which it was leased, commission at ads of waste, conduct amounting to nuisance to the occupiers cif the other portions in the same building, securing of alternative accommodation by the teriant and denial of the title of the lap.dfoid.\n\nThe grounds mentioned in SeCiioil iO(i) iipp1y hnth to tesideritial aiid iion-fesidential buildings. Section 10(3)(a)(i) provides for the evidibri of a ietiant where the landford of a resideiitial building require~ it for his own occupation. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) provid- . CS for the eviction of a teiiiint ffom a hOn'reSidentiaJ building where\n\n\"the landlord is not occupying a ri6n-residential building iii a city, fown or vi1fage concerned whicb is his own br to the possesSioiI bf wliieli he is ehtitled whether under the Act or othetwise-( a) for the purpose df a business which he iS carrying on on !he date of the app1icaliori, cir (b) for the purpose bf a business which: in !he opinion of the Con troll et, tlie landlo'rd boria'flde proposes to coinmence\".\n\nSection 12 alld 13 cdntaill special provisions relating fo recovery of buildings liy landlord fo'r the\n\npurpose of e:lfectihg repairs, aiteratidns or additions or for reconstiilCtion.\n\nThe scbefue at the Act is to prevent unreasonab1e eviction of\n\ntenants b! landlords and to provide for eviction on specified grounds.\n\nThe Act is of general application and its protection not confined to any classes of tenants nor is the right to evict under the Act limited to any c'lass of landlords.\n\nThere is no reason why a landlord who is a member of the legal or medical professions and who requires the premises for carrying on the practice of his profession should be wholly debarred from obtaining _possession of the premises. It is impossible to discover any reason for so making a discrimination against the liberal professions, But, that would be the result if the expression 'business' is given a narrow meaning which the appellant wants us to give to that expression.\n\nIt would indeed be anamolous to hold that all the provisions of the Act includinlJ Section 4 which provides for the determination of fair rent and Section 10(1) which bars the eviction of tenants apply to nonresidential buildings owned by an Advocate but not Section 10(3)\n\n(a) (iii) only, In onr view the expression business occurring iii Section 10(3)(a) (iii) is used in a wide sense so as to include the practice of the profession of an Advocate.\n\nThe Kerala IEgh Court in M.P. Sethurama Menon v. Meenakshi Am ma & Ors., (supra) construed the expression 'trade or business' as connoting commercial activity and as not including the practice of the legal profession.\n\nThe learned Judges referred to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and drew a distinction between the words 'business' and 'profession.' As mentiojled by us earlier, we do not think that it is right to ascribe to the word 'business' occurring in the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the.same meaning that the word may have when it occnrs in other statutory provisions. The word must be interpreted in the context of\n\nthe, statute in which it occurs and not in the context of other statutes or in a manner alien to the context of the statute concerned.\n\nIn Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Bo, qrd etc. v. R. Rajappa & Ors., (supra) Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) observed\" ...... I find myself unable to accept the broad formulation that a Solicitor's establishment cannot be an industry. A Solicitor, undoubtedly, does not carry on trade or business when he acts for his client or advises him or pleads for him, if and when pleading is permissible to him.\n\nHe pursues a profession which is variously and justifiably described as learned, liberal or noble.\" The observations of the Learned Judge were made in the context of the question whether a Solicitor's establishment would fall within the definition of 'industry' under the\n\n' •\n\n( _......\n\nr •\n\n. )\n\n-._r\n\n' '\n\nMOHAN LAL v. R KONDIAH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 17\n\nIndu.strial Disputes Act.\n\nIt. would be most unwise to apply this observation to determine whether the practice of the liberal professions is within the meaning of the expression 'business' in Rent Control legislation .\n\nIn Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (supra) it was observed that the carrying on of a Solicitor's business was the carrying on of a profession and was not the carrying on of a trade or business within the meaning of that phrase in the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927. The observation was made in the context of that Act which made a distinction between 'trade or business' and 'profession'. In fact sub-ection 3(a) of Section 17 of the Act expressly said : \"for the purposes of this Section premises shall not be deemed to he premises used for carrying on there at a trade or business by reason of their being used for the purpose of carrying on there at any profession\". The question in that case was about the right to compensation for the goodwill attached to the premises where the \"business\" or \"profession\" was being carried on. We do not think that the case is of any help to the appellant.\n\nWe may refer here to the decision of Danckwerts, J., in Re Williams' Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Another\n\nv. Williams and Others.(') where the question was whether the bequO.t\n\nto a son for the purpose of starting him in 'business.' was affective to start the son in medical practice. The learned Judge held that it did, E observing that the word 'business' was capable of including the practice of a profession and that it plainly included the profession of a Doctor.\n\nWe may refer to just one more case i.e. Taramal v. Laxman Sewak Surey & Ors(') where this very question whether the practice of law was a 'business' within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act came for consideration before A. P. Sen, J.\n\nThe learned Judge held that in the context of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the word 'business' hd to be given a wide meaning so as to include any profession.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the High Court that the practice of law is 'business' within the meaning of that expression in Section 10{;3) (a)\n\n(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.\n\nM. R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1) [1953] All E.R. 536.\n\n(2) [1971] M.P.L.J. 888.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "B\n\nS. MOHAN LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MOHAN LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. KONDIAH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. KONDIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l B\n\nS. MOHAN LAL v.\n\nR. KONDIAH\n\nFebruary 5, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(3)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1960", "statute": "Control Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1960", "statute": "Control Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "s.10(3)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1960", "statute": "Control Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "s. 10(3)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1784, "end_char": 1800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 SCR 207", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHAN LAL v. R KONDIA!l: (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 13\n\nC!vn.", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa F.eiidy"}}, {"text": "25-6-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3058, "end_char": 3067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25-6-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitaley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. 'Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3157, "end_char": 3169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "E. M. Sarul Anam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3223, "end_char": 3239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for the Respondent. • ."}}, {"text": "P. N. Ramalingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. 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'"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9577, "end_char": 9586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9697, "end_char": 9710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 10, 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(3)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10411, "end_char": 10430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(3)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10552, "end_char": 10573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11078, "end_char": 11088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12130, "end_char": 12139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12194, "end_char": 12207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12306, "end_char": 12319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12387, "end_char": 12403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala IEgh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12503, "end_char": 12520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala IEgh Court in M.P. Sethurama Menon v. Meenakshi Am ma & Ors., ("}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12749, "end_char": 12765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12787, "end_char": 12797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12805, "end_char": 12824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12830, "end_char": 12871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13107, "end_char": 13124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13476, "end_char": 13487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) observed\" ...... I find myself unable to accept the broad formulation that a Solicitor's establishment cannot be an industry."}}, {"text": "Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14665, "end_char": 14694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14846, "end_char": 14856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927", "statute": "the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Danckwerts", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15364, "end_char": 15374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may refer here to the decision of Danckwerts, J., in Re Williams' Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Another\n\nv. Williams and Others.(')"}}, {"text": "A. P. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16077, "end_char": 16086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may refer to just one more case i.e. Taramal v. Laxman Sewak Surey & Ors(') where this very question whether the practice of law was a 'business' within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act came for consideration before A. P. Sen, J.\n\nThe learned Judge held that in the context of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the word 'business' hd to be given a wide meaning so as to include any profession."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16367, "end_char": 16377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16452, "end_char": 16469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_169_183_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS.\n\nHOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, GOVT. OF\n\nBIHAR. PATNA\n\nF e.bruary 12, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, R. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\n16 9\n\nAdministration of Justice-Pre-trial detention-Right of under-trial prisoner to have a speedy trial-Art. 21 of Constitution of India .\n\n~ __ Pre-trial release--C'oncept of-Determinative factor~ in grant of bail and\n\n--~ release of under-trial prisoner on personal bond without monetary obligation\n\nC Y explainld.\n\nIn their petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus the petitioners stated that a large nun1ber of men and women i•.1cluding childr'en were in jails for years awaiting-trial in courts of law and that the offences, even if proved, would not warrant punishn1ent for more than a few months. Although sufficient opportunity was give.,,_, the State did not appea.r before the Court.\n\nDirecting the release of the undertrials on their executing a personal bond.\n\nHELD:\n\n(Per Bhagwati & Koshal, JJ.)\n\n1. A procedure \"\".hich keeps large number of people behind bars without trial for long, cannot possibly be regarded as \"rentsonable, just or fair\" so as. to be in E conformity wi1h the requirement of Art. 21. It is necessary, therefore, that the law as enacted by the Legislature and as administered by the courts must radicaliy\n\nchang~ its approach to pre-trial detention and ensure 'reasonable, 1ust an.J. fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case. [174 CD]\n\n2. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and, therefore, d_elay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. Though speedy trial is not sptcifically ):enun1erated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and C(Jntent \" of Art. 21.\n\nSpeedy trial which means reasonably expeditious trial, is an ititegral\n\npart of the fundamental right to life and liberty 'enshrined il\"l Art. 21, [179 H,\n\n180 c, F]\n\nArt. 21 confers a. fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his tife or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not eough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by Iaw, but that the pro .. cedure should be \"reasonable, fair and just\".\n\nIf a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not \"reasonable, fair or just\", such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Art. 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fund.am'ental right and secure his release.\n\nAny procedure pres~ cribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be \"reasonable1 fair or just\" unless. that procedure 'ensure.5 a pecdy trial for determination of the guilt of suchperson. [180 D-EJ\n\n12-196SC!/79\n\n• 17 0\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.Jt.\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of ln; dia, [1978] 2 SCR 621; referred to.\n\n3. Expeditious trial and freedom from detention are part of human rights an& basic freedoms.\n\nThe judicial system which permits incarceration of men an4 women for long peripds of time withcut trial is denying human rights to suck undertrials and withholding basic freedoms from th'em.\n\nLaw has become for them an iruttrument of injustice and they are helpless and despairing victims of B the callousness of the legal and judicial system. [173 C-E, F]\n\n4. One reason why our legal and judicial system continually denies justice te the poor -by keeping them for long years in pretrial detention is the highly unsatisfactory bail system, which suffers from a property oriented approach. It proceeds on th'e erroneous assumption that risk of monetary loss is the only deterrent against fleeing from justice. Even after its re-enactment1 the Code _'!.-....1. • Criminal Procedure cootinues to adopt the same antiquated approach.\n\nWhere an accused iao to be released on his personal bond, it insists that the bond ehould , contain a monetary obligation requiring the accused to pay a sum of money in -4 case he fails to appear at the trial. Moreover, as if this were not sufficient deterrent to the poor, the courts mechanically and as a matter of course insist that the accused should produce sureties who will stand bail for him and these sureties must again esta.blish th'eir solvency to be able to pay the amount of bail in case the accused fails to app'ear to answer the charge. [17 4 E-G]\n\nThis system of bails operates. very harshly agaiinst the poor and it is only the non-poor who are able to take adva.ntage of it by getting themselves released on bail. The poor find it difficult to furnish bail even without sureties because very often the amount of the bail fixed by the Court is so unrealistically cxces- 1ive that in a majority of cases the Poor are unable to satis.fy the police or the Magistrate about their solvency for the amount of tb'e bail. and where the bail is with sureties, as is usually the case, it becomes an almost impossible task for the poor to find pen-ons sufficiently solvent to stand as sureties. The result is that tither they are fleeced by the police and revenue officials or by touts and profes~ 1ional sureties and sometimes they ha,\"e even to incur debts for securing their release or, be.ng unable to obtain release, they have to remain in jail until such time as the court is able to take up their cases for trial, leading to grave consequences, namely, ( 1) though presumed innocent, they are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life, (2) they are prevented irom contributing to the preparation of their defence and (3) they lose their job, if the~ have on'e, and are deprived of an opportunity to work to support themselves .....__.., and their family members with the result that the burden of their detention almost invariably falls heavily on the innocent members of the family. [174 G-\n\n175 DJ • The bail system, as it op'erates today, is thus ai source of great hardship to G the poor and if the civil effects of poverty are to be eliminated and a fair and just treatment assured to the poor in the administration of justice, it is imperative that the bail system should be thoroughly reformed so that it should lie possible for the poor, as easily as the rich, to obtain pre-tTial release without 4 ' jeopardizing the interest of justice. [177 C-D]\n\nRi•k of monetary loss is not the only deterrent against fleeing from justice; There ar'e also other factors which act as equal dCterrents against :fleeing. There--\n\nfore. the courts, even under the law as it stands today, must abandon the anti~ quated concept under whicl!. pre-trial release is ordered ortly against .bail with\n\nsureties. If the coun is satisfied, after taking into account, on the basis of\n\n• ,.\n\n\\ '\n\nH. KHATOON V. HOME SECRETARY 1 71\n\ninformation placed berore it, that the accused has his roots in the community and is act likely to abscond, it can safely release the accused on hil5 personaJ. bond.\n\n[177 E, G, HJ\n\n5. To determine wheth'er the accused baas hisroots in the com1nunity which would deter him from fleeing, the court should take into account the following factors toncerning the accused : ( 1) The length of his residence in th'c community, (2) his employment status, history and his financial condition, (3) his family ties and relationships, ( 4) his reputation, character and monetary conditions, (5) his prior criminal record including any record of prior release on recognizance or on bail, (6) the identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for his reliability, (7) the nature of the offence charged and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sente!lce in so far as\n\n.hese factors are relevant to the risk of non appearance, and (8) any other factors indicating the ties of the accused to the oommunity or bearing on the risk of wilful failure to appear. [178 A-El\n\nIf the court is satisfied on a consideration of the relevMit factors that the accused has his ties in the community and there is no substantial risk of non- :!tppearance, the accus'ed may, as far as possible, be released on his personal bond.\n\nIf facts a.re brought to the notice of the court showing that, havi'O.g regard to the condition and background of the accused, his previous record and the nature and circumstances of the offence, th'ere may be a substantial risk of his nonappeamnce at the trial, as for example, where the accused is a notorious bad character or a confirmed criminal or the offence is serious, th'e court ma.y not release the accused on his personal bond and may insist on bail with sureties.\n\nBut in the J:J3jority of cases, considerations like family ties and relatil111ship, roots in the community, employment status etc. may prevail with the court in releasing the accused on his personal bond and particularly in cases where th'!! offence is not grave and the accused is poor or belongs to a weaker section of the commooity, release on p'erson21l bond could, as far as possible, be preferred.\n\nBut even while releasing the accused on personal bond it is necessary to caution the oourt that the amotmt of the bond which it fixes should not be based mer'cly on lhe nature of the charge. The decision as regards the amount of th~ bond should be an individualised decision depending on the individual :fina.ncial circum\n\nstances of the accused and the probability of his abS'COndiing.\n\nThe amount of the bond 5hould be determined having regard to these relevant factors and should not be fix'ed mechanically according to a schedule keyed to the nature of the charge.\n\nOtherwise, it would be difficult for the accused to secure his release even by executing a personal bond, it would be very harsh and 0 ppt'essive if lie is required to satisfy the court-and what is said in regard to the court must apply equally in relation to the police while &ranting bail-that he is solvent\n\nnough to pay the amount of the bond if be fails to appeM. at the trial and in oonsequence the bond is forfeited. The inquiry into the solvency of the accused can become a source of great harassment to him and often result in denial of bail and lfeprivation of liberty and should not, therefore, be ine; isted upon as a condition of acceptance of the personal bond. [178 F-179 DJ\n\n6. Necessary to provide by an amendment of the penal law that if an accused wilfully fails to appear in compliance with the promise contained in his personal bond, he shall be liable to ponal action. [177 Fl\n\n7. High time that the State Government realised its reopomibility to the people in the matter of administration of justice and set up more courts for the\n\ntrial ef <...... [180 HJ\n\nA Pathak J. (con.-urring)\n\n( 1) The primary principle of crimina-1 law ill that imprhonment may follow a judgment of guilt, but should not precede it.\n\nThere is also another principle which makes it desirable to ensure that the ac.::used is present to receive bis sentence in the event of being found guilty. [181 E]\n\n(2) It is indisputable that an unnecessarily prolooged det'ention in prison of unUertrials befou; b;; ing brought to trial is an affront to all civilized norms of human liberty and any meaningful concept of individual liberty which forms the bedrock of a civilized ]egflil system must view with distress patently lm1~\n\nperiods of imprisonment before persons awaiting trial can receive the attention of the aJministration of justice. [181 D]\n\n(3) The Code of Criminal Proc'edure both the old Code and the new, include provisions for the release of a person on bail or 0\\1 the execution of a bond without sureties for his appearance. There is an amplitude of judi-ciad. power to release a prisoner awaiting trial on bail or on the execution of a personal bond without sureties for his appearance within the existi\\1g provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it is for the Courts to fully acqua.int themselves with the nature and extent of their discr'etion in exercising it. It is no longer possible to countenance a mechanical exercise of the power. What should be the amount of security required or th'e monetary obligation demanded in a bond is a matter calling for the careful cons-idera.tion of several factors.\n\nThe entire object being cnly to ensure that tlie undertrial does not flee or hide himself from trial, all the relevant considerations which enter into the determination of\n\nthat question must be t<1ken into account. [181 E, 182 B-C]\n\n( 4) The abus'es attendant ~1 the prevailing system of pretrial release in India could be avoided or, in any event greatly reduced, if considerations like \"nature and circumstances of the offence charged, the weight of the vidence against the accused, the accus-ed's family ties, employment, finain..:ial resources, character ao,1d mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at eourt proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failur~ to appear at -court proceedings\", are taken into consideration when determining pre-trial r'elease and the amount of security or monetary obligation to be imposed. [182 G, E-F]\n\nUnited States Bail Reforms Act. 1966: 18 USS 3146 (b}, Moti Ram & Ors. v. State of M.P. [1978] 4 SCC 47; referred to.\n\n(5) Urgent need for a clear and explicit provision in the Code of Criminal G Procedure enabling the release, in appropriate cases, of an under trial prisoner on his bond without sureties and without any monetary obliga-tion. [l 83 B]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 57 of 1979.\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners\n\nS. M. Jha and U. P. Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of Bhagwati and Kasha!, JJ. was delivered by Bhagwati, J. Pathak, J. gave a separll.te Opinion.\n\n- )\n\n...\n\n• '- ,.\n\n• _ _, _i...\n\n• . '\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwmi, J. I I 7 :i\n\nBHAGWA TI, J .-This petition for a writ of habeas corpus discloses a shocking state of affairs in regard to administration of justice in the State of Bihar.\n\nAn alarmingly large number of men and women, children including, are behind prison bars for years awaiting trial in courts of law.\n\nThe offences with which some of them are charged are trivial, which, even if proved, would not warrant punishment for more than a few months, perhaps for a year or two, and yet these unfortunate forgotten specimens of humanity are in jail, deprived of their freedom, for periods ranging from three to ten years without even as much as their trial having commenced.\n\nIt is a crying shame on the judicial system which permits incarceration of men and women for such long periods of time without trial.\n\nWe are shouting from house tops about the protection and enforcement of human rights. , We are talking passionately and eloquently about the maintenance an:l preservation of basic freedoms.\n\nBut, are we not denying human rights to these nameless persons who .are languishing in jails for years for\n\noffences which perhaps they might ultimately be found not to have committed ? Are we not withholding basic freedoms from these neglected and helpless human beings who have been condemned to a life of imprisonment and degradation for years on end ? Are expeditious trial and freedom from detention not part of buman rights and basic freedoms ? Many of these unfortunate men and women must not even be remembering when they entered the jail and for what offence. They have over the years ceased to be human beings they are mere ticket-numbers. It is high time that the pnblic conscience is awakened and the Government as well as the judiciary begin to realise that in the dark cells of our prisons there are large nnmbers of men and women who are waiting patiently, impartiently perhaps, but ln vain, for jnstice-a commodity which is tragically beyond their reach and grasp.\n\nLaw has become for them an instrument of injustice and they are helpless and despairing victims of the callousness of the legal and judicial system.\n\nThe time has come when the legal and judicial system has to be revamped and restructured so that such injnstices do not occur and disfigures the fair and otherwise luminous face of our nascent democracy.\n\nThough we issued notice to the State of Bihar two weeks ago, it is nnfortnnate that on the 5th February, 1979 no one has appeared on. behalf of the State and we must, therefore, at this stage proceed on the basis that the allegations contained in the issues of the Indian Express dated 8th and 9th January, 1979 which are incorporated in the writ petition are correct.\n\nThe information contained in these newspaper cuttings is most distressing and it is sufficient to stir the conscie11ce and disturb the equanimity of any socially motivated lawyer or judge.\n\nSome of the undertrial prisoners whose names are giveil in the newspaper cuttings have been in jail for as many as 5, 7 or 9 years and a few of them, even more than 10 years, without their trial having begun.\n\nWhat faith can these lost souls have in the judicial system which denies them a bare trial for so many years and keeps them behind bars, not because they are guilty, but because they are too poor to afford bail and the courts have no time to try them. It is a travesty of justice that many poor accused, \"little Indians, are forced into long cellular servitude for little offences\" because the bail procedure is beyond their meagre means and trials don't commence and even if they do, they never conclude.\n\nThere can be little doubt, after the dynamic interpretation placed by this Court on Art. 21 in Mar.eka Gandhi v. Union of lndia( 1) that a procedure which keeps such large numbers of people behind bars without trial so long cannot possibly be regarded as 'reasonable, just or fair' so as to be in conformity with the requirement of that Article. It is necessary, therefore, that the law as enacted by the Legislature and as administered by the courts must radically change its approach to pretrial detention and ensure 'reasonable, just and fair' procedure which has creative conne>- tation after Maneka Gamlhi's caS!! supra.\n\nNow, one reason why our legal and judicial system continually denies justice to the poor by keeping them for long years in pretrial detention is our highly unsatisfactory bail system. It suffers from a property oriented approach which seems to proceed on the erroneous assumption that risk of monetary loss is the only deterrent against fleeing from justice.\n\nTlJe Code of Criminal Procedure, even after its re-enactment, continues to adopt the same antiquated approach as the earlier Code enacted towards the end of the last century .and where an accused is to be released on his personal bond, it insists that the bond should contain a monetary obligation requiring the accused to pay a sum of money in case he fails to appear at the trial.\n\nMoreover, as if this were not sufficient deterrent to the poor, the courts mechanically and as a matter of course insist that the accused should produc~ sureties who will stand bail for him and these sureties must again establish their solvency to be able to pay np the amonnt of the bail in case the accused fails to appear to answer the charge.\n\nThis system of bails operates very harshly against the poor and it is only the non-poor who are able to take advantage of it by getting themselves released on bail.\n\nThe poor find it difficult to furnish bail even without sureties because very often the amount of the bail fixed by the courts is so\n\n(1) [19781 2 S.C.R. 621.\n\n-- • - '\n\n' ,.\n\n--<'~\n\n--·\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwali, J.) 175\n\nunrealistically excessive that in a majority of cases the poor are unable to satisf) the police or the Magistrate about their solvency fox\n\nthe amount of the bail and where the bail is with sureties, as is usually the ca_se, it becomes an almost impossible task for the poor to find persons sufficiently solvent to stand as sureties.\n\nThe result is that either they are fleeced by the police and revenue officials or by touts and professional sureties and sometimes they have even to incur debts for securing their release or, being unable to obtain release, they have to remain in jail until such time as the court is able to take up !heir cases for trial, Jeaing to grave consequences, namely, (1) though presumed innocent, they are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life, (2) they are prevented from contributing to the preparation of their defence and ( 3) they lose their job, if they have one, and are deprived of an opportunity to work to support themselves and their family members with the result that the burden of '11eir detention almost invariably fal!s heavily on the innocent members of the family.\n\nIt is her~ that the poor find our legal and judicial system oppressive and heavily weighted against them and a feeling of frustration and despair occurs upon them as they find that they are helplessly in a position of inequality with the non-poor.\n\nThe Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat under the chairmanship of one of us, Mr. Justice Bhagwati, emphasised this , Paring inequality in the following words :\n\n\"The bail system, as we see it administered in the criminal courts today, is extremely unsatisfactory and needs drastic change.\n\nIn the first place it is virtually impossible to translate risk of non-appearance by the accused into precise monetary terms and even its basic premise that risk of :financial loss is necessary to prevent the accused from fleeing is of doubtful validity.\n\nThere are several considerations which deter an accused from running away from justice and risk of financial loss is only one of them and that too not a major one.\n\nThe experience of enlightened Bail Projects in tho United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and D. C.\n\nBail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to_ secure the presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases.\n\nMoreover, the bail system causes discrimination against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty. while the wealthier persons otherwise similarly situate would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford to furnish bail.\n\nThis discrimination arises even if the amount\n\nof the bail is fixed by the Magistrate is not high, for a large majority of those who are brought before the Courts in criminal cases are so poor that they would find it difficult to furnish bail even in a small amount.\"\n\nThe Gujarat Committee also pointed out how the practice of fixing B the amount of bail with reference to the nature of the charge without taking into account relevant factors, such as the individual financial circumstances of the accused and the probability of his fleeing before\n\nial, is harsh and oppressive and discriminates against the poor :\n\ni \"\n\n\"The discriminatory nature of the bail system becomes all the more acute by reason of the mechanical way in which it is custonnari!y operated. It is no doubt true that theoretically the Magistrate has broad discretion in fixing the amount of bail but in practice it seems that the amount of bail depends almost always on the seriousness of the offence.\n\nIt is fixed according to a schedule related to the nature of the charge. Little weight is given either to the probability that the accused will attempt to flee before his trial or to his individual financial circumstances, the very factors which seem most\n\nrelevant if the purpose of bail is to assure the appearance of the accused at the trial.\n\nThe result of ignoring these factors and fixing the amount of bail mechanically having regard only to the seriousness of the offence is to discriminate against the poor who are not in the same position as the rich as regards capacity to furnish bail.\n\nThe Courts by ignoring the differential capacity of the rich and the poor to furnish bail and treating them equally produce inequality between the rich and the poor : the rich who is charged with the same offence in the same circumstances is able to secure his release while the poor is unable to do so on account of his poverty.\n\nThese are some of the major defects in the bail system as it is operated to-day.\"\n\nThe same anguish was expressed by President Lyndon B. Johnson at the time of signing the Bail Reforms Act, 1966 :\n\n\"Today, we join to recognize a major development in our system of criminal justice : the reform of the bail system.\n\nThis system has endured-archaic, unjust and virtually unexamined-since the Judiciary Act of 1789.\n\nThe principal purpose of bail is to insure that an accused person will return for trial if he is released after arrest.\n\n• <\n\n, .. ,\n\n., J-- ..\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nHow is that purpose met under the present system ?\n\nThe defendant with means can afford to pay bail.\n\nHe can afford to buy his freedom.\n\nBut poorer defendant cannot pay the price.\n\nHe languishes in jail weeks, months and perhaps even years before trial.\n\nHe does 11ot stay in jail because be is guilty. He does not stay in jail because any sentence has been passed.\n\nHe does not stay in jail because he is any more likely to flee before trial.\n\nHe stays in jail for one reason only-because he is\n\npoor. ..... \" C\n\nThe bail system, as it operates today, is a source of great hardship to the poor and if we really want to eliminate the evil effects of poverty and assure a fair and just treatment to the poor in the administration of justice, it is imperative that the bail system should be thoroughly reformed so that it should be possible for the poor, as easily as the rich to obtain pretrial release with()ut jeopardizing the inteJest of justice.\n\nIt is high time that our Parliament realises that risk of monetary loss is not the only deterrent against fleeing from justice, but there are also other factors which act as equal deterrents against fleeing.\n\nOurs is a socialist republic with social justice as the signature tune of our constitution and Parliament 'would do well to consider whether it would not be more consonant with the ethos of our constitution that instead of risk of financial loss. other relevant considerations such as family ties, roots in the community, job security, membership of stable organisations etc., should be the cfeterminativc factors in grant of bail and the accused should be in appropriate cases be released on his persona) bond without monetary obligation.\n\nOf course, it may be necessary in such a case to provide by an amendment of the penal law that if the accused wilfully fails to appear in compliance with the promise contained in his personal bond, he shall be liable to penal action.\n\nBut even under the law as it stands today the courts must abandon the antiquated concept under which pretrial release is ordered only against bail with sureties.\n\nThat concept is outdated nd ex perience has shown that it has done more harm than good.\n\nThe new insight into the subject of pretrial release wh'ch has been developed in socially advanced countries and particularly the United States should\n\nROW inform the decisions of our Courts in regard to pretrial release.\n\nIf the Court is satisfied, alter taking into account, on the basis of information placed before it, that the accused has his roots in the community and is not likely to abscond, it can safely release the accnsed\n\non his personal bond. To determine whether the accused has his rooti; in the community which would deter him from fleeing, the Coort should take into account the following factors concerning the accused :\n\n1. The length of his residence in the community.\n\n2. his employment status, history and his financial condition,\n\n3. his family ties and relationships,\n\n4. his reputation, character and monetary condition,\n\n5. his prior criminal record including any record or prior release on recognizance or on bail,\n\n6. the identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for his reliability.\n\n7. the nature of the offence charged and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence in so far as these factors are relevant to the risk of non appearance, and\n\n8. any other factors indicating the ties of the accused to the community or bearing on the risk of wilful failure to appear. • II the court is satisfied ou a consideration of the relevant factors that the accused has his ties in the community and there is no substantial risk of nonappearance, the accused may, as far as possible, be raleased on his personal bond.\n\nOf course, if facts are brought to tlte F notice of the court which go to show that having regard to the copdition and background of the accused his previous record and the nature and circumstances of the offence, there may be a substantial risk of his non-appearance at the trial, as for example, where the accused is a notorious bad character or a confirmed criminal or the offence is serious (these examples are only by way of illustration), the G court may not release the accused on his personal bond and may insist on bail with sureties.\n\nBut in the majority of cases, considerations like family ties and relationship, roots in the community, employment status etc. may prevail with the court in releasing the accused on his personal bond and particularly in cases where the offence is not grave and the accused is poor or belongs to a weaker section of the com- H munity, release on personal bond could, as far as possible, be vreferred.\n\nBut een while releasing the accused on personal bond it is necessary to caution the court that the amount of the bond which it\n\n- •\n\n' <\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwati, J.) 179\n\nfixes should not be based merely on the nature of the charge.\n\nThe decision as regards the amount of the bond should be an individualiiied decision depending on the individual financial circumstances of the accused and the probability of his absconding.\n\nThe amount of the bond should be determined having regard to these relevant factors and should not be fixed mechanically according to a schedule keyed to\n\n~ 1tie nature of the charge.\n\nOtherwise, it would be difficult for the accased to secure his release even by executing a personal bond. Moreover, when the accused is released on his personal bond, it would be J.._very harsh and oppressive if he is required to satisfy the court-and _A Y.>hat we have said here in regard to the court must apply equally in ; relation to the police while granting bail-that he is olvent enough\n\nt~ tiay the amount of the bond if he fails to a, ppear at the trial and in consequence the bond is forfeited.\n\nThe inquiry into the solvency of the accused can become a source of gret harassment to him and often re1ult in denial of bail and deprivation of liberty artd should not, therefore, be insisted upon as a condition of acceptance of the personal bond.\n\nWe have no doubt that if the system of bail, even under the existing law, is administered in the manner we have in di~ cated in this judgment, it would go a long way towards relieving hardship of the poor and help them to secure pretrial release from incarceration. It is for this reason we hae directed the undertrial prisoners whose names are given in the two issues of the Indian Express ihould be released forthwith on their personal bond. We should have ordinarily said that personal bond to be executed by them should be with monetary obligation, but we directed as an exceptional measure that there need be no monetary obligation in the personal bond becanse we found that all these persons have been in jail without trial . for several years, and in some cases for offences for which the punisl!- o.; r ment would in all probability be less than the period of their detention and moreover, the order we were making was merely an interim order.\n\nThe peculiar facts and circumstances of the case dictated such an unusual course . •\n\nThere is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system G which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the undertrial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in d; sposal of cases. It is a bad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years.\n\nEven a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough; how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or H 7 or even 10 years.\n\nSpeedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial\n\nof justice.\n\nIt is interesting to note that in the United States, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights.\n\nThe Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that\n\n\"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.\" So also Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that :\n\n\"every one arrested or detained-shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.\" •\n\nWe think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in th~ broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in ,- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.\n\nWe have held in that case that + Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be \"reasonable, fair and just\".\n\nIf a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not \"reasonable, fair or just\", such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and 1ecure his release.\n\nNow obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the\n\nilt of such person.\n\nNo procedure which does not ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy tri>1l and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and~ liberty enshrined in Article 21.\n\nThe question which would, however, '• arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right undc Article 21.\n\nWould he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him\n\non the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 ? That is a question we shall have to consider when we hear the writ petition on merits on the adjourned\n\n7 <\n\ndate.\n\nBut one thing is certain and we cannot impress it too strongly on the State Government that it is high time that the State Government realised its responsibility to the people in the matter of admini-\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Pathak, J.) lSI\n\n'!ration of justice and set up more courts for the trial of cases.\n\nWe may point out that it would not be enough merely to establish more courts but the State Government would also have to man them by competent judges and whatever is necessary for the purpose of recruiting competent judges, such as improving their conditions of service, would have to be done by the State Government, if they want to improve the system of administration of justice and make it an effective instrument for reaching justice tb the large masses of people for whom justice is to-day a meaningless and empty word.\n\n• These are the reasons for which we made our order dated 5th ....-ebruary, 1979.\n\nWe shall now proceed to hear the ; nit petition on\n\n1 19th February, 1979.\n\nPATHAK, J.-lt is indisputable that an unnecessarily prolonged detention in prison of undertrials before being brought to trial is an affront to all civilized norms of human liberty.\n\nAny meaningful concept of individual liberty which forms the bedrock of a civilized legal system must view with distress patently long periods of im-' D prisonment before persons awaiting trial can receive the attention of the administration of justice.\n\nThe primary principle of criminal law is that imprisonment may follow a judgment of guilt.\n\nBut should not precede it. But there is another principle which . makes it desirable to ensure that the accused is present to receive his sentence in the event of being found guilty.\n\nNow, the Code of Criminal Procedure, both the old Code and the new, include provision for the release of a person on bail or on the execution of a bond without sureties for his appearance.\n\nNonetheless, as appears prima facie from the record before us, a large number of persons whose names, find mention in copies of the Indian Express of January 8 )-- -and 9, 1979, have been in prison for long year without even being\n\n,.~ brought to trial.\n\nAlthough sufficient opportunity was given to the State of Bihar to meet the allegations made, it is unfortunate that no one has appeared on behalf of the State.\n\nIn view of the importance of the questions arising on the habeas corpus petition, we have '\n\n\" T\n\nprovided further opportunity to the State to appear and accordingly have posted the petition for final hearing on February 19, 1979. But at the same time we see no reason why interim relief should be denied to these undertrials. After carefully considering what has been said in respect of each individual undertrial, we have considered it appropriate, in the interests of justice, to make the order of February 5, 1979 clirect!ng the release of the persons mentioned in that order on their executing a personal bond. '\\he order is somewhat unusual in that it directs that the personal bond to be taken in each\n\n- '\n\nA case should not be based on any monetary obligation.\n\nThe condition has been included as an exceptional measure, under the persuasive pressure of the particular facts and circumstance of the case.\n\nIn regard to the exercise of the judicial power to release a prisoner awaiting trial on bail or on the execution of a personal bond without B sureties for his appearance, I have to say this briefly.\n\nThere is an amplitude of power in thi.s regard within the existing provisions of _,, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it is for the Courts to fully acquaint themselves with the nature and extent of their discretion in exercising it.\n\nI think it is no longer possible to countenance a mecha- \" nical exercise of the power.\n\nWhat should be the amount~,_ C security required or the monetary obligation demanded in a bond is + a matter calling for the careful consideration of several factors.\n\nThe entire object being only to ensure that the undertrial does not flee or hide. himself from trial, all the relevant considerations which enter into the determination of that question must be taken into account. ( ') D • A synoptic impression of what the considerations could be may be drawn from the following provision in the United States Bail Reform Act of 1966:\n\n\"In determining which conditions of releases will reasonably assure appearance, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information, take into account the nature and circumstances of the offence charged, the weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings. (2) ·- ....\n\nThese are considerations which should be kept in mind when determining the amount of the security or monetary obligation. Perhaps, if this is done the abuses attendant on the prevailing system of pretrial release in India could be avoided or, in any event, greatly reduced See Moti Ram and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh.(8)\n\nI consider it desirable te refrain from making any final comment or observation on the legality and propriety of the continued detentian of the undertrial prisoners whether on the ground of infringement\n\n(1) Sectin 440, Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n(2) 18 lJ. s. s. 3146 (b)\n\n(3) [197i] 4 s.c.c. 47.\n\n, ..\n\n• .....\n\n1 •\n\n\"\"' '\n\n' •\n\nH. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Pathak, J.) 183\n\nof Article 21 of the Constitution or on other grounds. That, I think, A. should await the final determination of the habeas corpus petition . •\n\nThese are the reasons which have influenced me in making the order dated February 5, 1979.\n\nWhile concluding, it seems desirable to draw attention to the absence of an explicit provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure enabling the release, in appropriate cases, of an undertrial prisoner on his bond without sureties and without any monetary obligation. , There is urgent need for a clear provision. Undeniably, the thousands ~-~ of undertrial prisoners lodged in Indian prisons today include many ,_. who are nnable to secure their release before trial because of their\n\n• . '\n\ninability to produce sufficient financial guarantee for their appearance.\n\nWhere that is the only reason for their continued incarceration, there may be good ground for complaining of invidious discrimination.\n\nThe more so under a constitutional system which pronrises social equality and social justice to all of its citizens.\n\nThe deprivation of liberty for the reason of financial poverty only is an incongruous element in a society aspiring to the achievement of these constitutional objectives.\n\nThere are sufficient guarantees for appearance in the host of considerations to which reference has been made earlier\n\nand, it seems to me, our law-makers would take an important step in defence of individual liberty if appropriate provision was made in the statute for non-financial releases.\n\nN.V.K .", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, GOVT. OF\n\nBIHAR. PATNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, GOVT. OF BIHAR. PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 263, "end_char": 270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 274, "end_char": 295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1178, "end_char": 1185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case. ["}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1478, "end_char": 1491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case. [", "canonical_name": "Maneka Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475, "end_char": 2482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2879, "end_char": 2895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10653, "end_char": 10661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High time that the State Government realised its reopomibility to the people in the matter of administration of justice and set up more courts for the\n\ntrial ef <...... [180 HJ\n\nA Pathak J. (con.-urring)\n\n( 1) The primary principle of crimina-1 law ill that imprhonment may follow a judgment of guilt, but should not precede it."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11804, "end_char": 11830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "181 E, 182 B-C]\n\n( 4) The abus'es attendant ~1 the prevailing system of pretrial release in India could be avoided or, in any event greatly reduced, if considerations like \"nature and circumstances of the offence charged, the weight of the vidence against the accused, the accus-ed's family ties, employment, finain..:ial resources, character ao,1d mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at eourt proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failur~ to appear at -court proceedings\", are taken into consideration when determining pre-trial r'elease and the amount of security or monetary obligation to be imposed. ["}}, {"text": "United States Bail Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13125, "end_char": 13155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13539, "end_char": 13551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners\n\nS. M. Jha and U. P. Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13573, "end_char": 13582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners\n\nS. M. Jha and U. P. Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13587, "end_char": 13598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners\n\nS. M. Jha and U. P. Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Kasha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13649, "end_char": 13654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Bhagwati and Kasha!,"}}, {"text": "BHAGWA TI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13822, "end_char": 13831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwmi, J. I I 7 :i\n\nBHAGWA TI, J .-This petition for a writ of habeas corpus discloses a shocking state of affairs in regard to administration of justice in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13972, "end_char": 13977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY (Bhagwmi, J. I I 7 :i\n\nBHAGWA TI, J .-This petition for a writ of habeas corpus discloses a shocking state of affairs in regard to administration of justice in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16172, "end_char": 16186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though we issued notice to the State of Bihar two weeks ago, it is nnfortnnate that on the 5th February, 1979 no one has appeared on."}}, {"text": "5th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16232, "end_char": 16250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though we issued notice to the State of Bihar two weeks ago, it is nnfortnnate that on the 5th February, 1979 no one has appeared on."}}, {"text": "8th and 9th January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16427, "end_char": 16452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the State and we must, therefore, at this stage proceed on the basis that the allegations contained in the issues of the Indian Express dated 8th and 9th January, 1979 which are incorporated in the writ petition are correct."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17502, "end_char": 17509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gamlhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18015, "end_char": 18028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary, therefore, that the law as enacted by the Legislature and as administered by the courts must radically change its approach to pretrial detention and ensure 'reasonable, just and fair' procedure which has creative conne>- tation after Maneka Gamlhi's caS!!", "canonical_name": "Maneka Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18410, "end_char": 18436, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20971, "end_char": 20992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat under the chairmanship of one of us, Mr. Justice Bhagwati, emphasised this , Paring inequality in the following words :\n\n\"The bail system, as we see it administered in the criminal courts today, is extremely unsatisfactory and needs drastic change."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21715, "end_char": 21728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The experience of enlightened Bail Projects in tho United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and D. C.\n\nBail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to_ secure the presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases."}}, {"text": "Manhattan Bail Project", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21737, "end_char": 21759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The experience of enlightened Bail Projects in tho United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and D. C.\n\nBail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to_ secure the presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases."}}, {"text": "D. C.\n\nBail Project", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21764, "end_char": 21783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The experience of enlightened Bail Projects in tho United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and D. C.\n\nBail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to_ secure the presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases."}}, {"text": "Johnson at the time of signing the Bail Reforms Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24252, "end_char": 24309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25694, "end_char": 25704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is high time that our Parliament realises that risk of monetary loss is not the only deterrent against fleeing from justice, but there are also other factors which act as equal deterrents against fleeing."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32783, "end_char": 32792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33137, "end_char": 33147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33250, "end_char": 33260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33780, "end_char": 33790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34216, "end_char": 34226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34433, "end_char": 34443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34725, "end_char": 34735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34994, "end_char": 35004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th ....-ebruary, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36025, "end_char": 36047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• These are the reasons for which we made our order dated 5th ....-ebruary, 1979."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36126, "end_char": 36132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J.-lt is indisputable that an unnecessarily prolonged detention in prison of undertrials before being brought to trial is an affront to all civilized norms of human liberty."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36849, "end_char": 36875, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37659, "end_char": 37676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the importance of the questions arising on the habeas corpus petition, we have '\n\n\" T\n\nprovided further opportunity to the State to appear and accordingly have posted the petition for final hearing on February 19, 1979."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37948, "end_char": 37964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After carefully considering what has been said in respect of each individual undertrial, we have considered it appropriate, in the interests of justice, to make the order of February 5, 1979 clirect!ng the release of the persons mentioned in that order on their executing a personal bond. '"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38651, "end_char": 38677, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40546, "end_char": 40572, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40589, "end_char": 40596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40709, "end_char": 40719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41045, "end_char": 41071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N.V.K", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42229, "end_char": 42234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_184_187_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF HARYANA\n\nDARSHANA DEVI & ORS.\n\nFebruary 12, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.)\n\nCivil Procedure Code, Or. XXXIII, application to accident-claims cases, principles involved.\n\n'fhe respondents, a. widow and her daughter, claimed con1pensation for the •\n\nkilling of their sole bread-winner, by a Haryana State Transport bus, but could ,, not afford to pay any court fee on their clai, m.\n\nThe High Court held that the ___,,.,{ exemptive provisions of Order XXXIII, crc, will apply to Accident Claims-- ---..,__ Tribunals, which have the trappings of the Civil Court.\n\nDis-missing the special leave petition the Court,\n\nHELD : The Sta.te should fram'e appropriate rules to exempt from levy of court fee, cases of claims of compensation where automobile accidents are the cause. T\\vo principles are involved. Firstly, access to court, is an integral part of social justice, and tfre State bas no rational litigation policy if it forgets this fundamental, and secondly, it is the State's duty under Art. 41 of the Constitution to render assistance, without litigation, in cases of disablement and undeserved want. [185 B-C, D, 186 C]\n\nM. Cappelletti, Rabels Z, (1976) 669 at 672; quoted with approval.\n\nObiter dictum :\n\nI. It is a public duty of each great branch of Government to obey the rule of law and uphold the trys.t with the Constitution by making rules to effec~µat't legislation meant to help the poor. Now that insurance against third party risk is oompul, sory and motor insurance is nationalised, a'-'ld transport itself i! largely by Sta.le Undertakings, the principle of no-fault liability and on-the-spot e'ettlement of claims should become national policy. [186 B, C, D-E]\n\nII. Courts must give the accident claimS' cases high priority, adopt simplified procedures \\Vithout breach of natural jus-tice, try. out pre-trial settlements aind narrow down the controversy and remember, that 'wiping every tear from every eye' has judicial relevance. For, law must keep its promise to justice. [186 G~\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4120 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 8-3-78 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 80 I /7 6.\n\nPrem Malhotra and M. N. Shroff for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\n0 KRISHNA IYER, J.-We refuse leave bnt with a message tag.\n\nThe poor shall not be priced out of the justice market by insistence on court-fee and refusal to apply the exemptive provisions of\n\nJ ,_\n\nHARYANA V- DARSHANA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 185\n\nOrder XXXIII, C.P.C So we are distressed that the State of Haryana, mindless of the mandate of equal justice to the indigent under the Magna Carta of our Republic, expressed in Article 14 and stressed in Art 39A of the Constitution, has sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court which has rightly extended the 'pauper' provisions to auto-accident claims.\n\nThe reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order XXXIII will apply to tribunals which have the trappings of the civil court finds our approval.\n\nWe affirm the decision.\n\nEven so it is fair for the State to make clear the situation by fram- --ing appropriate rules to exempt from levy of court fee cases of claims -(\n\nc • of compensation where automobile accidents are the cause .\n\n~ . '\n\nHere is a case of a widow and daughter claiming compensation for the killing of the sole bread-winner _by a State Transport bus; and the Haryana Government, instead of acting on social justice and generously settling the claim, fights like a cantankerous. litigant even by avoiding adjudication through the device of asking for court-fee D from the pathetic plaintiffs.\n\nTwo principles are involved.\n\nAccess to court is an aspect of Social Justice and the State has no rational litigation policy if it forgets this fundamental.\n\nOur perspective is best projected by Cappelletti, quoted by the Australian Law Reform Commission :\n\n\"The nght of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection.\n\nSuch protection, moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system.\n\nEffective access to justice can thus be se.en as the most basic requirement-the most basic 'human right'-of a system which purports to guarantee legal right.\"(')\n\nWe should expand the jurisprudence of Access to Justice as an integral part of Social Justice and examine the constitutionalism of courtfee levy as a facet of human rights highlighted in our Nation's Constitution. If the State itself should travesty this basic principle, in the teeth of Articles 14 and 39A, where an indigent widow is involved, a second look at i_ts policy is overdue.\n\nThe Court must give the benefit of doubt against levy of a price to enter the temple of justice -----\n\n(l) M. Cappelletti, Rabcls Z (1976) 669 at 672.\n\nI -i96SCll79\n\n• D\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.CRuntil one day the whole issue of the validity of profit-making through sale of civil justice, disguised as court-fee, is fully reviewed by this Court.\n\nBefore parting with this point we must express our poignant feeling that no State, it seems, has, as yet, framed rules to give effect to the benignal\\t provision of legal aid to the poor in Order XXXIII Rule 9 A, Civil Procedure Code, although several years have passed since the enactment.\n\nParliment is stultified and the People are frustrated.\n\nEven after a law has been enacted for the benefit of the Poor, the State does not bring into force by wilful default in fulfilling\n\nthe conditio sine qua non. It is a public duty of each great branch ' of Gcvernmcnt to obey the rule of law and uphold the tryst with the - ~._\n\nConstitution by making rules to effectuate legislation meant to help the poor.\n\nThe second principle the State of Haryana has unhappily failed to remember is its duty under Art. 41 of the Constitution to render public assisttlnce, without litigation, in cases of disablement and undeserved want. It is a notorious fact that our highways are graveyards on a tragic sale, what with narrow, neglected roads, reckless, unchecked drivers, heavy vehicular traffic and State Transport buses often inflicting the maximum casualties.\n\nNow that insurance against third party risk is compulsory and motor insurance is nationalised and transport itself is largely by State Undertakings, the principle of no-fault liability and on-the-spot settlement of claims should becume national policy.\n\nThe victims, as here, are mostly below the poverty line and litigation is compounded misery.\n\nHit-and-run cases are common and the time is ripe for the court to examine whether nofault liability is not implicit in the Motor Vehicles Act itself and for Parliament to make law in this behalf to remove all doubts.\n\nA long ago Report of the Central Law Commission confined to hit-and-run-~ cases of auto-accidents is gathering dust.\n\nThe horrendous increase\n\n- \"\" of highway casualties and the chronic neglect of rules of road-safety constrains us to recommend to the Central Law Commission and to Parliament to senitize this tragic area of tort law and overhaul it humanistic ally.\n\nAnother asi;>ect must be noticed before we part with this petition.\n\nIn many States, for want of judicial manpower or other pathological causes, the accident claims pend before tribunals in heartless slowness.\n\nCourts must give this bleeding class of cases high priority, adopt simplified procedures without breach of natural justice, try ont pre-trial settlements and narrow down. the controversy and remember, that 'wiping every tear from every eye' has jndicial relevance.\n\nFor, law must keep its promise to Justice.\n\n., .\n\n'-C . '\n\nHARYANA v. DARSHANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 18 7\n\nWhile we di•mi•s the petition for leave, we hope the Haryana A State will hasten to frame rules under the Motor Vehicles Act to •enable claimants for compensation to be free from payment of courtfee .\n\nM.R.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n~ -", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DARSHANA DEVI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DARSHANA DEVI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 12, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1022, "end_char": 1029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Prem Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2229, "end_char": 2242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Malhotra and M. N. Shroff for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2247, "end_char": 2259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Malhotra and M. N. Shroff for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2324, "end_char": 2336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\n0 KRISHNA IYER, J.-We refuse leave bnt with a message tag.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The poor shall not be priced out of the justice market by insistence on court-fee and refusal to apply the exemptive provisions of\n\nJ ,_\n\nHARYANA V- DARSHANA (Krishna Iyer, !.)", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2578, "end_char": 2583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2614, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "185\n\nOrder XXXIII, C.P.C So we are distressed that the State of Haryana, mindless of the mandate of equal justice to the indigent under the Magna Carta of our Republic, expressed in Article 14 and stressed in Art 39A of the Constitution, has sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court which has rightly extended the 'pauper' provisions to auto-accident claims."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2768, "end_char": 2775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Haryana Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here is a case of a widow and daughter claiming compensation for the killing of the sole bread-winner _by a State Transport bus; and the Haryana Government, instead of acting on social justice and generously settling the claim, fights like a cantankerous."}}, {"text": "Cappelletti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our perspective is best projected by Cappelletti, quoted by the Australian Law Reform Commission :\n\n\"The nght of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights."}}, {"text": "Australian Law Reform Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our perspective is best projected by Cappelletti, quoted by the Australian Law Reform Commission :\n\n\"The nght of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4792, "end_char": 4811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order XXXIII Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5441, "end_char": 5458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6874, "end_char": 6892, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6908, "end_char": 6918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hit-and-run cases are common and the time is ripe for the court to examine whether nofault liability is not implicit in the Motor Vehicles Act itself and for Parliament to make law in this behalf to remove all doubts."}}, {"text": "Central Law Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A long ago Report of the Central Law Commission confined to hit-and-run-~ cases of auto-accidents is gathering dust."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7894, "end_char": 7906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARYANA v. DARSHANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 18 7\n\nWhile we di•mi•s the petition for leave, we hope the Haryana A State will hasten to frame rules under the Motor Vehicles Act to •enable claimants for compensation to be free from payment of courtfee .", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8024, "end_char": 8042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_188_193_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.\n\nDIGAMBAR BALWANT KULKARNI\n\nFebruary 13, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND AD. KoSHAL, JJ.J\n\nContract-Stipulated titne as essence of contract-Meaning of -Right to rescind the contract-When accrues.\n\nClause (2) of a works contract entered into by the plaintiff (respond'ent) with 1 \" the defendant (appellant) stipulated that time was of th~ essence of the contract,_ that time (of one year) allowed for carrying out the \\\\'ork shall be strictly ob~ c served by the contractor, and that the contractor shall pay compensation at a i\n\ncertain percentage for every day when the work re1nained unfinished after the proper dates. One of the three courses open to the defendant under cl. (3) was to rescind the contract in case the contractor rendered himself liable to pay con1pensation or Obandoned the work owing to serious illness or death of the contractor or any other cause and in that event security deposit of the contractor was to stand forfeited.\n\nIt was also provided in that clause that in the event of any of the above courses being adopted by the defendant the contractor shell have no claim to compensation for any loss sustained by him.\n\nThe work remained unfinished beyond the stipulated time.\n\nThe defendant rejected the contractor's request for extension of time and eventually rescinded the contract under cl. (3) and forfeited the security deposit.\n\nE In the plaintiff's suit for refund of security deposit and payment of certain\n\nother sums, the trial court, holding that the forfeiture of security deposit was legal, granted a decree for its refund.\n\nO~ appeal the High Court held that the right to rescind n contract being a right to put an end to it, it could not exist after the date for its performance had expired and that in this case the right of re_scission having been exercised after the expiry of the date of contract, the impugned action of the defendant in rescinding the contract ..vtls unjustified.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. The rescission of the contract was well-founded and the forfeiturt of the security deposit woo justified. [193 F]\n\n2. Although cl. (2) specifically mentioned that time was of the essence of the contract, all that was meant was that in case the work was not completed within the originally specified time, the plaintiff would be liable to pay such compensa~ tion for delay in execution as was fixed within the limits of that clause.\n\nThis is clear not only from clause (2) but also from clause (3). These two clauses must be read together.\n\nSo read, the contract was to continue to be in force till the completion of the work or its abandonment. Time was of the essence only H in the sense that if the plaintiff completed it within the originti1 period of one year, he would not be liable to pay any con1pensation but in case he overstepped that limit he would have to compensate for every day of de-lay and that the right\n\n• •\n\n. '\n\nto rescission would accrue only when compensation due exceeded the amount of the security d'eposit or the plaintiff aba.ndoned the \\1/0rk. Till the time it was rescined, the contract was in force. [193 A~C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2010 of 1969.\n\n(From the Judgment and Decree dt. 11-7-68 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 534 of 1960) .\n\nGirish Chandra and M. N. Shroff for the appellant.\n\nA. G. Ratnaparkhi for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The facts giving rise to this appeal by the two defendants (who are the State of Maharashtra and one of its Executive Engineers) on certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay against its judgment dated 11th July 1968 may be briefly stated. In the year 1955, defendant No. 1 decided to construct an aqueduct over Kulthi Nala situated in Malegaon Sub-Division of Nasik district. The Executive Engineer, Nasik Irrigation Division, invited tenders for the work which was entrusted to the plaintiff in acceptance of his tender on conditions n.duced to writing in the form of exhibit 66. The estimated cost of the work was Rs. 1,55,854.00 and it was to be completed within 12 months from the date of the written order to commence it which happened to be the 16th of May 1955. The plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 1558/- as earnest money and another of Rs. 3896/- as security deposit to defendant No. 1. Clauses (2) and (3) of the contract in\n\naccordance with which the work was to be executed provided as follows:-\n\n\"(2) : The time allowed for carrying out the work as entered in the tender shall be strictly observed by the contractor xx xx The work shall throughout the stipulated period of the contract be proceeded with all due diligence (time being deemed to be of the essence of the contract on the part of the contractor) and the contractor shall pay as compensation an amount equal to one per cent or such smaller amount as the Superintending Engineer xx xx xx may decide xx for every day that the work remains uncommenced, or unfinished after the proper dates.\n\nAnd further to ensure good progress during the execution of the work, the contractor shall be bound, in all cases in which the time allowed for any work exceeds one month, to complete\n\nH ,\n\nin 1/4 of time 1/10 of the work, in 1/2 of time 4 /10 of the work, in 3/4 of time 8/10 of the work\n\nxx xx xx\n\n'(X i:x xx\"\n\n\"(3) : In any case in which under any clause or clauses of this contract the contractor shall have rendered himsdI liable to pay compensation amounting to the whole of his security deposit xx xx xx xx or in the case of abandonment of the work owing to serious illness or death of the contractor or any other cause, the Executive Engineer xx xx xx shall have power to adopt any of the following courses :-\n\n(a) to rescind the contract (of which rescission notice in writing to the contractor under the hand of the Executive Engineer shall be conclusive evidence) and in that case the security deposit of the contractor shall stand forfeited and be absolutely at the disposal of the Government.\n\n(b) xx\n\n(c) xx\n\nxx xx\n\nxx xx\n\nIn the event of any of the above courses being adopted by the Executive Engineer, the contractor shall have no claim to compensation for any loss sustained by him.\" Clauses ( 4) and ( 5) of the contract related to action to be taken when the progress of any particular portion of the work was found unsatisfactory.\n\nProvision was made in the contract for interim payments of running bills submitted by the plaintiff and for final payment to him against a certificate of completion of the work. Clause (6) of the contract provided for extension of time during which the work was to be completed, in pursuance of applications to be made by the plaintiff. A provision was made in clause ( 14) of the contract for extension of time as a consequence of additions to or alteration in the work.\n\nThe plaintiff started executing the work and by December 1955, running payments amounting to Rs. 13,9671in all had been made to him against bills submitted by him.\n\nIn the month of March 1956, Shri Y. A. Shinde, defendant No. 2, came to occupy the post of Executive Engineer in N asik Irrigation Division and called upon the plaintiff to speed up the execution of the work as the progress thereof was not satisfactory.\n\nHowever, the work continued tQ be executed at a snail's pace and on May 9, 1956. the plaintiff made an application\n\n• •\n\n···---{ ...\n\n(exhibit 54) for extension of the time fixed for completion of the work • by a period of six months. That application was rejected by defendant No. 2 who informed the plaintiff accordingly through a letter dated June 15, 1956 (exhibit 55) which stated inter alia that the reasons put forth by the plaintiff for extension of the time-limit were not convincing, that the application had not been received within the time prescribed in that behalf by clause ( 6) of the contract and that the proportion o! the work executed did not conform to the condition contained in clause ( 2 J of the contract, the value of the work executed till then being only Rs. 25,000/-.\n\nThe letter further informed the plaintiff that he had become liable to pay compensation under clause (2) of the contract and called upon him to show cause why action should not be taken against him under clause ( 3) thereof.\n\nUltimately, by letter dated October 30, 1956 (exhibit 48) the plaintiff was informed that it had been decided to burden him with compensation at the rate of Rs. 5 /- per day for the entire period commencing on the 16th of May 1956 and ending with the comple\\ion of the work and that if the plaintiff failed to show satisfactory progress within a month of the date of the letter, defendant No. 2 would be compelled to increase the rate of compensaticn and take suitable penal action against the plaintiff. The work not having made much progress and the plaintiff having stopped its execution, he was informed by a letter dated January 17, 1957 (exhibit 49)\n\ntr.at the contract stood rescinded under clause (3) thereof.\n\nThe de!cndan'.s also forfeited the security deposit which had by then swelled, presumably on account of the addition of interest, to Rs. 4679/- ( although this amount has been erroneously described by the High Court as consisting of the earnest money of Rs. 1558/- and the security deposit of Rs. 3896/-).\n\nIn his suit, the plaintiff claimed a refund of the said amount of Rs. 4679/-, another sum of Rs. 2500/- on account of the balance due to him for part execution of the work and still another sum of Rs. 4000/- by way of damages.\n\nThe trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that any snm was due to him for execution of the work or by way of damages, but further held that the forfeiture of the security deposit was illegal. ll therefore granted a decree to the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 4679/- only with interest at 3 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till realisation and also proportionate costs of the suit.\n\nAggrieved by the decree passed by the trial court, the defendants H went up in appeal to the High Court and the plaintiff filed his cross objections to the decree appealed from which was maintained by the\n\nHigh Court in its entirety. The High Court agreed with the findings of the trial court and on the question of rescission of the contract observed as follows :-\n\n\"In our view in law the contract could not be rescinded subsequent to the expiry of the due date for the performance thereof. The right to rescind a contract is the right to put it to an end and such right cannot exist after due date for the performance expires. The right to rescind the contract is the right to accept anticipatory breach thereof by the promissor, i.e., prior to the expiry of the date of the performance of the contract.\n\nThis right arises in favour of the promisee under section 39 of the Contract Act. A contract cannot be abandoned by either side either by a promissor or a promisee after the expiry of the due date for performance thereof. For the above reasons in our view the abandonment of the work of the contract as mentioned in sub-clause (a) of the clause relate to (anticipatory) breach of the contract by the contractor before the due date for the performance thereof. In this case the Executive Engineer purported to rescind the con'.ract which had become dead some time in August 1956.\n\nHe purported to do so on the ground that the contractor had abandoned the contract some time in October 1956.\n\nThe Executive Engineer in our view, had no power under clause\n\n(3) to rescind the contract having regard to the facts and circumstances which we have already pointed out above. The forfeiture of the security deposit on the footing that the contract was validly rescinded must be held to be unjustified and untenable.\"\n\nIt was on the basis of this conclusion that the trial court's decree for Rs. 4679/- passed in favour of the plaintiff was affirmed. On the 9th of June 1969 however, the High Court certified the case to be a fit one for appeal by the defendants to the Supreme Court under subclause ( c) of clause (1) of article 133 of the Constitution of India.\n\nAt that s'age defendant No. 1 agreed to pay the costs of the respondent in the proceedings before the Supreme Court.\n\n2. Learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the correet- :iess of the observations made by the High Court and reproduced above. Those observations, according to him, run counter to the tenor of clauses (2) and (3) of the contract governing the execution of the work and we are of the opinion that his criticism thereof is justified.\n\nAlthough in clause (2) of the contract it was specifically mentioned that time was of the essence of the agreement between the parties, all\n\n• •\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. D. B. KULKARNI (Kasha/, l.)\n\nI 93\n\nthat was meant was that in case the work was not completed within the time originally specified in that behalf, the plaintiff would be liable to pay such compensation for delay in execution as was fixed by the Superintending Engineer within the limits laid down in the clause. This becomes clear not only from the provision appearing in clause (2) and stating that \"the contractor shall pay as compensation an amount equal to I per cent or such smaller amount as the Superintending Engineer may decide for every day that the work remains uncommenced, or unfinished after the proper dates\" but also from the contents of clause\n\n(3) of the contract, which would become operative only if the plaintiff\n\n-~ renders himself liable to pay compensation [in accordance with clause 1 (2)] or abandons the work either on account of serious illness or • death or for any other cause and it is then that the contract would become liable to rescission. Clauses (2) and (3) have to be read together and interpreted with reference to each other and their provisions, read as one single whole, clearly mean that the contract was to continue to be in force till the completion of the work or its abandonment. The time was of the essence of the contract only in the sense that if the plaintiff completed it within the original period of one year, he would not be liable to pay any compensation but that in case he overstepped the said time-limit he would have to compensate the defendants for eve.y day of the delay in completing the work and that the right to rescission would accrue to the defendant No. 2 only when the compensation due exceeded the amount of the security deposit or the plaintiff abandoned the work. Till the time the contract was rescinded therefore, it was fully in force and the rescission was consequently wellfounded, being squarely covered by clause (3) of the contract, subclause (a) of which conferred on the Executive Engineer the right to forfeit the security deposit Far from being illegal, the forfeiture was\n\n~_fully justified and the High Court's finding to the contrary is liable to \"' , be reversed.\n\n3. Jn the result the appeal succeeds and is accepted, the decree of the High Court is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed in its entirety.\n\nIn accordance with the undertaking given by defendant\n\nNo. 1 on the 9th June 1969 to the High Court when it certified the G case to be a fit one for appeal to this Court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the costs incurred by him in this Court. In respect of costs in the two courts below, we make no order.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DIGAMBAR BALWANT KULKARNI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIGAMBAR BALWANT KULKARNI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 13, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DIGAMBAR BALWANT KULKARNI\n\nFebruary 13, 1979\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND AD."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AD. KoSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "193 A~C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3284, "end_char": 3298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra and M. N. Shroff for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra and M. N. Shroff for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3336, "end_char": 3353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The facts giving rise to this appeal by the two defendants (who are the State of Maharashtra and one of its Executive Engineers) on certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay against its judgment dated 11th July 1968 may be briefly stated."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3502, "end_char": 3522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The facts giving rise to this appeal by the two defendants (who are the State of Maharashtra and one of its Executive Engineers) on certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay against its judgment dated 11th July 1968 may be briefly stated."}}, {"text": "16th of May 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4187, "end_char": 4203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,55,854.00 and it was to be completed within 12 months from the date of the written order to commence it which happened to be the 16th of May 1955."}}, {"text": "Y. A. Shinde", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7019, "end_char": 7031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the month of March 1956, Shri Y. A. Shinde, defendant No."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7309, "end_char": 7320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the work continued tQ be executed at a snail's pace and on May 9, 1956."}}, {"text": "June 15, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7587, "end_char": 7600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 who informed the plaintiff accordingly through a letter dated June 15, 1956 (exhibit 55) which stated inter alia that the reasons put forth by the plaintiff for extension of the time-limit were not convincing, that the application had not been received within the time prescribed in that behalf by clause ( 6) of the contract and that the proportion o!"}}, {"text": "October 30, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8293, "end_char": 8309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, by letter dated October 30, 1956 (exhibit 48) the plaintiff was informed that it had been decided to burden him with compensation at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "16th of May 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 /- per day for the entire period commencing on the 16th of May 1956 and ending with the comple\\ion of the work and that if the plaintiff failed to show satisfactory progress within a month of the date of the letter, defendant No."}}, {"text": "January 17, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8891, "end_char": 8907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The work not having made much progress and the plaintiff having stopped its execution, he was informed by a letter dated January 17, 1957 (exhibit 49)\n\ntr.at the contract stood rescinded under clause (3) thereof."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10790, "end_char": 10800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th of June 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11889, "end_char": 11905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th of June 1969 however, the High Court certified the case to be a fit one for appeal by the defendants to the Supreme Court under subclause ( c) of clause (1) of article 133 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th of June 1969 however, the High Court certified the case to be a fit one for appeal by the defendants to the Supreme Court under subclause ( c) of clause (1) of article 133 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12053, "end_char": 12064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12072, "end_char": 12093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_18_32_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "TARKESHWAR SIO THAKUR JIU\n\nBAR DASS DEY & CO. AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 6, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKAitJA AND 0. C!i!NNAPFA REDDY, H.J\n\nTransfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act IV) Sections 105, !OS \"ad withs. 3(:i6)' of the Gi!Hi!ral Ctlluses .A.ct-\"Immovable Property\" definitioh Of, explaiiled.\n\nMines Act, 1952, s. 2(i) read with Cl. (c) and (d) of s. 3 of the Mines and Minerals (RegUlatfrh1 blid DevelbjJ1ne11tl Act, (NO. 67 of 1957), Scope of.\n\nWest B'engal Estates Acquisit1on A ct, 1953, Section 6 (1) (i), 27 and 28, si:ope df,\n\nWortis ilnd Phrases ''Any\" \"direci!y worked by him\" in s. 28 of ihe West Bihitil Estates Acqulsltion Act, 1953, meaning Df-lnli!r/}reration of a ddcu- ·\n\nniht=-~Riigatd Hu1st be had td the substance and nbi the words or Iha fdrJn.\n\nThe #petlalit idol,. a juti<tic person. W\"3 exetcising the righ!S, lhtbugh tlie Shebait, Moha:nta Srimati Dlmdi Swami, of a Dalpatnidar iri the land iii suit.\n\nD By a leaoe-deed (Ex. A), dated July 10, 1941, tlie appellant granted to !lie respondents a lease of the suit land for the purpose of raising and tl.lking sand out bf the Ia:nd for a period of nine years ending on 11.tly 13, '1949 ..\n\nSub!equenlly, .on April 27, 1950, the appellant rilade a similar grant (Ex. I) for another nine yers exp\"iting on April 13, 1959, trot tliis grant was called• a \"licence\". The respondents did not pay the licence fee for the period 1362 (14-4-1955) to 1365 B.S.\n\nThe appellant thereupon issued notice dated March' E 31, 1966, terminating tlie 'licence' and then filed a suit No. 37 of 1960 for ejcctmen:t of the rCSpo\"ndent in the Court of the MunSiff, Chandernagare. the trial cOU:rt h::ivi:dg disinissed the suit, the appeUant filed a fir5t peai WIIich. was a1lowed. In second appeal the High Court restored the decree of the\n\ntrial court.\n\nJn appeal by special leave to this Court, it '-\"'as contended on behalf of the appellant :\n\n(a) The transaction evidenced by the document (Ex. I) dated April 27, 1950 Was a 'IicCnsc' for taking away sand and not a 'lease' of immovable prtJi>erty. 'flie-refbte, the appellant-intermediary Win be considerect to be in Khas possession of the holding on the date of vesting (April l, 1955) thfOuB; h the licensee and as such, entitled to reta:in it under Section 6 of the Bengal Rstates Acquisition Act, 1953~\n\n(b) Seeticn 28 of the Bengal Estates ACquisition: Act, 1953 is :dot pptica ble because there wa! no 'mine' in the suit land, es defirredin the Central Act 61 of 1Q57; the sand deposits naturally exist on the surface _and not be10w it and inere coUection and removal of the sand from the wrfacc did not constitute mining operations. Therefore, it could not be said that the suit land was comprised in a mine or. appertained to a mine ~>ithin the meaning of the said Section 28;\n\n( c) Even if the land was a 'mine' or appertained to a mine, the mine w.:is being worked by the appellant through a licensee, and as such, was being\n\n\"' •\n\nI ,\n\nTARKESHWAR V. B. D. DEY & CO. 19\n\n'directly worked' by the appellant-intermediary within the contemplation of A Section 28 o'f the engal Estates Acquisition Act, and therefore, the land would be deemed to have been leased to the appellant by the Government.\n\nRejecting these contentions, and dismissing the appeal,\n\n1-lELD : A. Jn ascertaining whether a dbcument evidences a 'Iea:se' or a 'licence.', regard must be had to the substa•nce of the transaction and not B n1erely the words or the form in which it is dreSsed.\n\n[26F]\n\nThe docunltnt (Ex. I the Agreen1ent), in tbe instant case tveal' the followin:g characteristics, which show that in fact and substance, it is :i 'lease' and not a 'licence' :\n\n[27E, 32C]\n\n(i) A right to \"raise' and \"take out\" and remove sand \"lying inside\" the Jand in dispute v.ras granted by the plaintiff to the defendant.\n\nThe words C \"raise\" and \"take out sand\" from \"inside\" 1hc land are Wide enbugh to include not only the \"right to carry oUt all the op-erations\" neceisary for eXtractirig sand, but alSo to take it away and appropriate it.\n\nColl'troed in the cO'irtext of the dotument: as a Whole, these words put it beyond dOulJt th'at rigOts to carry out \"rniniFlg operations\" [Within the definition in Cl. (d) of s. 3 of the\n\nCentral Act 67 of 1957] for winning sand and to rrppto}bri<tte it, V.:ete granted.\n\n[27F-G] I}\n\n(ii) The rights were granted for a period of 9 years, commencing from April 27, 1950.\n\n[27H]\n\n(iii) These rights were granted for a \"price\" fixed On yearly baiis, irres 4 pective of the quantity of sand extracted. The \"price\" fiXed is RS. 66/ 4 per annum. This consideration is payable in the month of Chaitra every year.\n\nJn case of dcfmllt, the First Patty (grantee) shall not bt entitled \"td raise the sand next year\" and the Second Party (grantor) shall have a riht to recover the arrears of rent together with interest at 12% by bringing a suit against the First Party.\n\n[28A-BJ\n\n(iv) \"The Second Party \\liill be entiled to take Khas possession of la11d'' \"f.t the end of the stipulated period.\n\nThis coTI'ditiOil, (contained in paragraph 4 of Ex. 1) read atong with the other parts of the docU'inent necessarily itnplies that if the First P'a:rty continues to pay the \"priCe\", as stipulated, {a:} he s-hall be entit!ed to enter iniO\" and remain in exclusive kha.~ p'osseSsiotl: Of the hi:rtd for the purpose of carrying out the; mining operations for the fall sti'puhttccl\n\nperiod of 9 years and (b) the Second Party (plaintiff) \\Vill not be entitled to retake khas possession of the Jand and revoke the so-called \"licence\" before the end of the .said period of 9 years.\n\n[28B-DJ\n\nThe term \"lea-se\" occurring in the definition of ··mining lease'' given in\n\ncl. (c) of s. 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Developmnt) Act is not used in the narrow techilical sense in Which it is defined in s. 105 of the Transfer of Propert~' Act.\n\nA rri.\"ining lease n'lay not rnefiCulot1slyarid strictly satisfy in all cases, all the characteristics of a ''lease\" as defined in the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nNevertheless, in the accepted legal sense it has ahvays been rCg'a:rded as a lease in this counfry.\n\n[29EG]\n\nIn the instant case the transaction evidenced by Ex. I not only falls within the definition of a mining l003e under Act, 67 of 1957, but also partakes of\n\nA all the essential characteristics of a \"lease\" defined in s. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. [30-A-B]\n\nBalakrishna Pal v. Jagannath Marwari, ILR 59 Cal. 1314; approved.\n\nRaj Kumar Thakur Girdhari Singh v. Megh Lal Pandey LR 44 I.A. 246; Gowan v. Christie, [1873] LR 2 HL (SC) 278; differed.\n\nB The negative definition of \"immovable property\" given in s. 3, Para 1 of\n\nthe Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is not exhaustive.\n\nTherefore, applying the definition given in s. 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) to the expresSion used in the Transfer of Property Act, except as modified by the definition in the first clause of s. 3 every interest in immovable property or a benefit arising out of land, wiH be 'immovable property' for the purpose of s. 105, Transfer of Property Act. [30E-G]\n\nA right to carry on mining operations in land to extract a specified mineral and to remove and appropriate that mineral, is a right to enjoy immovable property within the meaning of s. 105, more so, when it is coupled with a right to be in its exclusive khas possession for a specified period. The right to enjoy immovable property spoken of in s. 105, means the right to enjoy the property in the manner in which that property can be enjoyed. If the subject matter of the lease is mineral land or a sand-mine, it can be enjbyed and occupied by the lessee by working it Us indicated in s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act which regulates the rights and liabilities of lessors and lessees of immovable property, [30G-H, 31A]\n\nNageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Company, [1930]\n\nLR 58\n\nIA 29; applied.\n\nE H. V. Low & Co. Ltd. v. Joyti Prasad Singh Deo, [1931] !LR 59 Cal. 699;\n\nLR 58 IA 392, differed from.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa\n\nv. Kumar Kanakhaya Narain Singh, ILR (XX) Patna 13; approved.\n\nThe true character of the tronsaction evidenced by the document (Ex. 1) being that pf a 'lease' and not a 'licence,' Section 6(1)(i) of the Wool Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 will not cover the appellant's case and give him a right to retain the land in dispute, even if section 28 of that Act was out of the way.\n\n[32C-DJ\n\nB. The definition of \"mining operations\" and \"mine'', in the Central Act 67 of 1957 are very wide. The expression \"winning of mineral\" in the defi 4 nition of \"mining operations is spacious enough to comprehend every activity by which the mineral is extracted or obtained from the earth,. irrespective of whether such activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of the earth.\n\nMines and minerals need not always be sub-soil and there can be minerals on the surface of the earth.\n\n[24G]\n\nB. Dass v. State of U.P. [1976] 3 S.C.R, 869, reiterated. . ' It is true that in the definition of \"mine\", the term \"excavation\" in the ordinary dictionary sense means \"hole\", \"hollow\" or \"cavity made by digging\n\nont\". But the word \"any\" prefixed to ''excavation\" in the context of the hrase \"for the purpose of searching for or obtaining mineral\" gives it a p .\n\n.~· '\n\nmuch more extensive connotation, so that every \"excavation'\\ be it in the A shape of an open .. cast cavity or a sub-terranean tunnelling, will fall within the definition of 'mining operations'. The essence of 'mining operations' is that it must be an activity for winning a mineral, whether on the surface or beneath the surface of the earth. [24H, 25A-B]\n\nIn tho instant case, the land in dispute has large deposits of• sand, which is a minor mineral. The sand was admittedly being excavated and removed by the respondent lessee. The land was, thus, at the date of vesting, \"comprised in or appertained to a.'mine' within the meaning of s. 28 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. [25B-C]\n\nC. The phrase \"being directly worked by him'' in s. 2.8 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, \\vill not take in a case \\Vhere the mine was\n\nbeing \\Vorked through a lessee or licensee to whom the right to conduct minin'g operations and to take away the mineral had been granted by the intermediary c in consideration of receiving a periodic rent, royalty or a like amount. [25E-F]\n\nThe word \"directly\" means \"in a direct way, without a perso.n or thing coming between\", immediately as directly responsible. fhe use of the expression \"directly\" in the context of the word \"worked\", followed by the words \"by him\" unmistakably shows that the legislative intent was to allow only those intermediaries to retain land comprised in or appertaining to a mine, as lessees under the State, who immediately before the date of vesting, were working the ine under their immediate control, management and supervision.\n\n[25C-EJ\n\nSection 28 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 denies the right to retain the land comprised in a mine or appertaining to a mine, if, at the material date, it was not being directly worked by the intermediary but through a licensee, or other agency to whom the right to conduct mining operations had been granted by the intermediary. In that respect, the provisions of s. 28 are contrary to those of s. 6(1)(i), which give to an intermediary a right to retain land held by him in khas for the purpose rr1entioned therein through a licensee. In this _situation, according to the legislative mandate in s. 27. the provisions of s. 6(1) (i) must yield to those in•· 28.\n\n[26 B-C]\n\nThus, even on the assumption that the respondent was at the material date, holding the land in Kbas through a licensee and fulfilling all other conditions , vhicb entitled him to retain under section 6(1)(i), then also, the ce being in conflict with section 28, the latter section would prevail over the former.\n\n[26D & 32E]\n\nC!vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2218 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 14-3-1969 of the Calcutta High Court in appeal from Appellate Decree G No. 718 of 1962.\n\nD. N. Mukherju and N. R. Chaudhary for the Appellant.\n\nPurJhottam Ohattt:rju, P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by It\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Thii appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated Marcll 1-4, 1969, of the High Court at Calcutta.\n\nThe appellant had the interest of a DarpMnidar in t!J!' Jgµd in sµit,\n\nmeasurin~ 9 cres (27 big!Jas).\n\nThe plaintiff by~ /,, as~,<ll'~~ (px.A,)\n\nqµep Jijly l 01 194), gral)('d to tl]~ df.en.dant-rnsp.on<lenls a lease uf this land for the purpose of raising and taking sand out of the land fqr 11 !lf+iP<I of 9 Years eqding on July 13, 194\\).\n\nIn this lease deed, !AA pfopeyty was d.eiicribed to be Fatni Mahal.\n\nUnder the torms of this lcse, the Jessee had an option of .renewal for another 9 years.\n\nSubsequently on April 27, 1950, appellant made a similar grant (Ex.I) for another 9 years expiring on April 13, 1959, but this grant was called a \"licence\".\n\nTJ1e respo11<leµts did not pay the licence fee for the period from 1362 (14-4,1955) to 1365 B.S.\n\nThe plaintiffs thereupon issued notice, dated March 31, 1966, terminating the licence and then filed Suit No. 37 of 1960 for ejectmcnt of the respondent in the Court of the Munsif, Second Cou.rt, Chandernagore.\n\nThe S\\lit was resisted by the <)efendant-respondents, inter alia, on the ground that the land hd vested in the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Acquisitio11 .A, ct); that they were tenants, and not licensees, under the plaintiff and after the date of vesting with effect from April 14, 1955, became direct te11ants under the State in respect of suit land and were paying re!)t to the State.\n\nThe Trial Court dismissed the suit holding:\n\n(i) that the flefendants were not licensees, but were tenants; and (ii) that the plaintiff was not in khas possession on the date of the vesting (April 14, 1955); so he could not retain the land under Section 6 (I) (i) of the Act. , In the result, the suit was dismissed.\n\nTJw jirt appeljte Co4rt reversed the def'ision of the trial court and decree;:! the suit with the finding that the grant being a licence, the plaintiff-intermediary was entitled to retain the holding under Sectioll 6(1){i) of the Act.\n\nAllowing the Seco11d Appeal by the defendants, the High Court held:\n\n(a) that if the lease (Ex.A), being a lease for 9 years, was void under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property t\\.ct, it would still operate as a lease from month to month;\n\n(b) it was not a licence; and H\n\n(c) section 28 of the Act applied and, as the plaintiff was not directly working the mine in the land, he could not retain it.\n\nAggrieved, the plaintiff has come in appeal by special leave to this A Court.\n\nThe principal question that falls to be determined is: whether Section 6 o.r Section 28 of the Acquisition Act governs the case? The High Court has held that it is Section 28, and not Section 6, which is applicable; while the appellant contends that Section G is applicable.\n\nB by virtue of which he is entitled to retain the holding.\n\nSestion 6, so far as relevant for our purposes, is in these terms:\n\n \"6: Rirhts of intermediary to retain certain kinds.-\n\n- (1)_ Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except . in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting ...•........••\n\n(i) Whe.r_e the intermediary is. . . an institution established exclusively for a religious or a charitable purpose, or both,\n\n1or is a person holding under a trust or an endowment or other legal obligation exclusively for a purpose which is charitable or religious or both-land held in khas by such •..... institution or person, not being a tenant, by leave or licence of such ....... institution or person.'\" c..~. . The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the suit land was held 'by the appellant-intermediary in khas for a religious purpose through a licensee-the defendant being a licensee, and not a tenant-he would be entitled to retain and hold this land from the date of vesting by virtue of clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 6.\n\nThe other relevant provisions are in Chapter IV of the Acquisition Act They are as follows : \" · ·\n\n\"Sec. 27. Provisions of Chapter iv to override other provisions of the Act.-The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary elsewhere in this Act.\" /\n\n\"Sec. 28. Right of intermediaries directly working mines.-So much of the land in a notified area held by an intermediary immediately before the date of vesting (including sub-soil rights therein, but excluding rights in hats and bazars not in the khas possession of the intermediary and land comprising forests, if any) as was comprised in or as appertained to any mine wh_ich was being directly worked\n\nby him immediately before such date shall with effect from such date be deemed to have been leased by the Statei Government to such ........ iutermediary. The terms and conditions of such lease shall be as agreed upon\\ between him and the State Government, or in default of agreement as may be settled by the Mines Tribunal: Provided that all such terms and conditions shall be consistent with the provisions of anyi Central Act for the time being in force relating to the/ grant of mining leases.\"\n\nSection 2(j) of the Mines Act, 1952, defines 'Mine' to mean \"any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for obtaining mineral has been or is being carried on and includes ...... \"\n\n\"Minor .Minerals\" as defined in clause ( e) of Section 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, (No. 67 of\n\n1957) include \"ordinary sand\". Clause ( c) of the same Section defines \"mining lease\" as a \"lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations, and includes a sub-lease granted for such purpose.\" Clause (d) of the same Section defines \"mining operations\" to mean \"any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any minerals.\"\n\nBefore the High Court, it was common ground between the parties that the land in dispute has a sub-soil deposit of sand and the right& granted to the respondent, under the document (Ex. I); styled as a 'licence', were \"to raise\" and \"take\" away that deposit of sand.\n\nBefore us, an attempt was made to deviate from that stand by contending that the deposits of sand are on the surface in the shape of sand-dunes and for removing the same no excavation or mining operations are necessary.\n\nThe contention must be repelled.\n\nThe definition of \"mining operations\" and \"mine'', noticed above, are very ¥ride. The expression\n\n\"winning of mineral\" in the definition of 'mining operations'. is spacious enough to comprehend every activity by which the mineral is extracted or obtained from the earth irrespective of whether such activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of the earth. As pointed out by this Court in B. Dass v. State of Uttat Prndesh('), it is wrong to assume that mines and minerals must always be sub-soil and that there can be no minerals on the surface ot the earth.\n\nIt is ttu~ that in the definition of \"Mine\", the term \"excavation\", in the ordinary dictionary sense, means \"hole\", \"hollow\" or \"cavity made by digging out\". But the word \"any\" prefixed to \"excvatioa\"\n\n(1) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 869.\n\n• \\ --....._,\n\nI ' ).\n\njrli I\n\n' • ~-\n\n< ;\n\n' I\n\nin the context of the phrase \"for the purpose of searching for or obtaining mineral\" gives it a much more extensive connotation, so that every \"excavation\", be it in the shape of an open-cast cavity or a subterranean tunnelling, will fall within the definition of 'Mine'.\n\nSimilarly, it is not a requirement of the definition of 'mining ope.ration' that the activity for winning the mineral must necessarily be an underground activity. The essence of 'mining operations' is that it must be an activity for winning a mineral, whether on the surface or beneath\n\nt11e surface of earth.\n\nThus considered, the Jan_d in dispute having large deposits of sand, which is a minor mineral, was admittedly being excavated and removed by the defendant, was at the date of vesting \"comprised in or appertained to a mine\" within the meaning of Section 28.\n\nHaving seen that the land in dispute is a 'mine' in which 'mining operations' were ing carried on, the further question to be considered is, whether this mine was \"being directly worked\" by the appellantintermediary? The word \"directly\", according to Webster's New World Dictionary means \"in a direct way, without a prson or thing coming betw~\"; \"immediately: as directly responsible\".\n\nThe use of the expression \"directly\" in the context of the word \"worked', followed by the words \"by him\", unmistakably shows' that the legislative intent was to allow only those intermediaries to retain land comprised in or appertaining to a mine, as lessees under the State, who immediately before the date of vesting, were working the mine under their immediate control, management and supervision. Thus construed, the phrase \"being directly worked by him\" in the Section will not take in a case where the mine was being worked through a lessee or licensee to whom the right to conduct mining operations and to take away the mineral had been granted by the inte.rmediary in consideration of receiving a periodic rent, royalty or a like amount.\n\nIt was CQntended by the learned counsel for the appellant, that this interpretation of the phrase \"directly worked by him\", is inapplicable to an intermediary who is an idol because an idol, albeit a juristic person, has perforce to work the mine through a lessee or licensee.\n\nThe argument is ingenious but untenable.\n\nThe idol held the suit land comprised in the mine as an intennediary, only in the juristic sense, but, in fact he was exercising his rights in the suit land, throngh his human representative, the Shebait, Mohan.ta Srimat Dandi Swami.\n\nThe Shebait could in that representative capacity, directly work the mine J1imself.\n\nBut, instead of doing so, he, on April 27 .. 1950 granted the right of carrying on mining operations in the land and taking away the mineral, on payment of an annual sum for a period. of 9 years to 3-l 96SCil79 .\n\n\\ d.\n\nf •\n\nA the respondents.\n\nThus, irrespective of whether this transaction or grant, dated April 27, 1950, was a lease or a license, the fact remains that immediately before the date of vesting, the mine in thti suit land, was not being \"directly worked \" by the intermediary within the contemplation of Section 28.\n\nB The provisions of Section 6(1) (i) of the Acquisition Act, extracted earlier, give to an intermediary a right to retain land held by him in khas for the purposes mentioned therein, through a licehsee.\n\nSectiori 28, as construed by us, denies the right to retain the land comprised in a mine or appertaining to a mine, if, at the material date, it was '\n\nc not being directly worked by the intermediary but through a licerisee, or other agency to whom the right to conduct mining operations had been granted by the intermediary.\n\nIn that respect, the provisions of Section 28 (in Chapter IV) are contrary to those of Section 6(1)(i).\n\nJn this situation, according to the legislative mandate in Section 27, the provisions of Section 6(1) (i) must yield to those in Section 28.\n\nD Assunring argrendo, that the plaintiff was at th€1 material time,\n\nholding the land in khas through a licensee and fulfilled all other conditions which entitled him to retain under Section 6(l){i), then also, this case being in conflict with Section 28, the latter Section would prevail over the former.\n\nIn this view of the matter, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to resolve the controve.rsy as to whether the transaction (Ex. I) dated April 27, 1950, was a lease or a license.\n\nBut, as in the Courts below, and here also, a good deal of argument was addressed on this peint,\n\nwe propose to go into the same.\n\nIt is well-settled that in ascertaining the real character of a document, regard must be had to the substance of the transaction and not merely the words or the form in which it is dressed.\n\nThe Agreement ----!:. (Ex. I), which is named as a licence, is to be construed in the light of > this cardinal canon. !. ---\n\nThe Agreement (Ex. I) is not a very lengthy document.\n\nThe material part of this document may be extracted. as below:\n\n\"This deed of Agreement is executed to the effect following:- ................ We the First Party, have been carrying on the business of sand near Haripal Station. Sand was necessary for carrying on the said business and the said sand lymg inside the land described in the schedule below should be taken out and proposal having been made to the second parties for the purpose of business, the second parties agreed to take settlement to the effect that we can take out\n\nL ,\n\nthe sands of the said lands and become bound by the agreement on the following terms and conditions of taking out the sand from the said land only.\n\nTERMS AND CONDITIONS\n\n1. The sand which is in the said land belongs to the own share of the First Party and should be takeu out within the month of Chaitr.a from 1357 to 1365.\n\n2. Save and except the raising of the said sand there will be no right, title and interest in the land with the First Party. No right, title and interest will accrue to the First Party in respect of the land.\n\n3. The First Party for the purpose of raising sand, will pay Rs. 66/- (Rupees sixty six) per annum as the price of the said sand.\n\nIf the Government fixes any new amount of demand, then, save and except this, they wilt take the said amount otf Rs. 66/- and/or the Second Party will not be entitled to claim\n\nthe same. If the amount is not paid within the month of Chaitra every year, then the parties will not be entitled to raise the sand next year, and for realisation of the said amonnt of Rs. 661-, Second Party can bring a suit against the First Party, and will .get the arrears. of interest at the rate of 12 % .\n\n4. At the end of the stipulated period, the Second Party will take E k/zas possession of the said land; and the licence of the First Party will be revoked .... \"\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\nFrom what has been extracted above, the following characteristics .of the transaction are clear: F )(-\n\n(i) A right to \"raise\" and \"take out\" and rernme sand \"lying \"' inside\" the land in dispute was granted by the plaintiff to --i the defendant.\n\nTue. words \"raise\" and \"take out sand'' fro1n \"inside\" the land are wide enough to include not only the \"right to carry out all the operations\" necessary for extracting sand, but also to take it away and appropriate it.\n\nConstrued in the context of the document as a whole, these words put it beyond doubt that rights to carry out \"mining operations\" [within the definition in clause (d) of Section 3 of the Central Act 67 of 1957] for _; yinning sand and to appropriate it were granted.\n\n(ii) The rights were wanted for a period of 9 years, commencing from April 27, 1950.\n\n• I B\n\n,.,_ c\n\n(iii)\n\n(iv)\n\nThese rights were granted for a \"price\" fixed on yearly basis, irrespective of the quantity of sand extracted. The \"price\" fixed is Rs. 66/- per annum.\n\nThis consideration is payable in the month of Chaitra every year. In case of default, the First Party (grantee) shall not be entitled \"to raise\" the sand \"next year\" and the Second Party\n\n(grantor) shall have a right to recover the arrears of rent together with interest at 12 % by bringing a suit against the First Party. \" \"The Second Party will be entitled to take khas possession .~ • of the land\" \"at the end of the stipulated period\". This.__,....,,. condition, (contained in paragraph 4 of Ex.I) <ead along :, with the other parts of the document, necessarily implies \\ that if the First Party continues to pay the \"price\", as stipulated, (a) hei shall be entitled to enter into aiid remain in exclusive khas possession qf the land for the purpose of carrying out the mining operations for th~ full stipulated period of 9 years and (b) the Second Party (plain1iff) will not be entitled to detake khas possession of the laitd and revoke the so-<:alled \"license\" before the end of llie said period of 9 years.\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the appellant that, according to Condition 2 of the Agreement (extracted above) , \"except the raising of the sand\", no right, title and interest in the land was given) tG the defendant. It is submitted that in view of this express condition, the transaction was only a 'licence'.\n\nRelying on Paragraph 899 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 26, it is maintained that, in any case, it is not a 'lease' as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, but only a contract to sell sand, the price being payable in yearly instalments. It is emphasised that the essenti:il -'f: characteristic of a \"lease\" is that the subject is one which is occupied ,. and enjoyed and the corpus of which doe~ not in the nature of things \\. __. and by reason of user disappear.\n\nReference has alsq been made to the dictum of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Raj f Kumar Thakur Giridhari Singh v. Megh Lal Pandey('), and the deci- ,..., sion of the House of Lords in Gowan v. Christie(2).\n\nWe are unable to accept these contentions.\n\nPara 899 of Halsbury's Laws of England (ibid) reads, thus :\n\n\"A lease may be granted of land or any part thereof, and since minerals are a part of the land it follows that a\n\n(I) L. R. 44 I.A. 246.\n\n(2) [1873] L. R. 2. H. L. (Sc.) 278.\n\nlease can be granted to the surface of the laml and the minerals below, or of the surface alone, or of the minerals alone. It has been said that a contract for !he working and getting of minerals alone though for convenience called a milling lease, is not in reality a lease at all in the sense in w]Jich one speaks of an agricultural lease, and that such a contract, properly considered, is really a sale of a portion of the land at a price payable by instalments, that is, by way of rent or royalty, spread over a number of years.\"\n\n• )__ _ This statement of the law in England, appears to be founded on the\n\nbscrvations of Cairns, L. J. in Gowan v. Christie (ibid) and Gozens t Hardy, L.J. in Aldam's Settled Estate(!).\n\nIn Raj _Kumar Thakur Giridhari Singh (ibid), Lord Shaw, delivering the opinion of the Board, said that \"it must be borne in mind also that the essential characteristic of a lease is that the subject is one which is occupied and enjoyed and the corpus of which does not in the nature of things and by ; reason of the user disappear\". Counsel for the appellant has adopted this very argument. But this observation should not be tom out of the context.\n\nLord Shaw had further observed : \"In order to cause the latter speciality to arise, minerals must be expressly denominated, so as thus to permit of the idea of partial consumption of the subject leased''. Thus, Lord Shaw had himself pointed\n\nc.ut that minerals may be made a part of the subject-matter of a lease, and in such a case the lease would permit the idea of the partial con- •umption of the subj_ect-matter of the lease.\n\nIt is important to bear in mind that the term \"lease\" occurring in the definition of \"mining lease\" given in Section 3(c) of Act 67 of \\ 1957 does not appear to have been used in the narrow technical sense in which it is defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. \"' But, as rightly pointed out by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in\n\n~-; Fala Krishna Pal v. Jagannath Marwari('), a settlement of the character of a mining lease is everywhere in India regarded as 'lease'.\n\nA '• mining lease, therefore, may not meticulously and strictly satisfy in all -,.<· cases, all the characteristics of a 'lease' as defined in the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nNevertheless, in the accepted legal sense, it has always been regarded as a lease in this country.\n\nIn Fala's case (ibid) Mukerji, J., speaking for the Bench, held\n\nthat a cnal mining settlement may be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Section 105 and treated as a lease because under such H\n\n(I) [1902] 2 Ch. 46 at page 56.\n\n(2) I. L. R. 59 Cal. 1314.\n\nA settlement some portion, however small, of the surface has to be used for carrying on the mining operations and taking the coal out.\n\nBe that as it may, in the instant case, as shall be presently discussed, the transaction evidenced by Ex. I, not only fr.Us within the definition of a \"mining lease\" under Act 67 of 1957, but also partakes of B all the essential characteristics of a 'lease' defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nSection 105, Transfer of Property Act, defines a 'lease' of immovable ptoperty as-\n\n\"a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.\"\n\nIn the second paragraph of the Section, it is expressly stated that the price so paid in consideration of the transfer is called \"the premium, and the money, share, service, or other thing to be so rendered, is called the rent.\"\n\nThe definition of 'immovable property' given in Sectio11 3, Para\n\n1 of that Act is in the negative, and is not exhaustive. Therefore, the cle:fuiition given in Section 3 ( 26) of the General Clauses Act (X of\n\n1897) will apply to the expression used in this Act, except as modified by the definition in the first clause of Section 3.\n\nAccording to the definition given in Section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, \"immovable property\" shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth\". In short, the expression 'immovable property' comprehends all that would be real property according to 'f: English Law and possibly more. (See 1 I.A. 34). Thus, every in- \"' terest in immovable property or a benefit arising out o[ land, will be '- 'immovable property' for the purpose of Section 105, Transfer of Property Act. <\n\nA right to carry on mining operations in land to extract a specified mineral and to remove and appropriate that mineral, is a 'right to enjoy immovable property' within the meaning of Section I 05; more so, when -as in the instant case-it is coupled with a right to be in its exclusive khas possession for a specified period. The 'right to enjoy immovable property' spoken of in Section 105, means the right to enjoy the property in the manner in which that property can be enjoyed. If the subject-matter of the lease is mineral land or a sand-mine, as in the case\n\n... r-\n\n\"'--.-I.\n\nbefore us, it can only be enjoyed and occupied by the lessee by working it, as indicated in Section 108, Transfer of Property Act, which regUlates the rights and liabilities of lessors and lessees of immovable property.\n\nIn the view we take, we are supported by the observations of the Judicial Committee in Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Company(1).\n\nDelivering the opinion of the Board, Lord Macmillan said :\n\n\"In considering the character and effect of acts of possession in the case of a mineral field, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of tbe subject and the possession of which it is susceptible. Owing to the inaccessibility of minerals in the earth, it is not possible to take actual physical possession at once of a whole mineral field : it can be occupied only by extracting the minerals and until the whole minerals are exhausted the physical occupation must necessarily be partial.\"\n\nIn H. V. Low & Co. Ltd. v. Jyoti Prasad Singh Deo( 2), the law, as laid down in Gowan's case (ibid), was strongly relied upon by the appellants, therein. Negativing this contention, the Judicial Committee pomtod out that the rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee are defined in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the appellant had not shown that the respondent had failed, or was not in a position to perform the duties incumbent on a lessor under Section I 08 of the said Act.\n\nThe discussion will not be complete without noticing, the decision of the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa v. Kumar Kanakhaya Narain Singh('), which is in point.\n\nIn that case, af(er an exhaustive survey of all the c!ecisions on the subject; (including some of those which have been cited before us) a Full Bench consisting of three eminent Judges, held that coal-mining settlements whereby certain rights of entering upon the land of the sett!or. sinking shafts etc. and winning and taking away the coal are granted in consideration of receiving a salami and annual sums computed on\n\nthe amount of coal raised and the amount of coke manufactured, subject always to a minimum annual sum which was always payable irrespective of what coal was raised or coke manufactured, were not \"a sale of coal\", but could be regarded as 'leases' within the meaning of Section 105 read with Section 108, Transfer of Property Act, or with-\n\n(!) [1930] L. R. 58 I. A. 29.\n\n(2) [1931] I. L. R. 59 Cal. 699 ; L. R. 58 I. A. 392.\n\n(3) I. L. R. (XX) Patna 13.\n\nD .,\n\n~: A in the legal acceptance of the term \"lease\" in this country. This decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Judicial Committee, and the appeal filed by Kumar Kanakhaya was dismissed. (See L.R. 70\n\nI.A. 180).\n\nThe ratio of the Patna case applies with greater force to the facts B of the case before us, because, herein, (a) the annual fixed payment had no relation, whatever, with the quantity of sand extracted and appropriated, and, what is more important, (b) the defendant was given a right to enter into and remain in kha.r possession of the mineral field for the stipnlated period of 9 years.\n\nThe transaction (Ex. I), though labelled as a licence, has all essential elements of a 'lease' C even under Section 105 of the Transfer for Property Act. In short, stripped of the form in which it is draped, the Agreement (Ex. 0, in substance and in fact, is a 'lease' in the accepted legal sense of the term and not a 'licence' as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. If this be the correct construction of the document, and we\n\nthink it is so-it is doubtful whether Section 6(1) (i) could cover the appellant's case and give him a right to .retain the land in dispute, even ii Section 28 was ou.t of his way.\n\nIn sum, we may reiterate that even on the assumption that the respondent was a licensee, the appellant will not be entitled to retain the holding because he was not directly working the mine immediately before the date of vesting, and as such, will not be entitled to retain, due to the overriding operation of Section 28.\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed. ··--f. •", "total_entities": 144, "entities": [{"text": "JIU\n\nBAR DASS DEY & CO. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAR DASS DEY & CO. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 6, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKAitJA AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. C!i!NNAPFA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12332, "end_char": 12340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by It\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Thii appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated Marcll 1-4, 1969, of the High Court at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 14, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14071, "end_char": 14085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding:\n\n(i) that the flefendants were not licensees, but were tenants; and (ii) that the plaintiff was not in khas possession on the date of the vesting (April 14, 1955); so he could not retain the land under Section 6 (I) (i) of the Act. ,"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14126, "end_char": 14135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14575, "end_char": 14586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14715, "end_char": 14725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14981, "end_char": 14990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14995, "end_char": 15005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15082, "end_char": 15092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15102, "end_char": 15111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15422, "end_char": 15438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16425, "end_char": 16434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16538, "end_char": 16545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provisions of Chapter iv to override other provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16547, "end_char": 16611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16731, "end_char": 16738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provisions of Chapter iv to override other provisions of the Act", "statute": "Provisions of Chapter iv to override other provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17634, "end_char": 17646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that all such terms and conditions shall be consistent with the provisions of anyi Central Act", "statute": "Provided that all such terms and conditions shall be consistent with the provisions of anyi Central Act"}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17654, "end_char": 17669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17883, "end_char": 17892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 S.C.R. 869", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19612, "end_char": 19631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20512, "end_char": 20522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohan.ta Srimat Dandi Swami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22184, "end_char": 22211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The idol held the suit land comprised in the mine as an intennediary, only in the juristic sense, but, in fact he was exercising his rights in the suit land, throngh his human representative, the Shebait, Mohan.ta Srimat Dandi Swami."}}, {"text": "April 27 .. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22332, "end_char": 22348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, instead of doing so, he, on April 27 .. 1950 granted the right of carrying on mining operations in the land and taking away the mineral, on payment of an annual sum for a period."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22607, "end_char": 22621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, irrespective of whether this transaction or grant, dated April 27, 1950, was a lease or a license, the fact remains that immediately before the date of vesting, the mine in thti suit land, was not being \"directly worked \" by the intermediary within the contemplation of Section 28."}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22820, "end_char": 22830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22853, "end_char": 22865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23399, "end_char": 23409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23451, "end_char": 23466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23528, "end_char": 23538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23558, "end_char": 23570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23598, "end_char": 23608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23794, "end_char": 23806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23855, "end_char": 23865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chaitra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26043, "end_char": 26050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the amount is not paid within the month of Chaitra every year, then the parties will not be entitled to raise the sand next year, and for realisation of the said amonnt of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27119, "end_char": 27128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28958, "end_char": 28969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28977, "end_char": 29001, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L. R. 44 I.A. 246", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29759, "end_char": 29776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30389, "end_char": 30396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )  This statement of the law in England, appears to be founded on the\n\nbscrvations of Cairns, L. J. in Gowan v. Christie (ibid) and Gozens t Hardy, L.J. in Aldam's Settled Estate(!)."}}, {"text": "Gozens t Hardy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30489, "end_char": 30503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )  This statement of the law in England, appears to be founded on the\n\nbscrvations of Cairns, L. J. in Gowan v. Christie (ibid) and Gozens t Hardy, L.J. in Aldam's Settled Estate(!)."}}, {"text": "Aldam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30513, "end_char": 30518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• )  This statement of the law in England, appears to be founded on the\n\nbscrvations of Cairns, L. J. in Gowan v. 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Jagannath Marwari('), a settlement of the character of a mining lease is everywhere in India regarded as 'lease'."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32060, "end_char": 32084, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32190, "end_char": 32194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fala's case (ibid) Mukerji, J., speaking for the Bench, held\n\nthat a cnal mining settlement may be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Section 105 and treated as a lease because under such H\n\n(I) [1902] 2 Ch."}}, {"text": "Mukerji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32209, "end_char": 32216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fala's case (ibid) Mukerji, J., speaking for the Bench, held\n\nthat a cnal mining settlement may be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Section 105 and treated as a lease because under such H\n\n(I) [1902] 2 Ch."}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32332, "end_char": 32343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32855, "end_char": 32866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32874, "end_char": 32898, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32901, "end_char": 32912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32914, "end_char": 32938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33734, "end_char": 33743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33757, "end_char": 33776, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33897, "end_char": 33906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33946, "end_char": 33955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33968, "end_char": 33987, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34443, "end_char": 34454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34456, "end_char": 34480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34864, "end_char": 34875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35161, "end_char": 35172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35174, "end_char": 35198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35465, "end_char": 35474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delivering the opinion of the Board, Lord Macmillan said :\n\n\"In considering the character and effect of acts of possession in the case of a mineral field, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of tbe subject and the possession of which it is susceptible."}}, {"text": "Gowan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36056, "end_char": 36061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In H. V. Low & Co. Ltd. v. Jyoti Prasad Singh Deo( 2), the law, as laid down in Gowan's case (ibid), was strongly relied upon by the appellants, therein."}}, {"text": "Section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36260, "end_char": 36271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36279, "end_char": 36303, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36549, "end_char": 36565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The discussion will not be complete without noticing, the decision of the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa v. Kumar Kanakhaya Narain Singh('), which is in point."}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37359, "end_char": 37370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37381, "end_char": 37392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37394, "end_char": 37418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "L. R. 58 I. A. 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37441, "end_char": 37458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. R. 58 I. A. 392", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37495, "end_char": 37513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kumar Kanakhaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37713, "end_char": 37728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Judicial Committee, and the appeal filed by Kumar Kanakhaya was dismissed. ("}}, {"text": "L.R. 70\n\nI.A. 180", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37749, "end_char": 37766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37787, "end_char": 37792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of the Patna case applies with greater force to the facts B of the case before us, because, herein, (a) the annual fixed payment had no relation, whatever, with the quantity of sand extracted and appropriated, and, what is more important, (b) the defendant was given a right to enter into and remain in kha.r possession of the mineral field for the stipnlated period of 9 years."}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38268, "end_char": 38279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38503, "end_char": 38513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Easements Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38521, "end_char": 38541, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38642, "end_char": 38654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38753, "end_char": 38763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39097, "end_char": 39107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_194_200_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "JIT SINGH & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.\n\nFebruary 13, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.}\n\nPuniab Police Service Ruf, s, 1959-Rules 6 & 14-Scope of.\n\nThe proviso to r. 6 of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959 relating to the appointment to the higher posts of Deputy Superintendents of Police provided' that only those. inspectors would be 'eligible for promotion who had got six years' oontinuous service (officiating as well as substantive) in the rank of impector.\n\nSub-rule (2) required that a Jist (called List 'G') of officer~ considered fit for promotion to the ra.nk of Deputy Superint'endent of Police be prepared by the State Government in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and appointments shall be made by promotion from persons brought on that list. In view of an urgent need to m~.ke a number of appointment9 of Deputy Supcrin tende11ts of Police, an executive order was issued in 1965 reducing the period of six years continuous service to four yea-rs. Responden:s 4 to 37 were accordingly promoted on an ad !zoe basis as officiating Deputy Superintendents of Police.\n\nThe first list 'G' prepared in term of r. 6(2) was sent for approval of me Service Commission on 7th January, 1966 and in Sept'ember, 1966 a supplementary Jist of inspectors who had completed four years' service after 7th January, 1966 wa~\n\nsent ro the Commission. Both th~ lists were eventually approved by the srvice Commission in September, 1970.\n\nThe ;-tppellants who were appointed as inspectors in May, 1963 were con· firmed in May, 1966 and completed six years of service in May,\n\n1969. Their. names were not included in either the first or the supplementary list 'G' se•at by the State Government to the Service Commission whereas the names of res-- pondents 4 to 37 found a place in the Jist.\n\nIn rejecting the appellants' writ petition the High Court held tht they had:\n\n~1ot qualified th'emselves for inclusion of their names in List 'G' at the time\n\nthut list was drawn up by the State Government in 1966 because they had not\"- -·~\n\nput in the requisite period of service for being considered for inclusion in it. • •\n\nDismissing the llppeal,\n\nHFLD : l. The appellants were not eligible for indusion in List 'G' prepared\n\ni~1 1966 on the basis of the State Government's recommendation m2.:te in January and September of that year because at the relevant time only those inspctors: who had put in six years of continuou& servi:e as inspector were eligible for promotion. No further supplement to List 'G' was sent for the Commission's approval after 1966. In other words the final List 'G' related only to the year 1966.\n\nThe aoppellants who by then had ot put in even four years' ervice could not have been promoted. [199 F, HJ\n\n2. B'ecause of the extraordinary situa1ion which had developed on the borders of the State, the State Government \\\\tls driven to the necessity of making some\n\nJIT SINGH v. PUNJAB (Shingha/, J.) 195\n\nad hoc or temporary appointments, but it cannot be said that by reason of this, A\n\n.•.\n\nthe appointments so made were made wilfully in derogation of the requirements of the rules or were meant to run down the appellants. [200 B)\n\n3. However, the appellants' argument that the relaxation contemplated by r. 14 \\las restricted by considerations of \"undue hardship\" in any \"pa-rticular case\" and that it was not permissible for the State Govemmcnt to reduce in the case of the respondents 4 to 37, the requirement of continuous service from six years to fall r for the purpose of eligibility for promotion is correct because r. 14 as it\n\ntcod at the relevant time when respondenUI 4 to 37 were promoted did not\n\n;:ermit any general !'claxation of the nature ordered by the State Government in 1963 or 1965. The amended r. 14 could not avail the State Government because it c8me into force much later in January, 1969. [198 G-H, 199 C]\n\n- ~ 4. The argument that only those inspectors who had been confirmed as inspectors and held that post substantively were eligible for promotion is not correct. To accept that would only mean that a.n inspector who had put in six years' officiating service would not be eligible for promotion ii he had not been confirmed. All that proviso (a) to r. 6 permits is that, in order to be cligib.le for promotion, an inspector should have got six years \"continuous\" ervice, including service in ; m officiating well a~ substantive capacity. [198 C-D]\n\nCrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1849 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated J 0 11-1970 of the Punjab & Harya:na High Court in C.W. No. 2547 of 1970.\n\nY. S. Chitale and Mrs. Unnila Sirur for the Appellant.\n\nHardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was dvlivered by\n\nSIIJNGIIAL, J. This appeal by special leave is directed again:, t the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated Novem- -· ber 10, 1970, by which the writ petition of the appellants was dis- -.. missed on the ground that the promotions challenged by them were made on the basis of list \"G\" of 1966 when they had not qualified for promotion.\n\nIt has therefore to be examined whether that view of the High Court is incorrect in the facts and circumstances of the case.\n\nA list of dates bearing on the controversy has been furnished by Mr. Y. S. Chitale, learned counsel for the appellants, and we have been told by the learned counsel for the respondents that it is correct.\n\nThe facts which emerge from that list may be stated briefly for learn- H ed counsel agree that they are quite sufficient for the disposal of the appeal.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nAll the three appellants were appointed Inspectors of Police, by direct recruitment, on My 21, 1963, on a probationary period of three years.\n\nAt that time the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959. hereinafter referred to as the Rules, were in force, providing fC( appointment to the higher post of Deputy Superintendent of Police.\n\nFor purposes of this appeal, it will be sufficient to say that rule 6 of the Rules provided tha~ recruitment to the Punjab Police Service, consisting of the cadre of Deputy Superintendents of Police, shall be made by promotion to the extent of eighty percent from the rank of Inspector and twenty percent by direct appointment.\n\nThat was subject to the proviso that only those Inspectors would be eligible for_ promotion who had put in six years continuous service. It appears that as there were many vacancies in the posts of Deputy Superintendents of Police, the State Government took a decision on August 21, 1963, that the minimum requirement of six years continuous service for eligibility for promoion may be reduced to four years if about fifty percent of the vacancies were to be filled in any year; and an executive order to that effect was issued some time in 1965 under rule 14 of the Rules as it stood until its amendment on January 23,\n\n1969. The State Government accordingly promoted the respondents Nos. 4 to 37 as officiating Deputy Superintendents of Police on ad hoc basis. As it was the requirement of sub-rule (2) of ruk 6 of the Rules that appointments by promotion would be made from Inspectors ''brought on list 'G' which will be a list of officers considered fit for promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, prepared by Government in consultation with the Commission,\" a list was prepanCl by the State Government and it was sent for lhe approval of the Public Service Commission on January 7, 1966. Tb appellants were confirmed as Inspectors on September 10, 1966 witL retrospective effect from May 21, 1966.\n\nThe Government . took up the question of regularising the ad hoc promotions of respondents Nos. 4 to 3 7 pending the approval of the draft list 'G' by the Commission.\n\nA supplementary list was prepared of Inspectors who had completed four years service after January 7, 1966, and it was sent to the Commis sion on September 29, 1966. Before the two lists could be examined by the Commission, the State of Punjab was reconstituted on November 1, 1966.\n\nThe Commission thereupon sent a Jetter on December 30, 1966, to the Inspector General of Police, asking for information about the allocation of the police officers to the reorganis~ ed States and for information regarding the vacancies which remained to be filled in the State.\n\nThe Inspector General of Police sent a reply on February 8, 1967. The appellants completed four years of continuous service on May 21, 1967.\n\nWhile the aforesaid two lists of\n\nJIT SINGH v. PUNJAB (Shinghal, J.) 197\n\n1966 were pending with the Commission for the preparation of list 'G', the State Government substituted a new rule 14 on Januaty 28,\n\n1969.\n\nThe. appellants completed six years of service on May 21, ·\n\n1969. The Public Service Commission asked for a seniority Jist of Inspectors some time in 1970, and ultimately approved the list 'G' on September 7, 1970, consisting of the names in the two lists which had been sent by the State Government in 1966.\n\nThe names of respondents Nos. 4 to 37 were thus included in that list but it did not contain the names of the appellants.\n\nThey felt aggrieved and filed a writ petition in the High Court in September 1970, but it was dis- _missed by the High Court on November 10, 1970, as aforesaid.\n\nThat is why they have come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nBefore examining the arguments which have been advanced before us, it will be proper to make a brief reference to the salient points mentioned in the reply of the State Government. It was stated there that a large number of vacancies occurred in the cadre of Deputy Supr intendents of. Police because several battalions of the Police force had to be sent to the Punjab-Pakistan border and it became necessary !or the State Government to fill those vacancies immediately.\n\nThe State Govere..'llent had therefore, to reduce the minimum requirement of six years service for eligibility to appointment to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police to four years.\n\nThe State Government mentioned the circumstances in which it had to send two lists to the Commission in 1966 for the preparation of list 'G' and its ultimate approval by the Commission on September 7, 1970.\n\nThe lists, it was pointed out, were prepared as in 1966, by which date the appellants had not completed four years service as Inspectors. That, . accvrdit1g to the respondents, was the reason why their names could not be brought on that list. It was categorically stated that no names were recommended for inclusion in that list during the years 1967, 1969 and 1970, and that the assertion of the appellants to the contrary was\n\n.-... incorrect.\n\nT •\n\nIt is in the light of these facts and circumstances that we shall examine the arguments which have been advanced before us by the learned counsel for the appellants.\n\nThe main controversy is that relating to the meaning and the application of rule 6(1) of the Rules G which provides as follows,-\n\n\"6. Method of recruitment.- ( 1) Recruitment to the Service shall be made-\n\n(i) Eighty per cent by promoion from the rank of Inspector and twenty per cent by direct appointment :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 S.C:t.\n\nProvided that only those Inspectors wil1 be eligible for promotion who--\n\n(a) in the case of Inspectors (both promoted from\n\nsubordinate rank and directly recntited) have go't six years continuous service (officiating as well as substantive) in the rank of Inspector: and\"\n\nWe are not concerned with part (b) of the proviso as it relates to the promotion of Prosecuting Inspectors.\n\nIt has been argued that only those Inspectors were eligible for C promotion as Deupty Superintendent of Police who h<\\d been confirmed as Inspector and held that post on a substantive basis.\n\nA reading of part (a) of the proviso shows however that it c; mnot be said to rtstrict the eligibility for promotion only to the substantive holder~ o'f the post of Inspector. All that it permits is that, in order to be eligible Cor promotion, the Inspectors £hould have got six years \"con- D tinuous\" service, including service in an officiating as well as substantive capacity.\n\nWe are therefore unable to think that an Inspector who had put in six years officiating service was not eligible. for promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police.\n\nc ·\n\nIt has next been argued that the requirement of six years service could not be rcla:ted by the State Government on August 21, 196), or thereafter in 1965, because rule 14 of the Rules as it stood until its substitution on January 28, 1969, read as follows,-\n\n\"Wncre the Government is satisfied that the opcrattoH of any o[ the rules causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispcn.sc with or rcla.t the requirement o( that rule to sm:h extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider nccess:uy for dealing with the ase iu a iut and equitable manner, provided that the case is not dealt with in a m:!nncr less favourublc to the person concerned than providcll by the rdcvnnt rule.\"\n\nIt has thcrdore been urged that the rdaxation contemplated by that rule was rcstrich:d by conideratious o( \"undue hardship\", in uny\n\n''p:trticul:r case\", and thilt lt wa~ Dot permissible for thl! Stall! Government to rcducc tltc requirement of continuous service !rom six years to four y.:.trs for purposes of eligibility for promotion to th¢ Punjab 11 Police S.:rvi.:c.\n\nThe argument is correct because n.lc 14 as it stood\n\n011 the rckvant period of. time when promotions of respondents (Nos. 4 to 3 7) were made, dtd Dot permit any general rdaxation of the\n\n' '\n\nJIT SINGH v. PUNJAB (Shinghal, J.) 199\n\nnature ordered by the State Government in 1963 or 1965.\n\nIt is A true that rule 14 was amended and a new rule was inserted on ..\n\nJanuary 28, 1969, to the following effect-\n\n\"7. General power to relax rules.-where the Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, relax any of the provisions of these rules with respect to any class or category of persons.\"\n\n• That was a rule of general application, and it appears that there is .. ~-justification for the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that it could not authorise the kind of relaxation which was made by the State Government in 1963 and in 1965, but the fact remains that it could not avail the State Government as the new rule came into force much later on January 28, 1969. It would thus follow that the respondents were not eligible for promotion because the relaxation which was ordered in 1963 and 1965 was not warranted by the old rule 14 as it stood at that time. The question however remains whether the appellants could possibly succeed in their appeal before us for that reason.\n\nWhile examining this aspect of the matter we shall have regard to the requirement of rule 6, as it stood before its amendment on January 28, 1969 and disregard the relaxation orders of 1963 and 1965 as they were not warranted by the provisions of that rule.\n\nAnd as that rule made a clear provision that only those Inspectors would be eligible for promotion who had got six years continuous service as Inspectors, it would follow that the appellants were not eligible for promotion until May 21, 1969 as they had been appointed only -~ _on May 21, 1963.\n\nIn other words, they were not eligible for inclu- sion in list 'G', which was prepared under sub-rule (2) of rule 6, as it was prepared in 1966 on the basis of the State Government's recommendations dated January 7, 1966, and September 29, 1966.\n\nIt may be recalled that the State Government have categorically stated that they did not send any list thereafter, for the Commission's approval. We have made a reference to the facts and circumstances in which the Commission did not find it possible to finalise list 'G' until 1970, but the fact remains that the list contained names upto the year 1966. In other words, the final list 'G' related only to the year 1966, and as the appellants had not put in even four years of service by then, what to say of six years service in terms of clause\n\n(a) of the proviso to sub-rule\n\n(1) of rule 6 of the Rules, their names could not possibly be included in that list.\n\nWhen that was so, tlley could not have been promoted as Deputy Superintendent of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA Police because that was the asic requirement o'f sub-rule (2) of that mle.\n\nWe have made a reference to the circumstances in which the\n\n... _\n\nState Government was driven to the necessity of making some ad hoc .j, t. .. or temporary promotions because of the extraordinary situation which had developed on the border of the State, and as it was the Public Service Commission which delayed the finalisation of list 'G', it can~ not be said that the ad hoc appointments of the respondents were wilfully made in derogation of the requirement of the Rules, or were meant to run down the appellants.\n\nIn fact, as has been explained above, the appellants were, in any view of the matter, not eligible for promotion as their names were not included in list 'G' as it emerg- .. ed from the Public Service Commission in 1970.\n\nThe High Cour~ therefore cannot be blamed if it took the view that as the appellants had not qualified for promotion when list 'G' was drawn up by the State Government in 1966, they could not succeed in their claim in the writ petition.\n\nTheir names did not appear in list 'G' which was approved by the Commission in 1970, whereas the names of rc:spondents Nos. 4 to 3 7 appeared in it and it is not in dispute that they had all completed 6 years' continuous service much before the appellants.\n\nThe appellants have not therefore been able to show that they had any legal right for promotion before the respondents.\n\nThere is thus no force in the arguments which have been advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and the appeal is dismissed.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, we shall leave the parties to bear their own costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n, ...", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "JIT SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JIT SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 13, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 13, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.}"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s 4 to 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959", "statute": "the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4630, "end_char": 4643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale and Mrs. Unnila Sirur for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "Unnila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale and Mrs. Unnila Sirur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4703, "end_char": 4714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "SIIJNGIIAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was dvlivered by\n\nSIIJNGIIAL, J. This appeal by special leave is directed again:, t the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated Novem- -· ber 10, 1970, by which the writ petition of the appellants was dis- -.. missed on the ground that the promotions challenged by them were made on the basis of list \"G\" of 1966 when they had not qualified for promotion."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5336, "end_char": 5349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A list of dates bearing on the controversy has been furnished by Mr. Y. S. Chitale, learned counsel for the appellants, and we have been told by the learned counsel for the respondents that it is correct.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "At that time the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5809, "end_char": 5859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6112, "end_char": 6133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For purposes of this appeal, it will be sufficient to say that rule 6 of the Rules provided tha~ recruitment to the Punjab Police Service, consisting of the cadre of Deputy Superintendents of Police, shall be made by promotion to the extent of eighty percent from the rank of Inspector and twenty percent by direct appointment."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6597, "end_char": 6612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that as there were many vacancies in the posts of Deputy Superintendents of Police, the State Government took a decision on August 21, 1963, that the minimum requirement of six years continuous service for eligibility for promoion may be reduced to four years if about fifty percent of the vacancies were to be filled in any year; and an executive order to that effect was issued some time in 1965 under rule 14 of the Rules as it stood until its amendment on January 23,\n\n1969."}}, {"text": "January 23,\n\n1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that as there were many vacancies in the posts of Deputy Superintendents of Police, the State Government took a decision on August 21, 1963, that the minimum requirement of six years continuous service for eligibility for promoion may be reduced to four years if about fifty percent of the vacancies were to be filled in any year; and an executive order to that effect was issued some time in 1965 under rule 14 of the Rules as it stood until its amendment on January 23,\n\n1969."}}, {"text": "January 7, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7519, "end_char": 7534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As it was the requirement of sub-rule (2) of ruk 6 of the Rules that appointments by promotion would be made from Inspectors ''brought on list 'G' which will be a list of officers considered fit for promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, prepared by Government in consultation with the Commission,\" a list was prepanCl by the State Government and it was sent for lhe approval of the Public Service Commission on January 7, 1966."}}, {"text": "September 10, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7582, "end_char": 7600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tb appellants were confirmed as Inspectors on September 10, 1966 witL retrospective effect from May 21, 1966."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tb appellants were confirmed as Inspectors on September 10, 1966 witL retrospective effect from May 21, 1966."}}, {"text": "September 29, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7961, "end_char": 7979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A supplementary list was prepared of Inspectors who had completed four years service after January 7, 1966, and it was sent to the Commis sion on September 29, 1966."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the two lists could be examined by the Commission, the State of Punjab was reconstituted on November 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8080, "end_char": 8096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the two lists could be examined by the Commission, the State of Punjab was reconstituted on November 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8141, "end_char": 8158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission thereupon sent a Jetter on December 30, 1966, to the Inspector General of Police, asking for information about the allocation of the police officers to the reorganis~ ed States and for information regarding the vacancies which remained to be filled in the State."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8426, "end_char": 8442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspector General of Police sent a reply on February 8, 1967."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8505, "end_char": 8517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants completed four years of continuous service on May 21, 1967."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8932, "end_char": 8949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Public Service Commission asked for a seniority Jist of Inspectors some time in 1970, and ultimately approved the list 'G' on September 7, 1970, consisting of the names in the two lists which had been sent by the State Government in 1966."}}, {"text": "November 10, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9297, "end_char": 9314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They felt aggrieved and filed a writ petition in the High Court in September 1970, but it was dis- _missed by the High Court on November 10, 1970, as aforesaid."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9766, "end_char": 9772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police because several battalions of the Police force had to be sent to the Punjab-Pakistan border and it became necessary !"}}, {"text": "August 21, 196", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12482, "end_char": 12496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c ·\n\nIt has next been argued that the requirement of six years service could not be rcla:ted by the State Government on August 21, 196), or thereafter in 1965, because rule 14 of the Rules as it stood until its substitution on January 28, 1969, read as follows,-\n\n\"Wncre the Government is satisfied that the opcrattoH of any o[ the rules causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispcn.sc with or rcla.t the requirement o( that rule to sm:h extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider nccess:uy for dealing with the ase iu a iut and equitable manner, provided that the case is not dealt with in a m:!nncr less favourublc to the person concerned than providcll by the rdcvnnt rule.\""}}, {"text": "January 28, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c ·\n\nIt has next been argued that the requirement of six years service could not be rcla:ted by the State Government on August 21, 196), or thereafter in 1965, because rule 14 of the Rules as it stood until its substitution on January 28, 1969, read as follows,-\n\n\"Wncre the Government is satisfied that the opcrattoH of any o[ the rules causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispcn.sc with or rcla.t the requirement o( that rule to sm:h extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider nccess:uy for dealing with the ase iu a iut and equitable manner, provided that the case is not dealt with in a m:!nncr less favourublc to the person concerned than providcll by the rdcvnnt rule.\""}}, {"text": "May 21, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15322, "end_char": 15334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And as that rule made a clear provision that only those Inspectors would be eligible for promotion who had got six years continuous service as Inspectors, it would follow that the appellants were not eligible for promotion until May 21, 1969 as they had been appointed only -~ _on May 21, 1963."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15374, "end_char": 15386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And as that rule made a clear provision that only those Inspectors would be eligible for promotion who had got six years continuous service as Inspectors, it would follow that the appellants were not eligible for promotion until May 21, 1969 as they had been appointed only -~ _on May 21, 1963."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18083, "end_char": 18089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_1_5_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "r •\n\n-·.\n\n, .\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nASHOK KUMAR & ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 2, 1979\n\n[S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL JJ.]\n\nPenal Code-s. 302-Supreme Court-When would' interfere with order of acquittal in special leave-Witnesses claimed they identified the assailant from a distance of 150 yards on a moonlight night-If could be believed.\n\nThe respondents were charged with an offence under s. 302, I.P.C. The prosecution case was thh, t on the night of occurrence (which was a moonlight 'night) the deceased and the prosecution witnesses attended a drama in the Ramlila Grounds of the village and when the deceased, after taking two 1amosas and tea, was returning home some time past midnight, the respondents shot him dead and that this was seen by them from a distance of 150 yards from the scene of occurrence.\n\nThe trial court, believing the prosecution version, convicted the respondents.\n\nOn appeal the High Court rejected the prosecution story and acquitted both D the respondents. The State came in appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : It is well-settled that this Court, in special leave, would. not normally interlere with an order of acquittal unless there are cogent reasons for doing so or unless there is a gross violation of any procedure of law which results in serious miscarriage of justice. [2H] E\n\nHaving regard to the glaring defects in the prosecution story this is not a case in which this Court should interefere with the order of acquittal. [3B]\n\nIn the present case, though it was a moon-lit night according to the almanac the moon would have covered three-fourths distance on the night of occurrence. Even in the moonlight it would have been difficult for the witn°\"'\"' to identify the as.m!ants; even if they did, the possibility of mistake in identification could not be completely excluded. According to an authority, when the moon is at the quarter, it is possible to recognise persons at a distance of from 21 ft; in bright moonlight at from a distance of 23 to 33 ft. and at the very brightest period of the full moon at a distance of from 33 to 36 ft. In tropical countries the distance for moonlight nIDy be increased. Therefore, it would not have been possible for the eye witnesses to identify the assailants from a distance of 150 yards.\n\n[3F, G]\n\nAfter the assailants had given a call and fired at the deceased the witnesses would not have flashed the torch light, as suggested by the prosecution, and exposed themselves to the risk of being shot at. Even if the torches were lighted, in view of the distance, it would not have been Possible for the witnesses to identify the assailants with certainty. [ 4 B]\n\nSecondly, the medical evidence had shown that the stomach of the deceased was empty and the large intestines too were empty. Therefore, the evidence\n\nof the witnesses that the deceased took two samo!ils after the drama at midnight and before the attack i~ completely falsified by medical evidence.\n\nAnother prosecution witness stated that the deceased having had stomach ulcers never took any food at night. .Apparently until the dcpoaition of the first witness was complete the prosecution did not realise -the grtwvity of tho statement made by him and deliberately introduced a change on a vital i!sue which by itself is an importE.nt circumstance throwing doubt on the pr08ecu~ tion case.\n\nWhile witnesses may lie, circumstances would never. The evidence of the doctor, based on conclusive evidence cannot be belied, [4F-Hl • CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 1976. • Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated :=Ji\\ 21-4-75 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 27761 .. 74 and Referred No. 76/74. ~-\n\nD. P. Uniyal, and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant.\n\nD. Mookherjee, 0. P. Tewari, S. S. Srivastava and K. C. Jain, for Respondent No. 1.\n\nR. K. Garg, V. J. Francis and D. K. Garg for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI J.-The respondents had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Banda under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and senienced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe respondents thereafter filed an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad which after a fnll and complete consideration of the evidence came to a finding of fact that the prosecution has not proved its case and accordingly acquitted the respondents.\n\nThe High Court rejected the prosecution case mainly on two grounds. In the first place, it held that having regard to the circumstances and the distance from which the witnesses saw !he accused, it was difficult for them to identify the accnsed. Secondly, the High Court found that in view of the medical evidence which showed that the large intestines of the stomach were absolutely empty, the evidence of the eye-witnesses could not be believed.\n\nAgainst the order of acquittal passed by the High Court the State came up to this Court by special leave and after obtaining the same the case has been placed before us for hearing.\n\nThe facts of the case have been set out in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat them again. it is well settled that this Court would not normally interfere with an order of acquittal in special leave unless there are cogent reasons for . doing so or unless there is a gross violation of any procedure of law which results in serious miscarriage of justice.\n\nWe have heard\n\n• •\n\n' .\n\ncounsel for the parties and have gone through the judgment of the A Sessions Judge and of the High Court. It is true that High Court has not made an attempt to discuss the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the eye-witnesses but having .regard to the glaring defects\n\naparing in the prosecution case we are in agreement with the ultimate view taken by the High Court.\n\nAccording to the prosecution the deceased along with P.Ws. 1 & 2 had gone to Atarra to witness a drama in the Ramlila Grounds.\n\nThe party reached Atarra at about 9 o'clock and the drama finished at about 12 o'clock. Baura and Chanada P.Ws. 2 and 5 were also with the deceased Budhi Bi!as when he was returning from the Natak.\n\nIt is alleged that at about 12.30 a.m. the respondent-Ashok Kumar fired a few shots which hit the deceased as a result of which he died instantaneously. The two eye-witnesses P.Ws. 1 and 2 admittedly saw the firing from a distance of about 150 yards, as would appear from an examination of the te plan Ka-23 and which is endorsed_ by P.W. 1 who stated in his evidence that he has given the detaiL of the place from where they saw the occurrence to the Investigating Officer at the spot. The first question which falls for consideration is as to whether or not the witnesses would be in a position to identify the respondents from such a large distance at night.\n\nIt is true that it was a moon-lit night but from a reference to the almanac it would appear that the moon had covered 3/4th distance on the night of occurrence and wai to set at 3.23 a.m. Even though there may be some moon light at that night, it is difficult for the witnesses to identify the respondents or even if they did the possibility of mistake in identification cannot be completely excluded.\n\nIn this connection, we may refer with advantage to the following passage appear- , ing in Dr. Hans Grass's Criminal Investigation at page 185 :\n\n\"By moonlight one can recognise, when the :noon is at the quarter, persons at a distance of from 21 feet, in bright moonlight at from 23 to 3 3 feet; and at the very brightest period of the full moon, at a distance of from 33 to 36 feet.\n\nIn tropical countries the distances for moonlight may be increased.\"\n\nThe opinion of Gross referred to above fully fortifies our conclusions that it was not possible for the witnesses to have identified the respondents even in moonlight from a distance of about 150 yards.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, the High Court was fully justified in holding that it was not possible for _the eye-witnesses to identify the respondents from such a long distance on the night of the\n\noccurrence. The prosecution suggested that the witnesses had lighted their torches and it was in the light of torches coupled with moonlight that ideutification was possible.\n\nIn the first place, we find it difficult to believe that after Ashok Kumar had given a call and fired, the witnesses would dare to flash the torch light and expose themselves to the risk of being shot themselves. Secondly, even if torches were lighted, in view of the large distance, it would not be possible for the witnesses to identify the respondents with absolute certainty.\n\nAnother important circumstance which appears td clinch the issue is the medical evidence in the case. It appears from the evidence of Dr. Pillay, P. W. 7 who performed the post-mortem that the small intestines were distended with gas and in the end of the small intestines liquid faeces was present. The doctor further says that large intestines were empty.\n\nDoctor also fourtd the stomach to be empty.\n\nThese facts are also 1J1entioned in the post-mortem report.\n\nThis clearly shows that the deceased must have been shot at a time\n\n0 when he had either not taken any food at all or the entire food if taken was fully digested and left the stomach. P.W.1 had stated in his evidence that he along with his uncles and the deceased took tea and ate samosas.\n\nThe deceased had taken two samosas. This meal was taken by the deceased and the witnesses after the Natak\n\nended, that is to say, at about 12 O'clock in the night, because the evidence of P.W.1 is that the Natak started at 9 p.m. and continued for three hours. If th~ evidence of this witness is believed, then it is completely falsified by tile medical evidence which shows that the stomach was empty. In other words, if the witness is believed, the position would be that the deceased would have been shot only a few minutes after he had taken two samosas and a cup of tea.\n\nIn that case the stomach would not be empty.\n\nPerhaps realising this difficulty the prosecution through the mouth of P. Ws. 2 and 3 tried to effect a deliberate embellishment in their evidence by making them depose that the deceased Budhi Bilas had taken only milk when he started.\n\nP.W. 3 goes to the extent of saying that deceased Budhi B!las was suffering from stomach ulcers and he never took any food at night. The story of the deceased having taken samosas is given a complete go-back by other eye-witness, P.W. 2.\n\nIndeed, if these witnesses were present at the time when the deceased has taken something we should i0t have expected any discrepancy of this kind on this important aspect of the matter.\n\nEither deceased took food or he did not take any food. This fact would be known to his son, P.W. 1 and also to P.W. 2. We cannot understand what is the explanation for the two different versions given by P.Ws. 1 & 2 unless the idea\n\n. ,\n\n' .\n\nwas to bring the evidence, at least, of P.W. 2 in tune with the medical evidence.\n\nUntil the deposition of P .W. 1 was complete, the prosecution did not realise the gravity of the statement made by P.W. 1 that the deceased has taken two samosas and a cup of tea shortly before the occurrence. This deliberate attempt to introduce a change on a vital issue is by itself a very iinporta:nt circumstance which throws doubt on the prosecution case. It is manifest that whereas witness may lie circumstances never lie. The evidence of the doctor is based on conclusive circumstantial evidence which cannot be belied, and therefore an attempt has been made by the prosecution to introduce improvements in explaining the lacuna present in the case.\n\nApart from this we have gone through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 & 2 and their evidence also is full of discrepancies as pointed out by the High Court. Taking therefore an overall view of the picture, we hold that this is not a case in which we should interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the High Court.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we confirm the order of the High Court and dismiss this appeal. The respondent No. 1 who is in jail is directed to be released forthwith and respondent No. 2 will be discharged from his bail bonds.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed .", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ASHOK KUMAR & ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASHOK KUMAR & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nASHOK KUMAR & ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 2, 1979\n\n[S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383, "end_char": 389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "D. P. Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~-\n\nD. P. Uniyal, and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~-\n\nD. P. Uniyal, and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Mookherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjee, 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Tewari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjee, 0."}}, {"text": "S. S. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Tewari, S. S. Srivastava and K. C. Jain, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. C. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3840, "end_char": 3850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Tewari, S. S. Srivastava and K. C. Jain, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3875, "end_char": 3885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis and D. K. Garg for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis and D. K. Garg for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis and D. K. Garg for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI J.-The respondents had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Banda under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and senienced to imprisonment for life."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4201, "end_char": 4224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents thereafter filed an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad which after a fnll and complete consideration of the evidence came to a finding of fact that the prosecution has not proved its case and accordingly acquitted the respondents."}}, {"text": "Atarra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5899, "end_char": 5905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 & 2 had gone to Atarra to witness a drama in the Ramlila Grounds."}}, {"text": "Baura", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6038, "end_char": 6043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baura and Chanada P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Chanada", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baura and Chanada P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Budhi Bi!as", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6098, "end_char": 6109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 5 were also with the deceased Budhi Bi!as when he was returning from the Natak.", "canonical_name": "Budhi Bi!as"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that at about 12.30 a.m. the respondent-Ashok Kumar fired a few shots which hit the deceased as a result of which he died instantaneously.", "canonical_name": "ASHOK KUMAR & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Hans Grass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7309, "end_char": 7319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, we may refer with advantage to the following passage appear- , ing in Dr. Hans Grass's Criminal Investigation at page 185 :\n\n\"By moonlight one can recognise, when the :noon is at the quarter, persons at a distance of from 21 feet, in bright moonlight at from 23 to 3 3 feet; and at the very brightest period of the full moon, at a distance of from 33 to 36 feet."}}, {"text": "Gross", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7684, "end_char": 7689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The opinion of Gross referred to above fully fortifies our conclusions that it was not possible for the witnesses to have identified the respondents even in moonlight from a distance of about 150 yards."}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8316, "end_char": 8327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that after Ashok Kumar had given a call and fired, the witnesses would dare to flash the torch light and expose themselves to the risk of being shot themselves.", "canonical_name": "ASHOK KUMAR & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Pillay", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the evidence of Dr. Pillay, P. W. 7 who performed the post-mortem that the small intestines were distended with gas and in the end of the small intestines liquid faeces was present."}}, {"text": "Budhi Bilas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10200, "end_char": 10211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 tried to effect a deliberate embellishment in their evidence by making them depose that the deceased Budhi Bilas had taken only milk when he started.", "canonical_name": "Budhi Bi!as"}}, {"text": "Budhi B!las", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10300, "end_char": 10311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 3 goes to the extent of saying that deceased Budhi B!las was suffering from stomach ulcers and he never took any food at night.", "canonical_name": "Budhi Bi!as"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_201_208_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "MUDDADA CHAYANA A\n\nKARNAM NARAYANA AND ANR. ETC. ' February 14, 1979 B\n\n(D. A. DESAI AND Q. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nk Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (A.P. Act 26 of 1948), Sections 56(1)(c) 55, 11 and 15- • Whether operation of Section 56(1) (c) is limited only to the purposes of sec- lions 55 and 56(1)(a) ond (b)-lnterpretation of a statute. ,..,\n\nUilder Section 56(1)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, \"where, after an estate is notified, a dispute {1.<rises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, th>! dispute shall be decided l>y the Settlement Officer\". Section 56(2) of the Act provides for an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal agtdnst the decision of the Settlement Officer whose decision was final and not to be questioned in any court of law.\n\nThe petition filed before the Tahsildar, Pathapatn<lm under section 13 of the Andhra Tenancy Act by the appellant, for the eviction of the respondents\n\non the ground of default in i:tiyment of rent was dismissed on the ground, among others that the respondents had occupancy rights in the land. The E appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer Tekkali \\Vas dismissed on the ground that the petition for eviction wafj not maintainable since the question as to who was the lawful ryot in respect of lany holding in an estate had to be decided by the Settlement Officer under Section 56(l)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and that the decision of such question was within the exclusive competence of the Settlement Offi'Cer.\n\nIn the revision petition filed before it under Art. 227 F f the Constitution, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh agreed with the ,.._ r appellate order.\n\nDisn1issi11g the appeal by special leave the Court. • HELD : l. Interpretation of a statute contextual or otherwise must further G and not frustrate the object of the statute. [207 DJ\n\nThe object of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 is to protect ryots_ and not to leave them\n\ni~ wilderness.\n\nWhen the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1) (c) to discover who the lti.wful ryot of a holding \\Vas, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of a11 meaning by confining the pruvisions to the bounds of\n\nH Section 55 and 56(1) (a) and (b) on the ground of \"contextual interpreta tion\". [207 C-DJ 14-196 SCl/79\n\n2. The scope of section 56(1) (c) cannot be restricted to mean that it waa\n\ncontrolled by Section 55 and 56(1)(a} and (b) and that an enquiry into the que&tion as to who was the lawful tyot of a holding under that section was permissible only for the purpose of identifying the person liable to pay the arrear of rent which had accrued in respect of the holding before the taking over of the estate. [204 E-G]\n\n... ..\n\nIt would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an - oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari --4 pattas oo ryots and the <!ibolition of intermediaries is to be held not to cont.a.in\n\nany provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the * lawful ryot of a holding. Section 56(1)(c) is indeed such a provision. A con• textual interpretation may not be quite appropri~, te in view of the fact that ..\n\nSections 55 and 56(l)(a) and (b) occur under the heading 'Miscelluneous',-l._ Any other interpretation would lea, d to conflict of jurisdiction and the imp1e~ r--- raentation of the Act would be thrown into disarray. (206 F, 207 A, B-C] i..\n\nMunuswami Naidu (died) & Ors., v. R. Venkata Reddy and Ors., A.LR. 1978 A.P. 200 (F.B.); approved.\n\n3. The Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act is a self contained Code 'in\n\nwhich a provision is olso made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate is notified by specially constituted Tribunals.\n\nOn gene~ ral principles, the special Tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication. [204 D-EJ\n\nAppanna v. Sriramamurthy, [1958] 1 Andh. W.R. 420; npproved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1760-1763/ 69.\n\nthe Judgment and Decree dated\n\nHigh Court in Civil Revision Appeals by Special Leave from 25-10-1967 of the Andhra Pradesh Application Nos. 342-345 /64. ---..\n\nVepa P. Sarathi and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant.\n\nEx-parte for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The petitioner who lost before the Subordinate Tribmrals and the High Court is the appellant in this appeal by special leave.\n\nAlleging that he was the landlord and that the respondents were his tenants in respect of certain lands, in Bhommika village, the appellant filed petition before the Tehsildar, Pathapatnam under Section 13 of the Andhra Tenancy Act for the eviction of the respon-\n\n.......\n\nI I i•\n\nI • , • II!! j • I\n\n• •\n\nM. CHAY ANA v. K. NARAYANA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n20 J\n\ndents on the ground of default in payment of rent.\n\nThe respondents pleaded that the lands were situated in an Inam Estate which had been taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, and that, they and their ancestors, who had occupancy rights were always in cultivating possession of the lands. It was also pleaded that after the taking over of the estate by the Govern·\n\nment there was no longer any relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents.\n\nThe Tehsildar dismissed the petition for eviction on the ground, among others, that the respondents had occupancy rights in the land.\n\nThe landlord preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tekkali.\n\nThe Revenue Divisional Officer rejected the appeal on the ground that the petition for eviction was not maintainable since the question as to who was the 1'awful ryot in respect of any holding in an estate had to be decided by the Settlement Officer under Section 56(1) (c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) A.ct, and that th_e decision of such question was within the exclusive competence of the Settlement Officer.\n\nA revision petition filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Article 227 of the Constitution was dismissed by the High Court again for the reason that the question as to who was entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta had to be decided by the Settlement Officer under Section\n\n56 of the A.ndhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and, Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and that the decision of such question was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer.\n\nThe appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave of this Court.\n\nShri Vepa P. Sarathi, learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the view expressed by the High Court regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer to decide the question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding was not good law in view of the decisior: of a Full Bench of three Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors.(1)\n\nit is not disputed that the lands are situated in Bhommika village.\n\nIt is not also disputed that Bhommika village was in Inam estate and that it was taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. The appellant claims that he is the lawful ryot of the lands in dispute and that the respondents are his tenants. On the other hand the respondents claim that they are the lawful ryots of\n\n(1) A. I. R 1974 A. P. 85.\n\n204 SuFREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[J 979] 3 S.C.R.\n\nth~ holding. The question at issue between the parties therefore is, whether the appellant or the respondents are the lawful ryots of the holding.\n\nUnder Section 56(1) (e) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act \"where, after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer\". Section 56(2) provides for an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal against the decision of the Settlement Officer and further provides that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. Prima facie, therefore, the question as to who is the lawfnl ryot of any holding, if such question arises for decision after &n estate is notified, has to be resolved by the Settlement Officer and by the Estates Abolition Trib0nal under Section 56 (1) (c) and 56(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act The Andhra Pradesh\n\nEsmtes Abolition AClt is a self contained code in which provision is\n\n0 also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate is notified, by specially constituted Tribunals.\n\nOn general ; irinciples, the special Tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication.\n\nShri Vepa P. Sarathi's submission was that Section 56(1) (c) did not enable the Settlement Officer to decide the question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding every time such question arose and for all purposes but only when such qnestion arose in connection with the mr.tters dealt with by Section 5 5 and Section 5 6 ( 1) (a) and (b) . In other words the argument was that Section 56(1) (c) was controlled by Section 55 and Section 56(1) (a) and (b) and that an enquiry into the question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding under Section 56(1) (c) was permissible only for the purpose of identifying the per-· son liable to pay the arrear of rent which had accrued in respect of the holding before the taking over of the estate. The submission of Shri Vepa P. Sarathi is supported by the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopnlakrishnayya & Ors. (supra). We are, however, unable to see any\n\njusification for restricting the scope of Section 56(1) (c) in the manner suggested by Shri Sarathi. We will briefly indica•e our rearnns for holding that the scope of Section 56(l)(c) is not to be restricted as was done by the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors. (supra). We\n\n• •\n\nare fortunately relieved of the necessity of considering the matter more elaborately in view of the fact that the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya\n\nv. Gad de Gopalakrishnayya & Ors. on this part of the case has since beeu over-ruled by a Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in I. Munuswami Naidu (died) & Ors. v. R. Venkata Reddy & Ors.(!) after a thorough and exhaustive consideration of the question. We may also add here that until the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors., for several years it was understood that Section 56(1) (c) conferred complete and exclusive • __.l_. jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to decide rival claims of ryots for ,, the grant of ryotwari patta and Section 55 or 56(1) (a) and (b) were ; never understood as controlling Section 56(1)(c).\n\nA brief resume of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh ( Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act relevant for onr present purpose is permissible here. As stated in the preamble\n\nthe Act was enacted to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the Rights of land-holders in permanently D Eetlled and certain other estates and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. Section 1 ( 4) provides for the notification of estates and Section 3 enumerates the consequences of notifying an estate under Section l ( 4) of the Act. In particular Section 3 (b) provides that the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances Section 3 ( c) provides that all rights and interests created in/or over the estate by the land-holder shall cease and determine as against the Government. Section 3(d) empowers the Government to take possession of the estate but saves from dispossession any person who the Government considers is prirna\n\n. _ facie entitled to a ryotwari patta until the question whether he is actually _., J•r entitled to snch patta is decided by the Settlement Officer in the case of a ryot or by the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal in the ca''\" of a land-holder.\n\nSection 3 (f) provides that the relationship of • 1 be landholder and ryot shall, as between them, be extinguished .\n\nSection 3 (g) provides that ryots in the estate shall, as against the Government be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on them by or under the Act. Section 11 confers on every ryot in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti land which was included or ought to have been included in the holding on the notified date. Sections 12, 13 and 14 confer on the land-holder the right to obtain a ryotwari patra in respect of private\n\nland in a Zamindari, Inam and Under-tenure estate respectively. Section 15(1) provides for enquiry by the Settlement Officer into claims\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1978 A. P. 200.\n\nby a land-holder for a ryotwari patta, Under Sections 12, 13 and 14.\n\nSeciion 15 (2) provides for an appeal to the Tribnnal from the decision of the Settlement Officer and it declares that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law.\n\nSection 16 imposes on every person, whether a land-holder or a ryot who becomes entitled to a ryotwari patta under the Act in respect of any land, the liability to pay to the Government the assessment that may be lawfully imposed on the land. Section 21 to 23 provide for the survey of estates, the manner of affecting ryotwari settlement and the determination of the land-revenue. Sections 55 to 68 occur under the heading \"Miscellaneous\". Section 55 provides for the collection of ren: which had accrued before the notified date. Section 56 provides for the decision of certain disputes arising after an estate is notified.\n\nIt provides for the decision of a dispute as to (a) whether any rent due\n\nfron• a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is. The dispute is required to be decided by the Settlement Officer. Against the decision of the Settlement Officer, an appeal is provided to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal is declared final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law.\n\nNow the Act broadly confers on every tenant in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands which were inc:uded F. or ought to have been included in his holding before the notified date and on the land-holder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of lands which belonged to him before the notified date as his private lands. The Act makes express provision for the determination of claims by landholders for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the alleged private\n\nlands.\n\nIf there is provision for the determination of the claims of a landholder for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of his alleged private lands, surely, in an Act aimed at the abolition of intermediaries and the introduction of ryotwari settlement, there must be a provision for the determination of the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta. Section 56(1) is clearly snch a provision. But in Cherukuru Muthayya\n\nv. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors (supra) it was held that an enquiry as to who was the lawful ryot was permissible under Section 56(1) (c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrear of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose.\n\nThe conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed context in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held ihat Section 56(1) (c) occurred so closely on the heels of Section 55 and Section 56(1) (a) and (b), that the applicability of Section 56(1)(c) musl be held to be \"intimately and integrally connected\"\n\nwith those provisions.\n\nWe think that the approach of the Full Bench was wrong.\n\nApart from the fact that Section 55 and 56(1) (a), (b) and (c) occur under the heading \"Miscellaneous\", and, therefore, a contextual interpretation may not be quite appropriate, the Full Bench overlooked the serious anomaly created by its conclusion.\n\nThe anomaly is that while express provision is found in Section 15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by land-holders for the grant of ryotwari pattas., there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claim's by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas.\n\nIt would indeed be _J.. anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act ,... avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries, is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding.\n\nThe object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness.\n\nWhen the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1) (c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was, it is not for the Court to denudi' the Act of all meaning by confining the provision to the bounds of Section 55 and 56(1) (a) and (b) on the ground of \"contextual interpretation\".\n\nInterpretation of a statute, con. textural or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors. (supra) was wrongly decided in so far as it held that ambit of Section 56(1)(c) was controlled by Section 55 and Sec.tion 56('l)(a) and (b).\n\nWe do not think it necessary to consider the matter in further detail in view of the elaborate consideration which has been given to the case by the later Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Muniswami Naidu (died) & Ors v. R. Venkata Reddi & Ors. (supra) except to add that to adopt\n\nY .. the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges in Cherukuru Muthayya\n\nv. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors. would lead to contlict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.\n\nIn this connection we' may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v. Sriramamurry(I)\n\n\"Where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as is otherwiSe expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive.\n\nUnde.r the ---··--\n\n(1) (1958) I And. W. R. 420.\n\nS.R.\n\nAct, old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta, when a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act\".\n\nIn view of the above discussion the appeal is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "MUDDADA CHAYANA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUDDADA CHAYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nKARNAM NARAYANA AND ANR. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KARNAM NARAYANA AND ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 14, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 14, 1979 B\n\n(D. A. DESAI AND Q. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Q. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 56(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 809, "end_char": 822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1585, "end_char": 1601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1842, "end_char": 1850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1877, "end_char": 1905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 F f the Constitution, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh agreed with the ,.._ r appellate order."}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55 and 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2511, "end_char": 2531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2632, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55 and 56(1)(a} and (b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2706, "end_char": 2737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3373, "end_char": 3389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 55 and 56(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3508, "end_char": 3532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vepa P. Sarathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4578, "end_char": 4593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vepa P. Sarathi and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vepa P. Sarathi and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The petitioner who lost before the Subordinate Tribmrals and the High Court is the appellant in this appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5047, "end_char": 5057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5187, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j • I\n\n• •\n\nM. CHAY ANA v. K. NARAYANA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n20 J\n\ndents on the ground of default in payment of rent.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Revenue Divisional Officer, Tekkali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5978, "end_char": 6013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The landlord preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tekkali."}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6557, "end_char": 6568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6764, "end_char": 6775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7360, "end_char": 7385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Vepa P. Sarathi, learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the view expressed by the High Court regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer to decide the question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding was not good law in view of the decisior: of a Full Bench of three Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors.(1)\n\nit is not disputed that the lands are situated in Bhommika village."}}, {"text": "Bhommika village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7543, "end_char": 7559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not also disputed that Bhommika village was in Inam estate and that it was taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act."}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8151, "end_char": 8164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8540, "end_char": 8553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9572, "end_char": 9585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9826, "end_char": 9835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9910, "end_char": 9923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9946, "end_char": 9956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9961, "end_char": 9974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10074, "end_char": 10087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10584, "end_char": 10591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, however, unable to see any\n\njusification for restricting the scope of Section 56(1) (c) in the manner suggested by Shri Sarathi."}}, {"text": "Section 56(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10660, "end_char": 10676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cherukuru Muthayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11308, "end_char": 11326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also add here that until the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya & Ors.,"}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11402, "end_char": 11415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11572, "end_char": 11582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11643, "end_char": 11659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12103, "end_char": 12112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12271, "end_char": 12280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12401, "end_char": 12410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12557, "end_char": 12569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12966, "end_char": 12975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13084, "end_char": 13093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13272, "end_char": 13282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 12, 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13467, "end_char": 13489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13640, "end_char": 13653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 12, 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13789, "end_char": 13811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14031, "end_char": 14041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21 to 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14274, "end_char": 14290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 55 to 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14413, "end_char": 14430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14472, "end_char": 14482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16002, "end_char": 16015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16192, "end_char": 16205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16487, "end_char": 16500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16541, "end_char": 16551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16556, "end_char": 16569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16609, "end_char": 16625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55 and 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16790, "end_char": 16810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17073, "end_char": 17083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17764, "end_char": 17777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55 and 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17934, "end_char": 17954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18280, "end_char": 18296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18315, "end_char": 18325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18942, "end_char": 18951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection we' may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v. Sriramamurry(I)\n\n\"Where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as is otherwiSe expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_209_221_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "_J...__ ,.\n\nBADRI NATH & ANR.\n\nMST. PUNNA (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS.\n\nFebruary 15, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !YER, D A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nHindu Succession Act, 1956-S. 4-Scope of-Share of a baridar (turnhulder) ill the ofJerings of a temple-If a heritage right nature of office of baridar-C11ston1 that offerings should go to specified sub-castes-if valid .\n\nThe plaintiff's (respondent's) father and the defendants (appellants) were entitled to receive a defined share in the offerings made at a holy shrine.\n\nOB her father's death the plaintiff claimed his share in the offering~ alleging that both under the law of inheritance and by virtue of her father's wt11 executed in her favour, she was entitled to his share; but the defendants interfered with her right to collect that share.\n\nIn the plaintiff's suit the defendants contended that only members belong~\n\ning to four specified sub-castes were entitled to receive the offerings and the D plaintiff lm'Ving lost her sub-caste by reason of her marriage outside those sub-castes she was not entitled to her fs.ther's share. But this argument was rejected by the trial court which held that on the dea.th of the baridar (lumholder) his heirs inherited his right to receive offerings just as they inherited !his other property and that therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the offerings both under the Hindu Succession Act and the will executed by her father.\n\nOn appeal a Division Bench of the High Court held that where offerings were received by persons independently of any obligation to render services, they were alienable and attachable and that the custom which restricted the right to a share in the offerings only to members of the four specified subcastes, could not be given effect tG in Yiew of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and that therefore, the plaintiff \\Vas entitled to succeed to the right though she did not belong to any of the sub-castes.\n\nOn further appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that (1) the right of the baridar was not a trans[erable right and (2) the right to a share in the offerings and the duties attached to it must be regarded as an office like that of a shebait and cannot be regarded as heritable property.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The right of the baridar was a transferable right.\n\n1. To begin with, the right to a share in the offerings, according to the settlement record prepared for the village and 01 resolution passed by the Dharmarth Committee, was restricted to the four sub-castes, and similarly the baridars did not perform any duties in return. Sometime later, liowever, certain obligations, such as to provide permanent servant~, to look after visitors and the like, were superimposed on that right. Though the fight to receive & share in the offerings was subject to the performance of those duties, none of them\n\n.. '-- was in nature priestly or required a personal qualification. All of them were of a non-religious or secular character which could be performed by the baridar's agents or servants incurring expense on his account. When the right to receive !.he offerings made at a teinple is independent of rin obligation to -.. render services involving qualifications of personal nature, (such as offi.c; ating the worship) such a right is heritle as well as alienable. [217 B-H] ., B Balmukand & ors. v. Tula Ram & ors., AIR 1928 All. 721 approved.\n\n2. (0•) The right of the baridars cannot be equated with the right and ' duties of a shebait. The haridars were not managers of the shrine in the sense that a shebait is in relation to a temple in his charge. The overall • management of the temple vested in the Board of Trustees known as Dhar -....4..... marth Committee. (218 EJ '\"\n\n(b) It is not correct to say that shebaitship is neither more nor less than an office and is not heritable property. Shebaitship cannot be described as a mere office. In addition to certain responsibilities it carries with it a definite right to property. It is well-established that in the concept, CJf Shebait, both the elements of office and property, duties and personal interst are mixed up and one element cannot be detached from the other.\n\nOld texts as ¥; ell as courts have recognised heriditary office of shebaitship as itnmovablc property.\n\n(218 F; 220 A-BJ\n\nAngurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick, [1951] SCI{ 1125; Rain Ratran v.\n\nBajrang Lal & ors. [1978] 3 SCR 963 follo\\ved.\n\n3. The right to share the offerings being a right coupled with duties other than those involving personal qualifications and being heritable property, it will descend in accordance with the dictates of the I-Tindu Succession Act in supersession of all customs to the contrary in view of s. 4 of thrit Act. [220 EJ\n\nIn the instant case, in the light of s. 4 of the Hindu Succession Act the requirement that the right could not be exercised by a person not belonging to any of the four sub-castes becomes ineffective. [220 H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1118 of 1972\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-1-72 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in L.P.A. No. 6 of 1969.)\n\nL. N. Sinha, Satish Gupta, K. J. John and P. P. Singh, for the appellant.\n\nR. K. Bhat and D. C. Anand for respondent lB--iK.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave has arisen out of a suit brought by Sm!. Punna, respondent No. 1, against the two appellants\n\nH and respondent No. 2 for the issuance of a perpetual injunction rest- • raining the three defendants from interfering with her right to recover her father's share of six annas in a rupee in the offerings made\n\nBADRI NATH V. MST~ I'UNNA (lfoshal; J;) 211\n\nat the sacred shrine of Shri Vaishno Devi Ji which is situated on the Trikutta Hills.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the trial court whose judgment was upheld in first appeal by the District Judge, in a second appeal by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and in a Letters Patent Appeal by a Full Bench of that Court.\n\nIt is the judgment of the Full Bench (which is dated the 18th of January, 1972) that is impugned before us.\n\n2. The averments made in the plaint may be summarised thus. • , l The plaintiff is the daughter of one Bagu who died in or about the ,.- year 1959.\n\nDuring his life time Bagu and the three defendants were\n\nj entitled to receive the offerings made at the shrine of Shri Vaishno Devi Ji on certain days falling within every seventh Bikrami year so that Bagu would have 6/16th share therein and the defendants collectively a similar share.\n\nAfter the death of the plaintiff's father the parties were entitled to receive the offerings in the shares abovementioned on every eighth day in the Bikrami year 2019, the plaintiff having succeeded to th•e share of her father both under the law of inheritance and by virtue of a will executed by him in her favour.\n\nThe plaintiff had to resort to the suit as the defendants had started interfering with her right to collect her share of the offerings.\n\n3. The defenda\"nts contested the suit.\n\nThey challenged the will set up by the plaintiff as a forged one and further pleaded that only members of four sub-castes namely, Khas Thakars, Darora Thakars, Manotra Thakars and Samnotra Brahmins were entitled to receive the offerings and that while Bagu was entitled to a share in the same, th<:\n\nplaintiff was not as she had lost her original sub-caste by marriage outside the four sub-castes mentioned above.\n\nThe offerings, aecordying to the defendants, were also not liable to devolve by iiiheritance\n\n- <JI demise.\n\n----~\n\n4. The findings arrived at by the trial court were these :\n\n(i) On the death of a baridar (which expression, when literally translated, means turn-holder) belonging to any of the aforementioned sub-castes, his heirs inherited his right to receive offerings just as they inherited his other property.\n\n(ii) Under section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, any custom or usage inconsistent with the provisions of that Act becomes ineffective.\n\n(iii) Even under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act read with the Schedule appended therto the property of Bagu would devolve on the plaintifi in case Bagu died intestate.\n\n(iv) Gagu executed a valid will in favour of the plaintiff devising to her the right to receive the offerings, apart from other properties.\n\n(v) The plaintiff was entitled, in view of the above four findings to inherit the right to receive offerings not only by reason of the provision of sections 4 and 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, but also because of the will.\n\n(5) At the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeal by the Full\n\nBench, the following four contentions were raised on behalf of the defendants :\n\n(i) The chance of future worshippers making offerings to the deity is a mere possibility of the nature referred to in clause (a) of section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and is not property which can be transferred or inherited.\n\n(ii) The right to receive offerings is not a transferable or heritable right.\n\n(iii) The provisions of the Hindu Succession Act do not apply to the case in hand.\n\n(iv) According to the custom governing the shrine of Shri\n\nVaishno Devi Ji, only the abovementioned four subcastes were entitled to share the offerings.\n\nAll these contentious were rejected by the Full Bench as untenable. - ---..I\n\nl '- In regard to the first of them the Full Bench followed Ba mukand and Others v. Tula Ram and Others(') ih which it was held that the right to receive offerings when made is a definite and fixed right \"nd does not depend on any possibility of the nature referred to in clause\n\n(a) of section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. because the fact that offerings whether large or small are bound to be made is a certainty.\n\nIn relation to the second contention, the Full Bench noted the contents of paragraph 422 of \"Principles of Hindu Law\" by Mnlla\n\nwhich states, inter alia, that where offerings, though made to idols, are received by persons independently of any obligation to render ser-\n\n(I) AIR 1928 Allahabad 721.\n\nvices, they are alienable and attachable.\n\nReference in this connection was also made to Balmukand and Others v. Tulia Ram and Others (supra) wherein the following passage occurs :\n\n\"but when the right to receive the offerings made at a temple is independent of an obligation to render services involving qualifications of a personal nature, such as officiating at the worship we are unable to discover any Justification for holding that such a right is not transferable. That the right to receive the offerings when made is a valuable right and is property, admits of no doubt and, therefore, that right must, in view of the provisions of section 6 of Transfer of Property Act, be held to be transferable, unless its transfer is prohibited by the Transfer of Property Act or any other law for the time being in force.\"\n\nIn view of these observations which were adopted and followed in Nand Kumar Dutt v. Ganesh Dass,(') the Full Bench, being in agreement therewith, proceeded to determine whether the right to re- D <:eive the offerings in the present case was or was not independent of services of a priestly or personal nature.\n\nThe following translation of an extract from the Wajib-ul-Arz relating to village Purana Daiur wherein the holy shrine is situated, was then taken up for consideration : E \"Leaving aside cash, whatever is the 'Charatth' at the temples of 'Ad Kanwari' and 'Sri Trikutta Devi' the entire Darora community distributes that among itself and of (?) other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc. according to hereditary shares.\n\nAnd the castes 'Thakar Khas' and 'Minatra' are included in it.\n\nDarora\n\ncste take two shares and Manotra and Khas castes also take one equal share of Charatth'. That is divided as per hereditary shares.\n\nThere is no service in lieu thereof.\n\nOnly it is described as the blessings of Goddess.\n\nRupees twenty one hundred (two thousand one hundred rupees) go to the Government.\n\nEvery baridar keeps his man present in the temple who receives the 'Charatth'. Pujaries get pay from us.\"\n\nan<l it was interpreted to mean that the right to share in the offerings made at the holy shrine had no connection with any priestly functions or with other services involving qualifications of a personal nature and therefore was a heritable as well as alienable right.\n\nThis very con-\n\n(1' A.1.R. 1936 Allahabad 131.\n\nclusion was reached by the Full Bench on a consideration of the deposition of the Patwari of the concerned circle and the Ain-i-Dharamarth which purports to be the constitution of a Board of Trustees appointed by the State to manage the shrine.\n\nIn relation to the third contention, the Full Bench noted that the properties to which the Hindu Successio11 Act does not apply are only those which find enumeration in section 5 thereof, that the right to share the offerings is not one of those properties and that, therefore, such a right could not but be governed by the provisions of the Act. •\n\nIn repelling the last contention the Full Bench relied upon the • provisions of the Hindu Succession Act which over-rides all custom~ ,.__ or usage being part of the Hindu Law as in force immediately prior\n\n\"' to the commencement of the Act and concluded that the custom. of the right to share in the offerings being restricted to members of the four sub-castes abovemcntioned could not be given effoct to and that the plaintiff was fulJy entitled to succeed to that right in spite of the. fact that she did not belong to any of those sub-castes.\n\nIt was in these premises that the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed by the Full Bench.\n\n6. At the very outset Mr. L. N. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, has drawn our attention to the fact that the extract from the Wajib-ul-Arz taken note of by the Full Bench of the High Court relates not to the temple of Shri Vaishno Devi Ji but to a couple of other temples situated in its vicinity, namely, the temples of 'Ad Kanwari' and 'Sri Trikutta Devi' and has urged that the extract could not possibly relate to the temple of Shri Vaishno Devi Ji which was the main temple in the complex and a reference to which could not have been omitted from the extract in case it was intended to apply to that t•omple also.\n\nA carefnl perusal of the extract shows that Mr.~ Sinha's contention is well-founded because there is not so much as a ' hint to the main temple in the extract.\n\nAccording . to Mr. Sinha, the ,.__.\n\n• duties to which the right to share the offerings is subject are detailed in the settlement record prepared for village Daiur (Shri Vaishno Devi Ji) for the year 1965-66 Bikrami and a resolution passed by the -;,> Dharamarth Committee on Sawan 27, 1983 Bikrami. These documents may be set out in extenso :\n\nSettlement Record\n\n\"In the column of ownership, the State is entered as owner; in the column of possession-Dharmarth Trust entered as in possession. 'Mandir Gupha' situate on land compris- •\n\nt •\n\nBADRI NATH v. MST. PUNNA (Kasha/, J.) 215\n\ning 7 marlas bearing Khasra No. 166 and 'Bhawan' situate on land comprising 4 marlas bearing Khasra No. 167.\n\nThe sub-caste Thakar Darora, Manotra, Khas, and Brahmin Samnotra have been sharing the offerings according to the shapes mentioned be:ow from the very beginning.\n\nThakar Daroras and Brahmin Samnotra are entitled to three shares and one share respectively out of 213 of the total offerings whereas Thakar Manotras and Khas are entitled to share equally in the rest J/3 of the total offerings.\n\n\"Darora Thakars are sub-divided into further four subcastes namely; (i) Darora Sunk (ii) Darora Jaga (iii) Darora Pai and (iv) Darora Deoeh and each one of them has one equal share.\n\nSimilarly Brahmin (Samnotra) have also divided their share into four shares which are received as under :\n\nSamnotra Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' one share, Brahmins from the branch of 'Bairaj' one share; Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' one share; and Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' one .share.\n\nTherefore 'Darora Sunk' and Samnotras from the branch of 'Bairaj' have their turn together in om year and they divide the offerings for that in the proportion of 3.1 (i.e. 3 shares of Darora Sunk and I share to Samnotras from the branch of Dairaj). Similarly Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' have their turn with 'Darora Jaga' Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' with 'Darora Parath' and Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' with 'Darora Deoch' and Brahmins in each case recei, c I/4th share and Darora Thakars have 3/4th share.\n\n\"In the beginning nothing was taken from these persons ( bm idara11) in co\"nsideration of their receiving the offerings.\n\nBut because the Sadhus would often go to the shrine and due to the mismanagement of their stay and meals over there, there were always riots at the shrine.\n\nTherefore, in the year 1907 Bikrami during the regime of Maharaja Guiab Singh an amount of Rs. 11501was fixed as 'Aian' to be oaid by the baridars for the management of stay and meals for Sadhus\n\nat the shrine.\n\nThe said amount was to be deposited in the State Treasury.\n\nThereafter in 1920 Bikrami another hundred rupees were added to the above said amount and thenceforth Rs. 1250 /- were fixed per annum which was being deposited in the State Treasury. After 1940 Bikrami the said\n\namount of Rs. 1250 /- was being deposited with the Dhar\n\nmarth Trust and this continues till today.\n\nThe said amount is recovered from Thakar sub-castes. Besides this, so many other things (such as silk chunis etc.) are received from the said Thakar baridars.\n\nThakar baridars aro~ also liable to provide three permanent servants and six more peons during the season and will be liable to pay them.\n\nThe said Thakars are liable to arrange the carriage and pay for the 'Parshad', etc., from Katra to Vaishno Devi temple. With regard to the cattle kept by the Dharmarth Trustees, the said Thakars are liable to arrange for taking them from one place to another. If any Government servant visits the shrine the said Thakars will be liable to arrange for the carriage of his luggage, etc.\n\nThe said Thakars are also liable to perform the following duties :\n\n(1) Qeanliness of the Gupha (Vaishno Devi temple) and the compound appurtenan\\ thereto.\n\n(2) To carry Puja material inside the Gupha (temple along with the Pujari.\n\n(3) If during mela season there is any trouble to any pilgrim or he becomes, sick, etc, the said Thakars are liable to make proper arrangements for the removal of any such trouble.\"\n\nRESOLUTION OF THE DHARMARTH COMMITTEE\n\n\"(a) Dharmarth Trust shall charge its usual Aian\n\n(rent) from the baridaran which shall b~ paid by them before they distribute their share of the offering.\n\nThe baridar who refuses or avoids the payment of rent to Dharmarth shall not be entitled to receive his share of the offering and the same shall be attached and deposited with the manager, Dharmarth Trust.\n\nThe baridar whose share has been thus attached can receive his share on payment of tltc rent due to the Dharmarth Trust.\"\n\n\"(b) Unanimously it is passed that the strangers or persons other than baridars (i.e. four sub-castes) shall have no right to get the Puja performed in the shrine.\"\n\n\"(c) In case any baridar or his legal representative, due to any reason, cannot attend in person then it will be the duty of other co-sharer to deposit the absentee's share with\n\n• ,,_ \"\n\n' •\n\n• _j._\n\nthe Manager, Dharmarth Trust and when that baridar comes present, the Manager, Dharmarth Trust shall, after deduct ing the due, if any, from him to the Dharmarth, pay his share to him.\n\nThe baridaran shall be bound to perform the duties (such as Kah, Kunda, Argi etc. as being performed by them previously).\"\n\nAccording to these documents the right to share the offeri'ngs is restricted to members of the four sub castes abovementioned, and although to begin with baridars did not perform any duties in return, certain obligations were superimposed on the right from the year 1907 Bikarmi onwards.\n\nThose obligations are:\n\n(a) A duty to deposit a fixed annual sum with the Dharmarth Trust to be spent on arrangements for lodging and boarding of Sadhus visiting the shrine.\n\n(b) To provide three permanent servants, in addition to six peons, during the \"season\".\n\n( c) To pay for the 'prasad' and to arrange its transport from Katra to Vaishno Devi temple .\n\n(d) To arrange for the cattle owned by the Dharmarth Trust being taken from one place to another.\n\n(c) To arrange for the carriage of the luggage of Government servants visiting the shrine.\n\n(f) To keep the temple and the compound appurtenant thereto\n\nin a state of cleanliness.\n\n(g) To carry inside the temple the material required for worship by the priest.\n\n(h) To look after visitors to the shrine who fall ill and to make proper arrangements for the restoration or their health.\n\nThere is thus no doubt that the right to receive a share in the offerings is subject to the performance of onerous duties. _ But then it is apparent that none of those duties is in nature priestly or requiring a personal qualification.\n\nOn the other hand all of tl1em arc of a 'non-religions or secular character and may be performed not necessarily by the baridar personally but by his agents or servants so that their performance boils down to mere incurring of expense.\n\nIf the baridar chooses to perform those duties personally he is at liberty to do so.\n\nBut then the obligation extends merely to tbe making of necessary arrangements which may be secured on oayment\n\n5-196 SC!/79\n\nof money to others, the actual physical or mental effort involvec' beiug undertaken by those others. The right is, therefore, a transferable right as envisaged in the passage above extracted from Balmukand and other v. Tula Ram and others (supra) which has not beeu challenged before us as erroneous and which we regard as laying down the law correctly.\n\nThe contentions raised by Mr. Sinha to the contrary is' thas repelled.\n\n7. Another challenge made by Mr. Sinha to the impugned judgment is that the right to share offerings coupled with the duties to • which, it was subject must in its totality be regarded as an office (like • that of a she bait) only and not as property and that therefore no. --l .._ question of its heritability could arise.\n\nIn this connection reference was made to the following observations made by Mukherjea, J ., who delivered the judgment of the majority of this Court in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick.(')\n\n\"In a Hindu religious endowment on the other hand the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the deit'y or the. institution itself as a juristic person and the shebait or mahant is a mere manager.\"\n\nThere is nothing to indicate that baridars in the present case are the managers of the shrine in the sense that a shebait is in relation to the temple in his charge.\n\nOn the other band it appears that the overall management of the shrine vests in the Board of Trustees known as Dbarmarth Committee and it would not be correct therefore to look at the right of the baridars in the light of the rights a'.nd duties of a shebait. However, it may be pointed out that shebaitship cannot be described as a mere office because apart from certain responsibilities, it carries with it a definite right to property. This is a proposition on which emphasis was laid by this Court in Angurbala's . '- case (supra) itself. Mukherjea, J., observed in this connection:\n\n\"But though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not be correct to describe the shebtaitship as a mere office.\n\nThe shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a beneficial interest in the debutter property.\n\nAs the Judicial Committee observed in the above case, in almost all such endowments the shebait has a share in the usufruct of the debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage. Even\n\n(1) [1951] SCR 1125.\n\nI I\n\n( ...\n\nwhere no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right.\n\nThus, in the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of this pzrsonal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property.\n\nThis was elaborately discussed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Monohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji(') and this decision of the Full Bench was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v.\n\nLal Behary(2), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata(•). The effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Cmncil pointed out in the last case, was to emphasise the proprietary element in the shebaiti right, and to show that though in some respects anomalous, it was an anomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into Hindu Law from an early date. \"According to Hindu law,\" observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v.\n\nRumanlollji Gossammee(') \"when the worship of a Thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution.\" Unless, therefore, the founder has disposed of the shehaitship in any particular manner-and this right of disposition is inherrent in the founder or except when usage or custom of a different nature is proved to exist, shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance from the founder.\"\n\nAngurbala's case was followed by this Court in a recent decisioh reported as Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal & Others(') wherein Desai, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed :\n\n(!) I. L. R. 60 Calcutta 452.\n\n(2) 63 I. A. 448.\n\n(3) 70 I. A. 57\n\n14) 16 I. A. 137\n\n(5) [1978] 3 S, C, R. 963\n\n\"In the conception of shebait both the elements of office and property, duties and personal interest are mixed up and blended together and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other.\n\nOld texts, one of the principal sources of Hindu law and the commentaries thereon, and over a century the Courts with very few exceptions have recognised hereditary office of shebait as immovable, properly, and it has all along been treated as immovable property almost uniformly.\n\nWhile examining the nature and character of an office as envisaged by Hindu iaw it would be correct to accept and designate it in the same\n\nmanner as has been done by the Hindu Jaw text writers and accepted by courts over a long period. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the hereditary office of shebait which would be enjoyed by the person by turn would be immovable property.\"\n\nThe&e observations as also those made ih Angurbala's case and extracted above demolish the contention of Mr. Sinha that shebaitship is nothing more or less than an office and is not heritable property.\n\n8. The right to share the offerings being a right coupled with duties other than those involving personal qualifications and, therefore, being heritable property, it will descend in accordance with the dictates of the Hindu Succession Act and in supersession of all customs to the contrary in view of the provisions of section 4 of that Act, Sub-section (1) of which state:\n\n(a) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act-any\n\ntext, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom _ --J or usage as part of that law in force immediately before , ·\" the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act:\n\n(b) any other Jaw in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in_ so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provision's contained in this Act.\"\n\nThe requirements of the custom reli•ed upon by the appellants to the effect that the right could not be exercised by a person who is not a member of any of the four sub-castes mentioned above becomes wholly ineffective in view of these provisions, being contrary to the\n\n• ,\n\n{)rder of succession laid down in Chapter II of the Hindu Succession A Act under which the right devolves on the plaintiff-respondent.\n\n7. The only contention raised by Mr. Sinha is that the plaintiff had not stated in any part of the pleadings that she was prepared to carry out the services to the performance of which the right to share the offerings is subject and that therefore she was not entitled to a decree.\n\nThis contention must be repelled for the simple reason that it was not raised before the High Court. Besides, there being no repudiation on her part of tl1e obligations to render the services abovementioned,\n\n_>- her claim must ~~ regarded for the enforcement of that right coupled\n\nA with those services and the decree construed accordingly even though\n\n-i it may be silent on the point.\n\n9. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "BADRI NATH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BADRI NATH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MST. PUNNA (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MST. PUNNA (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 15, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "D A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1361, "end_char": 1381, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Yiew of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1759, "end_char": 1809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dharmarth Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2483, "end_char": 2502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To begin with, the right to a share in the offerings, according to the settlement record prepared for the village and 01 resolution passed by the Dharmarth Committee, was restricted to the four sub-castes, and similarly the baridars did not perform any duties in return."}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 SCR 963", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tindu Succession Act", "statute": "Tindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tindu Succession Act", "statute": "Tindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4813, "end_char": 4833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4974, "end_char": 5002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "220 H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5165, "end_char": 5176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Satish Gupta, K. J. John and P. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Satish Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5178, "end_char": 5190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Satish Gupta, K. J. John and P. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Satish Gupta, K. J. John and P. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Satish Gupta, K. J. John and P. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Bhat and D. C. Anand for respondent lB--iK.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave has arisen out of a suit brought by Sm!."}}, {"text": "D. C. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5255, "end_char": 5266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Bhat and D. C. Anand for respondent lB--iK.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave has arisen out of a suit brought by Sm!."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5335, "end_char": 5341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Bhat and D. C. Anand for respondent lB--iK.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave has arisen out of a suit brought by Sm!."}}, {"text": "BADRI NATH V. MST~ I'UNNA (lfoshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 for the issuance of a perpetual injunction rest- • raining the three defendants from interfering with her right to recover her father's share of six annas in a rupee in the offerings made\n\nBADRI NATH V. MST~ I'UNNA (lfoshal; J;) 211\n\nat the sacred shrine of Shri Vaishno Devi Ji which is situated on the Trikutta Hills."}}, {"text": "Vaishno Devi Ji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 for the issuance of a perpetual injunction rest- • raining the three defendants from interfering with her right to recover her father's share of six annas in a rupee in the offerings made\n\nBADRI NATH V. MST~ I'UNNA (lfoshal; J;) 211\n\nat the sacred shrine of Shri Vaishno Devi Ji which is situated on the Trikutta Hills.", "canonical_name": "Vaishno Devi Ji"}}, {"text": "High Court of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5970, "end_char": 5999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the trial court whose judgment was upheld in first appeal by the District Judge, in a second appeal by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and in a Letters Patent Appeal by a Full Bench of that Court."}}, {"text": "18th of January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the judgment of the Full Bench (which is dated the 18th of January, 1972) that is impugned before us."}}, {"text": "Bagu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6275, "end_char": 6279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l The plaintiff is the daughter of one Bagu who died in or about the ,.- year 1959."}}, {"text": "Khas Thakars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They challenged the will set up by the plaintiff as a forged one and further pleaded that only members of four sub-castes namely, Khas Thakars, Darora Thakars, Manotra Thakars and Samnotra Brahmins were entitled to receive the offerings and that while Bagu was entitled to a share in the same, th<:\n\nplaintiff was not as she had lost her original sub-caste by marriage outside the four sub-castes mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Darora Thakars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They challenged the will set up by the plaintiff as a forged one and further pleaded that only members of four sub-castes namely, Khas Thakars, Darora Thakars, Manotra Thakars and Samnotra Brahmins were entitled to receive the offerings and that while Bagu was entitled to a share in the same, th<:\n\nplaintiff was not as she had lost her original sub-caste by marriage outside the four sub-castes mentioned above.", "canonical_name": "Darora Jaga' Brahmins"}}, {"text": "Manotra Thakars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They challenged the will set up by the plaintiff as a forged one and further pleaded that only members of four sub-castes namely, Khas Thakars, Darora Thakars, Manotra Thakars and Samnotra Brahmins were entitled to receive the offerings and that while Bagu was entitled to a share in the same, th<:\n\nplaintiff was not as she had lost her original sub-caste by marriage outside the four sub-castes mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Samnotra Brahmins", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They challenged the will set up by the plaintiff as a forged one and further pleaded that only members of four sub-castes namely, Khas Thakars, Darora Thakars, Manotra Thakars and Samnotra Brahmins were entitled to receive the offerings and that while Bagu was entitled to a share in the same, th<:\n\nplaintiff was not as she had lost her original sub-caste by marriage outside the four sub-castes mentioned above.", "canonical_name": "Samnotra Brahmins"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7964, "end_char": 7984, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8090, "end_char": 8099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8107, "end_char": 8127, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gagu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8254, "end_char": 8258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iv) Gagu executed a valid will in favour of the plaintiff devising to her the right to receive the offerings, apart from other properties."}}, {"text": "sections 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8562, "end_char": 8582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8906, "end_char": 8930, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9098, "end_char": 9118, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9673, "end_char": 9682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9690, "end_char": 9714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mnlla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In relation to the second contention, the Full Bench noted the contents of paragraph 422 of \"Principles of Hindu Law\" by Mnlla\n\nwhich states, inter alia, that where offerings, though made to idols, are received by persons independently of any obligation to render ser-\n\n(I) AIR 1928 Allahabad 721."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10761, "end_char": 10785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10856, "end_char": 10880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Purana Daiur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11322, "end_char": 11334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following translation of an extract from the Wajib-ul-Arz relating to village Purana Daiur wherein the holy shrine is situated, was then taken up for consideration : E \"Leaving aside cash, whatever is the 'Charatth' at the temples of 'Ad Kanwari' and 'Sri Trikutta Devi' the entire Darora community distributes that among itself and of (?)"}}, {"text": "Trikutta Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11500, "end_char": 11513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following translation of an extract from the Wajib-ul-Arz relating to village Purana Daiur wherein the holy shrine is situated, was then taken up for consideration : E \"Leaving aside cash, whatever is the 'Charatth' at the temples of 'Ad Kanwari' and 'Sri Trikutta Devi' the entire Darora community distributes that among itself and of (?)"}}, {"text": "Pangal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11608, "end_char": 11614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc."}}, {"text": "Sarron", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11616, "end_char": 11622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc."}}, {"text": "Batan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11624, "end_char": 11629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc."}}, {"text": "Kotli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11631, "end_char": 11636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc."}}, {"text": "Gran", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11638, "end_char": 11642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc."}}, {"text": "Parhtal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11644, "end_char": 11651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other attached areas of Pangal, Sarron, Batan, Kotli, Gran, Parhtal etc."}}, {"text": "Darora", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11754, "end_char": 11760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Darora\n\ncste take two shares and Manotra and Khas castes also take one equal share of Charatth'."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12907, "end_char": 12916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13172, "end_char": 13192, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14405, "end_char": 14410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A carefnl perusal of the extract shows that Mr.~ Sinha's contention is well-founded because there is not so much as a ' hint to the main temple in the extract."}}, {"text": "Vaishno Devi Ji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14687, "end_char": 14702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Mr. Sinha, the ,..\n\n• duties to which the right to share the offerings is subject are detailed in the settlement record prepared for village Daiur (Shri Vaishno Devi Ji) for the year 1965-66 Bikrami and a resolution passed by the -;,> Dharamarth Committee on Sawan 27, 1983 Bikrami.", "canonical_name": "Vaishno Devi Ji"}}, {"text": "Dharmarth Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14969, "end_char": 14984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents may be set out in extenso :\n\nSettlement Record\n\n\"In the column of ownership, the State is entered as owner; in the column of possession-Dharmarth Trust entered as in possession. '"}}, {"text": "Thakar Darora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15226, "end_char": 15239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-caste Thakar Darora, Manotra, Khas, and Brahmin Samnotra have been sharing the offerings according to the shapes mentioned be:ow from the very beginning.", "canonical_name": "Thakar Manotras"}}, {"text": "Manotra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15241, "end_char": 15248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-caste Thakar Darora, Manotra, Khas, and Brahmin Samnotra have been sharing the offerings according to the shapes mentioned be:ow from the very beginning."}}, {"text": "Brahmin Samnotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15260, "end_char": 15276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-caste Thakar Darora, Manotra, Khas, and Brahmin Samnotra have been sharing the offerings according to the shapes mentioned be:ow from the very beginning."}}, {"text": "Thakar Daroras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15375, "end_char": 15389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakar Daroras and Brahmin Samnotra are entitled to three shares and one share respectively out of 213 of the total offerings whereas Thakar Manotras and Khas are entitled to share equally in the rest J/3 of the total offerings.", "canonical_name": "Thakar Manotras"}}, {"text": "Thakar Manotras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15509, "end_char": 15524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakar Daroras and Brahmin Samnotra are entitled to three shares and one share respectively out of 213 of the total offerings whereas Thakar Manotras and Khas are entitled to share equally in the rest J/3 of the total offerings.", "canonical_name": "Thakar Manotras"}}, {"text": "Darora Jaga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15694, "end_char": 15705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Darora Thakars are sub-divided into further four subcastes namely; (i) Darora Sunk (ii) Darora Jaga (iii) Darora Pai and (iv) Darora Deoeh and each one of them has one equal share.", "canonical_name": "Darora Jaga' Brahmins"}}, {"text": "Darora Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15712, "end_char": 15722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Darora Thakars are sub-divided into further four subcastes namely; (i) Darora Sunk (ii) Darora Jaga (iii) Darora Pai and (iv) Darora Deoeh and each one of them has one equal share.", "canonical_name": "Darora Jaga' Brahmins"}}, {"text": "Darora Deoeh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15732, "end_char": 15744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Darora Thakars are sub-divided into further four subcastes namely; (i) Darora Sunk (ii) Darora Jaga (iii) Darora Pai and (iv) Darora Deoeh and each one of them has one equal share.", "canonical_name": "Darora Deoeh"}}, {"text": "Brahmin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15798, "end_char": 15805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Brahmin (Samnotra) have also divided their share into four shares which are received as under :\n\nSamnotra Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' one share, Brahmins from the branch of 'Bairaj' one share; Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' one share; and Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' one .share."}}, {"text": "Samnotra Brahmins", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15895, "end_char": 15912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Brahmin (Samnotra) have also divided their share into four shares which are received as under :\n\nSamnotra Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' one share, Brahmins from the branch of 'Bairaj' one share; Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' one share; and Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' one .share.", "canonical_name": "Samnotra Brahmins"}}, {"text": "Darora Sunk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16112, "end_char": 16123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore 'Darora Sunk' and Samnotras from the branch of 'Bairaj' have their turn together in om year and they divide the offerings for that in the proportion of 3.1 (i.e. 3 shares of Darora Sunk and I share to Samnotras from the branch of Dairaj)."}}, {"text": "Darora Jaga' Brahmins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16418, "end_char": 16439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' have their turn with 'Darora Jaga' Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' with 'Darora Parath' and Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' with 'Darora Deoch' and Brahmins in each case recei, c I/4th share and Darora Thakars have 3/4th share.", "canonical_name": "Darora Jaga' Brahmins"}}, {"text": "Darora Parath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16474, "end_char": 16487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' have their turn with 'Darora Jaga' Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' with 'Darora Parath' and Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' with 'Darora Deoch' and Brahmins in each case recei, c I/4th share and Darora Thakars have 3/4th share.", "canonical_name": "Darora Jaga' Brahmins"}}, {"text": "Darora Deoch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16536, "end_char": 16548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Brahmins from the branch of 'Darya' have their turn with 'Darora Jaga' Brahmins from the branch of 'Ganesh' with 'Darora Parath' and Brahmins from the branch of 'Gobind' with 'Darora Deoch' and Brahmins in each case recei, c I/4th share and Darora Thakars have 3/4th share.", "canonical_name": "Darora Deoeh"}}, {"text": "Bikrami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16942, "end_char": 16949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, in the year 1907 Bikrami during the regime of Maharaja Guiab Singh an amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Guiab Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16971, "end_char": 16991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, in the year 1907 Bikrami during the regime of Maharaja Guiab Singh an amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dhar\n\nmarth Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17450, "end_char": 17467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1250 /- was being deposited with the Dhar\n\nmarth Trust and this continues till today."}}, {"text": "Katra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17889, "end_char": 17894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from Katra to Vaishno Devi temple."}}, {"text": "Dharmarth Trustees", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the cattle kept by the Dharmarth Trustees, the said Thakars are liable to arrange for taking them from one place to another."}}, {"text": "Dharmarth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18854, "end_char": 18863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The baridar who refuses or avoids the payment of rent to Dharmarth shall not be entitled to receive his share of the offering and the same shall be attached and deposited with the manager, Dharmarth Trust."}}, {"text": "Bikarmi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20075, "end_char": 20082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to these documents the right to share the offeri'ngs is restricted to members of the four sub castes abovementioned, and although to begin with baridars did not perform any duties in return, certain obligations were superimposed on the right from the year 1907 Bikarmi onwards."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22451, "end_char": 22460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection reference was made to the following observations made by Mukherjea, J .,"}}, {"text": "Angurbala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23464, "end_char": 23473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is a proposition on which emphasis was laid by this Court in Angurbala's . '-"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24749, "end_char": 24768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was elaborately discussed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Monohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji(') and this decision of the Full Bench was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v.\n\nLal Behary(2), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata(•)."}}, {"text": "Hobhouse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25317, "end_char": 25325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Hindu law,\" observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v.\n\nRumanlollji Gossammee(') \"when the worship of a Thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution.\""}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26177, "end_char": 26182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Angurbala's case was followed by this Court in a recent decisioh reported as Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal & Others(') wherein Desai, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed :\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27636, "end_char": 27656, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27737, "end_char": 27746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Hindu Succession A Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28602, "end_char": 28642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_222_231_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "ZILA SlNGH & ORS.\n\nHAZARI & ORS. •\n\nFebruary 25, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nCode of Civil Procedure 1908-S. 47, Or. XX r. !4(1)(b), Or. XXI r. I&\n\n, and S. 146-Whether purchaser -of land from a pre-emptor who has secured a decree for pre-emption and possession, could execute the decree to obtain posse&S1on of the iand. • The original vendor of the lands in dispute sold them to the first vendee~-- \\ .-_,_ In the meantime three decrees for pre-emption were passed in favour of the pre-emptor and 0-gainst the vendor and his vendees. After satisfying the k\" conditions imposed in the decrees regarding deposit of certain sums of money the pre-emptor sold the lands to the appellants.\n\nIn the execution petition filed by the appellants the original vendor as well as the first vendees filed their objections challenging the right of thtt appellants to execute the decrees on the ground that the right of pre-emption being a personal right of the pre-emptor, the decrees could not be assigned and thG:t the present appellants being subsequent vendees from the pre-emptor were not entitled to execute the decrees granted in his favour.\n\nRejecting the objections of the first vendees the executine court held thal the appellants were entitled to execute the decrees.\n\nOn appeal the Additional District Judge held that the pre-emptor having complied with the directions contained in the decree his title to the lands was perfected and that the appellants were entitled to recover possel!ion under o.146, CPC.\n\nIn execution second appeals of the first vendees the High Court held that the right of pre-emption being a personal right, the decree for pre-emption would be a personal decree and was not assignable and even if the pre-emptor had complied with the provisions of Or. XX r. 14 CPC, the appellants would not be entitled to execute the decree for possession because the decree was not assigned and s. 146 would not help the present appellaiits.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD : 1 (i) The question whether the right of pre-emption was a personal right or it created an interest in property was concluded by the decision of this Court between the same parties in an earlier round of litigation. The earlier litigation being inter partes and, therefore, binding on the respondents, it cannot be reopened or re-examined at the instance of the respondents. (226\n\nH-227 B]\n\n(ii) The contention that decree in a suit for pre-emption is a personal decree and creates no interest in land must fail.\n\n[228 B]\n\n(iii) The distinction between a voluntary inter vivos transfer and an involuntary transfer such as by way of inheritance is immaterial as for as the present case is concerned because the question in terms disposed of by\n\nthis Court in the earlier case is that the pre-emptor having complied with A\n\n0. XX, r. 14 bad become the owner of the lands and bis legal representatives on bis death were rightly substituted in the proceedings. [227 H-228 Al\n\nHazari & Ors. v. Neki & Ors., [19681 2 SCR 833; referred to.\n\nSection 146 CPC provides that where some proceedings could be taken or application could be made by a person under the Code of Civil Procedure any other person clniming under him is entitled to make and maintain such an application. The only limitation on the exercise of this right is in tho expression, 'save as otherwise provided by this O:>de,' occurring in the •ection. [229 El\n\n3. If the assignee of a decree can avail himself of the provisions contained under Or. XX! R. 16 by establishing that he is such an assignee he must only avail himself of thnt provision. But if he fails to establish his title as a transferee by assignment in writing or by operation of law within tho meaning of Or. XXI r. 16, there is nothing in that proviGion which prohibits him from availing himself of s. 146 if the provision of that section can be availed of by him. [230 El\n\nlugal Kishor< Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., [195'] SCR 1369; referred to.\n\nIn the instant case though the sale deed in respect of land would show that the decree itself was not assigned, the lands having been sold by the decree-holder after perfecting his title and purchased by the present appel-/ !ants, they would be person11 claiming under the original pre-emptor decree-1 holder and if he could have made an application for execution of the decree as decree-holder, the l\\pplications for execution by the present appellants would be maintainable under s. 146, and they are therefore entitled to execute tho decrees for possession. [231 C..D]\n\nSmt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dassi & Anr., [1958] SCR 1287; referred to. • r ..\n\nCivil APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1806-1808 of 1969.\n\nF -· From the Judgment and Order dated 30-5-1969 of tho Punjab and Haryana High Court in Executive Second Appeals Nos. 1131-1133 0£ 1968.\n\nH. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl for the Appellant.\n\nJaMrdhan Sharma and Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana arise H from three Execution Petitions filed by the present appellants for executing three decrees obtained by one Neki (since deceased) in three\n\nsuits bearing Nos. 313, 360 and 369 of 1961 filed by him for preemption, to recove.r physical possession of the lands involved in the suits.\n\nThe decrees in favour of Neki were confirmed finally by this Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1148, 1656 and 2341 of 1966 decided on 25th J_anuary 1968.\n\nThe Judgment of this Court is reported in Hazari & Ors. v. Neki & Ors.(') The facts which nltimately resulted in decrees for pre-emption in favour of Neki are fully set out at pages 834-835 of the reported judgment and repeating the same would merely add to the length of this judgment.\n\nSuffice to state that there is no dispute that decrees for pre-emption were passed in favour of Neki against the original vendor Dhara Singh and his vendees Hazari and others and the satisfaction of the condition in the decrees of pre-emption for payment or deposit of the amounts as directed by the Court within the stipulated time is not questioned in the present proceedings.\n\nIt appears that the trial court decreed the suits for pre-emption in favour of Neki on 7th November 1962 simultaneously imposing the condition fo deposit certain amounts in the three suits by or before 3rd December 1962.\n\nThe various amounts we.re duly deposited in the three decrees by Neki, the decree holder, on 3rd December 1962.\n\nSooh thereafter, on 5th December 1962 Neki sold the lands in respect of which he got the decrees to Zila Singh and others, the present appellants.\n\nThe present appellants are subsequent vendees but they will be referred to as the appellants, in this judgment. The former vendeea\n\nwould be referred to as 'first vendees', the sale in whose favour gave rise to the cause of actiou for pre-emption in favour of Neki against the original vendor Dhara Singh.\n\nAfter the sale in favour of the present appellants, they applied to\n\nbe joined as parties to the appeals preferred by the first vendees against , the decrees for pre-emption which we.re then pending in the High Court-~ and the Court directed by its order dated 13th Jnly, 1963 that the present appellants be joined as parties to the appeah; subject to just legal exceptions.\n\nThe appellants then filed Execution Applications Nos. 295, 296, 297 /64 seeking to execute the decrees to reccwer actual possession of the lands purchased by them from Neki.\n\nOriginal Vendor Dharn Singh and the first vendees filed their objections challenging the right of the present vendees to execute the decrees.\n\nPrincipal contention raised was that the sale deed of lands in favour of the appellants did not envisage assignment of the decrees and that the right of preemption being a personal right, the decrees could not be assigned and, therefore, the present appellants who were subsequent vendees from pre-emptor Neki, were not entitled and had no locus standi to execute\n\n(!) [1968] 2 S.C.R-833.\n\nthe decrees granted in favour of Neki.\n\nThe executing court after -examining the relevant provisions contained in section 4 7 and Order\n\nXXI, Rule 16, of the Code of Civil Procedure rejected the objections raised by the first vendees and held that the present appellants were entitled to execute the decrees and ditected warrant for possession to be issued.\n\nThe first vendees preferred three appeals being Nos. 25/14, 26/14 aud 27 /14 of 1968 to the District Court at Rohtak.\n\nThe learned Additional District Judge who heard these appeals, by a common order rejected the appeals and confirmed the order of the trial\n\n1 I Court observing that the pre-emptor having deposited the purchase ~-> iJrice as directed by the Court, in accordance with the terms of the <lecrees, his title to the lands was perfected from the date of depopit as provided in Order XX, Rule 14 (l)(b), C.P.C., the appellants as purchasers of lands from the pre-emptor in whose favour the decrees fat pre-emption including the one for possession had become final, were entitled to recover possession under section 146 C.P.C.\n\nHazari, Amar Singh and Bhan Singh the first vendees preferred three Execution Second Appeals Nos. 1131, 1132 and 1133/68 to the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.\n\nWhen these appeals came up before a learned single Judge of the High Court it was contended that in view of the decision in Ram Singh & Ors. v. Gainda Ram & Ors.( 1), The assignee of a holder of a decree for pre-emption cannot seek the assistance of the Court for executing the decree for pre-emption because the decree is a personal one and, therefore, non-assignable.\n\nOn behalf of the present appellants who were respondents before the High Court, reliance was placed on the decision in Satyanarayana v. Arun Naik(') and Ravi Parkash and Anr. v. Chunilal & Ors.(') The learned single Judge had certain reservations about the correctness of the decision in ' _.Ram Singh's case and, therefore, he considered it prudent to refer the\n\n<- ,._..- matter to a Division Bench.\n\nThe matter ultimately had to be referred to a Full Bench because there was another decision in Mehrkha11 and Shah Din v. Ghulam Rasul('), which also required reconsideration. -·\n\nThat is how the matter came before a Full Bench.\n\nThe Full Bench ..formulated the question for its consideration as under:-\n\n\"Whether the purchaser of land from a pre-emptor, of which the pre-emptor has become the owner in pursuance of a pre-emption decree after complying' with the\n\n(1) AIR 1953 Punjab 163.\n\n(2) AIR 1965 AP 81.\n\n(3) AIR 1967 Punjab & Hariana 268.\n\n(4) 2 Lahore 282.\n\nprovisions of Order XX, Rule 14 Civil Procedure Code could execute the decree in order to obtain possession of the land purchased by him.\"\n\nAll the three Judges of the Full Bench wrote separate opinions.\n\nD. K. Mahajan, J. was of the opinion that assuming that a decree of pre-emption is a personal decree, the transferees of the land from the pre-emptor whose title was perfected by deposit as envisaged in\n\n0. XX, Rule 14 (1) (b) were entitled to execute the decree granted\n\nby the Court in favour of the pre-emptor and can seek assistance of • the Court for recovering actual possession from the first vendees who had no right to continue in possession, apart from 0. XX, Rule 16 '-- c under section 146 C.P.C. P. C. Pandit, J. and H. R. Sodhi, J., the ~\n\nother two members of the Full Bench were of the opinion that the right of pre-emption being a personal right, a decree for pre-emption will be a personal decree and is not assignable and even if title to the land passed to the vendees who purchased the land from the preemptor after the pre-emptor complied with the provisions contained in Order XX, Rule 14 yet tbey would not be entitled to execute the decree for possession because decree is not assigned and section 146 would not help the present appellants. In accordance with this majority opinion, the appeals preferred by the first vendees were allowed and tbe applications for execution filed by the present appellants were dismissed.\n\nThe High Conrt granted a certificate under Article 133 (1) ( c) ef the Constitution because in its opinion tbe question involved in the appeals was of considerable importance and was likely to arise frequently and that it deserved to be decided finally by the Supreme\n\nr eonrt. '\n\nMr. Janardan Sharma, learned counsel for tbe respondents urged ijiat looking to the scheme of SS. 4, 6 and 15 of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1930, it is incontrovertible that foundation of the right of pre-emption being close personal relationship, it is a personal G right and can be exercised only by the person in .whom it vests, under the Jaw and if in exercise of such right snch a qualified person seeks to pre-empt a sale by instituting an action in a Court of Jaw, the resultant decree would be a personal decree.\n\nUrged Mr. Sharma further that if\" the decree is a personal one, obviously it cannot be assigned and the assignee gets no interest in a decree so as to enable H him to execute the decree.\n\nThe question whether the right of preemption conferred by the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, is a personal right or it creates an interest in the property is\n\n. '11 _~\n\nno more res integra and is concluded by a decision of this Court between the very parties who are parties to the present appeals, in an earlier round of litigation wherin the first vendees, the present respondents had challenged the right of Neki deceased pre-emptor to obtain a decree for pre-emption. Apart from the fact that the point is concluded by a decision of a Bench of three Judges of the Court, it is inter-partes and, there.fore, binding on the respondents whom Mr. Janardan Sharma represents and at the instance of the respondents it cannot be re-opened or re-examined. As the matter calls for\n\n4 no examination at the hands of the Court it would suffice to quote\n\nj,..__what has ben held in Hazari & Ors. v. Neki & Ors.(') Ramaswami, -' J. speaking for the Court, observed as under:\n\n\"1 \"In support of these appeals, learned counsel put forward the argument that the right of pre-emption claimed by Neki deceased plaintiff was a personal right which died with him upon his death and the legal representatives of Neki W0re not e'ntitled to be granted a decree for pre-emption.\n\nThe argument was that the statutory right of pre-emption under the Punjab Act was not a heritable right and no\n\ndecree for pre-emption should have been passed by the lower court in favour of the legal representatives as re- ;:iresenting the estate of Neki.\n\nWe are unable to accept the argument put forward by the appellants. It is not correct to say that the right of pre-emption is a personal right on the part of the pre-emptor to get the re-transfer of the property from the vendee who has already become the '.lWner of the same. It is true that the right of pre-emption becomes enforceable only when there is a sale but the right exists antecendently to the sale, the foundation of the right\n\nJeing the avoidance of the inconveniences and disturbances which would arise from the introduction of a stranger into the land.\n\nThe correct legal position is that the statutory law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon the ownership of a property to the extent that it restricts the owner's right of sale and compels him to sell the property to the person entitled to pre-emption under the statute.\n\nIn other words, the statutory right of pre-emption though . not amounting to an interest in the land is a right which attaches to the land and which can be enforced against a purchaser by the person entitled to pre-empt.\" Mr. Janardan Sharma, however, sought to position under a voluntary inter vivas transfer and\n\n(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 833-836.\n\ndistinguish the an involuntary\n\ntransfor such as by way of inheritance and urged that in this case Neki having sold the lands to the present appellants by sale inter vivas they cannot enjoy the fruits of the decree.\n\nThis distinction is immaterial as far as the present case is concerned because the question in terms disposed of by the Court is that Neki having complied with Order XX, Rule 14, had become the owner of the lands and his legal representatives on his death were rightly substituted in the proceedings.\n\nThe contention, therefore, that decree in a suit for pre-emption is a personal decree and creates no interest in land, the\n\n• •\n\nsubject matter of pre-emption, must accordingly fail. • _--l_ c\n\nThe next contention is that the deed evidencing the sale of lands 1-.\n\nExt. D-1 dated 15th February, 1963 merely transferred the lands t but does not purport to assign the decree, then in the absence of such an assignment the purported assignee cannot execute the decree in view of the provision contained in Order XXI, Rule 16, and therefore, the execution applications at the instance of the prese'nt appellants are not maintainable.\n\nThe Additional District Judge did not decide the contention whether the Execution Applications at the instance of the present appellants, (namely, subsequent transferees were maintainable under O. XXI, Rule 16, because in his opinion the present appellants were entitled to execute the decree under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe majority view of the High Court is that the subsequent transferees, the present appellants, were not entitled to execute the decree under 0. XXI, Rule 16 because the decree for pre-emption being a personal one cannot he assigned and alternatively if it could be assigned, as a matter of fact. it has not been assigned and therefore the applications for execution at their instance are not maintainable.\n\nThey were further of the view that section 146 would not assist the appellants as provisions. contained in 0. XXI, Rule 16 being a specific contrary provisions, section 146 cannot be invoked.\n\nOrder XXI, Rule 16 permits an execution of a decree at the instanoe of an assignee by transfer of a decree, the assignment may G be in writing or by operation of law and if such an application is made, the court to which an application is made shall issue a notice to the transferor of the decree and the judgment debtor and the decree cannot be executed until the Court heard their obj•ctions, if any, to its execution.\n\nSection 47 C.P.C. provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was pass-\n\nR ed, or their representatives, relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.\n\nExplanation appended to\n\nsection 4 7 provides that for the purposes of that section amongst others a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree is deemed to be a party to the suit. It would have been interesting to examine the question whether the purchaser of land from a pre-emptor in whose favour a decree for pre-emption has been passed and who subsequent to the decree complied with the requiremnt of Order XX, Rule 14 and thereby perfected his title would be, on the analogy of a purchaser al a sale in execution of a decree, a party to the suit or at any rate the representative of the decree-holder or a successor in interest of the decree-holder, but as we are of the opinion that the applications for execution filed by the present appellants are maintainable under section 146 C.P.C. the larger qnestion need not be decided in these appeals.\n\nSection 146 reads as under :\n\n\"Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him.\"\n\nShorn of unessentials the section provides that where some proceeding could be taken or application could be made by a person under the Code of Civil Procedure any other person claiming under him is entitled to make and maintain snch an application.\n\nThe limitation on the exercise of this right is to be found in the expression, 'save as otherwise provided by this Code'. It would mean that if the Code permits a proceeding to be taken or an application to be made by a party, then in the absence of a provision to the contrary, sec- .¥-tion 146 would enable any one claiming under such person as well • to make the same application.\n\nThe object behind the section appears to be to facilitate the exercise of right by a person claiming under the person whose right to maintain an application is beyond dispute.\n\nSection 146 came in for consideration in Jugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.(') In that case the facts were that the plain- . tiffs in a pending suit for recovery of debt transferred to another person all book and other debts due to them including the debt involved in the suit.\n\nThe transferees did 'not apply to be joined as parties in the pending suit and the suit continued in the name of the original plaintiffs and ended in a decree.\n\nSubsequently the\n\n(l) [1955] S.C.R. 1369.\n\ntransferees as decree-holders applied for execution of the decree against the judgment-debtor and upon a notice being issued, a contntion was raised that the application was not maintainable under Order XXI, Rule 16.\n\nOne submission was that even if ihe application for execution was not maintainable under 0. XXI, Rule 16, it would certainly l>~ maintainable at the instance of the transferees of the original debt under section 146.\n\nAccepting this contention Das, J. observed that a person may conceivably become entitled to the benefits of a decree without being a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law.\n\nIn that ituation the person so becoming the owner of the decree may well be regarded as a person claiming under the decree-holder.\n\nIt was further held in. that case that the transferees of the debt derived their title to the debt by transfer from the transferors and when the decree was passed in relation to decree they must also be regarded as persons claiming under the transferors and accordingly they would be entitled to make an application for execution under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nBhagwati, J. in a separate and concurring judgment on this point observed that the only meaning that can be assigned to the expression 'save as otherwise provided by this Code' in sec.\n\n146 is that if a transferee of the decree can avail himself of the provision contained under Order XXI, Rule 16 by establishing that he is such a transferee he must only avail himself of that provision. Bnt if he fails to establish his title as a transferee by assignment in writing or by operation of law within the meaning of 0. XXI, Rule 16 there is nothing in that provision which prohibits him from availing himself of section 146 if the provision of that section can be availed of by him.\n\nIt would thus appear that if the sale-deed in respect of land on its proper construction would show that the decree itself\n\nwas assigned obviously the application for execution would be main-·- -,{ tainable under 0. XXI, Rule 16. But if the appellants do not fall ·> within the four corners of 0. XXI, Rule 16 and they appear not to fall within the four corners of it, because though the land, the subject matter of the decree is sold to appellants, the decree itself is not assigned, they would nonetheless be able to maintain application for execution under section 146 as persons claiming under the decree-holder.\n\nThe respondents cannot have both the ways.\n\nIf the deed evidenced transfer of deree by assignment then 0. XXI, Rule 16 weula be attracted but if, as it appears, there is no transfer of decree by assignment, the lands having been sold by the decree-holder after perfecting his title and purchased by the present appellants they would be persons claiming under the original pre-emptor decreeholder Neki and if Neki could have made an application for\n\n- •\n\nexecution of the decree as decree-holder, the present appellants, as A purchasers of land from Neki would certainly be claiming under Neki • and, therefore, their application for execution would certainly be maintainable under section 146. In this connection it wonld be advantageous to refer to Smt. Saila BaU. Dassi v.\n\nSmt.\n\nNirma/a Sundari Dassi and Another(') wherein it has been in terms held that section 146 was introduced for the first time in Civil Procedure Code 1908 with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons in whom they came to be vested by devolution or assignment and being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally so as to • _, l advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense.\n\nViewed _, from this angle the present appellants must succeed because they pur- .,, chased land from pre-emptor Neki and the validity of sale being now beyond dispute, they are persons claiming under Neki whose right\n\nto execute the decree was never disputed and, therefore, appellants claiming under the vendor Neki would be able to maintain an application for execution under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nAppellants are thus entitled to execute the decree for possession.\n\nAccordingly these three appeals are allowed and the decision of the High Court dated 30th May, 1969 in Execution Appeals Nos. 1131, 1132 and 1133 of 1968 is set aside and the decision of the Additional District Judge dated 15th July, 1968 is restored, but in the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1287.", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "ZILA SlNGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ZILA SlNGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HAZARI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HAZARI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 25, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 25, 1979\n\n[P. 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K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. K. Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "JaMrdhan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4895, "end_char": 4910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JaMrdhan Sharma and Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana arise H from three Execution Petitions filed by the present appellants for executing three decrees obtained by one Neki (since deceased) in three\n\nsuits bearing Nos."}}, {"text": "Jitendra Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4915, "end_char": 4930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JaMrdhan Sharma and Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana arise H from three Execution Petitions filed by the present appellants for executing three decrees obtained by one Neki (since deceased) in three\n\nsuits bearing Nos."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4995, "end_char": 5000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JaMrdhan Sharma and Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana arise H from three Execution Petitions filed by the present appellants for executing three decrees obtained by one Neki (since deceased) in three\n\nsuits bearing Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Neki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JaMrdhan Sharma and Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana arise H from three Execution Petitions filed by the present appellants for executing three decrees obtained by one Neki (since deceased) in three\n\nsuits bearing Nos."}}, {"text": "25th J_anuary 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5543, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1148, 1656 and 2341 of 1966 decided on 25th J_anuary 1968."}}, {"text": "Dhara Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suffice to state that there is no dispute that decrees for pre-emption were passed in favour of Neki against the original vendor Dhara Singh and his vendees Hazari and others and the satisfaction of the condition in the decrees of pre-emption for payment or deposit of the amounts as directed by the Court within the stipulated time is not questioned in the present proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Dhara Singh"}}, {"text": "Hazari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suffice to state that there is no dispute that decrees for pre-emption were passed in favour of Neki against the original vendor Dhara Singh and his vendees Hazari and others and the satisfaction of the condition in the decrees of pre-emption for payment or deposit of the amounts as directed by the Court within the stipulated time is not questioned in the present proceedings.", "canonical_name": "HAZARI & ORS"}}, {"text": "3rd December 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The various amounts we.re duly deposited in the three decrees by Neki, the decree holder, on 3rd December 1962."}}, {"text": "5th December 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6587, "end_char": 6604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sooh thereafter, on 5th December 1962 Neki sold the lands in respect of which he got the decrees to Zila Singh and others, the present appellants."}}, {"text": "Zila Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sooh thereafter, on 5th December 1962 Neki sold the lands in respect of which he got the decrees to Zila Singh and others, the present appellants."}}, {"text": "Dharn Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Original Vendor Dharn Singh and the first vendees filed their objections challenging the right of the present vendees to execute the decrees.", "canonical_name": "Dhara Singh"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8220, "end_char": 8229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8260, "end_char": 8287, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "District Court at Rohtak", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8557, "end_char": 8581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25/14, 26/14 aud 27 /14 of 1968 to the District Court at Rohtak."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8980, "end_char": 8985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9183, "end_char": 9194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9195, "end_char": 9200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hazari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9203, "end_char": 9209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional District Judge who heard these appeals, by a common order rejected the appeals and confirmed the order of the trial\n\n1 I Court observing that the pre-emptor having deposited the purchase ~-> iJrice as directed by the Court, in accordance with the terms of the <lecrees, his title to the lands was perfected from the date of depopit as provided in Order XX, Rule 14 (l)(b), C.P.C., the appellants as purchasers of lands from the pre-emptor in whose favour the decrees fat pre-emption including the one for possession had become final, were entitled to recover possession under section 146 C.P.C.\n\nHazari, Amar Singh and Bhan Singh the first vendees preferred three Execution Second Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "HAZARI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9211, "end_char": 9221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional District Judge who heard these appeals, by a common order rejected the appeals and confirmed the order of the trial\n\n1 I Court observing that the pre-emptor having deposited the purchase ~-> iJrice as directed by the Court, in accordance with the terms of the <lecrees, his title to the lands was perfected from the date of depopit as provided in Order XX, Rule 14 (l)(b), C.P.C., the appellants as purchasers of lands from the pre-emptor in whose favour the decrees fat pre-emption including the one for possession had become final, were entitled to recover possession under section 146 C.P.C.\n\nHazari, Amar Singh and Bhan Singh the first vendees preferred three Execution Second Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Bhan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional District Judge who heard these appeals, by a common order rejected the appeals and confirmed the order of the trial\n\n1 I Court observing that the pre-emptor having deposited the purchase ~-> iJrice as directed by the Court, in accordance with the terms of the <lecrees, his title to the lands was perfected from the date of depopit as provided in Order XX, Rule 14 (l)(b), C.P.C., the appellants as purchasers of lands from the pre-emptor in whose favour the decrees fat pre-emption including the one for possession had become final, were entitled to recover possession under section 146 C.P.C.\n\nHazari, Amar Singh and Bhan Singh the first vendees preferred three Execution Second Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Dhara Singh"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab & Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9331, "end_char": 9361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1131, 1132 and 1133/68 to the High Court of Punjab & Haryana."}}, {"text": ".Ram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned single Judge had certain reservations about the correctness of the decision in ' _.Ram Singh's case and, therefore, he considered it prudent to refer the\n\n<- ,._..- matter to a Division Bench."}}, {"text": "AIR 1965 AP 81", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10631, "end_char": 10645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10735, "end_char": 10755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. K. Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10908, "end_char": 10921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. K. Mahajan, J. was of the opinion that assuming that a decree of pre-emption is a personal decree, the transferees of the land from the pre-emptor whose title was perfected by deposit as envisaged in\n\n0."}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11398, "end_char": 11409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11410, "end_char": 11415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "P. C. Pandit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11417, "end_char": 11429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XX, Rule 16 '-- c under section 146 C.P.C. P. C. Pandit, J. and H. R. Sodhi, J., the ~\n\nother two members of the Full Bench were of the opinion that the right of pre-emption being a personal right, a decree for pre-emption will be a personal decree and is not assignable and even if title to the land passed to the vendees who purchased the land from the preemptor after the pre-emptor complied with the provisions contained in Order XX, Rule 14 yet tbey would not be entitled to execute the decree for possession because decree is not assigned and section 146 would not help the present appellants."}}, {"text": "H. R. Sodhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XX, Rule 16 '-- c under section 146 C.P.C. P. C. Pandit, J. and H. R. Sodhi, J., the ~\n\nother two members of the Full Bench were of the opinion that the right of pre-emption being a personal right, a decree for pre-emption will be a personal decree and is not assignable and even if title to the land passed to the vendees who purchased the land from the preemptor after the pre-emptor complied with the provisions contained in Order XX, Rule 14 yet tbey would not be entitled to execute the decree for possession because decree is not assigned and section 146 would not help the present appellants."}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11923, "end_char": 11934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12199, "end_char": 12210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Supreme", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12416, "end_char": 12423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Conrt granted a certificate under Article 133 (1) ( c) ef the Constitution because in its opinion tbe question involved in the appeals was of considerable importance and was likely to arise frequently and that it deserved to be decided finally by the Supreme\n\nr eonrt. '"}}, {"text": "Janardan Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12441, "end_char": 12456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Janardan Sharma, learned counsel for tbe respondents urged ijiat looking to the scheme of SS."}}, {"text": "SS. 4, 6 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12531, "end_char": 12546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Preemption Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12554, "end_char": 12581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12969, "end_char": 12975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Urged Mr. Sharma further that if\" the decree is a personal one, obviously it cannot be assigned and the assignee gets no interest in a decree so as to enable H him to execute the decree."}}, {"text": "question whether the right of preemption conferred by the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13151, "end_char": 13251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14066, "end_char": 14075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswami, -' J. speaking for the Court, observed as under:\n\n\"1 \"In support of these appeals, learned counsel put forward the argument that the right of pre-emption claimed by Neki deceased plaintiff was a personal right which died with him upon his death and the legal representatives of Neki W0re not e'ntitled to be granted a decree for pre-emption."}}, {"text": "Neki W0re", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14355, "end_char": 14364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswami, -' J. speaking for the Court, observed as under:\n\n\"1 \"In support of these appeals, learned counsel put forward the argument that the right of pre-emption claimed by Neki deceased plaintiff was a personal right which died with him upon his death and the legal representatives of Neki W0re not e'ntitled to be granted a decree for pre-emption."}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 833", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15855, "end_char": 15874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th February, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16680, "end_char": 16699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-1 dated 15th February, 1963 merely transferred the lands t but does not purport to assign the decree, then in the absence of such an assignment the purported assignee cannot execute the decree in view of the provision contained in Order XXI, Rule 16, and therefore, the execution applications at the instance of the prese'nt appellants are not maintainable."}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17330, "end_char": 17341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17345, "end_char": 17372, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17818, "end_char": 17829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17944, "end_char": 17955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18398, "end_char": 18408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18409, "end_char": 18414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18722, "end_char": 18731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19477, "end_char": 19488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19489, "end_char": 19494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19555, "end_char": 19566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19992, "end_char": 20019, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20673, "end_char": 20684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21586, "end_char": 21597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21626, "end_char": 21629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accepting this contention Das, J. observed that a person may conceivably become entitled to the benefits of a decree without being a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law."}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22276, "end_char": 22287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22291, "end_char": 22318, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22321, "end_char": 22329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati, J. in a separate and concurring judgment on this point observed that the only meaning that can be assigned to the expression 'save as otherwise provided by this Code' in sec."}}, {"text": "sec.\n\n146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22501, "end_char": 22510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22931, "end_char": 22942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23563, "end_char": 23574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24302, "end_char": 24313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24479, "end_char": 24490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24528, "end_char": 24553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25197, "end_char": 25208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code 1908", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code 1908"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25212, "end_char": 25239, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "30th May, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25395, "end_char": 25409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly these three appeals are allowed and the decision of the High Court dated 30th May, 1969 in Execution Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "15th July, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25533, "end_char": 25548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1131, 1132 and 1133 of 1968 is set aside and the decision of the Additional District Judge dated 15th July, 1968 is restored, but in the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_232_235_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SHAKUNTLA ETC. ETC.\n\nSTATE , OF HARYANA\n\nFebruary 16, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nPEPSU 1 cna11cy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, S.\n\n32 FF, whetherapplicable to gift of land by non-related donor. f\n\n• '\n\nThe appellants were persons to whom gifts of agricultural lands were made .,_ before July 30, 1958, for love and affection, by non-related donors. The Reve- --4_\n\nnue authorities decided that these gifts were not protected by s. 32FF of the i PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, as there had been no valuable \"consideration\", within the meaning of that section. A Division Bench ot the Haryana High Court upheld the disn1issal of the appellants' writ petition,. by a single Judge of th(lt court.\n\nDismissing the app'eals the Court,\n\nHELD : It is the essence of a gift as defined in the Transfer of Property 1\\ct, that it should be without \"consideration•· of the nature defined in s. 2(d) of the Contract Act, and as section 32FF of the Act saves 'only the transfer vr disposition of land for \"consideration\" upto the limit specified in it, the gifts under dispute, will not fall within the purview of that section.\n\nAny other view of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act, which provides for ceiling on land and acquisition and disposal of surplus area. [234 E, G, H-235 A]\n\nJames Newton v. Robert Hargreaves, 135 ER 905; distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1829-1831 of 1969.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-1-69 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in LP.A. Nos. 256- 258 of 1966.\n\nY. C. Mahajan and Mrs. Urmila Kapur for the Appellant.\n\nB. Dutta and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J.-The appellants in these three appeals are aggrieved against a common judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated January 14, 1969, by which the judgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court dismissing their writ petitions was upheld on the ground that the gifts to them did not fall within the purview of the saving clause of section 32FF of the PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\n~ •\n\nI ..\n\n' •\n\n1 I\n\nIt is not in dispute that a gift was made in each of these cases before July 30, 1958, and in one case after August 21, 1956 but before July 30, 1958. The donees were not persons who were not related to the donors, and were persons to whom gifts were made of agricultural lands for love and affection.\n\nThe revenue authorities took the view that the gifts were not transfers of lands of the nature protected by section 32FF of the Act as there was no valuable consideration, and mere love and affection was not \"consideration\" within the meaning of that section.\n\nAs the High Court has upheld that view, the appellants feel aggrieved and have come up in appeal to this Court by special leave. .~ Section 32FF of the Act which deals with certain transfers which are not to affect the surplus area of a landowner provides as follows,-\n\n\"32FF. Save in the case of land acquired by the State Govermnent under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance or up to 30th July, 1958 by a landless person, or a small landowner, not being a relation as prescribed of the person making the transfer or disposition of land, for consideration up to an area which with oI without. the area owned or held by him does not in the aggregate exceed the permissible limit no transfer or other disposition of land effected after 21st August, 1956, shall affect the right of the State Govermnent under this Act to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer or disposition :\n\nProvided that any person who has received . any advantage under snch transfer or disposition of land shall be bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the . person from whom he received it.\" .~-The section therefore provides that no transfer or other disposition\n\nof land effected after August 21, 1956, shall affect the rights of the State Government under the Act to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer or disposition \"save\" in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force, or by an heir by inheritance or up to July 30, 1958\n\n• by a landless person, or small landowner, not being a relation as prescribed of the person making the transfer or disposition of land, provided that it is for \"consideration\", up to an area' which with or without the area owned or held by him does not in the aggreate exceed the permissible limit. The only point in controversy before us is whether the gifts of land which were made in the three cases\n\n16-196 SCI/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nunder appeal on account of natural love and affection, could be said to be transfers of the lands for consideration ? It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the aforesaid gifts were in the nature of transfer of property as defined in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act and it did not matter if they were by way of gift and did not amount to sale or exchange.\n\nSection 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines \"transfer of property\" to mean an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, inter alia, to one or more other living persons.\n\nSuch transfer of property may be made by one of the several modes known to law e.g. by sale, exchange or gift etc. It is not the case of the appellants that the transfers under consideration were by way of sale or exchange or that they were made otherwise than by way of gift to them.\n\nSection 122 of the Transfer of Property Act defines \"gift\" as follows,-\n\n\"122. \"Gift\" is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.\"\n\nIt is therefore one of the essential requirements of a gift that it should be made by the donor \"without consideration''.\n\nThe word \"consideration\" has not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act, but we have no doubt that it has been used in that Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act and excludes natural love and affection. If it were to be otherwise, a transfer would really amount to a sale within the meaning of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, or to an exchange within the meaning of section 118 for each party will have the rights and be subject to the liabilities of a seller as to what he gives and have the rights a11d be subject to the liabi• lities of a buyer as to that which he takes.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to examine the , other modes of transfer, for they have no bearing on the nature of the controversy before us. It would thus appear 1!hat it is of the essence of a gift as defined in the Transfer of Property Act that it should be without \"consideration\" of the nature defined in section 2 ( d) of the Contract Act,\n\nNow what section 32FF of the Act saves is transfer or dispo- B sition of land for \"consideration\" up to the limit specified in it, and as a gift is always without consideration, the gifts which are the subject matter of controversy before us will not fall within the purview of that section, and have rightly been excluded while calculat- A ing the surplus area in the three cases before us.\n\nAny other view\n\n--Of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act which provides for ceiling on land and acquisition and disposal of surplus area.\n\nMr. Mahajan for the appellants tried to argue that \"good consi- B\n\nderation\" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (fourth edition) to mean \"such as is founded on natural duty and affection'', cand would amount to consideration within the meaning of section 32FF of the Act.\n\nBut even there it has been clarified that \"good\" ~· is generally used \"in antithesis to valuable consideration\". which has\n\nA' necessarily to be excluded in the case of a gift by virtue of its defi- ., nition in section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThe rirgument of learned counsel becomes untenable on a reference to 17 C.J.S. Contract 91-92 on which he has placed considerable reliance.\n\nWe have also gone through James Newton v. Robert Hargreaves, Cl :but it cannot avail the appellants for there the conveyance was by the father to his two sons in consideration of natural Jove and affection and the law acknowledged that to be a \"good\" consideration, which is not so in the cases before us.\n\nThere is thus no force in these appeals and they arc dismissed with costs.\n\nM.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n(1) 135 E. R. 905,", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "SHAKUNTLA ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAKUNTLA ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE , OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE , OF HARYANA\n\nFebruary 16, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.\n\n32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench ot the Haryana High Court upheld the disn1issal of the appellants' writ petition,."}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 953, "end_char": 964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Any other view of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Y. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1605, "end_char": 1618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. C. Mahajan and Mrs. Urmila Kapur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. C. Mahajan and Mrs. Urmila Kapur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1661, "end_char": 1669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dutta and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dutta and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SHINGHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1754, "end_char": 1762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J.-The appellants in these three appeals are aggrieved against a common judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated January 14, 1969, by which the judgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court dismissing their writ petitions was upheld on the ground that the gifts to them did not fall within the purview of the saving clause of section 32FF of the PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as the Act."}}, {"text": "section 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104, "end_char": 2115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any other view of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "Any other view of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "July 30, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ •\n\nI ..\n\n' •\n\n1 I\n\nIt is not in dispute that a gift was made in each of these cases before July 30, 1958, and in one case after August 21, 1956 but before July 30, 1958."}}, {"text": "21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ •\n\nI ..\n\n' •\n\n1 I\n\nIt is not in dispute that a gift was made in each of these cases before July 30, 1958, and in one case after August 21, 1956 but before July 30, 1958."}}, {"text": "section 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2641, "end_char": 2652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2926, "end_char": 2937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th July, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Save in the case of land acquired by the State Govermnent under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance or up to 30th July, 1958 by a landless person, or a small landowner, not being a relation as prescribed of the person making the transfer or disposition of land, for consideration up to an area which with oI without."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3558, "end_char": 3575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the area owned or held by him does not in the aggregate exceed the permissible limit no transfer or other disposition of land effected after 21st August, 1956, shall affect the right of the State Govermnent under this Act to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer or disposition :\n\nProvided that any person who has received ."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".~-The section therefore provides that no transfer or other disposition\n\nof land effected after August 21, 1956, shall affect the rights of the State Government under the Act to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer or disposition \"save\" in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force, or by an heir by inheritance or up to July 30, 1958\n\n• by a landless person, or small landowner, not being a relation as prescribed of the person making the transfer or disposition of land, provided that it is for \"consideration\", up to an area' which with or without the area owned or held by him does not in the aggreate exceed the permissible limit."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4773, "end_char": 4808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only point in controversy before us is whether the gifts of land which were made in the three cases\n\n16-196 SCI/79\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5076, "end_char": 5100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5209, "end_char": 5233, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5684, "end_char": 5695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5727, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6165, "end_char": 6189, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6426, "end_char": 6436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6468, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6934, "end_char": 6958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7026, "end_char": 7035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "section 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7072, "end_char": 7083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "--Of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7472, "end_char": 7540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7627, "end_char": 7634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mahajan for the appellants tried to argue that \"good consi- B\n\nderation\" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (fourth edition) to mean \"such as is founded on natural duty and affection'', cand would amount to consideration within the meaning of section 32FF of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 32F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7878, "end_char": 7889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any other view\n\n--Of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "Any other view\n\n--Of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8116, "end_char": 8127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any other view\n\n--Of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "Any other view\n\n--Of the section would defeat the purpose of Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8135, "end_char": 8159, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_236_241_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "BAREILLY HOLDINGS LTD.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN\n\nFebruary 16, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACllUD, C.J., R. S. SARK.ARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA,\n\n0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J\n\nE111ployees State Insurance Act, 1948, Section 72 and Regulation 97 framed under Section 97(1) of the E.S.l., Act, .1948, purpose and effect oj- Whether 1he deduction of half day's wages corresponding to the sickness benefit to which the lvorkmen were entitled under the E.S.l. Act, in the event of their not availing themselves of the benefits under the E.S.l. scheme in order.\n\nBy virtue of the award in Adjudication case No. 33 of 1952 given by the State Tribunal Allahabad, respondents were entitled to fifteen days' sick leave on full wages as a condition of their service. The appellant adopted the Employees State Insurance Act in 1957.\n\nThe appellant, therefore, paid to the workmen full wages for two day's sick leave out of 1.5 days' sick leave for the reason that the workmen did not get cash benefit for the first two days of the waiting period of sickness on account of the provisions of section 49 of the E.S.I. Act. For the balance of the thirteen days only half the wages'\n\nwere paid. In the industrial dispute referred for adjudication to the Indtll!trial Tribunal under section 4(k) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the award went in favour of the workmen.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court, E HELD : !. The general purpose and effect of section 72 is to deny to\n\nthe employers the right or power to reduce or discontinue the benefit payable to the workmen under their conditions of service on the ground that the benefits available under the conditions of service and under the E.S.I.\n\nAct being similar the workmen would not be entitled to a double benefit. [240 A-Bl\n\nSection 72 provides in terms that the mere circumstance th.et an employer is liable to make a contribution under the E.S.I. Act will not entitle him, directly or indirectly, to reduce the wages of an employee or, in so far as the Regulation permits, discontinue or reduce the benefits payable to him under the conditions of his service even if those benefits are similar to tho benefits conferred by the E.S.I. Act. The purpos.e of Section 72 is evidently to dis~ courage employers from using the benefits provided under the E.S.I. Act as an excuse or justification for reducing or dis-continuing the benefits avDilable to the workmen under their conditions of service on the ground of similarity between the two types of benefits.\n\nThe case of the appellant before the lndutrsial Tribunal was that it was making a contribution to the E.S.I. Corporation for the benefit of its employees and if any individual employee chose not to avail of the benefits due to him from the Corporation on account of the sickness benefit; it is he who ought to suffer and there would be no justification for obliging the employer to spend for his sickness benefit twice over. It is precisely this type of argument and attitude that the legislature anticipated and guarded against by incorporating the particular provision in section 72. (240 B-E]\n\n• •\n\nMREILLY HOLDINGS LTD. v. WORKMEN (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\n2. The contention that it is enough for justifying the deduction from wages A <lue to the workmen for sick leave that the employee is covered by the E.S.I. Act is not correct. In the first place, section 46 of the\n\nE.S.I.\n\nAct would show that employees who are covered by the E.S.I. Act are entitled to certain benefit subject to the provisions of the E.S.I. Act. It is, therefore, not as if the workmen are entitled to the benefits absolutely and without compliance with the conditions laid don by the Act or the Regulation.\n\nSecondly, the proviso to Regulation 97 says that the employer shall be en- B titled to deduct from the leave salary of the employee, \"the amount of benefit\" to which he may be entitled under the E.S.I. Act for the corresponding period of his sickness. A \\vorkman does not become entitled to the \"amount\" paya ble to him by way of sickness benefit unless, in the first instance, he chooses to avail himself of the sickness benefit. That benefit cannot be forced on him. This would show that the employer's right to make a deduction from the employee's sick leave WQ, ges can only be exercised. in respect of those days C of sickness leave for which the workman has actually availed of the sickness benefit. [240 F, H, 231 A-CJ\n\n3. Benefits which are available under the E.S.I. Act are not intended as substitutes for benefits to \\Vhich the workmen are entitled under the condi~ tions of their service.\n\nA \\Vorkman becomes entitled to sickness benefit only if he is qualified for it and he gets a cash benefit only if he avails himself of the sickness b'enefit.\n\nThus it is only when a workma.n, in fact obtains or receives a cash benefit that the employer can exercise his right to make a deduction from wages due to him by way of leave salary. Jn providing for periodical peyment!I to an insured worker in case of sickness, the legislature did not intend to substitute any of those benefits for the workmen's right to , get leave on full pay on the ground of sickness. [241. B-D, FJ\n\nHindustOJI Times Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1964] I SCR 234 •pplied in part.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Award dated 28-11-1969 of the Industrial Tribunal (II) Lucknow in Adjudication Case No. 120 of 1968 published in U.P.\n\nGazette dated 21-3-1970.\n\nG. B. Pai, D. N. Misra and Shri Narain for the Appellant.\n\nGobilzd Das (A.C.) .and Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare fo.r the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow, U.P. dated November 28, 1969.\n\nOn September 7, 1968 the Government of U.P. referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under\n\nection 4 (K) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 28 of 1947 :\n\n\"Whether the action of the employers in deducting half wages corresponding to the sickness benefit to which workmen are entitled under the E.S.I. Act in the event of the\n\nworkmen not availing the services of the E.S.I. is legal and/or justified ? If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled and with what details ?\"\n\nThe respondent-workmen contended that the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the E.S.I. Act) was adopted by the appellant, M/s Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., in 1957, that the WO'rkmen used to enjoy, prior to 1957, 15 days' sick leave with full wages every year in accordance with the terms of an award given by the State Tribunal, Allahabad, in Adjudication Case No. 33 of 1952, that under that award, the workmen were entitled to sick leave on full wages as a condition of their service, that they also became entitled to sickness benefit under the Employees State Insurance Scheme and that the appellant was not justified in reducing the wages to the extent of a half day's wages in respect of employees availing. of sick leave.\n\nThe appellant contested the demand of the workmen on the grounds, mter aliu, th>at its action in deducting half wages corresponding to the sickness benefit to which the workmen we.re entitled under the Act in regard to the sick leave was in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 97 of the Employees State Insurance (General) Regulations 1950, that if any individual employee choose not to avail of th~ benefit due to him from the E.S.I. Corporation on account of his sickness, a deduction of half the wages corresponding to the sickness benefit could be made by the employer and that the sickness benefit provided under the E.S.I. Act and the Scheme was in substitution of the benefits. provided by the employer and not in addition thereto. The appellant raised an objection to the maintainability of the reference on the ground that the dispute referred by the State Government to the Triounal was not an industrial dispute and contended further that the subject matter of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Employees State Insurance Court set up under section 74 of the E.S.I.\n\nAct, as a result of which the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction todeal with the dispute.\n\nThe objection to the maintainability of the reference and to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to deal with it not having beeii pressed by the appellant's counsel, the only question which we liave to consider is whether the appellant can deduct half-day's wages corresponding to the sickness benefit to which the workmen are entitled under the E.S.I. Act, in the event of their not availing thmselves of the benefits under the E.S.I. Scheme.\n\n' •\n\n• _.---\"---- ,\n\nBefore dealing with this question. it may be mentioned that the appellant has no objection to paying full wages for two days of sick leave to the workmen and in fact, it has been paying full wages for two days out of 15 days' sick leave due to the workmen. The reason for this course seems to be that the workmen do, not get cash benefit for the first two days of the waiting period of sickness by reason of the provisions of section 49 of the E.S.l. Act.\n\nThe dispute in this appeal is, therefore, confined to a period of 13 days of sick kave only, for which the workmen are being paid half wages by the appellant.\n\nTo justify the deduction of half wages from 13 days of sick leave, the appellant relies on the provisions of section 72 of the E.S. I. Act and Regulation 97 framed unde; r section 97 ( 1) of the E.S.I. Act.\n\nSection 72 reads thns :\n\n\"Employer not to reduce the wages.\n\nNo employer by reason only of his liability for any contributions payable under this Act shall directly or indirectly reduce the wages of any employee, or except as provided by the regulations, discontinue or reduce benefits payable to him under the conditions of his se; rvice which are similar to the benefits conferred by the Act.\"\n\nThe relevant part of Regulation 97 is as follows :\n\n\"Discontinuance or reduction of benefi, t.\n\nAn employer may discontinue or reduce the benefits payable to his employees under conditions of tlieir service, which are similar to the benefits conferred by the Act to the extent specified below, namely:\n\n(a) from the date of commencement of the first benefit period following the appointed day fo; r his factory or establishment -\n\n(i) sick leave on half pay to the full extent;\n\n(ii) such proportion of any combined general purposes and sick leave on half pay as may be assigned as sick leave but in any case not exceeding SO per cent of such combined leave;\n\n(b)\n\nProvided that where an employee avails himself of any H leave from the employer for sickness, maternity or temporary disablement, the employer shall be entitled to deduct from\n\nthe leave salary of the employee the amount of benefit to which he may be entitled under the Act for the correi; ponding period.\"\n\nThe general purpose and effect of section 72 is to deny to the employers the right or power to reduce or discontinue the benefits payable to the workmen under their conditions of service on the ground that the benefits available under the conditions of service and under the E.S.I. Act being similar, the workmen would not be entitled to a double\n\nbenefit. Section 72 provides in terms that the mere circumstance that > an employer is liable to make a contribution under the E.S.I. Act _-l,_ will not entitle him, directly or indirectly, to reduce the wages of an \"- employee or, in so far as the Regulation permits, discontinue or reduce 7\n\nthe benefits payable to him under the conditions cf his service even if those benefits are similar to the benefits conferred by the E.S.I. Act.\n\nThe case of the appellant before the Industrial Tribunal was that it was making a contribution to the E.S.I. Corporation for the benefit of its employees and if any individual employee chose not to avail of the benefits due to him from the Corporation on account of the sickness benefit, it is he who ought to suffer and there would be no justification for obliging the employer to spend for his sickness benefit twice over. It is precisely this type of argument and attitude that the legislature an.ticipated and guarded against by incorporating the particular provision in section 72. The purpose of that provision is evidently to discourage employers from using the benefits provided under the E.S.I. Act as an excuse or justification for reducing or discontinuing the benefits available to. the workmen under their corrditions of service on the ground of similarity between the two types of benefits.\n\nThat leads to the question as to whether Regulation 97 can justify the deduction made by the appellant.\n\nRegulation 97 provides that aii employer may discontinue or reduce the benefits payable to his employees under the conditions of their service which are similar to the benefits conferred by the E.S.I. Act but only to the extent specified in clauses (a) and (b) of the Regulation.\n\nWe are not concerned with clause (b) and sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) have no application in the instant case.\n\nThe appellant relie.s strongly oo the proviso to Regulation 97 under which, where an employee avails himself of any leave from the employer for sickness, the employer shall be entitled to deduct from his leave salary the amount of benefit to which he may be entitled under the Act for the corresponding period. The case of the appellant is that it is enough for justifying the deduetion from wages due to the workmen tor sick leave that the employee is covered by the E.S.I. Act or the E.S.I. Scheme.\n\nIt is not possible\n\n' •\n\nto accept this submission.\n\nIn the first plac.~\\ section 46 of the E.S.I.\n\nAct would show that employees who are covered by the E.S.I. AcL are entitled to certain benefits subject. to the provisions of the E.S.I.\n\nAct.\n\nIt is, therefore, not as if the workmen are entitled to the beriefit• .absolutely and. without compliance with the conditions laid down by the Act or the Regulation.\n\nSecondly, the proviso to Regulation 97 says that the employer shall be entitled to deduct from the leave salary of the employee, \"the amount of benefit\" to which he may be crilitled under the E.S.I. Act for the corresponding pe.riod of his sickness.\n\nA • , workman does not become entitled to the \"amount\" payable to him _. ~-by way of sickness benefit unless, in the first instance, he chooses to avail himself of the sickness benefit.\n\nThat benefit cannot be forced on him.\n\nThis would show that the employer's right to make a deduction from the employee's sick leave wages can only be exercised in respect of those days of sickness leave for which the workman has actually availed of the sickness benefit. Benefits which are available under the E.S.I. Act are not intended as substitutes for benefits to which the workmen are entitled under the conditions of their service.\n\nAs stated rlier, a workman becomes entitled to sickness benefit only if he is qTl!lified for it and he gets a cash benefit only if he avails himself of the sickness benefit.\n\nThus, it is only when a workman, in fuct, obtains or receives a cash benefit that the employer can exercise his right to make a deduction from wages due to him by way of leave .salary.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Hindustan Times Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen(') is not directly in point bnt it can be cited in support of our reasoniug to the extent which it holds that in providing for periodical payments to an insured worker in case of sickness, the legis- _ lature did not intend to substitute any of those benefits for the workt' ·· men's right to get leave on full pay on the ground of sickness.\n\nFor these reasons, we confirm the award of the Industrial Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed .\n\n(I) [1964] I S.C.R. 234.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "BAREILLY HOLDINGS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAREILLY HOLDINGS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THEIR WORKMEN\n\nFebruary 16, 1979\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACllUD, C.J., R. S. SARK.ARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "statute": "State Insurance Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 97(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "statute": "State Insurance Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 626, "end_char": 635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 of 1952 given by the State Tribunal Allahabad, respondents were entitled to fifteen days' sick leave on full wages as a condition of their service."}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 793, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "statute": "State Insurance Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1247, "end_char": 1259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1436, "end_char": 1446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1769, "end_char": 1779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "E.S.I. Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2604, "end_char": 2622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the appellant before the lndutrsial Tribunal was that it was making a contribution to the E.S.I. Corporation for the benefit of its employees and if any individual employee chose not to avail of the benefits due to him from the Corporation on account of the sickness benefit; it is he who ought to suffer and there would be no justification for obliging the employer to spend for his sickness benefit twice over."}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3076, "end_char": 3086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3358, "end_char": 3368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5248, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5465, "end_char": 5474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, D. N. Misra and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, D. N. Misra and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5497, "end_char": 5503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, D. N. Misra and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Gobilzd Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5524, "end_char": 5535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobilzd Das (A.C.) .and Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare fo.r the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Sunanda Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobilzd Das (A.C.) .and Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare fo.r the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow, U.P. dated November 28, 1969."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1968 the Government of U.P. referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under\n\nection 4 (K) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 28 of 1947 :\n\n\"Whether the action of the employers in deducting half wages corresponding to the sickness benefit to which workmen are entitled under the E.S.I. Act in the event of the\n\nworkmen not availing the services of the E.S.I. is legal and/or justified ?"}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5800, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1968 the Government of U.P. referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under\n\nection 4 (K) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 28 of 1947 :\n\n\"Whether the action of the employers in deducting half wages corresponding to the sickness benefit to which workmen are entitled under the E.S.I. Act in the event of the\n\nworkmen not availing the services of the E.S.I. is legal and/or justified ?"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "respondent-workmen contended that the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6290, "end_char": 6363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent-workmen contended that the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the E.S.I. Act) was adopted by the appellant, M/s Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., in 1957, that the WO'rkmen used to enjoy, prior to 1957, 15 days' sick leave with full wages every year in accordance with the terms of an award given by the State Tribunal, Allahabad, in Adjudication Case No."}}, {"text": "section 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8131, "end_char": 8141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9153, "end_char": 9163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9453, "end_char": 9463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9516, "end_char": 9526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9552, "end_char": 9562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10956, "end_char": 10966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12284, "end_char": 12294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13699, "end_char": 13709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_242_253_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "DISTT. REGISTRAR PALGHAT & ORS.\n\nv .\n\n.M. B. KOYY AKUTI & ORS.\n\nFebruary 20, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nKera/a State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958-r. 28(b)(ii)-Scope o/- Gover\"!iment servo.nt appointed as lower dili.sion clerk relaxing minimum edu cational qualification-No provision in rule prescribing minimum educationar-\n\n' •\n\nqualificction for Promotion-Executiie 01der prescribing qualifying -_test for • promotion-Validity of.\n\nThe respondent, who originally belonged to the fadras Ministerial Service,.- was allotted to the State of Kera1a as tar lower division clerk on the reorgani sation of States.\n\nOn the ground thai he belonged to a community which was educationally backward the State Government of ladras hppointed him . as a lower division clerk relaxing the requirements Of r. 29 of the Special Rules for l\\.ladras Ministerial Service. which prescribed m1n1mum general educational qualification for appointment to service under the SttJ:te Government.\n\nI , In 1957 the State Government of Kerala is&ued an order providing: that, until common service rules were framed, every officer in the service of the new State of Kerala would be bound by the service rules oi Travancore- Cochin or l\\.ladra!, to _which he belonged prior to November l, 1956.\n\nThereafter in supersession of tJ.ll earlier rules the Kerala State and Subor- . dinate Service Rule!, 1958 were ir3.med. Rule 1 of the General Rules in Part II stated that the ruleS in that part shall apply to all State and Subordinte Services and the holders of all posts appointed before or after the date on which those. rules came into force.\n\nThe Special Rules contemplated byr. 2(16) -of Part I had. hoWever. not been framed.\n\nRule 28 (b) (ii) of Part Il provided that all promotion!~ or appointments by transfer [other than those mentioned in cl. (i) of this rulel shall be made in accordance with the seniority, subject to the person's fitness for appolntment.\n\nIn 1961, persons who did not possess the general minimum educational qualifications but were appointed as lower division clerks, were allowed tosit for a qualifying test for promotion to upper division clerks.\n\nIn the gradation list of officiating lower division clerks prepared, the res pendent was shown at no. 1 place. Even so, when two vacancies of upper division clerks occurred, two persons junior to him in the gradation list were -Promoted ignoring the iespondent.\n\nIn his writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the respondent contended that the exemption granted to him removing the bar of educational qualification enured to him for all purposes, and therefore, promotions of two juniors, ignoring r.28(b)(ii) under which seniority was the basis for pro motion, amounted to deriial of equal treatment guaranteed under Arts. 14 and\n\n16 of the Constitution.\n\nDISTT. REGISTRAR V. M. B. KOYYAKUTI 243\n\nA single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition on the ground A that the exemption granted was for the limited purpose Of enabling the resw pondent to be appointed and continued in the post of lower division clerk • but that it did not remove the bar of minimum qualification for promotion .\n\nOn appeal the di.vision bench reversed the order of the single Judge, and directed the Government to promote him la'i1.d determine his rank in the cadre of upper division clerks.\n\nOn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that (I) the Special Rules contemplated by r. 2 of Part I read with the State \"' ' Government's order of 1957, were the Special Rules contained in the Madras _... J....Ministerial Service Rules; (2) even if r. 28(b)(ii) was applirnble it was well within the power of the State Government to prescribe a test to judge the fitness of persons who were exempted from the minimum educational qualifications when appointed as lo, ver division clerks and (3) there was a reasonable basis for classifying those persons who did not possess the minimum educationtil qualification as a category apart from those '.\\'ho possessed such a qualification.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I (a) The Special Rules, for the purposes of Kerala Rules of 1958, would be as defined in r. 2(16) of Part I.\n\nThat definition contemplated that Special Rules \\vould be framed by the Governor but no such rules bad been framed. [248 HJ\n\n(b) Jn the matter of promotion as 011 upper division clerk the respondent was governed by r. 28(b)(ii) in Part II. [249 A]\n\n2. It cannot be said that the impugned notification merely \"supplemented\" or filled up a gap in the statutory rules. It tended to superimpose or superadd by an executive fiat on the statutory rules something inconsistent with the same.\n\nIf lhe statutory rules framed by the Governor or any lta:w enacted under Art. 309 is silent on any particular point, the government can fill up that gap and supplement the rule by issuing administrative instructions not inconi _, k--ntent with the statutory provisions already framed or enacted. [253 D; 250 C]\n\nIn the instant case, however, it could not be said that there was a gap in the statutory provisions in the matter of promotion from the cadre of lower division clerks to that of upper division clerks.\n\n3(a) The classification n1ade by the impugned government order was not\n\nonly unfair and irrational but also, virtually amounted to abandonment of the G te!it of seniority-cum-fitness provided in r. 28(b) (ii). [252 G-H] •\n\n(b) Bv virtue of s. 3 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, the 1958- Rules were deemed to have been made under the Act and were continued until superseded by rules made under that Act.\n\nNo Special Rules relating to upper division clerks having been made the General Rules in Part II would be applicable to upper division clerks, also. [250 El\n\n(c) The 1958 Rules superseded all earlier rules.\n\nThe General Rules did not provide any minimum genertal educational qualification for promotion to\n\nA the cadre of upper division clerks.\n\nThere il'I nothing in r. 28 (b) (ii) or elsewhere, which provides that a lower division clerk would be presumed to be unfit for promotion to upper division unless he possessed the minimum general educational qualification or passed the qualifying test. [250 G-HJ\n\nThere is nothing to show that the respondent wa~ considered for promotion but was found unfit. [251 BJ\n\n(d) (i) The impugned notification prescribed the qualifying test for promotion, not for all, but only for one category of persons with reference to the l manner in which they initially entered service.\n\nThe respondent and others\n\nlike him, appointed as lower division clerks after granting them exemption, had ~\n\nbeen singled out for this discrin1inatory treatn1ent. [251 1-<l _ _-l.\n\n(d) (ii) There is nothing on record toshow that the duties discharged by the clerks of the upper division were substantia11y different from those in the lower division. [251 GHJ\n\n(iii) The statutory rule did not warrant the classification made by the impugned order. It impinged upon the statutory rule inasmuch as it laid down that even if a lower division derk who entered service as a result of exemption from possessing minimum educational qualification satisfied the criterion of seniority-cum-fitness prescribed by this rule, he shall not be considered for promotion unless he qualified in the test.\n\nThe relevant rule did not provide any minimum general educational qualification for promotion to upper division. [252 A-BJ\n\nRoshan Lal Tandon v. Union of lndia, [1968J 1 SCR 185; followed.\n\nE State of lammu & Kashmir v. Triloki ]\\Tath Khosa & Ors. AIR 1974 SC\n\n1; held inapplicable.\n\n4. Though ordinarily the court would not issue a direction requrr1ng the government to promote an aggrieved employee and thereafter determine his rank in the cttdre, in the peculiar fact! of this case the respondent satisfied the two-fold criterion for promotion laid down in r. 28(b) (ii) and since the existence of both the criteria for promotion were not in dispute the H~ Court was justified in issuing the direction, it did. [253 AB; E] .\n\n!I.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2036 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-12-1968 of the Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 167/67.\n\nDr. V. A. Sayied Muhammed and K. M. K. Nair for the Appelant.\n\nA. S. Nambiar and D. D. Gupta for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave, directed against a judgment, dated December 18, 1968. of the High Court of Kera la, arises out of these facts :\n\n> Koyakutty, Respondent herein, entered service of the former\\ Madras State on May 1, 1943 as temporary Section Writer on probation in r the Registration Department.\n\nHe did not possess the minimum, general educational qualification prescribed by Rule 29 of the Madras, Ministerial Service Rllies.\n\nThis rule, inter alia, provided that no person shall be eligible for appointment to the service in any post either by •\n\n• .. direct recruitment or by recruitment by transfer on promotion unless he possesses the minimum general educational qualification prescribed\n\n~ in the Schedule to the General Rules.\n\nThe General Rules provided that the passing of the Secondary School Leaving Examination or other ' equivalent examination shall be the minimum educational qualification\n\n_, r-appointment to the Ministerial Service.\n\n-<, The State Government, however,· had the power to exempt a person from this qualification.\n\nThe Madras Government passed an Order, dated April 15, 1954, (Ex. P-11), exempting, him from the said qualification for being appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department. It will be useful to quote this order in extenso\n\n• A\n\n\"The Government consider that in view of the fact that Sri M. B. Koyakutty belongs to a community which is educationally backward, the petitioneashould be exempted from the minimum general educational qualification, so as to enable him to be appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department under G.O. MS. No. 2858 Rev. dt. 2-11-50 in his tum ........ The Governor of Madras accordingly relaxes rules 28 and 29 of the Special Rules for the Madras Ministerial Service in favour of Sri M. B. Koyakutty, a temporary Section Writer in the Registration Department in the Registration District of Palghat in order to enable him to be appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in that department.\n\nSd/- S. K. Chettu, Secretary to Govt.\"\n\nAs a result of this exemption, Koyakutty was appointed a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department on May 19, 1954 .\n\nConsequent on the reorganisation of the States in 1956, Koyakutty was allotted to the Kerala State Service as Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department.\n\nI On May 16, 1961, the Government of Kerala issued an Order, in consultation with the Public Service Commission, that \"all sucll\n\npersons who did not possess the general minimum educational qualification and were appointed as Lower Division Clerks, after granting !hem exemption from that qualification\", may be allowed to sit for a qualifying test to be conducted by the Commission, and in case they secure a certain minimum percentage of marks, they may be regarded as possessing the minimum general qualification of the S.S.L.C. Standard for purpose of promotion to Uppe.r Division and higher grades or continuance in the Upper Division, as the case may be.\n\nThe order further stated that the case of those who have been appointed and are continuing in the Upper Division, they need not be disturbed for the present,\n\nbnt they should be reverted, if they fail to qualify at the next snch ' examination of the Commission.\n\nAccording to para 3 of the Order,-..l_._ \"the minimum marks to be obtained for being declare.cl eligible_ for\n\npromotion to or continuance in the Upper Division etc. . ...... will be issued separately.\"\n\nA gradation list of Clerks was prepared by the District Registrar, Palghat, in which Koyakutty was shown at No .. 1 among the officiating Lower Division Qerks, while the original respondents 1 and 2 were shown at Nos. 7 and 6, respectively.\n\nIn July 1966, two vacancies occurred in the cadre of Upper Division Qerks in the Department.\n\nThe original respondents 1 and 2, who were junior to Koyakutty, were promoted against those vacancies as Upper Division Clerks.\n\nKoyakutty thereupon filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Kerala High Court, praying that the promotion o' original respondents 1 and 2 be quashed and a di.rection be issued requiring the District Registrar, Palghat, and the State of Kerala to consider his claim and to promote him in preference to the original respondents 1 and 2.\n\n-·...J..... • Koyakutty's contention was that nnder the Rules, seniority should be the basis for promotion; and promotion of his juniors amounted to a denial of equable treatment guaranteed under Article 14 and 16 G of the Constitution.\n\nHis stand was that the exemption granted to him by the Government, removing the bar from being appointed in the Ministerial Service enurcd for all purposes. This contntion was rejected by the trial Judge, who held that the exemption granted to Koyakutty was for the limited object of enabling him to be appointed and continued in the post of a Lower Division Clerk and did ncJt H remove the bar of minimum educational qualification for his promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk.\n\nIn the result, Koyakutty's writ petition was dismissed.\n\n--- • \"\"\n\nOn appeal by Koyakutty, a Division Bench of the High Court oreversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and directed the District Registrar, Palghat, and the State Government to treat Koyaikutty as eligible for promotion as an Upper Division Clerk and pass necessary orders on that basis.\n\nThe Division Bench further directed that Koyakutty's rank in the cadre of Upper Division Clerks will, .also, be determined after he is promoted to that Cadre.\n\nHence this appeal by the District Registrar, Palghat and the State.\n\n_.l The first question that falls to be considered is, whether in the C \"' matter of promotion to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks, the res-\n\n-<, pondent was governed by the Madras Ministerial Service Rules or by the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958?\n\nThe Government of Kerala, ou February 25, 1957, issued an -Order S(D)S..43405/56/PD to the effect that as an interim arrange D ment, every officer ill the service of the new State would be bourict by the Service Rules of Travancore-Cochin or Madras, as the case may be, to which he belonged prior to November 1, 1956 until common service Jules are framed and issued.\n\nThereafter, in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor of Kerala in supersession of all rules on the subject, framed the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958.\n\nPart I of these Rules deals with preliminary matters. Rule 2(16) in Part I defines \"Special Rules\" as meaning \"the rules in Part III applicable to each service or class of service.\" Such Special Rules have not, however, been framed by the Governor. '~ PJlrt II contains the General Rules.\n\nRule 1 in Part II delineates the v cope of the General Rules. It runs thus :\n\n• \"The rules in this Part shall apply to all State and Subordinate Services and the holders of all posts, whether temporary or permanent in any such service, appointeti thereto before, or after the date on which these rules come into force as provided in sub-rule (b) of rule l in Part I except to the extent otherwise expressly, provided (a) by or nnder any law for the time being in force, or (b) in respect of any member of such service by a contract or agreement subsisting between such member and the State Government.\"\n\nA Rule 2 in the same Part provides :\n\n\"2. Relation to the Special Rules.-If any provision in the General Rules contained in the Part is repugnant to a provision in the Special Rules applicable to any particular service contained in Part Ill, the latter shall in respect of that service, prevail over the provision in the General Rules in this Part.\"\n\nIt will bear repetition that since no Special Rules, as defined inc Rule 2(16) of Part I, have so far been framed by the Governor\n\nuder Article 309 of the Constitution, Rule 2 in Part II has remained~ ' otiose. --- •\n\nRule 28 in Part II provides regarding promotion.\n\nClause (i) of clause (b) of this rule deals with promotion and appointment by transfer to a selection catego.ry or Selection Grade in a service. Such promotion shall be made ou the basis of merit and ability, seniority being considered only where merit and ability are approximately equal.\n\nSub-clause\n\n(ii) of clause (b) of Rule 28 is captioned :\n\n\"Promotion and appointment by transfer to higher posts according to seniority\".\n\nIts material part, as it stood before the amendment of Decembe; r 28, 1970, reads as under :\n\n\"All other promotions or appointments by transfer shall, subject to the provisions of these rules and the special rules. be mde in accordance with seniority subject to the person's fitness for appointment.\"\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the appellants that by virtue of the Kerala Government Order dated February 25, 1957, referred to earlier, the Special Rules contained in the Madras Ministerial Service Rules, continued to govern the respondent because those Special Rules..~ have not been superseded by the Kerala Rules of 1958.\n\nThe pofnt • sought to be made out is that the Special Rules, within the meaning of Rule 2 in Part U read with the aforesaid Government Order dated February 25, 1957, will mean the Special Rules contained in the Madras Rules.\n\nA similar argument was raised before the Appellate Bench of the High Court, also, and it was repelled, and, in our opinion, rightly.\n\nSpecial Rules for the purpose of the Kerala Rules, 1958, will be as defined in Rule 2(16) in Part I. That definition contemplates that Special Rules in Part III will be framed by the Governor of Kerala.\n\nBut, no such rules have so far been framed.\n\nWe have, therefore, ne> hesitation in holding, in agreement with 1 the High Court, that in the matte; r of promotion as an Upper Division\n\nClerk, the appellant was governed by Rule 28(b) (ii) in Part II .\n\nThe alternative contention tbat has been advanced on behalf of the appellant is that even if Rule 28 (b )(ii) was applicable, then also, it was well within t!Je power of the State Government to prescribe a test to judge the fitness of those persons who did not possess the minimum educational qualification and were appointed as Lower B Division Clerks on being exempted from that qualification by Government Order.\n\nIn this connection, reference has, been made to Article 162 of the ·, Constitution, to show what the State GO'Vernment could do by framing\n\n< .).._ __ a statutory rule under Article 309, proviso, could well be done by an C \"> executive order, tbe executive power of the State being co-extensive with its legislative power. It is maintained that the power of tbe Government to prescribe selective test for promotion to highe.r service has been recognised by tbis Court in several decisions.\n\nReference has been made in this connection to the decisions of this Court in B. N. Nagarajan & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors.(1); Union of India D etc. v. Majji Jangamayya etc.('); State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.(').\n\nIt was further submitted that the possession of the minimum educational qualification, i.e. a certificate of having passed tbe S.L.C.\n\nExamination or any equivalent examination is presumptive proof of the fitness of the holder thereof, for promotion to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks.\n\nTherefore, according to the counsel, there was a reasonable basis, for classifying those who did not possess tbis minimum educational qualification as a category apart from those who possessed such a qualification. In tbis context, it is further emphasised that the exemption was granted only for tbe purpose of being appointed as a )-.- _Lower Division Clerk, a!'d not for the purpose of further promotion.\n\n• As against this, Mr. Nambiar, appearing foc the respondents, 5Ub- -• mils that once the bar of minimum educational qualification was removed for appointment as Lower Division Clerk, further promotion of the respondent was governed by Rule 28(b){ii), Part I of the • Kerala Rules of !958. After their appo, intment, the respondent or others like him who had been exempted from possessing the minimum educational qualification, had become integral members of the same cadre.\n\nThey could not be singled out for hostile treatment. Counsel has submitted that the rule enunciated by this Court in Triloki Nath\n\n(I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682\n\n(2) [1977]2 S.C.R. 28\n\n(3) AIR 1974 S.C. I.\n\n17-196 SCI/79\n\nKhosa's case (ibid), is not applicable because the facts of that case we.re entirely different.\n\nCounsel further stated that any executive order issued by the Government, cannot supplant the statutory rules framed by the Governor under Article 309. Executive instructions can operate only in areas not covered by the rules.\n\nBut here the area was fully occupied by the statutory rule 28(b)(ii).\n\nThere can be no quarrel with the proposition that if the statutory rules framed by the Governor or any law enacted by the State Legislature under Article 309 is silent on any: particular point, the Government can fill up that gap and supplement the rule by issuing administrative instructions not inconsistent with the statutory provisions already framed or enacted.\n\nThe Executive instructions in order to be valid must run subservient to the statutory provisions. In the instant case, however, it could not be said that there was a gap or a void in the statutory provisions in the matter of promotion from the cadre of Lower Division Clerks to that of Upper Division Cle.rks.\n\nAfter the enactment of the Kerala Public Services Act of 1968, the position was that by virtue of Section 3 of that Act, the Kerala State Subordinate Services Rules of 1958 framed by the Governor un.der the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution were deemed to have been made under the Act and we.re continued until superseded by rules made under that Act.\n\nAs noticed already, no Special Rules relating to Upper Division Clerks have been framed.\n\nThe General Rules in Part II will, therefore, be applicable to Upper Division Clerks, also.\n\nIt will beaJ:\" repetition that the preamble to the Rules and Rule I in Part II, indicate that all the previous rules have been superseded.\n\nThese General Rules do not provide any minimum general educa- G tional qualification for promotion to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks from that of Lower Division Clerks.\n\nAll that is required by rule 28 (b) (ii) which governs the promotions from the Lower Division to the Upper Division, is tbat promotions shall be made m accordance with seniority subject to the person's fitness for appointment. There is nothing in this sub-rule or elsewhere H which provides that a member of the Lower Division will be presumed to be unfit for promotion to the Upper Division unless he possesses the minimum general educational qualification, or\n\n...\n\n• •\n\n~ passes a qualifying test. It is conceivable that the State Government may prescribe a general test for all Clerks of the Lower Division to judge their fitness for promotion to the Upper Di, ision.\n\nBut, such is not the case here.\n\nThe respondent and the others like him who were appointed as Lower Division Clerks after granting them exemption from possessing the minimum general educational qualification have been singled out for this discriminatory treatment.\n\nThere is 1iothing on the record to show that the case of the respondent was considered for promotion and he was found unfit.\n\n• •\n\n• ,\n\n' '>\n\nThe ratio of Triloki Nath Khosa's case (ibid) does not advance the case of the appellant State.\n\nTherein, persons appointed directly and -by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers.\n\nRule 12 provided that Graduates among the Assistant Engineers, shall be eligible for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, to the exclusion of diploma-holders. This rule was a statutory rule.\n\nIts constitutional validity was challenged on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This Court, speaking through Chandrachud J. (as he then was), repelled this cmtention with the reasoning that the classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders could not be held to rest on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification was made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering Services . • It will be seen that Triloki Nath's case, is distinguishable from t!:e one before us, at least, in three important aspects.\n\nFirstly, in that case, the statutory rule in question did not make any discrimination in relation to the source of recruitment, it simply provided that Graduates alone shall go into the higher cadre of Executive Engineers, irrespective of whether they were appointed as Assistant Engineers directly or by promotion.\n\nIn the present case, the impugned notification\n\n~--prescribes a qualifying test for promotion, not for all but only for one • _ category of persons with reference to the manner in which they initial- -• ly entered service.\n\nSecondly, in Triloki Nath's case the post of the Executive Engineer carried higher responsibility and duties of a supervisory character requiring higher mental equipment and adm'nisfrative skill.\n\nThus, there, the classification rested on intelligible diITerentiru having a direct nexus to the object (viz., administrative effi-\n\n,.. ciency), to be achieved. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the duties discharged by the clerks of the Upper Division are substantially different from those in the Lower D:vision.\n\nThirdly, in the instant case the statutory rule docs not warrant the cla, s'.fication made by the impugned Government Order.\n\nThe primary criterion for promotion to the Upper Division prescribed by Rule 28(b) (ii) in seniority if the person concerned is otherwise not urn'.\n\nThe\n\nJ!'\n\nimpugned Government Order impinges upon that statutory rule inasmuch as it lays down that even if a Lower Div.ision Clerk who entered service as a result of exemption from possession minimum educational qualification, satisfied the criterion of seniority-cum-fitness prescribed by this Rule, he shall not be considered for promotion unless he qualifies in the test.\n\nThe relevant statutory Rules governing the appellant do not provide any minimum general education qualification for promotion to the Upper Division.\n\n' The case in point is Roshal Lal Tandon v. Union of India.(') In that case, before the impugned notification was issued, there was only one rule of promotion for both the departmental promotees and the-- ~\"- • direct recruits, and that rule was seniority-cum-suitability, and there ? was no rule of promotion separately made for application to direct recruits.\n\nAs a result of the impugned notification, a discriminatory treatment was made in favour of the direct recruits, i.e. existing Apprentice Train Examiners who had already been absorbed in Grade 'D' by March 31, 1966, because the notification provided that this group of Apprentice Train Examiners should first be accommodated en bloc in Grade 'C' upto 80 per cent of vacancies reserved for them without undergoing any selection.\n\nRamaswami J., speaking for a Bench of five learned Judges, held that the impugned notification violated the guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe reason was that once the direct recruits and promotees were absorbed in one cadre, they formed one class and they could not be discriminated against for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade 'C'. In that case, it was not disputed that before the impugned notification was issued there was only one rule of promotion for both the departmental promotees and the direct recruits and that rule was 'seniority-cum-suitability'.\n\nThe impugned notification was . discriminatory because in the case of that category who were appointed- as Train Examiners by promotion the aforesaid test of 'seniority-cum- • suitability' prescribed by the rule for further promotion to the higher •- Grade 'C' was abandoned and, instead, selection on merit only was adopted.\n\nThe principle enunciated in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India applies with greater force to the facts of the present case because here the classification made by the impugned Government Order is not only unfair and irrational but also, virtually amounts to abandonment of the test of seniority-cum-fitness provided in rule 28 (b) (ii).\n\nH The last point for consideration is, whether it was proper for the High Court to issue a positive direction requiring the appellant to ••\n\nll) [196811s.c.R.1ss.\n\npromote the respondent to the Upper Division and thereafter to determine his rank in the cadre of Upper Division Clerks. Ordinarily, the court does not issue a direction in such positive terms, but the peculiar feature of this case is that it has not been disputed that Koyakutty respondent satisfies the two-fold cr; terion for promotion laid down in the statutory rule 28(b)(ii). Indeed, the District Registrar, Palghat, who was impleaded as respondent 3 in the writ petition, expressly admitted in paragraph 8 of his counter-affidavit filed before the High Court, \"that the seniority of service is the basis of promotion from the ranks of Lower Division Clerks to the ranks of Upper Division Clerks provided they are fully qualified by passing the departmental tests for the purpose\". It was never the case of the Registrar that Koyakutty was not otherwise fit for promotion. Indeed, even in the grounds of appeal to this Court, incorporated in the Special Leave Petition, it is not alleged that Koyakutty did not satisfy the criterion of senioritycum-fitness prescribed by Rule 28 (b) (ii). The position taken by the appellant, throughout, was that this rule should be deemed to have heen \"supplemented\" by the impugned Government Notification. It is not correct that the impugned Notification merely \"supplements\" or fills up a gap in the statutory rules. It tends to superadd or super impose by an Executive fiat on the statutory rules something inconsis .. tent with the same.\n\nSince the existence of both the criteria viz., seniority and fitness for promotion to the Upper Division prescribed by the statutory Rule 28(b) (ii), in the case of Koyakutty was not disputed, the High Court was justified in issuing the direction, it did.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\n)..- -P.B.R.\n\nA ppeai d1sm1ssed .", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "DISTT. REGISTRAR PALGHAT & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DISTT. REGISTRAR PALGHAT & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. KOYY AKUTI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.B. KOYYAKUTI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 20, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Subordinate Service Rules, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Government of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I , In 1957 the State Government of Kerala is&ued an order providing: that, until common service rules were framed, every officer in the service of the new State of Kerala would be bound by the service rules oi Travancore- Cochin or l\\.ladra!,"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1165, "end_char": 1171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I , In 1957 the State Government of Kerala is&ued an order providing: that, until common service rules were framed, every officer in the service of the new State of Kerala would be bound by the service rules oi Travancore- Cochin or l\\.ladra!,"}}, {"text": "Travancore- Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1211, "end_char": 1229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I , In 1957 the State Government of Kerala is&ued an order providing: that, until common service rules were framed, every officer in the service of the new State of Kerala would be bound by the service rules oi Travancore- Cochin or l\\.ladra!,"}}, {"text": "November l, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1275, "end_char": 1291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to _which he belonged prior to November l, 1956."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and\n\n16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2802, "end_char": 2818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that (I) the Special Rules contemplated by r. 2 of Part I read with the State \"' ' Government's order of 1957, were the Special Rules contained in the Madras _... J....Ministerial Service Rules; (2) even if r. 28(b)(ii) was applirnble it was well within the power of the State Government to prescribe a test to judge the fitness of persons who were exempted from the minimum educational qualifications when appointed as lo, ver division clerks and (3) there was a reasonable basis for classifying those persons who did not possess the minimum educationtil qualification as a category apart from those '.\\'ho possessed such a qualification."}}, {"text": "Ministerial Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3599, "end_char": 3624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4773, "end_char": 4781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala Public Services Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5466, "end_char": 5498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "No Special Rules relating to upper division clerks having been made the General Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1974 SC\n\n1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7581, "end_char": 7595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-12-1968 of the Kerala High Court in W.A. No."}}, {"text": "V. A. Sayied Muhammed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. V. A. Sayied Muhammed and K. M. K. Nair for the Appelant."}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8275, "end_char": 8288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. V. A. Sayied Muhammed and K. M. K. Nair for the Appelant."}}, {"text": "A. S. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8308, "end_char": 8321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Nambiar and D. D. Gupta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "D. D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8326, "end_char": 8337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Nambiar and D. D. Gupta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8404, "end_char": 8412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave, directed against a judgment, dated December 18, 1968."}}, {"text": "Koyakutty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the High Court of Kera la, arises out of these facts :\nKoyakutty, Respondent herein, entered service of the former\\ Madras State on May 1, 1943 as temporary Section Writer on probation in r the Registration Department.", "canonical_name": "Koyaikutty"}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9482, "end_char": 9499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Government passed an Order, dated April 15, 1954, (Ex."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9523, "end_char": 9537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Government passed an Order, dated April 15, 1954, (Ex."}}, {"text": "M. B. Koyakutty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9786, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be useful to quote this order in extenso\n\n• A\n\n\"The Government consider that in view of the fact that Sri M. B. Koyakutty belongs to a community which is educationally backward, the petitioneashould be exempted from the minimum general educational qualification, so as to enable him to be appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department under G.O. MS."}}, {"text": "Governor of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10101, "end_char": 10119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2-11-50 in his tum ........ The Governor of Madras accordingly relaxes rules 28 and 29 of the Special Rules for the Madras Ministerial Service in favour of Sri M. B. Koyakutty, a temporary Section Writer in the Registration Department in the Registration District of Palghat in order to enable him to be appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in that department."}}, {"text": "S. K. Chettu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- S. K. Chettu, Secretary to Govt.\""}}, {"text": "Koyakutty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10501, "end_char": 10510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this exemption, Koyakutty was appointed a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department on May 19, 1954 .", "canonical_name": "Koyaikutty"}}, {"text": "May 19, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10582, "end_char": 10594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this exemption, Koyakutty was appointed a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration Department on May 19, 1954 ."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10767, "end_char": 10779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I On May 16, 1961, the Government of Kerala issued an Order, in consultation with the Public Service Commission, that \"all sucll\n\npersons who did not possess the general minimum educational qualification and were appointed as Lower Division Clerks, after granting !"}}, {"text": "Government of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10785, "end_char": 10805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I On May 16, 1961, the Government of Kerala issued an Order, in consultation with the Public Service Commission, that \"all sucll\n\npersons who did not possess the general minimum educational qualification and were appointed as Lower Division Clerks, after granting !"}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10848, "end_char": 10873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I On May 16, 1961, the Government of Kerala issued an Order, in consultation with the Public Service Commission, that \"all sucll\n\npersons who did not possess the general minimum educational qualification and were appointed as Lower Division Clerks, after granting !"}}, {"text": "Palghat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11958, "end_char": 11965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A gradation list of Clerks was prepared by the District Registrar, Palghat, in which Koyakutty was shown at No .. 1 among the officiating Lower Division Qerks, while the original respondents 1 and 2 were shown at Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12404, "end_char": 12415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12915, "end_char": 12932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Koyaikutty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13703, "end_char": 13713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• \"\"\n\nOn appeal by Koyakutty, a Division Bench of the High Court oreversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and directed the District Registrar, Palghat, and the State Government to treat Koyaikutty as eligible for promotion as an Upper Division Clerk and pass necessary orders on that basis.", "canonical_name": "Koyaikutty"}}, {"text": "Madras Ministerial Service Rules or by the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14214, "end_char": 14305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State would be bourict by the Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14482, "end_char": 14525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14529, "end_char": 14546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Kerala, ou February 25, 1957, issued an -Order S(D)S..43405/56/PD to the effect that as an interim arrange D ment, every officer ill the service of the new State would be bourict by the Service Rules of Travancore-Cochin or Madras, as the case may be, to which he belonged prior to November 1, 1956 until common service Jules are framed and issued."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14608, "end_char": 14624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Kerala, ou February 25, 1957, issued an -Order S(D)S..43405/56/PD to the effect that as an interim arrange D ment, every officer ill the service of the new State would be bourict by the Service Rules of Travancore-Cochin or Madras, as the case may be, to which he belonged prior to November 1, 1956 until common service Jules are framed and issued."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14735, "end_char": 14746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State would be bourict by the Service Rules", "statute": "State would be bourict by the Service Rules"}}, {"text": "Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14847, "end_char": 14896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part I of these Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14899, "end_char": 14920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PJlrt II contains the General Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15151, "end_char": 15186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part II delineates the v cope of the General Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15199, "end_char": 15249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Relation to the Special Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15835, "end_char": 15864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16280, "end_char": 16291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relation to the Special Rules", "statute": "Relation to the Special Rules"}}, {"text": "February 25, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17240, "end_char": 17257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended on behalf of the appellants that by virtue of the Kerala Government Order dated February 25, 1957, referred to earlier, the Special Rules contained in the Madras Ministerial Service Rules, continued to govern the respondent because those Special Rules..~ have not been superseded by the Kerala Rules of 1958."}}, {"text": "Special Rules for the purpose of the Kerala Rules, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17830, "end_char": 17885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18750, "end_char": 18761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Rules for the purpose of the Kerala Rules, 1958", "statute": "Special Rules for the purpose of the Kerala Rules, 1958"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18876, "end_char": 18887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Rules for the purpose of the Kerala Rules, 1958", "statute": "Special Rules for the purpose of the Kerala Rules, 1958"}}, {"text": "Nambiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20155, "end_char": 20162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• As against this, Mr. Nambiar, appearing foc the respondents, 5Ub- -• mils that once the bar of minimum educational qualification was removed for appointment as Lower Division Clerk, further promotion of the respondent was governed by Rule 28(b){ii), Part I of the • Kerala Rules of !"}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20743, "end_char": 20762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Khosa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20824, "end_char": 20829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel has submitted that the rule enunciated by this Court in Triloki Nath\n\n(I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682\n\n(2) [1977]2 S.C.R. 28\n\n(3) AIR 1974 S.C. I.\n\n17-196 SCI/79\n\nKhosa's case (ibid), is not applicable because the facts of that case we.re entirely different."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21060, "end_char": 21071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21366, "end_char": 21377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "After the enactment of the Kerala Public Services Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21899, "end_char": 21952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21997, "end_char": 22006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the enactment of the Kerala Public Services Act", "statute": "After the enactment of the Kerala Public Services Act"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22117, "end_char": 22128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the enactment of the Kerala Public Services Act", "statute": "After the enactment of the Kerala Public Services Act"}}, {"text": "These General Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22584, "end_char": 22603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Triloki Nath Khosa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23852, "end_char": 23870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\n• ,\n\n' '>\n\nThe ratio of Triloki Nath Khosa's case (ibid) does not advance the case of the appellant State.", "canonical_name": "Triloki Nath Khosa"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24327, "end_char": 24345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24396, "end_char": 24407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, speaking through Chandrachud J. (as he then was), repelled this cmtention with the reasoning that the classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders could not be held to rest on any unreal or unreasonable basis."}}, {"text": "Triloki Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24754, "end_char": 24766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be seen that Triloki Nath's case, is distinguishable from t!:e one before us, at least, in three important aspects.", "canonical_name": "Triloki Nath Khosa"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27533, "end_char": 27542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswami J., speaking for a Bench of five learned Judges, held that the impugned notification violated the guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27657, "end_char": 27675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_254_290_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "M. KARUNANIDHI\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 20, 1979\n\nJ.Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA,\n\nS. MURTAZA, FAZAL ALI AND R. S. PATHAK; JJ.J\n\nTamilnadu Public Men (Cmninal MlscO{lduct) Act, 1973-Whether inconsistent with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 & Criminal Law (Atnendment) Act, 1952-Art. 254 of Co11sti111tion of India-Inconsistency between laws 1nade by Parliament and lalvs 1nade by legislature of states-Effect of.\n\nConstitution of India 1950-Arts. 164 & 161-Nature, constitu/jonal position and status of Minister Dr Chief Minister.\n\nIndian Penal Code 1869-S. 21(12)-Public servant & Criminal Procedure Code 1898-S. 199(2)-'0ther public servant'-Scope of-Chief Minister whether 'public servant'.\n\nWords & Phrases-'in the service or pay of the Government'-S. 21(12)(a) !PC-Meaning of.\n\nIn December 1973, the Madras Legislature passed an Act known as the Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 after obtaining the assent of the President. The State Act was amended by Act 16 of 1974 and the President's assent was received on April 10, 1974. The provisions of the State Act were brought into force with effect from May 8, 1974.\n\nThe State Act was repctlled and the President's assent to the repealing Act was given on September 6, 1977.\n\nl'he Act provided for the investigation in respect of a complaint of crimin::iJ misconduct against any public man by a Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner of Inquiries appointed for this purpose. The word 'public man' had been given a specific connotation in s. 2(c) of the Act and clearly excluded a Government servant.\n\nThe appellant was the former Chief Minister of the State of Tamilnadu.\n\nOn June 15, 1976 the Chief Secretary to the State Government requested the Central Bureau of Investigation to make a detailed investigation into certain allegations tht:Jt the appellant and others were alleged to have abused their official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab. With the State Governor's sanction a charge sheet was filed after investigation for the prosecution of the appellant under ss. 161, 468 and 471 IPC and s. 5(2) read with S. 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for allegedly having derived pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs. 4 to lakhs for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms.\n\nThe appellant applied for discharge under s. 239 Cr. P.C. on the ground that the prosecution against him suffered from various legal and constitutional infirmities.\n\nOn the application being rejected, the appellant applied to the High Court' for quashing the proceedings and for setting aside the order of the Special Judge refusing to discharge him. The High Court rejected the applications.\n\n• ,.\n\nM. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION 255\n\nIn the appeal! to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant : A\n\n( 1) Even though the State Act was repealed, the provisions of the Central Acts having themselves been protanto repw!ed by the State Act when it was passed could not be pressed into service for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant unleM these provisions were re-enacted by the appropriate legisla ture.\n\n(2) It was contended that even assuming that the State Act had ceased to exist and the Central Acts applied, the appellant cannot be prosecuted under any of the sections of the Penal Code or the Corruption Act, becallSe by virtue of the position -that the appellant enjoyed as Chief Minister, there was no relationship of master and servant between him and the Government and he was acting as a constitutional functionary, and therefore could not be described as a .'public servant' as contemplated by s. 21(12) 0£ the Penal Code.\n\n(3) The provisions contained in the State Act run counter to those of the Central Acts in respect of the following matters; (a) The procedure for investigation ofthe offences by a Central Agency as contemplated by the Corruption Act b dispensed with and is instead invested in a Commissioner appointed under the State Act. (b) The provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, regarding the grant of sanction under s. 197 of the Code to the accused is given a complete go by and instead a Commissioner is appointed to hold a regular inquiry for himself and then to submit his report. An accused who has to be tried under the State Act b thus deprived of the protection afforded to every Government servant regarding grant of a sanction by the appointing authority. Therefore the protection if any, given by the State Act is purely illusory, and\n\n(4) By virtue of the fact that the State Act has obtained the assent of the President, it will be deemed to be a dominant legislation, and therefore it would over-rule the Central Acts.\n\nDismise:ing the appeal!,\n\nHELD : 1. The scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable dis- F tribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures.\n\nFirst, regarding the matters contained in List I, i.e. the Union List to the SevCnth Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures hal'e no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in Li!t I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down G by Art. 254(1). Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e. the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on \"them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. [263 D-E]\n\n2. In such matters repugnancy may result from the following circums tances :-\n\n(i) Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List arC fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconciliable. the Central\n\nc\\ct will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.\n\n256 SuPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(ii) Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with cl. (2) of Art. 254.\n\n(iii) \\\\''here a law passed by the State legislature while being substantially B within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the C..e.ntral List the constitutionality of the lay may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List an entrenchment, if any, being purely incidental or jnconsequential.\n\n(iv) Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with or repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Art. 254(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and over-rule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will D exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the provisO' to Art. 254. [263 F-264 DJ\n\n3. A careful analysis, therefore, of the various provisions of the State ... '\\.ct leads to the irresistible inference that the State Act was passed 'vith a view t() afford sufficient protection to a public man by enjoining a summary inquiry or investigation by a high and independent Tribunal of the status of a High Court Judge or a Senior District Judge to instil confidence in the people and to prevent public men from being prosecuted on false, frivolous and vexatious allegations. Although the ingredients of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5(1)- ( d) of the Corruption Act are substantially the same in the State Act as in the Central Acts but here also the, punishment is much severer in the case of the State Act than the one contained in the Central Acts. It is, therefore, manifest that the State Act does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the Central Acts, but is a sort of complementary Act which runs pari passu the Central Act. [270 . G-271 A]\n\n4. Prima facie, there does not appear to be any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts.\n\nBefore any repugnancy can arise, the follo\\ving conditions must be satisfied :\n\n(i) That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act; (ii) that such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable;\n\n(iii) that the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the hvo Acts into direct collision with each other ::ind a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. [272D-E]\n\n5. ( 1) In order to decide the questions of repugnancy it must be shown tha.t the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions~\n\n_.l__\n\n\" ?\n\n- • ••\n\nM. KARUNANIDHI V. UNION 257\n\nso that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field; (2) that there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes; (3) that where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results; ( 4) that where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field. [278 FH] •\n\nHu111e v. Palmer, 38 CLR 441; Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand v.\n\nComn1onwealth, 36 CLR 130; Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn, 37\n\nCLR 466; Ex. Porte McLean, 43 CLR 472; Zavarbhai Amaidas v. State of Botnbay, ,, l [1955] I SCR 799; Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. etc. v. The State of U.P. & Ors.\n\n~ [1956] SCR 393 Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh, 1939 FCR 188; Om '> Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., [1957] SCR 423; Deep Chand v. State of UP & Ors. [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 8, Megh Raj & Ors. v. Allah Rakhia & Ors. AIR 1942 FC 27; State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co. [1964] 4 SCR 461; T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rangochari, [1969] 3 SCR 65; referred to.\n\nColin Heward's Australian Federal Constitution Law 2nd Edn. Nicholas i\\.ustralian Constitution 2n<l Edn. p. 303 referred to.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the State Act creates distinct and separate offences with different ingredients and different punishments and it does not in any way collide, with the Central Acts. On the other hand, the State Act itself permits the Central Act, namely, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act to come to its aid after an investigation is completed and a report is gubmitted\n\nby the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. [279 A-B]\n\n6. Doubtless, the State Act is the dominant legislation but there are no provisions in the State Act which are irreconcilably or directly inconsistent with the Central Acts so as to overrule them. f279 Cl\n\nThe original s. 29 of the State Act underwent an amendment which was brought about by Tamil Nadu Act l 6 of 1974 which substituted a new s. 29\n\n~ for the old one. This amendment received the assent of the President on 10th F April, 1974 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 16 April, 1974. Although the State Act was passed as far -· back as 30 December, 1973 it feceived the' assent of the President on the 10 April, 1974 that is, on the same date as Act 16 of 1974. The Act was how- • ver brought into force on the 8 May, 1974 when. the new s. 29 which had :tlready replaced the 'old section and had become a part of the statute.\n\nThere~ fore, for all intents and purposes the State Act cannot be read in isolation, but has to be interpreted in conjunction with the express language contained in s. 29 of the State Act. The legislature has in unequivocal terms expressed the intention that the State Act which was undoubtedly the dominant legislation would only be \"in addition to and not in derogation with any other law for the time being in force\" which manifestly includes the Central Acts, namely, the Indian Penal Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. Thus, the Legislature about a month before the main Act came into force clearly declared its intention that there, ou1d be no question of the State Act colliding with the Central Acts referred to above. The second part\n\n.A of s. 29 also provides that nothing contained in the State Act shall exempt any public man from b'eing proceeded with by way of investigation or otherwise under a proceeding instituted against him under the Central Acts.\n\nIt is, rhere fore, clear that in view of this clear intention of the legislature there can be no room for any argument that the State Act was in any way repugnant to the Central Acts. [279 D-280 DJ\n\n7. The provisions of s. 29 would be presumptive proof of the fact that there is no repugnancy between the State Act and the C1:ntral Ac.; ts nor did either the legislature or the President intend to create any repugnancy beh1i'een these Acts as a result of which the criticism regarding the repugnancy is com~ •\n\npletely obliterated in the instant case and we,, therefore, hold that the State ' legislature never intended to occupy the same field as covered by the Central......_ \"- Acts. [281 BJ\n\n8. So far as the first part of cl. (12) (a) is concerned, namely 'in the service of the Government undoubtedly signifies a relationship of master and servant where the employer employs the employee on the basis of a salary or remuneration. However, the second limb of the clause, 'in the pay of the Government' is concerned, that appears to be of a much wider amplitude so as to include within its ambit even a public servant who may not be a regular employee receiving salary from his master.\n\nA Minister or a Chief Minister will be clearly covered by the said expression. [282 E-F]\n\nA careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word 'pay' in the various dictionaries an<! the texts would clearly reveal that the expression 'in the pay of' connotes that a person is getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount of tnoney. This by itself however does not lead to the inference that a relationship of master and servant must necessarily exist in aII cases where a person is paid salary. [283 G-HJ\n\nShorter Oxford English Dictionary; Websters Third New International Dictionary : Websters New World Dictionary : Words a.nd Phrases, Permanent Edition Vol. 31A p, 176.\n\nVenkataramaya's Law Lexicon Vol. 11 p. 1122. Corpus Juris Secundum \"\\lol. 70 p. 200; referred to.\n\n9. By virtue of the prov1s1ons contained in Art. 167, the Chief lviinister undoubtedly performs a public duty of the nature as enjoined by clauses (a) lo (c) of Art. 167. It is also clearly provided in the Constitution that the Chief Minister or the Ministers are entitled to salaries or allowances obviously in lieu of public duties that they perform. The salaries given to the Chief hfinister or the Ministers are given from the Government funds, and, therefore, there will be no difficult}' in holding that the Ministers are in the pay of the Government inasmuch as they receive their salaries, remunerations or wages from the Government. [285 E-F]\n\nOnce it is conceded that the Governor appoints the Chief Minister who is paid a salary according to a statute madeby the legislature from the Govern~ ment funds, the Chief Minister becomes a person in the pay of the Government so as to fall squarely within cl. (12) of s. 21 of the Penal Code. [286 BJ\n\nM. KARUNANIDHI v; UNION 259\n\n10. The use of the words 'other public servants' following a Minister of the Union or of a State clearly show that a Minister would also be a public servant as other public servants contemplated by s. 199(2) of the Code and the Code being a statute complementary and allied to the Penal Code can be looked into for the purpose of determining the real meaning and import of the words 'public servant' as used in the aforesaid section [286 F]\n\nDattatraya Narayan Patil v. State of Maharashtra, [1975], Supp. SCR 145; B Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors., AIR 1945 PC 156; Rao Shiv Bakadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of .TJ.indhya Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188; referred to.\n\n_s- -- S. Tara Singh v. Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Jullundur & Ors. AIR 1958 Pub. 302, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors., AIR 1968 J & K 98; approved.\n\n11. Three facts that have been proved beyond doubt :-\n\n. (i) That a Minister is appointed or dismissed by the Governor and is, therefore, subordinate to him whatever be the nature and status of his constitutional function.\n\n(ii) That a Chief Minister or a Minister gets salary for the public work done or the public duty performed by him.\n\n(iii) That the said salary is paid to the Chief Minister or the Minister from the Government funds.\n\n[290A-B]\n\n12. It is thus incontrovertible, that the holder of a public office such as the Chief Minister is a public servant in respect of which the Constitution provides that he will get his salary from the Government Treasury so long he holds his office on account of the public service that he disch<irges. The tialary given to the Chief Minister is coterminus with his office and is not paid like other constitutional functionaries such as the President and the Speaker.\n\nThese facts, therefore, point to one and only one. conclusion and that is that the Chief 1finister is in the pay of the Government ood is, therefore, a public -iiervant within the meaning of s. 21(12) of the Penal Code. [290 C-D]\n\n-· CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 270- 271 of 1977.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 10-5-1977 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 429 and Cr!. R.P. No. 50/77.\n\nK. K. Venugopal, N. A. Subramaniam, C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mrs.\n\nShanta Venugopal, K. R. Chowdhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant.\n\nS. N. Kackar, Sol. Genl. (In Cr!. A. No. 270) R. B. Datar and R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondent.\n\nV. P. Raman, Adv. Genl and A. V. Rangam for the State of Tamil Nadu.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.s. .• A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against a common order of the Madras High Court dated 10th May, 1977 dismissiug the applications filed before the High Court by the appellant for quashmg the order of the Special Judge, Madras dated 4th January, 1977 refusing to discharge the appellant under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code).\n\nThe facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the . ._ High Court aad it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over -> again. However, in order to understand the points in issue, it may be necessary to give a resume of the important stages through which the case has passed and the constitutional points argued before us.\n\nThe appellant, M. Karunanidhi, was a former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and was the petitioner before the High Court in the applications filed by him before the High Court. On 15-6-1976 a D.O. letter was written by t11e Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBI requesting him lo make a detailed investigation into certain allegations against the appellant and others who were alleged to have abused their official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab. A first information report was accordingly recorded on 16-6-1976 and four months later sanction under section. 197 of the Code was granted by the Governor of Tamil Nadu for the prosecution of the appellant under sections 161, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) read with section 5 (1) (d) cf the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred_ J,__ to as the Corruption Act) . Thereafter, the police submitted a charge- •• sheet against the appellant for the offences mentioned above and alleged that the appellant had derived for himself pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs. 4 to Rs. 5 Iakhs from Madenlal Gupta for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms. The case was registered before the Special Judge and the uecessary copies of the records were furnished to the appellant. The appellant on appearing before the Special Judge filed an application for discharging him nnder section 239 of the Code on the grour.d that the prosecution against him suffered from various legal and conslilutional infirmities. The Special Judge, however, after hearing counsel for the parties rejected the application of the appellant as a result of \\\\hich the appellant filed two applications in the High Court for quashing the proceedings and for setting aside the order of the Special Judge refusing to discharge the appellant. As indicated\n\nabove, the High Court rejected the applications of the appellant but A granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court and hence these appeals before us.\n\n• As far bacii. as 30th December, 1973 the Madras Legislature had passed an Act known as The Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the State Act. The ' State Act was pased after obtaining the assent of the President of India.\n\nThis State Act was, however, amended by Act 16 of 197 4 and the President's assent was received on 10th April, 1974. According to the provisions of the State Act the statute was brought into force by virtue ,_., J. oj a notification with effect from 8-5-1974. According to the allegations \"\\ made against the appellant, the acts said to have been committed by him fell within the period November 197 4 to March, 197 5.\n\nOn 31-1-1976 by virtue of the provisions of Article 356 President's rule was imposed in the State of Tamil Nadu and the Ministry headed by the appellant was dismissed and a Proclamation to his effect was issued on the same date.\n\nThe High Court decided the petitions of the appellgnt on 10-5-1977 and granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court on 27-7\"1977.\n\nSubsequently, however, the State Act was repealed and the President's assent to the repealing of the State Act was given on 6-9-1977.\n\nThus, it is manifest that by the time the appeal bas reached this Court and was taken up for hearing the State Act no longer exists.\n\nConsequently, some of the constitutional points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before the Court do not survive for consideration before us.\n\nFaced with this situation, Mr. Venn Gopal, learned counsel for the appellant has raised only two points before us. In the first place, be submitted that even though the State Act was repealed on 6-9-1977 >, .. , during the time that it was in force, it was wholly repugnant to the •/ provisions of the Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act and by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India the provisions of the aforesaid Central Acts stood repealed and could not revive after the State Act was repealed. The constitutional position, it is submitted, was that even though the State Act was repealed the provisions of the Central Acts having themselves been protanto repealed by the State Act when it was passed could not be pressed into service for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant unless those provisions were re-enacted by the appropriate legislature.\n\nA number of grounds were raised by counsel for the appellant in support of the first plank of his argument that the State Act was repugnant to the provisions of the Central Acts as a result of which the former was rendered void.\n\nSecondly, it was ar!'jlled that even assuming that the State Act has ceased to exist and the Central Acts apply to the facts of the present case, the appellant cannot be prosecuted under any of the sections of the Penal Code or the Corruption Act, because being the Chief Minister of the State at the relevant time he was not a public servant as defined in section 21 clause (12) of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe argument was that by virtue of the position that the appellant enjoyed as Chief Minisr there was no relationship of master and servant between him and the Government and he was acting as a constitutional functionary and, therefore, could not be described as a public servant as contemplated by section 21 (12) of the Penal Code.\n\n. ~.\n\nWe propose to deal with the two arguments separately. We would \". first deal with the question of repugnancy as raised by learned counsel ? for the appellant. It is true that the State Act was passed by the Legislature of Tamil Nadu and the assent of the President was obtained on 30th December, 1973. By virtue of the provisions of Article 254\n\n(2) of the Constitution since the assent of the President had been given the State Act was to prevail over the Central Acts so far as the State of Tamil Nadu was concerned, but the serious question to be considered is as to whether or not there was a real repugnancy result; ing from an irreconcilable inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts. Article 254 of the Constitution runs thus :~\n\n\"254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States : ( 1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. • . ...\n\n(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State : -\n\nI I\n\nProvided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of State\" .\n\nIt would be seen that so far as clanse (l) of Article 254 is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision bet-\n\n~ ween a provision of a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated iu the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy.\n\nThis naturally means that\n\nwhere both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by . ' the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior '> in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislautres. First, regarding the matters contained in List l, i.e. the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing' therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e., the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circum. stances :- ·\n\nl. Where the provisions of a Central Act' and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.\n\n2. Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.\n\n3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List\n\nthe constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law\n\nfalls within the four corners of the State List an entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.\n\n4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.\n\nSo far as the present State Act is concerned we are called upon to consider the various shades of the constitutional validity of the same under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIt is neither alleged or argued that l'arliament has at any time after the State Act was passed proceeded to pass any law as contemplated by the Proviso to Article 254. As, however, the State law has already been repealed and the President's assent to the said repeal has been received as far back as 6-9-1977 we are concerned only with the limited qtrestion as to whether if the State law had repealed or overruled the provisions of the Central law what will be the position after the State\n\n• ,\n\nF law itself ceases to exist. It is true that the doctrine of eclipse would\n\not apply to the constittioality of the Central law and te only ~s~ hon we have to determme 1s whether there was such an meconcilabfe -....,.\n\ninconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts that the - provisions of the Central Act stood repealed abd unless re-enacted the ~- said provisions cannot be invoked even after the State Act was itself repealed. In order, however, to enter into the domain of repugnancy of the two Acts we have to consider the relevant provisions of the Central Acts and of the State Act.\n\nThe High Court has on a very\n\n• ....\n\ncareful abd cautious analysis of the various provisions of the two Acts -' • come to a clear finding that there is no repugnancy between the State Act and the Central Acts, but the State Act merely creates a new and distinct offence which in its nature and purport is sentially different from the offences contemplated by the Ibdian Penal Code and the Corruption Act. It has been pointed out by the High Court as also '\n\n• '\n\n\"' •• '>----··\n\nby the Solicitor General that not only the ingredients of the offences created by the State Act are different from those of the Central Act, but even the procedure is different. It was further argued by the Solicitor General that there is absolutely no repuguancy between the two Acts and both can operate in their respective fields.\n\nIu order to appreciate this question, we would briefly refer to the B scheme of the State Act.\n\nSection 2 defines ortain dignitaries like Commissioner, Additional Commissioner, Government, Public man, public servant.\n\nClause (a) of section 2 defines 'Commissioner' thus:\n\n\" 'Commissioner' or \"Additional Commissioner'' mans the Commissioner of Inquiries or an Additional Commissioner of Inquiries, as the case may be, appointed under section 4\"\n\nClause ( c) of section 2 defines 'public man' thus :\n\n\"Public man\" means\n\n(i) any person who is or has been the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the State;\n\n(ii) a person who is or has been a Member of the Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Council of the\n\nState; or\n\n(iii) a person who is or has been a Mayor or Deputy Mayor of the Municipal Corporation of Madras or of Madurai or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1919) or the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971) as the case may be;\n\n(iv) a person who is or has been the Chairman or Vice- Chairman of a Municipal Council or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Tamil Nadu Disirict Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920) or any other law for the time in force;\n\n( v) a prson who is or has been the Chairman or Vicec\n\nChairman of a Panchayat Union Council or Chairman H or President of any Standing or Subject or other Com mittee of such council constituted or deemed to be\n\n18-196 SC!/79\n\nconstituted under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act XXXV of 1958), or any other law for the time being in force;\n\n(vi) a person other than a Government servant who is or has been the Chairman of-\n\n( a) any corporation (not being a local authority) established by or under a State or Provincial Act and owned or controlled by the State Government;\n\n(b) any Government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956), in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government, or any company which is a subsidiary of a company in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government\".\n\nIt may be noticed here that the concept of public-man as contemplated by the State Act differs in certain respects from that of a public servant as contemplated by section 21 (12) of the Penal Code.\n\nTo begin with, unde.r the State Act a public-man clearly includes the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the State as also a member\n\nof the State Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council. Secondly, the word 'public man' appearing in Section 2(c) clearly excludes a Government servant, unless he falls within the categories of (a), (b) and (c) of clause (vi) of section 2 of the State Act. This is a basic departure from the provisions of the Penal Code where the word 'public servant' has been used in the widest possible sense so as to include not only Government servants who are receiving salary from the Government, but also other dignitaries who are in the pay of the Government.\n\nSection 3 clauses (1), (2) and (3) define criminal misconduct which is almost the same as defined by the provisions of the Corruption Act and the Penal Code (sections 5(2) and 5(1) (d) of the Corruption Act and section 161 of the Indian Penal Code).\n\nH It may, however, be noted here that the State Act does not make ioections 468 and 4 71 of the Indian Penal Code any offence under this Act.\n\nSection 4 prescribes the procedure for appointment of a high\n\n• '\n\npowered tribunal for the purpose of holding investigation into the allega- A tions made against any public man. Sections 4 a'nd 5 run thus :-\n\n\"4. Appointment of Commissioner of Inquiries and Additional Commissioner of Inquiries: (1) For the purpose of conducting investigation in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Government shall, on the recommendation of the\n\nChief Justice of the High Court appoint, by notification, a person to be known as Commissioner of Inquiries and one or more persons to be known as Additional Commissioner of Inquiries.\n\n(2) The Commissioner shall be a person who is, or who is qualified for appointment as, or who has been, a Judge of a High Court and an Additional Commissioner shall be a person who is, or who is qualified for appointment as, or who has been, a District Judge.\n\n(3) Every person appointed as the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner shall, before entering upon his office, make and subscribe before the Chief Justice of the High Court or some person appointed in that behalf by him a'n oath for affirmation in the form set out for the purpose in the First Schedule .\n\n( 4) The Additional Commissioner shall be subject to the administrative control of the Commissioner, and in particular, for the purpose of convenient disposal of investigations under this Act, the Commissioner may issue such general or special directions as he may consider necessary to the Additional Commissioner;\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-section! shall be construed to authorise the Commissioner to question any finding conclusion or recommendation of an Additional Commissioner.\n\nx x x x x\n\n5. Term of office and other conditions of ,!ervice of Com-\n\n~ missioner and Additional Commissioner :\n\nx x x x\n\n.--.::-1\n\n' \"\n\n(4) There shall be paid to the Commissioner and the H Additional Commissioner such salaries as are specified in the Second Schedule.\n\n\" ;.\n\n(5) The allowances and pension payable to, and other conditions of service of, the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner shall be the same as admissible -\n\n(a) to a Judge of a High Court in the case o! the Commissioner,\n\n(b) to a District Judge in the case of an Additional Commissioner :\n\nProvided that the allowance\" and pension payable to, and other conditions o! service of, the Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall not be varied to hii cliiadvantage after his appointment\".\n\nAnother impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Acts is a provision regarding limitation. Under section 8 which was introduced by section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Amending Act 16 of 1974 it is provided that the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner shall not investigate any complaint invohing criminal misconduct which is made after the expiry of 5 years from the date on which the criminal misconduct complained against was alleged to have been committed or after the expiry o! one year from the date on which the public man ceased to be such public man. The provisions of section 8 may be extracted thns :-\n\n\"6. Limitation for preferring complaints : ( 1) The Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall not investigate or cause to be investigated any complaint involving criminal misconduct if the complaint is made :-\n\n(i) after the expiry of five years from the date on which the criminal misconduct complained against was alleged to have been committed; or\n\n(ii) after the expiry of one year of the date on which the public ceases to be such public man,\n\nWhichever is later.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall not investigate or cause to be investigated any complaint involving criminal misconduct, the complaint is made after the expiry of one year from the date on which the action complained again5t becomes known to the complainant\".\n\nSimilarly section 10 of the State Act confers plenary powers on A the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner to prescribe a procedure for conducting an investigation in respect of a complaint and runs thus :-\n\n\"10. Procedure in respect of investigation of criminal misconduct : ( 1) The procedure for conducting any investigation in respect of a complaint of criminal misconduct against any public man shall be such as the Commissioner or tl1e Additional Commissioner considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.\n\n(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), where C any complaint of criminal misconduct against a public man is received by the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner, the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner shall make or cause to be made a preliminary investigation to find out whether there is any prima facie case against the public man in respect of the allegation of criminal misconduct : D\n\nx x x\n\n( 3) Where tht Commissioner 01: Additional Commissioner gives a finding under sub-section (2) that there is no prima facie case against the public man in respect of the allegation of criminal misconduct, he shall dismiss the complaint after briefly recording his reasons for doing so :\n\nProvided that the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner shall not dismiss any complaint under this sub-section, unless the complainant has been given an opportunity of being heard, if such complainant has not already been heard under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2).\n\nx x x x\"\n\nUnder clause (3) of section 10 the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner is empowered to dismiss the complaint if he is satisfied G that no prima facie case against the public man ha$ been made out, but such an order of dismissal can be made only after the complainant has been given an opportunity of being heard.\n\nSection 11 is also a new provision as compared to the Central Acts which provides for grant of compensatory costs to the public H man if the. allegation made against him are found to be false, frivolous or vexatious to the knowledge of the complainant.\n\nSection 12 gives a right of apal to a Division Bench of the High Court against any order passed by the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner under sub-section (1) of • section 11 granting compensatory costs to the public man and runs thus :-\n\n\"Appeal against an order under section 11 :\n\n(1) • Against any order passed by the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner under sub-section (1) of section 11, the complainant may, within such period as may be prescribed, • appeal to a Special Appellate Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by the Chief Justice in that behalr'.\n\nSection 14 provides the procedure for examination of witnesses, receiving of affidavits, issuing of commissions etc.\n\nSection 15 provides an enhanced punishment of seven years for criminal misconduct as compared to the punishment provided by the D Corruption Act.\n\nSection 16 provides for prosecution of a complainant if his complaint is found to be false, frivolous and vexatious and such a complainant is liable to be punished for a term which may extend to three years and fine, but such a prosecution can be launched only witbi the previous sanction of the Commisioner.\n\nSection 16 runs thus:-\n\n\"16. Punishment for false, frivolous or vexatious complaint : ( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, every person who makes a false, frivolous or vexatious complaint against a public man under this Act, shall on conviction bo punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine\".\n\nA careful analysis, therefore, of the various provisions of the State Act leads to the irresistible inference that the State Act was passed with a view to afford sufficient protection to a public man by enjoining a summary inquiry or investigation by a high and indepmdent Tribunal of the status of a High Court Judge or a Senior District Judge to instill confidence in the people and to prevent public man from being prosecuted on false, frivolous and vexatious allegations. Although the ingredients of crimiqal misconduct as defined in section 5 (1 )( d) of the Corruption Act are substantially the same in the State Act as ll,:i the Central Acts but here also the punishment is much severer in the case of the State Act than the one contained in the Central Acts. It is, therefore, manifest that the State. Act does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the Central Acts, but is a sort of comple-\n\n~ •\n\nmentary Act which runs pari passu the Central Acts mentioned above.\n\nA After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act is complete and a report is submitted, section 18 of the State Act provides thus :-\n\n\"18. Report of the Commissioner and Additiona' Commissioner : (1) Where as a result of any detailed investigation under sul>-section ( 4) of section 10 in respect of a complaint of criminal misconduct against a public man, the Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner is of opinion,-\n\n(a) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that the public man against whom criminal misccliduct has been alleged, should be prosecuted fo~ an offence under section 15; or\n\n(b) that the allegation has not been substantiated, he shall record a finding to that effect stating his reasons therefor and report the same to the Government.\n\n( 2) In cases falling under clause (a) of sul>-section (1) , the public man shall be prosecuted and tried under section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Central Act 46 of 1952)\".\n\nThe State Act enjoins that the public man concerned will have to be prosecuted under the Criminal Law (Amendment). Act of 1952. Thus, far from there being any inconsistency, the provisions of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act are directly applied to a public man by thq State Act after the preliminary investigation by the Commissioner is over. It seems to us that what the State Act does is merely to create , different and distinct offences and not to over-rule any provisions of the Central Act.\n\nIt was, however, strongly contended by Mr. Venu Gopal that the provisions contained in the State Act run counter to tho5e qf the Central Acts in respect of the following matters :\n\n1. The procedure for investigation of the offences by a Central agency as contemplated by the Corruption Act is dispensed with and is instead invested in a: Com-· missioner appointed under the State Act.\n\n2. The provision under the Prevention of Corruption: Act\n\nregarding the grant of sanction under section 197 of H the Code to the accused is given a complete go by and instead a Commissioner is appointed to hold a regular\n\ninquiry for himself and then to submit his report.\n\nThus, an accused who has been tried under the State Act is deprived of protection afforded to every Government servant regarding grant of a sanction by the appointing authority.\n\nIt is thus suggested that the protection, if any, given by the State Act is pwely illusory.\n\nIn order, however, to understand the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be necessary to consider the question of repngna\\Jcy in a little broader perspective.\n\nIt is well settled that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person assailing the Act to prove that it is nnconstitutional.\n\nPrima facie, there does not appear to us to be any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts.\n\nBefore any repugnancy can arise, the following conditions must be satisfied:-\n\n!. That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act.\n\n2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.\n\n3. That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.\n\nIn Colin Howard's Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 2nd Edition the author while describing the nature of inconsistency between the two enactments observed as follows:-\n\n\"An obvious inconsistency arises when the two enactments produce different legal results when applied to the same facts\".\n\nIn the case of Hume v. Palmer( 1) Knox, C.J. observed as. follows:-\n\n\"The rules prescribed by the Commonwealth Law and the State law respectively are for present purposes substantially identical, but the penalties imposed for the contravention differ ................................. .\n\nIn these circumstances, it is I think, clear that the reasons given by my brothers Issacs and Starke for the deci-\n\n(1) 38 C. L. R. 441.\n\n• .....\n\nsions of this Court in Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand\n\nv. Commonwealth(') and Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn(') establish that the provisions of the law of the State for the breach of which the appellant was convicted are inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth within the meaning of sec. 109 of the Constitution and are therefore invalid\".\n\nIssacs, J. observed as follows:-\n\n,.~·· ..\n\n\"There can be no question that the Commonwealth Navigation Act, by its own direct provisions and the Regulations made under its authority, applies upon construction to the circumstances of the case. It is inconsistent with the State Act in various ways, including (1) general supersession of the regulations of conduct, and so displacing the State regulations, whatever those may be; (2) the jurisdiction to convict, the State law empowering the Court to convict summarily, the Commonwealth Law making the contravention an indictable offence, and therefore bringing into operation sec. 80 of the Constitution, requiring a jury; (3) the penalty, the State providing a maximum of £ 50 the Commonwealth Act . prescribing a maximum of £ 100, or imprisonment, or both; ( 4) the tribunal itself\".\n\nStarke, J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"It i' not difficult to see that the Federal Code would be 'disturbed or deranged' if the State Code applied a different sanction in respect of the same act. Consequently the State regulatjon' are, in my opinion, inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth and rendered invalid by force of sec. 109 of the Constitution''.\n\nIn a later case of the Australian High Court in Ex. Parte Mclean(') Issacs and Starke, JJ. while dwlling on the question of repugnancy made the following observation:-\n\n\"In Cowburn's case (supra) is stated the reasoning for that conclusion and we will now refer to those statements without repeating them.\n\nIn short, the very same onduct by the same persons is dealt with in conflicting terms by the Commonwealth and State Acts.\n\nA Court, seeing that, has\n\n(!) 36 C. L. R. 130.\n\n(2) 37 C.L.R. 466.\n\n(3) 43 C.L.R. 47i.\n\nno authority to inquire further, or to seek to ascertain the scope or bearing of tbe State Act. It must simply apply sec. 109 of tbe Constitution, which declares the invalidity pro tanto of. tbe State Act\".\n\nSimilarly Dixon, J. observed thus:-\n\n\"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and sec. 109 applies.\n\nThat this is so is settled, at least when the sanctions they impose are diverse Hume v. Palmer (supra)\".\n\nIn tbe case of Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay(') this Court laid down the various tests to determine the inconsistency between two enactments and observed as follows-\n\n\"The important thing to consider with reference to this provision is whether the legislation is 'in respect of the same matter'. If the latr legislation deals not with the matters which formed the subject of the earlier legislation but with other and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character, then Article 254 (2) will have no application.\n\nThe principle embodied in section 107 (2) and Article 254\n\n(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the Centre and by tbe Province, both of them being competent to enact the same, the law of the Centre ehould prevail over that of the State\".\n\n\"It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Article 254 ( 1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if subject-matter of tbe later legislation is identical with tbat of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254(2) whether tbe further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law\".\n\nIn the case of Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. etc. v. The State of Uttar ft Pradesh & Ors.(') while dealing with the question of repugnancy\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 799.\n\n(2) (1956] S.C.R. 393\n\nbetween a Central and a State enactment, this Court relied on the observations of Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Ed. p.303, where three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy have been laid down and which are as follows:-\n\n\" (1) There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of the competing statutes R. Brisbane Licensing Court(').\n\n(2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law may be inoperative because the Co=onwealth law, or the award of the Commonwealth Court, is intended to be a complete exhaustive code Clyde Engineering Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nCow burn (supra).\n\n(3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may arise when both State and Co=onwealth seek to exercise their powers over the same subject matter Victoria v. Commonwealth(2) Wenn v. Attorney General(')\n\nThis Court also relied on the decisions in the case of Hume v.\n\nPalmer as also the case of Ex Parte Mclean (supra) referred to above.\n\nD This Court also endorsed the observations of Sulaiman, J. in the caoe of Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh (') where Sulairnan, J. obl!erved as follows:\n\n\"When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should be on the party attacking its validity.\n\nThere ought to be !l presumption in favour of its validity, and every effort should be made to reconcile them and construe both so as to avoid their being repugnant to each other, and care should be taken to see whether the two do not really operate in different fields without encroachment.\n\nFurther, repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend merely on a possibility\".\n\nIn the case of Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P.(5) where this Court was considering the question of the inconsistency between the two Central enactments, namely, the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act held that there was no inconsistency and observed as follows:-\n\n\"It seems to us, therefore, that the two offences are distinct and separate. This is the view taken in A11U1rendra\n\n(I) 28 C.L.R. 23\n\n(2) 58 C.L.R. 618.\n\n(3) 77 C.L.R. 84.\n\n(4) [1939] F. C. R. 188.\n\n(5) [1957] S.C.R. 423.\n\nNath Roy v. The State(') and we endorse the opinion of the learned Judges, expressed therein.\n\nOur conclusion, therefore, is that the offence created under section 5 (1)\n\n(c) of the Corruption Act is distinct and separate from the one under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, there can be no question of section 5 (l) ( c) repealing section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIf that is so, then, Article 14 of the Constitution can be no\n\nbar\".\n\n~·~.\n\nSimilarly in the case of Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh f & Ors. (2) this Court indicated the various tests to ascertain the question of repugnancy between the two statutes and observed as. follows:-\n\n\"Repugnancy between two statutes may thus be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles:-\n\n( 1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions;\n\n(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and\n\n(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislat\\Jre occupy the same field\".\n\nIn the case of Megh Raj and Ors. v. Allah Rakhia & Ors.('} where Varadachariar, J. speaking for the Court pointed out that where\n\na~ in Australia a provision similar to section l 07 of the Government _ ·\"\"\"- of India Act, 1935 existed in the shape of section 109 of the Australian -._.\n\nConstitution, there was no corresponding provision in the American Constitution. Similarly, the Canadian cases have laid down a prin- ' - ciple too narrow for application to Indian cases. According to the learned Judge, the safe rule to follow was that where the paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified there is no inconsistency and in this connection observed as follows :-\n\n\"The principle of that decision is that where the paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified, but itself permits or recognises other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision made in it, it can-\n\n(!) A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 236.\n\n(2) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 8\n\n(3) A.LR. 1942 F.C. 27.\n\n,( Anot be said that any qualification or restriction introduced by another law is repugnant to the provision in the main or paramount law\".\n\n\"The position will be even more obvious, if another test of repugnancy which has been suggested in some cases is applied, namely, whether there is such an inconsistency between the two provisions that one must be taken to repeal the other by necessary implication\"\n\nIn the case of Stai. of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co. (') Ayyangar J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:\n\n\"Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other.\n\nBut two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is pos- sible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however. the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation\".\n\nJn the case of T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rangachai(2) it was pointed out by this Coun that before corning to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication, the Coun must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent that it becomes impossible for them to stand together. In other words, this Court held that when there is a direct collision between the two enactments which is irreconcilable then only repugnancy results. In this connection, the Court made the following observations :-\n\n\"Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication, the Court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot\n\n(I) [1964] 4 S .C.R. 461\n\n.(1) [1969] 3 SC.R. 65.\n\nstand together and the repeal of the exprs prior enactment must flow from necessary implication of the language of the later enactment. It is therefore necessary in this connection to scrutinise the terms ana consider the true meaning and effect of the two enactments\".\n\n\"The provisions enacted in s. 52 of the 1922 Act do not alter the nature or quality of the offence enacted in s. 177, Indian Penal Code but it merely provides a new course of procedure for what was already an offence.\n\nIn a case of this description the new statute is regarded not as superseding, nor repealing by implication the previous law, but as cumulative\".\n\n\"A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence.\n\nIn other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence\".\n\nOn a careful consideration,· therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge :-\n\n1. That in order to dcide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.\n\n2. That there can be no ! peal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.\n\n3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field. there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.\n\n4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute OC\n\ncopying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field.\n\n• i\n\ni \"\n\nM. KARUNANIDffi v. UNION (Fazal Ali,!.) 279\n\nIn the light of the propositions enunciated above, there can be no doubt that the State Act creates distinct and separate offences with different ingredients and different punishments and it does not in any way collide with the Central Acts.\n\nOn the other hand, the State Act itself permits the Central Act, namely, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act to come into its aid after an investigation is completed and ' a report is submitted by the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. It was contended however by Mr. Venu Gopal that by virtue .. of the fact that the State Act has obtained the assent or the President, .it will be deemed to be a dominant legislation, and, therefore, it would ,,+.overrule the Central Acts.\n\nDoubtless, the State Act is the dominant \"\">< legislation but we are unable to agree with Mr. Venu Gopal that there are any provisions in the State Act which are irreconcilably or. directly inconsistent with the Central Acts so as to overrule them.\n\nLast but not the least there is a very important circumstance which completely and conclusively clinches the issue and takes the force out of the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal on the question of repugnancy.\n\nIt would be seen that in the original State Act, section 29 ran thus\n\n\"Act to overrule other laws, etc.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority\".\n\nThis section underwent an amendment which was brought about by Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1974 which substituted a new section 29 for the old one.\n\nThe new section which was substituted may be extracted thus:-\n\n\"Saving-The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force, and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public man from any proceeding by way of investigation or otherwise which might, apart from this Act. be instituted against him\".\n\n\" This amendment received the assent of the President on 10th April, 1974 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 16th April, 1974. We have already shown that although the State Act was passed as far back as 30th December, i973\n\nit Pceived the assent of the President on the 10th April, 1974 that is H\n\n..._ to say, on the same date as Act 16 of 197 4. The Act was however brought into force on the 8th May, 197 4 when the new section 29\n\nwhich had already replaced the old section and had become a part of the statnte. Therefore, for all intents and purposes the State Act cannot be read in isolation, but has to be interpreted in coojunction with the express language contained in section 29 of the State Act.\n\nThis section has in unequivocable terms expressed the intention that the\n\nState Act which was undoubtedly the dominant legislatioo would only be \"in addition to and '.not in derogation with any other law for the , time being in force\" which manifestly includes the Central Acts,\n\nnamely, the Indian Penal Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. Thus, the Legislature about a month bfore\n\nthe main Act came i'.nto force clearly declared its intention that there l would be no question of the State Act colliding with the Central Act!'T'-- ,. referred to above.\n\nThe second part of section 29 also provides that (' nothing contained in the State Act shall exempt any public man from\n\nbing proceeded with by way of investigation or otherwise under a proceeding i'.nstituted against him under the Central Acts. It is, therefore, clear that in view of this clear intention of the legislature there can be no room for any argument that the State Act was in any way repu2nant to the Central Acts.\n\nWe have already pointed out from the decisions of the Federal Court and this Court that one of the important tests to find out as to whether or not there is repugnancy is to ascertain the inteution of the legislatnre regarding the fact that the dominant legislature allowed the subordinate legislature to operate in the same field pari passu the State Act.\n\nCraies in his Interpretation on Statute Law 6th Ed. p. 369 observes as follows:-\n\n,.._. -\n\n\"Many earlier statutes contain clauses similar in effect to the general rule, but without the confusing words as to contrary intention.\n\nThese statutes, of some of which a list is given below, seem not to be affected by the above rule, Gave so far as it enables the revisers of the 'tatute-book to excise the particular clauses.\n\nIn accordance with this rule, penalties imposed by statute for offences already punishable under a prior statute are regarded as cumulative or alternative and not as replacing the penalty to which the offender was previously liable.\"\n\nSuch an intention is clearly discernible from, the provisions of section 29 of the State Act. Mr. Venn Gopal tried to rebut this argument on\n\n. H !he ground that section 29 would have no application where the inconsistency between the dominant statute and the subordinate statute . is direct and complete.\n\nWe have already found on a discussion of\n\n-<.\n\n,-; j·\n\n• - •\n\nthe various provisions of t'he State Act that there is no direct inconsistency at all between the State Act and the Central Acts, ; md this affords a sufficient answer to the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal. Having, therefore, given our anxious consideration to the import and ambit of section. 29 it seems to us that the provisions of section 29 would be presumptive proof of the fact that there is no repugnancy between the State Act and the Central Acts nor did either the legislature or the President intend to create any repugnancy between these Acts as ii result of which the criticism regarding the repugnancy is completely obliterated in the instant case and we, therefore, hold that the State\n\n,~ legislature never intended to occupy the same field covered by the ' Central Acts.\n\nIt wns also contended by Mr. Venu Gopal that if the Central Acts being repugnant to the State Act are pressed into service even after the repeal of the State Act, the Central Acts would stand repealed hence the prosecution of the appellant would be hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution, i.e. the appellant cannot be prosecuted for an ex\n\npost facto offence.\n\nOn our findings in this case that there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts the application of Article 20(3) of the Constitution to the facts of this case does not arise at all. We, therefore, find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court that the State Act creates new and distihct offences and is not in m1y way repugnant to any provisions -0f the Central Acts and consequently overruled the first limb of the argument of counsel for the appellant.\n\nSimilarly the contention of Mr. Venu Gopal as to whether or not t11e prosecution of the appellant would be violative of Article 14 of !he Constitution is not available to the appellant, and consequently the lean1ed counsel gave up this point and in our opinion very rightly because since the State Act has now been repealed the question of the prosecution of the appellant hereafter under the State Act does not arise at all, and, therefore, the question of two remedies being open to the prosecution which they may elect at their own option does not arise in this case.\n\nThe appellant can be prosecuted only under the Corruption Act and the Penal Code and under no other Act at the moment.\n\nMoreover, it was obviously wrong to say that the earlier Central Law became violative of Article 14 as soon as the State law was enacted.\n\nThis brings us to the second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant which relates to the import and connotation of the term 'public servant' appearing in section 21 (12) of the Indian\n\n19-196 SCI/79\n\nA Penal Code.\n\nClause 12 of section 21 which is the relevant provision so far as the present case is concerned runs thus :-\n\n\"21. The words 'public servant' denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following namely :- x x x B Twelfth-Every personc\n\n(a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government:\n\nx x x\n\nIt was vehemently contended by Mr. Venu Gopal that having regard to the constitutional and public duties of a Chief Minister or a Minister he cannot be deemed to be a public servant in any sense of the term.\n\nHe further contended that the entire clause (12) (a) should be read as a whole and cannot be severed into two limbs inas much as the words 'in the service or pay of the Government' are used .as synonyms. It was further contended that the words 'in the service or pay of the Government' clearly connote the relationship of master and servant-a relationship which is completely beyond the concept of the position of a Minister or a Chief Minister.\n\nWe, however, agree that so far as the first part of clause (12) (a) is concerned, namely 'in the service of the Government' undoubtedly signifies a relationship of master and servant where the employer employs the employee on the basis of a salary or remuneration.\n\nBut we are of I\n\nthe opinion that so far as the second limb 'in the pay of the Government' is concerned, that appears to be of a much wider amplitude so as to include within its ambit even public servant who may not be F a regular employee receiving salary from his master.\n\nIn other words; we think that even a Minister or a Chief Minister will be clearly covered by the expression 'person in the pay of the Government'. Mr.\n\nVenu Gopal, however, relied on the meaning of the words \"in the pay of' as appearing in the various dictionaries.\n\nIn Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the expression 'in the pay of' is defined thus-\n\n\"To give money, etc., in return for something or in discharge of an obligation.\n\nOf a thing or action. To yield an adequate return.\n\nTo give money or other equivalent value for\".\n\nSimilarly 'Payer' is defined thus:\n\n\"One who pays a sum of money\".\n\n• .. '' • I ...\n\n' F\n\n+__,_\n\n.•-\n\n'- ) _,\n\n, ..,\n\n.-. •\n\nM. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, /.) 283\n\n In Webster's Third New International Dictionary the expression A 'in the pay of' is mdicated to mean:-\n\n\"Compensate, remunerate, satisfy, reimburse, indemnify, recompense, repay. Pay is a general term, lacking particular connotation but sometimes bluntly stressing the purchase of service, pay a machinist high wages\".\n\n\"Wages, salary remuneration\".\n\nIn Webster's New World Dictionary the expression 'in the pay of is thus defined:-\n\n\"Stresses the idea of payment for a service rendered, but it often also carries an implication of reward (a bumper crop remunerated the farmer for his labors)\". ·\n\nIn Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition Vol. 31A p. 176 the meaning, of the word 'pay' is given thus:- / . .\n\n'~Pay\" is remuneration, wages or salary.\n\nTo remunerate; to recompense, to give any pay''.\n\nIn Venkataramaya's Law Lexicon Vol. II p.1122 the expression 'to pay money' has the following connotation:-\n\n\"To piiy money is to pay it in respect of a right which some person has to receive it\".\n\nIn Corpus Juris Secnndum Vol. 70 at. page 200 the word 'pay' if used as a noun is defined as remuneration, wages, compensation, salary and the following observations are also made:-\n\n\"To noun 'pay' has been held equivalent to, or synony- -, mous with, 'compensation', salary and wages and has been compared with, or distinguished from, 'aliowance' and 'consideration' \". ~\n\n/ .\n\nA careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word 'pay' in the various dictionaries and the texts referred to above would clearly reveal that the expression 'iii the pay of' connotes that a person is getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount of money.\n\nThis by itself however does not lead to the inference that a relationship of master and servant must necessarily exist in all cases where a perso!l is paid salary. This aspect of the matter would become crystal Clear if we examine the nature and. the 'constitutional position and status of a Minister or a Chief Minister: ·\n\nArticle 164 of the Constitution runs thus:-\n\n\"Other provisions as to Ministers: ( 1) The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor:\n\nProvided that in the States of Bihar. Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, there shall be a Minister in Charge of tribal welfare who may in addition be in charge of the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and backward classes or any other work\".\n\nThis Article clearly shows that a Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor and having been appointed by the Governor it is manifest that he is subordinate to the Governor.\n\nEven in section 52 ( 1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which preceded our Constitution the provision was worded thus:-\n\n\"52(1) The Governor of a Governor's province may, by notification, appoint ministers, not being members of his executive council or other officials to administer transferred subjects, and any ministers so appointed shall hold office during his pleasure:\n\nThere may be paid to any minister so appointed in any province the same salary as is payable to a member of the executive council in that province, unless a smaller salary is provided by vote of the legislative council of the province\".\n\nF In this section also it was the Governor who alone had the power\n\nto choose the ministers.\n\nIn fact, in Article 164 the word 'appointment' is much higher than the concept of a person being chosen.\n\nArticle 164(5) provides for the salary and allowances of Ministers and runs thus:-\n\n\"164 (5) The salaries and allowances of Ministers shall be such as the Legislature of the State may from time to time by law determine and, until the Legislature of the State so determines, shall be as specified in the Second Schedule\".\n\nUnder this provision the Ministers on being appointed by the H Governor are entitled to such salaries and allowances as the Legislature of the State may determine from time to time and until this is done, the emoluments will be such as are specified in the Second\n\nSchedule.\n\nAs however all the Legislatures of the States as also Parliament have already passed Acts providing for the salaries and emoluments of the Chief Minister and the Ministers the specification of iheir emoluments in the Second Schedule to the Constitution have bee.a deleted.\n\nArticle 1 67 lays down the duties of the Chief Minister and runs B thus:-\n\n\"167. Duties of Chief Minister as respects the furnishing of information to Governor etc. It shall be the duty of the Chief Minister of each State-\n\n( a) to communicate to the Governor of the State all deci- C sions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation;\n\n(b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation as D the Governor may call for;\n\n(c) if the Governor so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not been considered by the Council\" .\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 167, the Chief Minister undoubtedly performs a public duty J of the nature as enjoined by clauses (a) to (c) of Article 167. It is also clearly provided in the Constitution that the Chief Minister or the Ministers are entitled to salaries or allowances obviously in lu of public duties that they perform.\n\nThe salaries given to the Chief Minister or the Ministers are given from the Government funds, and therefore, there will be no difficulty in holding that th<> Ministers are in the pay of the Government inasmuch as they receive their salaries, remunerations or wages from the Government. Mr. Venu Gopal, how- 0ver, submitted that no analogy can be drawn between the constitu tional provisions and the provisions contained in the Government of India Act because the constitutional position of a Chief Minister under the Constitution was not the same as under the Government of India Act where the Governor enjoyed vast and plenary powers and was not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers as the Governor is under our Constitution. It is not necessary to probe into this aspect of the matter, because the Constitution clearly lays down that the Governor appoints the Chief Minister and being the appoint-\n\n; A\n\ning authority he is also the dismissing authority.\n\nWe are not at all concerned in the instant case as to the circumstances under which the Governor can appoint or dismiss the Chief Minister.\n\nOnce it is conceded that th~ Governor appoints the Chief Minister who is paid a salary according to a statute made by the legislature from the Government funds, the Chief Minister becomes a person in the pay of the Government so as to fall squarely within clause (12) of section 21 of the Penal Code.\n\nThere is another circumstance to show that a Chief Minister or a Minister is undoubtedly a public servant which was relied upon by the High Court in repelling the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal. Section 199 of the Code runs thus:-\n\n\"199 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code is alleged to have been committed against a person who, at the time of such commission is the President of India, the Vice President of India, the Governor of a State, the Administrator of a Union Territory or a Minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence, without the case being com\n\nmitted to it, upon a complaint iu writing made by the Public Prosecutor\".\n\nThe use of words 'other public servants' following a Minister of the Union or of a State clearly show that a Minister would also be a\n\npublic servant as other public servants contemplated by section 199 ·- . ..L.\n\n(2) of the Code are the Code being a statute complimentary and allied ~~ to !he Penal. Code can be looked into for the purpose of determining the real meaning and import of the words 'public servant' as used in the aforesaid section. '\n\nThe Solicitor General placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Dattatraya Narayan Patil v. State of Maharashtra(') where this Court had held in a slightly different context that a Mimster was a public servant.\n\nMr. Venu Gopal has, however, distinguished this decision on the ground tliat this Court proceeded on the ass11mption that it was not disputed before the Court that the Minister was a Public Servant and the case having been decided on the concession\n\n(I) [1975] Supp. S.C.R. 145.\n\n(. +- ' -,\n\n......\n\nL •\n\n<Of the parties cannot be relied upon by the Solicitor General. In that A case to which two of us (Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ.) were parties to the judgment, the following observations were made:-\n\n\"The duty assigned to a public servant by his master, be it be under a statute or by an executive order, will assume the character of public duty, provided the duty assigned is not illegal or against public policy.\n\nWill it make any difference in the case of a Minister? In our judgment, not.\n\nThe Minister is a public servant-not disputed\".\n\n. These observations no doubt fortify our opinion that the Chief Minister is a public servant which is baaed on the reasons that we have already given and which are different from those given in the <:ase cited before us.\n\nIn the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors.(') the Privy Council clearly held that it was not in a position to accept the sugges- D tion of the counsel that the Minister was not subordinate to the Governor.\n\nThis was the precise argument which had been put forward by Mr. Venu Gopal when he contended that the Chief Minister is not\n\nubordinate to the Governor.\n\nThe Privy Council observed as follow! in this connection:-\n\n\"So far as it is relevant in the present case, their Lordships are unable to accept a suggestion by counsel for the respondents that the Home Minister is not an officer subordinate to the Governor within the meaning of s.49 (1), and so far as the decision in Emperor v. Hemendra Prasad <Jhoshe (19) I.L.R. (1939) 2 Cal. 411 decides that a Minister is not such an officer their Lordships are unable to agree with it.\n\nWhile a Minister may have duties to the Legislature, the provisions of s.51 as to the appointment, payment and dismissal of Ministers, and s.59 (3) and ( 4) of the Act of 1935, and the Business Rules made by virtue of s.59, place beyond doubt that the Home Minister is an officer subordinate to the Governor\" .\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the Privy Council. In fact the case of the Privy Council referred to above was noticed and relied upon by this Court in the case of Rao\n\n(1) A.T.R. 1945 P. C. 156.\n\nA Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh(') •\n\nwhere this Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"Clause 9 of section 21 Indian Penal Code shows that every officer in the service or pay of the Crown for the performance of any public duty is a 'public servant'. The decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Sibnatfr Banerji(') is decisive to show that a Minister under the Government of India is 'an officer' subordinate to the Governor.\n\nOn the same reasoning there can be no doubt that the Minister of Vindhya Pradesh would be an 'Officer of the State of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nTherefore, prior to the passing of Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 and on the view that the Indian Penal Code with necessary adaptation mutatis mutandis was in force at least in the Rewa portion of Vindhya Pradesh (if not in the entirety of Vindhya Pradesh) the first appellant was a public servant as defined in section 21, Indian Penal Code, as adapted.\n\nThe amendment of the said section brought about therefore no substantial change in the position of the first appellant\".\n\nIn the case of Namdeo Kashinath A her v. H. G. Vartak & Anr. (3 ) Deshpande, J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"Whatever be the practical and actual position, the fact remains that it is the Governor who can accept the resignation of the Ministry or Minister and it is the Governor again who can dismiss or remove the Minister from office.\n\nUnder section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the word 'State Government' has been defined. Clause (cl of section 3 ( 60) is applicable to the present case and therefore the State Government is to mean the Governor for the purpose of the present case.\n\nThe result therefore is that accused No.1 is a public servant who can be said to be removable only by the State Government, meaning thereby the Governor, and I do not find any difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the second requirement of Section 197, Cr. P.C. also is fully satisfied as far as accused No. l is concerned\".\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1188 ..\n\n(2) (1945] F.C.R. 195.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1970 Born. 385.\n\n--4 --\n\n.. M. KARUNANIDIII v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 289\n\nJn the case of S .. Tara Singh v. Director'Consolidation of Holdings, A Punjab, Ju/l1111d11r & Ors.(') the Punjab High Court took the same view and observed as follows:-\n\n\"lt follows from the above conclusion that under Article 154 (1) of the Constitution the Governor may act directly or through his subordinate officers.\n\nIn the present case he has acted through the Development Minister. The question arises whether he could so act.\n\nObviously the executive . authority carries on the business of the Government and part of this business is the power given to the State Government under section 42 of the Consolidation Act. Under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution the Governor can allocate this business to any Minister he likes ............ Moreover there can be no doubt that a Minister is subordinate to the Governor. . The Governor is the executive head of the State and this position he does not share with the Chief Minister or any other Minister. He allocates his executive duties to various Ministers under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution.\n\nHe appoints a Minister albeit on the advice of the Ch!ef Minister and the Minister holds office during his pleasure.\n\nTherefore it is open to a Governor under the Constitution to dismiss an individual Minister at his plesure.\n\nJn these circumstances there can be no doubt that a Minister is to be considered as an officer subordinate to the Governor\".\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken and the reasons given by the Punjab High Court in the aforesaid case.\n\nTo the same effect is a decision of the 1 & K High Court in the case of Bakshi Ghulam Mol1d. v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors(2 ) where Anant\n\nSingh, J, observed .as follows:-\n\n\"A Minister of a State is 'paid from its public exchequer, and he is paid for doing public duty and, in my opinion, a Minister is a 'public officer' within the meaning of Sec. 80 as defined in Sec. 2 (17) (h) of the Civil Procedure Code\".\n\nThe opinion expressed by the learned Judge is clearly in consonance with the view that we have taken in this case.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab. 302.\n\n(!) A. I. R. 1963 J & K. 98.\n\nThree facts, therefore, have been proved beyond doubt:-\n\n1. That a Minister is appointed or dismissed by the Governor and is, therefore, subordinate to him whatever be the nature and status of his constitutional functions.\n\n2. That a Chief Minister or a Minister' gets s3tary for the public work done or the public duty performed by him. ' . .\n\n3. That the said salary is paid to the Chief Minister or the Minister from the Government funds.\n\nIt is thus incontrovertable, that the holder of a public office such as the Chief Minister is a public servant in respect of whom the Constitution provides that he will get his salary from the Government Treasury so long he holds his office on account of the public service that he discharges.\n\nThe salary given to the Chief Minister is coterminus with his office and is not paid like other constitutional functionaries such as. the President and the Speaker. These facts, therefore, point to one and only one conclusion and that is that the Chief Minister' is in the pay of the Government and is, therefore, a public servant' within the meaning of section 21 ( 12) of the Penal Code.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are satisfied that a Chief Minister or a Minister is undoubtedly a public servant as defined in section ·\n\n21(12){a) of the Penal Code and the view taken by the High-Court on this point was absolutely correct in law.\n\nThe result is that all the .contentions raised by Mr. Venu Gopal, counsel for the appellant fail and the appeals are dismissed. The case before the Special Judge will now proceed to its ultimate end according to law.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n-. •", "total_entities": 308, "entities": [{"text": "M. KARUNANIDHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 287, "end_char": 320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 495, "end_char": 516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 164 & 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 522, "end_char": 537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 613, "end_char": 635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 21(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1869", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1869"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 199(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 692, "end_char": 701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898"}}, {"text": "S. 21(12)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 834, "end_char": 846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898"}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 886, "end_char": 904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1973, the Madras 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Federal Constitution Law 2nd Edn.", "canonical_name": "Colin Heward"}}, {"text": "can be no doubt that the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10729, "end_char": 10763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11385, "end_char": 11390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the State Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the State Act"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11509, "end_char": 11514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the State Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the State Act"}}, {"text": "10th F April, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11590, "end_char": 11608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This amendment received the assent of the President on 10th F April, 1974 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 16 April, 1974."}}, {"text": 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataramaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14915, "end_char": 14928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkataramaya's Law Lexicon Vol."}}, {"text": "Art. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15058, "end_char": 15066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15175, "end_char": 15183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15936, "end_char": 15941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15949, "end_char": 15959, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": 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Venugopal, N. A. Subramaniam, C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mrs.\n\nShanta Venugopal, K. R. Chowdhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18258, "end_char": 18273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal, N. A. Subramaniam, C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mrs.\n\nShanta Venugopal, K. R. Chowdhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Veena Devi Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18283, "end_char": 18300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal, N. A. Subramaniam, C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mrs.\n\nShanta Venugopal, K. R. Chowdhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18321, "end_char": 18333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kackar, Sol."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18367, "end_char": 18378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "270) R. B. Datar and R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18383, "end_char": 18397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "270) R. B. Datar and R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18420, "end_char": 18431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. P. Raman, Adv."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18447, "end_char": 18459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Genl and A. V. Rangam for the State of Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18577, "end_char": 18585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against a common order of the Madras High Court dated 10th May, 1977 dismissiug the applications filed before the High Court by the appellant for quashmg the order of the Special Judge, Madras dated 4th January, 1977 refusing to discharge the appellant under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code).", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18807, "end_char": 18828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against a common order of the Madras High Court dated 10th May, 1977 dismissiug the applications filed before the High Court by the appellant for quashmg the order of the Special Judge, Madras dated 4th January, 1977 refusing to discharge the appellant under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code)."}}, {"text": "4th January, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18835, "end_char": 18852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against a common order of the Madras High Court dated 10th May, 1977 dismissiug the applications filed before the High Court by the appellant for quashmg the order of the Special Judge, Madras dated 4th January, 1977 refusing to discharge the appellant under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code)."}}, {"text": "section 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18895, "end_char": 18906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18914, "end_char": 18940, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. Karunanidhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19342, "end_char": 19356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, M. Karunanidhi, was a former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and was the petitioner before the High Court in the applications filed by him before the High Court.", "canonical_name": "M. KARUNANIDHI"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19389, "end_char": 19399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, M. 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against the appellant and others who were alleged to have abused their official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab."}}, {"text": "CBI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19639, "end_char": 19642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-6-1976 a D.O. letter was written by t11e Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBI requesting him lo make a detailed investigation into certain allegations against the appellant and others who were alleged to have abused their official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab."}}, {"text": "16-6-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19908, "end_char": 19917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A first information report was accordingly recorded on 16-6-1976 and four months later sanction under section."}}, {"text": "sections 161, 468 and 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20065, "end_char": 20090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20098, "end_char": 20115, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20120, "end_char": 20132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20143, "end_char": 20152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20168, "end_char": 20196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madenlal Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20478, "end_char": 20492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 Iakhs from Madenlal Gupta for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms."}}, {"text": "section 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20770, "end_char": 20781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th December, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21402, "end_char": 21421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as 30th December, 1973 the Madras Legislature had passed an Act known as The Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the State Act."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21752, "end_char": 21768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This State Act was, however, amended by Act 16 of 197 4 and the President's assent was received on 10th April, 1974."}}, {"text": "According to the provisions of the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21770, "end_char": 21814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "8-5-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21903, "end_char": 21911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. oj a notification with effect from 8-5-1974."}}, {"text": "31-1-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22076, "end_char": 22085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-1-1976 by virtue of the provisions of Article 356 President's rule was imposed in the State of Tamil Nadu and the Ministry headed by the appellant was dismissed and a Proclamation to his effect was issued on the same date."}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22117, "end_char": 22128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the provisions of the State Act", "statute": "According to the provisions of the State Act"}}, {"text": "10-5-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22360, "end_char": 22369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court decided the petitions of the appellgnt on 10-5-1977 and granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court on 27-7\"1977."}}, {"text": "27-7\"1977.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22433, "end_char": 22443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court decided the petitions of the appellgnt on 10-5-1977 and granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court on 27-7\"1977."}}, {"text": "6-9-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22569, "end_char": 22577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, however, the State Act was repealed and the President's assent to the repealing of the State Act was given on 6-9-1977."}}, {"text": "Court and was taken up for hearing the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22646, "end_char": 22694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venn Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22903, "end_char": 22913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faced with this situation, Mr. Venn Gopal, learned counsel for the appellant has raised only two points before us."}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23207, "end_char": 23233, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23251, "end_char": 23265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court and was taken up for hearing the State Act", "statute": "Court and was taken up for hearing the State Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23273, "end_char": 23294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24212, "end_char": 24222, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24355, "end_char": 24365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24385, "end_char": 24402, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24703, "end_char": 24713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24736, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25078, "end_char": 25089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25451, "end_char": 25462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26906, "end_char": 26917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27748, "end_char": 27764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 254(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28142, "end_char": 28156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29034, "end_char": 29045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29773, "end_char": 29787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30219, "end_char": 30230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "So far as the present State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30233, "end_char": 30264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30377, "end_char": 30391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So far as the present State Act", "statute": "So far as the present State Act"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30570, "end_char": 30581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "So far as the present State Act", "statute": "So far as the present State Act"}}, {"text": "Acts we have to consider the relevant provisions of the Central Acts and of the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31422, "end_char": 31511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31885, "end_char": 31895, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32425, "end_char": 32434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts we have to consider the relevant provisions of the Central Acts and of the State Act", "statute": "Acts we have to consider the relevant provisions of the Central Acts and of the State Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32561, "end_char": 32570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32763, "end_char": 32772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32790, "end_char": 32799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33148, "end_char": 33154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (a) of section 2 defines 'Commissioner' thus:\n\n\" 'Commissioner' or \"Additional Commissioner'' mans the Commissioner of Inquiries or an Additional Commissioner of Inquiries, as the case may be, appointed under section 4\"\n\nClause ( c) of section 2 defines 'public man' thus :\n\n\"Public man\" means\n\n(i) any person who is or has been the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the State;\n\n(ii) a person who is or has been a Member of the Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Council of the\n\nState; or\n\n(iii) a person who is or has been a Mayor or Deputy Mayor of the Municipal Corporation of Madras or of Madurai or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1919) or the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971) as the case may be;\n\n(iv) a person who is or has been the Chairman or Vice- Chairman of a Municipal Council or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Tamil Nadu Disirict Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920) or any other law for the time in force;\n\n( v) a prson who is or has been the Chairman or Vicec\n\nChairman of a Panchayat Union Council or Chairman H or President of any Standing or Subject or other Com mittee of such council constituted or deemed to be\n\n18-196 SC!/79\n\nconstituted under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act XXXV of 1958), or any other law for the time being in force;\n\n(vi) a person other than a Government servant who is or has been the Chairman of-\n\n( a) any corporation (not being a local authority) established by or under a State or Provincial Act and owned or controlled by the State Government;\n\n(b) any Government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956), in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government, or any company which is a subsidiary of a company in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government\"."}}, {"text": "Madurai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33161, "end_char": 33168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (a) of section 2 defines 'Commissioner' thus:\n\n\" 'Commissioner' or \"Additional Commissioner'' mans the Commissioner of Inquiries or an Additional Commissioner of Inquiries, as the case may be, appointed under section 4\"\n\nClause ( c) of section 2 defines 'public man' thus :\n\n\"Public man\" means\n\n(i) any person who is or has been the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the State;\n\n(ii) a person who is or has been a Member of the Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Council of the\n\nState; or\n\n(iii) a person who is or has been a Mayor or Deputy Mayor of the Municipal Corporation of Madras or of Madurai or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1919) or the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971) as the case may be;\n\n(iv) a person who is or has been the Chairman or Vice- Chairman of a Municipal Council or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Tamil Nadu Disirict Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920) or any other law for the time in force;\n\n( v) a prson who is or has been the Chairman or Vicec\n\nChairman of a Panchayat Union Council or Chairman H or President of any Standing or Subject or other Com mittee of such council constituted or deemed to be\n\n18-196 SC!/79\n\nconstituted under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act XXXV of 1958), or any other law for the time being in force;\n\n(vi) a person other than a Government servant who is or has been the Chairman of-\n\n( a) any corporation (not being a local authority) established by or under a State or Provincial Act and owned or controlled by the State Government;\n\n(b) any Government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956), in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government, or any company which is a subsidiary of a company in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government\"."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33322, "end_char": 33336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33356, "end_char": 33400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33402, "end_char": 33416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33691, "end_char": 33705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34007, "end_char": 34038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34040, "end_char": 34054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State or Provincial Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34277, "end_char": 34300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 617", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34400, "end_char": 34411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State or Provincial Act", "statute": "State or Provincial Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34419, "end_char": 34438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34886, "end_char": 34896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34909, "end_char": 34919, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35163, "end_char": 35175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35291, "end_char": 35300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35372, "end_char": 35382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35616, "end_char": 35625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35762, "end_char": 35772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 5(2) and 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35774, "end_char": 35796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35827, "end_char": 35838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35846, "end_char": 35863, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35963, "end_char": 35980, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36010, "end_char": 36019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36189, "end_char": 36199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37192, "end_char": 37206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Term of office", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37718, "end_char": 37732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Term of office and other conditions of ,!"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37958, "end_char": 37973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38476, "end_char": 38566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38611, "end_char": 38620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act", "statute": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38645, "end_char": 38654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act", "statute": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39091, "end_char": 39100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act", "statute": "Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act but not in the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39955, "end_char": 39965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41491, "end_char": 41501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41793, "end_char": 41803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42047, "end_char": 42057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42217, "end_char": 42227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42323, "end_char": 42333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42440, "end_char": 42450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42665, "end_char": 42675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42783, "end_char": 42793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42930, "end_char": 42940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43240, "end_char": 43250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44148, "end_char": 44157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44420, "end_char": 44492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act which runs pari passu the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44534, "end_char": 44575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44597, "end_char": 44660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44700, "end_char": 44710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act", "statute": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44887, "end_char": 44897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act", "statute": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45199, "end_char": 45209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act", "statute": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45489, "end_char": 45498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act", "statute": "After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act"}}, {"text": "Act are directly applied to a public man by thq State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45790, "end_char": 45847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venu Gopal that the provisions contained in the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46111, "end_char": 46168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46550, "end_char": 46561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Venu Gopal that the provisions contained in the State Act", "statute": "Venu Gopal that the provisions contained in the State Act"}}, {"text": "Colin Howard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47961, "end_char": 47973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Colin Howard's Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 2nd Edition the author while describing the nature of inconsistency between the two enactments observed as follows:-\n\n\"An obvious inconsistency arises when the two enactments produce different legal results when applied to the same facts\".", "canonical_name": "Colin Heward"}}, {"text": "Issacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48627, "end_char": 48633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, it is I think, clear that the reasons given by my brothers Issacs and Starke for the deci-\n\n(1) 38 C. L. R. 441.", "canonical_name": "Issacs"}}, {"text": "Starke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48638, "end_char": 48644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, it is I think, clear that the reasons given by my brothers Issacs and Starke for the deci-\n\n(1) 38 C. L. R. 441.", "canonical_name": "Starke"}}, {"text": "sec. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48987, "end_char": 48995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Issacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49045, "end_char": 49051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Issacs, J. observed as follows:-\n\n,.~·· ..\n\n\"There can be no question that the Commonwealth Navigation Act, by its own direct provisions and the Regulations made under its authority, applies upon construction to the circumstances of the case.", "canonical_name": "Issacs"}}, {"text": "can be no question that the Commonwealth Navigation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49096, "end_char": 49151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49670, "end_char": 49677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no question that the Commonwealth Navigation Act", "statute": "There can be no question that the Commonwealth Navigation Act"}}, {"text": "Starke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49881, "end_char": 49887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Starke, J. observed as follows:-", "canonical_name": "Starke"}}, {"text": "sec. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50207, "end_char": 50215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cowburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50413, "end_char": 50420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while dwlling on the question of repugnancy made the following observation:-\n\n\"In Cowburn's case (supra) is stated the reasoning for that conclusion and we will now refer to those statements without repeating them."}}, {"text": "sec. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50876, "end_char": 50884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50977, "end_char": 50982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Dixon, J. observed thus:-\n\n\"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and sec."}}, {"text": "Parliament of the Commonwealth", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51014, "end_char": 51044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Dixon, J. observed thus:-\n\n\"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51281, "end_char": 51289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51899, "end_char": 51910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51968, "end_char": 51979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51988, "end_char": 51999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52277, "end_char": 52288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52687, "end_char": 52701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nicholas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53072, "end_char": 53080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) (1956] S.C.R. 393\n\nbetween a Central and a State enactment, this Court relied on the observations of Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Ed."}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53966, "end_char": 53974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D This Court also endorsed the observations of Sulaiman, J. in the caoe of Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh (') where Sulairnan, J. obl!erved as follows:\n\n\"When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should be on the party attacking its validity.", "canonical_name": "Sulairnan"}}, {"text": "Sulairnan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54038, "end_char": 54047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D This Court also endorsed the observations of Sulaiman, J. in the caoe of Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh (') where Sulairnan, J. obl!erved as follows:\n\n\"When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should be on the party attacking its validity.", "canonical_name": "Sulairnan"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54835, "end_char": 54852, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54861, "end_char": 54889, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A11U1rendra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55057, "end_char": 55068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the view taken in A11U1rendra\n\n(I) 28 C.L.R. 23\n\n(2) 58 C.L.R. 618."}}, {"text": "[1939] F. C. R. 188", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55131, "end_char": 55150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55333, "end_char": 55342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55418, "end_char": 55429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55437, "end_char": 55454, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55499, "end_char": 55508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55528, "end_char": 55539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55547, "end_char": 55564, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55588, "end_char": 55598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56345, "end_char": 56358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Varadachariar, J. speaking for the Court pointed out that where\n\na~ in Australia a provision similar to section l 07 of the Government  ·\"\"\"- of India Act, 1935 existed in the shape of section 109 of the Australian -..\n\nConstitution, there was no corresponding provision in the American Constitution."}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56416, "end_char": 56425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Varadachariar, J. speaking for the Court pointed out that where\n\na~ in Australia a provision similar to section l 07 of the Government  ·\"\"\"- of India Act, 1935 existed in the shape of section 109 of the Australian -..\n\nConstitution, there was no corresponding provision in the American Constitution."}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56491, "end_char": 56506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56531, "end_char": 56542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SC.R. 65", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 59530, "end_char": 59547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59848, "end_char": 59853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59931, "end_char": 59937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59939, "end_char": 59956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Venu Gopal that there are any provisions in the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62405, "end_char": 62462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62815, "end_char": 62825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Venu Gopal that there are any provisions in the State Act", "statute": "Venu Gopal that there are any provisions in the State Act"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63216, "end_char": 63226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Venu Gopal that there are any provisions in the State Act", "statute": "Venu Gopal that there are any provisions in the State Act"}}, {"text": "have already shown that although the State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63784, "end_char": 63830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "8th May, 197 4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64048, "end_char": 64062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was however brought into force on the 8th May, 197 4 when the new section 29\n\nwhich had already replaced the old section and had become a part of the statnte."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64076, "end_char": 64086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already shown that although the State Act", "statute": "We have already shown that although the State Act"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64332, "end_char": 64342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already shown that although the State Act", "statute": "We have already shown that although the State Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64654, "end_char": 64671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64965, "end_char": 64975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Craies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65734, "end_char": 65740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Craies in his Interpretation on Statute Law 6th Ed."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66455, "end_char": 66465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66552, "end_char": 66562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Act that there is no direct inconsistency at all between the State Act and the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66790, "end_char": 66886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67090, "end_char": 67100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Act that there is no direct inconsistency at all between the State Act and the Central Act", "statute": "State Act that there is no direct inconsistency at all between the State Act and the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Article 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67800, "end_char": 67813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Venu Gopal that if the Central Acts being repugnant to the State Act are pressed into service even after the repeal of the State Act", "statute": "Venu Gopal that if the Central Acts being repugnant to the State Act are pressed into service even after the repeal of the State Act"}}, {"text": "Article 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68029, "end_char": 68042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On our findings in this case that there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act", "statute": "On our findings in this case that there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68535, "end_char": 68545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On our findings in this case that there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act", "statute": "On our findings in this case that there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69057, "end_char": 69067, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69196, "end_char": 69206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69423, "end_char": 69433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69471, "end_char": 69481, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69484, "end_char": 69493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69497, "end_char": 69507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73760, "end_char": 73771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 74100, "end_char": 74105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 'constitutional position and status of a Minister or a Chief Minister: ·\n\nArticle 164 of the Constitution runs thus:-\n\n\"Other provisions as to Ministers: ( 1) The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor:\n\nProvided that in the States of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 74107, "end_char": 74121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, there shall be a Minister in Charge of tribal welfare who may in addition be in charge of the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and backward classes or any other work\"."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 74126, "end_char": 74132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, there shall be a Minister in Charge of tribal welfare who may in addition be in charge of the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and backward classes or any other work\"."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74486, "end_char": 74496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74509, "end_char": 74538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75203, "end_char": 75214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 164(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75297, "end_char": 75311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75600, "end_char": 75615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second\n\nSchedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75876, "end_char": 75892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76112, "end_char": 76127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76169, "end_char": 76178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77009, "end_char": 77020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77129, "end_char": 77140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78705, "end_char": 78715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78723, "end_char": 78733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78927, "end_char": 78938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79053, "end_char": 79089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79875, "end_char": 79886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80770, "end_char": 80778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that A case to which two of us (Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80783, "end_char": 80792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that A case to which two of us (Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "s.49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82081, "end_char": 82085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82350, "end_char": 82354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82418, "end_char": 82422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82497, "end_char": 82501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82786, "end_char": 82789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact the case of the Privy Council referred to above was noticed and relied upon by this Court in the case of Rao\n\n(1) A.T.R. 1945 P. C. 156."}}, {"text": "Clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82926, "end_char": 82934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82938, "end_char": 82948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82949, "end_char": 82966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83208, "end_char": 83227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Sibnatfr Banerji(') is decisive to show that a Minister under the Government of India is 'an officer' subordinate to the Governor."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 83339, "end_char": 83354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same reasoning there can be no doubt that the Minister of Vindhya Pradesh would be an 'Officer of the State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83383, "end_char": 83407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same reasoning there can be no doubt that the Minister of Vindhya Pradesh would be an 'Officer of the State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83499, "end_char": 83516, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83720, "end_char": 83730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83732, "end_char": 83749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Deshpande", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83952, "end_char": 83961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 ) Deshpande, J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"Whatever be the practical and actual position, the fact remains that it is the Governor who can accept the resignation of the Ministry or Minister and it is the Governor again who can dismiss or remove the Minister from office."}}, {"text": "section 3(60)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84225, "end_char": 84238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84246, "end_char": 84271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84333, "end_char": 84342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84726, "end_char": 84737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "(1945] F.C.R. 195", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 84843, "end_char": 84860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85054, "end_char": 85071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Punjab High Court took the same view and observed as follows:-\n\n\"lt follows from the above conclusion that under Article 154 (1) of the Constitution the Governor may act directly or through his subordinate officers."}}, {"text": "Article 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85167, "end_char": 85178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85537, "end_char": 85547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85580, "end_char": 85591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85967, "end_char": 85978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anant\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86613, "end_char": 86625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors(2 ) where Anant\n\nSingh, J, observed .as follows:-\n\n\"A Minister of a State is 'paid from its public exchequer, and he is paid for doing public duty and, in my opinion, a Minister is a 'public officer' within the meaning of Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86825, "end_char": 86832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86847, "end_char": 86853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87339, "end_char": 87341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88162, "end_char": 88172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88186, "end_char": 88196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88355, "end_char": 88365, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 88667, "end_char": 88673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_291_312_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "BAI VAJIA (DEAD) BY L. RS .\n\nA • v.\n\nTHAKORBHAI CHELABHAI AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 20, 1979 B\n\n[P. S. KAILASAM, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nHindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 14(1) and (2), Scope of-Interpreta- ) -Oon of Statute-Legislature does not e111ploy n1eaningles~ language . . -~ c -,\n\nAs per the decree in a partition suit dated August, 18, 1909 Motabbai an.:t two sons of Mohanbhai being two predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs respondents \\Vere burdened with the responsibility of paying an yearly maintenance allowance of Rs. 42/- to Btai Vajia appellant on Magsher Sud 2 of every year. The decree further provided that in the event of default in payment of 'SUCh allowance continuing for a period of a month after the due date, Bai D Vajia_ would be entitled to take possessi9n of the land allotted to them nod.er the decree viz. Survey Nos. 31, 403, 591, 611, 288 and 659/3 in lieu of the maintenance awarded to her and would enjoy the income thereof without however being competent to sell, mortgage, bequeath, gift or otherwise transfer the same. The decree declared that any alienation made by Bai Vajia in contravention of the direction given by the decree in that behalf would be void . .By clause 8 of the decree Motabhai and, sons of Mohanbbai were also deprived E of the right of alienati., pn of the land during the lifetime of Bai Vajia. Default having been made in the payment of maintenance to her according to the terms of the decree, the appellant, took out execution and obtained possession .of the lands in question, which she continued to enjoy till October 21, 1963 when she made a sale of -Survey No. 31 in favour of one D. P. Desai. The sale was challenged by the plaintiffs in Civil Suit No. 110/66 \\1lhich was decreed by the trial court. The District Court in first appeal conftrn1ed it and the lJigh F _,,.........,_Court in second appeal upheld the decree of Ba.i Vajia .\n\nAllowing the appear of the Legal Representative by special leave, the Court.\n\nHELD: 1. A con1bined reading of sub-sections (1) £n1d (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and the Explanation following sub section (1) makes it clear, that sub-section (2) does not operate to take property acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of mainten1111ce or arrears of maintenance (\\vhich is property specifically included in the enumeration contained in this Explanation) out of the purview of sub-section (1). [311 D-E]\n\n. 2. For the applicability of sub-section (1) of Section 14 t\\vb conditions\n\nmust cocxis t namely.\n\n(l) the concerned female Hindu must be possessed of property; and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.it.\n\n(2) such property must be possessed by her as a \"limited owner\".\n\nIf these two conditions are fulfilled, the sub section gives her the right to hOld the property as a full owner irrespective of the fact whether she acquiro4 it before or after the commencement of the Act. [309 D-F] A\n\nThe Explanation declares that the property mentioned in sub section (1) , includes both n1ovable and immovable property and then proceeds to enume~ rate the mods of acquisition of various kinds of property which the sub-sectio• would embrace. Two such modes are \"in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance\", and \"any such property held by her as Stridhana\" immediately before the commencement of the Act. It, therefore, follows that the Leg:islatu~: i. in its wisdom took pains to specify all kinds of \"Stridhana\" in the Explanatio~ and declared that the same would form \"property\" within the meaning of that ' word e.s used in sub-section (i). This was done \"to achie\\le a social purpoSe by ..:-- bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu Society\". It was ao step in the direction of practical recognition of equality of th1 sexes and was meant to elevate women from a subservient position in the economic field to a pedestal where they could exercise full powers of enjoyment and disposal of the property held by them as owners, untrammelled by artificial limitations placed on their right of ownership by a society in which tho will of the dominant male prevailed to bring about a subjugation of the opposite sex. It was also a step calculated to ensure uniformity in the law relatin: to the nature of ownership of 'Stridhana'. This dual purpose underlying the Explanation must be borne in mind and given effect to when the ecction ia aubjected to analysis and interpretation, and sub-section (2) is not to be given u\n\nmeaning which would defeat that purpose and negative the legislative intent, if the language used so warrants. [309 F, 311 A-DJ\n\n3. It is true that that it is only some kind of \"limited ownership\" that Would get enlarged into full ownership and that where no ownership at all vested in the concerned Hindu Female, no question of lhe applicability of sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act, would arise. [306 B-C]\n\n4. A plain reading of sub section ( 1) of section 14 of the Act makes~ it _' clear that the concerned Hindu female must have limited O\\Vncrship in propert~J'. which limited ownership would get enlarged by the operation of that sub sec~ tion. If it was intended to enlarge any sort of a right which could in no sense be described as ownership, the expression \"and not as a limited owners\", would not have been used at all and becomes redundant, which is against the well known principle of interpretation of statutes that the Legislature does not employ meaningless language. [306 H, 307 A]\n\n...\n\nEran1ma v. Veerappanna and Ors., [1966] 2 SCR 626; Mangat Singh and f Ors. v. Sritnati Rattno & Anr., [1967] 3 S.C.R. 454; reiterated.\n\n5. Limited ownership in the concerned Hindu female is thus a sine qua non for the applicability of sub section (I) of section 14 of the Act. In a case wbcro this condition is fulfilled the Hindu female represents the estate completely and the reversioners of her husband have only a spes succession is i.e. a mere chance of\n\ns1n .. cession which is not a vested interest and a transfer of which is a nullity.\n\nThe widow is con1petent to protect the property from all kinds of tresspass and tc sue and be sued for all purposes in relation thereto so long as she is alive .\n\nOwnership in the fullest sense is a sum-total of all the rights which may possibly 11ow from title to property, while limited ownership in its very nature must he a bundle of rights constituting in their totality not full ownership but somef ·,:ng less. [308 E-H]\n\n\\\\1hen a wido\\\\' holds the property for her enjoyment as long as she lives, nobody is entitled to d.!prive her of it or to deal with the property in any manner to her detriment. The property is for the time being beneficially vested in her and she has the occupation, control and usufruct of it to the exclusion J of all others. Such a relationship to property falls squarely \\Vithin the meaning • if the expression \"limited owner\" as use<l in sub section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. [308 H, 309A]\n\n6. In the instant case : Bai Vajia became a full owner of the land in dispute under the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 14 of the Act and that\n\nsubsection (2) thereof has no application to her case, the land having been\n\ngiven to her as a limited o\\vner and in recognition of her preexisting right against property. So long as she lived, she was to have full enjoyment of and complete control over the land, barring any right to alienate it. Such a right was aho taken a\\vay from Motabhai and two sons of Mohanbhai. The arrangement meant that whatever rights existed in relation to the land during the life-time of Bai Vajia were exercisable by her alone and by nobody else. Not even the said three persons could deal with the land in any n1anner whatsoever, and if they did, Bai Vajia had the right to have their acts declared null and void during her life-time. After the land \\Vas made over to her she became its owner for life although \\Vith a limited. right and therefore only as a limited owner.\n\nUnder the decree the land vested in 1\\.-Iotabhai and sons of ~Iohanbhai only so Jong: as they vverc not dispossessed of it at the instance of Bai Vajia in accordance \\Vth the tern1s stated therein. As soon as Bai Vajia took possession of the land, no rights of any kind whatsoever in relation thereto remained with them and thus they ceased to be the owners for the span of Bai Vajia's life.\n\n[311 G-H, 312 A-DJ\n\n.:;;;.... .,,,, l\". Tulasanuna and Ors. v. Sesha Reddy, [19771 3 S.C.R. 261; discussed in- cxtenso •nd. followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2434 of 1977.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated T 4/5th November, 1976 of the Gujarat High Court in S.A. No. 685/\n\n69.\n\nU. R. La/it (A.C.), I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of th~ Court was delivered by,\n\nKosHAL, J.-The facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave against a decree dated November 5, 1976 of the High Court of Gujarat\n\nA may be better appreciated with reference to the following pedigree- • table :\n\nNARANJI\n\nB Dabybhai Haribhai\n\nRanchhodji\n\nBhimbhai (died childless in 1913) Mohanbhai\n\n·~ ' .\n\nBhikbubhai (Plaintiff 5) Thakorbhai (Plaintiff 6)\n\nParvatiben=Dayalji (Plaintiff 8)\n\nNirrnalben (Plaintiff 9)\n\nNARANJI (contd.)\n\nGulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai_.._\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n\n-...t.\n\n2. In the year 1908 Ranchhodji son of Dahyabhai instituted Civil • Suit No. 403 of 1908 against Bhimbhai son of Haribhai, Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai, Motabhai son of Gulabbhai, Bai Amba widow of Nichhabhai and Bai Vajia widow of Surbhai, for a partition I of the joint Hindu family properties belonging to the parties. The suit resulted in a decree dated August 18, 1909 which provided, inter alia, that Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai, and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai would be full owners of Survey Nos. 31 and 403 and also owners of a half share in Survey Nos. 591, 611, 288\n\nand 659 /3. These persons were burdened by the decree with the responsibility to pay an yearly ml\\intenance allowance of Rs. 42/- to Bai Vajia on Magsher Sud 2 of every year and the decree further provided that in the event of default in payment of such allowance continuing for a period of a month after the due date, Bai Vajia would be entitled to take possession of the land above-mentioned in lieu of the maintenance awarded to her and would enjoy the income thereof without however being competent to sell, mortage, bequeath, gift or otherwise transfer the same. The decree declared that any alienation made by Bai Vajia in contravention of the direction given by the decree in that\n\n• _. behalf wonld be void.\n\nBy clause 8 of the decree sons of Mohanbhai as well as Motabhai were also deprived of the right of alienation of the land dudng the lifetime of Bai Vajia.\n\nDefault having been made in the payment of maintenance to Bai Vajia according to the terms of the decree, she took out execution and obtained possession of the land above detailed. Thereafter Dayalji\n\nand Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai deposited in comt the arrears of Th maintenance and filed an application with a prayer that the land of which possession had been given to Bai Vajia in execution of the decree be restored to them.\n\nThat application was dismissed on the 8th March 1912 and more than 2t years later, i.e., on 27th October 1914, Dahyabhai son of Mohanbhai instituted Civil Suit No. 576 of 1914 in the court of the Additional Sub-Judge, Valsal, for a declara- E: tion that the dismissal of his application was null and void and for recovery of possession of the land which Bai Vajia had taken in execution of the decree.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed in first appeal on the 13th March 1918.\n\n- Bai Vajia continued to enjoy the land till the 21st October 1963 when she made a sale of Survey No. 31 in favour of one Dhirubhat Paragji Desai.\n\nThe sale was challenged in Civil Suit No. 110 of 1966 by 10 persons being the heirs of Mohanbhai and Motabhai as shown in the pedigree table above, the defendants being Bai Vajia and the said Dhirubhai Paragji Desai. It was claimed by the plaintiffs that Bai Vajia had no right to alienate in any manner the land obtained I. by her in execution as per the terms of the decree, that sub-section ( 1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had no application to her case which was covered by sub-section (2) of that section and that the sale by her in favour of defendant No. 2 was null and void. Bai Vajia contested the suit and contended that the sale was good in view of the provisions of subsection (1) abovementioned which enlarged her limited ownership\n\ninto full and absolute ownership and that sub-section (2) aforesaid did not cover her case.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the trial court and Bai Vajia remained unsuccessful in the appeal which she instituted in the court of the District Judge, Bulsar. A second appeal was filed by her before the High Court of Gujarat and during the pendency thereof she expired when one Dhirubhai Dayalji Desai was substituted for her as her sole heir and legal representative. The appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of the High Court who by its judgment dated 5th November, 1976 dismissed it holding that the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 403 of 1908 did not recognise any \"pre-existing\" right of Bai Vajia in the property in dispute. In~ coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge followed Narai11i Devi v. ,•.\n\nSmt. Ramo Devi and others.(') ,-\n\nThe legal representative of Bai Vajia is the sole appellant in the appeal before us, the respondents thereto being nine of the plaintiffs and six legal representatives of plaintiff No. 5 as also the purchaser from Bai Vajia who is arraigned as respondent No. 11.\n\n2. At the outset it was pointed out by Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the appellant, that Naraini Devi's case (supra) has since been over-ruled by the decision of this Court in V.\n\nTulasamma & others v. V. Sesha Reddi(') and we find that this is so.\n\nIn the case last mentioned, the facts were these.\n\nThe husband of Tulasamma died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step-brother V. Sesha Reddi. A decree for maintenance was passed in favour of Tulasamma against V. Sesha Reddi on June 29, 1946. On the 30th July 1949, a compromise between the contending parties was certified by the Court executing that decree.\n\nUnder the compromise, Tulasamma was allotted certain properties in lieu of maintenance, her r!ght being limited to enjoyment there.of coupled with the specific condi- -~ t1on that she wonld not have any nght of altenatmn whatsoever. , , Tulasamma took possession of those properties and continued to enjoy them till the early sixties.\n\nOn 12th of April 1960 she leased out some of the properties to two persons and on the 26th of May 1961 made a sale of some others to another person.\n\nV. Sesha Reddi filed a suit on July 31, 1961 for a declaration that the alienations made by Tulasamma were not binding on him and could remain valid only so long as she was alive.\n\nThe basis of the action was that Tulasamma I acquired a restricted estate under the terms of the compromise and that her interest could not be enlarged under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act in view of sub-section (2) of that section.\n\nThe \"'\n\n\nsuit was decreed by the trial court whose decision however was reversed in appeal by the District Judge, with a finding that the allotment of properties to Tulasamma by the terms of the compromise had been made in recognition of a \"pre-existing\" right-a finding which was reversed by the High Court, who restored the decree passed by the trial court.\n\nThe matter came up to this Court in appeal by special leave and Fazal Ali, J., who wrote an exhaustive judgment thus formulated the two points falling for determination :\n\n( 1) Whether the instrument of compromise under which the properties were given to the appellant Tulasamma before the Hirn'- Succession Act in lieu of maintenance falls wi' a section 14 (I) or is covered by section 14(2) of that Act.\n\n( 2) Whet9er a Hindu widow has a right to property in lieu of her maintenance, and if such a right is conferred on her subsequently by way of maintenance 1t would amount to mere recognition of a pre-existing right or a conferment of new title so as to fall sguarely within section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act.\n\nFaZ'al Ali, J., was of the opinion that the resolution of the dispute made it necessary that the real legal nature of the incidents of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance be considered.\n\nHe referred to various works by celebrated authors on Hindu Law and in doing so cited passages fr<:im 'Digest' of Hindu Law' by Colebrooke, 'Hindu Law' by G. S. Sastri, 'Hindu Law and Usage' by Mayne and 'Principles of Hindu Law' by Mulla and came to the conclusion that the widow's .right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is \"' undoubtedly a \"pre-existing\" right.\n\nA survey of various judicial pronouncements was then undertaken by Fazal Alj, 1., and as a consideration thereof he arrived at the following propositions :-\n\n\"(l) A Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property.\n\nIf the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow.\n\n20-196 SCI/79\n\n(2)' Though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right iu property, i.e., it is a jus ad rem, not jus in rem, and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court.\n\n(3) The right of mai'ntenanoo is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notiee of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance.\n\n( 4) The right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 193 7 (') or the Act or 1946, (') and is therefore, a pre-existing right.\n\n. -\n\n( 5) The right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort or co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature.\n\n(6) Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make arrangements for her maintenance.\"\n\nFazal Ali, J ., then embarked on a consideration of the scope and meaning of section 14 of the Act in the light of various pronounce-~ ments made by this Court as also of the decisions rendered by various High Courts in relation to the points in dispute.\n\nDuring the course of the discussion he made the following pertinent observations :-\n\n\"It is true that a widow's claim for maintenance does not ripen into a full-fledged right to property, but nevertheless it is undoubtedly right which in certain cases can amount to a right to property where it is charged. It cannot be said that where a property is given to a widow in lieu of\n\n(1) The Hindu Women's Right to Property Act.\n\n(2) The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946.\n\n...\n\nmaintenance, it is given to her for the first time and not in lieu of a pre-existing tight.\n\nThe claim to maintenance, as also the right to claim, property in order to maintain herself, is an inherent right conferred by the Hindn Law and, therefore, ay property given to her in lieu of maintenance is . merely in recognition of the claim or right which the widow\n\npossessed from before. It cannot be said that such a right has been conferred on her for the first time by virtue of the document concerned and before the existence of the documnt the widow had no vestige of a claim or right at all.\n\nOnce it is established that the instrument merely recognised -the. pre-existing right, the widow would acquire absolute interest. Secondly, the Explanation to section 14 ( 1) merely mentions the various modes by which a widow can acquire a property and the property given in lieu of maintenance is one of the modes mentioned in the Explanation. Sub-\n\nection (2) is merely a proviso to section 14(1) and it cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to destroy the very concept of the right conferred on a Hindu woman under section 14(1). Sub-section (2) is limited only to those cases where by virtue of a certain grant or disposition a right is conferred on the widow for the first time and the said right is restricted by certain conditions.\n\nIn other words, even if by a grant or disposition a property is conferred on a Hindu male under certain conditions, the same are binding\n\non the male.\n\nThe effect of sub-section (2) is merely to .equate male and female in respect of grant conferring a restricted estate.\"\n\n~· Finally, Fazal Ali, J., made a reference to Naraini Devi's case >\n\n(supra) to which he himself was a party (apart from Sarkaria, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court) and in relation thereto made the following observations : •\n\n\"This case is no doubt directly in point and this Court by holding that where under an award an interest is created in favour of a widow that she should be entitled to rent out the property for her !ife\"time, it was held by this Court that this amounted .to a restricted estate under section 14(2) of the 1956 Act.\n\nUnfortunately the various aspects, namely, the nature and extent of the Hindu women's right to maintenance, the limited scope of sub-section (2) which\n\n300 SUPREME COURT RllPORTS [1979] 3 s.C.R.\n\nis a proviso to sub-section ( 1) of section 14 and the effect of the Explanation, etc., to which we have adverted in this judgment, were neither brought to ur notice nor were argued before us in that case.\n\nSecondly, the ground on which this Court distinguished the earlier decision of thi>; Court in Badri Parshad v. Smt. Kanso Devi(') was that in the aforesaid decision the Hindu widow had a share or interest in the house of her husband under the Hindu Law as it was applicable then, and, therefore, such a share amounted to a pre-existing right.\n\nThe attention of this Court however, was not drawn to the language of the Explanation to section 14(1) where a property given to a widow at a partition or in lieu of maintenance had been placed in the same category, and therefore, the reason given by this Court does not appear to be sound. For the reasons that we have already given, after taking an overall view of the situation, we are satisfied that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nara, ini Devi's case (supra) was not correctly decided and is therefore overruled.\"\n\nSu=arising the conclusions of law which Fazal Ali, J., reached after an exhaustive consideration of the texts and authorities mentioned by E him, he enumerated them thus :\n\n\"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing right.\n\n\n• I\n\n\"(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be\n\nliberally construed in favour of females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic end' sought to be achieved by this long-needed legislation.\n\n\"(3) Sub-section (2) of section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of section 14(1) materially.\n\nThe proviso >hould not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the\n\neffect of the main provision or the protection granted by section l 4 (l) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.\n\n\"(4) Sub-section (2) of section 14 supplies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts; etc., which create independent and new titles in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights.\n\nIn such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female i~ legally permissible and section 14(1) will not operate. in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the . female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be elllarged into an absolute one by force of section 14 ( 1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted ()r transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance. or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub- >ection (2) and would be governed by section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of lhe transferee.\n\n\"(5) The use of express terms like \"property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition\", \"or in lieu of maintenance\" \"or arrears. of maintenance\", etc., in the Explanation to section 14(1) clearly makes snb-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly e:tcepted from the operation of snb-section (2).\n\n\" ( 6) The words \"possessed by\" used by the Legislature in section 14 (1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the\n\n<>\"Wiler is not in actual or jihysical possession of the same.\n\nThus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the po.sscssion of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.\n\n\"(7) That the words \"restricted estate\" used in section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee\".\n\nApplying these principles Fazal Ali, J., held :-\n\nD \"(i) that the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified by the Court;\n\n(ii) that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the pr()perties and there was 'a clear restriction prohibiting E her from alienating the properties;\n\n(iii) that despite these restrictions, she continued to be in possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 1956 came into force; and\n\n(iv) that the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the properties.\"\n\nIn this view of the matter Fazal Ali, J., allowed the appeal of Tula- ... samma's legal representatives.\n\nBhagwati, J., wrote a separate judgment in Tu/asamma's case and G A. C. Gupta, J., agreed with him.\n\nHe also allowed the appeal substantially for the same reasons as had weighed with Fazal Ali, J., and in doing so observed :\n\n\"Now, sub-section (2) of section 14 provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any pro- H perty acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other\n\n.• ,\n\n.. '\n\nBAI v AJIA v. THAKORBHAI ( Koshal' J.) 303\n\ninstrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in snch property.\n\nThis provision is more in the natur_e of a proviso or exception to sub-section ( 1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v.\n\nSmt. Kanso Devi.(') It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of subsection (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it must re construed strictly so\n\nas to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision. contained in sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-\n\nection ( 1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section ( 1).\n\nThe language of sub-section (2) is apparently wide enough to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the ins(rument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partitio'n or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument, d•ccree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for lier in the property.\n\nBut that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub-section (1), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu !emale subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of subsection ( 1). The Explanation to sub-section ( 1) which includes within . the scope of that sub-section property -acquired by a fomale Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there\n\n(I) [1970] 2 S.C.R 95.\n\nwould hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lien of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property ........... . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '.'\n\nThe social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled.\n\nThat surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting sub-section (2) .\"\n\nBhagwati, J ., laid down the nature of the right which .a Hindu widow has to be maintained out of the joint family estate in the following terms :-\n\n\"It is settled law that a widow is entitled. to maintenance out of her deceased husband's estate, irrespecitve whether that estate may be in the hands of his male issue or it may be in the hands of his coparceners.\n\nThe joint family estate in which her deceased husband had ll share is liable for her maintenance and she has a right to be maintained out of the joint family properties and though, as pointed out by this Court in Rani Bai v. Shti Yddul!dndan Ram(') her claim for maintenance is not a charge upon any joint family property until she has got her _maintenance determined and made a specific charge either by agreement or a decree or order of a Court, her right is \"not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of her claim or even with notice of the claim uuless the transfer was made with the intention of defeating her right\". The widow can for the purpose of her maintenance follow the joint family property \"into the hands of any one who takes it as a volunteer o~ with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance\".\n\nThe courts have even gone to the length of taking the *few that where a widow is in possession of any specific property for the purpose of her maintenance, a purchaser buying with notice of her claim is not entitled to possession of that property without first securing proper maintenance for her, vide Rachawa & Ors. v. Shivayanappa(') cited with approval in Ranibai's case (supra). It is, therefore, clear that under\n\n\n(2) I. L. R. 18 Bombay 679.\n\n....\n\nBAI VAJIA v. THAKORBHA! (Koshal, J.).\n\nthe Sastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into :a charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged in the joint family property and even if no specific charge is -created, this right would be enforceable against joint family property ill the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking\n\n it with notice of her claim.\n\nThe right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rem, since it does not give her any interest in ihe joint family property but it is certaiO:y jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the family property.\n\nTherefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow.\n\nThe widow would be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such preexisting right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right .or title. There is also another consideration which is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the property and did not, in so many terms, presctibe that she would have a limited interest, she would have no more than a limited interest in the propertl\\ under the Hindu Law as it stood prior to the: enactment of the Act and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a 1:mitcd interest in the property would be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case (supra), \"merely rex:ording the true legal position\" and that would not' attract the applicability of sub-section (2) hut would be governed by sub-section (1) of section 14.\n\nAll the three Judges were thus unanimous in accepting the appeal on the ground that Tulasamma's right to maintenance was a preexisting right, that it was in recognition of such a right that she obtained property under the compromise and that the compromise therefOre did not fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of\n\nthe Act but would attract the provisions of sub-section (1) thereof H coupled with the Explanation thereto.\n\nWith respect we find ourselves irt complete agreement with the conclusions arrived at by\n\nBhagwnti and Fazal Ali, JJ., as also the reasons which weighed with them in coming to those conclusions.\n\n4. Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents, and Mr. U. R. Lalit who very ably assisted the Conrt at its request, contended that for a Hindu female to be given the benefiL of wbsection ( 1) of section 14 of the Act she must first be an owner, albeit a limited owner, of the property in question and. that Tulasamma not being an owner at all, the Bench presided over by Bhagwati, J .,· did\n\nnot reach a correct decision in holding that the sub-section aforesaid . covered her case.\n\nWe find that only that part of this argument which ' is interpretative of sub-section ( 1) is correct, namely, that it is only ... some kind of \"limited ownership\" that would get enlarged into full '\n\nownership and that where no ownership at all vested in the concerned Hindu female, no question of the applicability of the sub-section would arise.\n\nWe may here reproduce in extenso section 14 of the Act with advantage :\n\n\"14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner ..\n\n\"Explanation :\n\nIn this sub-section, \"property\" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise,· or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before,' at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what-so-ever, and also any such property held by her as \"Stridhana\" immediately before the commencement of this Act.\n\n\"(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or G any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed a restricted estate in such property.\"\n\nA plain reading of sub-section (1) makes it clear that the con H cerned Hindu female must have limited ownership in property, which limited ownership would get enlarged by the operation of that subsection. If it was intended to enlarge any sort of a right which could\n\nj...\n\nBAI VAJIA v. THAKORBHAI (Kasha/, ].) 307\n\nm no sense be described as ownership, the expression \"and not as a\n\nllmited owner\" would not have been used at all and becomes redundant, which is against the well-recogn:seJ principle cf interpretation of statutes that the Legislature does not employ meaningless language.\n\nReference may also be made in this connection to Er am ma v.\n\nVerrupanna & others(') where in Ramaswami, J., speaking on behalt 0. ot himself, Gajendragadkar, C.J., and Hidayatullah, J., interpreted . the sub-section thus :\n\n\"The property possessed by a female Hindu, as contemplated in the section, is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act. It may be noticed that the Ex- 11lanation to section 14 (1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicates that the section appljes only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be.\n\nThe words \"as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner\" as given in the last portion of sub-section (1) of section 14 clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the limited ownership of a Hindu female should be changed into full ownership.\n\nIn other words, section 14(1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who, in the absence of this provision, would have been limited owner of the property, will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section.\n\nThe object of the section is to extinguish the estate called 'limited ·state' or 'widow's estate' in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman, who under the old law would have been only a limited owner, a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder .... -..\n\n. . . ...\n\nIt does not in any way confer a title on the female Hindn where she did not in fact possess any vestige of title. It follows, therefore, that the section cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser.\n\nIn other words, the provisions of section 14 (1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession\n\n\nof the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespaser without any right to property.\"\n\nThis interpretation of sub-section ( 1) was cited with approval in Mangal Singh and Others v. Shrimati Rattno & Another('). by Bhargava, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court and observed:\n\n\"This case also, thus, clarifies that the expression \"possessed by\" is not intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title, and that the legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question.\n\nEven mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the provisions of this section.\n\nThis case also, thus, supports our view that the expression \"possessed by\" was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership and, while the Hindu female possesses the rights of ownership, she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled.\n\nThe section will, however, not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could, in no manner, exercise her rights of ownership in that property any longer.\"\n\n. Limited ownership in the concerned Hindu female is thus a sine qua non for the applicability of sub-section ( 1) of section 14 of the Act but then. this condition was fully satisfied in the case of Tulasamma to whom the property was made over in lieu of maintenance\n\nwith full rights of enjoyment thereof minus the power of alienation. l_ These are precisely the incidents of limited ownership. In such a-~ ~._ case the Hindu female represents the estate completely and the re-· versioners of her husband have only a spes successionis, i.e., a mern ..\n\nchance of succession, which is not a vested interest and a trans· fer of which is a nullity.\n\nThe widow is competent to proteell the property from all kinds of trespass and to sue and be sued for all purposes in relation thereto so long as she is alive.\n\nOwnership in the fullest sense is a sum-total of all the rights which may possibly flow from title to property, while limited ownership in its very nature must be a bundle of rights constituting in their totality not full ownership but something less.\n\nWhen a widow holds the property for her enjoyment as long as she lives, nobody is entitled to deprive her of it or to deal with the property in any manner to her detriment.\n\nThe ----\n\n(!) {19671 3 S.C.R. 454.\n\nBAI VAJIA v. THAKORBHAI (Kasha/, J.) 309\n\nproperty is for the time being beneficially vested in her and she has the occupation, control and usufruct of it to the exclusion or all others.\n\nSuch a relationship to property in our opinion falls squarely within the meaning of the expression \"limited owner\" as used in sub-section ( l) of section 14 of the Act.\n\nIn this view of the matter the argument that the said sub-section did not apply to Tulasammas's case\n\n(supra) for the reason that she did not fulfil the condition precedent of being a limited owner is repelled.\n\n5. The next contention raised by Mr. Desai and Mr. Lalit also challenged the correctness of the decision in Tulasamma's case. They _j mgued that in any case the only right which Tulasamma had prior to ... r the compromise dated July 30, 1949 was a right to maintenance\n\n~ slmpliciter and not at all a right to or i\\1 property.\n\nFor the reasons which weighed with Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JL in rejecting this 3rgnment we find no substance in it as we are in full agreement with these reasons and the same may not be reiterated here.\n\nHowever we may emphasize one aspect of the matter which flows from a scrutiny of subsection (I) of section 14 of the Act and the explanation appended thereto.\n\nFor the applicability of sub-section (1) two conditions must co-exist, 'namely:\n\n(1) the concerned female Hindu must be possessed of property, and\n\n(2) such properly n1ust be possessed by her as a limited owner.\n\nIf these two conditions are fulfilled, the sub-section gives her the right to hold the property as a full owner irrespective of tl1e fact wheiher she acquired it before or after the commencement of the Act. . - - The Explanation declares that the property mentioned in sub- _.,- ' section Cl) includes both movable and immovable property and then proceeds to enumerate the modes of acquisition of various kinds of _ property which the sub-section would embrace.\n\nSuch modes of acquisition are:\n\n(a) by inheritance, ( b) by devise, { c) at a partition, ( d) in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance,\n\n(e) by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, (I) by her own skill or exertion,\n\n(g) by purchase,\n\n(h) by prescription,\n\n(i) in any other manner what-so-ever, and\n\n[1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(j) any such property held by her as \"stridhana\" immediately before the commencement of this Act.\n\nA reference to the Hindu law as it prevailed immediately before .,, the commencement of the Act would lead one to the conclusion that\n\nthe object of the Explanation was to make it clear beyond doubt that l.. all kinds of property which fell within the ambit of the term \"stric ...>: dhana\" would be held by the owner thereof as a full owner and not C as a limited owner.\n\nReference may in this connection be made to the ~' . ..,\n\nfollowing enumeration of \"Stridhana\" in paragraph 125 of Mulla's • Hindu law:\n\n( 1) Gifts and bequests from relations.\n\n(2) Gifts and bequests from strangers.\n\n(3) Property obtained on partition. ( 4) Property given in lieu of maintenance. ( 5) Property acquired by inheritance. ( 6) Property acquired by mechanical arts. .\n\n(7) Property obtained by compromise. ( 8) Property acql!ired by adverse possession.\n\n(9) Property purchased with stridhana or with savings of income of stridhana.\n\n(10) Property acquired from sources other than those mentioned above.\n\n' . These heads of property are then dealt with at length by Mulla in paragraphs 126 to 135 of his treatise.\n\nPrior to the commencement-~~ of the Act, the Hindu female did. not enjoy full ownership in respect of all kinds of \"Stridhana\" and her powers to deal with it further varied from school to school.\n\nThere was a sharp difference in this behalf between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga.\n\nAnd then the Bombay, Benaras, Madras and Mithila schools also differed from each other on the point.\n\nSuccession to different kinds of \"S'tridhana\" did not follow a uniform pattern.\n\nThe rights of the Hindu female over \"Stridhana\" varied according to her status as a maiden, a married woman and a widow .. The source and nature of the property acquired also placed limitations on her ownership and made a difference to the mode of succession thereto.\n\nA comparison of the contents of the Explanation with those of paragraph 125 of Mulla's Hindu Law would show that\n\nthe two are practically identical. It follows that the Legislature in jts wisdom took pains to enumerate specifically all kinds of \"Stridhana\" jn the Explanation and declared that the same would form \"property\"\n\nwithin the meaning of that word as used in sub-section (1). This was done, in the words of Bhagwati, J., \"to achieve a social ourpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society\". It was a step in the direction of practical recognition of equality of the sexes and was meant to elevate women from a subservient position in the economic field to a pedestal where they could exercise full powers of enjoyment and disposal of the pro- 1Jerty held by them as owners, untrammelled by artificial limitation~ ,_} placed on their right of ownership by a society in which the will of\n\nA J-- the dominant male prevailed to bring about a subjugation of the -opposite sex.\n\nIt was also a step calculated to ensure uniformity in the law relating to the nature of ownership of \"Stridhana\". This dual 1JUrpose underlying the Explanation must be borne in mind and given\n\neffect to when the section is subjected to analysis and interpretation, ><nd sub-section (2) is not to be given a meaning which would defeat that purpose and negative the legislative intent, if the language used\n\no warrants.\n\nA combined reading of the two sub-sections and the Explanation leaves no doubt in our minds that sub-section (2) doe~ not operate to take property acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance (which is property specifically included in the enumeration contained in the Explanation) out of the 1Jurview of sub-section (1).\n\n6. Tulasamma's case (supra) having, in our opinion been decided <:orrectly, the appeal in hand must succeed as the facts in the latter ><re on all fours with those in the former.\n\nMr. Desai did vehemently argue that this was not so inasmuch as by the decree dated August 18, 1909 the ownership of the land in dispute was vested in Dayalji -< and Dayabhai soru; of Mohanbhai and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai while Bai Vajia was only giv>n the right to possess it for her life-the ownership remaining' all along in the said three persons, but this argument does not find favour with us.\n\nIt has to be noted that so Jong as she Jived, Bai Vajia was to have full enjoyment of and complete <:ontrol over the land, barring any right to alienate it.\n\nSuch a right\n\nwas also taken away from the said three persons.\n\nThe arrangement meant that whatever rights existed in relation to the land during the life-time of Bai Vajia, were exercisable by her alone and by nobody else.\n\nNot even the said three persons could deal with the Jana in any manner whatsover, and if they did, Bai Vajia had the right to have -< their acts declared null and void during her life-time.\n\nAfter the land\n\n-' • was made over to her she became its owner for life although with a limited right and therefore only as a limited owner.\n\nUnder the decree the land vested in the said three persons only so long as they were not dispossessed of it at the instance of Bai Vajia in accordance with the terms stated therein.\n\nAs soon as Bai Vajia took possession of the land, no rights of any kind what.soever in relation thereto remained with them and thus they ceased to be the owners for the span of Bai Vajia's. life.\n\n7. Following Tulsamrna's case we hold that Bai Vajia became a full owner of the land in dispute under the provisions of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 14 of the Act and that sub-section (2) thereof has n<>\\_ application to her case, the land having been given to her as a limited-IC·-~ owner and in recognition of her pre-existing right against property.\n\nIn the result therefore, the appeal succeeds and is .accepted.\n\nThe judgment and the decree of the High Court are set aside and the suit giving rise to this appeal is d'smissed.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n\n. S.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n~ ,.\n\nI:'", "total_entities": 156, "entities": [{"text": "BAI VAJIA (DEAD) BY L. RS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAI VAJIA (DEAD) BY L. RS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THAKORBHAI CHELABHAI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKORBHAI CHELABHAI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Bai D Vajia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree further provided that in the event of default in payment of 'SUCh allowance continuing for a period of a month after the due date, Bai D Vajia would be entitled to take possessi9n of the land allotted to them nod.er the decree viz.", "canonical_name": "Bai D Vajia"}}, {"text": "Bai Vajia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1121, "end_char": 1130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree declared that any alienation made by Bai Vajia in contravention of the direction given by the decree in that behalf would be void .", "canonical_name": "Bai D Vajia"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1220, "end_char": 1228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1243, "end_char": 1251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".By clause 8 of the decree Motabhai and, sons of Mohanbbai were also deprived E of the right of alienati.,"}}, {"text": "Mohanbbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1265, "end_char": 1274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".By clause 8 of the decree Motabhai and, sons of Mohanbbai were also deprived E of the right of alienati.,", "canonical_name": "Mohanbbai"}}, {"text": "October 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1591, "end_char": 1607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Default having been made in the payment of maintenance to her according to the terms of the decree, the appellant, took out execution and obtained possession .of the lands in question, which she continued to enjoy till October 21, 1963 when she made a sale of -Survey No."}}, {"text": "D. P. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 in favour of one D. P. Desai.", "canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "Ba.i Vajia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1907, "end_char": 1917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Court in first appeal conftrn1ed it and the lJigh F ,,.........,_Court in second appeal upheld the decree of Ba.i Vajia .", "canonical_name": "Bai D Vajia"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2060, "end_char": 2070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2078, "end_char": 2098, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2485, "end_char": 2495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4859, "end_char": 4869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 SCR 626", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 S.C.R. 454", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5604, "end_char": 5623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6939, "end_char": 6949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7098, "end_char": 7108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohanbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7491, "end_char": 7500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a right was aho taken a\\vay from Motabhai and two sons of Mohanbhai.", "canonical_name": "Mohanbbai"}}, {"text": "~Iohanbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8050, "end_char": 8060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the decree the land vested in 1\\.-Iotabhai and sons of ~Iohanbhai only so Jong: as they vverc not dispossessed of it at the instance of Bai Vajia in accordance \\Vth the tern1s stated therein."}}, {"text": "R. La", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8713, "end_char": 8718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it (A.C.), I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8730, "end_char": 8742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it (A.C.), I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8747, "end_char": 8760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it (A.C.), I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8781, "end_char": 8792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "Vimal Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8794, "end_char": 8804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8814, "end_char": 8822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of th~ Court was delivered by,\n\nKosHAL, J.-The facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave against a decree dated November 5, 1976 of the High Court of Gujarat\n\nA may be better appreciated with reference to the following pedigree- • table :\n\nNARANJI\n\nB Dabybhai Haribhai\n\nRanchhodji\n\nBhimbhai (died childless in 1913) Mohanbhai\n\n·~ ' .", "canonical_name": "KosHAL"}}, {"text": "Bhikbubhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9200, "end_char": 9210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikbubhai (Plaintiff 5) Thakorbhai (Plaintiff 6)\n\nParvatiben=Dayalji (Plaintiff 8)\n\nNirrnalben (Plaintiff 9)\n\nNARANJI (contd.)", "canonical_name": "Bhikbubhai"}}, {"text": "Thakorbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikbubhai (Plaintiff 5) Thakorbhai (Plaintiff 6)\n\nParvatiben=Dayalji (Plaintiff 8)\n\nNirrnalben (Plaintiff 9)\n\nNARANJI (contd.)"}}, {"text": "Parvatiben=Dayalji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9251, "end_char": 9269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikbubhai (Plaintiff 5) Thakorbhai (Plaintiff 6)\n\nParvatiben=Dayalji (Plaintiff 8)\n\nNirrnalben (Plaintiff 9)\n\nNARANJI (contd.)"}}, {"text": "Nirrnalben", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9285, "end_char": 9295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikbubhai (Plaintiff 5) Thakorbhai (Plaintiff 6)\n\nParvatiben=Dayalji (Plaintiff 8)\n\nNirrnalben (Plaintiff 9)\n\nNARANJI (contd.)"}}, {"text": "NARANJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikbubhai (Plaintiff 5) Thakorbhai (Plaintiff 6)\n\nParvatiben=Dayalji (Plaintiff 8)\n\nNirrnalben (Plaintiff 9)\n\nNARANJI (contd.)", "canonical_name": "NARANJI"}}, {"text": "Dahyabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9350, "end_char": 9359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai..\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n...t.\n\n2.", "canonical_name": "Dahyabhai"}}, {"text": "Padmilben", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9376, "end_char": 9385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai..\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n...t.\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Vallabhbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9402, "end_char": 9413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai..\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n...t.\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Chhotubhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9504, "end_char": 9514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai..\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n...t.\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Manibhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai..\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n...t.\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Ramanbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9580, "end_char": 9589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulabbhai\n\nMotabhai\n\nDahyabhai\n\n(Plaintiff T}\n\nPadmilben (Plaintiff 10)\n\nVallabhbhai\n\nNichhabhai = Surbhai Amba Bai Bai Vijia (Defendant I}\n\nGhelabhai Lallubhai (Plaintiff 3) Chhotubhai (Plaintiff 4) Manibhai..\n\n,,_,..,\n\nThakobhai\n\n(Plaintiff I)\n\n: Ramanbhai\n\nPlaintiIT 2)\n...t.\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Ranchhodji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9633, "end_char": 9643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1908 Ranchhodji son of Dahyabhai instituted Civil • Suit No."}}, {"text": "Bhimbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9709, "end_char": 9717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "403 of 1908 against Bhimbhai son of Haribhai, Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai, Motabhai son of Gulabbhai, Bai Amba widow of Nichhabhai and Bai Vajia widow of Surbhai, for a partition I of the joint Hindu family properties belonging to the parties.", "canonical_name": "Bhikbubhai"}}, {"text": "Dayalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit resulted in a decree dated August 18, 1909 which provided, inter alia, that Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai, and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai would be full owners of Survey Nos."}}, {"text": "Dahyabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10042, "end_char": 10051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit resulted in a decree dated August 18, 1909 which provided, inter alia, that Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai, and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai would be full owners of Survey Nos.", "canonical_name": "Dahyabhai"}}, {"text": "Gulabbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit resulted in a decree dated August 18, 1909 which provided, inter alia, that Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai, and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai would be full owners of Survey Nos."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10930, "end_char": 10938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th March 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11552, "end_char": 11566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was dismissed on the 8th March 1912 and more than 2t years later, i.e., on 27th October 1914, Dahyabhai son of Mohanbhai instituted Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "27th October 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11606, "end_char": 11623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was dismissed on the 8th March 1912 and more than 2t years later, i.e., on 27th October 1914, Dahyabhai son of Mohanbhai instituted Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "Additional Sub-Judge, Valsal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11710, "end_char": 11738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "576 of 1914 in the court of the Additional Sub-Judge, Valsal, for a declara- E: tion that the dismissal of his application was null and void and for recovery of possession of the land which Bai Vajia had taken in execution of the decree."}}, {"text": "13th March 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11998, "end_char": 12013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed in first appeal on the 13th March 1918."}}, {"text": "21st October 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12065, "end_char": 12082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bai Vajia continued to enjoy the land till the 21st October 1963 when she made a sale of Survey No."}}, {"text": "Dhirubhat Paragji Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12138, "end_char": 12161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 in favour of one Dhirubhat Paragji Desai.", "canonical_name": "Dhirubhat Paragji Desai"}}, {"text": "Dhirubhai Paragji Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12356, "end_char": 12379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "110 of 1966 by 10 persons being the heirs of Mohanbhai and Motabhai as shown in the pedigree table above, the defendants being Bai Vajia and the said Dhirubhai Paragji Desai.", "canonical_name": "Dhirubhat Paragji Desai"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12566, "end_char": 12576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12584, "end_char": 12604, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "District Judge, Bulsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13186, "end_char": 13208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the trial court and Bai Vajia remained unsuccessful in the appeal which she instituted in the court of the District Judge, Bulsar."}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13254, "end_char": 13275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second appeal was filed by her before the High Court of Gujarat and during the pendency thereof she expired when one Dhirubhai Dayalji Desai was substituted for her as her sole heir and legal representative."}}, {"text": "Dhirubhai Dayalji Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13329, "end_char": 13352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second appeal was filed by her before the High Court of Gujarat and during the pendency thereof she expired when one Dhirubhai Dayalji Desai was substituted for her as her sole heir and legal representative.", "canonical_name": "Dhirubhat Paragji Desai"}}, {"text": "5th November, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13525, "end_char": 13543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of the High Court who by its judgment dated 5th November, 1976 dismissed it holding that the decree passed in Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14123, "end_char": 14135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the outset it was pointed out by Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the appellant, that Naraini Devi's case (supra) has since been over-ruled by the decision of this Court in V.\n\nTulasamma & others v. V. Sesha Reddi(') and we find that this is so.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "Naraini Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14177, "end_char": 14189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the outset it was pointed out by Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the appellant, that Naraini Devi's case (supra) has since been over-ruled by the decision of this Court in V.\n\nTulasamma & others v. V. Sesha Reddi(') and we find that this is so."}}, {"text": "Tulasamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14404, "end_char": 14413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The husband of Tulasamma died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step-brother V. Sesha Reddi.", "canonical_name": "Tulasammas"}}, {"text": "V. Sesha Reddi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14482, "end_char": 14496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The husband of Tulasamma died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step-brother V. Sesha Reddi."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14583, "end_char": 14596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A decree for maintenance was passed in favour of Tulasamma against V. Sesha Reddi on June 29, 1946."}}, {"text": "30th July 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th July 1949, a compromise between the contending parties was certified by the Court executing that decree."}}, {"text": "12th of April 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15055, "end_char": 15073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12th of April 1960 she leased out some of the properties to two persons and on the 26th of May 1961 made a sale of some others to another person."}}, {"text": "26th of May 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15138, "end_char": 15154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12th of April 1960 she leased out some of the properties to two persons and on the 26th of May 1961 made a sale of some others to another person."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15233, "end_char": 15246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Sesha Reddi filed a suit on July 31, 1961 for a declaration that the alienations made by Tulasamma were not binding on him and could remain valid only so long as she was alive."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15560, "end_char": 15570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16052, "end_char": 16061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter came up to this Court in appeal by special leave and Fazal Ali, J., who wrote an exhaustive judgment thus formulated the two points falling for determination :\n\n( 1) Whether the instrument of compromise under which the properties were given to the appellant Tulasamma before the Hirn'- Succession Act in lieu of maintenance falls wi' a section 14 (I) or is covered by section 14(2) of that Act.", "canonical_name": "FaZ'al Ali"}}, {"text": "Tulasamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16257, "end_char": 16266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter came up to this Court in appeal by special leave and Fazal Ali, J., who wrote an exhaustive judgment thus formulated the two points falling for determination :\n\n( 1) Whether the instrument of compromise under which the properties were given to the appellant Tulasamma before the Hirn'- Succession Act in lieu of maintenance falls wi' a section 14 (I) or is covered by section 14(2) of that Act.", "canonical_name": "Tulasammas"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16335, "end_char": 16345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16367, "end_char": 16380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16668, "end_char": 16681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16689, "end_char": 16709, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "FaZ'al Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16712, "end_char": 16722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FaZ'al Ali, J., was of the opinion that the resolution of the dispute made it necessary that the real legal nature of the incidents of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance be considered.", "canonical_name": "FaZ'al Ali"}}, {"text": "Colebrooke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17028, "end_char": 17038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to various works by celebrated authors on Hindu Law and in doing so cited passages fr<:im 'Digest' of Hindu Law' by Colebrooke, 'Hindu Law' by G. S. Sastri, 'Hindu Law and Usage' by Mayne and 'Principles of Hindu Law' by Mulla and came to the conclusion that the widow's .right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is \"' undoubtedly a \"pre-existing\" right."}}, {"text": "G. S. Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17055, "end_char": 17067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to various works by celebrated authors on Hindu Law and in doing so cited passages fr<:im 'Digest' of Hindu Law' by Colebrooke, 'Hindu Law' by G. S. Sastri, 'Hindu Law and Usage' by Mayne and 'Principles of Hindu Law' by Mulla and came to the conclusion that the widow's .right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is \"' undoubtedly a \"pre-existing\" right."}}, {"text": "Mayne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17094, "end_char": 17099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to various works by celebrated authors on Hindu Law and in doing so cited passages fr<:im 'Digest' of Hindu Law' by Colebrooke, 'Hindu Law' by G. S. Sastri, 'Hindu Law and Usage' by Mayne and 'Principles of Hindu Law' by Mulla and came to the conclusion that the widow's .right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is \"' undoubtedly a \"pre-existing\" right."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17133, "end_char": 17138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to various works by celebrated authors on Hindu Law and in doing so cited passages fr<:im 'Digest' of Hindu Law' by Colebrooke, 'Hindu Law' by G. S. Sastri, 'Hindu Law and Usage' by Mayne and 'Principles of Hindu Law' by Mulla and came to the conclusion that the widow's .right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is \"' undoubtedly a \"pre-existing\" right."}}, {"text": "Fazal Alj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17362, "end_char": 17371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A survey of various judicial pronouncements was then undertaken by Fazal Alj, 1.,", "canonical_name": "FaZ'al Ali"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19259, "end_char": 19269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Right to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19839, "end_char": 19860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19893, "end_char": 19946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20711, "end_char": 20721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946", "statute": "Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20937, "end_char": 20950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946", "statute": "Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21074, "end_char": 21087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21691, "end_char": 21699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· Finally, Fazal Ali, J., made a reference to Naraini Devi's case >\n\n(supra) to which he himself was a party (apart from Sarkaria, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court) and in relation thereto made the following observations : •\n\n\"This case is no doubt directly in point and this Court by holding that where under an award an interest is created in favour of a widow that she should be entitled to rent out the property for her !"}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22091, "end_char": 22104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22355, "end_char": 22365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22959, "end_char": 22972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23319, "end_char": 23323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons that we have already given, after taking an overall view of the situation, we are satisfied that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nara, ini Devi's case (supra) was not correctly decided and is therefore overruled.\"", "canonical_name": "NARANJI"}}, {"text": "Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23329, "end_char": 23333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons that we have already given, after taking an overall view of the situation, we are satisfied that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nara, ini Devi's case (supra) was not correctly decided and is therefore overruled.\""}}, {"text": "Yajnavalkya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23977, "end_char": 23988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su=arising the conclusions of law which Fazal Ali, J., reached after an exhaustive consideration of the texts and authorities mentioned by E him, he enumerated them thus :\n\n\"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu."}}, {"text": "Manu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23992, "end_char": 23996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su=arising the conclusions of law which Fazal Ali, J., reached after an exhaustive consideration of the texts and authorities mentioned by E him, he enumerated them thus :\n\n\"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu."}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24595, "end_char": 24608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24898, "end_char": 24908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25008, "end_char": 25021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25278, "end_char": 25288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25638, "end_char": 25651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26002, "end_char": 26012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26297, "end_char": 26310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26552, "end_char": 26565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26764, "end_char": 26774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27203, "end_char": 27216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27548, "end_char": 27561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27610, "end_char": 27623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 30, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27875, "end_char": 27888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applying these principles Fazal Ali, J., held :-\n\nD \"(i) that the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified by the Court;\n\n(ii) that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the pr()perties and there was 'a clear restriction prohibiting E her from alienating the properties;\n\n(iii) that despite these restrictions, she continued to be in possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 1956 came into force; and\n\n(iv) that the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the properties.\""}}, {"text": "Tula-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28433, "end_char": 28438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the matter Fazal Ali, J., allowed the appeal of Tula- ... samma's legal representatives."}}, {"text": "samma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28443, "end_char": 28448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the matter Fazal Ali, J., allowed the appeal of Tula- ... samma's legal representatives."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28475, "end_char": 28483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati, J., wrote a separate judgment in Tu/asamma's case and G A. C. Gupta, J., agreed with him.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "asamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28521, "end_char": 28527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati, J., wrote a separate judgment in Tu/asamma's case and G A. C. Gupta, J., agreed with him."}}, {"text": "G A. C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28539, "end_char": 28552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati, J., wrote a separate judgment in Tu/asamma's case and G A. C. Gupta, J., agreed with him."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28726, "end_char": 28736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R 95", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31477, "end_char": 31494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ranibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33641, "end_char": 33648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Shivayanappa(') cited with approval in Ranibai's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33762, "end_char": 33768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Koshal, J.).", "canonical_name": "KosHAL"}}, {"text": "Nirmal Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35595, "end_char": 35607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also another consideration which is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the property and did not, in so many terms, presctibe that she would have a limited interest, she would have no more than a limited interest in the propertl\\ under the Hindu Law as it stood prior to the: enactment of the Act and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a 1:mitcd interest in the property would be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case (supra), \"merely rex:ording the true legal position\" and that would not' attract the applicability of sub-section (2) hut would be governed by sub-section (1) of section 14."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35777, "end_char": 35787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36109, "end_char": 36119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwnti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36323, "end_char": 36331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With respect we find ourselves irt complete agreement with the conclusions arrived at by\n\nBhagwnti and Fazal Ali, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36436, "end_char": 36447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents, and Mr. U. R. Lalit who very ably assisted the Conrt at its request, contended that for a Hindu female to be given the benefiL of wbsection ( 1) of section 14 of the Act she must first be an owner, albeit a limited owner, of the property in question and.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36505, "end_char": 36516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents, and Mr. U. R. Lalit who very ably assisted the Conrt at its request, contended that for a Hindu female to be given the benefiL of wbsection ( 1) of section 14 of the Act she must first be an owner, albeit a limited owner, of the property in question and."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36645, "end_char": 36655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37317, "end_char": 37327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39080, "end_char": 39089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may also be made in this connection to Er am ma v.\n\nVerrupanna & others(') where in Ramaswami, J., speaking on behalt 0."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39129, "end_char": 39143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ot himself, Gajendragadkar, C.J., and Hidayatullah, J., interpreted ."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39155, "end_char": 39167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ot himself, Gajendragadkar, C.J., and Hidayatullah, J., interpreted ."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39449, "end_char": 39459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39822, "end_char": 39832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39980, "end_char": 39993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40901, "end_char": 40911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41272, "end_char": 41280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Bhargava, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court and observed:\n\n\"This case also, thus, clarifies that the expression \"possessed by\" is not intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title, and that the legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42393, "end_char": 42403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43882, "end_char": 43892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulasammas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43989, "end_char": 43999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the matter the argument that the said sub-section did not apply to Tulasammas's case\n\n(supra) for the reason that she did not fulfil the condition precedent of being a limited owner is repelled.", "canonical_name": "Tulasammas"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44155, "end_char": 44160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next contention raised by Mr. Desai and Mr. Lalit also challenged the correctness of the decision in Tulasamma's case."}}, {"text": "Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44169, "end_char": 44174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next contention raised by Mr. Desai and Mr. Lalit also challenged the correctness of the decision in Tulasamma's case."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44481, "end_char": 44489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons which weighed with Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JL in rejecting this 3rgnment we find no substance in it as we are in full agreement with these reasons and the same may not be reiterated here.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44750, "end_char": 44760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47305, "end_char": 47315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a sharp difference in this behalf between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga."}}, {"text": "Dayabhaga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47320, "end_char": 47329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a sharp difference in this behalf between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47345, "end_char": 47351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And then the Bombay, Benaras, Madras and Mithila schools also differed from each other on the point."}}, {"text": "Benaras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47353, "end_char": 47360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And then the Bombay, Benaras, Madras and Mithila schools also differed from each other on the point."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47362, "end_char": 47368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And then the Bombay, Benaras, Madras and Mithila schools also differed from each other on the point."}}, {"text": "August 18, 1909", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49852, "end_char": 49867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai did vehemently argue that this was not so inasmuch as by the decree dated August 18, 1909 the ownership of the land in dispute was vested in Dayalji -< and Dayabhai soru; of Mohanbhai and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai while Bai Vajia was only giv>n the right to possess it for her life-the ownership remaining' all along in the said three persons, but this argument does not find favour with us."}}, {"text": "Dayabhai soru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49934, "end_char": 49947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai did vehemently argue that this was not so inasmuch as by the decree dated August 18, 1909 the ownership of the land in dispute was vested in Dayalji -< and Dayabhai soru; of Mohanbhai and Motabhai son of Gulabbhai while Bai Vajia was only giv>n the right to possess it for her life-the ownership remaining' all along in the said three persons, but this argument does not find favour with us."}}, {"text": "Jana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50606, "end_char": 50610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not even the said three persons could deal with the Jana in any manner whatsover, and if they did, Bai Vajia had the right to have -< their acts declared null and void during her life-time."}}, {"text": "Tulsamrna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51280, "end_char": 51289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following Tulsamrna's case we hold that Bai Vajia became a full owner of the land in dispute under the provisions of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 14 of the Act and that sub-section (2) thereof has n<>\\_ application to her case, the land having been given to her as a limited-IC·-~ owner and in recognition of her pre-existing right against property."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51407, "end_char": 51417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_313_319_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• •\n\nKISHAN CHAND\n\nDELHI ADMiNIStRATION AND ANR.\n\n'February 20, i 979\n\nts. MURTAzA FAZAL ALi AND A. b. kosiiAL, JJ_]\n\nPrevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955r. 6.i-Scope oi.\n\nRuie 60 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 defines \"emulsifYing a@-ents\" and \"stabilising agentS\" to mean substances which, when added\n\ntci food, are -capable of facilitating a uniform dispersi6ll of oils and fats in acqueous medi:i or vice versa nnd/or stabilising such emulsions. One of the agents mentiorted, among others, in the rule is brominated vegetable oils.\n\nRhles 61 (IeClafes that no emulsifying or stabilisin~ agents shall be used in ahy fMd eicepl Where. they are used as specifically permitted. The proviso to the rule state& that certain emutsifyiiig or stabilising agents including brominateU vegetable oils shall not be used in riiilk arid cream. ·\n\nA food inspector visited an Jee-cream factory and collected a sample of chocolate ice ct_eam. In the inventory of the samPie prepared, by him it was stated that \"this is prepared, of covering chocolate, vegetable ghee and icecream''. The Public Analyst. to whom the sample was sent for analysis, stated that _the salli, J?Ie was adulteated \"as the butyro-refractometer reading at 40°C was fonnd 6.4 in excess and the Baudouin test was found positive of the extracted fat.\"\n\nThe factory, its .owner and the employee who sold the ice-cream, were prosecut1.1d under the .Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The trial court acquitted the factory but convicted and sentenced both its owner and e -employee.\n\ni On appeal the Additional Sessions Judge acquitted both the accused.\n\nOn furl.her appeal the High Court acquitted the factory owner but convicted the employee (appellant before this Court). The High Court pointed out that vegetable ghee could not be made to serve as an emulsifying agent because r. 61 forbids addition of brominated vegetable oil to milk or cream and without milk and/ or cream manufacture of ice-cream wao:i i.nconceivable and that the appellruit's stand had been that vegetable ghee had been used and not that any brominated vegetable oil got into the ice-cream by way of an emulsifying or -stabilising ager, t.\n\nAllowing tho appeal,\n\nHELD : 1 (a) The sample of ice-cream obtained from the appellant was not sho'W'.11 to have been adulterated within the meaning of the Act and the Rules. [3i6 DJ\n\nG ..\n\n(b) The prohibition contained in the proviso to r. 61 does not apply to ice- H ->< crarn,.ku!fi and chocolate ice .cream covered by sub-item A.11.02.08, wherein iUs clearly stated that these. three milk PJQdui; ts_ J; lllly .con)ain permitted siabi-\n\n314 SuPREMB COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nlisers and emul•ifiers not exceeding 0.5 per eent by weight. Clearly, therefor.,, brominated veaetable oils could have formed a part of the chocolate ic.,. cream to the extent of 0.5 per cent by weight, without the article beini treated as adulterated under the rules. What the provioo to r. 61 prohibits is the use of certain emulsifying and •tabilising agenta only in milk and one of its products, namely, c_rcam and not in other milt products such a malai, dahi, cheese, ice~ cream and chocolate ice-cream. Had the intention of the rule been to prohibit the u•e ol the said agents in all milk products, the expression would have been \"shall not be used in milk and milk products\" and not \"shall not be used in milk and cream\". [318 C..El\n\n2. It was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the •ample contained an inaredient which made it adulterated and any stand taken by the accused could hardly be used as evidence, unless its truth wai otherwise established. The prosecution had completely failed to prove that the ingredient objected to by it was a substance other than a brominated vegetable oil or that if it was oil of that description, its quantity WM in excess of 0.5% by weight.\n\nThe analy•t's report did not indicate the presence in the sample of brominated vegetable oil beyond the prescribed maximum of 0.5 % by wei&ht or of unbrominated vegetable,~ oils.\n\n[318G-HJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 245 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25-3-1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 122/72.\n\nE Harjinder Singh for the Appellant.\n\n' E. C. A.garwala and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. 1\n\n-V. S. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi dent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nfor Re_spont\n\nKosHAL, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 25th March, 1975 convicting the appellant of an offence under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 16 read with clause (i) of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (herei\"nafter called the Act) and sen~ncing\n\nhim to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-, the sentence in default of payment of fine being rigorous imprisonment for three months.\n\n2. The facts giving rise to the appeal may be briefly stated.\n\nFood Inspector V. P. Anand, (P.W.2) visited the premises of Messrs Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Foqd Co. (which carries on business in .Greater Kailash No.I, a locality of New Delhi and is hereinafter , eferred to as the Company) on the 22nd May 1970 and bought for\n\n.. \"\"\n\n...\n\n....\n\npurposes of analysis a sample of chocolate ice-cream from the appellant A who was one of the employeeo of the Company.\n\nAn inventory of the sample was prepared by the Food Inspector and at the foot of the same the appellant made the following endon; ement:\n\n\"A sample of Chocbar Ice-Cream (Chocolate Ice-Cream) manu.factured by Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Food Co., M-67, Greater Kailash, given as per above.\n\nThis Ice-Cream Chocolate is of one lot.\n\nThis is prepared of covering Chocolate, vegetable ghee and Ice-Cream.\"\n\nThe sample was forwarded to the Public Analyst who thus details the conclusions arrived at by him on analysis thereof, in report exhibit\n\nPE:\n\n\"Total solids by Weight :-45 per cent.\n\nProtein by weight : 4.4 per cent.\n\nChocolate :-Present.\n\nBntyro-refractometer reading at 40'C of the fat ex- D tracted from ice-cream :-49.4.\n\nBaudouin test of the extracted fat : Positive.\n\nMelting point of the extracted fat :-34'C.\"\n\nIn his report the Public Analyst further stated that in his opinion lhe sample was adulterated \"as the Butyro-refractometer reading at 40'C was round 6.4 in excess and the Baudouin lest wao found positive of the extracted fat ............ \"\n\nA complaint was lodged by the Municipal Corporatio~ of Delhi against the appellant, the Company and its managing partner Avtar Singh in respect of an offence under section 7 read with section 16\n\n~·- of the Act.\n\nThe trial court acquitted the Company but convicted the other two accused, sentencing each of them to rigorous imprisonment\n\nfor six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-, the sentence in default of payment of fine being rigorous imprisonment for four months. Both the convicts appealed to the Seosions Court and were acquifted by an order dated 9th March 1972 pased by an Additional Sessions Judge.\n\nThe Municipal Corporation of Delhi then knocked at the door of the High Court which upheld the acquittal of Avtar Singh but convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid by the impugned judgment,\n\nmainly for the reasons reproduced below :\n\n\"It is established Qn the record beyond doubt that this endorsement was made by Kishan Chand and it contains an admission that vegetable ghee was used in the preparation of\n\n316 SUPREME COURT IUlPORtS\n\n[1979) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe jce-cream sold by him, The judgment of the learned Addition; tl Sessions Judge reveals that the corttention of the\n\ndefence before him was that Variaspati was nsed in the preparation of the .relevant ice-cream by way of emulsifier but the plea was misconceived because vegetable ghee cannot be made to serve as an emulsifying agent.\n\nA reference to the Prevention of Food' Adulteration Rules, i955 shows that as per Rule 60 'brominated' vegetable oil is one of the recognised emulsifying and stahilffiing agents but Rule 61 forbids addition of brominated vegetable oil to milk or cream and without milk and/ or cream manufacture of ice-cream is inconceivable.\n\nMo.reover, the stand of the accused from the very start has been that 'vegetable ghee' had been used\n\nin the preparation of ice-cream and not that any 'brominated' vegetable oil got into the ice-cream by way of an emulsifying or stabilising agent.\n\nThe evidence would not countenance the contention raised before, us.\"\n\n3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length we are of the opinion that the sample in question is not shown to have been. , adulterated within the meaning of the Act.\n\n4. The case is admittedly governed by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 which have been framed by th1!\n\nCentral a Government in exercise of the pqwers conferred on it by section 23 of the Act and which are hereinafter called the Rules.\n\nRule 6Q defines \"emulsifying agents\" and \"stabilising agents\" to mean sub-•' stances which, when added to food, are capable of facilitating a uniform dispersion of oils and fats in aqueous media, or vice versa, and/ or stabilising such emulsions.\n\nThe rule then proceeds to specify nume- F rous agents of the type mentioned and they include brominated vegetable oils.\n\nRule 61 declares that no emulsifying or stabilising agents shall be used in any food except' where their use fa specifically permitted.\n\nA proviso added to the rule states that certain emulsifying or stabilising agents, including brominated vegetable oils, shall not be used in milk and cream.\n\nAppendix B to the Rules specifies the G standard of quality of various articles of food.\n\nMilk and milk: products are dealt with in that Appendix under Group A.11 which is divided into various items.\n\nItem A.11.01 which is fnrthe.r dMded into sub-items A 11.01.01 to A 11.01.11 contains definitions and standards of purity of various kinds of milk:\n\nH- Item A.11.02 defines milk products.thus:\n\n\"MILK PRODUCTS means the products obtained froµi milk snch as cream, malai, curd, skimmed milk curd,\n\n• --\n\n-----·-\n\nchhanna, skimmed milk chhanna, cheese, processed cheese, ice-cream, milk ices, condensed milk sweetened and unsweetened, cond.ensed .skimmed milk sweetened and unsweetened, milk powder, skimmed milk powder, partly skimmed milk powder, khoa, infant milk food, table butter and deshi bntter.\"\n\nThen follow definitions of different kinds of milk products in sub-items A.11.02.01 to A.11.02.21. \"Cream\" is Jefined as follows in subitem A.11.02.02 :-\n\n\"CREAM excluding sterilised cream means the product of cow, or buffalo milk or of a combination thereof which contains not less thap. 25.0 per cent milk fat.\"\n\nChocolate ice-cream forms the subject matter of sub-item A.11.02.08 which runs thus :\n\n\"ICE-CREAM, KULFI, AND CHOCOLATE ICE- CREAM mean the frozen product obtained from cow or buffalo milk or a combination thereof or from cream, and/or other milk products, with or without the addition of cane sugar, eggs, fruits, fruit juices, preserved fruits, nuts, chooc- Iate, edible flavours and permitted food colours.\n\nIt may contain permitted stabilizers and emulsifiers not exceeding 0.5 per cent by weight.\n\nThe mixture shall be suitably heated before freezing.\n\nThe product shall contain not less than 10.0 per cent milk fat, 3.5 per cent protein and 36.0 per cent total solids except that when any of the aforesaid preparations contain fruits or nuts or both, the content of milk fat may proportionately reduced but shall not be lesi than 8.0 per cent by weight.\n\n\"Starch may be added to a maximum extent of 5.0 pe.r cent under a declaration on a label ai specified in sub-rule\n\n(2) of Rulo 43. ·\n\n\"The standards for ice-<:ream shall also apply to softy G ice cream.\"\n\nFrom the abo'l'e examination of the provisions of. Appendix B to the Rules, it is clearly made out that the standard of purity for each milk product has been separately laid down and that ice-c.ream, kulfi -· -..: and chocolate ice-cream are treated as a clasi by themselves, which H is differ_ent, for the purpose of purity from other milk products including cream.\n\nThe classification employed leaves no room for doubt that\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nwben the proviso to rule 61 states that certain emulsifying and ; tabilising agents shall not be used in milk and cream, it prohibits the use of those agents only in milk and one of its products, namely, cream and not other milk products such as malai, dahi, cheese, ice-cream and chocolate ice-cream.\n\nHad the rule-making authO'fity meant by the proviso to prohibit the use of the said agents iu all milk products,\n\ntlie expression used would have been \"shall not be used in milk and milk products\" and not ''!; ball not be used in milk and crean1\". The prohibition contained in the proviso thus does not apply to ice-cream, kulfi, chocolate ice-cream cove.red by sub-item A.11.02.08, wherein it is clearly stated\" that these three milk products may contain permitted stabilisas and emulsifiers not exceeding 0.5 per cent by weight.\n\nIn equating the words \"mill:: and cream\" with milk and all'its products, the High Court was clearly in error and this is so in spite of the fact that ice-cream, kulfi and chocolate ice-cream must have milk or cream as a necessary ingredient. It follows that brominated vegetable, oil~ could have formed a part of the chocolate ice-cream sold by the appellant, to the extent 0.5 per cent by weight, without the article being treated as adulterated under the Rules.\n\nBefore the appellant could be convic'ed, therefore, it was incumbent on the prosecution to establish that the sample taken from him contained either brominated vegetable oils or other permitted stabilisers and emulsifiers exceeding 0.5 per cent by weight or that it did not conform to the prescribed standard in some other detail.\n\nApart from falling into the error of misreading rules 60 and 61, the High Court considered the sample taken from the appe.Uant to be adulterated by reason of the stand he had taken from the very beginning to the effect that he had used \"vegetable ghee'' in the preparation of the chocolate ice-cream and because, according to the High Court, \"vegetable ghee\" was not brominated vegetable oil.\n\nThis is again an erroneous approach to the problem in hand. It was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the sample ini question contained an in!j!'edient which made it adulterated and any stand taken by the accused could hardly bo used as evidence, unless its truth was\n\notherwise established which is not the case.\n\nAll that was made out from the evidence before the court was that the Butyro\"refractameter reading at 40° C was higher than the maxinmm prescribed for milk fat by 6.4 and that the Baudouin test was positive. These two factorn indicated that either vanaspati or milk fat to which ti! oil had been. added was one of the ingredients of the sample.\n\nThere is not an iota of evidence on the record to show whether or not such ti! oil was bro-· minated, which means that the prosecution )lad completely failed to prove that the ingredient objected to by it was a substance other than\n\n...I. <\n\n.... .\n\nKISHAN CHAND v. DELID ADMINISTRATION (Koshal, !. ) 31 9\n\na brominated vegetaJ:ile oil or that if it was oil of that description its quantity was in excess of 0.5 per cent by weight The Butyro-refractometer reading did no doubt exceed the maximum of the prescribed standard by 6.4 and the Baudouin test was also positive but these factors did not Indicate the presence in the sample of brominated vegetable mI beyond the prescribed maximum of 0.5 per cent by weight or of unbrominated vegetable oils.\n\n5. The sample of: chocolate ice-cream obtained by the Food Inspec- . tor from the appellant not having been shown to be adulterated, the\n\nappeal is accepted, the judgment of the High Court in so far as it relates to the appellant is reversed, the conviction recorded against and the sentence imposed upon the appellant by the High Court are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge. The bail bood executed by him shall stand cancelled:\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "KISHAN CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KISHAN CHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DELHI ADMiNIStRATION AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, i 979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'February 20, i 979\n\nts."}}, {"text": "ts. MURTAzA FAZAL ALi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1431, "end_char": 1466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "E Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Harjinder Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "E. C. A.garwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' E. C. A.garwala and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' E. C. A.garwala and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\nV. S. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi dent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4380, "end_char": 4396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\nV. S. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi dent No."}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\nV. S. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi dent No."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4485, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nfor Re_spont\n\nKosHAL, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 25th March, 1975 convicting the appellant of an offence under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 16 read with clause (i) of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (herei\"nafter called the Act) and sen~ncing\n\nhim to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4557, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nfor Re_spont\n\nKosHAL, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 25th March, 1975 convicting the appellant of an offence under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 16 read with clause (i) of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (herei\"nafter called the Act) and sen~ncing\n\nhim to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4678, "end_char": 4688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4730, "end_char": 4770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. P. Anand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5054, "end_char": 5065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Food Inspector V. P. Anand, (P.W.2) visited the premises of Messrs Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Foqd Co. (which carries on business in .Greater Kailash No."}}, {"text": "Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Foqd Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Food Inspector V. P. Anand, (P.W.2) visited the premises of Messrs Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Foqd Co. (which carries on business in .Greater Kailash No."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5211, "end_char": 5220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, a locality of New Delhi and is hereinafter , eferred to as the Company) on the 22nd May 1970 and bought for\n\n.. \"\"\n\n...\n\n....\n\npurposes of analysis a sample of chocolate ice-cream from the appellant A who was one of the employeeo of the Company."}}, {"text": "Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Food Co., M-67, Greater Kailash", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5652, "end_char": 5712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An inventory of the sample was prepared by the Food Inspector and at the foot of the same the appellant made the following endon; ement:\n\n\"A sample of Chocbar Ice-Cream (Chocolate Ice-Cream) manu.factured by Mebrose Ice-Cream and Frozen Food Co., M-67, Greater Kailash, given as per above."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6693, "end_char": 6703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th March 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7062, "end_char": 7076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the convicts appealed to the Seosions Court and were acquifted by an order dated 9th March 1972 pased by an Additional Sessions Judge."}}, {"text": "Avtar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Delhi then knocked at the door of the High Court which upheld the acquittal of Avtar Singh but convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid by the impugned judgment,\n\nmainly for the reasons reproduced below :\n\n\"It is established Qn the record beyond doubt that this endorsement was made by Kishan Chand and it contains an admission that vegetable ghee was used in the preparation of\n\n316 SUPREME COURT IUlPORtS\n\n[1979) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe jce-cream sold by him, The judgment of the learned Addition; tl Sessions Judge reveals that the corttention of the\n\ndefence before him was that Variaspati was nsed in the preparation of the .relevant ice-cream by way of emulsifier but the plea was misconceived because vegetable ghee cannot be made to serve as an emulsifying agent."}}, {"text": "Kishan Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7442, "end_char": 7454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Delhi then knocked at the door of the High Court which upheld the acquittal of Avtar Singh but convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid by the impugned judgment,\n\nmainly for the reasons reproduced below :\n\n\"It is established Qn the record beyond doubt that this endorsement was made by Kishan Chand and it contains an admission that vegetable ghee was used in the preparation of\n\n316 SUPREME COURT IUlPORtS\n\n[1979) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe jce-cream sold by him, The judgment of the learned Addition; tl Sessions Judge reveals that the corttention of the\n\ndefence before him was that Variaspati was nsed in the preparation of the .relevant ice-cream by way of emulsifier but the plea was misconceived because vegetable ghee cannot be made to serve as an emulsifying agent.", "canonical_name": "KISHAN CHAND"}}, {"text": "case is admittedly governed by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8754, "end_char": 8831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The case is admittedly governed by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955", "statute": "The case is admittedly governed by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955"}}, {"text": "Appendix B to the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9661, "end_char": 9684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.11.02.01", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10538, "end_char": 10548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then follow definitions of different kinds of milk products in sub-items A.11.02.01 to A.11.02.21. \""}}, {"text": "A.11.02.21", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10552, "end_char": 10562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then follow definitions of different kinds of milk products in sub-items A.11.02.01 to A.11.02.21. \""}}, {"text": "Appendix B to the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11897, "end_char": 11920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12273, "end_char": 12308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The classification employed leaves no room for doubt that\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_320_328_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "GAYARAM PATEL & ORS.\n\nKAILASH CHAND P ANIGRAHI\n\nf ef?ruary 20, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nOrissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951-S.1-\"lntermediary\" who is -Gaonda thik<1dari' whether intermedia,:Y.\n\n- ·- '. . ~-.\n\nThe ancestors of a former Zamindar dedicated their maufi interest in a 'Yillage in favour of a deity. Acting on behalf of the deity the ex-zamindar created a lease of thikadari rights in the village in favour of the appellant for ten years. The lease deed termed the appellant .. \"legal guardian of gaontia thikadari patta\". While the lease was in force the Orissa Estates Abolition A':~ 1951 which •ought to abolish all intermediaries in land and vest their intell'.S! in the State came intO force. The Act however protected certain interme.tiarie& thereby carving out an exception to the scheme of the Act.\n\nMeanwhile the Managing Trustee of the Board of Trustee• appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 to look after the affairs of the deity filed a petition under s. 7 of the Abolition Act claiming that the deity was in Khas possession of certain lands including the land lease to the appellant and prayed that the same be settled on the Board of Trustees as an occupan::y tenant. The question was eventually settled in favour of the Truateet and agair1st the appellant.\n\nfo the Managing Trustee's application under s. 145 Cr. P.C. aasertina that the appellant was disturbing peaceful possession of the deity over the land, the Magistrate held that it was the appellant who was in poaseaaion of the land and directed that the land should be restored to him.\n\nThe High Court in revision set aside the order of the Maai1trate.\n\nIn appeal• to this Court the appellant contended that it was he and not the deity, who was the thikadar and therefore an intermediary within the meaning of the definition of that term in the Abolition Act and WM in Khaa possessi1)n ef the land in dispute and so the land should be restored to him.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD : 1. It was the appellant who had the Khas possssion of the land,. and therefore, the land must be deemed to have been vested in him, and not in the deity, as an occupancy tenant under the provisions of 11. 7 of the Abolition Act. [328 F]\n\n2. Apart from the description of the appellant as gaontia thikadari patta. condition 8 contains a. sure indication of the nature of the tenancy agreement.\n\nIt states \"that the cultivable lands cannot be utilised for any other purpose nor can they be transferred or sold or otherwise dealt with to the hardship of the villagers or the tenants.\" [328 B-C]\n\n-~ ~\n\n...\n\n,--..\n\nGAYARAM PATEL v. j(AILAS\\I CHANp (mbal, J.) 321\n\n3. The reference to tenants in !his condition points to the land bejng under the cuthvatiOn' of persons Other than the 3.ppellant ai the mo'ment the lease was granted. This position was incompatible with the grarit of~ an ordinary lease to\n\nhim. The tenure. granted in his favour was on the other band one conferring on him a right to collect the rents from the tenants of the deity and in lieu thereof pay a fixed sum to it. He was, therefore, correctly described as gacmtia or thikadar, both of which expressions describe an intermediary as distinguiihed from a raiyat or an acfoal tiller of the soil. [328 D-EJ\n\nI}, a CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 286 a' ' of 1973. ) Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n~. ,_ 16-5-1973 of the Orissa High Court in Crl. Revision No. 645 of 1972.\n\nAND CIVIL APPEAL No. 2036 of 1973\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 6-3-1973 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 491/72.\n\nJ. L. Jain and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Appellants.\n\nG. Dass, Mrs. S. Bhandare and A. N. Karkhanis for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. By this judgment we shall dispose of Civil Appeal No. 2036 of 1973 and Criminal Appeal No. 286 of 1973, both of which have arisen from a dispute over a single piece of land and the facts leading to which may be briefly stated.\n\nLong before the year 1949, the ancestors of Shri Lal Anup Singh Dea, ex-zamindar of 'i<hariar dedicated their maufi interest in village Konabira in favour of Sri Samaleswari Devi (hereinafter referred to as the deity). On the 10th May 1949 Shri Lal Annp Singh Dea aforesaid, acting on behalf of the deity, created a lease of thikadari rights in the vilJage for a\n\neriod of 10 years beginning with the 1st of June 1950 and ending on the 31st May 1960 in favour of Gayaram Patel, who figures as the !\\Ppellant in each of the appeals and is hereinafter called Patel. The geed of lease appears at pages 5 and 6 of the paper book in Civil Appeal No. 2036 of 1973 and describes Patel thus :\n\n\"Gayaram Patel son of Bisram Patel, the legal gnardian of gaonila thikadari patta\"\n\nThe terms on which the lease was granted to Patel arc reproduced below:-\n\n(i) That the yearly rent payable shall be Rs. 109/- to be paid before January of every year.\n\n(ii) That in case of non-payment the lease is liable to be cancelled.\n\n(iii) That all the repairs, upkeep and development works should be executed and for such works no compen- 5ation can be claimed. All the repairs, maintenance of tanks, garden, buildings, etc., shall be carried ont 11t your responsibility.\n\n(iv) That no injustice should be done to the community in maintaining the abovementioned works.\n\n(v) That no transfer is permissible in respect of the property.\n\n(vi) That the property is to be maintained for the exclusive welfare of the community with the help, directions, orders and co-operation of the Estate Officer.\n\n(vii) That the rules and regulations for forest lands are to be obeyed.\n\n(viii) That the cnltivable lands cannot be utilised for any other purpose, nor can they be transferred or sold or otherwise dealt with to the hardship of the villagers or the tenants. If any land is abandoned and (?) takes a new land for cultivation he will be liable nnder the law and be subjected to the payment of the usual rent.\n\nThe lease was acted upon and while it was in force, the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Abolition Act) was promulgated. The object of that Act was to abolish all intermediaries and rent-receivers, to vest their interest in the State, and to establish a direct relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil. Section 3A of the Abolition Act authorised the State Government to declare by notification that such interests have passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. A notification of that type was issued by the State Government and became effective from the 1st of June 1959.\n\nIn the meantime a Board of Trustees had been appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (for short Endowments Act) with Shri Kailash Cha11dra Panigrahi as the Managing Trustee to look after the affairs of _the deity on whose behalf an application under section 7 read with section 8-A ( 1) of the Abolition Act was made by the Managing Trustee after the said\n\n- 1 • \"\n\n~-.\n\n- -~\n\n• .,\n\n~ ~\n\nnotification had come into force.\n\nIt was claimed in the application that the deity was in \"Khas possession\" of certain lands in village Konabira and prayed that the same be settled on it as an occupancy tenant.\n\nThe. application was resisted by Patel who claimed that it was lie and not the deity who enjoyed the \"Khas possession\" of the said land. The application was decided by the Tehsildar Khariar, Tehsil Nawapara, acting as Collector under the Abolition Act.\n\nHe . held that Patel was in \"Khas possession\" of o'nly one plot of land which was designared by No. 5 and had an area of 20.14 acres but j that such possession was held by him on behalf of the deity and not .. . on his own account. In this view of the matter he passed the order\n\n, dated 13th June 1962, the operative part of which runs thus :\n\n\"Sir lands in village Konabira bearing plot No. 5 with an area of 20.14 acres are settled on occupancy rights with Gayaram Patel s/o Bisram Patel of Konabira, P. S. Kamna Distt. Kalahandi for and on behalf of Samaleswari Devi of Kemna, the Maufidar, u/s 7(1) (b) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951. A fair and equitable annual rent of Rs. 6.75 np. is determined from the date of vesting release rent from 1959-60 onwards.\"\n\nOn the 21st of October 1963, the Managing Trustee -0f the deity made an application to the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments under section 68 of the Endowments Act complaining that he had been resisted by Patel in obtaining possession of the land of the deity and praying for recovery of possession thereof from Patel. In his order dated the 12th of January 1970, the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments allowed the application holding that it was the deity and not Patel who had been declared to be the occupancy tenant in the order dated 13th June 1962 abovementioned. Patel went up in revision to the Conunissioner of Endowments but without success and thereafter knocked at the door of the Orissa High Court with a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to have the orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and the Commissioner of Endowments set aside. The High Court however took the same view of the matter as was expressed by authority appointed under the Endowments Act and negatived the contentions raised on behalf of Patel, in its order dated 6th March 1973. It is that order which is challenged before us in Civil Appeal No. 2036 of 1973 instituted by special leave.\n\nIn the meantime litigation had started between the deity and Patel on the criminal side also. Claiming that the de, ity had recovered\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nP<Jl>Session of plot No. 5 abovementioned (which had by then come !Cl 1:le designated by No. 15 and to have an area of 22.58 acres) on t!ie 9th of Decell!ber 1970 through a warrant of possession dated 14th Febrµary 1970 issued by the Assistant Co=issioner of Endowments, the M anagjng Trustee filed an application dated 28th October 1 ~71 under section 145 of the Code of Criminal frocedure before. a l\\.fagistrate of the First Class at Nawapara against Patel, who was alleged to be disturbing the peaceful possession of the deity over the h,)nd ill di, spute. A Preliminary order attaching the property was passed by the Magistrate on the same day, i.e., 28th October 1971.\n\nThat order was however cancelled and the proceedings were dropped on the 15th November 1971 in pursuance of a report dated 6th November 1971 made by the officer incharge of the Police Siation, Kemna (within the territorial limits of which lay the land in dispute) to the effect that there was no apprehension of a breach of peace by the parties. Nevertheless, on the 20th November 1971, another report was received by the Magistrate from the same officer revealing \"an emergency\" whereupon the Magistrate made a direction that the preliminary order dated 28th October 1971 re given effect to and that the land be attached along with the crops standing thereon. Ultimately, the proceedings were finalised through an order dated 21st September 1972 passed by the Magistrate who held that it was Patel who was in possession of the land in dispute\n\noll' the 20tJ1 November 1971, and directing that the land be restored to him.\n\nAggrieved by the order of the Magistrate the Managing Trurtee or the deity went up in revision to the H'gh Court, a learned Single Judge of wl1ich set aside the same and directed delivery of possession of the land to the deity on the basis of the findings given below :\n\n(1) The proceedings had. terminated on the 15til\n\nNovember 1971 and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to revive them five days later and to give effect\n\nt0 the order of attachment which already stood vacated.\n\n(2) There had been a civil suit and a writ application in\n\nrtspect of the land which has terminated in favour of the deity.\n\n(3) The matter had been taken up by the Endowments\n\nDepartment which had delivered all properties to the deity before the 29th April 1970.\n\nIt is this order of the High Court which is impugned in Criminal Appeal No. 286 , of 1973 by special leave of this Court.\n\n• ..\n\nI - \"\n\n.. '\n\n_,.\n\nGAYARAM PATEL v. KJllLASH CHANt:J (Kvshal, J.) 325\n\n2. In order to appreciate. the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties it is necessary to make a refetehee to the relevant pruvisions of the Abolition Act and to determine the party in whom the occupancy temlllcy vests under section 7 there9f, As already pointed -Oui the object of the .Aboiition Act was to 90 away with all\n\ninterfueiliries and rept:reeeivers aJ\\d to estblish a djrect relationship between the .State and thoo actual tillers of the soil. The preamble of the Act states :\n\n\"Whereas in pursuance of the Directive Pdnciples of State Policy laid dowh by the Constitution of India it is incumbent on the State to secure economic justice for all and to . that end to secure the ownership and control of all material resources of the community so that they may best subserve the common good, and to prevent the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in order to enable the state to discharge the above obligation it is expedient to provide for the abolition of all the rights, title and interest in land of Intermediaries by whatever name known, including the mortgagees and lessees such interest, between the raiyat and the\n\nState of Orissa for vesting in the said State of the said rights, title and interest and to make provision for other matters connected with; .............. \"\n\nSection 2 contains definitions. Clauses (f), (g), (h), (hh) and (j) thereof are relevant to the dispute and are extracted below :\n\n(f) \"date of vesting\" means in relation to an estate vested in the State the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 3-A in respect of such estate and in the case of surrender by an intermediary under section 4 the date of the\n\nexecution of the agreement;\n\n(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and means any land held by or vested in an Intermediary and included under one entry in any revenue roll or any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and ievenue-free fands, prepared aild maintained under the law relating to land revenue for the time being in force or urtder any rule, order, custom or usage having the foree of law, and inc1udes tevenue-free\n\nlands not entered in any register or revenue-roll and all classes of tenures or under-tenures and any Jagir, iham or maufi or other similar i:rant;\n\n(h) 'Intermediary' with reference to any .estate means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, landholder, malguzar, thik:adar, gaontia, tenure-holder, undertenure-holder, and includes an inamdar, a jagirdar, Zamindar, Ilaquadar, Khorposhdar, Parganadar, Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Ruler of an lndian State merged with the State of Orissa and all other holders or owners of interest in land between the raiyat and the State;\n\n(hh) 'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'state' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'intermediary interest' also;\n\n( j) .. Khas possession\" used with reference to the possession of an Intermediary of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, means the possession of such in'ermcdiary by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself wHh his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock;\n\nThe provisions of section 3A have already been noted.\n\nThen comes section 7 which is all-important for the purpose of resolving the present dispute. It states :\n\n\"7. ( 1) On and from the date of vesting-\n\n( a) all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes which were in Khas possession of an Intermediary on the date of such vesting,\n\n(b) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and held by a temporary lessee or lessees of an Intermediary who owns either as Intermediary or in any other capacity less than thirty\"three acres of land in total extent situated within the State,\n\n( c) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and in possession of a mortgagee, which immediately before the execution of the mortgage bond were in Khas possession of such intermediary,\n\n. ,,,\n\n• . '\n\nL \"' *\n\n~· -: ' t\n\nshall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such Intermediary and with all the shareholders owning the estate and such Intermediary with all the share-holders shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as raiyats under the State Government having occupancy rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner :\n\nSub-section (1) of section SA requires Intermediaries to file their claims in the prescribed manner for settlement of fair and equitable rent in respect of land and buildings, which are deemed to be settled with them under section 6 or section 7, before the Collector within the specified period.\n\n3. It would be seen that clauses (a), (b) and (c) o{ sub-section\n\n(1) of section 7 protect certain Intermediaries and thus form exception> to the scheme of the Act which, generally speaking, conforms to the object detailed in the preamble. In the present case we are not concerned with clause (c). According to learned counsel for Patel his caoc falls within the ambit of clause (a). It is claimed on his behalf that he was not merely a lessee or a temporary lessee under the deity but was a thikadar aud, therefore, himself an Intermediary within the meaning of the definition of that word occurring in clause\n\n(h) of section 2 and that he being in \"Khas possession\" of the land , in dispute on the elate of vesting was an Intermediary described in clause (a). On the other hand, for the deity it is argued that Patel was granted only a temporary lease in 1949, that he did not have any status better than that of a Jessee, temporary or otherwise, and that therefore his case was covered by clause (b) and not clause (a) so that it was the deity who was entitled to be regarded as the occupancy tenant on and from the date of vesting. The whole controversy thus turns rouqd the position which Patel came to hold in respect of the land in dispute under the 181lSe deed of 1949 and in order to assess that position it is necessary to refer to the lease deed dated 10th May\n\n1949. As noted earlier that deed itself describes Patel as \"gaontia thikadari patta\". Learned counsel for the diety has contended that\n\n328 supitliME COURT !U!PORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthis description is really not correct and that the conditions of the lease clearly make out a case of Patel being inducted into the land as an ordinary lessee who was to till the land against payment of rent.\n\nThe ccirttetition (foes not appear to us to have any force. Apart from the description of Patel as \"gaoniia thikadari patia\" the deed contanis a sure inditatioh of the natute of the tenure granted in condition (8) which states specilically :\n\n'\"fhat the cultivable lands cannot be utilised for any other purpose, nor can they be transrerred or sold or otherwi5e dealt with lo the hardship of the vi:lagers or the tenants. ..\n\nThe reference to tenants is of considerable significance and points to land being under the cultivation of persons other than Patel at the moment the lease was granted. This state of affairs is focoinpatible with the grant of an ordinary lease to Patel. The tenure granted in his favour was on the other hand one corJerring on him a right to collect the rents from the tenants of the deity and in lieu thereof pay a fixed sum of Rs. 109 /- per annum to it so that he wak correctly described in the lease deed as a gaontia or thikadar, bnth of\n\nwhich expressions describe an Intermediary as distinguished from a raiyat or an actual tiller of the soil.\n\n4: Once Patel is found to be an Intermediary his case must fall within clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 7 as it was he who had the \"Khas possession\" of the land now in controversy, according to the findings contained in the order dated 13th January 1962 pa.Ssed by the Collector and mentioned above, which have not been F shown to us to suffer from any infirmity. And if that be so, the land must be held to have vested in him, and not in the deity, as an occupancy tenant under the provisions of that section.\n\n5 .. In the result both the appeals sncceed and are accepted, the order of the High Court impugned in each being set aside and it being directed that the possession of the land in dispute attached by the order of the Magistrate in the proceedings nnder section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be delivered to Patel as an occupancy tenaht under the State. the parties are however left to bear their own costs throughout.\n\nN.V.K..\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n11roiPF-!9li SCI/79-27-9-79.:._1000", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "GAYARAM PATEL & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAYARAM PATEL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAILASH CHAND P ANIGRAHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kailash Cha11dra Panigrahi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "statute": "Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "J. L. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3658, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. L. Jain and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3678, "end_char": 3695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. L. Jain and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "G. Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3717, "end_char": 3724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Dass, Mrs. S. Bhandare and A. N. Karkhanis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Dass, Mrs. S. Bhandare and A. N. Karkhanis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Dass, Mrs. S. Bhandare and A. N. Karkhanis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. By this judgment we shall dispose of Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Lal Anup Singh Dea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4116, "end_char": 4134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long before the year 1949, the ancestors of Shri Lal Anup Singh Dea, ex-zamindar of 'i<hariar dedicated their maufi interest in village Konabira in favour of Sri Samaleswari Devi (hereinafter referred to as the deity).", "canonical_name": "Lal Anup Singh Dea"}}, {"text": "Konabira", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long before the year 1949, the ancestors of Shri Lal Anup Singh Dea, ex-zamindar of 'i<hariar dedicated their maufi interest in village Konabira in favour of Sri Samaleswari Devi (hereinafter referred to as the deity)."}}, {"text": "Samaleswari Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long before the year 1949, the ancestors of Shri Lal Anup Singh Dea, ex-zamindar of 'i<hariar dedicated their maufi interest in village Konabira in favour of Sri Samaleswari Devi (hereinafter referred to as the deity)."}}, {"text": "10th May 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th May 1949 Shri Lal Annp Singh Dea aforesaid, acting on behalf of the deity, created a lease of thikadari rights in the vilJage for a\n\neriod of 10 years beginning with the 1st of June 1950 and ending on the 31st May 1960 in favour of Gayaram Patel, who figures as the !"}}, {"text": "Lal Annp Singh Dea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4312, "end_char": 4330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th May 1949 Shri Lal Annp Singh Dea aforesaid, acting on behalf of the deity, created a lease of thikadari rights in the vilJage for a\n\neriod of 10 years beginning with the 1st of June 1950 and ending on the 31st May 1960 in favour of Gayaram Patel, who figures as the !", "canonical_name": "Lal Anup Singh Dea"}}, {"text": "Gayaram Patel", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th May 1949 Shri Lal Annp Singh Dea aforesaid, acting on behalf of the deity, created a lease of thikadari rights in the vilJage for a\n\neriod of 10 years beginning with the 1st of June 1950 and ending on the 31st May 1960 in favour of Gayaram Patel, who figures as the !", "canonical_name": "GAYARAM PATEL & ORS"}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2036 of 1973 and describes Patel thus :\n\n\"Gayaram Patel son of Bisram Patel, the legal gnardian of gaonila thikadari patta\"\n\nThe terms on which the lease was granted to Patel arc reproduced below:-\n\n(i) That the yearly rent payable shall be Rs."}}, {"text": "Gayaram Patel", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4754, "end_char": 4767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2036 of 1973 and describes Patel thus :\n\n\"Gayaram Patel son of Bisram Patel, the legal gnardian of gaonila thikadari patta\"\n\nThe terms on which the lease was granted to Patel arc reproduced below:-\n\n(i) That the yearly rent payable shall be Rs.", "canonical_name": "GAYARAM PATEL & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bisram Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2036 of 1973 and describes Patel thus :\n\n\"Gayaram Patel son of Bisram Patel, the legal gnardian of gaonila thikadari patta\"\n\nThe terms on which the lease was granted to Patel arc reproduced below:-\n\n(i) That the yearly rent payable shall be Rs."}}, {"text": "Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6102, "end_char": 6136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6393, "end_char": 6403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "1st of June 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification of that type was issued by the State Government and became effective from the 1st of June 1959."}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6768, "end_char": 6792, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kailash Cha11dra Panigrahi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6836, "end_char": 6862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime a Board of Trustees had been appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (for short Endowments Act) with Shri Kailash Cha11dra Panigrahi as the Managing Trustee to look after the affairs of _the deity on whose behalf an application under section 7 read with section 8-A ( 1) of the Abolition Act was made by the Managing Trustee after the said\n1 • \"\n\n~-.", "canonical_name": "Kailash Cha11dra Panigrahi"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the meantime a Board of Trustees had been appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "In the meantime a Board of Trustees had been appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6984, "end_char": 6993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the meantime a Board of Trustees had been appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "In the meantime a Board of Trustees had been appointed under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Nawapara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7513, "end_char": 7521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was decided by the Tehsildar Khariar, Tehsil Nawapara, acting as Collector under the Abolition Act."}}, {"text": "Collector under the Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13th June 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7857, "end_char": 7871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the matter he passed the order\n\n, dated 13th June 1962, the operative part of which runs thus :\n\n\"Sir lands in village Konabira bearing plot No."}}, {"text": "P. S. Kamna Distt. Kalahandi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8073, "end_char": 8101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 with an area of 20.14 acres are settled on occupancy rights with Gayaram Patel s/o Bisram Patel of Konabira, P. S. Kamna Distt."}}, {"text": "Kemna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8143, "end_char": 8148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalahandi for and on behalf of Samaleswari Devi of Kemna, the Maufidar, u/s 7(1) (b) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951."}}, {"text": "s 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8166, "end_char": 8172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Collector under the Abolition Act", "statute": "Collector under the Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8184, "end_char": 8218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21st of October 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8352, "end_char": 8372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st of October 1963, the Managing Trustee -0f the deity made an application to the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments under section 68 of the Endowments Act complaining that he had been resisted by Patel in obtaining possession of the land of the deity and praying for recovery of possession thereof from Patel."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "12th of January 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8690, "end_char": 8710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his order dated the 12th of January 1970, the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments allowed the application holding that it was the deity and not Patel who had been declared to be the occupancy tenant in the order dated 13th June 1962 abovementioned."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel went up in revision to the Conunissioner of Endowments but without success and thereafter knocked at the door of the Orissa High Court with a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to have the orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and the Commissioner of Endowments set aside."}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9083, "end_char": 9103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9111, "end_char": 9132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "6th March 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9447, "end_char": 9461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court however took the same view of the matter as was expressed by authority appointed under the Endowments Act and negatived the contentions raised on behalf of Patel, in its order dated 6th March 1973."}}, {"text": "Cl 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9815, "end_char": 9819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "9th of Decell!ber 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 and to have an area of 22.58 acres) on t!ie 9th of Decell!ber 1970 through a warrant of possession dated 14th Febrµary 1970 issued by the Assistant Co=issioner of Endowments, the M anagjng Trustee filed an application dated 28th October 1 ~71 under section 145 of the Code of Criminal frocedure before."}}, {"text": "28th October 1 ~71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10068, "end_char": 10086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 and to have an area of 22.58 acres) on t!ie 9th of Decell!ber 1970 through a warrant of possession dated 14th Febrµary 1970 issued by the Assistant Co=issioner of Endowments, the M anagjng Trustee filed an application dated 28th October 1 ~71 under section 145 of the Code of Criminal frocedure before."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10093, "end_char": 10104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "28th October 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10404, "end_char": 10421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Preliminary order attaching the property was passed by the Magistrate on the same day, i.e., 28th October 1971."}}, {"text": "20th November 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10791, "end_char": 10809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nevertheless, on the 20th November 1971, another report was received by the Magistrate from the same officer revealing \"an emergency\" whereupon the Magistrate made a direction that the preliminary order dated 28th October 1971 re given effect to and that the land be attached along with the crops standing thereon."}}, {"text": "21st September 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11151, "end_char": 11170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, the proceedings were finalised through an order dated 21st September 1972 passed by the Magistrate who held that it was Patel who was in possession of the land in dispute\n\noll' the 20tJ1 November 1971, and directing that the land be restored to him."}}, {"text": "15til\n\nNovember 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11662, "end_char": 11682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "terminated on the 15til\n\nNovember 1971 and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to revive them five days later and to give effect\n\nt0 the order of attachment which already stood vacated."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12532, "end_char": 12541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12879, "end_char": 12900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13492, "end_char": 13507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that end to secure the ownership and control of all material resources of the community so that they may best subserve the common good, and to prevent the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in order to enable the state to discharge the above obligation it is expedient to provide for the abolition of all the rights, title and interest in land of Intermediaries by whatever name known, including the mortgagees and lessees such interest, between the raiyat and the\n\nState of Orissa for vesting in the said State of the said rights, title and interest and to make provision for other matters connected with; .............. \"\n\nSection 2 contains definitions."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13651, "end_char": 13660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13939, "end_char": 13948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13971, "end_char": 13980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zamindar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14891, "end_char": 14899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauses (f), (g), (h), (hh) and (j) thereof are relevant to the dispute and are extracted below :\n\n(f) \"date of vesting\" means in relation to an estate vested in the State the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 3-A in respect of such estate and in the case of surrender by an intermediary under section 4 the date of the\n\nexecution of the agreement;\n\n(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and means any land held by or vested in an Intermediary and included under one entry in any revenue roll or any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and ievenue-free fands, prepared aild maintained under the law relating to land revenue for the time being in force or urtder any rule, order, custom or usage having the foree of law, and inc1udes tevenue-free\n\nlands not entered in any register or revenue-roll and all classes of tenures or under-tenures and any Jagir, iham or maufi or other similar i:rant;\n\n(h) 'Intermediary' with reference to any .estate means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, landholder, malguzar, thik:adar, gaontia, tenure-holder, undertenure-holder, and includes an inamdar, a jagirdar, Zamindar, Ilaquadar, Khorposhdar, Parganadar, Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Ruler of an lndian State merged with the State of Orissa and all other holders or owners of interest in land between the raiyat and the State;\n\n(hh) 'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'state' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'intermediary interest' also;\n\n( j) .. Khas possession\" used with reference to the possession of an Intermediary of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, means the possession of such in'ermcdiary by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself wHh his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock;\n\nThe provisions of section 3A have already been noted."}}, {"text": "Ilaquadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14901, "end_char": 14910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauses (f), (g), (h), (hh) and (j) thereof are relevant to the dispute and are extracted below :\n\n(f) \"date of vesting\" means in relation to an estate vested in the State the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 3-A in respect of such estate and in the case of surrender by an intermediary under section 4 the date of the\n\nexecution of the agreement;\n\n(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and means any land held by or vested in an Intermediary and included under one entry in any revenue roll or any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and ievenue-free fands, prepared aild maintained under the law relating to land revenue for the time being in force or urtder any rule, order, custom or usage having the foree of law, and inc1udes tevenue-free\n\nlands not entered in any register or revenue-roll and all classes of tenures or under-tenures and any Jagir, iham or maufi or other similar i:rant;\n\n(h) 'Intermediary' with reference to any .estate means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, landholder, malguzar, thik:adar, gaontia, tenure-holder, undertenure-holder, and includes an inamdar, a jagirdar, Zamindar, Ilaquadar, Khorposhdar, Parganadar, Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Ruler of an lndian State merged with the State of Orissa and all other holders or owners of interest in land between the raiyat and the State;\n\n(hh) 'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'state' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'intermediary interest' also;\n\n( j) .. Khas possession\" used with reference to the possession of an Intermediary of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, means the possession of such in'ermcdiary by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself wHh his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock;\n\nThe provisions of section 3A have already been noted."}}, {"text": "Khorposhdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14912, "end_char": 14923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauses (f), (g), (h), (hh) and (j) thereof are relevant to the dispute and are extracted below :\n\n(f) \"date of vesting\" means in relation to an estate vested in the State the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 3-A in respect of such estate and in the case of surrender by an intermediary under section 4 the date of the\n\nexecution of the agreement;\n\n(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and means any land held by or vested in an Intermediary and included under one entry in any revenue roll or any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and ievenue-free fands, prepared aild maintained under the law relating to land revenue for the time being in force or urtder any rule, order, custom or usage having the foree of law, and inc1udes tevenue-free\n\nlands not entered in any register or revenue-roll and all classes of tenures or under-tenures and any Jagir, iham or maufi or other similar i:rant;\n\n(h) 'Intermediary' with reference to any .estate means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, landholder, malguzar, thik:adar, gaontia, tenure-holder, undertenure-holder, and includes an inamdar, a jagirdar, Zamindar, Ilaquadar, Khorposhdar, Parganadar, Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Ruler of an lndian State merged with the State of Orissa and all other holders or owners of interest in land between the raiyat and the State;\n\n(hh) 'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'state' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'intermediary interest' also;\n\n( j) .. Khas possession\" used with reference to the possession of an Intermediary of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, means the possession of such in'ermcdiary by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself wHh his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock;\n\nThe provisions of section 3A have already been noted."}}, {"text": "Parganadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14925, "end_char": 14935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauses (f), (g), (h), (hh) and (j) thereof are relevant to the dispute and are extracted below :\n\n(f) \"date of vesting\" means in relation to an estate vested in the State the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 3-A in respect of such estate and in the case of surrender by an intermediary under section 4 the date of the\n\nexecution of the agreement;\n\n(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and means any land held by or vested in an Intermediary and included under one entry in any revenue roll or any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and ievenue-free fands, prepared aild maintained under the law relating to land revenue for the time being in force or urtder any rule, order, custom or usage having the foree of law, and inc1udes tevenue-free\n\nlands not entered in any register or revenue-roll and all classes of tenures or under-tenures and any Jagir, iham or maufi or other similar i:rant;\n\n(h) 'Intermediary' with reference to any .estate means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, landholder, malguzar, thik:adar, gaontia, tenure-holder, undertenure-holder, and includes an inamdar, a jagirdar, Zamindar, Ilaquadar, Khorposhdar, Parganadar, Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Ruler of an lndian State merged with the State of Orissa and all other holders or owners of interest in land between the raiyat and the State;\n\n(hh) 'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'state' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'intermediary interest' also;\n\n( j) .. Khas possession\" used with reference to the possession of an Intermediary of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, means the possession of such in'ermcdiary by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself wHh his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock;\n\nThe provisions of section 3A have already been noted."}}, {"text": "Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14937, "end_char": 14979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15729, "end_char": 15739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Rule", "statute": "Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Rule"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15777, "end_char": 15786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Rule", "statute": "Sarbarakar and Maufidar including the Rule"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17263, "end_char": 17272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17276, "end_char": 17285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17411, "end_char": 17420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th May\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18701, "end_char": 18715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole controversy thus turns rouqd the position which Patel came to hold in respect of the land in dispute under the 181lSe deed of 1949 and in order to assess that position it is necessary to refer to the lease deed dated 10th May\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20286, "end_char": 20295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th January 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20426, "end_char": 20443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4: Once Patel is found to be an Intermediary his case must fall within clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 7 as it was he who had the \"Khas possession\" of the land now in controversy, according to the findings contained in the order dated 13th January 1962 pa."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20955, "end_char": 20966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20974, "end_char": 21000, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_329_339_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• , ...\n\nNAVINCHANDRA RAMANLAL\n\nKALIDAS BHUDA:RBHM AND ANR.\n\nBebruary 2.1, 1979\n\n(P.N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] •\n\nBombay Tenancy & Agric1iltural Lands Act, \"1956-Ss. 43C and 88(1) (b'J- Scope of.\n\nSections 43C and 88 of the Bombay Tenancy and A, gricultural Lands Act, 1948 exempted _certain lands from .the qperation .of the _Act.\n\nSection 43C provided that nothing in s. 32 to s. 32R (both inclusive) and s. 43 shall apply C to lands in the \"area within the limits\" .of a Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948. The Gujarat Amendment Act, 1965 substituted the words \"areas -wliich .On the date of coming into force of the Amending Act, 1956 and within the limits of\" for the words \"areas within the limits of\" occurring in the original section. Similarly s. 88(1)\n\n(b) conferred power on -the State Govei:nment to exempt land from the operation of the provision of the Act which the State Government may, from time to B time, by notification in the official Gazette, specify as being reserved for nonagricultural or industrial development. The Amendment Act, 36 of 1965 engraftcd a proviso to cl. (b) of s. 88(1), providing that if after a notification in respect of any area specified in. th.e notification is issued under the said .clause, whether before or after the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agicultu:cal Lands Act, 1965 the limits of the area so specified are enlarged on account of the addition of any other area thereto, then, merely by reason E of such addition the reservation as made by the notification so issued shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to the area so added.\n\nThe aprellant v;•as the owner of survey No. 165 situated within the revenue limits of village A.cher near Ahmedabad. For sometime prior to 1946 the respondent had been a tenant of this land.\n\nBy virtue of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 the respondent became a protected tenant and F continued to be so under the Tenancy Act, 1948. The Amendment Act of 1956 provided for the transfer of ownership of the land from the landlord to the tenant by operation of law. The day was styled as tillers' day. Under this section every tenant was deemed to have purchased from his landlord free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the tillers' day the land held by him as tenant. By virtue of this provision the tenant claimed himself to be the owner of the land G\n\nOn August 9, 1956 the Government issued a notification specifying the area within the 1imits of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmednbad as being_ reserved for urban non-agricultural and industrial development. This notification was superseded by another notification dated the 14th February, 1957 by which the Government specified, amongst others, the areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad \"8 being reserved for the above mentioned purpose. Subsequently the Government extended the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation by reason of which survey\n\nNo. 165 which was formerly outside the Municipal limits, was included within the area of the Municipal Corporation of AhmedaOOd as from May 30, 1959.\n\nIn an inquiry by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for determining the purchase price of the land the appellant-landlord contended before the Tribunal that in view of s. 88(1)(b) read with the notification of Februnry 14, 1957 the land (survey No. 165) was exempt from the operation of the 1948 Act and that the inquiry should be dropped. This contention was negatived and the appeal by the landlord failed. In revision preferred by the landlord, the Revenue Tribunal was of the opinion that not merely the lands which were in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act but the exemption wou1d also extend to the lands brought within the Corporation area from time to time without any fresh notification for reervation.\n\nIn the repondents-tenant5' writ petition the High Court held that the exemption would apply only to the lands included within the limits of the Municipal Corporation as on the date of the notification and in the absence of fresh reservation by a fresh notification the land included in the Mc.nicipal area on extension of the limits of the Municipal Corporation subsequent to the notification would not enjoy the exemption from the operation of the Tenancy Act.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHEW : l(a) From the language of the amendment• made in s. 43C and s. i8(1)(b) it is clear that both the amendments are retroactive from August 1, 1956 i.e. from the date the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956 came into force.\n\nIn other \\Vords the amended s. 43C E and s. 88(1) (b) with its proviso will have to be read as if they have been introduced in their amended form from August 1, 1956. 1336 A-Bl\n\n(b) The land of survey No. 165 would be governed by the Tenancy Act,\n\n1948. The land which was originally within the revenue limits of the village was included in the area of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation from May 30, 1959. When the amended s.43C and s.88(1)(b) with its proviso came into force on August l, 1956, the land not being in the Municipal Cor- .> poration area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the notification issued on August 9, 1956 superseded by the subsequent notification of February 14, 1957. [3360-E]\n\n2(a) The respondent was a tenant on the tillers' day and has by operation of law become the owner and a deemed purchaser. [338 F]\n\n(b) The land (Survey No. 165) was not within the Municipal Corporation area either on February 14, 1957, the date on which the exemption was\n\ngranted or on August 1, 1956 when Bombay Act XIII of 1956 was put into operation or on April l, 1957 the tillers' day when title to land would stand transferred to the tenant by sheer operation of Jaw without anything more.\n\nTherefore the Notification dated February f4, 1957 would not cover the land which was at the date of the issue of the Notification not included in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area.\n\nSubsequent e:r.tension of the area of Municipal Corporation would not ipso facto qualify the lands falling within the extended area for exemption in view of the proviso to s. 88(1) (b) and the opening word of s. 43C, both of which clearly recite that the exemp-\n\n• ,\n\n-_.,\n\n.r •\n\n• ,\n\ntion would apply to the land included in the Municipal Corporation area on August I, 1956, the date on which the Bombay Act 13, 1956 came into force and not to any subsequently added area to the area of Municipal Corporation.\n\nSince the land was brought within the Municipal Corporation area after August I, 1956 the Notification dated February 14, 1957 would not cover such added or extended Brea and there would be no exemption under that Notification for the land in the extended area. [338B-E]\n\n(c) The ratio in the decisions in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli [1963] 2 S.C.R. 707 and Sidram Narasappa Kamble v.\n\nSho/apur Borough Municipality [1966] I S.C.R. 618 would not apply because those cases turned upon the construction of s. 88 ( 1) (b) as it stood at the relevant time.\n\nPresumably in order to combat the effect of some judgments which purported to lay down thla.t the exemption once granted would apply to any area that may be included in the Corporation area at a date C much later to the date of the issue of the Notification, the amendment of s. 88(1) (b) was made.\n\nThe law :having undergone substantive amendment bearing on the iubject, the earlier decision would be of no assistance, [339 A-D]\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2200 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 26/ 28th March, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 543 of 1964.\n\nI. N. Shroff, R. P. Kapur and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant.\n\nl. C. Shah and Vineet Kumar for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.-Thili appeal by special leave arises from a judgment rendered by the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 542 of 1%4 filed by the present respondent No. 1 against the present appellant contending that the land involved in the dispute is not exempt from the operation of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1948 ('Tenancy Act' for short).\n\nA brief recital of the facts will put the point of law raised herein in proper perspective.\n\nAppellant is the owner of Survey No. 165 measuring 2 acres 21 gunthas situated in Village Acher, City Taluka, District Ahmedabad.\n\nRespondent is and has been the tenant of this land since before 1946. He became a protected tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 and his name appeared in the Register of protected tenants maintained nnder that Act. On the introduction of the Tenancy Act of 1948 the respondent continued to be the protected tenant under it.\n\nA very comprehensive amendment was made in the Tenancy Act of 1948 by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands .(Amendment) Act, 1956 (Bomaby Act XIIl of 1956) ('1956\n\nS0PR1!MH COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nAct' for short'). Section 32 as amended by 1956 Act provided for transfer of ownership of the land from a landlord to the tenant of the land by operationof law. 'f.he day was styled as 'tiller's day' and section 32 provided that snbject to the other provisions of the section and provisions of the next succeeding section every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from this landlord free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant.\n\nThe land involved in this appeal was one to which the Tenancy Act of 1948 as amended by the Amending Act of 1956 applied and by the operation of law the tenant-the respondent claimed to be the owner of the land.\n\nSection 88 of the Tenancy Act of 1948 as it stood at the relevant time provided for exemption of certain lands from its provisions,. one such exemption being in respect of any area which the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify as being reserved for urban non-agricultural or industrial development. Armed with this power the Government issued Notification No. TNC/5156/ 101955-F dated 9th August, 1956 whereby amongst others the Government specified the area within the limits of the Mun'cipal Corporations of the cities of Poona and Ahmedabad as being reserved for urban non-agricnltural and industrial deelopment. This Notification was superseded by another Notification No. TNC/5156/ J 69426-M 'dated 14th February 1957 whereby the Government specified amongst others the areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporations of the cities of Poona and Ahmedabad as 'being reserved for the above-mentioned purpose.\n\nNeither of the Notifications at the date of issue had any relevance to the land involved in this appeal because it was not situated within the area of the Mun; cipal Corporation of Ahmedabad.\n\nSubsequently the Government extended the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation whereby Acher Village in which Survey No. 165 is situated was included in the area of Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad on and from 30th May, 1959.\n\nG In January 1960 Agricultural Lands Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area wherein the Survey No. 165 is situated, commenced an enquiry under s. 32G of the Tenancy Act of 1948 for determining the purchase price of the land on the footing that under s. 32 respondent/tenant has become the deemed purchaser of it.\n\nJn the course of this enquiry the appellant landlord gave an application that II the land in respect of which the enquiry is being held is now included within the limits of Municipal Corporation at Ahmedabad and hence in view of s. 88(1) {b) read with the Notification dated 14th February,\n\n• •\n\n> •\n\nY.. ,.\n\n4 •\n\n• ,\n\n' <\n\n• •\n\n1957\" it was exempted from the operation of ss. 1 to 87 of t1w Tenancy Act of 1948 and, therefore, the enquiry should be dropped.\n\nThe Agricultnral Lands Tribunal rejected the application of the appellantlandlonl and proceded further with the enquiry.\n\nThe appelfant-landlord' appealed to the Collector which met with the same fate, Appellant carried' the matter to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.\n\nThe Revenue Tribunal was of the opinion that on a true and correct interpretation of s. 88 ( 1) (b) read with the relevant notification, not merely the lands which were in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the Notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act but the exemption would also extend to the lands brought within the Corporation area from time to time without any fresh Notification for reservation and accordingly allowed the Revision Application of the appellant-landlord and directed that the enquiry under s. 32G be dropped. The respondent no. I-tenant approached the High Court of Gujarat under Article 227 of the Constitution, The High Court held that the exemption would apply only to the lands included within the limit~ of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad as on the date of Notification and in the absence of the fresh reservation by a fresh notification the lands included in the Municipal area on extension of the limits of the Municipal Corporation subsequent to the Notification would not be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion one aspect that impressed the High Court was that while power to exempt the land from the operation of the Tenancy Act vests in the Government, the area of the Municipal Corporation may be extended by the Corporation authority and if to such extended area the exemption were to apply, the power of granting exemption would be enjoyed by Municipal Corporation which was not the legislative delegate and on which the power to exempt was not concerned and simultaneously, the legislative delegate, namely, State Government would completely abdicate its function.\n\nThis aspect is specifically referred to as it proceeds on an erroneous assumption that Municipal Corporation can extend its own area.\n\nA reference to section 3 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act would show that unless the State Government in exercise of the power conferred upon it, extends the limits, the Municipal Corporation on its own cannot extend the limit.\n\nThe assumption being incorrect, it cannot be called in aid of the conclusion , reached by the High Court.\n\nMr. J. C. Shah for the respondent, however, frankly stated that he could not support the aforementioned reason of the High Court and, therefore, the Court should ignore it.\n\nWe would say no more about it. In accordance with its opinion that\n\n334 SUPRl!ME COUll.T 11.EPOll.TS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\n.. the land falling in the iubsequently extended limit would not 1njoy\n\nthe benefit of exemption, the High Court quashed the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and directed the authority under the Tenancy Act to proceed further with the enquiry under s. 32G.\n\nMr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant\n\n8 urged that the High Court was in error in putting a narrow construction on s. 88(1) (b) because the power to exempt an area situate within the Municipal Corporation limit was to be exercised for urban nonagricultural or industrial development and that once such powt!f is exercised, it should cover the entire area situate JVithin the limits of Municipal Corporation at any given point of time, and this cons1ruc- C tion adopted by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal deserves acceptance by this Court as it effectuates the purpose for which power is conferred.\n\nIt was further contended that once a Notification exempting the land from the operation of the Tenancy Act is issued under s. 88(1) (b), the exemption would become operative retrospectively and no vested\n\nright could thereafter be claimed.\n\nThe contention raised by Mr. Shroff would have necessitated examination ot the heme of the various provisions of the Te:m1ncy Act as illls been done by the High Court but in our opinion the High Court unnecessarily undertook this exercise wholly overlooking and by passing two important amendments introduced in the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1948, viz., 43C and 88(1) both of which were in force at the timo when the petition was heard and upon proper construction both amendments being retroactive in their operation from the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1956 w:iich came into force on ht August, 1956 would have clinched the issue.\n\nTherefore, it is not necessary to examine the contention from the angle from which the High Court has done but the contention of Mr. Shroff can be disposed of by a mere reference to the two relevant provisions.\n\nThe two sections relevant for considering the exemption from the operation of the Tenancy Act of 1948 are 43C and 88. Section 43C as it stood before its amendment by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 read as G under :\n\n\"43C. Nothing in ss. 32 to 32R, both inclusive, and 43 shall apply to lands in the areas within the limits of- ( a) xxx xxx xxx xxx\n\n(b) Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948\".\n\nSection 88 ( 1) (b) as it stood prior to the introduction of a proviso by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 reads as under :\n\n• •\n\n\" '\n\n~ ,.\n\n~ '-\n\n.. -i;\n\n~ ·.~\n\n-\\.-'\"\n\n' .x.\n\n\"88.(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in subS.\n\n(2) uothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply-\n\n( a). x x x x\n\n(b) to any area which the State Government may from time to time by Notification in the official gazette specify as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development\".\n\nThe Tenancy Act of 1948 was amended by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965, (Gujarat Act 36 of 1965). Section 7 of the Amendment Act of 1965 reads as under :-\n\n\"7. Amendment of section 43C of Born.\n\nLXVII of 1948-In section 43C of the principal Act, for the word 'areas within the limits of', the words 'areas which on the date of the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1955 are within the limits of' shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect on and from 1st August, 1956\".\n\nSection 18 of the Amending Act reads as under :\n\n\"18. Amendment of section 88 of Born.\n\nLXVII of 1948-In section 88 of the principal Act,-\n\n(1) in sub-section ( 1),\n\n(i) x x x x x x x x x x\n\n(ii) to clause (b) the following provisios shall be added, namely\n\nProvided that if after a notification in respect of any area specified in the notification is issued under this clause, whether before or after the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965 (Guj. 36 of 1965), the limits of the area so specified are enlarged on account of the addition of any other area thereto, then merely by reason of such addition, the reservation as made by the notification so issued shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to the area so added, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree. or order of any court, tribunal or any other authority\".\n\n2-253SCI/79\n\nBoth these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 which came into force from 29th December, 1965.\n\nHowever, looking to the language of the amendments made in s. 43C and s. 88(1) (b), both the amendments are retroactive from !st August 1956, i.e. from the date Bombay Act 13 of 1956 came into force.\n\nIn other words, amended s. 43C and s. 88 ( 1) (b) with its proviso will have to be read as if they were introduced in that very form from !st August, 1956.\n\nHaving noticed the amendments let us look to its impad on the question of application of the Tenancy Act of 1948 to the lands included in the Municipal Corporation area of Ahmedabad after 1st August, 1956.\n\nIndisputably, Survey No. 165, the land involved in this appeal, being situated within the revenue limits of Acher Village, was included in the area of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation from 30th May, 1959.\n\nTherefore, on 1st August 1956 when the amended sections 43C and 88(1) (b) with its proviso as amended by Act 36 of 1965 came into force, the land being not in Municipal Corporation area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the Notification issued on 9th August, 1956, superseded by the subsequent Notification dated 14th February, 1957 in exercise of the power conferred bys. 88(1)(b). Accordingly, this land Survey No'. 165 would be governed by the Tenancy Act of\n\n1948. The consequences of the application of the Tenancy Act of 1948 to land Survey No. 165 may now be examined.\n\nBy Bombay Act 13 of 1956 a revolutionary amendment of far reaching consequence was made in the Tenancy Act of 1948 and F the amended Act came into force with effect from 1st August, 1956.\n\nThe most important provision of the Amending Act was s. 32 as amended by the Amending Act which provided for transfer of the ownership of land by operation of law from the landlord to the tenant.\n\nThe title to the land which vested in the landlord on 1st April, 1957, the tiller's day, passed to the tenant by operation of law. What is the effect of this transfer of title was examined by this Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay.(') The Court held as under.\n\n\"The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tiller's day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant. The tenant is no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to\n\nCl) [1959] Suppl. I S.C.R. 489.\n\n• •\n\nMVINCHANDRA v. KALIDAS (Desai, !.) 3 37\n\npurchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to pur chase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller's day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, s. 32M declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein.\n\nHere also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant.\n\nThe title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal.\n\nThe tenant gets a vested interest in the land defcasible only in either of those cases and it cannot therefore be said that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or\n\nF x' indefinite''.\n\n) • If the effect of the land being governed by s. 32 on tiller's day is to transfer the title of the landlord to the tenant by operation of law, dcfeasible only in the event of tenant declining to purchase the land or committing default in payment of price as determined by the G Tribunal, the next question is : if the land is subsequently brought within the Municipal Corporation area which area enjoys the exemption under s. 88(1)(b), would the vested title be vested:\n\nThis question can be answered shortly by referring to the amended H s. 43C ands. 88(1)(b) with its proviso, both of which clearly assert that the exemption granted under s. 88 ( 1) (b) by a Notification\n\nissued by the Government would enure for the benefit of the land which was within the Municipal Corporation area on lst August, 1956 and in no case the additional area which may be included within the Municipal Corporation area after 1st August, 1956 would enjoy the exemption granted by the Notification unless a fresh J\\:otification is issued. Admitiedly, since 14th February, 1957 no fresh Notification is issued.\n\nThe land bearing Survey No. 165 was not within the Municipal Corporation area either on 14th February, 1957, the day on which exemption was granted, or on 1st August, 1956 when Bombay Act VIII of 1956 was put into operation or on 1st April, 1957, the tiller's day, when title to land would stand transferred to the tenant by sheer operation of law without anything more.\n\nTherefore, the Notification dated 14th February, 1957 would not cover the land which was at the date of the issue of the Notification not included in Ahmcdabad Municipal Corporation area.\n\nSubsequent ex ten; ion of the area of Municipal Corporation would not enjoy the benefit of exemption in view of the proviso to s. 88(1) (b) and the opening words of s. 43C both of which clearly recite that the exemption would apply to the land included in the Municipal Corporation area on 1st August, 1956, the day on which Bombay Act 13 of 1956 came into force, and not to any subsequently added area to the area of Municipal Corporation. Land bearing Survey No. 165 was brought within the Municipal Corporation area after 1st August, 1956 and, therefore, the Notification dated 14th February, 1957 would not cover such added or extended area and there would be no exemption under that Notification for the land in the extended area.\n\nIf the land bearing Survey No. 165 does not enjoy the benefit of exemption under s. 88(1) (b) and it being agricultural land in respect of which the respondent was tenant on the tiller's day, the respondent has, by operation of law, become the owner and is a deemed purchaser.\n\nThe Agricultural Lands Tribunal would have to proceed with the enquiry to determine the price as required by s. 32G.\n\nMr. Shroff, however, contended that the decisions of this Court in Mohan/al Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli,(') and Sldram Narsappa Kamble v. Sholapur Borough Municipality,(2) would clearly indicate that whenever a Notification under s. 88(1) (b) is issued by the appropriate Government granting exemption to any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act for the purposes mentioned in the sub-section, such exemption will apply retrospectively\n\n(!) [1963] 2 SCR 707. l (2) [1966] I SCR 618.\n\n• •\n\n) •\n\nand no vested right under the Tenancy Act 1948 or even one under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, could be claimed by any one. It is not necessary to examine this contention because subsequent to the later decision in Sidram Narsappa Kamble (supra) the Tenancy Act of 1948 was amended by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 making it abundantly clear that if there is any Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act issued by the appropriate Government under s. 88(1) (b), the exemption would enure for the benefit of that area included in the Municipal Corporation as on 1st August, 1956 and in the absence of a fresh Notification such exemption would not be available to the extended or area added to the area of Municipal Corporation and this amendment is made effective notwithstanding any judgment, order or decision of the Court or Tribunal to the contrary .\n\nPresumably, in order to combat the effect of some judgments which purported to lay down that the exemption once granted would apply to any area that may be included in the Corporation area at a date much later to the date of issue of the Notification, the amendment was made. Accordingly, law having undergone a substantive amendment bearing on the subject, the ratio in the decision of Mohan/a! Chunilal Kothari and Sidram Narsappa Kamble (supra) which turned upon the construction of s. 88 (1) (b) as it stood at the relevant time, would not be of any assistance.\n\nTherefore, for the reasons herein stated, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 120, "entities": [{"text": "NAVINCHANDRA RAMANLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAVINCHANDRA RAMANLAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KALIDAS BHUDA:RBHM AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALIDAS BHUDARBHAI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bebruary 2.1, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bebruary 2.1, 1979\n\n(P.N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] •"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss. 43C and 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 43C and 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 377, "end_char": 382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 32R", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 481, "end_char": 575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gujarat Amendment Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "On the date of coming into force of the Amending Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the date of coming into force of the Amending Act, 1956", "statute": "On the date of coming into force of the Amending Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1169, "end_char": 1177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the date of coming into force of the Amending Act, 1956", "statute": "On the date of coming into force of the Amending Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Lands Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.cher", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1777, "end_char": 1783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 situated within the revenue limits of village A.cher near Ahmedabad."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 situated within the revenue limits of village A.cher near Ahmedabad."}}, {"text": "By virtue of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1875, "end_char": 1934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of this provision the tenant claimed himself to be the owner of the land G\n\nOn August 9, 1956 the Government issued a notification specifying the area within the 1imits of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmednbad as being_ reserved for urban non-agricultural and industrial development."}}, {"text": "Ahmednbad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of this provision the tenant claimed himself to be the owner of the land G\n\nOn August 9, 1956 the Government issued a notification specifying the area within the 1imits of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmednbad as being_ reserved for urban non-agricultural and industrial development."}}, {"text": "14th February, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2735, "end_char": 2754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notification was superseded by another notification dated the 14th February, 1957 by which the Government specified, amongst others, the areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad \"8 being reserved for the above mentioned purpose."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2994, "end_char": 3025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the Government extended the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation by reason of which survey\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "AhmedaOOd", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 which was formerly outside the Municipal limits, was included within the area of the Municipal Corporation of AhmedaOOd as from May 30, 1959."}}, {"text": "May 30, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 which was formerly outside the Municipal limits, was included within the area of the Municipal Corporation of AhmedaOOd as from May 30, 1959."}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3369, "end_char": 3380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Februnry 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3411, "end_char": 3428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an inquiry by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for determining the purchase price of the land the appellant-landlord contended before the Tribunal that in view of s. 88(1)(b) read with the notification of Februnry 14, 1957 the land (survey No."}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4551, "end_char": 4557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 4992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tenancy Act,\n\n1948", "statute": "the Tenancy Act,\n\n1948"}}, {"text": "s.88(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5182, "end_char": 5192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tenancy Act,\n\n1948", "statute": "the Tenancy Act,\n\n1948"}}, {"text": "August l, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5229, "end_char": 5243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the amended s.43C and s.88(1)(b) with its proviso came into force on August l, 1956, the land not being in the Municipal Cor- ."}}, {"text": "February 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5487, "end_char": 5504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "> poration area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the notification issued on August 9, 1956 superseded by the subsequent notification of February 14, 1957. ["}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April l, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165) was not within the Municipal Corporation area either on February 14, 1957, the date on which the exemption was\n\ngranted or on August 1, 1956 when Bombay Act XIII of 1956 was put into operation or on April l, 1957 the tillers' day when title to land would stand transferred to the tenant by sheer operation of Jaw without anything more."}}, {"text": "February f4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore the Notification dated February f4, 1957 would not cover the land which was at the date of the issue of the Notification not included in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area."}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956", "statute": "Bombay Act XIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "[1963] 2 S.C.R. 707", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7074, "end_char": 7093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7244, "end_char": 7249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7923, "end_char": 7935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, R. P. Kapur and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "R. P. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, R. P. Kapur and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7953, "end_char": 7966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, R. P. Kapur and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7990, "end_char": 7997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. C. Shah and Vineet Kumar for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. C. Shah and Vineet Kumar for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8080, "end_char": 8085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.-Thili appeal by special leave arises from a judgment rendered by the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "became a protected tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8752, "end_char": 8811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S0P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9177, "end_char": 9180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9235, "end_char": 9245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9421, "end_char": 9431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "Section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9914, "end_char": 9924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "On the introduction of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "30th May, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11277, "end_char": 11291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 is situated was included in the area of Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad on and from 30th May, 1959."}}, {"text": "s. 32G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11441, "end_char": 11447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11548, "end_char": 11553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11841, "end_char": 11849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 1 to 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11985, "end_char": 11996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agricultnral Lands Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12076, "end_char": 12103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agricultnral Lands Tribunal rejected the application of the appellantlandlonl and proceded further with the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Revenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12311, "end_char": 12335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appelfant-landlord' appealed to the Collector which met with the same fate, Appellant carried' the matter to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12423, "end_char": 12428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12896, "end_char": 12902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the Notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the Notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12958, "end_char": 12979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I-tenant approached the High Court of Gujarat under Article 227 of the Constitution, The High Court held that the exemption would apply only to the lands included within the limit~ of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad as on the date of Notification and in the absence of the fresh reservation by a fresh notification the lands included in the Municipal area on extension of the limits of the Municipal Corporation subsequent to the Notification would not be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act."}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 12997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the Notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the Notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14185, "end_char": 14194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. C. Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14528, "end_char": 14538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. J. C. Shah for the respondent, however, frankly stated that he could not support the aforementioned reason of the High Court and, therefore, the Court should ignore it."}}, {"text": "s. 32G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15070, "end_char": 15076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15083, "end_char": 15095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\n.. the land falling in the iubsequently extended limit would not 1njoy\n\nthe benefit of exemption, the High Court quashed the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and directed the authority under the Tenancy Act to proceed further with the enquiry under s. 32G.\n\nMr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant\n\n8 urged that the High Court was in error in putting a narrow construction on s. 88(1) (b) because the power to exempt an area situate within the Municipal Corporation limit was to be exercised for urban nonagricultural or industrial development and that once such powt!f is exercised, it should cover the entire area situate JVithin the limits of Municipal Corporation at any given point of time, and this cons1ruc- C tion adopted by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal deserves acceptance by this Court as it effectuates the purpose for which power is conferred.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15822, "end_char": 15830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15969, "end_char": 15975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention raised by Mr. Shroff would have necessitated examination ot the heme of the various provisions of the Te:m1ncy Act as illls been done by the High Court but in our opinion the High Court unnecessarily undertook this exercise wholly overlooking and by passing two important amendments introduced in the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1948, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Section 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 32 to 32R", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17036, "end_char": 17049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17156, "end_char": 17248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17252, "end_char": 17262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948", "statute": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17874, "end_char": 17883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948", "statute": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17949, "end_char": 17960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948", "statute": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17988, "end_char": 17999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948", "statute": "Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay H Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Amending Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18132, "end_char": 18150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st August, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18267, "end_char": 18283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LXVII of 1948-In section 43C of the principal Act, for the word 'areas within the limits of', the words 'areas which on the date of the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1955 are within the limits of' shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect on and from 1st August, 1956\"."}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18287, "end_char": 18297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1955", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18354, "end_char": 18364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1955", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18392, "end_char": 18402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1955", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19224, "end_char": 19297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th December, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19336, "end_char": 19355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2-253SCI/79\n\nBoth these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 which came into force from 29th December, 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19417, "end_char": 19423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act", "statute": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act"}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19428, "end_char": 19436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act", "statute": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act"}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19583, "end_char": 19589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act", "statute": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act"}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19594, "end_char": 19599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act", "statute": "Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act"}}, {"text": "1st August 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20142, "end_char": 20157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, on 1st August 1956 when the amended sections 43C and 88(1) (b) with its proviso as amended by Act 36 of 1965 came into force, the land being not in Municipal Corporation area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the Notification issued on 9th August, 1956, superseded by the subsequent Notification dated 14th February, 1957 in exercise of the power conferred bys."}}, {"text": "sections 43C and 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20175, "end_char": 20197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having noticed the amendments let us look to its impad on the question of application of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "Having noticed the amendments let us look to its impad on the question of application of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "9th August, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20438, "end_char": 20454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, on 1st August 1956 when the amended sections 43C and 88(1) (b) with its proviso as amended by Act 36 of 1965 came into force, the land being not in Municipal Corporation area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the Notification issued on 9th August, 1956, superseded by the subsequent Notification dated 14th February, 1957 in exercise of the power conferred bys."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21010, "end_char": 21015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st April, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21208, "end_char": 21223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The title to the land which vested in the landlord on 1st April, 1957, the tiller's day, passed to the tenant by operation of law."}}, {"text": "s. 32M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22548, "end_char": 22554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23593, "end_char": 23598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23971, "end_char": 23982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24087, "end_char": 24093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24189, "end_char": 24194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VIII of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24818, "end_char": 24841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ahmcdabad Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25163, "end_char": 25194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the Notification dated 14th February, 1957 would not cover the land which was at the date of the issue of the Notification not included in Ahmcdabad Municipal Corporation area."}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25329, "end_char": 25337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act VIII of 1956", "statute": "Bombay Act VIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 43C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25367, "end_char": 25373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act VIII of 1956", "statute": "Bombay Act VIII of 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26020, "end_char": 26028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26326, "end_char": 26332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26584, "end_char": 26592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government granting exemption to any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26626, "end_char": 26705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963] 2 SCR 707", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26800, "end_char": 26816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26883, "end_char": 26899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26922, "end_char": 26946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sidram Narsappa Kamble", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27068, "end_char": 27090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to examine this contention because subsequent to the later decision in Sidram Narsappa Kamble (supra) the Tenancy Act of 1948 was amended by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 making it abundantly clear that if there is any Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act issued by the appropriate Government under s. 88(1) (b), the exemption would enure for the benefit of that area included in the Municipal Corporation as on 1st August, 1956 and in the absence of a fresh Notification such exemption would not be available to the extended or area added to the area of Municipal Corporation and this amendment is made effective notwithstanding any judgment, order or decision of the Court or Tribunal to the contrary ."}}, {"text": "Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27209, "end_char": 27278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27322, "end_char": 27330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28116, "end_char": 28121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, law having undergone a substantive amendment bearing on the subject, the ratio in the decision of Mohan/a!"}}, {"text": "Chunilal Kothari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28125, "end_char": 28141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunilal Kothari and Sidram Narsappa Kamble (supra) which turned upon the construction of s. 88 (1) (b) as it stood at the relevant time, would not be of any assistance."}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28215, "end_char": 28220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act", "statute": "Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_33_40_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "JAGAT SINGH KISHOR SINGH DARBAR ETC. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nFebruary 6, 1979\n\n[P. s. KAILASAM, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosiiAL, JJ.]\n\nBon1bay PJ'ei•ention. of Gan1bli11g Act, 1887-S. 3(ii)-Scope of-Direct ,.relation lVitlz use of the premises or with instrument of gaming-If necessary to bring the place withln the scope of the definition-Mere probability or expectation of profit-If snfficient-Presun1ption under s. 1-When raised.\n\nThe term \"common gaming house\" has been defined in s. 3 of the Bombay i:'Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887. Under cl. (i) of the section a house or\n\n-pklce in which any of six different types of gaming enun1erated therein takes\n\nplace or in which instruments of gaming are kept or used for such gaming would fall within the definition.\n\nClause (ii) of that section states that in the ·-case of any other form of gaming (a) any house, room or place whatsoever in which any instn1ments of gaming \\J.'fe kept or used (b) for the profit or gain.of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house, etc., (c) by way of charge for the use of such house, roon1 or instrument or otherwise holvsoever, would be a common gaming house.\n\nCertain instruments of gaming were seized by the po1ice from the premises -of appellant no. 1 in both the appeals.\n\nHe was convicted for keeping a common gaming house while the other appe11ants we:re convicted of an offence under s. 5 of the Act.\n\nOn appeal, rejecting the appellants' contention that a mere expectation or probability of profit arising from gaming, without establishing a direct relation with the use of the premises or v-:ith instruments of gaming, would not be sufficient to bring the p1ace within the scope of the definition, the High :Court held that the purpose of occupying or using the premises must be such profit or gain as meant a probability or expectation of profit or gain and not necessarily a certainty of it.\n\nThe argument urged before the High Court was reiterated in appeal before this Court.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHEID : 1. The expression \"or otherwise hO'-''Soever\" is of the widest Omplitude and cannot be restricted to the words immediately preceding it, G namely, \"for profit or gain. . . . by way of charge for the use of the pre- mises.\"\n\n[37F]\n\n2. For proving that a particular house, room or place was a common gaming house, it would be sufficient if it was shown that the house was one in which instruments of gaming were kept or were used for the profit or gain of the person keeping or using such place, that is, where . the person \"keeping or using the house knew that profit or gain would in all probability result from the use of the instruments of gaming.\n\nProfit or gain may not actually result from such use. Even the hope of making a profit out of the\n\n' '\n\nSUPRJ/ME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\ngambling would be sufficient to satisfy the definition. In a given case the occupier of a house may allow it to be used by the public for gambling and he himself may take part in it in the hope of making profit although he may not necessarily make it every time.\n\nSuch a hope would be sufficient to make the house a common gaming house and the occupier liable for keeping such a house. At the same time the prosecution must establish that the purpose of keeping or using the instrun1ents was profit or gain, which may be done either by showing that the owner was charging for use of the instruments of gaming or for the use of the house, room or place or in any other manner that may be possible having regard to the nature of the gan1e carried on. [38E, 39E-Fl\n\n3. The profit or gain and the other requirements mentioned in cl. (ii) of the definition are a matter of peremptory presumption which has to be raised by the court as soon as seizure of instruments of gaming from the place is prorcd. Section 7 which allows a presumption to be raised against the accused, provides that seizure Of instruments of gaming from the premises shall be evidence, until the contrary was proved, that they were used as a common\n\n- gaming house and the persons found therein were present for the purpose of gaming, although no gaming was actually s'een.\n\nIn the instant case there is no evidence in rebuttal of the presumption. [40F-GJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 126- 127 of 1972.\n\n(From the Judgment and Order dt. 21-4-72 of the Gnjarat High Collrt in Criminal Revision App!n. Nos. 490-491 of 1971).\n\nS. K. Dholakia and R. Ramachandran for the appellants.\n\nS. P. Nayar and M. N. Shroff for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. By this judgment we shall dispose of Criminal Appeals Nos. 126 and 127 of 1972 both of which have been instituted on certificates granted under Article 134 (1 )( c) of the Constitution of India by the High Court of Gujarat against the judgment dated April 21, 1972 of a Division Bench of that Court upholding the conviction of each of the appellants under section 4 or section 5 of the Bombay Pr\"vention of Gambling Act 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act) and a sentence of imprisonment coupled with fine.\n\n2. Appeal No. 126 of 1972 has been filed by eight persons.\n\nAppellant No. 1 has been convicted of an offence under section 4 of the Bombay Act for keeping a common gaming house, while his seven co-appellants were found guilty of an offence under section 5 of that Act. In Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1972, appellant No. 1 is the same person who figures as appellant No. 1 in the former appeal and the conviction recorded against him is one for an offence under section 4 or, in the alternative, under section 5 of the Bombay Act. His two co-appellants have earned a conviction under. the section last mentioned ..\n\nI' '\n\n,._\n\n' '\n\n3. The two appeals have arisen from Criminal Revisions Nos. 490 and 491 of 1971 both of which were dismissed by the High Court through the impugned judgment. In Appeal No. 126 of 1972, appel- Ja;1t No. 1 was said to be keeping or using house No. 1408 situate in Ward No. 1 of Himatnagar town as a common gaming house and appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were said to have been employed by him for carrying on in that house the business of betting on Worli Matka figures.\n\nOn a search by the police, appellants Nos. 2 to 8 were found present in the house from which numerous betting slips and boards indicating the opening and closing figures of Worli Malka betting were recovered.\n\nA personal search of appellants Nos. 2 and 3 yielded\n\ncol1l1erfoils of the said slips.\n\nThe allegations against the three appellants in criminal appeal No. 127 of 1972 were that all of them were found present for the purpose of gaming in the said house which was, as already stated, being run by appellant No. 1 as a common gaming house.\n\n4. The only contention raised on behalf of the appellants before the High Court was that the said house had not been proved to be a\n\n\"common gaming house\" within the meaning of tbe definition of that expression occurring in section 3 of the Bombay Act. That definition runs i:hus:\n\n'111 this Act, \"common gaming-house\" means- ( i) in the case of gaming- ( a) on the market price of cotton, opium or other commodity or on the digits of the number used is stating such price, or\n\n(b) on the amount of variation in the market price of any such commodity or on the digits of the number used in stating the amount of such variation, or\n\n( c) on the market price of any stock or share or on the digits of the number used in stating such price, r\n\n( d) on the occurrence or non-occurrence of rain or other natural event, or\n\n( e) on the quantity of rainfall or on the digits of the number used in stating such quantity, or\n\n(f) on the pictures, digits or fignres of one or more 8 playing cards or other documents or objects bearing numbers, or on the total of such digits\n\nor figures, or on the basis of the occurrence or non-occurrence of any uncertain future event, or on the result of any draw, or on the basis of the sequence or any permutation or combination of such pictures, digits, figures, numbers, events or draws,\n\nany house, room or place whatsoever in which such gaming takes place or in which instruments of gaming are kept or used for such gaming :\n\n(ii) in the case of any other form of gaming, any house, room or place whatsoever in which any instruments of gaming are kept or used for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house, room or place by way of charge for the use of such house, room or place or instrument or otherwise howsoever.\"\n\nClause (i) of the definition is obviously inapplicable to the cases in hand and the plea of the prosecution has throughout been that the house in question squarely falls within clause (ii) thereof. This plea\n\nwas challenged before the High Court on behalf of the appellants with the contention that the house abovementioned had not been shown to be kept for use \"for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying ........ \" because, according to their learned counsel, the profit or gain mentioned in the definition must have a direct relation with the use of the premises or with the instruments of gaming and a mere expectation or probability of profit arising from gaming itself would not be sufficient to bring the place within the definition of a common gaming house. The High Court noted that there was a clear distinction between the language employed in the two clauses of the definition so that while the element of profit or gain of the person owning or occupying the premises in question was immaterial under clause (i), it was an essential requirement of clause (ii) which deals with forms of gaming not covered by sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (i). The High Court therefore analysed the provisions of clause (ii)• and formed the opinion that the expression \"or otherwise howsoever\" occurring therein had the widest amplitude and did not take its colour from the immediately preceding portion of the clause which employs the words \"by way of charge for the use of such house, room or place or instrument\".\n\nDiscussing the matter further the High Court was of the opinion that the uqnirement of the expression \"for the profit and gain of the person owning, occupying ........ \" was that the purpose of occupying or using the premises must be such profit or gain as meant a probability\n\n--y\n\nt '\n\n. '\n\nor expectation of p.rofit or gain and not necessarily a certainty of it and that the expression would embrace even a case where the keeper of the premises expected to gain by the process of gaming itself. In coming to this conclusion, the High Court relied upon two Division Bench judgments of the Bombay High Court reported in Emperor v.\n\nDaltatraya Shankar Paranjpe and another(') and Emperor v. Chimanlal Sankalchand(2) and rejected as untenable an opinion to the contrary expressed in some Allahabad cases and a single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in State v. Vardilal Natuchand, (Criminal Appeal No. 551 of 1964 decided on the 14th of January 1965).\n\n5. The argument raised before the High Court on behalf of the appellants has been reiterated before us by their learned counsel, Shri S. K. Dholakia, but on a consideration of the definition extracted above, we cannot agree with him. It is common ground between the parties that the present case is not covered by clause (i) of the definition, o that what has to be considered is the language of clause (ii) thereof.\n\nFor the applicability of the clause last mentioned, the following co\"liitions have to be fulfilled :-\n\n(1) Instruments of gaming must be kept or used in the premises in question.\n\n(2) The keeping or using of the instruments aforesaid must be for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such premises.\n\n(3) Such profit or gain may be by way of charge for the use of the premises or of the instruments or in any other manner whatsoever.\n\nWe fully agree with the High Court that the expression \"or otherwise howsoever\" is of the widest amplitude and cannot be restricted in its scope by the words immediately preceding it which Jay down that the profit or gain may be by way of charge for the use of the premises.\n\nIn this connection we may usefully quote from the judgment of Shah, Acting C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bene!. in Emperor v. Dattatraya Shankar Paran; pe, (Supra).\n\n\"It is essential for the prosecution under this definition to establish that instruments of gaming were kept or used in the house, room or place for profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping the house, room or place. It may be done by establishing that the persori did so either by a charge for use of the instruments of gaming or of the house, room or place, or otherwise howsoever. The <n 25 Bombay Law Reporter 1089 A.I.R. 1924 Bombay 184\n\n(2) 47 Bombay Law Reporter 75 A.I.R. 1945 Bombay 305. ·\n\nexpression \"otherwise howsoever\" appears to be very comprehensive, and does not suggest any limitation, such as is contended on behalf of the accused.\"\n\n.......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \"We have heard an interesting argument on the question as to how far the words justify the somewhat restricted meaning which has been put upon the definition by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court; and after a careful consideration cf the arguments urged on either side, and with great respect to the learned Judges, I have come to the conclusion that the words of the definition which we have to construe here would not have their full meaning if we were to accept the narrow construction.\n\nI do not think that on a proper construction of the definition the prosecution can be restricted for the purpose of proving that a particular honse, room or place is a common gaming house, to the twp\n\nalternatives mentioned in the case of Lachchi Ram v.\n\nEmperor('). It is sufficient if the house is one in which instruments of gaming are kept or used for the profit or gain of the person keeping or using such place, i.e., where the person keeping or using the house knows that profit or gain will in all probability resnlt from the use of the instruments of gaming.\n\nThe profit or gain may not actnally result from such use.\n\nBut if profit or gain is the probable and expected result of the game itself and if that is the purpose of keeping or using the instrnments, it would be .sufficient, in my opinion, to bring the case within the scope of the definition.\n\nAt the same time it is clear that the prosecution must establish that the purpose is profit or gain.\n\nThis may be done either by showing that the owner was charging for use of the instruments of gaming or for the use of the house, room or place, or in any other manner that may be possible under the circumstances of the case, having regard to the nature of the game carried on in that house.\"\n\nThe opinion of Shah, Acting C.J., was noted with approval in Emperor v.\n\nChimanlal Sankalchand (supra), the reasoning adopted in which may be reproduced with advantage:\n\nfJ \"Lachchi Ram's case was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Emperor v. Dattatraya (1923) 25 Bombay\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1922 All. 61.\n\n. ---r ,.\n\nf y\n\n' '\n\nLaw Reporter (1089) and was dissented from.\n\nIt was held that to constitute a common gaming house it was sufficient if it was one in which instruments of gamrng were kept or used for the profit or gain of the person keeping or using such place, i.e., where the person keeping or using the house knew that profit or gain would in all probability result from the use of the instruments of gaming.\n\nThe profit or gain may not actually result from such use.\n\nBut if profit or gain is the probable and expected result of the game itself and if that is (he purpose of keeping or using the instruments, it would be sufficient to bring the case within the scope of the definition.\n\n\"It is argued by Mr. Pochaji on behalf of the accused that even in that case it was observed that 'the prosecution must establish that the purpose was profit or gain and tha1 that might be done either by showing that the owner was charging for the use of the instruments of gaming or for the use of the room or place or in any other manner.' The words 'or in any otheamanner,' (which were used there instead of the words appearing at the end of the definition' ·•or otherwise howsoever') cannot be regarded as restricting the profit or gain of the owner or occupier of the house to profit or gain in a manner ejusdem genea-is with what pre- cedes those words, and hence even the hope of making a profit out of the gambling itself is suflicient to satisfy the -requirement of the definition of common gaming house. It may happen that the occupier of a house may allow it to be used by the public for gambling and he. himself may take part in it in the hope of making a profit, although he may not necessarily make it every time.\n\nSuch a hope is sufficient to make the house a common gaming house and the occupier liable for keeping such a house.\"\n\nWe fully agree with the interpretation of the definition of the te.rm \"'common gaming house\" occurring in section 3 of the Bombay Act as propounded in the two Bombay authorities cited above, as also iii the impugned judgment, that interpretation being in conformity with ihe unambiguous language employed by the legislature.\n\nThe opinion 'lo the contrary expressed in Lachchi Ram's case (supra) and in either\n\ndecisions is found to be incorrect.\n\n6. The learned counsel for the appellants concedes that if the interpretation placed on clause (ii) of the definition by the impugned judgment be upheld, t}le conviction of the appellants in the two appeals\n\nis well-founded.\n\nHowever, we ma}' state that there. is anothe.r go~' reason for up holding the conviction and that flows from the presumption which has to be raised under section 7 of the Bombay Act which> states:\n\n\"When, any instrument of gaming has been seized in any house, room of place entered under section 6 or about the person of any one found therein, and in the case of any other thing so seized if the conrt is satisfied that the Police Officer who entered snch house, room or place had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the thing so seized was an instrument of gaming, the seizur() of such instrument or thin, g shall be evidence, until the contrary is proved, that such house, room or place is used as a common gaming-house and the persons found therein were then present for th~ purpose of gaming, although no! gaming was actually seen by the Magistrnte or the Police Officer or by any person acting under the authority of either of them: ·\n\nProvided that the aforesaid presumption shall be made, notwithstanding any defect in th~ warrant or order in pnrc suance of which the house, room or place was eniered under section 6, if the Court considers the defect not to be a material one.'' It is not disputed that instruments of gaming were seized from the premises in question in both the appeals. That circumstances, according to the section, \"shall be evidence, until the contrary is proved, that such house, room or place is used as a comon gaming-l1ouse and the persons found therein were present for the purpose of gaming, although no gaming was actually seen .......... \" . The profit or gain mentioned in clause (ii) of the definition and also the other requirements of tliat clause are a matter of peremptory presumption which has to be raised by the court as soon as the seizure of instruments of gaming from the place in question is proved, as is the case here.\n\nAdmittedly, there is no evidence in reouttal of the presumption which must therefore be raised and which furnishes a good basis for the conviction of the appellants.\n\n7. In the result both the appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nf '", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "JAGAT SINGH KISHOR SINGH DARBAR ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGAT SINGH KISHOR SINGH DARBAR ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nFebruary 6, 1979\n\n[P. s. KAILASAM, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosiiAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. s. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 3(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 415, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 507, "end_char": 539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1398, "end_char": 1402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887", "statute": "Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dholakia and R. Ramachandran for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dholakia"}}, {"text": "R. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dholakia and R. Ramachandran for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4497, "end_char": 4508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Nayar and M. N. Shroff for the respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4513, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Nayar and M. N. Shroff for the respondents."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4592, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. By this judgment we shall dispose of Criminal Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4747, "end_char": 4758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "126 and 127 of 1972 both of which have been instituted on certificates granted under Article 134 (1 )( c) of the Constitution of India by the High Court of Gujarat against the judgment dated April 21, 1972 of a Division Bench of that Court upholding the conviction of each of the appellants under section 4 or section 5 of the Bombay Pr\"vention of Gambling Act 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act) and a sentence of imprisonment coupled with fine."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4959, "end_char": 4968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4972, "end_char": 4981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gambling Act 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act 1887"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act 1887"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5583, "end_char": 5592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act 1887"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act 1887"}}, {"text": "Himatnagar town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6029, "end_char": 6044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of Himatnagar town as a common gaming house and appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 6998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10672, "end_char": 10689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to this conclusion, the High Court relied upon two Division Bench judgments of the Bombay High Court reported in Emperor v.\n\nDaltatraya Shankar Paranjpe and another(') and Emperor v. Chimanlal Sankalchand(2) and rejected as untenable an opinion to the contrary expressed in some Allahabad cases and a single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in State v. Vardilal Natuchand, (Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10868, "end_char": 10877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to this conclusion, the High Court relied upon two Division Bench judgments of the Bombay High Court reported in Emperor v.\n\nDaltatraya Shankar Paranjpe and another(') and Emperor v. Chimanlal Sankalchand(2) and rejected as untenable an opinion to the contrary expressed in some Allahabad cases and a single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in State v. Vardilal Natuchand, (Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "14th of January 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11017, "end_char": 11037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "551 of 1964 decided on the 14th of January 1965)."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11175, "end_char": 11189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument raised before the High Court on behalf of the appellants has been reiterated before us by their learned counsel, Shri S. K. Dholakia, but on a consideration of the definition extracted above, we cannot agree with him.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dholakia"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12262, "end_char": 12266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection we may usefully quote from the judgment of Shah, Acting C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bene!."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13326, "end_char": 13346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard an interesting argument on the question as to how far the words justify the somewhat restricted meaning which has been put upon the definition by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court; and after a careful consideration cf the arguments urged on either side, and with great respect to the learned Judges, I have come to the conclusion that the words of the definition which we have to construe here would not have their full meaning if we were to accept the narrow construction."}}, {"text": "Lachchi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15075, "end_char": 15086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The opinion of Shah, Acting C.J., was noted with approval in Emperor v.\n\nChimanlal Sankalchand (supra), the reasoning adopted in which may be reproduced with advantage:\n\nfJ \"Lachchi Ram's case was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Emperor v. Dattatraya (1923) 25 Bombay\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1922 All."}}, {"text": "Pochaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15928, "end_char": 15935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"It is argued by Mr. Pochaji on behalf of the accused that even in that case it was observed that 'the prosecution must establish that the purpose was profit or gain and tha1 that might be done either by showing that the owner was charging for the use of the instruments of gaming or for the use of the room or place or in any other manner.'"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17160, "end_char": 17169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17881, "end_char": 17890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18015, "end_char": 18024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18844, "end_char": 18853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_340_354_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "TARINIKAMAL PANDIT AND ORS.\n\nPERFULLA KUMAR CHATTERJEE (DEAD) BY L.RS.\n\nFebruary 21, 1979\n\nI [V. R. KRISHNA IYER, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nPlea, which is a pure question of lalv taken for the first time may be permitted to be raised even at the last tier of appellate stage fn the Sr1preme Court.\n\nSuit against purchaser, non-n1aintainability on ground of purchase being C on behalf of plaintiff-Whether applies to an auction sale by a Receiver appointed under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code--Scope of section 66 of the C.P.C. read wlih Order XX/ Rule 82 and Order XL Rule I.\n\n\"Purchase certified by the Court\" in Section 66 refers only to 1he cirti ficate issued by the Court to the Purchaser under Order XXl Rule 94 C.P.C~.\n\nD The plaintiffs-appellants filed a suit against the defendants-respondents claiming their title on an unregistered document to the suit property and premises purchased by the latter through a sale by the Receiver under the orders of the Court, on the ground that they were co-owners thereof by virtue of the said document.\n\nThe trial conrt decreed the suit but th;?J High Court, on appeal, accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit.\n\nE Allowing the appeal by certificate, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. A pure question of la\"'' on the facts and circumstances of a case can be taken for the first time in the Supreme Court. [351 B-C]\n\n(a) In the instant case, the plea that \"as the title has vested in the respon dent by virtue of the confirmation of sale and the registered conveyance, the plaintiffs-appellants cannot rely on an unregistered document\" is a pure qucs tion of law not involving any investigation of the facts.\n\n[35IC-E]\n\nYaswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, [1950] S.C.R. 852 @ 861; Raia Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Rao v. State of Orissa [1956J S.C.R. 72; Seth Badri Prasad and Ors. v. Seth Nagarmal and Ors., [1959] Suppl. I S.C.R. 769 @ 773; State of U.P. and Anr. v. Anand Swarup, (1974] 2 S.C.R. 188; T. A. Appanda Mudaliar v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2459; applied.\n\n2. In a suit against the purchaser on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of plaintiff or on behalf of some one through whom the plaintiff c1aims, the plaintiff cannot succeed in displacing the title of the - defendant on the basis of the unregistered agreement. [352 C]\n\nff On the pleadings, in the instant case, the question of law raised cannot result in the suit being dismissed as not maintainable. The claim of the appellant as a real owner was not based on the unregistered agreement alone.\n\nTAiUN!KAMAL V. P. K. CHATTERJEE .341\n\nThe suit was basied on the plea that the suit property and the premises werA A purchased in ownership (i.e.) on the claim that the appellants-plaintiffs were the real owners of the property. [352 C-D]\n\nG. H. C. Arifi v. Jadunath Mazumdar Bo.hadur, Aferitin1e Electric Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies Ltd., ferred to.\n\nA.LR. 1931\n\nP.C. 79, A.LR. 1937 PC 114; re-\n\n3. Section 66 of the Civil Procedure Code prohibits any person claiming that a purchase certified by the Court in such manner as may be prescribed iu, favour of a person was made on behalf of the plaintiff. In order to invoke the prohibition it is necessary to establish that the person against whom the suit cannot be maintained is a person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court in such manner as may be prescrjbed. A certificate by the Court for the purchase in the manner prescribed is. therefore. C'sscntial. [353 B-C]\n\nThe word \"prescribed\" is defined under section 2(16) of the Civil Procedure Code, as meaning prescribed by Rules. The provision as to grant of a certificate by a court under a purchase is prescribed in Order 21. Order 21, Rules 64 to 73 prescribe the procedure relating to sale generally while Rules 82 to 103 prescribe the procedHre relating to sale of immovable property.\n\nWhen the Court makes an order confirming the aale under Order 21, Rule 92, the sale becomes \"'bgolute.\n\nAfter the sale becomes absolute under Rule 94 the Court shall grant a certificate specifying the properties sold and the name of the person who at the time of the sale i! declared to be the purchaser.\n\nSuch certificate is required to bear the day and the date on which the sale became absolute. (353 C-E]\n\nThe certificates by the Court referred to in Section 66 C.P.C. is a certificate under Order 21, Rule 94. The procedure envisaged for sale generally and sale of immovable property under Order 21 i~ sale by a public auction. S!le by a Court through the Receiver appointed by Court is not contemplated under these provisions. In a sale by a Receiver a certificate to the purchaser under Order 21, Rule 94, i~ not given by the Court. Therefore, the prohibition under Sec. 66 cannot be invoked in the case of a sale by the Receiver.\n\nA Receiver is appointed. under Order 40 Rule 1, and a property can be sold' by the Receiver on the directions of the Court even by private negotiations.\n\nThe requirement of Sec. 66 of the C.P.C., i~ a certificate by the Court as prescribed. Since Section 66 is not applicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question whether a ale by the Receiver under the Rules of the Calcutta High Court v; ould come within the purview of s. 66.\n\nSection 66 refers to execution of sales only and has 110 application to a sale held by a Receiver~ In this case, the conveyance Ex. 5 was in accordance with the original side Rule of the High Court. [353 E-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1626 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16-9-1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 209/66.\n\nS. N. Andley, K. C. Sharma, Prem Malhotra and Uma Datta for the appellant.\n\nA L. N. Sinha, G. S. Chatterjee, D. N. Mukherjee and D. P. Mukherjee\n\nfor the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment and Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is by plaintiff 1, legal representatives of plaintiff 2 and plaintiff 3 by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta against its judgment dismissing the suit.\n\nThe suit was filed by the plaintiffs for the declaration of each of the plaintiffs' title to the extent of I/4th share each and in all 3/4th for all the plaintiffs of the suit property and the premises with the findings that the suit property and the premises were purchased in co-ownership awarding the plaintiffs and the defendants equal I/4th share each in terms of the agreement dated 2.4.1960 and for partition of the suit property and premises in equal 1/4th share each and for a decree of Rs. 45,000 with further accruals by way of receipt of further rent till full realisation of the claim. In the alternative a decree for accounts of the dissolvr.d partnership on declaration of dissolution of the same and partition of the suit property and premises in equal 1/4th share to each of the plaintiffs and the defe'1dant by metes and bounds.\n\nThe defendant in his written statement denied the claim of the plaintiff and contended that the suit property was ne.ver purchased in coownership or that the plaintiffs were entitled to 3 /4th share. He contended that plaintiffs 2 and 3 advanced Rs. 10,000 each as loan and that they had no claim to the property he having purchased the property in court auction as the absolute owner.\n\nThe trial court decreed the suit.\n\nThe defendant preferred an appeal to the High Court which accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit.\n\nThe facts of the case may be shortly stated. The suit property in Darjeeling belonged to one Harbhajan Singh Wesal.\n\nHe executed a mortgage in favour of the Calcutta National Bank Ltd.\n\nThe bank instituted a suit against Harbhajan Singh Wesal for recovery of Rs. l ,82,4CJ3-11-3 and for enforcement of the mortgage. Pending suit the Calcutta National Bank was wound up and the High Court of Calcutta passed a decree against Harbhajan Singh and appointed the Official Liquidator of the Calcntta National Bank as Receiver of the mortgaged property including the suit properties. On 5-9-1959 a final decree was passed directing the sale of the mortgaged property including the suit properties at Darjeeling by public auction subject to confirmation by the Court.\n\nThe defendant Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee was interested in buying the property in Darjeeling. He was negotiating with the Receiver for\n\n\" -•\n\n',-\n\n-~-\n\n.:_\n\n• •\n\nTARINIKAMAL v. P. K. CHATTERJEE (Kailasam, J.) 343\n\nthe purchase of Darjeeling properties.\n\nOn 10.6.1959 he received a letter from D. N. Mukherjee Advocate advising him to give an offer to the Rece\\yer and on 22:6.59 the defendant obtained an engineering estim_ate and made an offer to the Receiver to purchase the property for .Rs. 32,000.\n\nOn 20.11.59 an advertisement appeared in the newspaper by P.W. 1, K. K. l{shetry, Solicitor of the bank, for auction of the suit property.\n\nTue property was auctioned on 15th December, 1959 and the defendant offered the highest bid for Rs. 30,000.\n\nOn the same day the defendant deposited Rs. 7,500/-. While the sale was awaiting confirmation by the High Court a higher offer was made by one Baidyanath Ga\"i and thereupon the defendant offered Rs. 40,000 which was accepted by the court and the sale in favour of the defendant was confirmed by the the High Court for a sum of Rs. 40,000 tm 19.1.60. The defendant deposited a sum of Rs. 2,500 in addition to Rs. 7,500 that had already\n\nben .::!...-posited.\n\nThe t.1e[cndant \\Vas granted,, three months' time for depositing the balance sum of Rs. 30,000. Tue defendant did not have funds to pay the bqlancc of Rs. 30,000 and had to raise the amount.\n\nOn 2.4.1960 an agreement was entered into between the three plaintiffs and the defendant.\n\nThe suit by the plaintiffs is mainly based on this agreement P-45 dated 2.4.60.\n\nTue agreement is signed by the three plaintiffs as well as by the defendant. ·. According tothe recital in the agreement the parties after learning from the notification in the newspaper of the sale of the suit proPerty agreed between themselves to call the bid jointly in co-o\\vnership in the nanie of the defendant and that in pursuance of the agreement the defendant was deputed to call the bid. Tue agreement further states that accordingly the defendant w1s. s, nt to Calcutta and the bid at the auctiort which was finally knocked down on 19.1.60 for a sum of Rs. 40,000 in the name of the defendant.· Tue agreement also provided that the plaintiffs and the defendants would be entitled to equal shares in the property. Another term of the agreeIIlent provided that the conveyance shall be drawn in the joint\n\nnames f the parties by obtaining kave from the High Court.\n\n On 7.4.60 the defendant executed two receipts Exs. 22 and 22A in 'favour of the second and the third plaintiffs respectively.\n\nIt is recited in the receipt that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 10,000 as the share of the purchase price of the property sold in public auction by the Official Liquidator in pursuance of the agreement amongst themselves. Though the receipt was typed in Darjeeling on 7.4.60 the defendant signed the receipt at Calcutta on 11-4-60; In the meantime en 8.4.60 the ddendant filed an application in the High Court of Calcutta praying that the time for completion of the sale be extended by three. months from 19-4-60 and the conveyance be executed in\n\n• n:\n\nfavour of the three plaintiffs and himself. On 11-4-60 a sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid to M. R. Kshetry. The request for the conveyance to be made in favour of the three plaintiffs and the defendant was given up and the court directed the execution of the conveyance in favour of the defendant alone. On 17-6-60.a conveyance was executed by the Registrar of the High Court and the Receiver in favwr of the defendant alone in pursuance of the order of the court dated 11-4-60.\n\nOn 2-1-61 the plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant calling upon him to partition the property and deliver their shares and render accounts. On 3-6-61 the plaint in the suit was filed.\n\nThe plaintiffs apart from oral evidence very strongly rely on three documents to prove that they are joint owners and are entitled to 3 /4th share in the suit property.\n\nThe first document is the agreement between the parties dated 2.4.60.\n\nThe second are two receipts dated 7.4.60 is'sued by the defendant in favour of plaintiffs 2 and 3.\n\nThe third document is the application filed by the defendant on 8-4-60 in the High Court praying that the conveyance may be effected in favour of the three plaintiffs and himself.\n\nThe case for the plaintiffs is that between 20th and 23rd November, 1959 there was an advertisement in the newspapers by the Official Receiver announcing the sale of the suit property. According to the plaintiffs the three plaintiffs and the defendant mutually agreed to call the bid jointly in co-ownership in the name of the defendant and to purchase the property in equal shares contributing equolly foe bid money and the other costs as might be. incurred for the conveyance of the property.\n\nIt was further agreed that the plaintiffs and defendaot would have equal share in the property. According to the plaintiffs in pursuance of the agreement the. defendant was sent to Calcutta where he bid on 15.12.59 for Rs. 30,000 and the bid was confirmed by the High Court on 19.1.60 for a sum of Rs. 40,000.\n\nOut of the bid money a sum of Rs. 7,500 was paid to the Receiver on 15.12.59 and a sum of Rs. '.!,500 on 19-1-60 and the balance of Rs. 30,000 on 11-4-60. In the meantime it is stated that the plaintiffs and the defendants considered i.t advisable to have the verbal agreement between them reduced to writing and thus the agreement dated 2.4.60 came into existence.\n\nAfter the full bid money was paid, the plaintiffs contributing equally, a deed of conveyance was executed on 17-6-60 and registered at Darjeeling.\n\nAccording to the mutual agreement the parties were entitled as cosharers to enjoy and occupy the suit property in co-ownership and were also e\"citled to income from them. It was further agre<d that the defendant would manage thei joint property for the co-owners of the property and the defendant would realise the .rents for and on behalf of the parties with liability to pay the respective shares\n\n·-\n\ni _x:\n\n,) •\n\nTARINIKAMAL v. P. K. CHATTERJEE (Kailasam, !.) 345\n\nto each of the plaintiffs.\n\nThe defendant, on the other hand, submitted that he was trying to purchase the suit property from the previous owner Harbhajan Singh by private negotiations before the proceeding was started for auction sale. The defendants efforts to purchase the property from the owner proved abortive and he decided to purchase the snit property in the auction sale when the property was advertised for sale. As the defendant was not acquainted with the procedure of court's sale he approached the first plaintiff for legal service and the first plaintiff gave directions as to how the defendant 'should proceed.\n\nThe defendant denied that he was sent by the plaintiffs to Calcutta for calling the bid.\n\nAccording to him he went of his own accord, attended the public auction on 15.12.59 and offered Rs. 30,000 for purchasing the property and when the bid was accepted he paid Rs. 7,500 and that money belonged to him alone. Eventually, the sale was confirmed in favour of the defendant for Rs. 40,.000 and he paid a sum of Rs. 2,500 in court to make up Rs. 10,000 i.e. one-fourth of the bid-amount all by himself.\n\nAs the defendant had to pay the balance of Rs. 30,000 and as he was in short of funds he approached the first plaintiff who was his lawyer and asked for his advice. As the time for payment of balance amount was fast approaching the defendant frantically tried to find a person who could advance him temporary loan of Rs. 20,000 which amount he needed for completing the purchase.\n\nAs he was not successful he. requested the first plaintiff to find from amongst his clients persons who could make temporary advance of the amount.\n\nAccording to the defendant in the first week of April, 1960 the first plaintiff informed the defendant that two of his clients, namely plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3, were agreeable to advanoe the requisite amount but in view of the provisions of Bengal Money Lenders' Act they were not willing to advance the amount unless some sort of safeguards were provided for and the transaction was not described as loan.\n\nThe first plaintiff drafted a document in the form of an agreement and the defendant signed it under the advice. and suggestion of the first plaintiff on the understanding that the document was not intended to be acted upon and was only to remain as a security for the loan and that the recitals in the said document do not represent the real nature of the transaction.\n\nThe defendant admitted that plaintiffs 2 and 3 advanced to the defendant a sum of Rs. 110,000 each by way of .loan and the defendant had to sign in their favour the documents acknowledging the receipt of the loan.\n\nThe defendant denied that the plaintiffs and the defendant contributed equally for payment of the bid money or in defraying the incidental costs in equal shares.\n\nThe defendant asserted that he alone paid the entire bid money and bore all the incidental expenses and that there was never any co-ownership or co-\n\npartnership. He submitted that as the conveyance was executed exclusively in his favour the plaintiffs had no right to the property.\n\nThe plaintiffs have sought to prove that the parties after learning from the notification in the newspaper of the sale of the property agreed betwem themselves to call the bid jointly in co-ownership in the name of the defendant and in pursuance of that agreement the defendant paid the deposit Further it is the plaintiffs' case that in pursuance of the agreement the defendant was sent to Calcutta where he bid at the auc;. tion which was finally knocked down for the benefit of all. The plaintiffs' claim that they contributed I/4th of the price of the property and the expenses i.e. Rs. 13,500 each.\n\nFurther, it was, contended by the plaintiffs that the bid by the defendant was for the benefit of the three plaintiffs and the defendant and that it was agreed that the conveyance should also be in favour of all of them.\n\nIt is seen from the evidence that the defendant was interested in buying the property alone before the advertisement appeared in the newspapers on 20-11-59 and 23-11-59. The defendant received Ex. V a letter dated 10-6-59 from D. N. Mukherjee advocate, advising him to give an offer to the Receiver so that he can place the matter to the court for an order for sale by private negotiation.\n\nSoon after, the defendant obtained an engineering estimate of the value of the property under Ex.\n\nM and in accordance with the valuation wrote Ex. L on 22 .6.59 to K. K.\n\nKshctry offering Rs. 32,000 for the property. On 15-12-79 the defendant went to Calcutta by himself and made a bid for Rs. 30,000 and deposited Rs. 7,500 of his money.\n\nThe plaintiffs admit that the entire deposit was, made by the defendant bnt pleaded that it was agreed that on accounts being taken the expenses will be shared by the plaintiffs.\n\nDue to a third party making a higher offer the defendant had to raise the bid for Rs. 40,000.\n\nIt is also not in dispute that the defendant by himself paid Rs. 2,500 over Rs. 7,500 already paid to make l/4th of the bid amount.\n\nThe bid for Rs. 40,000 was made by the defendant alone.\n\nOn behalf of the plaintiffs it is 'stated that 2 or 3 days after the advertisement appeared the defendant went to the first plaintiff and told him that he did not have sufficient funds and requested the first plaintiff to join him to purchase the property and that 2 or 3 days later plaintiff 3 and son of plaintiff 2 came' to first plaintiff and expressed their desire to purchase the property and the plaintiff advised them to purchase the property jointly with the defendant in shares.\n\nPlaintiff 3, Daluram Agarwala, deposing as P.W. 5 does not support this case. In crossexamination P.W. 5 stated that on November 24 or 25, 1959 he and one N. K. Aggarwala, who is the son of plaintiff No. 2, went to see thEl first\n\n~ r--x\n\n• , •-\n\nTARINJKAMAL v. P. K. CHATTERJEE (Kailasam, !.)\n\n3 J 7\n\nplaintiff. It was decided among them that the property would be pur .. . chased in the names of all the four of them, the plaintiffs and the defendant.\n\nHe would further say that the defendant on return from Calcutta towards the end of December, 1959 stated that the property had been purchased in the names of three plaintiffs and the defendant.\n\nIt is thus the case of P.W. 5 that the defendant was sent by all the three plaintiffs to bid on their behalf and that the defendant bid on behalf of all of them.\n\nP.W. 7, the son of the second plaintiff, would state that it was agreed that\n\nthe property would be bought in the name of the defendant and that there was no talk that it would be purchased in the names of all the four of them. It is rather inexplicable as to how plaintiffs 2 and 3 who wanted to buy the property separately for themselves agreed to purchase jointly for the benefit of all of them.\n\nIt i's also difficult to accept the plea that palintiffs 2 and 3 went to the first plaintiff who is an advocate and there agreed to purchase the property in equal shares between the defendant, first plaintiff and themselves.\n\nThe second plaintiff had an office in Calcutta and the Calcutta office had a Munim and three other partners in whom they had complete confidence.\n\nIn the circumstances it is strange that they wanted the first plaintiff to be a co-'sharer so that he could attend to all the legal questions.\n\nThere is no explanation as to why plaintiffs 2 and 3 who were independant businessmen would join to purchase the property.\n\nThe e.xplanation that the agreement was arrived at to keep the bid low is purile. The evidence discloses that the plaintiffs were taking active part in the transaction after 2.4.1960 while between November, 1959 when the advertisement appeared and the date of agreement, there was comparative quiet, which fact probablises that the plaintiffs were not taking any part in the activities of the defendant regarding the bid in the court auction of the property.\n\nThe dealings '\\ • of plaintiffs 2 and 3 show that they were dealing with the defendant at arms' length insisting on passing of a receipt for their payment of Rs.\n\n20,000 and accompanying the defendant and paying the money to the Receiver themselves. It is highly improbable that they would have deputed the first defendant to go and bid on their behalf. There is no explanation as to why their share of the bid of Rs. 30,000 or the subsequent bid for Rs. 40,000 was not paid by them.\n\nThe story that before the defendant bid for the property for Rs. 30,000 there was an agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant that the bid should be on behalf of all of them cannot be accepted .\n\n. The next questio~ at arises is whether the plaintiffs have proved their case th.at pla.mti!Is 1, 2 and 3 each of them paid Rs. 13,500, Rs. 10,000 bemg their share of the bid money and Rs. 3,500 towards expenses. The two receipts! Exs. 22 and 22A are acknowledgements by\n\nthe defendant of receipt of Rs. 1 o; ooo from each of the plaintiffs 2 and 3.\n\nThe defendant admits that he did receive Rs. 10,0-00 from each of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 bnt his case is that it is a loan.\n\nThere can be no doubt that •he defendant was paid Rs. 10,000 by each of the plaintiffs 2 and 3.\n\nThe case of the plaintiffs is that they paid in addition Rs. 3,500 each towards expenses.\n\nThere is no receipt for this extra payment.\n\nBut the plea on behalf of plaintiffs 2 and 3 is that the son of the second plaintiff paid Rs. 27,000 to the Receiver Kshetry personally representing the share of plaintiffs 2 and 3 of Rs. 13,500 each.\n\nWe, find it difficult to accept the story for plaintiffs 2 and. 3 were reluctant to part with Rs. 10,000 each without receipt even though the first plaintiff assured\n\nthat there was no need for a receipt.\n\nIn fact :he money was not parted with by them till the second plaintiff's son accompanied the defendant to Calcutta and paid it in person to the Receiver.\n\nIn such circumstances, it is not possible to accept the plea of plaintiffs 2 and 3 that they did not insist on a receipt for payment of Rs. 3,500 each.\n\nIn this connection, the evidence of P.W. 1 Kshetry that out of the sum of Rs. :.0,000 paid in cash Rs. 27,000 was handed over to him by Narendra Kumar Aggarwal and only the balance was paid by the defendant was relied on by the plaintiffs to show that the share of plaintiffs 2 and 3 of Rs. 13,500 ' each was paid.\n\nAccording to the defendant second plaintiff's son Narendra gave him Rs. 20,000 and he had Rs. 10,000 and he and Narendra counted Rs. 30,000 and handed over the sum of Rs. 30, C-OO to Kshetry, in the presence of the Judge.\n\nOn the evidence th~ High Court came to lhc conclusion that the money was counted by Ne.rendra and the defendant before it was paid to Kshetry and if Narendra handed to the Solicitor a sum of Rs. 2 7 ,000 after counting, the inferen:e <hat Rs. 27,000 belonged to plaintiffs is not justified.\n\nWe agree with the view taken by the High Court.\n\nWe therefore find that plaintiffs 2 and 3 have not proved that they paid Rs. 3,500 each towards the expenses.\n\nThe evidence relating to payment by the first plaintiff is even worse. According to the first plaintiff, who examined himself as P.W. 2, on 2nd April, 1960 when the agreement was signed he paid Rs. 10,000 as his share of purchase price and Rs. 2,500 towards cost, Rs. 12,500 in all in cash to the defendant.\n\nHe did not consider it necessary to take a receipt in view of the signed agreement which he thought was sufficient acknowledgment of the liability by the defendant. The first plaintiff was cross-examined about the availability of the sum with him.\n\nHe admitted that he had no accounts and that the payment of Rs .. 12.500 is not recorded any where. The first plaintiff would add that he paid another Rs. 1,000 by issuing a cheque in favbur of the third plaintiff with a direction that the third plaintiff should pay te\n\n> 'r -x\n\n• •\n\nTARINJKAMAL v. P. K. CHATTERJEE (Kailasam, J.) 349\n\n\"um of Rs. 1,000 to the defendant towards expenses. A cheque was no doubt drawn by the first plaintiff in favour of the third plaintiff but there is nothing to indicate that this amount was to be paid to\n\n*''\" dcfemiant. The third plaintiff did not obtain any receipt from the defendant. The High Court rightly rejected the plea on behalf of the first plaintiff that the proceeds of the cheque were paid to the defendant. On the record there is hardly any acceptable evidence for establishing the payment of Rs. 13,500 by the first plaintiff to the defendant or the paymc;1t of Rs. 3,500 each by the plaintiffs 2 and 3 to the defendant.\n\nThere is no explanation by the plaintiffs as to how the conveyance came to be registered in the name of the defendant only when the agreement was that it should be taken in the name of the three plaintiffs md the dclcnc1ant jointly.\n\nThe agreement contemplated taking of the conve:, ancc in the names of the three plaintiffs and the defendant and in fact the application made by the defendant to the court prayed that the sale be confirmed in favour of the three plaintiffs ancj the defendant and the conveyance issued in their joint names.\n\nBut the applica1 ion for confirmation in the joint names was not pre>~'cd and the conveyance was ultimately made in favour of the first defendant alone.\n\nThere is no explanation as to why the plaintiffs did not insist on the bid being confirmed in the names of all of them and the conveyance issued in their joint names. Equally on the side of the defendant there is no explamtion as to why he signed the agreement which povided tbat te sale should be for the benefit of all of them arnl as lo why he applied to the court praying for the confirmation of the sale in favour of all of them.\n\nNeither has the defendant denied receipt of Rs. 10,000 from each of the plaintiffs 2 and 3. There is no provision for payment of interest by the defendant to plaintiffs 2 and 3 for the sums advanced. If it had been loan simpliciter there could be no explanation for absence of provision for payment of interest. On a close analysis of the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendant we agree with the High Court that neither the version of the plaintiffs nor that of the defendant discloses the entire troth. The conclusion we arrive at on the evidence is that the plaintiffs have failed to prove any prior agreement before the defendant made his bids for Rs. 30,000 •nd later for Rs. 40,000 and paid the deposits amounting to Rs. 10,000 by himself. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 have failed to prove that they have paid Rs. 3,500 each towards expenses in addition to payment of Rs. 10,000 by each of them which is admitted. The first plaintiff has totally faiied in proving that he had paid any part of the consideration. On the side of the defendant there is no explanation as to why he subscribed to the\n\nagreement agreeing to share the property along with the three plaintiffs and for his applying to the court for confirmation of the sale in favour of all of them.\n\nNeither is there any explanation by him as to why plaintiffs 2 .md 3 advanced Rs. 20,000 without interest.\n\nTaking ail the circumstances into account we feel the irresistible inn ference is that the defendant having made the bid by himself later on found himself badly in need of money to pay the balance of the bid amount. In trying to find the money he sought the help of the plaintiffs and received paymeut of Rs. 20,000 from plaintiffs 2 and 3. The crucial question is whether this amount was received merely as a loan as contended by the defendant or given on the agreement that plain- C tiffs 2 and 3 should be entitled to a share each. The conduct of the defendant shows that while he badly needed the money he was not willing to share the property with them for the amount. Equally plaintiffs 2 and 3 wanted the share in the property for the money advanced by them. It is clear that the money was not advanced as a loan. It may be that the plaintiffs 2 and 3 were insisting on a hard bargain but D it cannot be denied in the circumstances in which the defcridar.t was placed that he had accepted it. The condition insisted upon by plaintiffs 2 and 3 might not have been fair but the agreement arrived at in the circumstances cannot be said to be due to undue influence. The relief to whkh the plaintiffs are entitled to under the agreement cannot\n\nbe denied. The High Court after observing that plaintiffs 2 and 3 whD' are businessmen would not have Jent a large sum of money without charging interest and that it is not likely that the plaintiffs would have been so chantable towards the defendant who was a stranger was of the view that it was not necessary to examine the defendant's financial position and record a finding on the point for the purpose of appeal.\n\nWhile holding that the defendant's version also does not disclose the entire truth the High Court held that that would not help the plaintiffs who have to prove the case they set up in the plaint. On the short ground that the agreement dated 2nd April, 1960 does not reflect the true nature of the transaction the High Court held that the suit must fail.\n\nWe are of the view that if the amount was not advanced as a loan but paid towards acquiring of a share in the property the relief cannot be denied. In the circumstances, the plaintiff\" 2 and 3 are entitled to I/4th share each in the property on their payment of their share of the expenses i.e. Rs. 3,500 each. The defendant has been in possession of the property ever since the purchase and the plaintiffs are entitled to their share of the rents collected by the defendant. We estimate the share of the rents collected for each of the plamtiffs at Rs. 25,000. The result is the appeal is allowed to the extent that there will be a decree for partition and separate possession of 1I4th share\n\n\" ,\n\n\"' I\n\n\"' ~\n\n• , l\n\nTARINIKAMAL v. P. K.\"CHATTERJEE (Kaila.mm, J.)\n\n35 I\n\neach of plaintiffs 2 and 3. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 will pay to the defendant\n\nR~. 3,500 each and interest at 10 per cent per annum from the date of the conveyance and receive Rs. 25,000 each from the defendant towards their share of the rent collected upto date. The first plaintiff will not be entitled to any relief and the suit so far as he is concerned is dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nBefore we conclude we will shortly refer to the question of law raised by Mr. L. N. Sinha on behalf of the defendant. He submitted that as the title in the property vested in the defendant by confirmation of the court sale and later by a registered conveyance, the plaintiffs cannot seek relief on the unregistered agreement Ex. 4 as conveying any title to them. This point was not taken in any of the courts below but learned counsel submitted that because it is a pure question of law not involving any investigation of facts and as it goes to the root of the matter the court may permit the point to be taken. In support of his contention that a pure question of law in the circumstances can be taken for the first time in this Court he relied on the decisions of this Court. in Yaswant Deorao Deshmukh v.\n\nWalchand Ramchand Kothari('), Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Dea v. The State of Orissa('), Seth Badri Prasad and Others v. Seth Nagarmal and Others('), State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Anand Swarup(4 ) and T. G. Appanda Mudaliar v. State of Madras(•). As the point raised is a pure question of law not involving any investigation of the facts, we permitted the learned counsel to raise the question. The plea of the learned counsel is that as the title has vested in him by virtue of the confirmotion of the sale and the registered conveyance the plaintiff cannot rely on the unregistered agreement. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Privy Council in G. H. C. Arif] v. Jadunath Majumdar Bahadur(•) and Maritime Electric Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies Ltd. (7). In G. H. C. Arif] v. Jadunath Majumdar Bahadur it was doubted whether the English equitable doctrine can be applied so as to modify the effect of an Indian statute.\n\nThe court expressed itself thus : \" .... but that an English equitable doctrine affecting the provisions of an English statute relating to the right to sue upon a contract, should be applied by analogy to such a 'statute as the Transfer of Property Act and with such a result as to create without any writing an interest which the statute says can only\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R. 852 at p. 861\n\n(2) [1956] S.C.R. 72\n\n(3) [1959] Supp. (I) S.C.R. 769 at 773\n\n(4) [1974] 2 S.C.R. 188\n\n(5) A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2450\n\n(6) A.LR. 1931 P.C. 79\n\n(7) A.LR. 1937 P.C. 114\n\n3-253SCI/79\n\nbe created by means of a registered instrument, appears to their Lordships, in the absence of some binding authority to that effect, to be impossible\".\n\nThe Court further observed : \"Their Lordships do not understand the dicta to mean that equity will hold people bound as if a contract existed, where no contract was in fact made : nor do they understand them to mean that equity can override the provisions of a statute and (where no registered document exists and no registrable document can be procured) confer upon a person a right which the statute enacts shall be conferred only by a registered instrument.\" In Meritime Electric Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies Ltd. (supra) the court observed : \" .... where as here the statute imposes a duty of a positivo kind, not avoidable by the performance of any formality, for the doing d the very act which the plaintiff seeks to do, it is not open to the defendant tCJ set up an estoppel to prevent it\". The decisions are clear that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in displacing the title of the defendant on the basis of the unregistered agreement. But this will not help the defrndant as the suit is based on the plea that the suit property and the premises were purchased in co-ownership i.e. on a claim that the plaintiffs were the real owners of the property.\n\nThe claims of the plaintiff as a real owner is not based on the unregistered agreement alone. On the pleadings in the case the question of law raised cannot result in the rnit being dismissed as not maintainable.\n\nThe sccor, d question the learned counsel raised was that the suit is barred under section 66 of the Civil Procedure Code. The trial court overruled the plea on the ground that although the sale in question is a court sale it is not according to the rules prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code but only according to the Rules of the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side.\n\nThe learned counsel submitted that the purpose of section 66, Civil Procedure Code, applies equally to court sales conducicd under Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Privy Council in Bishun Dayal v. Kesha Prasad and Anr. (I) where the only case pleaded by the plaintiff was that the person through whom he claimed derived his right to half of the village from the auction purchase having been made in part on his behalf by the auction purchaser, it was held that the claim was barred by section 66, Civil P10cedurc Code, inasmuch as no case independent of auction purchase and basing title upon subsequent possession was put forward in the plaint. Section 66 of the Civil Procedure Code runs as follows:-\n\n\"66(1). No suit shall be maintained against any persott claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court in such ----\n\n(!) A.LR. 1940 P.C. 202.\n\nTARINIKAMAL v. P. K. CHATTERJEE (Kailasam, !.) 353\n\nm.inner as may be prescribed on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or ou behalf of some oue through whom the plaintiff claims.\"\n\n(2) ' x x x x\n\ns. 66 prohibits any person claiming that a purchase certified by the court in such manner as may be prescribed in favour of a person was made on behalf of the plaintiff. In order to invoke the prohibition it is necessary to establish that the person against whom the suit cannot be maintaintd is a person claiming title under a purchase certified by\n\nthe court in such manner as may be prescribed. A certificate by the court for the purchase in the manner prescribed is therefore essential.\n\nThe word \"prescribed\" is defined under s. 2(16) of the Civil Procedure Code as meaning prescribed by Rules. The provisions as to grant of a certificate by a court under a purchase is prescribed in Order 21.\n\nOrder 21, Rules 64 to 73 prescribe the procedure relating to sale generally while Rules 82 to 108 prescribe the procedure relating to sale of immovable property. When the court makes an order confirming the sale under Order 21, Rule 92, the sale becomes absolute. After the sale becomes absolute under Rule 94 the court shall grant a certificate specifying the properties sold and the name of the person who at the time of the sale is declared to be the purchaser.\n\nSuch certificate is required to bear the day and the date on whlch the sale became absolute. The certificate by the court referred to in sec. 66 is a certificate under Order 21, Rule 94. The procedure envisaged for sale generally and sale of immovable property under Order 21 is sale by a public auction. Sale by a court through the Receiver appointed by court is not contemplated under these provisions. In a sale by a Receiver a certificate to the purchaser under Order 21, Rule 94, is not given by the Court. Therefore, the prohibition under sec. 66 cannot be invoked in the case of a sale by the Receiver. A Receiver is appointed under\n\nOrder 40, Rule 1, and a property can be sold by the Receiver on the directions of the court even by private negotiations. The requirement of s. -156 of the C.P.C. is a certificate by the court as prescribed. In this c:ise the conveyance Ex. 5 was in accordance with the original side Rules of the High Court. In the view we have taken that s. 66 is not\n\na_Pplicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question whether a sale by the Receiver under the Rules of the Calcutta High Court would come within the purview of s. 66. Section 66 refers to xecution of sales only and has no application to a sale held by a Receiver. In this view the objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendant has to be rejected.\n\nORDER\n\nWhen the Judgment was delivered in Court on 16th January, 1979, allowing the appeal to the extent that there will be a decree for partition and separate possession of one-fourth share each of plaintiffs 2 and 3, the parties expressed their desire to agree amongst themselves and divide the properties finally and report a settlement to that effect and prayed that the Court may be pleased to pass a decree in terms of the compromise.\n\nLeave was granted to the parties to enter into a compromise and report the matter to the Court for the passing of the decree in terms of the compromise. Accordingly the parties have entered into a compromise and have filed the compromise memo along with plans for passing of the final decree.\n\nAccordingly we direct that a decree be passed in terms of the compromise.\n\nS. R. . Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 111, "entities": [{"text": "TARINIKAMAL PANDIT AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TARINIKAMAL PANDIT AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PERFULLA KUMAR CHATTERJEE (DEAD) BY L.RS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PERFULLA KUMAR CHATTERJEE (DEAD) BY L.RS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 89, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 21, 1979\n\nI [V. R. KRISHNA IYER, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. 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N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5694, "end_char": 5706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, K. C. Sharma, Prem Malhotra and Uma Datta for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. C. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, K. C. Sharma, Prem Malhotra and Uma Datta for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Prem Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, K. C. Sharma, Prem Malhotra and Uma Datta for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Uma Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5740, "end_char": 5749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, K. C. Sharma, Prem Malhotra and Uma Datta for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5770, "end_char": 5783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, G. S. Chatterjee, D. N. Mukherjee and D. P. Mukherjee\n\nfor the Respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5785, "end_char": 5801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, G. S. Chatterjee, D. N. Mukherjee and D. P. Mukherjee\n\nfor the Respondent."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, G. S. Chatterjee, D. N. Mukherjee and D. P. Mukherjee\n\nfor the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "D. P. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, G. S. Chatterjee, D. N. Mukherjee and D. P. Mukherjee\n\nfor the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5915, "end_char": 5923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment and Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is by plaintiff 1, legal representatives of plaintiff 2 and plaintiff 3 by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta against its judgment dismissing the suit.", "canonical_name": "KAILASAM"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment and Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is by plaintiff 1, legal representatives of plaintiff 2 and plaintiff 3 by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta against its judgment dismissing the suit."}}, {"text": "Darjeeling", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7547, "end_char": 7557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit property in Darjeeling belonged to one Harbhajan Singh Wesal."}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Singh Wesal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7574, "end_char": 7595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit property in Darjeeling belonged to one Harbhajan Singh Wesal.", "canonical_name": "Harbhajan Singh Wesal"}}, {"text": "Calcutta National Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He executed a mortgage in favour of the Calcutta National Bank Ltd.\n\nThe bank instituted a suit against Harbhajan Singh Wesal for recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "Calcutta National Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending suit the Calcutta National Bank was wound up and the High Court of Calcutta passed a decree against Harbhajan Singh and appointed the Official Liquidator of the Calcntta National Bank as Receiver of the mortgaged property including the suit properties."}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7905, "end_char": 7920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending suit the Calcutta National Bank was wound up and the High Court of Calcutta passed a decree against Harbhajan Singh and appointed the Official Liquidator of the Calcntta National Bank as Receiver of the mortgaged property including the suit properties.", "canonical_name": "Harbhajan Singh Wesal"}}, {"text": "Calcntta National Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending suit the Calcutta National Bank was wound up and the High Court of Calcutta passed a decree against Harbhajan Singh and appointed the Official Liquidator of the Calcntta National Bank as Receiver of the mortgaged property including the suit properties."}}, {"text": "5-9-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8061, "end_char": 8069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5-9-1959 a final decree was passed directing the sale of the mortgaged property including the suit properties at Darjeeling by public auction subject to confirmation by the Court."}}, {"text": "Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8256, "end_char": 8281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee was interested in buying the property in Darjeeling."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8534, "end_char": 8549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10.6.1959 he received a letter from D. N. Mukherjee Advocate advising him to give an offer to the Rece\\yer and on 22:6.59 the defendant obtained an engineering estim_ate and made an offer to the Receiver to purchase the property for .Rs.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "22:6.59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8612, "end_char": 8619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10.6.1959 he received a letter from D. N. Mukherjee Advocate advising him to give an offer to the Rece\\yer and on 22:6.59 the defendant obtained an engineering estim_ate and made an offer to the Receiver to purchase the property for .Rs."}}, {"text": "20.11.59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8748, "end_char": 8756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20.11.59 an advertisement appeared in the newspaper by P.W. 1, K. K. l{shetry, Solicitor of the bank, for auction of the suit property."}}, {"text": "K. K. l{shetry", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8811, "end_char": 8825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20.11.59 an advertisement appeared in the newspaper by P.W. 1, K. K. l{shetry, Solicitor of the bank, for auction of the suit property."}}, {"text": "15th December, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue property was auctioned on 15th December, 1959 and the defendant offered the highest bid for Rs."}}, {"text": "Baidyanath Ga\"i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9137, "end_char": 9152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the sale was awaiting confirmation by the High Court a higher offer was made by one Baidyanath Ga\"i and thereupon the defendant offered Rs."}}, {"text": "19.1.60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9335, "end_char": 9342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000 tm 19.1.60."}}, {"text": "2.4.1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9647, "end_char": 9655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2.4.1960 an agreement was entered into between the three plaintiffs and the defendant."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10289, "end_char": 10297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s, nt to Calcutta and the bid at the auctiort which was finally knocked down on 19.1.60 for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "7.4.60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10695, "end_char": 10701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7.4.60 the defendant executed two receipts Exs."}}, {"text": "11-4-60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11148, "end_char": 11155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the receipt was typed in Darjeeling on 7.4.60 the defendant signed the receipt at Calcutta on 11-4-60; In the meantime en 8.4.60 the ddendant filed an application in the High Court of Calcutta praying that the time for completion of the sale be extended by three."}}, {"text": "8.4.60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11176, "end_char": 11182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the receipt was typed in Darjeeling on 7.4.60 the defendant signed the receipt at Calcutta on 11-4-60; In the meantime en 8.4.60 the ddendant filed an application in the High Court of Calcutta praying that the time for completion of the sale be extended by three."}}, {"text": "19-4-60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11330, "end_char": 11337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "months from 19-4-60 and the conveyance be executed in\n\n• n:\n\nfavour of the three plaintiffs and himself."}}, {"text": "M. R. Kshetry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11466, "end_char": 11479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30,000 was paid to M. R. Kshetry."}}, {"text": "17-6-60.a", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11680, "end_char": 11689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17-6-60.a conveyance was executed by the Registrar of the High Court and the Receiver in favwr of the defendant alone in pursuance of the order of the court dated 11-4-60."}}, {"text": "2-1-61", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11856, "end_char": 11862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2-1-61 the plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant calling upon him to partition the property and deliver their shares and render accounts."}}, {"text": "3-6-61", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12003, "end_char": 12009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3-6-61 the plaint in the suit was filed."}}, {"text": "2.4.60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first document is the agreement between the parties dated 2.4.60."}}, {"text": "8-4-60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12450, "end_char": 12456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third document is the application filed by the defendant on 8-4-60 in the High Court praying that the conveyance may be effected in favour of the three plaintiffs and himself."}}, {"text": "20th and 23rd November, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12611, "end_char": 12639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the plaintiffs is that between 20th and 23rd November, 1959 there was an advertisement in the newspapers by the Official Receiver announcing the sale of the suit property."}}, {"text": "15.12.59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13269, "end_char": 13277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "defendant was sent to Calcutta where he bid on 15.12.59 for Rs."}}, {"text": "19-1-60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13479, "end_char": 13486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".!,500 on 19-1-60 and the balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "17-6-60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13850, "end_char": 13857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the full bid money was paid, the plaintiffs contributing equally, a deed of conveyance was executed on 17-6-60 and registered at Darjeeling."}}, {"text": "20-11-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18432, "end_char": 18440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is seen from the evidence that the defendant was interested in buying the property alone before the advertisement appeared in the newspapers on 20-11-59 and 23-11-59."}}, {"text": "23-11-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18445, "end_char": 18453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is seen from the evidence that the defendant was interested in buying the property alone before the advertisement appeared in the newspapers on 20-11-59 and 23-11-59."}}, {"text": "10-6-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18499, "end_char": 18506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V a letter dated 10-6-59 from D. N. Mukherjee advocate, advising him to give an offer to the Receiver so that he can place the matter to the court for an order for sale by private negotiation."}}, {"text": "22 .6.59 to", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18829, "end_char": 18840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L on 22 .6.59 to K. K.\n\nKshctry offering Rs."}}, {"text": "K. K.\n\nKshctry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18841, "end_char": 18855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L on 22 .6.59 to K. K.\n\nKshctry offering Rs."}}, {"text": "15-12-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18897, "end_char": 18905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-12-79 the defendant went to Calcutta by himself and made a bid for Rs."}}, {"text": "Daluram Agarwala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19985, "end_char": 20001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plaintiff 3, Daluram Agarwala, deposing as P.W. 5 does not support this case."}}, {"text": "November 24 or 25, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20092, "end_char": 20115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In crossexamination P.W. 5 stated that on November 24 or 25, 1959 he and one N. K. Aggarwala, who is the son of plaintiff No."}}, {"text": "N. K. Aggarwala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20127, "end_char": 20142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In crossexamination P.W. 5 stated that on November 24 or 25, 1959 he and one N. K. Aggarwala, who is the son of plaintiff No."}}, {"text": "Kshetry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23804, "end_char": 23811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27,000 to the Receiver Kshetry personally representing the share of plaintiffs 2 and 3 of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kshetry", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24447, "end_char": 24454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the evidence of P.W. 1 Kshetry that out of the sum of Rs. :"}}, {"text": "Narendra Kumar Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24540, "end_char": 24563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27,000 was handed over to him by Narendra Kumar Aggarwal and only the balance was paid by the defendant was relied on by the plaintiffs to show that the share of plaintiffs 2 and 3 of Rs."}}, {"text": "Narendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24770, "end_char": 24778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the defendant second plaintiff's son Narendra gave him Rs."}}, {"text": "Ne.rendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25027, "end_char": 25036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evidence th~ High Court came to lhc conclusion that the money was counted by Ne.rendra and the defendant before it was paid to Kshetry and if Narendra handed to the Solicitor a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd April, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25535, "end_char": 25550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the first plaintiff, who examined himself as P.W. 2, on 2nd April, 1960 when the agreement was signed he paid Rs."}}, {"text": "Kailasam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26271, "end_char": 26279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 by issuing a cheque in favbur of the third plaintiff with a direction that the third plaintiff should pay te\n'r -x\n\n• •\n\nTARINJKAMAL v. P. K. CHATTERJEE (Kailasam, J.) 349\n\n\"um of Rs.", "canonical_name": "KAILASAM"}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32722, "end_char": 32733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we conclude we will shortly refer to the question of law raised by Mr. L. N. Sinha on behalf of the defendant."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34655, "end_char": 34679, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 S.C.R. 188", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34880, "end_char": 34899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36597, "end_char": 36607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36941, "end_char": 36951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36953, "end_char": 36973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37022, "end_char": 37105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37469, "end_char": 37479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules", "statute": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37630, "end_char": 37640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules", "statute": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38065, "end_char": 38070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules", "statute": "Rules of Civil Procedure Code as well as those conducted under the High Court Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 2(16)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38596, "end_char": 38604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rules 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38765, "end_char": 38783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38983, "end_char": 39000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39368, "end_char": 39375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39399, "end_char": 39416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39697, "end_char": 39714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39776, "end_char": 39783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 40, Rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39872, "end_char": 39888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40028, "end_char": 40033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40212, "end_char": 40217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40410, "end_char": 40415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pplicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question whether a sale by the Receiver under the Rules", "statute": "Pplicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question whether a sale by the Receiver under the Rules"}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40417, "end_char": 40427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pplicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question whether a sale by the Receiver under the Rules", "statute": "Pplicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question whether a sale by the Receiver under the Rules"}}, {"text": "16th January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40661, "end_char": 40679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ORDER\n\nWhen the Judgment was delivered in Court on 16th January, 1979, allowing the appeal to the extent that there will be a decree for partition and separate possession of one-fourth share each of plaintiffs 2 and 3, the parties expressed their desire to agree amongst themselves and divide the properties finally and report a settlement to that effect and prayed that the Court may be pleased to pass a decree in terms of the compromise."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_355_372_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "\\ • .)( \"\n\n' •\n\nBISHNU DEO SHAW@ BISHNU DAYAL A\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 22, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J B\n\nDemand of death for murder, rationale of section 302 I.P.C. vis-a-vis- Section 354(3) of the Crl. P.C. 1973-\"Special Reason:/', meaning of-Section 354(3) 360. 361 of Crl. P.C.-Scope of.\n\nThe appellant was convicted by the Additional Session's Judge Alipore for the murder of his son 00.d sentenCed to death. The reason given by the C Sessions Judge was that the murder was \"cruel and brutal\" and that the facts showed the \"grim determination\" of the accused to kill the deceased. The Sessions Judge made no reference to the motive of the accused for the commission of the murder. The High Court while confirming the conviction and sentence observed that the accused had previously murdered his wife, suspecting her infidelity that the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him for the\n\nmurer of his wife had no sobering effect, that he suspected that the deceased D in the present case was not his own son and so he murdered him without any mercy or remorse, and that he, therefore deserved no mercy.\n\nAllowing the appeal by special leave limited to the question of sentence, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. There were no \"special reasons\" justifying the imposition of the E death penalty. [3 71 Fl\n\n(a) The Sessions Judge was wrong in imposing the sentence of death without even a reference to the reason v\"hy the appellant comn1itted the murder.\n\n[371 CJ\n\n(b) The observation of the High Court that the appellant deserved no mercy because he showed no mercy smacks very much of punishment by way of retribution.\n\n[371 CJ\n\n(c) From the evidence, it is clear that the appellant 'Whs a moody person who had for years been brooding over the suspected infidelity of his wife and the injury of having a son foisted on him. The mere use of adjectives like \"cruel and brutal\" does not supply the special reasons contemplated by section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. [3.710-E]\n\nRajendra Prasad v. State of Utrar Pradesh, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 78, applied.\n\n2. \"Special reasons 1 ' are reasons which are special with reference to the offender, with reference to constitutional and legislative directives and with reference to the times, that is, with reference to contemporary ideas in the\n\nfields of criminology and connected sciences. Special reasons are those H which lead inevitably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemp tion, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the legislative\n\npolicy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made in the methods of treatment etc. Section 354(3) of the 1973 Code has narrowed the discretion of sentence for murder. Death sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be imposed for \"Special reasons\".\n\nJudges are left with the task of discovering \"special reasons\".\n\n[368 D-E. 370E-F]\n\n(a) Apart from Section 354(3), there is another prov1s1on in the Code which also uses the significant expression \"Special reasons.\". It is Section 361, Section 360 of the 1973 Code re-enacts, in substance, Section 562 of ~16 1898 Code and provides for the release on probation of good conduct or after admonition any person not under twenty-one years of age who is COn• victed of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or any person under twentyone years of age or any woman who is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, if no previous offence is proved against the offender, and if it appears to the Court having regard to the age, character or antec-e dents of the offender, and to the circunlStances in which the offellce was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be re1eased on proba tion of good conduct or after admonition. If the Court refrains from den.I ing with an offen<Jer under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Pro bation of Offenders Act, or any other law for the treatment, training, or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where the Court could have done, so, Section 361, which is a new provision in the 1973 Code makes it tnendatory for the Court to record in its judgment the \"Special reasons\" for not doing so. Section 361 thus casts a duty upon the Court to apply the prov1s1ons of Section wherever it is possible to do so and, to state \"special reasons\" it it does not do so. [368F-H, 369A-Bl\n\n(b) In the context of Section 360, the \"Special reasons\" contemplat'd by Section 361 must be such as to compel the Court to hold that it is iin possible to reform and rehabilitate the offenders, after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. This is some indication by the Legislature that reformation and rehabilitation of offenders, and not mere deterrence are now among the foremost objects of the administration of criminal justice in our country. Section 361 and Section 354(3) have both entere_d the Statute Book at the same time and they are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the Indian Parliament of the new trends in criminology. Therefore, the personality of the offender as revealed by his age1 character, antecedents and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender to reform must necessarily play the most prominent role in determin~ ing the sentence to be awarded.\n\nSpecial reasons must have some relation to. these factors.\n\n(369B-EJ\n\n3. Criminal justice is not a computer machine. It deals with con1plex-. human problems and diverse 1 human beings.\n\nIt deals with persons who areotherwise like the rest of us, who work and play, who laugh and mourn, whe> love and hate, who yearn for affection and approval, as all of us do, who think learn and forget. Like the rest of us they too are the creatures of circumstances. Heredity, environment, home neighbourhood, upbringing, school, friends, associates, even casual acquaintences, the books that one reads, newspapers, radio and TV, the economics of the household, the opporr ,\n\nBISHNU DEO V. WEST BENGAL 357\n\ntunities provided by circumstances and the calarnaties resulting therefrom the A success and failure of one's undertakings the affairs of the heart, ambitions and frustrations, the ideas and ideologies of the time, these and several other ordinary and extra-ordinary incidents of life contribute to a person's personality and influence his conduct. Differently shaped and differently circumstanced indivi duals reaoet differently in given situations. A judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the circumstances the situations and the reaction~ and choose the appropriate sentence to be imposed.\n\nA judge must try tO 3.nswcr a myriad question such as was the offence comn1itted without premeditation or was it after due deliberation ? What was the motive for the criwe '! \\Va-s it for, gain ? Was it the outcome of a village feud ? Was it the result of a petty drunken, street brawl, or a domestic bickering between a helpless husband and a helpless wife ? Was it due to sexua-1 jealousy ? Was the n1u:·<ler committed under some stress, emotional or otherwise ? What is the background of the offende( ? What is his social and economic status ? What is the level of his education or intelligence ? Do his actions betray a particularly callous indifference towards the welfaire of society, or on the other hand, do they show a great concern for humanity and are in fact inspired by such concern ? Is the offender so perpetually and constitutionally at \\Var \\Vith society that there is no hope of ever reclaiming him from being a n1enace to society ?\n\nOr is he a person who is patently amenable to reform ? [369 E-H, 370 A-CJ\n\n(a) Judges in India have the discretion to impose or not to in1pose the death penalty.\n\nIt is one of the great burdens \\Vhich judges in this country have to carry.\n\nIn the past, the reasons which \\veighed in the matter of awardin:; or not awarding the sentence of death varied widely a-nd there was certainly room for complaint that there was unequal t:lpplication of the law in the matter of imposition of the sentence of death.\n\n{367C-D]\n\n(b) There cannot be any higher basic human right than the right to life and there can not-be anything more offensive to human dignity than a violation of that right by the infliction of the death penalty. It is in the light of the right to life as a basic concf1'.()t of human dignity, in the conb!xt of the unproven efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent and in the background of modern theories of criminology based upon progress in the ·!jeJds of science, medicine, psychiatry and sociology and in the setting of the march of the movement for abolition of Capital Punishment, that Judges in India arc required to decide\n\n\\Vhich sentence to impose in a case of murder, death or imprisonn1ent fer life?\n\n[3660, 367B-C]\n\nFurman v. Georgia, 33 Lawyers Edn. 2nd Series 346 1eferred to.\n\n( c) Realising that discretion, even judicial_, 1nust proceed along. perceptive lines, but, conscious, all the same that such discretion cannot be reduced to formulate or put into pigeon-holes, this Court has ben at great pain ever since Ediga-Annamma to point out the path along which to proceed. In the latest pronouncement of this Court in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U11ar Pradesh, several relevant principles have been enunciated to guide the exercise of discretion in making the choice betv.een the penalties of death ~:nd Jife-imprisonment.\n\n[367F-G]\n\nEdiga Annamma v. State of A.P. [1974] S.C.C. 443, Rajendra Prasad v.\n\nState of U.P. [1979] 3 SCR 78 referred to.\n\n4. Among the several theories of punishment the reformative theory is irrelevant where death is the punishment since life and not death can reform; the preventive theory is unimportant \"'here the choice, is between death and life imprisonment las in India; the retributive theory is incongruous in an era of enlightenment and inadequate as a theory since it does not attempt to justify punishment by any beneficial results either to the society or to the person punished. Equally, the denunciatory theory is as inadequate as the retributive theory since it does not justify punishment by its results.\n\n[359H, 360AwB,\n\n36!BJ\n\n5. (a) The very nature Of the penalty of death makes it imperative that at every suitable opportunity life imprisonment should be preferred to the death penalty.\n\n[359E]\n\nFurman v. Georgia, 33 L.ed. 2nd Edn. 346; relied on.\n\n(b) AU studies made on the subject whether capital punishnlent is the most desirable and most effective instrument for protecting the community fr01:.1 violent crime than other penalties say, a sentence of imprisonment for long terms, have led to the conclusion that the death penalty is inconsequential as a deterrent. [361 F]\n\n( c) There is no positive indication that the death penalty has been deterrent.\n\nIn other words, the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent is unproven.\n\n[365A]\n\n6. The death penalty, rather than deterring murder, actually deters the proPer administration of criminal justice. [365 A-B]\n\n(a) There is the absolute finality and irrevocability of the dearh penalty.\n\nHuman justice1 can never be infallible. The most conscientious judge is no E proof against any mistakes. Cases are unknown where innocent persons haye been hanged in India and elsewhere.\n\n[365B-C]\n\n(b) Some Judges and Jurists have an abhorrence of the death penalty that they would rather find a guilty person not guilty than send even a guilty perscn to the gallows. The refusal of juries to convict persons of murder because of the death penalty is a well known phenomenon throughout the world.\n\nA. perusal of some of the judgments of the Superior Courts in India. dealing with cases where Trial Courts have imposed sentence of death reveals the same reluctance to convict because the result would otherwise be to confirm the sentence of death. Thus a guilty person )s prevented from conviction by a possibility that a death penalty may otherwise be the result.\n\n(365C-D]\n\n(c) Yet a more 'grievious injury' which the death penailty inflicts on the administration of Criminal Justice is that it rejects reformation and rehabilitation G of offenders as among the most important objectives of Criminal Justice, though the conscience of the World Community spelaking through the voices of the Legislature of several countries of the world has accepted reforma•tion ard\n\nrehabilitation as among the basic purposes of Criminal Justice.\n\nDeath penalty is the broOOing giant in the part of reform and treatment of Crime and Crimiilals, 'inequitably sabotaging any social or institutional programme tO reformation'.\n\nIt is the 'fifth column' in the administration of criminal justic:e.\n\n[365E-GJ\n\n( d) There is also the compelling class complexion of the death penalty.\n\nA tragic by-product of social and economic deprivation is th.Qt the 'have-nots'\n\nin every society always have been 5Ubject to grea¢:er pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more afiluent fellow citizens. So, the burden -0f capital punishment falls more frequently upon the ignorant, the improverished and the underprivilege. [365 G-H]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimihal Appeal No. 70 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-2-1978 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1976 and death Reference No. 4/76.\n\nH. C. Mittal (Amicus Curiae) for the Appellaitt.\n\nG. s. Chatterjee for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-\"The murderer has killed. It is wrong to kill. Let us kill the murderer\". That was how a Mr. Bonsall of Manchester (quoted by Arthur Koestler in his 'Drinkers of Infinity'), in a letter\n\nto the Press, neatly summed up the paradox and the pathology of the D Death Penalty.\n\nThe unsoundness of the rationale of the demand of -Oeath for murder has been discussd and exposed by my brother Krishna Iyer, J., in a recent pronouncement in Rajendra Prasad v ..\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(').\n\nI would like to add an appendix to what bas been said there.\n\nThe dilemma of the Judge i'n every murder case, \"Death or life imprisonment for the murderer ?\" is the question with which we are faced in this appeal.\n\nThe very nature of the penalty of death appears to make it imperative that at every suitable opportunity life imprisonment should be preferred to the death penalty. \"The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, uot ih degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpooe of criminal justice.\n\nAnd, it is unique finally in its absolute re nuhciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity\" (per Stewart J., in Furman v. Georgia) (2). \"Death is irrevocable, life imprii; onment is not.\n\nDeath, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible, 1ife imprisonment doos not\" (per Marshall, J., in Furman v.\n\nGeorgia).\n\nI' Theories of punishment, there are many reformative, preventive, retributive, denunciatory and debrre'nt. Let us examine which cap .fits capital punishment.\n\nThe reformative theory is irrelevant where H\n\n~ y\n\n\nA death is the punishment since life and not death can reform.\n\nThe preventive theory is unimportant where the choice is between death and life imprisonment as in India.\n\nThe retributive theory is incongruous in an era of enlightenment.\n\nIt is inadequate as a theory sinoe it does not attempt to justify punishment by any beneficial results either to the society or to the persons punished.\n\nIt is, however, hecessary to clear a common misnnderstanding that the retributive theory justifies the death penalty. According to the retributivist society has the right and the duty to vindicate the wrong done to it and it must impose a punishment which fits the crime. It does not mean returning of evil for evii but the righting of a wrong.\n\nIt implies the imposition of a just but no more than a jnst penalty and automatically rules out execessive punishment and, therefore, capital punishment.\n\nAccording to a modern exponent of the v::tributive theory of justice \"capital punishmeht . . . . . . is without foundation in a theory of just punishment.\n\nIndeed one could go further and assert that capital punishment is antithetical to the purposes. and principles of punitive sanctions in the law.\n\nRequital, when properly understood in terms of a concept of just law, undoubtedly does have a legitimate roe in punishment.\n\nHowever, neither requital nor punishment in general is a returning of evil for evil, and, theP::fore, I see no support for the demand that a murder (or an act of treason, or some other serious offence) be paid for with a lifo\".\n\nThe Biblical injunctioh 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' is often quoted as if it was a command to do retributive justice. It was not.\n\nJewish history shows that it was meant to be merciful and set limits to harsh punishments which were imposed earlier including the death penalty for blasphamy, Sabbath breaking, adultery, false prophecy, cursing, striking a parent etc. And, as one abolitionist reminds us, who, one \"' may ask, remembers the voice of the other Jew : \"Whoever shall smite on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also ?\".\n\nThe d•::nunciatory theory of punishment is only a different shade of the retributive theory but from a sternly moral plain.\n\nLord Den- G ning advahced the view before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment : \"The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the .great majority of citizens for them- It is a mistake to consider the obj•::cts of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. The ultimate justification of a'ny punishment is not that it is a deterrent but that it H is th:: emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime, and from this point of view them are some murders which in the present state of opinion demand the most emphatic denunciation of all, namely the\n\n• ..\n\n., I\n\ndeath penalty\" . . . . . . \"The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not\".\n\nThe implication of this statement is that th•c death penalty is necessary not because the preservation of society requires it but because society demands it.\n\nDespite the high moral tone and phrase, the dennnciatory theory, as propounded, is nothing but an echo of the retributive theory as explained by Stephen who had said earlier : \"The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite\".\n\nThe denunciatory theory is as inade-. quate as the retributive theory since it does not justify punishment by its results.\n\nAs Prof.\n\nHart points out the idea that we may puhish offenders not to prevent harm or suffering or even the reptition of the offence but simply as a means of emphatically expressing our con~ demnation, is uncomfortably close to human sacrifice as an expression of righteousness.\n\nAnd, the qu•ostio'n remains : \"Why should denunciation take the form of punishment\".\n\nThe deterrent theory may now be considered.\n\nIt is important to notice here that the question is not whether the penalty of death, hai;; deterrent effect on potential murderers but whether it deters morecffectively than other. penalties say, a sentence of imprisonment for a long term ? Is Capital Punishment the most desirable and the most effective instrument for protecting the community from violent crime?\n\nWhat is the evidence that it has a uniquely deterrent force compared with the alternative of protracted imprisonment? If the death penalty really and appreciably decreases murder, if there is equally no effective substitute and if its incidents are not injurious to society, we may well support the death penalty.\n\nBut all studies mad•c on the subject, as I will presently point out, appear to have led to the conclusion that the death penalty is inconsequential as a deterrerrt.\n\nSir James Fitz James Stephen, a great Victorian Judge and a vigorous expo'nent of the deterrent theory said in his Essay on Capital Punishment : \"No other punishment of death.\n\nThis is one of those committing crimes as the punishment of death.\n\nThi; is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof can make them.\n\nIt is possible to display ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all.\n\nThe who'•' experie'nce of mankind is in the other direction.\n\nThe threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute necessity of producing some results ...... No one goes to certain inevitable death except by compulsion.\n\nPut the\n\nmatter the other way, was there ever yet a criminal who when sentenced to death and brought out to die would refuse the offer ol' a commutati<in of a sentence for a severest secondary punishment ?\n\nSurely not.\n\nWhy is this? It can only be because 'all that a man has will be given for his life''. In any secondary punishment however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly\".\n\nStephen's statement was admittedly a dogmatic assertion since he himself stated that it was a proposition difficult to prove though according to him, self evident.\n\nThe great fallacy in the argument of Stephen has been pointed out by several criminologists.\n\nStephen makes no distinction between a threat of certain and imminent punishment which faces the convicted murderer and the threat of a different problamatic punishment which may or may not influence a potential murderer.\n\nMurder may be unpremeditated, under the stress of some disturbing emotior: or it may be premeditated after planning and deliberation.\n\nWhere the murder is premeditated any thought of possibility of punishment. is blurred by emotion and the penalty of death can no more deter than any other penalty.\n\nWhere murder is premedit~, ted the offender disregards the risk of punishment because he thinks there is no chance of detection.\n\nWhat weighs with him is the uncertainty of detection and consequent punishment rather than the nature of the punishment.\n\nThe Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders appointed by the Government of Great Britain stated in their report in 1960 \"We were impressed by the argument that the greatest deterrent to crime is not the fear of punishment, but the certainty of detection\".\n\nProf. Hart countered Stephen's argument with these observations: 'This (Stephen's) estimate of the paramount place in human motivation of the fear of death reads impressively but surely contaim a suggestio falsi and once this is detected its congency as an argument in favour of the death penalty for murder vanishes for there is really no parallel between the situation of a convicted murderer over the alternative or life imprisonment in the shadow of the gallows and the situation of the murderer contemplating his crime.\n\nThe certainty of death is one thing, perhaps for normal people nothing can he compared with it.\n\nBut the existence of the death penalty does not mean for the murderer certainty of death now. It means not very high probability of death in the future.\n\nAnd, futurity and uncertainty, the hope of an escape, rational or irrational lastly diminishes the difference between death and imprisonment as deterrent, and may diminish to vanishing point ....... The way in which the convicted\n\nI r\n\n\")(\n\n~ • ' •\n\nmurderer may view the immediate prospect of the gallows after he has been caught must be a poor guide to the effect Of this prospect upon him when he is contemplating committing his crime\".\n\nA hundred and fifty years ago a study was made by the Joint Selec.t Committee appointed by the General Assembly of Connecticut and they reported \"Your Committee do not hesitate to express their firm belief that a well devised system of imprisopment, one which should render the punishment certain and perpetual would be far more effectual to restrain from crime than punishment of death''.\n\nOne of the most comprehensive enquiries ever undertaken on the subject was that made by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.\n\nThe Commission visited several countries of Europe and the United States, addressed qnestionnaires to many other couutries in search of information and examined celebrated experts and jurists. The Commission's conclusions are of significance.\n\nThey said: \"There is no clear evidence in any of the figures we have examined that the abolition of Capital Punishment has led to an increase in the homicide rate, or that its reintroduction to a fall ....... prima fade the penalty 0f death is likely to have a stronger effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of punishment and there is some evidence (though no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so.\n\nBut its effect does not operate universally or unifonnly and there are many offenders on whom it is limited and may often be negligible. It is accordingly important ta view this question in just perspective and not ta base a penal policy in relation to murder an exaggerated estimates of the uniquely deterrent farce of the death penalty\".\n\nProf. Thorsten Sellin who made a serious and thorough study of the entire subject in the United States on behalf of the American Law In, stitute stated his conclusion: \"Any one who carefully examines the above data is bound to arrive at the conclusion that the death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence on the extent or fluctuating rate of capital crime. It has failed as a deterrenf'.\n\nIn 1962 statistics were compiled and a report was prepared at the instance Qf the United Nations Economic and Social Council on the question of Capital Punishment, the laws and practices relating thereto and the effects of capital punishment and the abolition thereof on the rate of criminality.\n\nAccording to the report all the information available appeared to confinn that neither total abolition of the death penalty nor its partial abolition in regard to certain crimes only had\n\nbeen followed by any notable rise in the incidence of crime which was previously punishable with death.\n\nLate Prime Minister Bhandarnaike of Sri Lanka suspended the death penalty in 1956.\n\nA Commission of Inquiry on Capital Punishment was appointed and it reported \"If the experience of the many countries which have suspended or abolished capital punishment is taken into account there is in our view, cogent evidence of the unlikelihood of this 'hidden protection' ...... It is, therefore, our view that the statistics of homicide in Ceylon when related to the social changes since the suspension of the death penalty in Ceylon and when related to the experience of other countries tend to disprove the assumption of the uniquely deterrent effect of the death penalty, and that in deciding on the question of reintroduction or abolition of the capital punishment reintroduction cannot be justified on the argument that it is a more effective deterrent to potential killers than the alternative of protracted imprisonment''. It is a tragic irony that Prime Minister Bhandarnaike who suspended the Capital Punishment in Ceylon was murdered by a fanatic and in the panic that ensued death penalty was reintroduced in Ceylon.\n\nIn the United States of America several studies have been made but 'the resnlts simply have been inconclusive'.\n\nThe majority Judges of the United States Supreme Court who upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in the State of Georgia in Gregg v. Georgia(') were compelled to observe \"Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence supporting or refuting this view\".\n\nIn the same case the minority Judges Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., were convinced that 'capital punishment was not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society'.\n\nIn India no systematic study of the problem whether the death penalty is a greater deterrent to murder than the penalty of life imprisonment has yet been undertaken. A few years ago I made a little research into the matter and studied the statistics relating to capital crime in several districts of Andhra Pradesh from 1935 to 1970.(') The pattern was most eratic but it can be boldly asserted that the fignres do not justify a conclusion that the death penalty has been a deterrent, but, then, the figures do not also lead inevitably to the conclusion that the death penalty has not been deterrent. One of the complicating factors is the discretion given to 1udges to inflict -·-------· (I) 49 L. Edn. 2nd 859.\n\n(2) Article in the Hindu, Madras, published in 1973.\n\nJ f ~-\n\ni '\n\n' •\n\ndeath penalty or imprisonment for life (about which more later) which A {!estroys the utility of any study based on statistics. The most reasonable conclusion is that there is no positive indication that the death penalty has been deterrent. In other words, the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent ls unproven.\n\n\"The death penalty, rather than deterring murder, actually deters the proper administration of criminal justice\".(') There is the absolute finality and irrevocability of the death penalty.\n\nHuman justice can never be infallible.\n\nThe most conscientious judge is no proof against sad mistakes.\n\nEvery criminal lawyer of experience will admit that cases are not unknown where innocent persons have been hanged in India and elsewhere.\n\nAnd, it is not the only way the death penalty strikes at the administration of criminal justice.\n\nSome Judges and Juries have an abhorrence of the death penalty that they would rather find a guilty person not guilty than send even a guilty person to the gallows.\n\nThe refusal of Juries to convict persons of murder because of the death penalty is a well known phenomenon throughout the world. A perusal of some of the judgments of the Superior Courts in India dealing with cases where Trial Courts have imposed sentences of death reveals the same reluctance to convict because the result would otherwise be to confirm the sentence of death.\n\nThus a guilty person is prevented from conviction by a possibility that a death penalty may otherwise be the result.\n\nThat is not all.\n\nThere is yet a more 'grievous injury' which the death penalty inflicts on the administration of Criminal Justice. It rejects reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as among the most important objectives of Criminal Justice, though the conscience of the World Community speaking through the voices of the Legislature of several countries of the world has accepted reformation and rehabilitation as among the basic purposes of Criminal Justice.\n\nDeath penalty is the brooding giant in the path of reform and treatment of Crime and Criminals, 'inevitably sabotaging any social or institutional programme to reformation'. It is the 'fifth column' in the administration of criminal justice. • There is also the compelling class complexion of the death penalty.\n\nA tragic by product of social and economic deprivation is that the \"have-nots\" in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens.\n\nSo, the burden of capital punishment falls more frequently upon the ignorant, the impoverished and the underpriviledged. In the words of Marshall, J., \"Their impotence leaves them\n\n(1) Frank-cYConnor quoted in 'Ready for the Defence' by Garbus.\n\nvictims of a sanction that the welthier, better represented, just-as guilty person can escape.\n\nSo long as the capital sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily forgotten members of society, legislators are content to maintain the status-quo because change would draw attention to the problem and concern might develop.\n\nIgnorance is perpetuated and apathy soon becomes its ma.te and we have today's situation''.\n\nAs a matter of historical interest it may be mentioned here that when in 1956, in Great Britain, the House of Commons adopted a resolution \"That this House believes that the death penalty for murder no longer accords with the needs or the true interests of a civilised society, and calls on Her Majesty's Government to introduce forthwith legislation for its abolition or for its suspension for an experimental period\", and the death penalty Abolition Bill was introduced, 'from the hills and forests of darkest Britain they came: the halt, the lame, the deaf, the obscrue, the senile and the forgotten-the here- . ditary peers of England, united in their determination to use their medieval powers to retain a medieval institution\",(') and the bill was torpedoed by the House of Lords.\n\nCapital Punishment was however abolished in Great Britain in 1966.\n\nThere is finally the question whether the. death penalty conforn1s to the current standards of 'decency'.\n\nCan there be any higher basic human right than the right to life and can anything bt; more offensive to human dignity than a violation of that right by the infliction of the death penalty. Brennan, J., observed in Furman v. Georgia( 2 ) \"In comparison to all other punishments today ...... the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity ..... death for whatever crime and under all circumstances is truly an awesome punishment.\n\nThe calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity ...... as executed person has indeed loot the right to have rights''. Senor Tejera of Uruguay in the debate in the United Nations said \"A death penalty is an anachronism iu the twentieth Century and it is significant that no one in the committee has defended it. It is the duty of the United Nations to promote pre~ gress and to protect man from the prejudices and barbarity surviving from the past''.\n\nIn a large number of countries in the world where the murder rate is higher than in India, the death penalty has been abolished. In most La'.in American countries, in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Costa\n\n(1) Quotation from the New Statesman.\n\n(2) 22 L. Edn. 2nd 346.\n\n\"\"t\n\n\\! i\n\n_t: I w I\n\ni\\11 j\n\n~~ ..\n\n\"\"' •\n\n.> -\n\n~ • i\n\n- \\\n\nl •\n\nRica, Ecuador, Maxico, Panama, Peru and Uruguas, Venezuala, in European countries, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, in Iceland, in Israel, in many Australian States and in many of tbe States in the United\n\nStates of America, death sentence has been abolished .\n\nIt is in the light of the r\\ght to life as a basic concept of human B dignity, in the context of tbe unproven efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent and in tbe background of modern theories of criminology based upon progress in the fields of science, medicine, psychiatry n<l\n\nsociology and in the setting of the march of the movement for abolition of Capital Punishment, that Judges in India are required to decide which sentence to impose in a case of murder, death or imprisonment 0 for life?\n\nJudges in India have the discretion to impose or not to impose the death penalty. It is one of the great burdens which Judges in this country have to carry.\n\nIn the past, the reasons which weighed in the matter of '!warding or not awarding the sentence of death varied widely and tbere was certainly room for complaint that there was an unequal application of the Jaw in the matter of imposition of the sentence of death.\n\nThe varying outlook on the part of Judges was well brought out a few years ago by two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n\nIn tbe first case, while confirming the conviction of certain \"Naxalites\" for murder, the judges set aside the sentence of death and awarded life imprisonment instead.\n\nThat the mnrder was not for any personal motive but was in p.nrsuit of some mistaken ideology was the reason which weighed with the judges for substituting the sentence of life imprisonment for the sentence of death.\n\nWithin a few montbs tbis view was subjected to severe criticism by two other Judges, who, in the second case confirmed the sentence of death.\n\nRealising that discretion, even judicial, must proceed along perceptive lines, but, conscious, all the same, that such discretion cannot be reduced to formulae or put into pigeon-holes, this Court has been at great pains cversince Ediga Annamma to point the path along which to proceed. In the latest pronouncement of this Conrt in Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utlar Pradesh (supra) several relevant principles have been enunciated to guide the exercise of discretion in making the choice between the penalties of death and life-imprisomnent.\n\nI express my agreement witb tbe elucidation of tbe principles in Rajendra Prasad\n\nv. State ofUttar Pradesh. (supra)\n\nSection 302 Indian Penal Code prescribes deatb or life-imprison- H •-r ment as the penalty for mnrder. While so, the Code of Criminal Procedure instructs the Conrt as to its application. The changes which\n\n4-253 SCI /79\n\nthe Code ha~ undergone in the last 25 years clearly indicate that Parliament i~ taking note of contemporary criminological thought and movement.\n\nPrior to 1955, Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 insisted upon the Court stating its reasons if the sentence of death was not imposed in a case of murder.\n\nThe result was that it was thought that in the absence of extenuating circumstances, which were to be stated by the Court, the ordinary penalty for murder was death.\n\nIn 1955, sub-section (5) of Section 367 was deleted and the deletion was interpreted, at any rate by some Courts, to mean that the sentence of life imprisonment was the normal sentence for murder and the sentence of death could be imposed only if there were aggravating circumstances. In the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, there is a further swing towards life imprisonment Section 354(3) cf the new Code now provide8 :\n\n\"When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative imprisonment for life or imprison- D mcnt for a t_\\lrm of years, the judgment shall tale the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the Special reasons for such sentence.\"\n\nSo, the discretion to impose the sentence of death or life-imprisonment is not so wide, after all.\n\nSection 354(3) has narrowed the E discretion Death Sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be imposed for 'Special reasons', Judges are left with the task of discovering 'Special reasons'.\n\nLet us first examine if the Code of Criminal Procedure gives any clue leading to the discovery of 'Special reasons'.\n\nApart from Section 354(3) there is another provision in the Code which also uses the significant expression 'special reasons'. It is Section 361.\n\nSection 360 of the 1973 code re-enacts, in substance, Section 562 of the 1898 Code and provides for the release on probation ot good conduct or after admonition any person not under twenty one years ot age who is convicted of an offence punishable with tine only or with imprisonment for a term ot seven years or less, or any person under twenty one years of age or any women who is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment of life, if no previous offence is proved against the offender, and if it appears to the Court, having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct or after admonition. If the Court refrains from dealing\n\n• J\n\n,,..--..\n\nwith an offender nnder Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, or any other law for the treatment, training,\n\nor rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where the Court could have done so, Section 361, which is a new provi>ion in the 1973 Code makes it mandatory for the Court to record in its judgment the 'special reasons' for not doing so.\n\nSection 361 thus casts a duty upon the Court to apply the provisions of Section 360 wherever it is possible to BJ do so and, to state \"special reasons\" if it does not do so. In the context of Section 360, the \"special reasons\" contemplated by Section 361 mnst be such as to compel the Court to hold that it is impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. This is some indication by the Legislature that reformation and rehabilitation of offenders, and not mere deterrence, are now among the foremost objects of the administration of criminal Justice in our country. Section 361 and Section 354i(3) have both entered the Statute Book at the same tin1e and they are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the Indian Parliament of the new trends in criminology.\n\nWe will not, therefore, be wrong in assuming that the persona!ity of the offender a. revealed by his age, character, antecedents and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender to reform !llust necessarily play the most prominent role in determining the sentence to be awarded.\n\nSpecial reasons must have some relation to thege factors.\n\nCriminal justice is not a computer machine. It deals with omplex human problems and diverse human beings. It deals with persons who are otherwise like the rest of us, who work and play, who laugh and mourn, who love and hate, who yearn for affection and approval, as all of us do, who think, learn and forget.\n\nLike the rest of us they too are the creatures of circumstance. Heredity, environment, home neighbourhOQd; upbringing, school, friends, associates, even caual acquaintenances, the books that one reads, newspapers, radio and TV, the economics of the household, the opportunities provided by circumstances and the calamities r$Jsulting therefrom, the success and failure of one's undertakings, the affairs of the heart, ambitions and frustrations, the ideas and ideologies of the time, these and several other ordinary and extra-ordinary incidents of life contribute to a person's personality and influence his conduct. Differently shaped and differentc\n\n. ly circumstanced individuals react differently in given situations.\n\nA H Judge has to balance the: Pl!tsonality of the offender with the circumstance the situations and the reaction8 and choose the appropriate\n\nsentence to be imposed. A judge must try to answer a myried questions such as was the offence committed without premeditation or was it after due deliberation ? What was the motive for the crime ? Was it for gain? Was it .the outcome of a village feud? Was it the result of a petty, drunken, street brawl, or a domestic bickering between a hapless husband and a helpless wife ? Was it due to sexual jealousy ?\n\nWas the murder committed under some stress, emotional or otherwise ?\n\nWhat is the background of the offender ? What is his social and economic status ? What is the level of his education or intelligence ?\n\nDo his actions betray a particularly callous indifference towards the welfare of society or, on the other hand, do they show a great concern for humanity and are in fact inspired by such concern ? Is the offender so perpetually and constitutionally at war with society that there is no hope of ever reclaiming him from being a menace to society ? Or is he a person who is patently amenable to reform? Well, may one ex claim with Prof. Vrij \"What audacity is involved in these three tasks : to interpret life, explain an act, predict the latest inclination of a human mind.\"\n\n'Special reasons', we may, therefore say, are reasons which are special with reference to the offender, with reference to constitutional and legislative directives and with reference to the times, that is, with reference to contemporary ideas in the fields of Criminology and connected sciences.\n\nSpecial reasons are those which lead inevitably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemption, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the legislative policy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made in the methods of treatment etc.\n\nI will not attempt to catalogue any 'Special reasons'.\n\nI have said enough and perhaps more than what I intended, to indi cate what according to me should be the approach to the question.\n\nWhatever I have said is but to supplement what my brother Krishna Iyer has already said in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (')\n\nComing to the case before us, our brothers J aswant Singh and Kallas am, JJ ., ordered 'notice confined to the question of sentence only.' At the last hearing we granted special leave to appeal on the question of sentence. The appellant was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions' Judge, Alipore, for the murder of his son and sentenced to death. The High Court of Calcutta confirmed the conviction and sentence. The reason given by the learned Sessions Judge for giving the sentence of death was that the murder was 'cruel and\n\n(1) (1979] 3 S.C.R. 18.\n\nt ,\n\n- ~\n\nBISHNU DEO v. WEST BENGAL (Krishna Iyer, J.) 371\n\nbrutal' and that the facts show the 'grim determination' of the accused to kill the deceased.\n\nThe Sessions Judge made no reference to the motive of the accused for the commission of the murder.\n\nThe High Court while confirming the sentence observed that the accused had previously murdered his wife, suspecting her infidelity and suspecting that the deceased in the present case was not his own son, that the sentence of imrisomnent imposed on him for the murder of his wife had no soberii)g affect and that he had murdered his own son without any mercy or remorse and that he, therefore, deserved no mercy. We do not think that either the Sessions Judge or the High Court made the right approach to the question.\n\nThe Sessions Judge was wrong in imposing the sentence of death without even a reference to the reason why the appellant co=itted the murder.\n\nThe observation of the High Court that the appellant deserved no mercy because he showed no mercy smacks very much of punishment by way of retribution.\n\nWe have examined the facts of the case. We find some vague evidence to the effect that the appellant suspected that the deceased was not his own son and that he used to get angry with the deceased for not obeyini: him.\n\nThere is also vague evidence that he had killed the mother of the deceased and had suffered sentence of imprisonment for that offence. From the vague evidence that is available we gather that the appellant was a moody person who had for years been brood-· ing over the suspected iI\\fidelity of his wife and the injustice of having a son foisted on him.\n\nWe do not think that the mere use of adjectives like 'cruel and brutal' supplies the special reasons contemplated by\n\nSection 354(3) Criminal Procedure Code. In the light of the principles enunciated in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P.,(') and in the light of what we have said earlier, we do not think that there are anv 'special reasons' justifying the imposition of the death penalty.\n\nW~ accordingly allow the appeal as regards sentence, set aside the sentence of death and impooe in its place the sentence of life imprisonment.\n\n KRISHNA IYER, J.-I have had the advantage of reading the Judgment of my learned brother, Shri Justice Chinnappa Reddy.\n\nI wholly agree with his reasoning and conclusion.\n\nIndeed, the ratio of Rajendra Prasad ec. v. State of Uttar Prade•h etc.('), if applied to the present case, as 1t must be, leads to the conclusion that death sentence cannot be awarded in the circumstances of the present case.\n\nCoun5el for the State, if I recollect aright, did state that in view of the criteria laid\n\n\nA down in Rajendra Prasad's case the State did not propose to file any written submissions against commutation to life imprisonment.\n\nI concur with my learned brother and direct that the appeal, confined to sentence, be allowed and the alternative of life imprisonmer.t imposed.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed\n\n(l) (1979]3 S.C.R. 78.\n\n• J\n\n• •", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "BISHNU DEO SHAW@ BISHNU DAYAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BISHNU DEO SHAW @ BISHNU DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. 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["}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-2-1978 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. C. Mittal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13491, "end_char": 13503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. Mittal (Amicus Curiae) for the Appellaitt."}}, {"text": "G. s. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13541, "end_char": 13557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. s. Chatterjee for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13621, "end_char": 13636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-\"The murderer has killed.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Bonsall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was how a Mr. Bonsall of Manchester (quoted by Arthur Koestler in his 'Drinkers of Infinity'), in a letter\n\nto the Press, neatly summed up the paradox and the pathology of the D Death Penalty."}}, {"text": "Manchester", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13745, "end_char": 13755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was how a Mr. Bonsall of Manchester (quoted by Arthur Koestler in his 'Drinkers of Infinity'), in a letter\n\nto the Press, neatly summed up the paradox and the pathology of the D Death Penalty."}}, {"text": "Arthur Koestler", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13767, "end_char": 13782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was how a Mr. Bonsall of Manchester (quoted by Arthur Koestler in his 'Drinkers of Infinity'), in a letter\n\nto the Press, neatly summed up the paradox and the pathology of the D Death Penalty."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14026, "end_char": 14038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unsoundness of the rationale of the demand of -Oeath for murder has been discussd and exposed by my brother Krishna Iyer, J., in a recent pronouncement in Rajendra Prasad v ..\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(').", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Stewart", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14864, "end_char": 14871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And, it is unique finally in its absolute re nuhciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity\" (per Stewart J., in Furman v. Georgia) (2). \""}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15039, "end_char": 15047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible, 1ife imprisonment doos not\" (per Marshall, J., in Furman v.\n\nGeorgia)."}}, {"text": "Den- G ning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17522, "end_char": 17533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Den- G ning advahced the view before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment : \"The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the .great majority of citizens for them- It is a mistake to consider the obj•::cts of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18679, "end_char": 18686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Despite the high moral tone and phrase, the dennnciatory theory, as propounded, is nothing but an echo of the retributive theory as explained by Stephen who had said earlier : \"The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite\"."}}, {"text": "Hart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18959, "end_char": 18963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Prof.\n\nHart points out the idea that we may puhish offenders not to prevent harm or suffering or even the reptition of the offence but simply as a means of emphatically expressing our con~ demnation, is uncomfortably close to human sacrifice as an expression of righteousness."}}, {"text": "Royal Commission on Capital Punishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24384, "end_char": 24422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the most comprehensive enquiries ever undertaken on the subject was that made by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment."}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24469, "end_char": 24475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission visited several countries of Europe and the United States, addressed qnestionnaires to many other couutries in search of information and examined celebrated experts and jurists."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24484, "end_char": 24497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission visited several countries of Europe and the United States, addressed qnestionnaires to many other couutries in search of information and examined celebrated experts and jurists."}}, {"text": "Thorsten Sellin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25462, "end_char": 25477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Thorsten Sellin who made a serious and thorough study of the entire subject in the United States on behalf of the American Law In, stitute stated his conclusion: \"Any one who carefully examines the above data is bound to arrive at the conclusion that the death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence on the extent or fluctuating rate of capital crime."}}, {"text": "United Nations Economic and Social Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25935, "end_char": 25977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962 statistics were compiled and a report was prepared at the instance Qf the United Nations Economic and Social Council on the question of Capital Punishment, the laws and practices relating thereto and the effects of capital punishment and the abolition thereof on the rate of criminality."}}, {"text": "Bhandarnaike", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26463, "end_char": 26475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Late Prime Minister Bhandarnaike of Sri Lanka suspended the death penalty in 1956."}}, {"text": "Sri Lanka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26479, "end_char": 26488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Late Prime Minister Bhandarnaike of Sri Lanka suspended the death penalty in 1956."}}, {"text": "Ceylon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26874, "end_char": 26880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Commission of Inquiry on Capital Punishment was appointed and it reported \"If the experience of the many countries which have suspended or abolished capital punishment is taken into account there is in our view, cogent evidence of the unlikelihood of this 'hidden protection' ...... It is, therefore, our view that the statistics of homicide in Ceylon when related to the social changes since the suspension of the death penalty in Ceylon and when related to the experience of other countries tend to disprove the assumption of the uniquely deterrent effect of the death penalty, and that in deciding on the question of reintroduction or abolition of the capital punishment reintroduction cannot be justified on the argument that it is a more effective deterrent to potential killers than the alternative of protracted imprisonment''."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27570, "end_char": 27594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States of America several studies have been made but 'the resnlts simply have been inconclusive'."}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27703, "end_char": 27730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority Judges of the United States Supreme Court who upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in the State of Georgia in Gregg v. 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{"in_sentence": "Realising that discretion, even judicial, must proceed along perceptive lines, but, conscious, all the same, that such discretion cannot be reduced to formulae or put into pigeon-holes, this Court has been at great pains cversince Ediga Annamma to point the path along which to proceed.", "canonical_name": "Ediga-Annamma"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37088, "end_char": 37099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37100, "end_char": 37117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37205, "end_char": 37231, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37375, "end_char": 37385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The changes which\n\n4-253 SCI /79\n\nthe Code ha~ undergone in the last 25 years clearly indicate that Parliament i~ taking note of contemporary criminological thought and movement."}}, {"text": "Section 367(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37470, "end_char": 37484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37492, "end_char": 37523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37826, "end_char": 37837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38090, "end_char": 38124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38177, "end_char": 38191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38615, "end_char": 38629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38839, "end_char": 38865, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38940, "end_char": 38954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39062, "end_char": 39073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40354, "end_char": 40365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40474, "end_char": 40485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40525, "end_char": 40536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41009, "end_char": 41020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41025, "end_char": 41036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41157, "end_char": 41174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 361 and Section 354i(3) have both entered the Statute Book at the same tin1e and they are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the Indian Parliament of the new trends in criminology."}}, {"text": "Vrij", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43790, "end_char": 43794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Well, may one ex claim with Prof. Vrij \"What audacity is involved in these three tasks : to interpret life, explain an act, predict the latest inclination of a human mind.\""}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44749, "end_char": 44761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever I have said is but to supplement what my brother Krishna Iyer has already said in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (')\n\nComing to the case before us, our brothers J aswant Singh and Kallas am, JJ .,", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "J aswant Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44863, "end_char": 44877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever I have said is but to supplement what my brother Krishna Iyer has already said in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (')\n\nComing to the case before us, our brothers J aswant Singh and Kallas am, JJ .,"}}, {"text": "Kallas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44882, "end_char": 44888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever I have said is but to supplement what my brother Krishna Iyer has already said in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (')\n\nComing to the case before us, our brothers J aswant Singh and Kallas am, JJ .,"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45177, "end_char": 45199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta confirmed the conviction and sentence."}}, {"text": "(1979] 3 S.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45359, "end_char": 45377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47143, "end_char": 47157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47158, "end_char": 47181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47560, "end_char": 47572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J.-I have had the advantage of reading the Judgment of my learned brother, Shri Justice Chinnappa Reddy.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47662, "end_char": 47677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J.-I have had the advantage of reading the Judgment of my learned brother, Shri Justice Chinnappa Reddy.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48061, "end_char": 48076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coun5el for the State, if I recollect aright, did state that in view of the criteria laid\n\nA down in Rajendra Prasad's case the State did not propose to file any written submissions against commutation to life imprisonment."}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48331, "end_char": 48337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed\n\n(l) (1979]3 S.C.R. 78."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_373_384_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS.\n\nDELHI STOCK EXCHANGE ASSN. LTD.\n\nFebruary 23, 1979 [R. S. SARKARIA, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, .fJ.]\n\nSecurities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956-Ss. 4 & 16-Notification is.sued -B\n\n'fl! thereunder-Scope of.\n\n• Interpretation of statutes-Press Note issued by Gorern1ne11t arid letter of\n\n,. .\n\nMinistry of Finance-I/ could be used for interpreting the notifil:ation.\n\nBy a notification issued on the 27th June, 1969, under ' 16( I) of the .)ecurities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 the Central Govcrnme•t banned with immediate effect all forward trading in hares on recognised tock exchanges in the country.\n\nThe proviso to the notification, \"Which dealt with bow all existing contracts remaining outstanding as on the date of the notification should be closed or liquidated, contained a direction to the effect that \"a contract other than a spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery may be entered into between it~ members or th1ough or with any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing tontrac~ ren1aining to bei performed after that date.\" It further provided that \"such contracts !hall be subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the recognised stock exchange\" that con1e into force when further new deall.n~ arei prohibited and subject also to such term~ and conditions as the Cential Government may impose.\n\nIn tel'l!ns of the notification the re!pondent called upon all its rr1cmbers , o subntit a list of outstanding transa-ctions in all securitie~ on the cleared list and to deposit along with it, interim margins in cash or approved shares\n\n.; alcUlated on the basi& of differences between the rates of the last clearing and certain average specified r1'.te! fixed by it.\n\nAppellant no. 2 'vho was a partner flf appellant no. 1, contended that the demand for interim margins was by 'vay r)f \"carry over\" of the forward transactions which, in view of the ban contained in the notification, was illegal. Instead of submitting a list of his outstanding transactions on the basis of the rates fixed by the respondent, he enclosed n statement of his outstanding transactions adjusted at the last official closing rates which \\'\\'ere higher than the rates fixed by the respondent. t1uggesting thereby that he WM not liable to pay anything. The respondent rejected the appellant'& contention and again called upon him to comply with its earlier notice. Eventually since the appellant did JiOt comply with the notice the respondent by a resolution declared him a defaulter \\Vbich exposed him under the bye la\\'\\'S to a rigorous enquiry into hi! financial condition and entailed other disabilitie! including termination of membership.\n\nBy another resolution the appellant was called upon to deposit additional security of Rs. 20,000 / •·\n\nIn his writ petition before the High Court, challenging the resolutions, the appellant contended that all his transoction! which remained outstanding on June 27, 1969 were forward contracts pertaining to cleared securities and aiJ such were affected by the notification which banned all for¥.'ard contracts, that these had to be adjusted at the last official closing rates, and thererore, the respondent's action in calling upon him to deposit interim margins calculated\n\nA on the basis of certain ave; rage specified rates fixed by it was not warranted by the proviso of the notification and was illegal. The I-ligh Court <lis1nissed the petition.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD The directions issued by the respondent were proper and legal. [383 Hl\n\nThe proviso clearly permitted the closing out or liquidation of all out~ standing transactions in the normal manner by entering into a forward contract (which would include \"carry over\") in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent.\n\nThere was no warrant for the stand taken by appellant no. 2 that all outstanding transactions had to be or coilld be adjusted on the basis of \"previous official closing.\" {381F]\n\n1. For the purpose of closing or liquidating existing outstanding transactions a forward contract was permitted to be entered into. rhe expression \"such contracts\" occurring in the last part of the notification meant those as were referred to in the first part of the notification, the making of which was banned after June 27, 1969. The expression \"such contracts\" was not referable to the existing outstanding \"contracts nor to 'a contract' that could be entered into for closing or liquidating the existing outstanding contracts. The last part of the notifica-tion has nothing to do with the existing outstanding contracts, the closing or liquidating of which was independently provided for by the proviso.\n\n[381C-DJ\n\n2. Moreover the letter of the Joint Director Ministry of Finance addressed to the President of the respondent and the Press Note, issued by the Ministry of Finance clearly brought out that as per the notification itself all outslanding contracts. were permitted to be liquidated in accordance with the relevar; rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange and secondly no :; pecific period was mentioned in the notification for liquidation of outstanding business but that the members operating on a recognised stock exchange \\Vere expected to clear the outsta-ndings in a smooth and orderly manner within a rea'ionable period.\n\n[382G-H]\n\n3. The two documents which came into existence a-lmost simultaueously with the issue of the notification, could be looked at for finding out the true intention of the Government in issuing the notification. The principle of conten1poranea expositio can be invoked, though the same will not al\"'ays be decisive on the question of construction.\n\nIn construing a statute courts will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at the time of its enactment and by th~ whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it. C-ontem-.. poraoncous construction placed by administrative or eixecutive officers charged with executing a statute, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable \\\\'eight; it is highly persuasive.\n\n[383A-B]\n\nBaleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass, ILR 35 Cal. 701 at 713; .'\\fathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha, ILR 43 Cal. 790; approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2458 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 14-10-1969 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 520/69.\n\n, !\n\n•• •\n\n• A\n\nf \\\n\n\\ '\n\nDesh Bandhu Gupta (for Appe)lant No. 2 for self and on behalf of appellants 1 and 3.)\n\nF. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.~This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order dted October 14, 1969 of the Delhi High Court dismissing the appellants' Civil Writ Petition (520 of 1969) whereby the appellants sought to quash certain directions issued on June 28, 1969 and two resolutiqns passed on July 2 and 3, 1969, by the Delhi Stock Exchange, which adversely affected them.\n\nThe Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., New Delhi (the Respondent herein) is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913. It has received recognition from the Centrl Government under s. 4 of the Securi ties Contracts Regulation) Act (XLII) of 1956 for the purpose of the said Act.\n\nOne Desh Bandhu Gupta (Appellant No. 2) carried on business as a share-broker in the firm name and style of Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. (Appellant No. 1) and as such was a member of the Respondent.\n\nBy a notification No. S.0. 2561 dated June 27, 1969 issued under s. 16(1) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 the Central Government banned with immediate effect all forward trading in shares at all the Stock Exchanges in the country by declaring that \"no person, in the territory to which the said Act extends, shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of recongnised Stock Exchange\", but as regards the forward contracts which remained outstanding as on that date it was directed under the proviso that these could be closed or liquidated in the normal manner.\n\nOn June 28, 1969 at an emergent meeting held at I 0.30 a.m. the Board of Directors of the Respondent considered the abnormal situation arising from the ban imposed under the notification and decided to issue notice to all its\n\nmembrs directing them to submit their lists of outstanding transactions in all the securities on the cleared list and to deposit alongwith it interim margins in cash or approved shares calculated on the basis of differences between the rates of the last clearing and certain average specified rates fixed by it: Upon receipt of such notice dated June 28, 1969 from the Respondent the appellant No. 2 addressed a letter of\n\neven date to the Board of Directors contending that the demand for interim margins was by way of \"carry over\" of the forward transactions which in view of the ban contained in the notification was illegal and instead of submitting a list of his outstanding transactions on the basis of the rates which had been fixed by the Respondent he enclosed a statement of his outstanding transactions adjusted at the last official closing rates which were higher than the rates fixed by the Respondent, thus suggesting that he was not liable to pay any thing but was entitled to receive some amount at the foot of closing out or liquidating his outstanding transactions.\n\nBy a rejoinder of the same date the Board of Directors of the Respondent reiterated that its action in fixing the interim clearing rates in the concenied securities and demanding interim margins was in order and that the adjustment of outstanding business claimed by appellant No. 2 wa~ utterly wrong and as snch appellant No. 2 was called upon to comply with its notice by submitting an amended list in accordance with the directions together with the differences, if any, immediately.\n\nBy a telegram dated June 30, 1969, which was confirmed by a letter of even date the appellant No. 2 was again called upon to submit his list alongwith the amount of differences, if any, by July 1, 1969 failing which he was informed that necessary action would be taken against him. As the appellant No. 2 stuck to his stand, the Respondent by its letter dated July 1, 1969 once again stressed that the action of the Board in calling for the list and margin money was in order and in accordance with the rules, byelaws, regulations, practices usages and previous resolutions of the Board and gave further opportunity to him to comply with the directions by July 2, 1969 upto 11.00 a.m. failing which further action was threatened. At the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Respondent held on July 2, 1969 at 4.00 P.M. the Board noticed that all !'1embers, except appellant No. 2, had complied with its directions and on a consideration of the entire matter came to the conclusion that appellant No. 2 was intentionally evading to comply with its direction and to pay the required amount of margins and, therefore, resolved that appellant No. 2 trading in the name and style of Desh Bandhu G Gupta & Co. be declared a defaulter for such failure and a notice in • that behalf be pasted on the Notice Board and appellant No. 2 was informed about it by a telegram and a letter. The resolution passed on July 2, 1969 declaring appellant No. 2 as a defaulter exposed him under the bye-Jaws to a rigorous inquiry by the Respondent into his financial condition and entailed other disabilities including termination H of his membership of the Respondent under Bye-law 308 read with Article 43 (iv) of the Articles of Association. Appellant No. 2 thereupon filed a writ petition (Civil Writ No. 520 of 1969) in Delhi High\n\nJ '\n\n,.._-...,\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nCourt challenging the directions of the Respondent demanding payment of interim margins as also its resolution declaring him to be a defaulter. It appears that after the filing of the petition the Board of Directors of the Respondent at its meeting held on July 3, 1969 passed another resolution calling upon the appellant No. 2 under Article 29 of the Articles of Association to deposit additional security of Rs. 20,000/- failing which further action was thereatened. The writ petition was amended and a prayer seeking to quash the second resolution was added. The main contention of the appellant No. 2 was that all his transactions which remained outstanding as on June 27, 1969 were forward contracts pertaining to cleared securities and as such were affected by the Notification which banned all forward contracts, that these had to be adjusted at the last official closing rates, that the action of the Respondent in calling upon him to deposit interim margins calculated on the basis of certain average specified rates fixed by it was not warranted by the proviso therein but in fact amounted to carry over of those transactions which had been prohibited and, therefore, illegal and that both the resolutions, one dated July 2, 1969 whereby he was declared to be a defaulter and the other dated July 3, 1969 whereby he was called upon to deposit Rs. 20,000/- as additional security were contrary to law and unjust and, therefore, the said action as well as the resolutions were liable to be quashed.\n\nThe appellant No. 2 further contended that by passing the two resolutions, particularly the first one dated July 2, 1969 in contravention or breach of statutory Bye-laws and Regnlations his fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19 (1 )(f) of the Constitution had been infringed and, therefore, issuance of appropriate writ quashing the directions issued on June 28, 1969 and the two resolutions dated July 2 and 3, 1969 was sought.\n\nBy its reply filed on July 15, 1969 the Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition. It was contended that the relationship between appellant No. 2 and the Respondent was contractual resulting from the Memorandum & Articles of G Association and the Rules, Bye-laws and Regnlations made under the powers given by the Articles of Association, and since the grievance made in the writ petition related to contractual rights and obligations between the parties and no question of enforcement of any statutory right or obligation arose the remedy under writ jurisdictin was not available.\n\nOn merits it was contended that the enstruetion H sought to be placed by the appellants on the proviso contained iu the Central Government Notification, which dealt with closing out or liqui\n\n.\\, B\n\n' l c\n\n\" G\n\ndating the transactions outstanding as on June 27, 1969 was not correct, that under the said proviso such transactions were permitted to be closed or liquidated in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Respondent and, therefore, the directions issued by\n\nits Board of Directors on June 28, 1969 to all its members including appellant No. 2 to submit their lists of outstanding transactions and.to pay interim margins on the basis of the average specified rates fixed by it were proper and lawful and both the resolutions were legal and justified.\n\nThe respondent, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.\n\nOn .i consideration of the rival submissions made before it by counsel for the parties, the High Court upheld both the contentions of the Respondent and dismissed the petition with costs.\n\nThe High Court's view on both the points is challenged by the appellant before us in this appeal.\n\nIn the view which we are taking on the merits of the case after giving our anxious consideration to the rival submissions thereon, we feel lhat it would be unnecessary to go into and decide the preliminary objection raised by the respondent to the maintainability of the writ petition.\n\nWe, therefore, propose to dispose of the appeal on merits.\n\nOn merits the question that arises for our determination is what on proper construction is the scope and ambit of the proviso contained in the notification ? Whether, after the imposition of the ban on all forward trading in shares with effect from the close of June 27, 1969, the outstanding contracts that had remained to be performed as on that date were permitted to be closed or liquidated under the proviso in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Respondent or not? On the one hand counsel for the appellants contended that by reason of the ban imposed on all forward trading in shares with effect from the close of June 27, 1969 the action of the respondent in making the demand for interim margins calculated on the basis of the difference between the rates of the last clearing and certain average rates fixed by it in respect of their forward outstanding transactions, which amounted to \"carry over\" of those transactions, was illegal; in other words the proviso did not permit the closing out or liquidation of the existing outstanding transactions by way of \"carry over\".\n\nOn the other hand, counsel for the respondent contended that notwithstanding the ban imposed, which prohibited all future forward trading in shares, the existing forward transactions that remained outstanding on that date were permitted to be closed or liquidaied in the\n\n• ,.\n\n• •\n\n' •\n\n! \\\n\nD. B. GUPTA & co. v. EX¢HANGE ASSOCIATION (Tulzapurkar, !.) 379\n\nnormal manner under its rules, bye-laws and regulations and, therefore, the directions issued, by the respondent on June 28, 1969 were in accordance with the ntification. It was pointed out that at the close of June 27, 1969, the appellant No. 2 had certain outstanding contracts in Cleared Securities for the then current clearing of July 8, 1969 which had to be completed and performed for the said clearing in the manner laid down '.in Regulation 8 and Bye-law 52 ( e) which meant that he could either.make cross contracts to close his outstanding purchases or sales for that clearing or to make carry over contracts so as to close the contracts of the current clearing and to make contracts for the ensuing clearing and such contracts could be made upto the last business day prescribed for that clearing by the Respondent; and so much was permitted by the proviso contained in the notification.\n\nMoreover, in vie\\v of the crisis created by the Notification the Board of Directors of the Respondent issued the directions on June 28, 1969 having regard to Bye-law 73, which were in order and the further action taken by the respondent against the appellant No. 2 consequent upon his failure to comply with the directions was proper and justified under Bye-law 308 read with Article 43 (iv) of the Articles of Association o( the respondent. Since the question depends upon proper construction of the notification dated June 27, 1969, it will be desirable to set out the said notification in extenso which ran thus :-\n\n\"New Delhi, the 27th June 1969.\n\nNOTIFlCATION\n\nS.O. 2561. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection ( 1) of section 16 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 ( 42 of 1956) the Central Government, being of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable speculation in securities in the whole of India, hereby declares that no person, in the territory to which the said Act exterids, shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contracts for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange:\n\nProvided that a contract other than a spot delivery conact or cont; cts for cash or hand delivery cir special delivery m any secunties on the Qeared Securities List of a recognised stock exchange may be entered into between: its members\n\nor through or wit)l any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing contracts entered into upto the date of this notification and remaining to be performed after the said date, but such contracts shall be subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the recognised stock exchange that come into force when further new dealings are prohibited in any securities on the Cleared Securities List and subject also to such terms and conditions, if any, as the Central Government may from time to time impose.\"\n\nCounsel for the appellants did not dispute that the proviso in the aforesaid notification dealt with the topic of closing out or liquidating all existing forward contracts entered into up to the date of the notification and which remained to be performed or outstanding as on that date but contended that it did not permit the closing or liquidating all such outstanding transactions in the normal manner under the rules, bye4aw or regulations of the respondent, but such outstanding transactions were declared to be \"subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the rcc0gnised Stock Exchange that come irto force when further new dealings are prohibited in any securities on the Cleared Securities List and subject also to such tenns and conditions, if any as the Central Government may from time to time impose.\" In other words, according to counsel, the words \"but such contracts\" occurring in the last part of the notification referred to the outstanding contracts that remained to be performed at the close of June 27, 1969 and it is this last portion of the notification which indicated the manner in which such outstanding transactions were required to be closed or liquidated. The Respondent's counsel disputed this and urged that the last portion had nothing to do with such outstanding transactions, the closing or liquidating of which was fully dealt with by the proviso. It cannot be disputed that the drafting of the notification in question has been far from happy but even so on a fair reading of the notification it is difficult to accept the construction sought to be placed thereon by counsel for the appellants. In our view, the notification was in three parts. By the first part the Central Government put a ban on all forward trading in shares through the Stock Exchanges in the country by declaring that \"no person ...... shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange.\" The second part consisted of the proviso and it dealt fully with how all existing contracts remaining outstanding as on the date of tho notification should be closed or liquidated, and the direction\n\n' ,\n\n' I\n\n-f-·--\"\n\n' +\n\n~ j\n\n• •\n\n-contained therein in that behalf was to the effect that \"a contract other than a spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery (meaning thereby a forward contract) ...... may be entered into between its members or through or with any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing contracts .... remaining to be performed after that date.\" In other words, for the purpose of closing or liquidating existing outstanding transactions a forward contract (which would include a carry over) was permitted to be entered into. Then follows the third or the last part of the notification which commences with the words \"but such contracts shall .be subject to ....... \" The expression \"such contracts\" occurring in this last. part of the notification meant those as were referred to in the first part of the notification the making of which was banned after June 27, 1969 and the last portion provided that such forward contracts that had been banned \"shall be subject to the rules, bye-laws or regulations of the recognised Stock Exchange that come into force (i.e. become applicable) when further new dealings are prohibited ...... and subject also to such terms and conditions as the Central Government may from time to time impose.'' In our view the expression \"such contracts\" occurring in the last part of the notification were not referable to the existing outstanding contracts nor to 'a contract' that could be entered into for closing or liquidating the existing outstanding contracts.\n\nIn other words, the third part of the notification on which reliance has been placed by the counsel for the appellants, in our view, has nothing to do with the existing outstanding contracts, the closing or liquidating of which was independently provided for by the proviso. It will thus appear clear that on a proper construction of the notification in question the proviso clearly permitted the closing or liquidating of the existing outstanding transactions in the normal manner by entering into a forward contract (which would include a \"carry over\") in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Respondent. There was no warrant for the stand taken by th~ appellant No. 2 that all outstanding transactions had to be or could be adjusted on the basis of \"previous official closing''.\n\nOn the construction of the proviso counsel for the Respondent rightly invited our attention to two documents on record which had come into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification explaining the manner in which outstanding transactions were intended to be closed or liquidated. In a Press Statement or Press Note issued by the Finance Ministry immediately upon the issuance of the notification it was stated thus :\n\n\"The existing contracts entered into upto the date of the notification and remaining to be performed are, however, permilted by the same notification to be liquidated in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Stock Exchange concerned.\"\n\nFurther it appears that in response to a query made by the President. of the respondent, Shri Maitra, Joint Director (S.E.) Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, addressed a communication dated June 28, 1969 to the President in which he stated thus :\n\n\"As stated in the notification itself, all outstanding contracts which were not liquidated till the date of notification, will have to be liquidated in accordance with the relevant rules, bye-laws and regulations of your exchange in that regard. No fresh forward transactions in any cleared security, however, is permissible.\n\nA statement of outstanding position in each of the cleared securities on your Exchange, as on the date of the notification may please be forwarded to us as early as possible and thereafter at each settlement so as to enable Government to know the reduction in the outstanding business effected from time to time. As will be seen, no specific period has been mentioned in the notification for liquidation of the outstandings. It is, however, hoped that you will issue suitable instruction to your members to ensure that the outstandings are cleared in a smooth and orderly manner within a reasonable period.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied}\n\nIt may be stated that in one of his earlier conununications appellant No. 2 himself had requested the respondent to seek clarification from the Government on the points raised by him in regard to the outstanding transactions. The letter dated June 28, 1969 addressed by the Joint Director to the President of the Respondent clearly brings out two aspects : first, that as per the notification itself all outstanding contracts were permitted to be liquidated in accordance with the relevant rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent and secondly, no specific period was mentioned in the notification for liquidation of the outstanding business but the members operating on a recognised Stock Exchange were expected to clear the outstandings in a smooth and orderly manner within a reasonable period and, in fact, the Government desired the respondent to forward to it a statement at each settlement indicating the reduction in outstanding business effected from time to time. The exposition in these two documents, therefore, conforms. to our interpretation of the provi'So.\n\n' ,\n\nD. B. GUPTA & co. v. EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION (T11lzap11rkar, 1.) 383\n\nIt may be stated that it was not disputed before us that these two dccuments which came into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification could be looked at for finding out the true . intention of the Government in issuing the notification in question, particularly in regard to the manner in which outstanding transactions were to be closed or liquidated. •The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction. (Maxwell 12th Edn. p. 268). In Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edn.) in para 219 (at pp. 393-395) it has been stated that <1dministrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a constructioo, commonly referred to as practical construction, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive. In Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass(') the principle, which was reiterated in Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha(') hM been stated by Mukerje<> J. thus :\n\n\"It is a well-settled principle of construction that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply\n\nit. I do not suggest for a moment that such interpretatioo E has by any means a controlling effect upon the Courts; such interpretation may, if occasion arises, have to be disreg; irded for cogent and persuasive reasons, and in a clear case of error, a Court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction.\" •\n\nOf course, even without the aid of these two documents which contain a contemporaneous exposition of the Government's intention, we have come to the conclusion that on a plain construction of the Notification the proviso permitted the closing out or liquidation of al! outstanding transactions by entering into a forward contract in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent.\n\nHaving regard to the above construction which appears to us to be the true and proper construction of the notification in question it will be clear that the directions issued by the respondent to all its members including appellant No. 2 on June 28, 1969 in regard to their outstanding transactious as at the close of June 27, 1969 were proper and\n\n(I) I.L.R. 35 Cal. 701 al 713. (2l I.LR. 43 Cat 790.\n\nS-2S3SCI/19\n\n384 StJP!U!ME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nlegal and the appellants' stand was clearly erroneous. It cannot be disputed that ample opportunity was given to appellant No. 2 to comply with the directions but the appellant persisted in his erroneous contention, and failed to comply with those directions with the result that the respondent had no alternative but to declare him a defaulter. In our view, the directions dated June 28, 1969 as well as the two resolutions passed by the respondent on July 2 and July 3, 1969 were proper and justified and the appellants' case on merits was rightly rejected by the High Court. This conclusion of ours, 11s stated at the commencement of the judgment, renders unneceiiary the determination of the preliminary objection.\n\nIn th= result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nA'ppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DELHI STOCK EXCHANGE ASSN. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI STOCK EXCHANGE ASSN. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 82, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 23, 1979 [R. S. SARKARIA, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, .fJ.]\n\nSecurities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956-Ss."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 183, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ss. 4 & 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "vho", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1817, "end_char": 1820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 'vho was a partner flf appellant no."}}, {"text": "June 27, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3010, "end_char": 3023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which remained outstanding on June 27, 1969 were forward contracts pertaining to cleared securities and aiJ such were affected by the notification which banned all for¥.'ard contracts, that these had to be adjusted at the last official closing rates, and thererore, the respondent's action in calling upon him to deposit interim margins calculated\n\nA on the basis of certain ave; rage specified rates fixed by it was not warranted by the proviso of the notification and was illegal."}}, {"text": "I-ligh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The I-ligh Court <lis1nissed the petition."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Desh Bandhu Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•• •\n\n• A\n\nf \\\n\n\\ '\n\nDesh Bandhu Gupta (for Appe)lant No.", "canonical_name": "DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS"}}, {"text": "S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6592, "end_char": 6602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents ."}}, {"text": "Bihamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents ."}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6618, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents ."}}, {"text": "LaUta Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents ."}}, {"text": "Manish Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bihamber Lal, Manoj Swarup, Miss LaUta Kohli and Miss Manish Gupta for the Respondents ."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.~This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order dted October 14, 1969 of the Delhi High Court dismissing the appellants' Civil Writ Petition (520 of 1969) whereby the appellants sought to quash certain directions issued on June 28, 1969 and two resolutiqns passed on July 2 and 3, 1969, by the Delhi Stock Exchange, which adversely affected them."}}, {"text": "Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7128, "end_char": 7165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., New Delhi (the Respondent herein) is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., New Delhi (the Respondent herein) is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913."}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7237, "end_char": 7257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7327, "end_char": 7331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913"}}, {"text": "Desh Bandhu Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7430, "end_char": 7447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Desh Bandhu Gupta (Appellant No.", "canonical_name": "DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS"}}, {"text": "Desh Bandhu Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7534, "end_char": 7551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) carried on business as a share-broker in the firm name and style of Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. (Appellant No.", "canonical_name": "DESH BANDHU GUPTA & CO. & ORS"}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7643, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7686, "end_char": 7694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913"}}, {"text": "Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7702, "end_char": 7745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7750, "end_char": 7768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2561 dated June 27, 1969 issued under s. 16(1) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 the Central Government banned with immediate effect all forward trading in shares at all the Stock Exchanges in the country by declaring that \"no person, in the territory to which the said Act extends, shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contract for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of recongnised Stock Exchange\", but as regards the forward contracts which remained outstanding as on that date it was directed under the proviso that these could be closed or liquidated in the normal manner."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8475, "end_char": 8488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 28, 1969 at an emergent meeting held at I 0.30 a.m. the Board of Directors of the Respondent considered the abnormal situation arising from the ban imposed under the notification and decided to issue notice to all its\n\nmembrs directing them to submit their lists of outstanding transactions in all the securities on the cleared list and to deposit alongwith it interim margins in cash or approved shares calculated on the basis of differences between the rates of the last clearing and certain average specified rates fixed by it: Upon receipt of such notice dated June 28, 1969 from the Respondent the appellant No."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10292, "end_char": 10305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a telegram dated June 30, 1969, which was confirmed by a letter of even date the appellant No."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 was again called upon to submit his list alongwith the amount of differences, if any, by July 1, 1969 failing which he was informed that necessary action would be taken against him."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10928, "end_char": 10940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 stuck to his stand, the Respondent by its letter dated July 1, 1969 once again stressed that the action of the Board in calling for the list and margin money was in order and in accordance with the rules, byelaws, regulations, practices usages and previous resolutions of the Board and gave further opportunity to him to comply with the directions by July 2, 1969 upto 11.00 a.m. failing which further action was threatened."}}, {"text": "Desh Bandhu G Gupta & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11454, "end_char": 11479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 trading in the name and style of Desh Bandhu G Gupta & Co. be declared a defaulter for such failure and a notice in • that behalf be pasted on the Notice Board and appellant No."}}, {"text": "Article 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12451, "end_char": 12461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 3, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13419, "end_char": 13431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 was that all his transactions which remained outstanding as on June 27, 1969 were forward contracts pertaining to cleared securities and as such were affected by the Notification which banned all forward contracts, that these had to be adjusted at the last official closing rates, that the action of the Respondent in calling upon him to deposit interim margins calculated on the basis of certain average specified rates fixed by it was not warranted by the proviso therein but in fact amounted to carry over of those transactions which had been prohibited and, therefore, illegal and that both the resolutions, one dated July 2, 1969 whereby he was declared to be a defaulter and the other dated July 3, 1969 whereby he was called upon to deposit Rs."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13860, "end_char": 13870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 2 and 3, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14041, "end_char": 14059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 further contended that by passing the two resolutions, particularly the first one dated July 2, 1969 in contravention or breach of statutory Bye-laws and Regnlations his fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19 (1 )(f) of the Constitution had been infringed and, therefore, issuance of appropriate writ quashing the directions issued on June 28, 1969 and the two resolutions dated July 2 and 3, 1969 was sought."}}, {"text": "Articles of G Association and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14325, "end_char": 14364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18923, "end_char": 18933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th June 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19182, "end_char": 19196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the question depends upon proper construction of the notification dated June 27, 1969, it will be desirable to set out the said notification in extenso which ran thus :-\n\n\"New Delhi, the 27th June 1969."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19282, "end_char": 19292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19300, "end_char": 19337, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19484, "end_char": 19489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection ( 1) of section 16 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 ( 42 of 1956) the Central Government, being of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable speculation in securities in the whole of India, hereby declares that no person, in the territory to which the said Act exterids, shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of securities other than such spot delivery contract or contracts for cash or hand delivery or special delivery in any securities as is permissible under the said Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations of a recognised stock exchange:\n\nProvided that a contract other than a spot delivery conact or cont; cts for cash or hand delivery cir special delivery m any secunties on the Qeared Securities List of a recognised stock exchange may be entered into between: its members\n\nor through or wit)l any such member for the purpose of closing out or liquidating all existing contracts entered into upto the date of this notification and remaining to be performed after the said date, but such contracts shall be subject to the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the recognised stock exchange that come into force when further new dealings are prohibited in any securities on the Cleared Securities List and subject also to such terms and conditions, if any, as the Central Government may from time to time impose.\""}}, {"text": "Maitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26276, "end_char": 26282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the respondent, Shri Maitra, Joint Director (S.E.) Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, addressed a communication dated June 28, 1969 to the President in which he stated thus :\n\n\"As stated in the notification itself, all outstanding contracts which were not liquidated till the date of notification, will have to be liquidated in accordance with the relevant rules, bye-laws and regulations of your exchange in that regard."}}, {"text": "Mukerje", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29843, "end_char": 29850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass(') the principle, which was reiterated in Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha(') hM been stated by Mukerje<> J. thus :\n\n\"It is a well-settled principle of construction that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply\n\nit."}}, {"text": "July 2 and July 3, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31752, "end_char": 31775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our view, the directions dated June 28, 1969 as well as the two resolutions passed by the respondent on July 2 and July 3, 1969 were proper and justified and the appellants' case on merits was rightly rejected by the High Court."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_385_392_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• •\n\nA.K.A.CT.V.CT. MEENAKSHISUNDARAM CHETTIAR\n\nA.K.A.CT.V.CT. VENKATACHALAM CHETTIAR\n\nFebruary 23, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] B\n\nCourl Fee.J Act, 1870-S. 7(iv) (/)-Suit for accounts--l\\recessary for plaintiff to give fair estimate of the amount for which he sues-Court can reject the plaint under Or. Vil r. 11 C.P.C. if plaintiff arbitrarily and deliberately undervalues the relief.\n\nThe power of attorney by which the plaintiff constituted the defendant as his agent, authorised the defendant amongst other things to discharge debt! and invest moneys on behalf of the plaintiff. In the suit filed by the plaintiff, the relief claimed was for directing the defendant to render true and correct\n\nao;.counts of all transactions entered into by him and for amounts received by him on behalf of the plaintiff.\n\nIn his written statement the defendant gavo details of amounts invested by him in banks and other relevant details.\n\nAn issue whether the suit had been properly valued and proper court-fee D ha<l been paid was answered by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nOn appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court held that since the plaintiff had quantified the amouni payable, by the defendant, the suit should have been valued on the basis of amount quantified and that not having been done, the :suit had not been properly valued .\n\nAllowin2 the appeal,\n\nHELD: (1) The estittnlte of the relief as given by the plaintiff '\"a~ adequate and reasonable and was not an under-estimate.\n\n{392C]\n\n(2) The High Court was in error in holding that thet plaint was clea-r, that apart from the money which the defendant was liable to pay to him as\n\nhis agent the plaintifl' had quantified the' amount payable by the defend>nt. The F suit was not only for accounting of the amounts received but also for an account of the transactions of the defendant as power' of attorney agent.\n\nHad the defendant been able to establish that in the course of his management he had invested moneys according to the power of attorney, he would have properly .accounted for his management. The defendant himself had stated that the\n\nMiit was for accounting\n\n0of his management as power of attorney agent.\n\nHe pleaded that the moneys had been remitted to the plaintiff by investment or G <>therwise.\n\n[389H-390B]\n\n(3) The. amount of the court-fee payable in suits for accounts as provided for in s. 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is according to the amount at\n\nwhich relief sought i!ll valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.\n\nIn a suit for accounts it is not possible for the plaintiff to estimate correctly the amount which he may be entitled to because in a suit in which the plaintiff <\\Sb H for accounting regarding the mana.gcmcnt by a power of attorney agent he might not know the state of affairs of the defendant's management and the amount to which he would be entitled to on accounting. [390G-H]\n\n(4) Even where s. 35 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 is applicable, it is necessa.ry that the plaintiff should give a fair estimate of the amount for which he seeks relief.\n\nOrder VII H.. 11 CPO casts a duty on the court to reject a plaint when the relief claimed is under-valued.\n\n[391 D-E]\n\nChillakuru Chenchurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchuran1i Reddy, I.L.R.\n\nB 1969 AP. 1042 (F.B. ), approved.\n\n(5) Before corning to the conclusion that the suit is under-valued the cou:t will have to take into account that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which \\Vould result after taking all the account.\n\nIf he Cannot estimate th_e' exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for accounts which is adequate and reasonable. The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately under-value the relief.\n\nAll that is required is that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate his relief and the estimate should not be a deliberate under-estimation. [391 H- 392 Bl CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 504 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-12-1978 of the High Court of Madras at Madras in Appeal No. 408/72.\n\nK. Rajendra Chaudhary for the Appellant.\n\nA. T. M. Sampath for the Respondent.\n\nA. V. Rangam for the Intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1021 of 1979 is filed by the plintiff in the suit O.S. No. 83 of,1969 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, against the two orders passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Appeal No. 408 of 1972 holding that the suit had not been properly valued for court-fee and directing the petitioner to pay court-fee on the valuation of Rs. 9,74,598.35 and requiring that the deficit court-fee both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal be paid within six weeks from the date of the order.\n\nOn hearing the petitioner we directed notice to the respondents calling upon them to show carnie why special leave should not be granted and the appeal allowed and remitted to the High Court for disposal of all the issues. On hearing the respondents we granted Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thus heard.\n\nThe appellant filed the suit praying for a decree against the respondent/ defendant to render true and correct account of all the transactions of the respondent as the petitioner's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also of all the amounts received by him as the agent of the petitioner including the amount recovered by him from Alagappa Chettiar and pay to the petitioner the amount found dne on such rendition of accounts. In the written statement filed by the defendant it was con-\n\n• ..\n\nMEENAKSHISUNDARAM v. VENKATACHALAM (Kailasam, 1.) 387\n\ntended that the suit is not properly valued and proper court-fee has not A been paid. The trial court framed an issue as to whether the suit had been properly .valued and proper court-fee had been paid. It answered the issue holding that the plaint has been properly valued and proper court-fee has been paid. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved that the defendant is liable to account and that the suit was barred by limitation, On an appeal B by the plaintiff to the High Court, the High Court found that the plaint made it clear that apart from the money which the defendant is liable to pay to the plaintiff as his agent, the plaintiff has quantified the amount at Rs. 9,74,598.35 as payable by the defendant to him which is made clear in allegations in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint and therefore the plaintiff ought to have valued the suit at Rs. 9,74,598.35. As C the appeal was disposed of on the ground that the plaint had not been properly valued we are concerned in this petition in determining whether the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct.\n\nThe High Court has passed its conclusion on a reference to paragraph 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint. We will now consider the pleadings D in the case. In paragraph 5 it is stated that on 22nd January, 1965, the plaintiff executed a General Power of Attorney at Karaikudi authorising the defendant to transact all his business, sell his properties, receive the sale price and other monies etc.\n\nThis paragraph refers to the General Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on 22nd January, 1965.\n\nThe terms of the power of E attorney will be referred to in due course. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint which have been relied on by the High Court may be set out:-\n\n\"6. On 27-3-1963, the Plaintiff and the Defendant retired from the said partnership and the other two brothers continued the business under the same name, Alagappa taking on the shares of the plaintiff and Defendant and all their assets in the firm for a consideration or hls paying $ 6,50,000/- equivalent le Rs. 16,12,000/- at the rate ot Rs. 248/- per\n\n100 Dollars to each of them, so that Alagappa became entitled to 314 share and Annamalai to 1/4 share in the continuing firm.\n\n7. As the Plaintiff's agent and on behalf of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, on or about 13-4-1965 received from Alagappa $ 6,50,000/- equivalent to Rs. 16,12,000/- at the rate of 248 rupees per 100 Dollars for the 1/4th share of the Plaintiff in the said firm taken over by Alagappa.\n\n8. The Defendant from Madras has sent to the Plaintiff at Kottaiyer Rs. 25,000/- on 25-10-1965, Rs. 1,30,750/- on\n\n7-2-1966, Rs. 25,311.65 on 7-2-1965 (Rs. 25,000/- plus Rs. 311.65 for interest) and Rs. 4,36,340/- on 11-8-1967.\n\n9. The Defendant as Plaintiff's agent is bound to render true and correct account to the Plaintiff of all the amounts received by him in the course of the agency, to wit, from 22-1-1965 the amounts received from Alagappa.\n\nIn paragraphs 6 and 7 the plaint refers to the plaintiff and the defendant retiring from the partnership and Alagappa taking the shares of the plaintiff and the defendant for a consideration of his paying equivalent to Rs. 16,12,000/- to each of the plaintiff and the defendant.\n\nIn paragraph 7 it is stated that the defendant as plaintiff's. agent received Rs. 16,12,000/-. Paragraph 8 .refers to certain payments which the plaintiff received from the defendant. Paragraph 9 of the plaint states that the defendant as plaintiff's agent is bound to render true and correct account to the plaintiff of all the amounts received by him in the course of agency, to wit, from 22nd January, 1965 the amounts received from Alagappa. It may be noted that the reliefs sought for is for rendering true and correct account to the plaintiff of ~11 the amounts received by him in the course of the agency. The Power of Attorney was given on 22nd Jannary, 1965 and thus the relief is not confined to the amount payable by Alagappa alone.\n\nIn paragraph 10 which is not taken note of by the High Court the plaintiff alleged that on 2nd September, 1967 and 4th October, 1967, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant requiring him to send the accounts of the agency.\n\nThese letters were refused. Again on 5th December, 1967, the plaintiff issued a lawyer's notice to render accounts and for payment of the amounts due from him. This notice was also returned.\n\nThe defendant did not render any accounts.\n\nAt this stage reference may be made to the Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on 22nd January, 1965.\n\nThe plaintiff by the Power of Attorney dated 22nd January, 1965, constituted the defendant as his Attorney and authorised the defendant to act for the plaintiff. It is sufficient to state that the power authorises G in general the defendant to manage all the affairs of the plaintiff. Paragraph 3 bf the Power of Attorney empowers the defendant to pay and settle all the debts of the plaintiff and obtain full and effectual receipts and releases for the same.\n\nParagraph 5 empoweys the defendant amongst other things to sign and execute any discharge or release in connection with Charges or Bills of Sale. Paragraph 10 gives the power H to the defendant to charge or mortgage any of the plaintiff's property and paragraph 11 to borrow such sums of money and upon such tenns as the Attorney shall deem expedient. Paragraph 19 confers the power\n\n• •\n\nMllENAKSHISUNDARAM v. VENKATACHALAM (Kailasam, J.) 389\n\non the defendant to invest moneys upon mortgages or charges of land etc. In short there can be no dispute that complete J?OWer of management is given to the defendant and the defendant could, in exercising; this power, discharge debts, invest moneys on behalf of the plaintiff etc.\n\nWhen the plaintiff in paragraph 7 of the plaint demanded the agent to render true and correct account to the plaintiff of all tho amount& received by him in the course of agency i.e. by virtue of the power conferred on 22nd January, 1965, the plaintiff is entitled to know as to what amounts the defendant received during tho course of his management and what amounts he had invested or otherwise dealt with.\n\nAt the date of the plaint the plaintiff was not aware as to the amount of moneys that were due by the defendant to him. The letters and the lawyer's notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendant were unanswered.\n\nIf the defendant had invested or otherwise dealt with moneys according to the power conferred on him nothing would be due to the plaintiff on accounts being taken. The relief claimed for in the plaint in para•\n\ngraph 14(a) of the plaint is for directing the defendant to render true and correct acconnt of all transactions made by the defendant as the plaintiff's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also for all the amounts received by the defendant on the plaintiff's behalf as his agent inclnding the amount recovered by him from Alagappa and pay the plaintiff what may be found due to him. This paragraph makes it clear that what was required was not only an account of the amount recovered by the defendant from Alagappa but also an account of all the transactions of the defendant as the plaintiff's agent from 22nd January, 1965.\n\nA reading 0£ the written statement also makes it clear that the plaint was understood by the defendant as a suit for accounting of his management as a power of attorney agent. In paragraph 7 of the written\n\nstatement the defendant states that out of 6,50,000 dollars got for the F plaintiff's one-fonrth share, 40,000 dollars were invested in fixed deposit in plaintiff's name with the Indian Overseas Bank, Kuala Lumpnr and 10,000 dollars in plantiff's V. CT. M. Accounts on 10th April, 1965.\n\nOn the same day the remaining 6,00,000 dollars were invested with Alagappa Chetttiar himself who had credited the amount in plantiff's name in his accounts. If the defendant was able to prove these con- G tentions the accounts as required by the plaintiff would have been satisfactorily rendered , and very little wonld have been due by the defendant to the plaintiff Qllracconnting. The High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the plaint is clear that apart from the money which the defendant is liable to pay to him as his agent the plaintiff has quantified the amonnt at Rs. 9,74,598.35 as payable by H the defendant to him. In our view, the plaint has been misread.\n\nThough paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 refer to the transactions in which the\n\nplaintiff is entitled to Rs. 16,12,000, paragraphs 10,11 and 14(a) make it clear that the suit was for accounting not only regarding Rs. 16,12,000 but also for the management by the defendant as power of attorney agent. The power, as already noted, confers a right on the defendant to invest moneys. If the defendant has shown in the written statement itself is able to establish that in the course of his management he had invested moneys according to the power conferred on him, he would have properly accounted for his management. In the written statement the defendant himself had pleaded that the moneys which he recieved from Alagappa have been remitted to the plaintiff by investment and otherwise. The conclusion arrived at by th~: High Court is, therefore, unsupportable.\n\nThe provision relating to the levy ot court-fee for a suit on accounts is found in section 7(iv) (f) of the Court Fees' Act, 1870 which runs as follows :-\n\n\"7. The amount of fee payable nnder this Act in the suits next hereinafter mootioned shall be computed as follows :-\n\n(i) x x x\n\n(ii) x x x\n\n(iii) x x x\n\n(iv) In suits-\n\n(a) x x x\n\n(b) x x x\n\n(c) x x x\n\n(d) x x x\n\n(e) x x x ( f) for accounts- According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.\n\nIn all such suits the plaintiff shall state th_e amount at which he values the relief sought.\" Reading this provision by itself the amount of court-fee paya]?le in G suits for accounts is according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. The plaintiff is required to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. In suits for accounts it is not possible for the plain~ to estimate correctly the amount which he may be entitled to for, as in the present case, when the plaintiff asks for accounting regarding the management by a II powe.r of attorney agent, he might not know the state of affairs of the defendant's management and the amount to which he would be entitled to on accounting. But it is necessary that the a1nount at which he\n\n• •\n\nMEENAKSHISUNDARAM v. VENKATACHALAl)I (Kai/asam, J.) 391\n\nvalues the relief sought for should be a reasonable estimate. Section A 35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, XIV, of 1955, is as follows :-\n\n\"In a suit for accounts, fee shall be computed on the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint.\"\n\nSub-section (2) of section 35 provides :\n\n\"Where the amount payable to the plaintiff as ascertained in the suit is in excess of the amount as estimated in the plaint, no decree directing payment of the amount as so ascertained shall be passed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the amount as ascertained, is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the Court may nx, the decree shall be limited to the account to which the fee paid extends.\"\n\nWhile section 35(1) permits the plaintiff to pay the court-fee on the amount estimated by him sub-section (2) safeguards against the loss of revenue for it requires that no decree for any amount in excess of the amount as estimated in the plaint shall be passed unless the difference between the fee actually paid and the fees that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the amount as ascertained, is paid. But here again it is necessary that the plaintiff should give a fair C!ltimate of the amount for which he sues. Order 7, Rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code, requires the co_urt to return the plaint if the relief claimed is undervalued.\n\nOrder 7, Rule 11, runs thus :\n\n\"11. The phiint shall be rejected in the following cases :-\n\n(a) x x x\n\n(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff on beini.; required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;'_'\n\n(c) x x x\n\n(d) x x x\n\nThis section casts a duty on the Court to reject the plaint when the relief claimed is undervalued. If on the materials available before it the Court is satisfied that the value of relief as estimated by the plaintiff in a suit for accounts is undervalued the plaint is liable to be rejected.\n\nIt is therdore necessary that the plaintiff should take care that the valuation is , adequate and reasonable taking into account the circums- H tances of the case. In comin~ to the conclusion that the suit is undervalued the court will have to take into account that in a suit for\n\naccounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after the taking of the accounts. If he cannot estimate the exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for accounts which is adequate and reasonable.\n\nThe plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief. A ful! Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a decision in Chillakuru Chenchurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchurami Reddy,(') after elaborate consideration of the case law on the subject bas rightly observed that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate hi, s relief and that the estimate should not be a deliberate under-estimation.\n\nOn a consideration of the entire circumstances of the case we are not atisfied that the estimate of the relief as givcm by the plaintiff is inadequate or unreasonable or .a deliberate under-estimation.\n\nIn the result, we allow the appeal set aside. the judgment of the Madras High Court and remit it back to the High Court for disposal of all th1~ issues arising in the appeal. The cost will abide by the result.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal al/awed.\n\n(!) l.L.R. 1969 A.P. 1042 (F.B.)", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "A.CT.V.CT. MEENAKSHISUNDARAM CHETTIAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K.A.CT.V.CT. MEENAKSHISUNDARAM CHETTIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.CT.V.CT. VENKATACHALAM CHETTIAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K.A.CT.V.CT. VENKATACHALAM CHETTIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATACHALAM CHETTIAR\n\nFebruary 23, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 7(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7(iv)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2413, "end_char": 2424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act, 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2432, "end_char": 2452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2952, "end_char": 2957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Court Fees Act, 1870", "statute": "the Court Fees Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2965, "end_char": 3016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4141, "end_char": 4171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-12-1978 of the High Court of Madras at Madras in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4195, "end_char": 4216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajendra Chaudhary for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4275, "end_char": 4287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4353, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-Special Leave Petition (Civil) No."}}, {"text": "22nd January, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5416, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed the suit praying for a decree against the respondent/ defendant to render true and correct account of all the transactions of the respondent as the petitioner's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also of all the amounts received by him as the agent of the petitioner including the amount recovered by him from Alagappa Chettiar and pay to the petitioner the amount found dne on such rendition of accounts."}}, {"text": "Alagappa Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed the suit praying for a decree against the respondent/ defendant to render true and correct account of all the transactions of the respondent as the petitioner's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also of all the amounts received by him as the agent of the petitioner including the amount recovered by him from Alagappa Chettiar and pay to the petitioner the amount found dne on such rendition of accounts.", "canonical_name": "Alagappa Chetttiar"}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7163, "end_char": 7172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 5 it is stated that on 22nd January, 1965, the plaintiff executed a General Power of Attorney at Karaikudi authorising the defendant to transact all his business, sell his properties, receive the sale price and other monies etc."}}, {"text": "27-3-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7608, "end_char": 7617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27-3-1963, the Plaintiff and the Defendant retired from the said partnership and the other two brothers continued the business under the same name, Alagappa taking on the shares of the plaintiff and Defendant and all their assets in the firm for a consideration or hls paying $ 6,50,000/- equivalent le Rs."}}, {"text": "Alagappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7756, "end_char": 7764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27-3-1963, the Plaintiff and the Defendant retired from the said partnership and the other two brothers continued the business under the same name, Alagappa taking on the shares of the plaintiff and Defendant and all their assets in the firm for a consideration or hls paying $ 6,50,000/- equivalent le Rs."}}, {"text": "Annamalai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "248/- per\n\n100 Dollars to each of them, so that Alagappa became entitled to 314 share and Annamalai to 1/4 share in the continuing firm."}}, {"text": "13-4-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Plaintiff's agent and on behalf of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, on or about 13-4-1965 received from Alagappa $ 6,50,000/- equivalent to Rs."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8390, "end_char": 8396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Defendant from Madras has sent to the Plaintiff at Kottaiyer Rs."}}, {"text": "Kottaiyer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8426, "end_char": 8435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Defendant from Madras has sent to the Plaintiff at Kottaiyer Rs."}}, {"text": "25-10-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8452, "end_char": 8462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,000/- on 25-10-1965, Rs."}}, {"text": "7-2-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8510, "end_char": 8518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,311.65 on 7-2-1965 (Rs."}}, {"text": "11-8-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8585, "end_char": 8594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,36,340/- on 11-8-1967."}}, {"text": "22nd Jannary, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9748, "end_char": 9766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Power of Attorney was given on 22nd Jannary, 1965 and thus the relief is not confined to the amount payable by Alagappa alone."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 10 which is not taken note of by the High Court the plaintiff alleged that on 2nd September, 1967 and 4th October, 1967, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant requiring him to send the accounts of the agency."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10104, "end_char": 10122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again on 5th December, 1967, the plaintiff issued a lawyer's notice to render accounts and for payment of the amounts due from him."}}, {"text": "Alagappa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12784, "end_char": 12792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relief claimed for in the plaint in para•\n\ngraph 14(a) of the plaint is for directing the defendant to render true and correct acconnt of all transactions made by the defendant as the plaintiff's agent from 22nd January, 1965 and also for all the amounts received by the defendant on the plaintiff's behalf as his agent inclnding the amount recovered by him from Alagappa and pay the plaintiff what may be found due to him."}}, {"text": "Indian Overseas Bank, Kuala Lumpnr", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13475, "end_char": 13509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 7 of the written\n\nstatement the defendant states that out of 6,50,000 dollars got for the F plaintiff's one-fonrth share, 40,000 dollars were invested in fixed deposit in plaintiff's name with the Indian Overseas Bank, Kuala Lumpnr and 10,000 dollars in plantiff's V. CT."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13565, "end_char": 13581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Accounts on 10th April, 1965."}}, {"text": "Alagappa Chetttiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13650, "end_char": 13668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day the remaining 6,00,000 dollars were invested with Alagappa Chetttiar himself who had credited the amount in plantiff's name in his accounts.", "canonical_name": "Alagappa Chetttiar"}}, {"text": "Qllracconnting", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13952, "end_char": 13966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the defendant was able to prove these con- G tentions the accounts as required by the plaintiff would have been satisfactorily rendered , and very little wonld have been due by the defendant to the plaintiff Qllracconnting."}}, {"text": "section 7(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15206, "end_char": 15219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Suits Valuation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16594, "end_char": 16613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16766, "end_char": 16776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17308, "end_char": 17321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 7, Rule 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 7, Rule 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17969, "end_char": 17985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19195, "end_char": 19220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a decision in Chillakuru Chenchurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchurami Reddy,(') after elaborate consideration of the case law on the subject bas rightly observed that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate hi, s relief and that the estimate should not be a deliberate under-estimation."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19810, "end_char": 19827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the judgment of the Madras High Court and remit it back to the High Court for disposal of all th1~ issues arising in the appeal."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19955, "end_char": 19961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal al/awed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_393_398_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "\" •\n\nHUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS.\n\nHOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA\n\nFebruary 26, 1979\n\n(P. N. BHAGWATI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950-Art. 21-Womtn kept in jail by way of 'protective custody'-Violation of personal liberty .\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure 1973-Ss. 167(5) & 468-Releau of under-trial prisoner 1vlun Magistrate not satisfied with necessity of c, ontinuing i1ivestigation\n\n01A charge-sheel not filed within limitation.\n\nAt the further hearing of the case on release of under-trials in the State of Bihar,\n\nHELD : (a) (i) The expression 'protective custody' is an euphemism calculated to disguise what is really and i11 truth nothing but imPrisonmcnt. It is an expression intended to appease the conscience. This so-called 'protective custody' is nothing short of a blatant violation of personal liberty guaranteed\n\nunder Art. 21 of the. Constitution, because there is no provision of law under D which a \\\\'Oman can be kept in jail by way of 'protective custody' or merely because she is required for the purpose of giving evidence. [395C-p]\n\n(ii) The Government in a social welfare state must set up rescue and welfare homes for the purp0&e of taking care of women and children who have nowhere el!!e to go and who are otherwise uncared for by society.\n\n{395E]\n\n(b) Th~ under-trial prisoners against whom charge.-sheets have not been filed by the police within the period of limitation provided for in sub-section\n\n(2) of section 468 cannot be proceeded against at all and they would be entitled to be released forthwith, as their further detention \\VOuld be unlawful and in violation of their fundamental right under Art. 21. [397 G]\n\n(c) The provision of •· 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure! 1973 requiring the investigating officer to satisfy the fagistrate on the necessity of continuation of the investigation beyond a period of six months has not been complied with, because there are quite a few cases where the offences charged against the under-trial prisoners are' triable as sumn1ons cases and yet they are languishing in jail for a long number of years far exceeding six months.\n\n[398CJ\n\nAnd the Court directed that :-\n\n(a) All women and children in thei jails in the State of Bihar under 'protective custcx:Iy' should be released and taken forthwith to '\\velfare homes , or rescue homes and should be kept there and properly looked after.\n\n[395F]\n\n__ )c.\n\n(b) The State Government should scrutinise the cases of under-trial prisoners a.nd release uch of them who are not liable to be proceeded against by reason of the period of limitation provided in •· 468 Cr.P.C. having expired. [397H]\n\n(c) The State Govt. should inquire into those cases \\vhere the investigation has been going on for a period of more than six months without the satisfaction\n\nA of the Magistrate as envisaged in s. 167(5) and to release the under-trials unless the necessary orders of the Magistrate are obtained within one month. [398D- El\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 57 of 1979.\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners .\n\n. B Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh and S. N. J ha for the Respondent.\n\nS, V. Gupte, Attorney General, R. N. Sachthey for the Attorney General.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-The Government of Bihar has tiled before us a note containing the proposed clarification of paragraph 2(e) of the Government Order dated 9th February, 1979, pursuant to the suggestion made by us in our order dated 19th February, 1979. This clarification states in paragraph one that where the police investigation in a case has been delayed by over two years, the Superintendent of Police will see to it that the investigation is completed expeditidusly\n\nand final report or charge-sheet is submitted by the police as quickly as possible and the responsibility to ensure this has been laid personally on the Superintendent of Police. We are glad to. note that the State Government has responded to our suggestion but we re not at all sure whether it is enough merely to provide that the investigation would be completed expeditiously and the final report or chargesheet submitted as quickly as possible.\n\nWe arc of the view that a reasonable time limit should be set by the State Government within which these steps should be taken, so that no further delay is occasioned in the submission of the final report or charge-sheet.\n\nWe fail to see how any police investigation can take so Jong as two years and if police investigation cannot be completed within two years, then there must be something radically wrong with the police force in the State of Bihar. It appears that there are a number of cases where police investigation has not been completed for over two years and persons have been in jail as under-trial prisoners for Jong periods. 'Ibis is a shocking state of affairs so far as the administration of law and. order is concerned.\n\nWe would, therefore, suggest that in those cases where police investigation has been delayed by over two years, the final report or charge-sheet must be submitted by the police within a further period of three months and if that is not done, the State Government might well withdraw such cases, because if after a period of over two years plus an additional period of three months, the police is not able to file a charge-sheet, one can reasonably assume that there is no case against the arrested persons. ~--\n\nThe Government of Bihar has also filed a connter-affidavit made by Mr. Mrinmaya Chaudhry, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons\n\n(1), Bihar setting out the particulars in regard to 18 under-trial who have been ordered to be released by us on their personal bond.\n\nThe p:irticulars given in this counter-affidavit make very distressing reading.\n\nIt appears from this counter-affidavit tliat there are quite a few women prisoners who are in jail without even being accused of any offence, merely because they happen to be victims of an offence or they are required for (he purpose of giving evidence o.r they are in \"protective custody\". The expression 'protective custody' is a euphemism calculated to disguise what is really and in truth nothing but imprisonment. It is an expression intended to appease the conscience. It cannot be gainsaid that women who have been kept in jail under the guise of 'protective custody' have sullere<l involuntary deprivation of liberty for long periods without any fault on their part.\n\nWe may point out that this so-called 'protective custody' is nothing short of a blatant violation of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, because we are not aware of any provision of law under which a woman can be kept in jail by way of \"protective custody\" or merely because she is required for the purpose of giving evidence. The Government in a social welfare state must set up rescue and welfare homes for the purpose of\n\ntaking care of women and children who have nowhere else to go and who are otherwise uncared for by the society.\n\nIt is the duty of government to protect women and children who are homeless or destitute and it is surprising that the Government of Bihar should have come forward with the explanation that they were constrained to keep women in 'protective custody' in jail because a welfare home maintained by the State was shut down.\n\nWe direct that all women and children who are in the jails in the State of Bihar under 'protective\n\nustody' or who are in jail because their presence is required for giving evidence or who are victims of offence should be released and taken forthwith to welfare homes or rescue homes and should be kept there and properly looked after.\n\nWe also find from the counter-affidavit that Bhola Mahto was in jail from 23rd November, 1968 until 16th February, 1979 when he was released on his personal bond pursuant to the directions given by us by our order dated 5th February, 1979. He is accused in a case under Section 363 & 368 of the Indian Penal Code and he was committed to the court of Sessions on 13th September, 1972 but his sessions trial has not yet commenced. It is amazing that a sessions\n\ntrial of a person committed to the court of sessions as far back as 13th September 1972 should not have been commenced for about seven years.\n\nWe direct that the Sessions Judge, Patna should forward to this Court through the High Court of Patna an explanation as to why the sessions trial of Bhola Mahto has not yet commenced.\n\nThis is also a matter to which we would invite the attention of the High Court of Patna.\n\nThe same may be said also of Ram Sagar Mistry who was admitted in jail on 28th March, 1971 and committed to the Court of Sessions on 28th June, 1972 on a charge un.der section 395 of the Indian Penal Code but whose trial has not yet commenced before the Court of Sessions though a period of more than six years has elapsed since the date of his commitment and a period of eight years since the date of his imprisonment.\n\nThe counter-affidavit shows that Babloo Rai who is reported to be a Naxalite is in jail since 15th May, 1975.\n\nHe is alleged to be involved . in five cases which are set out in .the counter-affidavit.\n\nSo far as he is concerned, it will be open to him to make an application to the Magistrate before whom he is produced, for being released on bail or on his personal bond and the Magistrate will deal with his application in accordance with broad gnidelines laid down by us in our judgment dated 12th February, 1979.\n\nWe are not at all sure on reading the counter-affidavit whether the under-trial prisoners whose particulars are given there, are being produced periodically before the Magistrate as required by the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n\nWe should like to know from the Government in a proper affidavit to be filed before us on or before 3rd March, 1979 whether these under-trial prisoners were periodically produced before the Magistrate in compliance with the requirement of the proviso to Section 167(2). The proviso to Section 167(2) says that the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person beyond the period of 15 days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so.\n\nWe hope and trust that in these cases the Magistrates concerned did not act mechanically but applied their mind and satisfied themselves that adequate grounds existed for remanding these persons to judicial custody from time to time over a period varying from two to ten years, though we fail to see how the Magistrates could possibly have been satisfied about the existence of adequate grounds for remanding these persons to judicial custody for such long periods of time ranging from two to ten years for the purpose of police investigation.\n\nThis is also a matter which we would like the High Court of Patna to consider after making a detailed inquiry.\n\n...\n\n\" •\n\nThe Government of Bihar has also filed before us a list giving par- A ticulars of the under-trial prisoners who are confined in 17 jails in Bihar for more than 18 months as on 1st February, 1979. The chart shows that there are under-trial prisoners confined in these jails for Joni: periods of time and sometimes even exceeding the maximum punishment which could be awarded to them even if they are found guilty of\n\nthe, offences charged against them.\n\nTo take an example, we find at Item 30 one Lambodar Gorain has been in Ranchi Jail since 18th June,\n\n1970 for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act for which the maximum punishment is two years, with the result that he has been in jail as an under-trial prisoner for St years for an offence for which even if convicted, he could not have been awarded more than two years' imprisonment.\n\nThere are many such cases in the chart, but it is not possible to identify them easily from the chart because the chart rnntains a large number of names of under-trial prisoners.\n\nWe would, therefore, direct the Government of Bihar to submit to us on or before 3rd March, 1979 a revised chart showing yearwise break-up of the particulars of the under-trial prisoners in these jails after dividing them broadly into two categories, one of minor offences and the other of major offences.\n\nOur attention has also been drawn to Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which in sub-section ( 1) provides that except ' as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code, no court shall take cogni- E zance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation and under sub-section ( 2) the period of limitation provided is six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only, one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, It would, therefore, be seen that the under-trial prisoners against whom charge-sheets have not been filed by the police within the period of limitation provided in sub-section (2) of Section 468 cannot be proceeded against at all and they would be entitled to be released forthwith, as their further detention would bo unlawful and in violation of their fundamental right under Article 21. We, therefore, direct 'the Government of Bihar to scrutinise the cases of under-trial prisoners charged with offences which are punishable with fine only or punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years and release such of them who are not liable to be proceeded against by reason of the period Of limitation having expired.\n\nThis direction shall be carried out by the Government of Bihar within a\n\nA period of six weeks from today and compliance reports containing particnlars shall be submitted to this Court, first at the end of four weeks and then at the end of the next two weeks.\n\nWe also find from section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that if in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence, unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary.\n\nWe are not at all C sure whether this provision has been complied with, because there are\n\nquite a few cases where the offences charged agaiust the under-trial prisoners are triable as summons cau1 and yet they are languishing in jail for a long number of years far exceeding six months.\n\nWe, therefore, direct the Government of Bihar to inquire into these cases and\n\nwhere it is found that the investigation has been going on for a period of more than six months without satisfying the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary, the Government of Bihar will release the under-trial prisoners, unless the necessary orders .of the Magistrate are obtained within a period of one month from today.\n\nWe would also request th.e High. Court to look into this matter and satisfy itself whether the Magistrates in Bihar have been complying with the provisions of section 167 (5).\n\nWe adjourn tge hearing of the Writ Petition to 5th March, 1979 and on that date, we shall proceed to hear and dispose of the W.rit Petition on merits on the vanous question11 arising for determination.\n\nN.V.K.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 167(5) & 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 851, "end_char": 858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1453, "end_char": 1464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1705, "end_char": 1731, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[398CJ\n\nAnd the Court directed that :-\n\n(a) All women and children in thei jails in the State of Bihar under 'protective custcx:Iy' should be released and taken forthwith to '\\velfare homes , or rescue homes and should be kept there and properly looked after."}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2611, "end_char": 2617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 167(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2837, "end_char": 2846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3027, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioners ."}}, {"text": "B Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh and S. N. J ha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh and S. N. J ha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. N. J ha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh and S. N. J ha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, V. Gupte, Attorney General, R. N. Sachthey for the Attorney General."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3164, "end_char": 3178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, V. Gupte, Attorney General, R. N. Sachthey for the Attorney General."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3247, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-The Government of Bihar has tiled before us a note containing the proposed clarification of paragraph 2(e) of the Government Order dated 9th February, 1979, pursuant to the suggestion made by us in our order dated 19th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3264, "end_char": 3283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-The Government of Bihar has tiled before us a note containing the proposed clarification of paragraph 2(e) of the Government Order dated 9th February, 1979, pursuant to the suggestion made by us in our order dated 19th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "Mrinmaya Chaudhry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5486, "end_char": 5503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~--\n\nThe Government of Bihar has also filed a connter-affidavit made by Mr. Mrinmaya Chaudhry, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons\n\n(1), Bihar setting out the particulars in regard to 18 under-trial who have been ordered to be released by us on their personal bond."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6572, "end_char": 6582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhola Mahto", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7708, "end_char": 7719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also find from the counter-affidavit that Bhola Mahto was in jail from 23rd November, 1968 until 16th February, 1979 when he was released on his personal bond pursuant to the directions given by us by our order dated 5th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7737, "end_char": 7756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also find from the counter-affidavit that Bhola Mahto was in jail from 23rd November, 1968 until 16th February, 1979 when he was released on his personal bond pursuant to the directions given by us by our order dated 5th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "16th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7763, "end_char": 7782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also find from the counter-affidavit that Bhola Mahto was in jail from 23rd November, 1968 until 16th February, 1979 when he was released on his personal bond pursuant to the directions given by us by our order dated 5th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "5th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also find from the counter-affidavit that Bhola Mahto was in jail from 23rd November, 1968 until 16th February, 1979 when he was released on his personal bond pursuant to the directions given by us by our order dated 5th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "Section 363 & 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7933, "end_char": 7950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7958, "end_char": 7975, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "13th September, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is accused in a case under Section 363 & 368 of the Indian Penal Code and he was committed to the court of Sessions on 13th September, 1972 but his sessions trial has not yet commenced."}}, {"text": "13th September 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8191, "end_char": 8210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is amazing that a sessions\n\ntrial of a person committed to the court of sessions as far back as 13th September 1972 should not have been commenced for about seven years."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8348, "end_char": 8367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We direct that the Sessions Judge, Patna should forward to this Court through the High Court of Patna an explanation as to why the sessions trial of Bhola Mahto has not yet commenced."}}, {"text": "Ram Sagar Mistry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8570, "end_char": 8586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same may be said also of Ram Sagar Mistry who was admitted in jail on 28th March, 1971 and committed to the Court of Sessions on 28th June, 1972 on a charge un.der section 395 of the Indian Penal Code but whose trial has not yet commenced before the Court of Sessions though a period of more than six years has elapsed since the date of his commitment and a period of eight years since the date of his imprisonment."}}, {"text": "28th March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8615, "end_char": 8631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same may be said also of Ram Sagar Mistry who was admitted in jail on 28th March, 1971 and committed to the Court of Sessions on 28th June, 1972 on a charge un.der section 395 of the Indian Penal Code but whose trial has not yet commenced before the Court of Sessions though a period of more than six years has elapsed since the date of his commitment and a period of eight years since the date of his imprisonment."}}, {"text": "28th June, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8674, "end_char": 8689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same may be said also of Ram Sagar Mistry who was admitted in jail on 28th March, 1971 and committed to the Court of Sessions on 28th June, 1972 on a charge un.der section 395 of the Indian Penal Code but whose trial has not yet commenced before the Court of Sessions though a period of more than six years has elapsed since the date of his commitment and a period of eight years since the date of his imprisonment."}}, {"text": "section 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8709, "end_char": 8720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8728, "end_char": 8745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Babloo Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8995, "end_char": 9005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter-affidavit shows that Babloo Rai who is reported to be a Naxalite is in jail since 15th May, 1975."}}, {"text": "15th May, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9056, "end_char": 9070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter-affidavit shows that Babloo Rai who is reported to be a Naxalite is in jail since 15th May, 1975."}}, {"text": "12th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9458, "end_char": 9477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as he is concerned, it will be open to him to make an application to the Magistrate before whom he is produced, for being released on bail or on his personal bond and the Magistrate will deal with his application in accordance with broad gnidelines laid down by us in our judgment dated 12th February, 1979."}}, {"text": "Section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9689, "end_char": 9703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9711, "end_char": 9743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We should like to know from the Government in a proper affidavit to be filed before us on or before 3rd March, 1979 whether these under-trial prisoners were periodically produced before the Magistrate in compliance with the requirement of the proviso to Section 167(2)."}}, {"text": "Section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10000, "end_char": 10014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10031, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "1st February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11055, "end_char": 11073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\n\" •\n\nThe Government of Bihar has also filed before us a list giving par- A ticulars of the under-trial prisoners who are confined in 17 jails in Bihar for more than 18 months as on 1st February, 1979."}}, {"text": "Lambodar Gorain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11375, "end_char": 11390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To take an example, we find at Item 30 one Lambodar Gorain has been in Ranchi Jail since 18th June,\n\n1970 for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act for which the maximum punishment is two years, with the result that he has been in jail as an under-trial prisoner for St years for an offence for which even if convicted, he could not have been awarded more than two years' imprisonment."}}, {"text": "Ranchi Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11403, "end_char": 11414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To take an example, we find at Item 30 one Lambodar Gorain has been in Ranchi Jail since 18th June,\n\n1970 for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act for which the maximum punishment is two years, with the result that he has been in jail as an under-trial prisoner for St years for an offence for which even if convicted, he could not have been awarded more than two years' imprisonment."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11459, "end_char": 11469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11477, "end_char": 11485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12249, "end_char": 12260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12268, "end_char": 12299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13052, "end_char": 13063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13247, "end_char": 13257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "section 167(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13973, "end_char": 13987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13995, "end_char": 14027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15462, "end_char": 15473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15527, "end_char": 15542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We adjourn tge hearing of the Writ Petition to 5th March, 1979 and on that date, we shall proceed to hear and dispose of the W.rit Petition on merits on the vanous question11 arising for determination."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_399_418_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "\" \" t •\n\nHOSHNAK SINGH v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 27, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nDisplaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-Ss. 10' & 12-Scope of.\n\nRes judicata-Principles analogous to res judicata when could be invoked.\n\nA part of the land allotted to the appellant on quasi-permanent basis as a displaced person from West Pakistan was acquired by the Government.\n\nWben C the question of payment of compensation in respect of the land acquired w:.1s pending, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 was passed which enabled holders of quasi-pe.rmanency rights to obtain perntanent settlement pursuant to which permanent settlement in respect of acquired land was made in favour of the appellant.\n\nAJJeging that the land allotted to the appellant was not allottable on a pcrrna- D nent basis, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated 17th March, 1961, cance11ed the allotment. The appellant's petition questioning the correctness of this decision was dismissed by the High Court in limine.\n\nThereupon the appellant preferred a petition under s. 33 of the Act to the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Rehabilitation Department, challenging the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner.\n\nBy his order dated 29th September, 1964 the Joint Secretary rejected the petition pointing out that the cancellation of the appellant's permanent settlement rights in the land was in accordance with law and that no interference was called for.\n\nlbe appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court.\n\nIn rejecting the appellant's writ petition impugning the order dated 29th September, 1964 the High Court was of the view that it was barred by princinfes\n\nanalogous to res judicata because if that petition were aI1owed, it would in F effect, amount to cancellation of the order dated the 17th March, 1961 which beclame final as against the appellant on dismissal of his first petition.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHEID : l(a) Where a petition under Art. 226 is dismissed in limine without a speaking order, such a dismissal would not constitute a bar of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action.\n\nWhen a petition is G dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision under a statute and on failure to get relief after pursuing the remedy by way of appeal or revision, he moved the High Court, it would be incorrect to dismiss the petition on the ground that the order made by the re\\'isional authority had the effect of merging the orieinal order with the order of the revisional authority, and that the challenge on the fresh cause of actifln to the order of the revisional authority would of necesitv be a cha11enge to the H original order also and that therefore the petition would be barred bv nrinciples analogous to res judicata as the first order had become final.\n\n[407C-E]\n\n6-253SCI/79\n\nDaryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 574; Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Govt. of Madras, [1968] 2 SCR 740; Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H. B. Munshi & Anr., [1969] 2 SCR 824; referred to.\n\nIn the instant case in the first wTit petition the appellant questioned the cor rcctness of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 17th March, 1961 without claiming therein any compensation for the land a1:quired.\n\nThat having been dismissed in linline he invoked the revisional jurisdiction under s. 33 of the Act.\n\nWhen that petition was dismissed by the revisional authority he preferred the second writ petition. What he prayed in the second petition was a direction quashing the order dated 29th September, 1964 of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The High Court was, therefore, in error in rejecting the second petition on the sole ground that the order of 17th March, 1961 merged into the order of 29th September, 1964 and in substance: the challenge was to the order dated 17th March, 1961 which had become final. [40d A-Bl\n\n(b) Secondly, if the claim for compensation was not raised in the first petition but was specifically raised in the second, it would not be dismissed on the ground that it \\Vas barred by principles analogous to res judicata. f408 D]\n\n2 (a) It has been well established by a long line of decisions of this Court that after July 22, 1952 the Custodian had no authority to cancel or modify quasi-permanent allotment, that the allottees of these rights could not \"be dispossessed at the whim or caprice of the Custodian, that the quasi-permanent rights were heritable and that the holders were entitled to permanent settlement by issuance of sanad. Added to this was the fact that r. 14(6) of the Adminii;;- tration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 as amended 1Ero1n July 22, 1952 restricted the power of the Custodian to resume or cancel quasi-permanent rights of the allottees except in the circumstances 'mentiont:d in the subrule and no material is placed on record to show that the Custodian had exercised hi• power under r. 14(6) of the Rules.\n\n[41! D-E]\n\nP. D. Sharma v. State Bank of India, [1968] 3 SCR 91; Amar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab, [1957] SCR 801; State of Punjab v.\n\nSuraj Prakash Kapur, etc., [1962] 2 SCR 711; Joginder Singh & Ors. v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property, [1962] 2 SCR 738 at 740; referred to.\n\n(b) Nor again is there any material to show that the Custodian had the power to cancel the allotment under the State Rules. It was not shown that the State Government had framed any re-settlement scheme and that the allot ment was cancelled for that purpose.\n\n[412 HJ\n\n'3(a) Under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 property which was declared ns evacuee property vested in the Custodian and was aliotted to displaced persons on a quasi-permanent basis. To obviate difficulties caused by continued unextinguislied title of the evacuee, the 1954 Act was passed, under s. 12(2) of which the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in the notification issued under the section stood extinguished and the\n\nevncuee property would vest absolutely in the Central Government.\n\nEvacuee property acquired in this manner. formed part of the compensation pool. Therefore, the appellant's property which was acquired in 1953, much before the coming into force of th, e 1954 Act, could not have become part of the compensation pool. [413 G-H]\n\n\" l' _.__ ..\n\nl!OSHNAK SINGH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 4 01\n\n(b) Even assuming that though the property was taken over by the Central A Government in 1953 evacuee interest in it bad not been extinguished till a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act had been issued and that on the issue of the notification it became part of the compensation pool, the consequence envisaged by s. 10 of the 1954 Act must ensue. It is that so long as the property remained vested in the Central Government it shall continue in possession of the person to whom it was allotted on the same conditions on v.'hich he held th'e property immediately before the date of acquisition. [914 C-Dl In the present case if the property had been taken over by the Central Government much before the 1954 Act came into force neither s. 12 of tht:\n\n1954 Act nor r. 49 would be attracted. If on the other hand the evacuee interest in the property came to be extinguished on the issue of a notification under s. 12, s. 10 would be attracted and the appellant would be entitled to hold the property till it continued to vest in the Central Government under s. 12.\n\nIn other \\vords in either event he would be entitled to +c:ompensation. [415\n\nC-D]\n\n(c) Nor again is it correct to say that it was a fresh n.Uotment under s. 10 of the 1954 Act. The land was allotted in 1949 and s_ 10 does not purport to make a fresh a!lotment. [415 Al 4(a) The whole of chapter VIII of the 1955 Rul'es (which indudes rr. 49 to 69) Would not apply because the land allotted was agricultural land and the allotment was made under the notification of the Goven1ment of Punjab dated 8th July, 1949_ [416 CJ\n\n(b) Once chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules and especially r. 49 v:hich provides for payment of compensation in the form of land is out of the way, there is nothing in the Act which would debar a quasi-permanent allottee asking for compensation in cash and the Government paying it. Moreover on the former occasion the appellant was paid compensation in cash for a part of the land acquired from him_\n\n[417 D-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2082 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-2-1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A.\n\nNo_ 103/68.\n\nR. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant.\n\nGirish Chandra for Respondent No. 1.\n\nHardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents 2-5.\n\nThe Judgment of lhe Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from the dismissal of the Civil Writ Petition filed by the present appellant by a learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court as also dismissal in fimine of the Letters Patent appeal preferred by him.\n\nAppellant is a displaced person from West Pakistan.\n\nOu his migrntion to India he was allotted on quasi-permanent basis land admeasuring 32t standard acres in village Daulatpur, Tehsil Pathankot,\n\nDistrict Gurdaspur.\n\nFirst respondent Union of India acquired land admeasuring 1243 canals, 5 marlas which included 15 acres of !and allotted to the appellant, for constructing a railway line.\n\nAccording to the appellant he was paid cash compensation for the same. First respondent further acquired in 1950 some land for construction National Highway from Jammu to Jullundur and the acquis; tion included a portion of the land allotted to the appellant and along with other allottees he was paid cash compensation for the same.\n\nFirst respondent wanted an open plot of land for setting up a housing colony for rehabilitating some refugees from Mirpur (Kashmir) and in all it took possession of land comprising 7.88 acres of non-evacuee land and 6.64 acres ot evacuee land.\n\nThis acquisition included land admeasuring 1 standard acre and 15! uuits of land allotted to the appellant.\n\nPossession of the land including the land of the appellant was admittedly taken over in July 1953. Since then the appellant has been requesting the first respondent and other competent authorities for payment of compensation for the same.\n\nIn the mean time after the introduction of the Dispfaced Persons ·(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, ('1954 Act' for short), allotment of land to appellant which was till then on quasi permanent basis was converted into permanent basis.\n\nAs the appellant was clamouring for compensation for the land taken from him, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, made an order on 17th March 1961, Annexure 'C', whereby a reference made from the Evacuee Property Department was accepted and the permanent settlement rights conferred on the appellant in respect of 1 standard acre and\n\n15:!- units of land were cancelled on the ground that there already existed houses over that portion of the land and the land was described as ghair mumkin abadi and was not allottable on permanent settlement, as agricultural land against the verified claim of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant questioned the correctness of this order in Writ Petition No. 559/61 in the High Court which was dismissed in limine on 22nd March 1961 and which has led to a contention on behalf of the respondents that the subsequent writ petition from which the present appeal arises is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the aforementioned writ petition the appellant approached the Financial Commissioner (Rehabilitation Department), Chandigarh, as per his representation Annexure 'D' dated 15th March 1963 requesting him to pay cash compensation for the land taken over by the first respondent which till such taking over was held by the appellant on quasi permanent allotment.\n\nOn receipt of this representation the appellant was directed as per Annexure 'E' dated 25th April 1963 to appear before the Financial Commissioner (Taxation) on 16th March 1963 at Chandigarh. The appellant accordingly appeared before the\n\n...\n\n• •\n\nHOSH~AK SINGH \\'. UNION (Desai, J.) 403\n\nFinancial Commissioner (Taxation) and represented his case lo1 cash compensation. Subsequent thereto, Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, wrote to his counterpart in the Central Government requesting the first respondent to concur with the decision of the Punjab Government for payment of cash compensation to the appellant adding that the land held by the appellant on quasi permanent basis was taken over for the purpose of the first respondent um! that as the area involved was less than 2 acres, the decisioa to pay cash compensation in respect of such area, arrived at in the meeting held between the officers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation on 27th August, 1957 would govern the case. Presumably in response to this communication from the Punjab Government the then Horne Minister wrote a demi official letter to the then Chief Minister of Punjab in which it was admitted that the land allotted to the appellant was in rural areas and a part of it was required later on for public purpose and that in view df the decision arrived at the meeting on 27'h August. 1957 the appellant would be entitled to cash compensation and requested the Chief Minister to process the case accordingly.\n\nThus, even though both the Govcrmnents agreed in their inter-departmental communications that the appellant would be entitled to cash compensation, nothing tcngihle\n\ncame out with tl1e result that the appellant preferred a petition under s. 33 of the 1954 Act challenging the order datcu 17th March 1961 of the then Settlement Commissioner cancelling the permanent settlement rights conferred upon the appellant.\n\nThis appliation was rejected by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India observing that the cancellation of the permanent settlement right, was in accordance with law and no interference was called for.\n\nThereafter the appellant filed the writ petition from which the present appeal arises.\n\nAfter the writ petition was filed and rule nisi was issued, a return was filed as per the affidavit of one R. C. Aggarwal, Under Secretary to Goverrnnent of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, presumably on behalf of all the respondents which undoubtedly amongst others, include the Union of India, the first respondent, and the State of Punjb. the second respondent. It must be specifically mentioned that tl; e Union of India did not file any separate return and accepted the return filed by and on behalf of the State of Punjab and other officers of the Punjab\n\nGovernment. There are certain averments in this return which must be noticed.\n\nAppellant is a displaced person and he was allotted 32t standard acres of land on quasi permanent basis is in fact admitkd. It\n\nis equally admitted that the land which was taken over for setting up a colony for rehabilitation o[ some families from Kashmir included one\n\nstandard acre and 15! units of land which was till then held by the appellant and that the land was taken over in July 1953.\n\nIt was contended that when land is allotted on quasi permanent basis, the allotment can be cancelled and the land can be resumed and that when such a resumption takes place the allottee is only entitled to compensation in the form of land and not in cash. It was also contended that the cancellation of the permanent settlement rights was just and legal because the conferment was the result of a fraud between the appellant and some officers of the Punjab Government and proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the land was used as agricultural land though in fact it can be appropriately described as ghair mumkin abadi. The manner in which the preliminary objection was raised at the hearing of the writ petition that in view of the dismissal of the earlier petition bearing on the same subject the present petition is barred by the principles of res judicata was not in terms taken up in the return filed on behalf of the respondents. The High Court, however, appears to have permitted the respondents to raise that contention.\n\nThe learned single Judge held that the effect of dismissal of the earlier petition filed by the present appellant was that the order dated 17th March, 1961 by which permanent settlement rights conferred or the appellant were cancelled became final and if the present petition is allowed the only thing the court would have to do would be to cancel the order dated 17th March, 1961 which has become final against the appellant and, therefore, the petition is barred by the principles a'nalogous to res judicata.\n\nMr. Girish Chandra for the first respondent and Mr. Hardev Singh for the remaining respondents urged that the appeal must fail for the same reason for which the earlier petition of the appellant was dismissed inasmuch as the cause of action for both the petitions being the same, the subsequent petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.\n\nIn the earlier petition the appellant questioned the correctness of the decision dared 17th March 1961 by which permanent settlement 6 rights conferred on the appellant for the land held by him on quasi permanent basis, including the land admeasnring 1 standard acre and\n\n!St units taken over by the first respondent in July 1953, and the appellant in the earlier petition did not claim any cash compensation for the land taken over by the first respondent. In the present ptition the appellant seeks a direction for quashing the order H of the Joint Secretary, Rehabilitation Department, Government of India dated 29th September, 1964 rejecting the representation made to the Central Government presumably nuder s. 33 of the 1954 Act question-\n\n...\n\n..,\n\ning the correctness of the order dated 17th March 1961. Under s. 33 the Central Government has power to call for the rocord of any proceeding under the Act and to pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisio'm; contained in the Act or the rules made thereunder.\n\nBroadly stated the powe.r of revision is conferred on the Central Go\\'ornment under s. 33. Appellant invoked this revisional jurisdiction under s. 33 against the order dated 17th March 1961 which he challenged in the first petitio'n.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the first petition he preferred revision application under s. 33 and when this revision petition was dismissed he preferred the second petition. 'The High Court was of the view that the ordr dated 17th___March 1961 merged into the order dated 29th September 1964 passed by the Central Government while dismissing the revision applicatio'n of the appellant and, therefore, if now the petition is allowed it would have the effect of setting aside the order dated 17th March 1961 which in view of the dismissal of th~ earlier petition of the appellant had become final. The High Court is clearly in error in reaching this conclusion.\n\nThe earlier petition was dismissed by a 'non-speaking, one word, order 'dismissed'. The High Court may as well dismiss the petition\n\nin limine on the ground of delay or !aches or on the ground of alternative remedy. The second petition after pursuing the alternative remedy would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.\n\nMore often a petition under Article 226 is dismissed on the ground that bfore invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, if the potitioner has an alternative remedy under a statute under which the right is claimed by the petitioner, the Court expects the pditioner to exhaust the remedy and in such a situation the petition is dismissed in limine.\n\nIf after preforring an appeal or revision under the statute under which the right is claimed by the petitioner a petition under Article 226 is filed irrespoctive of the fact that the revision or appeal was dismissed and th~ original order which was challenged in the first petition had merged into the appellate or revisional order, nonetheless tho second petition in the circumstances would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata b<canse the cause of action is entirely different and the merger of the order cannot stand in the way of the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.\n\nIn the leading case of Daryao & Ors. v. State df U.P. & Ors.(') this Court in venns said that if the petition filed in the High Court under\n\n(!) [1962] I SCR 574.\n\nArticle 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applyihg for the writ or becaus•.; it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it th>\"n the dismissal of the writ\n\npetition would not constitute a bar to the subsequent. petition under Art. 32 exc.opt in cases where the facts found by the High Court may th•.omselves be relevant even under Art. 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would ho a bar; if the order says that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was\n\nguily of !aches or that he had an alternativ•e remedy it would not lx• a bar except in cases indicated ii; i the judgment. Then comes an obserrntion which may better be quoted :\n\n\"It the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the• view that there was no substance in the petition at all, but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and uhsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Art. 32\".\n\nIn Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Government of Madras,( 1) rejecting the contention that if the petition under Art. 226 is dismissed without issuing a notice to the other side though by a speaking order such a dismissal would not bar the subsequent petition for same cause of action or for the same relief, it was observed that this Court in Daryao's case(') did not mean to lay down that if the petition is dismissed in limine without notice to the opposite side it would not bar a subsequent petition. This Court only ruled that if the petition is dismissed. in limine but with a speaking order which order itself indicates that the petition was dismissed on merits, the absence of notice to other side by itself would not be sufficient to negative the plea of res judicata in 2 subsequent petition in respect of the same cause of action.\n\nHowever, while negativing the contention on the facts of the case this Court reaffirmed that if the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order than such a dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. Similarly in Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H. B.\n\n(I) [1968] 2 SCR 740.\n\n(2) [1962] 1.S.C.R. 574.\n\n• , r\n\n.> •\n\n____ ,,,_\n\nMunshi & Anr.,(') a majority of the Judges affirmed the ratio in Daryao's case (supra) that if a petition under Art. 226 is dismissed not on merits but because an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner or that the petition was dismissed in limine without a speaking -0rder such dismissal is not a bar to the subsequent petition under Art.\n\n32. It must follow as a necessary corollary that a subsequent petition under Art. 226 would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata. Roraffirming the view taken on this point in Daryao'.1 oase, in P. D. Sharma v. State Bank of India(') the preliminary objection about bar of res judicata was negatived. lt is, therefore, incontrovertible tha\\ whe.re 1 petition under Art .. 226 is dismissed \"' limine without a ; peaking order ; ach a dismissal would not constitute a _bar\" of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, more so, when on the facts in this case it appears that the petition was dismissed presumably because the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of a revision petition under s. 33 of the 1954 Act which remedy he availed of and after failure to get the relief he moved the High Court again for the relief. It would be incorrect in such a situation to dismiss the petition on the ground that the order made by the revisional authority dismissing the revision petition had the effect of merging the original order against which the revision was preferred with the order made by the revisional authority and, therefore, the challenge on the first cause e>[\n\naction to the order made by the revisional authority would of necessity _be a challenge to the original cider also and the petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata as the rest order had become final.\n\nThe High Court was clearly in error in dismissing the petition on this short ground.\n\nThere is yet another fallacy in the approach of the High Court while dismissing the petition as being barred by the principles analogous to res judicata because the second relief claimed by the appellant in the second petition was never claimed in the first petition and is an independent '\\nd separate relief which the High Court was invited to grant if the appellant was otherwise entitled to it.\n\nThe appellant, by prayer (b) of the petition, sought a direction that the respondents be ordered to pay cash compensation to the appellant for the area of land which had been takeu over by the respondents. It is nobody's case that such a prayer was ever made in the first petition. In the first petition the grievance of the appellant was that the order dated 17th March, 1961 made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner cancelling the permanent settlement rights conferred on the appellant in respect of his land was illegal and invalid.\n\nThere was no claim for\n\n(I) [1969] 2 SCR 824.\n\n(2) (1%8] 3 SCR 91.\n\ncompensation. A claim for compensation was being separately pursued by the apellant and he did not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court praying for a direction to pay him compensation. In. the second petition from which this appeal arises there is a specific prayer for compen.i; ation and Mr. Narula, learned counsel for the appellant, stated that the appellant is not interested in the first prayer questioning the validity of the order made by the Joint Secretary to Government of India dated 29th September 1964 affirming the order dated 17th March, 1961 which was the subject-matter of the first petition. Now, if claim for compensation was not raised in the first petition and if it is specifically raised in the second petition on the allegation that as the land of the appellant has been taken over by the Government for its own use, if compensation is not paid it would be deprivation of property without compensation and would be denial of fundamenta I right to hold property, it is unthinkable that the present petition for this particular relief can ever be dismissed in the facts of this case on the ground that it is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.\n\nFor this additional reason the order of the High Court is unsustain· able.\n\nAnd now to the facts of the case.\n\nThe appellant is admittedly a displaced person to whom 32t standard acres of land was allotted and the allotment admittedly was on quasi permanent basis. It is again an admitted position that in July 1953 the first respondent, Union of India, took possession of 1 standard acre and 15t units of land from the land allotted to the appellant on quasi permanent basis for its use,. viz., for setting up a colony.\n\nAppellant contends that he must be paid compensation in cash for the land taken over from him. Respondents en the other hand contend that an allotment of land on quasi permanent basis could be resumed by the first respondent when the land was. required for its own use and on such resumption the appellant would only be entitled to allotment of an equivalent area of land but in no case the appellant would be entitled to compensation in cash.\n\nThis necessitates examination as to what is the interest of the appellant in the land allotted to him on quasi permanent basis and when and in what circumstances and for what purpose .it can be resumed or allotment cancelled and if so resumed, to what relief the appellant is entitled to.\n\nThere has been a flood of enactments on the taking over and administration of evacuee property as also compensation payable to displaced persons.\n\nThis Court in Amar Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee\n\nI ..\n\nProperty, Punjab,(') exhaustively and stage by stage examined the measures taken by the Central and State Governments first for rehabilitating displaced persons, taking over of properties left by those who migrated to Pakistan, its distribution and allotment to displaced persons who came over to India on partition, and ultimately extinguisbment of the evacuee interest in such properties.\n\nTo recapitulate them here would be merely adding to the length of this judgment.\n\nWe would, therefore, only take note of the conclusion reached in Amar Singh's case (supra) with regard to the interest of the displaced persons to whom agricultural land was allotted on quasi permanent basis up to July 22, 1952. Says the Court at page 823 :\n\n\" ( 1) The allottee is entitled to right of use and occupation of property until such time as the property remains vested in the Custodian;\n\n( 2) The benefit of s.uch right will enurc to bis heirs and successors;\n\n( 3) His enjoyment of the property is on the basis of paying land revenue thereupon and cesses for the time being.\n\nAdditional rent may be fixed thereupon by the Custodian. If and when he does so, the allottee is bound to pay the same;\n\n( 4) He is entitled to quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of the property during that period;\n\n(5) He is entitled to make improvements on the land with the assent of the Custodian and is entitled to compensation in the manner provided m the Punjab Tenancy Act;\n\n( 6) He is entitled to exchange the whole or any part of the land for other evacuee land with the consent of the Custodian;\n\n(7) He is e.ntitled to lease the land for a period not exceeding three years without the permission of the Custodian and for longer period with bis consent.\n\nBut he is not entitled to transfer his rights by way of sale, gift, will, mortgage or other private contract;\n\n(8) His rights in the allotment are subject to the fairly extensive powers of cancellation under the Act and rules as then in force prior to July 22, 1952. on\n\n(1) [1957] SCR 801.\n\nvaried ad1ninistrative considerations and actions such as the following : .................. \"\n\nUndoubtedly this Court held that these quasi permanent rights in land would not be property within the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitution and, therefore, if deprivation of property is complained of a petition under Art. 32 would not lie.\n\nHowever, after concluding in this manner this Court summed up the position with regard to the interest of quasi permanent holder in his holding as under :\n\n\"In holding that quasi-permanent allotment does not carry with it a fundamental right to property under the Constitution we are not to be supposed as denying or weakening the scope of the rights of the allottee.\n\nTliese rights as recognised in the statutory rules arc important and constitute the essential basis of a sat ; sfactory rehabilitation and settlement of displaced land-holders.\n\nUntil such time as these land-holders obtain sanads to the lands, these rights are entitled to the zealous protection of the constituted authorities according to administrative rules and instructions binding on them, and of the courts by appropriate proceedings where there is usurpation of jurisdiction or abuse of exercise of statutory powers\".\n\nAfter re-affirming the position of the quasi permanent allottees as herein quoted, this Court in State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash Kapur, etc., ( 1) held that after July 22, 1952, the Custodian ceases to have any authority to cancel or modify quasi permanent allotment.\n\nThis enunciation of the interest of the quasi permanent allottees in the land allotted to them should dispel any doubt about their entrenched interest in the land.\n\nNor could it be said that those allottees were at ':lie mercy of the Custodian and can be dispossessed at his whim or caprice.\n\nThese were heritable rights and the holders were entitled in due course. to permanent settlement by issuance of sanads.\n\nBut even before this situation was reached a fundamental change occurred in the posit ion of the Custodian vis-a-vis the quasi permanent :)llottces about 'he right of the former to cancel allotment and resume land. In exercise of the_ powers conferred by s. 56 of the Administration o[ Evacuee Property Act, 1950, the Central Government enacted what aro styled as Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950. Rule 14 recites the power of the Custodian to vary or cancel the lease or allotment under certain circumstances mentioned therein.\n\nInitially sub-rule ,(6) was added to this rule and later on it was modified where-\n\n(!} [1962] 2 SCR 7tl.\n\n...\n\n.. ,.\n\nby the power to cancel any allotment or resume evacuee property allotted on quasi permanent basis was circumscribed and was available in the circumstances mentioned in amended sub-rule (6). The amendment effective from 22nd July 1952 had undoubtedly the effect of modifying and thereby restricting the power of resumption or cancellation vested in the Custodian in respect of quasi permanent allottees and the power was confined within very narrow limits. Therefore, subsequent to July 22, 1952, the Custodian of Evacuee Property would have the power to cancel an allotment only upon a ground which falls within the exceptions enumerated in sub-rule (6) (vide Joginder Sillgh\n\n& Ors. v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property).(') We need not examine the circumstances in which resumption or cancellation can be ordered under the amended sub-rule (6) of rule 14 because it is not the case of the respondents that the land was resumed in exercise of the power conferred by rule 14 and in one or other of the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule (6) thereof.\n\nSuffice it to say that after July 22, 1952, the Custodian had no authority to cancel quasi permanent allotment and resume land except in the circumstances and contingencies mentioned in sub-rule (6) of rule 14 and that having not been done, it cannot be contended on behalf of the respondents that the land in this case allotted on quasi permanent basis to appellant was resumed by the Custodian.\n\nTwo fact situations material and necessary for raising this contention are absent in this case. There is no material placed on record, including the counter-affidavit, which would show that the Custodian resumed the land of the appellant in exercise of the power conferred by rule 14 and in one of the circumstances mentioned in rnb-rule ( 6). And secondly, no such order of Custodian 1s forth-coming even after time was given to produce the file.\n\nMr. Hardev Singh, however, contended that even though sub-rule • (\") of rule 14 as amended up to July 22, 1952 would not \"enable the Custodian to resume land or cancel allotment granted on quasi pennanent basis except in the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule ( 6), yet\n\nthe State Government had the requisite power under a rule made by the G Punjab State Government on 29th August, 1951. It was contended that in exercise of the powers delegated by the Central Government under sub-s. (1) of s. 55 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to make rules under clause (i) of sub-section (2) of s. 56, the Punjab Government made the rule, the relevant portion of which reads as under : H\n\n(l) (1962] 2 SCR 738 at 740.\n\n\"The Custodian shall be competent to cancel or terminate any lease or allotment or vary the terms of any lease, allotment or agreement and evict the lessee allottee in any one of the following circumstances;\n\n(h) that it is necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of a lease/allotment for the implementation of resettlement schemes-and/or-rules framed by the State Government or for such distribution amongst displaced persons as appears to the Custodian to be equitable and proper\".\n\nMr. Hardev Singh contended that presumably the Custodian at the State level cancelled the allotment in respect of the land taken over for resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees from Kashmir and ci1at this cancellation and resumption must be for implementation of resettlement scheme or under the rules framed for such resettlement D schemes by the State Government and, therefore, the resumption was one under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and it was not a case of either acquisition or taking over of the land of the petitioner.\n\nThere is no material placed before us to support this submission.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents not one word has E been stated that the Custodian at State level cancelled the allotment and resumed the land.\n\nThe stand taken in the return filed m the High Court is that evacuee area measuring 7.88 acres was taker. over by the Government for construction and development of a colony for rehabilitation of 300 Kashmiri displaced persons and that such land\n\nincluded an area of 1 standard acre and 15! units of the land allot:ed to the petitioner. It was further stated that this land of the appellant stood acquired under s. 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.\n\nThere is not the slightest suggestion that the Custodian in exercise of the power under the aforementioned rule cancelled the allotment in favour of the appellant and resumed the land. If snch is not the case, the power claimed under the rule can.not help the respondents.\n\nAssuming that there was power to cancel aJlotment and resume land under the State Rules, it must be shown that the State Government had framed a resettlement scheme and for the purpose of the scheme the allotment was cancelled and land was resumed.\n\nThe fact pleaded is to the contrary that the Union of India took possession of the land for setting up a colony.\n\nThis also becomes clear frm the letter written by the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Annexure 'F wherein it was in terms stated that\n\n,..\n\n• >' -..,.- ..\n\n.->\n\nthe land in question was not acquired by the State Government but stood acquired by the Central Government in terms of the general notification issued in 1955 and, therefore, the Government should concur in payment of compensation out of the funds allotted for setting up ol\n\nthe colony.\n\nFrom the contents of the letter which have remained uncontroverted the situation that emerges is that the land was acquired by the Central Government for its own use.\n\nThe Central Government could exercise powers under the Central Rules.\n\nIt had not asked the State Government to acquire the land.\n\nTherefore, the power conferred\n\nc>n the State Custodian under the State Rules would not help the respondents as contended by Mr. Hardev Singh.\n\nc It was next contended that on the introduction of the 1954 Act and the issuance of Notification under s. 12, all evacuee property was acquired by th.e Central Government and under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 12 such aCCiJUired evacuee property formed part of the compensation pool.\n\nIt was further said that if acquisition was under s. 12 of the 1954 Act, the allottee of land on quasi permanent basis would. be entitled to compensation as provided by rule 49 of Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, and in that event he would be entitled to compensation by allotment of agricultural land but not cash compensation. To understand the full import of the submission it is necessary to state that when there was migration of large number <if persons both the ways from India to Pakistan and vice versa, initially such property left by migrants from India to Pakistan was taken over for the purpose of administration under the1provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. This Act broadly provided for appointment of Custodian General of Evacuee Property and other authorities subordinate to him.\n\nThe authorities set up under the Act were empowered to declare certain properties to be evacuee property and any property so declared as evacuee property would, under s. 8, vest in the Custodian for the State. The Custodian was empowered to administer the property and the powers and duties of the Custodian were enumerated in s. 10. In exercise of this power the Custodian allotted lands on quasi permanent basis to displaced persons. But this was an unsatisfactory situation because the interest of the evacuee in the evacuee property remained intact and till such evacuee interest was extinguished, the evacuee property could not be settled on permanent basis. In order to obviate this difficulty the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was enacted by Parliament.\n\nSection 12 provided for issuance of a notification as hereinabove mentioned and sub-s. (2) of s. 12 amongst others provided that the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in\n\nthe notification shall, on and from the beginning of the date on which the notification is so pnblished, be extinguished and the evacuee prc- perty shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.\n\nEvacuee properties acquired in this manner would form part of the compensation pool.\n\nIf the scheme of the 1954 Act is as hereinbefore mentioned, we f; ril to see how the property which was admittedly allotted to the appellant on quasi permanent basis and which was taken over by the Central Government in July 1953, i.e. much before the introducticn of the 1954 Act, became property of the compensation pool.\n\nAssuming that even though it was taken over by the Central Government n July 1953, the evacuee interest therein having not been extinguished till the issue of a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act and, ther~ fore, on the issue of a notification the property became part of the compensation pool, the consequences provided in 1954 Act must ensue, viz., that so long as the property remained vested in the Central Government it shall continue in possession of the person to whom it was allotted on the same conditions on which he held the property immediately before the date of acquisition.\n\nIn this connection reference to s. 10 of the 1954 Act would be advantageous..\n\nThe relevant portion reads as under :\n\n\"10. Where any immovable property has been leased or allotted to a displaced person by the Custodian under the conditions published :-\n\n(a) by the notification of the Govermnent of Punjab in the Department of Rehabilitation No.\n\n4891-S or 4892-S, dated the 8th July 1949; or\n\n(b) by the notification of the Govermnent of Patiala and East Punjab States Union in the Department of Rehabilitation No. SR or 9R, dated the 23rd July, 1949, and published in the Official Gazette of that State, dated the 7th August 1949, and such property is acquired under the provisions of this Act and forms part of the compensation pool, the displaced person shall, so long as the property remains vested in the Central Government, cont; nue in possession of such property on the same conditions on which he held the property immediately before the date of the acquisition, and the Central Government may, for tho purpose of payment of compensation to such displaced person, transfer to h; m mch property on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.\"\n\n....\n\n' • -\\ \" .....\n\n\"!r; ( • • ' ~\n\nJ 4\n\n/.. f\n\nill\n\n-.\\. lii\n\n~ \"\"' ....\n\n'\"' ..\n\n• y\n\n~-- ,\n\nm ..\n\n.... • •\n\nr. ~~ \"\"\n\nI }- . \"\"\n\nI-'\n\n...\n\n\" •\n\n-r-\n\n' • •\n\n¥ ~\n\nNow, indisputably the appellant was allotted the property on quasi permanent basis under the conditions published by the notification of the Government of Punjab in the Department of Rehabilitation, dated 8th July 1949. If he had continued to hold the property on the date on which the notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act was issued, by the operation of s. 10 he would be entitled to hold the property till the property remained vested in the Central Government and v, ould be entitled to payment of compensation by transfer to him of sue~ property on terms and conditions that may be prescribed.\n\nTherefore,\\'. if 1954 Act is not attracted because the property in questio!l was ·. already taken over by the Central Government in July 1953 much before the 1954 Act came into force neither s. 12 nor Rule 49 would be attracted. If on the other hand the evacuee interest in the property came to be extinguished on the issue of a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act, its consequences would be as provided in s. 10 and the appelfant would be entitled to hold the property till it continues to vest in the Central Government under s. 12.\n\nIn either event he would be entitled to compensation.\n\nMr. Hardev Singh, however, urged that assuming that the appellant is entitled to compensation for taking over of his land, the land having formed part of the compensation pool on the issue of a notification under s. 12 and the allotment in this case being one not under the notification of the Government of Punjab dated 8th July 1949 but o fresh allotment under s. 10, the compensation would only be payable ; n the form of land under rule 49: There is a two-fold fallacy in this subm1ss1on.\n\nIndisputably the land was allotted to the appellant under the conditions published by the notification of the Government of Punjah dated 8th July 1949 ands. 10 does not purport to make a fresh allotment.\n\nIt merely tkes note of the earlier allotment and assures that if the displaced person has continued to be in possession of the land allotted, on the issue of a notification under s. 12 and the land becoming part of the compensation pool, such allottee would be entitled to continue in possession of such property on the same conditions on which he held the property immediately before the date of acquisition by issue of notification under s. 12 till the property continues to vest in the Central Government and further he would be entitled to the transfer of su.ch property to him presumably on permanent se!tlement basis as and by way of _compensation. Section 10 does not permit a .,. construction as canvassed for by Mr. Hardev Singh that a fresh allotment could be made under s. 10.\n\n7-253SC!i79\n\nFurther, rule 49 which proYides that compensation shall be in the form of land will have to be read with r. 69 which reads as under\n\n''69. Saving-Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to agricultural land allotted in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union under section 10 of the Act.\"\n\nIt will immediately appear that where allotment was made under .. the conditions published by the notification of the GoverllDK'nt of ' Punjab dated 8th July 1949, the whole of Chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules which includes Rules 49 to 69 would not apply. In this case };. appellant was allotted agricultural land and th~ allotment was under -- C th0 notification hereinbefore mentioned which has been set out in rule\n\nlO(a) and in that situation provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the Rules would not be attracted. Therefore, rule 49 cannot be c:alled in aid by the respondents.\n\nThe last contention, however, is that if the appellant is a displaced person and he was being allotted land against a verified claim in respect of agricultural land held by him in Pakistan, ordinarily compemation for land taken over must be in the form of land and not in form of cash.\n\nOrdinarily it should be so.\n\nBut in this connection the e~:peri ence gained by the Government in disposing of the claims cannot be overlooked.\n\nThere were allottees of small plots of land.\n\nOnce allotc ment is mad~ and thereafter the land is taken over by the Govcrrment a fresh allotment cannot be in a compact area and if a small plot of land is allotted at a distant place the allottee would be put to a serious disadvantage.\n\nRealising this position, at a meeting between th~ olficers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation of the Central Government held on 27th August 1957, a decision was taken which was notifi.cd by the Press Note Annexure 'A' of the very date.\n\nIt provides that there are largo number of displaced land allottees whose whole or part of the land were acquired by the Government for various public purposes and their claim for cash compensation is pending.\n\nSuch of the allottees who have acquired permanent rights and others who arc quasi permanent allottees and small pieces of their land are acquired by th~ Government, should send their applications to the Doputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur, giving various details therein.\n\nThe decision further provided that quasi permanent land allottes whose land exceeding two standard acres have been acquired should apply for alternative allotment to the. Land Claims Officer, and those whose land admrnsuring less than two standard acres is acquired should apply for payment of compensation in cash.\n\nThe decision was the deci!>ion of the O::ntral\n\n• ¥\n\n,.,\n\nt . - ,..\n\nGovernment and the Punjab State Government that displaced persons to whom lands were allotted on quasi permanent basis, part of which was taken over for public purposes by the Government and where the land acquired was less than two standard acres in area, payment of compensation would be in cash and applications were accordingly invit\"d.\n\nThis decision was affirmed in the letter of the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, addressed to his counterpart in the Central Government wherein after referring to the meeting dated 27th August, 1957 and the decision arrived at it, he r\"quested the Central Government that the appellant would be entitled to cash compensation because the land taken over from him was vo>S than two standard acres and was covered by the decision arrived at, at the meeting and that the Central Government should concur in\n\npaym\"nt of compensation out of the funds allotted for setting up the colony for which the land was acquired.\n\nIn the face of this position it is difficult to entertain the contentian that comp.; nsation in cash was never payable for agricultural land taken over from a quasi permanent allottee. It was said that such a decision which runs counter to th;, statute cannot be given effect to by the Court.\n\nOnce Chapter Vil! of 1955 Rules and especially rule 49 which provides for payment of <0ompensatian in the form of land is out of the way, we sec nothing in the statute which would debar a quasi-p.; rmanent allottec asking for compensation in cash and the Government paying the same.\n\nIn fact the appellant has averred in his petition and in his affidavit that on former occasion he was paid compensation in cash and the denial is on the ground of want of information which can frankly be styled as a vague one.\n\nNow it is indisputable that the appellant was a quasi permanent F allottee and that his land admeasuring 1 standard acre and 15} uni.ts had been taken over by the, Central Government in July 1953. In view of the decision n:corded in the Press Note referred to above he would be e'ntitled to compensation in cash which has not been paid to him.\n\nThe appellant would be entitled to compensation in cash for the intere1; t that he had in th~ land because land was taken awa v G from him.\n\nWhat is the quantum of compensation will have to b~ worked out according to law and the modalities of determining the compensation.\n\nThis appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed.\n\nThe respondents H are directed to pay the compensation in cash to the appellant for the fand admeasuring 1 standard acre and 15} units taken over in July\n\nA 1953.\n\nAs there is a delay of nearly 25 years, the respondents should pay the compensation as directed herein within a period of six months from today.\n\nRespondents should also pay the costs of the appellant and bear their own costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allow<'d.\n\n...", "total_entities": 134, "entities": [{"text": "HOSHNAK SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOSHNAK SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27, 1979\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th March, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AJJeging that the land allotted to the appellant was not allottable on a pcrrna- D nent basis, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated 17th March, 1961, cance11ed the allotment."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1125, "end_char": 1130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1172, "end_char": 1191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appellant preferred a petition under s. 33 of the Act to the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Rehabilitation Department, challenging the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2026, "end_char": 2034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 SCR 574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2986, "end_char": 3002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 740", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3066, "end_char": 3082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 824", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3480, "end_char": 3485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 22, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f408 D]\n\n2 (a) It has been well established by a long line of decisions of this Court that after July 22, 1952 the Custodian had no authority to cancel or modify quasi-permanent allotment, that the allottees of these rights could not \"be dispossessed at the whim or caprice of the Custodian, that the quasi-permanent rights were heritable and that the holders were entitled to permanent settlement by issuance of sanad."}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 SCR 91", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 711", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 738", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5355, "end_char": 5371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5957, "end_char": 5965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To obviate difficulties caused by continued unextinguislied title of the evacuee, the 1954 Act was passed, under s. 12(2) of which the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in the notification issued under the section stood extinguished and the\n\nevncuee property would vest absolutely in the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central A Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6576, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l!OSHNAK SINGH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 4 01\n\n(b) Even assuming that though the property was taken over by the Central A Government in 1953 evacuee interest in it bad not been extinguished till a notification under s. 12 of the 1954 Act had been issued and that on the issue of the notification it became part of the compensation pool, the consequence envisaged by s. 10 of the 1954 Act must ensue."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6830, "end_char": 6835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7432, "end_char": 7437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7572, "end_char": 7577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7735, "end_char": 7740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8077, "end_char": 8091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "49 to 69) Would not apply because the land allotted was agricultural land and the allotment was made under the notification of the Goven1ment of Punjab dated 8th July, 1949 [416 CJ\n\n(b) Once chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules and especially r. 49 v:hich provides for payment of compensation in the form of land is out of the way, there is nothing in the Act which would debar a quasi-permanent allottee asking for compensation in cash and the Government paying it."}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8702, "end_char": 8714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8716, "end_char": 8727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Doabia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8729, "end_char": 8741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R_ Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8758, "end_char": 8772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Narula, S. K. Mehta, T. S. Doabia, P. N. Puri and K. R_ Nagaraja, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8794, "end_char": 8808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Girish Chandra"}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents 2-5.", "canonical_name": "Hardev Singh"}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondents 2-5."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8927, "end_char": 8932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of lhe Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from the dismissal of the Civil Writ Petition filed by the present appellant by a learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court as also dismissal in fimine of the Letters Patent appeal preferred by him.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9083, "end_char": 9110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of lhe Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from the dismissal of the Civil Writ Petition filed by the present appellant by a learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court as also dismissal in fimine of the Letters Patent appeal preferred by him."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9422, "end_char": 9436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First respondent Union of India acquired land admeasuring 1243 canals, 5 marlas which included 15 acres of !", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9740, "end_char": 9745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First respondent further acquired in 1950 some land for construction National Highway from Jammu to Jullundur and the acquis; tion included a portion of the land allotted to the appellant and along with other allottees he was paid cash compensation for the same."}}, {"text": "Jullundur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9749, "end_char": 9758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First respondent further acquired in 1950 some land for construction National Highway from Jammu to Jullundur and the acquis; tion included a portion of the land allotted to the appellant and along with other allottees he was paid cash compensation for the same."}}, {"text": "Mirpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10028, "end_char": 10034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First respondent wanted an open plot of land for setting up a housing colony for rehabilitating some refugees from Mirpur (Kashmir) and in all it took possession of land comprising 7.88 acres of non-evacuee land and 6.64 acres ot evacuee land."}}, {"text": "Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10036, "end_char": 10043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First respondent wanted an open plot of land for setting up a housing colony for rehabilitating some refugees from Mirpur (Kashmir) and in all it took possession of land comprising 7.88 acres of non-evacuee land and 6.64 acres ot evacuee land."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10868, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellant was clamouring for compensation for the land taken from him, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, made an order on 17th March 1961, Annexure 'C', whereby a reference made from the Evacuee Property Department was accepted and the permanent settlement rights conferred on the appellant in respect of 1 standard acre and\n\n15:!- units of land were cancelled on the ground that there already existed houses over that portion of the land and the land was described as ghair mumkin abadi and was not allottable on permanent settlement, as agricultural land against the verified claim of the appellant."}}, {"text": "17th March 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10893, "end_char": 10908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellant was clamouring for compensation for the land taken from him, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, made an order on 17th March 1961, Annexure 'C', whereby a reference made from the Evacuee Property Department was accepted and the permanent settlement rights conferred on the appellant in respect of 1 standard acre and\n\n15:!- units of land were cancelled on the ground that there already existed houses over that portion of the land and the land was described as ghair mumkin abadi and was not allottable on permanent settlement, as agricultural land against the verified claim of the appellant."}}, {"text": "22nd March 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11508, "end_char": 11523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "559/61 in the High Court which was dismissed in limine on 22nd March 1961 and which has led to a contention on behalf of the respondents that the subsequent writ petition from which the present appeal arises is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11851, "end_char": 11861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dismissal of the aforementioned writ petition the appellant approached the Financial Commissioner (Rehabilitation Department), Chandigarh, as per his representation Annexure 'D' dated 15th March 1963 requesting him to pay cash compensation for the land taken over by the first respondent which till such taking over was held by the appellant on quasi permanent allotment."}}, {"text": "HOSH~AK SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12346, "end_char": 12359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant accordingly appeared before the\n\n...\n\n• •\n\nHOSH~AK SINGH \\'.", "canonical_name": "HOSHNAK SINGH"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12371, "end_char": 12376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Desai, J.) 403\n\nFinancial Commissioner (Taxation) and represented his case lo1 cash compensation.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that as the area involved was less than 2 acres, the decisioa to pay cash compensation in respect of such area, arrived at in the meeting held between the officers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation on 27th August, 1957 would govern the case."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Rehabilitation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13065, "end_char": 13091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that as the area involved was less than 2 acres, the decisioa to pay cash compensation in respect of such area, arrived at in the meeting held between the officers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation on 27th August, 1957 would govern the case."}}, {"text": "27th August, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that as the area involved was less than 2 acres, the decisioa to pay cash compensation in respect of such area, arrived at in the meeting held between the officers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation on 27th August, 1957 would govern the case."}}, {"text": "27'h August.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13499, "end_char": 13511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Presumably in response to this communication from the Punjab Government the then Horne Minister wrote a demi official letter to the then Chief Minister of Punjab in which it was admitted that the land allotted to the appellant was in rural areas and a part of it was required later on for public purpose and that in view df the decision arrived at the meeting on 27'h August."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13875, "end_char": 13880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. C. Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14456, "end_char": 14470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the writ petition was filed and rule nisi was issued, a return was filed as per the affidavit of one R. C. Aggarwal, Under Secretary to Goverrnnent of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, presumably on behalf of all the respondents which undoubtedly amongst others, include the Union of India, the first respondent, and the State of Punjb."}}, {"text": "State of Punjb", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14677, "end_char": 14691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the writ petition was filed and rule nisi was issued, a return was filed as per the affidavit of one R. C. Aggarwal, Under Secretary to Goverrnnent of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, presumably on behalf of all the respondents which undoubtedly amongst others, include the Union of India, the first respondent, and the State of Punjb."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14761, "end_char": 14775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be specifically mentioned that tl; e Union of India did not file any separate return and accepted the return filed by and on behalf of the State of Punjab and other officers of the Punjab\n\nGovernment."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14863, "end_char": 14878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be specifically mentioned that tl; e Union of India did not file any separate return and accepted the return filed by and on behalf of the State of Punjab and other officers of the Punjab\n\nGovernment."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16940, "end_char": 16954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Girish Chandra for the first respondent and Mr. Hardev Singh for the remaining respondents urged that the appeal must fail for the same reason for which the earlier petition of the appellant was dismissed inasmuch as the cause of action for both the petitions being the same, the subsequent petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.", "canonical_name": "Girish Chandra"}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 17000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Girish Chandra for the first respondent and Mr. Hardev Singh for the remaining respondents urged that the appeal must fail for the same reason for which the earlier petition of the appellant was dismissed inasmuch as the cause of action for both the petitions being the same, the subsequent petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.", "canonical_name": "Hardev Singh"}}, {"text": "29th September, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17917, "end_char": 17937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present ptition the appellant seeks a direction for quashing the order H of the Joint Secretary, Rehabilitation Department, Government of India dated 29th September, 1964 rejecting the representation made to the Central Government presumably nuder s. 33 of the 1954 Act question-\n\n...\n\n..,\n\ning the correctness of the order dated 17th March 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18015, "end_char": 18020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18120, "end_char": 18125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18504, "end_char": 18509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18564, "end_char": 18569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18737, "end_char": 18742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19678, "end_char": 19689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20143, "end_char": 20154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20635, "end_char": 20646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20813, "end_char": 20824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21101, "end_char": 21108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21206, "end_char": 21213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22358, "end_char": 22365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22495, "end_char": 22503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daryao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22726, "end_char": 22732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 is dismissed without issuing a notice to the other side though by a speaking order such a dismissal would not bar the subsequent petition for same cause of action or for the same relief, it was observed that this Court in Daryao's case(') did not mean to lay down that if the petition is dismissed in limine without notice to the opposite side it would not bar a subsequent petition.", "canonical_name": "Daryao'.1"}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 740", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23521, "end_char": 23537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Munshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23590, "end_char": 23596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "> •\n\n ,,,_\n\nMunshi & Anr.,(')"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23702, "end_char": 23710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23936, "end_char": 23944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24019, "end_char": 24027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daryao'.1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24138, "end_char": 24147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roraffirming the view taken on this point in Daryao'.1 oase, in P. D. Sharma v. State Bank of India(') the preliminary objection about bar of res judicata was negatived.", "canonical_name": "Daryao'.1"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24683, "end_char": 24688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 824", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26444, "end_char": 26460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Narula", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26783, "end_char": 26789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the second petition from which this appeal arises there is a specific prayer for compen.i; ation and Mr. Narula, learned counsel for the appellant, stated that the appellant is not interested in the first prayer questioning the validity of the order made by the Joint Secretary to Government of India dated 29th September 1964 affirming the order dated 17th March, 1961 which was the subject-matter of the first petition."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26973, "end_char": 26978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the second petition from which this appeal arises there is a specific prayer for compen.i; ation and Mr. Narula, learned counsel for the appellant, stated that the appellant is not interested in the first prayer questioning the validity of the order made by the Joint Secretary to Government of India dated 29th September 1964 affirming the order dated 17th March, 1961 which was the subject-matter of the first petition."}}, {"text": "29th September 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26985, "end_char": 27004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the second petition from which this appeal arises there is a specific prayer for compen.i; ation and Mr. Narula, learned counsel for the appellant, stated that the appellant is not interested in the first prayer questioning the validity of the order made by the Joint Secretary to Government of India dated 29th September 1964 affirming the order dated 17th March, 1961 which was the subject-matter of the first petition."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29349, "end_char": 29357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Amar Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee\n\nI ..\n\nProperty, Punjab,(') exhaustively and stage by stage examined the measures taken by the Central and State Governments first for rehabilitating displaced persons, taking over of properties left by those who migrated to Pakistan, its distribution and allotment to displaced persons who came over to India on partition, and ultimately extinguisbment of the evacuee interest in such properties."}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29670, "end_char": 29680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would, therefore, only take note of the conclusion reached in Amar Singh's case (supra) with regard to the interest of the displaced persons to whom agricultural land was allotted on quasi permanent basis up to July 22, 1952."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31359, "end_char": 31369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31467, "end_char": 31474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33325, "end_char": 33330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33356, "end_char": 33382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 33712, "end_char": 33726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "22nd July 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33962, "end_char": 33976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment effective from 22nd July 1952 had undoubtedly the effect of modifying and thereby restricting the power of resumption or cancellation vested in the Custodian in respect of quasi permanent allottees and the power was confined within very narrow limits."}}, {"text": "29th August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36024, "end_char": 36041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Hardev Singh, however, contended that even though sub-rule • (\") of rule 14 as amended up to July 22, 1952 would not \"enable the Custodian to resume land or cancel allotment granted on quasi pennanent basis except in the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule ( 6), yet\n\nthe State Government had the requisite power under a rule made by the G Punjab State Government on 29th August, 1951."}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36147, "end_char": 36152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36160, "end_char": 36204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36259, "end_char": 36264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "(1962] 2 SCR 738", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36357, "end_char": 36373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38073, "end_char": 38078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assuming that there was power to cancel aJlotment and resume land under the State Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38422, "end_char": 38509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38853, "end_char": 38873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This also becomes clear frm the letter written by the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Annexure 'F wherein it was in terms stated that\n\n,..\n\n• >' -..,.- ..\n\n.->\n\nthe land in question was not acquired by the State Government but stood acquired by the Central Government in terms of the general notification issued in 1955 and, therefore, the Government should concur in payment of compensation out of the funds allotted for setting up ol\n\nthe colony."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39813, "end_char": 39818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39906, "end_char": 39911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40034, "end_char": 40039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40668, "end_char": 40712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41007, "end_char": 41011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41167, "end_char": 41172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41620, "end_char": 41630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to obviate this difficulty the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was enacted by Parliament."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41633, "end_char": 41643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41727, "end_char": 41732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42661, "end_char": 42666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43109, "end_char": 43114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44705, "end_char": 44710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44759, "end_char": 44764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45194, "end_char": 45199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45351, "end_char": 45356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45415, "end_char": 45420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45536, "end_char": 45541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45812, "end_char": 45817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45962, "end_char": 45967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46477, "end_char": 46482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46738, "end_char": 46743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46953, "end_char": 46963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47079, "end_char": 47084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47340, "end_char": 47347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saving-Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to agricultural land allotted in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union under section 10 of the Act.\""}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47383, "end_char": 47393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th July 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47557, "end_char": 47570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will immediately appear that where allotment was made under .. the conditions published by the notification of the GoverllDK'nt of ' Punjab dated 8th July 1949, the whole of Chapter VIII of the 1955 Rules which includes Rules 49 to 69 would not apply."}}, {"text": "Chapter VIII of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47878, "end_char": 47903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ministry of Rehabilitation of the Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48802, "end_char": 48854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Realising this position, at a meeting between th~ olficers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation of the Central Government held on 27th August 1957, a decision was taken which was notifi.cd by the Press Note Annexure 'A' of the very date."}}, {"text": "27th August 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48863, "end_char": 48879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Realising this position, at a meeting between th~ olficers of the Punjab Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation of the Central Government held on 27th August 1957, a decision was taken which was notifi.cd by the Press Note Annexure 'A' of the very date."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49410, "end_char": 49468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such of the allottees who have acquired permanent rights and others who arc quasi permanent allottees and small pieces of their land are acquired by th~ Government, should send their applications to the Doputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur, giving various details therein."}}, {"text": "Punjab State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49908, "end_char": 49931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government and the Punjab State Government that displaced persons to whom lands were allotted on quasi permanent basis, part of which was taken over for public purposes by the Government and where the land acquired was less than two standard acres in area, payment of compensation would be in cash and applications were accordingly invit\"d."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_419_427_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "STATE OF U. P. & ANR.\n\nRAZA BULAND SUGAR CO. LTD., RAMPUR\n\nFebruary 27, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.) B\n\nU.P. Agricultural Income-tax Act (1948)-S. 18 Assessment of tax-If •could be made against partners of a firm without issuing notice to the firm.\n\nPlea not taken at the first instance-If could be raised later.\n\nTwo joint stock companies entered into agreements with a former Princely State for the grant of agricultural land on payment of fu1r and equitable land C reYenue.\n\nLater the two companies formed into a partnership. firm.\n\nOn the merger of the State with the Union of India, the Assessing Authority under the\n\nU.P. Agricultural Income-tax Act issued notices to the two companies to submit their returns of agricultural income, which the companies did.\n\nIn writ petitions filed by the companies cho.llenging the assessment orders 1 the High Court accepted the contention that since the lands were neither assessed to land revenue nor were they assessed to any local rate or cess as requird by s. 2(a) of the Act, they were not assessabl'e to agricultural income-tax and remanded the cases to the Assessing Authority for determination of this question.\n\nBefore the Assessing Authority, on remand the companies raised for the\n\n-first time the contention that since no notice had been issued to the firm of which they were partners, the assessment was invalid. The Assessing Authority E rejected this contention. He also held that the ]ands satisfied the requirements of s. 2(a).\n\nIn writ petitions filed by the two companies a single Judge of the High Court upheld the contention that the Assessing . .<\\uthority committed an error of lb 1w in assessing the two' partners without assessing the firm. This \\'iew V>'as affirmed by a Division Bench on appeal.\n\nOn further appeal to this Court it was contended that in the absence of a prohibition in the Act, the two companies could be validly assessed to tax without assessing the firm .\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELO : 1. The Assessing Authority was not in error in assessing tax on the returns submitted by the two companies and therefore the argument that assessment of the companies, without assessing the firm, was not legal, is without sub&tance.\n\n[ 425 H-426 A]\n\n2. \"Person\" defined in the section means an individual and includes a firm or a company. [ 423 G]\n\n3. There is nothing in the Act prohibiting the Assessing Authority frcm H proceeding against individuals forming a partnership. Section 18 enables the authorities, v;1hile proceeding with assessment of a firm or a company, not to\n\nr '\n\nA determine the tax payable by the firm or the company but to proceed to determine the agricultural income of each member of the firrn.\n\nTho provisions do not apply to a case \\Vhere the returns were submitted by the partners and the assessment made on that basis. The section would be applicable if assess\n\nment proceedings against a firm are stopped and the share of the individual is to be determined under the provisions of s. 18.\n\n[ 424 F]\n\n4. The well established position under the Incometax 1\\.ct (Central Act) \\Vith regard to assessment of firms is that where a firm has not made a return it is op'en to the department to assess a. partner directly in Hpect of his share of the firm's income without resorting to the machinery provided under the Act and without making an assessment on the firm, the only prohibition hi!ing against double taxation. [424 HJ\n\nC.I.T. v. Murlidhar Jhawar & l'urna Ginning & Pressing Factory, 60 lTR 95 SC; referred to.\n\n5. Secondly, the plea that assessment proceedings ought to have been taken egainst the firm, was not taken by them in the first instance either before the Assessing Authority or before the High Court. This plea cannot be allowed to be taken at a later stage. The assessees submitted their returns on the basis of their respective incomes.\n\n[425 F-426 A]\n\n6. The Assessing Authority has oorr'ectly come to the conclusion that the agreement between the parties provided for payment of land revenue. r426\n\nF-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURJSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2281 of 1969\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 6th December, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 978/62.\n\nShiv Pujan Singh and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is by the State of U.P. by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and order of the High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 978 of 1962.\n\nTwo companies, the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., were incorporated under the Rampur State Companies Act, 1932.\n\nMessrs. Govan Brothers (Rampur) Ltd. were the common managing agents of the two companies.\n\nOn 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur.\n\nThe agreements provided that the Rampur State should grant to the companies le.ases of the a§ficultural land with adequate irrigation facilities suitable for cultivation of sugar-cane.\n\nThe companies were required to pay fair and equitable land revenue which was to be agreed upon by the com-\n\n• y\n\n...\n\npanies and the Rampur State.\n\nOn 5th May, 1935, a partnership deed was a executed by the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. constituting a partnership firm of the two companies in equal shares known as the Agricultural Company, Rampur. In the year 1939 the Rampur State leased 2,000 acres of land and in the year 1946 another 2,000 acres of land to the Agricultural Company, Rampur.\n\nIn 1949 the State of Rampur acceded to the Union of India and was merged with the State of Uttar Prades)l with effect from 1st December, 1949.\n\nThe Rampur State had agreed to exempt the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. from all taxes for a period of 15 years from the date of commencement of their business.\n\nThe U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act was applied to the areas which formed part of the erstwhile State of Rampur on 1st July, 1950.\n\nThe Assessing Authority issued notices under section 16 ( 4) of the U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act to the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. for furnishing returns of their agricultural incomes for the years 1357 F to 1361 F. It may be noted that the notice was not issued to the Agricultural Company, Rampur.\n\nThe Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. submitted their returns. The Assessing Authority assessed the two companies to agricultural income-tax for the years concerned. The companies preferred an appeal against the assessment to the Commissioner, Rohilkhand.j)ivision, and also filed writ petition No. 2385 of 1959 in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the assessment orders.\n\nOn 17th April, 1961 the writ petition was allowed and the o.rder of assessment was quashed with a direction that fresh assessments may be made.\n\nThe Commissioner also directed the Assessing Authority to make fresh assessments in the light of the observations made by the High Court in its. judgment dated 17th April, 1961, allowing the writ petition No. 2385 of 1959.\n\nWhen the Assessing Authority started fresh hearing in pursuanco of the order of the High Court an objection was raised with regard to the assessability of the two companies on the !lfOund that no notice had been sent to the Agricultural Company, Rampur.\n\nThe Assessing Authority negatived the plea and assessed the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. for the years 1357 F to 1361 F and also for the years 1362 F to 1363 F.\n\nAgainst the order of the Assessing Authority the two companies which in the meantime became amalgamated as the Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur, filed a writ petition No. l 982 of 1962 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and prayed for the quashing of the assessment order dated 29th June, 1962. made by the Assessing Authority against the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. for the assessment years 1357 F to 1363 F.\n\nThe writ petition was heard by a single Judge of the High Court who by his order dated 4th October, 1962 allowed the writ petition; ou the ground that the Assessing Authority committed an error of law in assessing the two partners of the Agricultural Company, Rampur, and not assessing the firm as such.\n\nAggrieved by the order the State filed Special Appeal No. 978 of 1962 before the Division Bench of the High Court at Allahabad.\n\nThe Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 6th December, 1965, dismissed the Special Appeal.\n\nAn application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court.\n\nThe appellants then preferred Special Leave Petition No. 1724 of 1969 to this Court and on the leave being granted this appeal is now before us.\n\nThe main contention that has been raised before us by the appellants is that there being no express prohibition under the U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act an assessment can be validly and legally made on the individual partners, in the present case the tWo companies, without proceeding against the firm. It was pleaded that the tax could be assessed either on the partnership firm or on the partners invididually and that the view O!f the High Court that ti1e tax can only be recovered from the firm is erroneous.\n\nThe facts of the case disclose that on receipt of a notice by the Assessing Authority under section 16(4) of the U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act, the two cqmpanies Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. submitted their returns relating to the income of the two companies.\n\nIn the return it was stated that the income was half of the incc 'lle received from the partnership firm, the Agricultural Company, Rampur.\n\nThe assessment was made on the basis of the returns.\n\nThe, assessn•ent was questioned before the Commissioner and in. the writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad on the ground that the lands were neither assessed to land revenue in the United Provinces nor were they subject to local rate or cess assessed and collected by an officer of the Provincial Government.\n\nThis contention was accepted by the I-Ugh Court which directed the Assessing Authority to determine the question whether the lands were assessed to land revenue, in the (; nitcd Provinces or they were subject to local rate or cess assessed and collected by an officer as required under section 2 (a) of the U.P.\n\nAgricultural Income Tax Act, 1948.\n\nAfter remand the Assessinjli Authority found that the lands from which the income accrued satfofied the requirements of the section.\n\nFor the first time before the Assessing Authority the point was raised that as no notice was issued to the partnership firm, the partners i.e. two companies cannot be proceeded with for assessment of the tax.\n\nWhen this plea was rejected by the\n\n, ,,.\n\nt '\n\nAssessing Authority the matter was taken up before the High Cot,\n\n.first before a single Judge and then before the Division Bench, which accepted the contention of the two companies and held that in the absence of notice to the partnership firm proceedings cannot be taken 3gainst the two companies for assessment of the tax.\n\nThe relevant provisions unde.r the United Provinces Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1948, may be noticed.\n\nSection 2(5) defines \"Assessee\" as meaning a person by whom agricultural income-tax is payable. \"Company\" is defined under section 2(8) as meanin~ a company as defined in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, section 2(5A) defines a company as follows :-\n\n\"(SA) \"company\" means -\n\n(i) any Indian company, or\n\n(ii) any association, whether incorporated or not and whether Indian or non-Indian, which is or was assessable or was assessed as a company fC\\f the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1948, or which is declared by general or special order of the Central Board o! Revenue to be a company for the purposes of this Act;\"\n\n\"\"Firm\" is defined in section 2(9) as having the same meaning assigned 'to it in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.\n\nSection 4 of the Indian 'Partnership Act, 1932, states that \"Pe.rsons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually 'partners' and collectively a firm and the name under which their business is carried on is called the 'firm name' \". \"Person\" is defined in section 2 ( 11) as meaning an individual or association of individuals, owning or holding property for himself or for any other, or partly for his own benefit and partly for that of another, either as owner, trustee, receiver, manager, administrator or executor or in any capacity recognized by\n\nlaw, and includes an undivided Hindu family, firm or company hut G does not include a local authC\\fity.\n\nIt may be noted that by the definition the word \"person\" means an individual and includes a firm or a company. The liability of the person whether he be an individual. partner or the company for the agricultural income-tax is therefore beyond question.\n\nThe only point that is raised in this case is as to when there is a registered firm of which the two companies we.re partners the assessment proceeding& cannot be taken against the two partners, namely the two companies, without proceeding against the\n\nfirm.\n\nIn support of this contention section 18 of the U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act was strongly relied on.\n\nSection 18 confers the power to assess individual members of ce.rtain firms, associations and companies.\n\nSub-section (1) of section 18 enables the Assistant Collector with the previous approval of the Collector of the district concerned to pass an order under the circumstances stated in the sub-Sec. that the\n\nsum payable as agricultural income-tax by the firm or association shall not be determined, .and thereupon the share of each member in the aicultural income of the firm or association shall be included' in his total agricultural income for the purpose of his assessmenL thereon.\n\nSection 18(2) states that under certain circumstances the,· Collector may, with the previous approval of the Commissioner of thee area concerned, pass an order that the sum payable as agricultura\" income-tax by the company shall not be determined and the.reupon the proportionate share of each member in the agricullural income of the company, whether such agricultural income has been distributed to the members or not, shall be included in the total agricultural income or such member for the purpose of his assessment thereon. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent which was accepted by the High Court was that if the Agricultural Income-tax authorities wanted to p1oceed against the individual members of the firm they ought to have taken proceedings under section 18 (1) and in the absence of such proceedings the partners, in this case the two companies, could not have been proceeded with.\n\nThe argument thus presented though looks attractive does not stand scrutiny. There is nothing in th_e provisions of the Act prohibiting the Assessing Authority from proceeding against the individuals forming the partnership. Section 18 enables the authorities while proceeding with the assessment of a firm or a company not to determine the tax payable by the firm or the company but proceed to determine the agricultural income of each member of the. firm.\n\nThe prnv1sions do not apply to a case wher-o tre returns tlre submitted by the partners, as in this case, and the assessment made on that basis. fhe section would undoubtedly be applicable if assessment proceeding against the firm is stopped and the share of the individual is to be dete1 mined under the provisions of section 18. Our attention was not drawn to any provision in the Act which would bar the incometax authorities from proceeding against the individual partners on the returns submitted by the partners as such. Under the Indian Incom~ tax Act it has been held that where a firm has not made a return and has not offered its income for assessment, the Department may assess. a partner directly in respect of his share of the firm's income without resorting to the machinery provided under the Act and without making an assessment on the firm, (ClT v. Murlidhar Jhawar & Purna Ginning\n\n~- '\n\nu. P. STATE v. RAZA BULAND SUGAR co. (Kaiklsam, !.) 425\n\n& Pressing Factory('). It has been further held that once the Department has exercised its option and assessed the partners individually it cannot therei1flcr assess the same income in the bands cf the firm as an unregistered firm. It is not necessary for us to refer to the distinction that is maintained under the Income-tax Act between a registered and unregistered firm for no snch distinction is maintained under the U.P.\n\nAgricultural Income Tax Act. The only prohibition is against double taxation. In this case no assessment proceedings have been taken against the firm much less any tax imposed on it. The principle that is applicable in tax statutes is that the income is subject to tax in the hands of the same person only once. Thus, if an association or a firm is taxed in respect of its income the same income cannot be charged again in the hands of the members individually and vice versa.\n\nThe trust iucome cannot be taxed in the hands of the settlor and also in the hands of the trustee or beneficiary or in the hands of both the trustee as well as the beneficiary. These principles are, of course, subject to any special provision enabling double taxation in the statute.\n\nIn the circumstances, we are unable to share the view of the High Court that without proceeding against the firm the Assessing Authority was in error in proceeding against the two partners of the firm on the basi; of the returns submitted by them.\n\nThere is yet another objection to the upholding of the plea of the E respondents. Apart from submitting the returns their only plea in the earlier writ petition before the High Court was that the lands did not satisfy the requirements of the provisions of the U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act in that they were not assessed to land revenue in the\n\nUnited Provmces nor were they subject to local rate or cess.\n\nThis plea was accepted but the High Court remanded it for the detcrmina- F tion of the question whether the land was assessed to land revenue or was subject to local rate or cess.\n\nThe plea that the assessment proceedings ought to have been taken against the firm was not taken. This plea cannot be allowed to be taken in proceedings after remand. The objection was taken only before the Assessing Authority after remand. ft is true 1hat in the proceedings before the Assessing Authority the G assessment relating to two Fasli years 1362 and 1363 which did not form part of the proceedings before the High Court was also taken up.\n\nBut here again the returns were submitted by the two companies on the basis of their respective income.\n\nIn the circumstances, it cannot be said that the tax authorities were in error in assessing a tax on the returns submitted by the two companies. The plea, therefore, that the\n\nII!\n\n(1)_60 I.T.R. 95 (SC)\n\nassessment on the two companies, in the absence of proceedings against the firm of which the companies were partners, is not legal cannot be 11pheld.\n\nThe second contention that was raised before us was that it has not been established that the lands were either assessed to land revenue in the United Provinces or were subject to local rate or cess assessed and collected by an officer of the Provincial Government.\n\nAs the Single Judge of the High Court and the Division Bench of the High Court accepted the plea of the assessees that the assessment proceedings against them could not be sustained because of the failure of the authorities to take proceedings against the firm, they considered it un- nccessary to go into this question.\n\nIt is unfortunate that this aspect of the matter was not considered either by the Single Judge or by the Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nWe do not think it desirable to remit the case to the High Court for the determination of this question as the matter has been long pending.\n\nThis plea has been elaborately considered by the Assessing Authority which has pointed out that agreements with the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co.\n\nLtd. show that it was stipulated that the Rampur State shall from time t~\n\ntim~ grant to the Company lease of agricultural land.\n\nIt was further provided that such fair equitable land revenue as may be agreoo between the Rampur State and the Company shall be payable in respect of such land and shall be subject to revision by agreement every 15 years.\n\nThe lease also provided that fair and equitable water rales anc! cesses shall be payable in respect of the land.\n\nIn section 4(7) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it is mentioned that the word ''i\\fal Guzari\" will be applicable where it has been duly assessed or has been determined by means of an auction or by any other means.\n\nOn a consi deration of all the relevant facts the Assessing Authority came to the conclusion that the agreement in favour of the companies provided for payment of land revenne and the word \"rent\" used in i:he leases has to be considered in relation to the original agreements and as such it is seen that the agreement provided for payment of land revenue. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents was unable to challenge the correctness of the finding of the Assessing Authority.\n\nOn a consideration of all the facts that were placed before the Assessing Autho· rity, we do not see any reason.for not accepting the conclusion arriver:\n\nat by the Authority.\n\nThis issue also we find against the assessce.\n\nIn the result we hold that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the assessment proceedings against the respon·\n\n... '\n\n. -\n\nI'\"\n\ndent were unsustainable.\n\nWe set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore the order of the Assessing Authority . ..\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U. P. & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO. LTD., RAMPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO. LTD., RAMPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMPUR\n\nFebruary 27, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CmNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 609, "end_char": 623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merger of the State with the Union of India, the Assessing Authority under the\n\nU.P. Agricultural Income-tax Act issued notices to the two companies to submit their returns of agricultural income, which the companies did."}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1517, "end_char": 1524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "On further appeal to this Court it was contended that in the absence of a prohibition in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1805, "end_char": 1901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490, "end_char": 2500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On further appeal to this Court it was contended that in the absence of a prohibition in the Act", "statute": "On further appeal to this Court it was contended that in the absence of a prohibition in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3025, "end_char": 3030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shiv Pujan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4263, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Pujan Singh and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Pujan Singh and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is by the State of U.P. by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and order of the High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is by the State of U.P. by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and order of the High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Raza Sugar Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4622, "end_char": 4641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two companies, the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., were incorporated under the Rampur State Companies Act, 1932."}}, {"text": "Buland Sugar Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two companies, the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., were incorporated under the Rampur State Companies Act, 1932."}}, {"text": "Rampur State Companies Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Govan Brothers (Rampur) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Govan Brothers (Rampur) Ltd. were the common managing agents of the two companies."}}, {"text": "10th May, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur."}}, {"text": "Raza Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4850, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur."}}, {"text": "11th December, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4867, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur."}}, {"text": "Buland Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4892, "end_char": 4903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur."}}, {"text": "Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4956, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th May, 1933 the Raza Ltd. and on 11th December, 1934, the Buland Ltd. entered into agreements with the erstwhile State of Rampur."}}, {"text": "5th May, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5302, "end_char": 5315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th May, 1935, a partnership deed was a executed by the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. constituting a partnership firm of the two companies in equal shares known as the Agricultural Company, Rampur."}}, {"text": "Rampur State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1939 the Rampur State leased 2,000 acres of land and in the year 1946 another 2,000 acres of land to the Agricultural Company, Rampur."}}, {"text": "State of Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1949 the State of Rampur acceded to the Union of India and was merged with the State of Uttar Prades)l with effect from 1st December, 1949."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Prades)l", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1949 the State of Rampur acceded to the Union of India and was merged with the State of Uttar Prades)l with effect from 1st December, 1949."}}, {"text": "1st December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1949 the State of Rampur acceded to the Union of India and was merged with the State of Uttar Prades)l with effect from 1st December, 1949."}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.P. Agricultural Income Tax Act was applied to the areas which formed part of the erstwhile State of Rampur on 1st July, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6710, "end_char": 6733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2385 of 1959 in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the assessment orders."}}, {"text": "17th April, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th April, 1961 the writ petition was allowed and the o.rder of assessment was quashed with a direction that fresh assessments may be made."}}, {"text": "Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assessing Authority negatived the plea and assessed the Raza Ltd. and the Buland Ltd. for the years 1357 F to 1361 F and also for the years 1362 F to 1363 F.\n\nAgainst the order of the Assessing Authority the two companies which in the meantime became amalgamated as the Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur, filed a writ petition No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l 982 of 1962 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and prayed for the quashing of the assessment order dated 29th June, 1962."}}, {"text": "6th December, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 6th December, 1965, dismissed the Special Appeal."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court."}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8886, "end_char": 8913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9367, "end_char": 9380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9393, "end_char": 9420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "I-Ugh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention was accepted by the I-Ugh Court which directed the Assessing Authority to determine the question whether the lands were assessed to land revenue, in the (; nitcd Provinces or they were subject to local rate or cess assessed and collected by an officer as required under section 2 (a) of the U.P.\n\nAgricultural Income Tax Act, 1948."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10341, "end_char": 10350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10368, "end_char": 10401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United Provinces Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11227, "end_char": 11239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "the United Provinces Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 2(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11350, "end_char": 11362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "the United Provinces Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11402, "end_char": 11429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11435, "end_char": 11462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(5A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11464, "end_char": 11477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11751, "end_char": 11774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, section 2(5A) defines a company as follows :-\n\n\"(SA) \"company\" means -\n\n(i) any Indian company, or\n\n(ii) any association, whether incorporated or not and whether Indian or non-Indian, which is or was assessable or was assessed as a company fC\\f the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1948, or which is declared by general or special order of the Central Board o!"}}, {"text": "section 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11927, "end_char": 11939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11990, "end_char": 12018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12021, "end_char": 12030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12307, "end_char": 12316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13252, "end_char": 13262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13275, "end_char": 13302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13328, "end_char": 13338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13453, "end_char": 13463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13919, "end_char": 13932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15061, "end_char": 15071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15614, "end_char": 15624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16574, "end_char": 16588, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16686, "end_char": 16713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17963, "end_char": 17990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United Provinces", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19344, "end_char": 19360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second contention that was raised before us was that it has not been established that the lands were either assessed to land revenue in the United Provinces or were subject to local rate or cess assessed and collected by an officer of the Provincial Government."}}, {"text": "Raza Sugar Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20187, "end_char": 20206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This plea has been elaborately considered by the Assessing Authority which has pointed out that agreements with the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co.\n\nLtd. show that it was stipulated that the Rampur State shall from time t~\n\ntim~ grant to the Company lease of agricultural land."}}, {"text": "Buland Sugar Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20215, "end_char": 20237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This plea has been elaborately considered by the Assessing Authority which has pointed out that agreements with the Raza Sugar Co. Ltd. and the Buland Sugar Co.\n\nLtd. show that it was stipulated that the Rampur State shall from time t~\n\ntim~ grant to the Company lease of agricultural land."}}, {"text": "section 4(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20704, "end_char": 20716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20729, "end_char": 20745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_41_57_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "• f\n\nSTATE OF M.P. & ANR. ETC. v.\n\nRAM RAGHUBIR PRASAD AGARWAL I< ORS.\n\nFebruary 7, 1979\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Prathmik Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shikshal (Pathya Pusthakon Sambandhi Vyavrutha) Adhinlyam, 1973.\n\n(MP.\n\nAct No. 13 of 1973). Ss. 2(d), 3, 4 and 5-Whether '1ate has power to compile and distribute its own text books. Mention of topics in bare outline whether constitutes 'syllabi'' in S. 2(d) .\n\nMere communtcation to concerned officialJ or Departments lvhether sufficient for 'publication' in s. (3).\n\nThe M. P. Prathmik Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pla!hya Pus!hakon Sambandhi Vyavas!ha) Adhiniyam 1973 empowered the State Government to prescribe text books aceording to !!yllabus laid downand to undertake the preJ*l1'ation, printing and distribution of text books.\n\nSection 2(d) of the Act defines \"syllabi\" M a document containing courses of instructions for each standard of primary, middle school and secondary r-.ducation. Section 3 empowers the Stnte Government, in the case of primary and middle school education, and the Board in the dlse of secondary education, to lay down the syllabi and publish the same. Section 4 makes the State Government the competent authority to prescribe the text-books in accordance with the syllabus laid down under s. 3. Section 5 empowers the State Government to undertake the preparation, printing and distribution of text-books itself or cause them to be done through such agency as it deems fit and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.\n\nThe appellant (State Government) exercised i~ po, ver under s. 5 of the Act and produced the necessary text-book for \"Rapid Reading\" an item in the syllabus for secondary schools and distributed it among the students in many schools.\n\nUntil then, the books of the respondent, a private publisher were in use.\n\nThe respondent challenged the action of the State Government in the High F Court on the ground that the State Government had not given consideration to the availability of text-books in terms of the \"syllabi'' withprivate publishers as required by s. 5 of the Act, before it produced and distributed the text-books compiled by itself among the students of the secondary schools.\n\nThe High Court upheld the challenge and held that the statutory exercise envisaged under the Act had not been carried out before preparing and distributing the Government text books.\n\nIn the State Gove1nment's appeal to this Court it was contended that\n\n(1) as s. 2(d) envisages syllabus as a document containing courses of instruction, a broad outline, a demarcation if the topic would be sufficient compliance and that there n€ed not be particularisation of details, and (2) 'publication' of the syllabus, essential under s. 3 means communication by the Board to the Government or the concerned authorities. On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the mere mention of topics in bare outline, as in the instant case did not constitute 'syllabi' as defined in s. 2(d) and that to fclfil, 4-J96SCil79\n\nA the statutory requisites a syllabus. for a subject must concretise and constellate courses of instruction, short of which it is no syllabus in the eye of law.\n\nAllowing the appeal in part,\n\nHELD : 1. The syllabus for 'Rapid Reading', suffers invalidation under s. 3 because it has not been published. The publication must precede the prescription of text-books under s. 4 or their preparation under s. 5.\n\n[56C]\n\nIn the instant case the syllabus was published only on June 30, 1978 while the text-books were prescribed in October, 1977.\n\nSo ss. 3 and 4 have been breached and a fresh decision by Government prescribing text books for 'Rapid Reading' must be taken.\n\n[56D]\n\n2. The State Government shall take a fresh decision under ss. 4 and 5 read together.\n\nIf publishers of text-books or pro bona publico representationists communicate relevant matters bearing on the selection of text-books, their merits will be examined departmentally.\n\nIf, thereafter, Governn1ent conside:rs it proper to take over the text-books business under s. 5 it is free to do so.\n\nThe private sector has no 'right' and Government's jurisdiction is wide, although the State need not be allergic to private publishers if books of excellence, inexpensive a-nd well-designed, are readily available.\n\n[560-H]\n\n3. The laying down of the syllabus is a condition precedent to the prescription of text-books, because the courses of instruction follow upon and should be in conformity with the syllabus and text books are in implementation of the courses of instruction.\n\n[50B]\n\n4. To fulfil the statutory requisites, a syllabus for a subject must concretise and constellate courses of instruction, short of which it is no syllabus in the eye of law. [510]\n\n5. No prhtl1e publisher has a right under s. 4 that his text-book shall be prescribed or necessarily considered by Government. No such right as is claimed by the respondent-publisher has, therefore, been violated by the State Government.\n\n[54C]\n\n6. Tue syllabus for 'Rapid Reading' is not bad as falling short of definitional needs, although it is desirable for the Board to be more expressive when laying it down.\n\nWilful vagueness in syllabi will invite an adverse verdict.\n\n[56AJ\n\n7. A sy1labus may helpfully give general features but may not cease to be so solely because only an outline is silhouetted. 'Courses of Instruction' in s. 2(d) simply means the rubric for teaching, not more. It must be a syllabus of courses and so the courses must be spelt with relevancy, even though with brevity. [51G, 52A] ·\n\n8. Functionally the syllabus must tell the publisher and pundits in the\n\nconcerned field sufficient to enable them to help Government under s. 4 to !\"- ,\n\nclloose text-books. If this minimum is not complied with the court will use the lancet and issue an appropriate writ. [52C-DJ\n\n9. The expression \"syllabi'' must be so interpreted as to fulfil the purpose of ss. 3 and 4 which means there must be sufficient information for those concerned to know generally what courses of instruction are broadly covered\n\nI ,.\n\nM. P. STATE V. R. P. AGARWAL 43\n\n>-- under the heading mentioned, so that they may offer text-booki for such A courses.\n\nIf there is total failure here the elements of syllabi may well be held\n\n1 '\n\nto be non-existent, even though experts might daim otherwise. The law is \\Vhlat the Judges interpret the statute to be, not what the experts in their monopoly of v..isdom assert it to be.\n\n[52E-F]\n\n10. 'Publication' means more than mere con1n1unication to concerned officials or departments. The purpose of s. 3 animates the meaning of the expression 'publish'. 'Publication is \"the act of publishing anything; offering it to public notice, or rendering it accessible to public scrutiny. . . . an advising of the public; a making kno'Wll of something to then1 for a purpose.\" (52H,\n\n53ABJ L\n\n11. The legislative obj'e-ctive is to ensure that when the Board lays down\n\n~ the 'syllabi' it must publish 'the same' so that when the stage of prescribing text-books according to such syllabi arrives, both the publishers and the State 1 Government and even the educationists among the public may have some precise conception about the relevant syllabi to enable Government to decide upon suitable text-books from the private market or compiled under s. 5 by the State Government. [53C]\n\n12. \"Publication\" to the educational world is the: connotation of the expression.\n\nEven the student and the teaching community may ht:vve to know what the relevant' syllabus for a subject is, \"'hich means wider publicity than n1inimaI communication to the departmental officialdom.\n\n[53D]\n\nOnly when they come to know about the syllabi prescribed representatives in the educational field or in the public sector m+ary be able to tell the State Government what type of text-books are available, what kind of books will make for excellence in teaching and what manner of material will promote the interests of the students in the subjects of study.\n\n[53H-54A]\n\n13. Government has plenary power under s. 5 to produce its own textbooks in tune with the sy11abi prescribed under s. 3. No private publisher can quarrel with it on the ground that his profit is affected or that the Sta.te sector acquires a monopoly in text book production.\n\nThe legislature has em- JX)Wered the State to do so and there is no vice of unconstitutionality whatever.\n\nThe caveat built into s. 5 by the legislature is that it la'Uthorises Government to enter the text-book field as a monopolist \"if it considers so to do.\" [54E-F] <r\n\n14. Nationalisation of the activity of preparation, printing or distribution of text-books is a serious step and resort to that measure calls for . a policy judgment.\n\n[54G]\n\n15. The Court should not sit in judgment over Government decisions in\n\nx '\n\n• ...\n\nthese matters save in exceptional ca6es.\n\nThe: law is complied with if Govern- G ment has, before undertaking action under s. 5, bestowed consideration on matters of relevance which may vary from time to time and from subject to subject.\n\nGovernment may like to avoid expenditure from the public exchequer if books, inexpensive and qualitatively acceptable, are easily lavai1able.\n\nThe decision is that of the Government and it has :i. wide discretion. Publishers have no right to complain, and if the mind of the Government has been relevantly applied to the subject, courts must keep their hands off. [55B-C] H\n\nNarainda• Tndurkhya v. State of M.P. & Ors .• (1974] 3 SCR 624; Black's Legal Dictionary, p. 1386, referred to.\n\nS~PREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.a.\n\ni A ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2062-2063/\n\n78.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20-9-78 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Misc. Petition No. 403/78 .\n\nA. K. Sen, K. K. Adhikari, S. K. Gambhir and Miss B. Ramrikhyanai for the Appellant.\n\nN. C. Upadhaya, K. P. Gupta and B. B. Tawakley for Respondents 1-2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-If King Midas suffered from the course of turning into gold everythlng he touched, Indo-Anglian legalism suffers from the pathology of making mystiques of simple words of common usage when they are fouod in the Corpus Juris.\n\nWe cannot afford this luxury of legalistics, the besetting sin of Jaw-in-action. This acid comment is provoked by the prolonged debate carried on with logomachlc dexterity in this appeal against a meticulous judgment where the semantic complexity and definitional intricacy of innocent words like 'syllabus', 'courses of instruction' and 'publish' and the procedural mechanics for prescribing text-books for secondary education set out in a fasciculus of sections have been investigated.\n\nLaw, in a democratic, pluralist society sprea.ds over vast space~ where the Constitution of developing couotries, like ours, commands the State to adventure into a profusion of welfare measures and commits to the judicial process the interpretation of legislation, not to obfuscate but to objectify the meaning of enactments. The Justice System ceases to be fuoctional if courts do not make the technology\n\n• t 4\n\n:..\n\nof statutory construction serve the betterment of society. In Cardozo's .. __, lofty diction : 7 >\n\n\"We may figure the task of the judge, if we please, as tl{e task of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without.\n\nNone the less, we will not set men to such a task, unless they have absorbed the spirit, and have filled themselves with a love, of the language they must read.\"(') If a broad and viable reading of statutory language were not adopted by Judges filled with the wish to make things work according to social justice courts may be classed with the dinosaurs.\n\n{J) The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardozo.\n\nl' 174.\n\n.,-·\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh, alive to its obligation to promote education in widest co=onalty, with accent on quality and cost, among the impressionable generation, undertook the task Of statutory regulation of teaching material for 'primary education', 'middle school education', and 'secondary education'.\n\nThen followed, in conformance with the rule of law, executive action, legislative m€:a!!ures, regulatory procedures and infra-structures, necessary for the incarnation of a State-directed but expert-oriented scheme of pre-university • education.\n\nA painstakingly accurate and comprehensively detailed 1 , statement of the project, with an integrated analysis of the statutory J-- provisions and erudite enunciation of the law,, is found in the judgment ,: of Bhagwati, J. in Naraindas('), if we may say so with respect, that ! a repeat performance here again may be supererogatory.\n\nWe read that ruling into this judgment by incorporations, as it were, and content ourselves with a skeletal projection of the legislation with special reference to the key sections, viz, ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1973. Its title is Prathamik, Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Samhandhi Vyavastha) Adhiniyam (hereinafter referred to, for short, as the 1973 Act).\n\n_..,\n\n.../'\n\n' .\n\nThe respondent before us who was the petitioner before the High Court-is a private publisher. It may be cynical to say that textbooks are co=odity for consumers of school education and there is big money in the trade especially when the private sector in the book business has been enjoyiµg a ready market provided by th~ proliferation of schools and the obligatory purchase of text-books, once Government prescribes them.\n\nSo, behind the veil of 'educational excellence formulation of syllabi and competent text-books is the vast profit pouring into private publishers. In our system, unalloyed public interest litigation, through organisations crusading in the field, is yet 'a consummation devoutly to be wished', and private vested interests are the vociferous ventriloquists of public causes.\n\nDemocratic participation in the justice process gains reality only when popular organs blossom from the desert and enter the litigative oasis with fighting faiths.\n\nHere the respondent successfully challenged before the High Court the validity of the prescription of the State's text-book for 'Rapid Reacting', an item in the syllabus for secondary schools. Once Government books were chased out, the respondent filled the vacuum since prior to the entry of the State his book on the subject had admittedly been legally in vogue.\n\nThe State has, by special leave, come up in appeal and secured a stay of operation of the judgment of the High\n\n(!) Naraindas lndurkhva v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [1974] 3 S.C.R. 624.\n\n11'\n\n5UPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nCourt, and its books are back in circulation in the schools.\n\nA brief calendar of events shows that since the opening of schools this academic year Government text-books have been in use uptil now, barring for about a month between the judgment of the High Court and the stay ordered by this Court.\n\nThis bears upon monlding the relief since the benign power under Art. 226 is a special instrument of justice which, with flexible pragmatism and genius for equity inhibits social trauma even while upholding individual rights.\n\nThe writ jurisdiction is geared to community good.\n\n. I There is a trichotomy of school education in Madhya Pradesh as __J_ in many other States-Primary, Middle and Secondary.\n\nWe are 7 , concerned in this case with the text-book controversy for secondary / schools.\n\nThe Board of Secondary Education, Appellant No. 2, was constituted under Act No. 23 of 1965 which also conferred power on it to prescribe courses of instruction in such branches of secondary education as it deemed fit.\n\nIndeed, the Board was a functional entity with expert capability and entrusted with secondary education in its many facets.\n\nEven the power to make regulations was given to the Board and it did make such regulations providing for appointment of Committees on Courses which, in turn, could lay down syllabi in the various subjects and recommend suitable text-books when required.\n\nThe courses approved by the Committee went to the Board and when sanctioned by the Board found their way in the printed prospectus which served as the guide-book for study and examination for the students. All that we need emphasise here is that the provisions of the 1965 Act and the regulations framed by the Board took good care of the Rule of Law as against behavioral caprice of administrative organs in this branch of education.\n\nIn 1973 the legislature enacted Act 13 of 1973, referred to earlier in this Judgment.\n\nThe provisions of this Act form the basis of the powers claimed by the appellants and the nidus of rights of the respondent alleged to have been violated.\n\nThe scheme of the statute runs as follows : Section 2 contains definitions and we are concerned particularly with s. 2 ( d) which tells us what the legislature means by the expression 'syllabi'.\n\nThe Section also defines 'text-book', although there is not mnch quarrel about its connotation in the case before us.\n\nOne of the basic disputes between the parties turns on the conceptual clarity of 'syllabi' as defined in s. 2(d). Section 3 clothes the State Government and the Board with powers vis-a-vis laying down of syllabi.\n\nTo narrow the scope of the dispute we may straightway state that s. 3(2) empowers the Board\n\nto lay down 'syllabi' in the case of secondary education.\n\nWe may bave A. to take a close-up of this provision a little later.\n\nBut suffice it to say - for the present that the syllabus for 'Rapid Reading', wh'ch is the bone of contention before us, is within the province of the Board to lay down.\n\nWe may vivify the discussion by quoting the provisions of direct B concern in this case and they are ss. 2(d), 3 and 5.\n\n\"2. (d) syllabi\" means a document containing courses of instructions for each standard of primary education, middle school education and secondary education;\n\n3. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) the State Government may, from time to time, in relation to primary education and middle school education and the Board may, from time to time, in\n\nrelation to secondary education lay down syllabi D and publish the same in such manner as may be prescribed.\n\n(2) The syllabi laid down under the authority of the State Government in the case of primary education and middle school education and by the Board, in the case of the secondary education and in force immediately before the appointed day shall be the syllabi laid down and published for the purpose of sub-section ( 1) .\n\n4. ( 1) The State Government may, by order, prescribe the text books according to syllabi laid down under section 3 :\n\nProvided that text books for secondary education shall not be prescribed without prior consnUation with the Board.\n\n(2) The text books prescribed by the State Government or the Board according to the syllabi referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3 and in force immediately before the appointed day shall, till they are changed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, be the text books prescribed for the purpose of sub-section (1) .\n\n(3) As from the appointed day, no books other than the text books prescribed nnder sub-section ( 1) or referred to in sub-section (2) shall be used in any approved school or recognised school for imparting instructions in accordance with syllabi in primary education, middle school education or secondary education.\n\n5. The State Government may, if it considers it necessary so to do, undertake the preparation, printing or distribution of text books itself or cause the text books to be prepared, printed or distributed through such agency as it may deem fit on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.\"\n\nSection 2( d) conceputalises 'syllabi'; s. 3 statutorises the modus operandi for fixing the 'syllabus'.\n\nOnce the syllabus is fixed, the follow-up is the prescription of text books in accordance with the syllabus.\n\nSection 4 makes the State Government, the competent authority, to prescribe text-books in accordance with the syllabus laid down nnder •· 3.\n\nOf course, even the provisions of text books for secondary education must be made by Government only after prior consultation with the Board.\n\nThis is obviously intended to ensure the quality of the text books which sometimes suffers at the hands of unenlightened departmental officers or unheeding political bosses too hubristic to listen to experts in the field.\n\nIt is vital to notice that until valid prescription of text-books under s. 4 (1) the books prescribed and in vogue immediately before the F change shall continue; that is to say, the legislature has taken care to avoid a gap when there would be no text books for the students to study and take their examinations.\n\nThe scheme of s. 4 is for the State Government to prescribe textbooks.\n\nThis may be done in one of the two ways.\n\nGovernment may select from the private sector when text books are offered by publishers, if they satisfy quality control, price, social perspective and other relevant aspects.\n\nIndeed, many publishers compete in the text-book market because it assures purchasers and profit.\n\nHowever, for a variety of good reasons the State Government may consider it necessary to depart from the practice of picking and choosing from the private sector.\n\nMay be, books are of sub-standard quality; may be, the paper on which they are printed or the manner and design may be unsatisfactory; may be the cost is such that the poor children may be\n\n----,,\n\npriced out It may also be that Government thinks that more excellence and better educational direction may be imparted to the impressionable generation of students at the secondary school level by the public sector getting such text-books compiled in conformity with the syllabi laid down by the concerned authority.\n\nSection 5, therefore, makes it perfectly legitimate for the State Government to undertake the preparation, printing and distribution of text-books itself or cause them to be so done through such agency as it may deem fit and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. In short, the relevant provision creates a facultative public sector for text-book production and distribution.\n\nWhat is significant to note is that the departure from the private sector and the \"nationalisation\" of textbook manufacture may be undertaken only if the State Government \"considers it necessary so to do\".\n\nOnce it comes to that judgment, the competence to deprive the private sector and entrnst to the public sector is beyond challenge.\n\nIn the present case, one of the subjects of secondary education is \"Rapid Reading\". The syllabus has to be laid down in this behalf.\n\nText-books need to be prescribed in conformity with the syllabi and then a decision has to be taken by the Government either to choose extant text-books from the private publishers or take over the operation itself if it considers it necessary so to do.\n\nThe first appellant, in the present case, chose to exercise its power under s. 5 and produced the necessary text-book for \"Rapid Reading\" and distributed it among the students in many schools.\n\nUntil then, the respondent's books were in use for \"Rapid Reading\".\n\nNaturally, when his customers vanished and his profit was extinguished he came up to the Court contending that the statutory exercise had not been carried out before preparing and distributing the text books under s. 5 and that, for that reason, the Government text-books had to be withdrawn as invalid and his books, instead, resuscitated for circulation.\n\nThe specific grounds of invalidation relied on by the Writ Petitioner are many and the Jong Judgment of the High Court has lavished G discussion on these aspects. Counsel have sought to repeat the rival contentions before us.\n\nBut we do not think that it is necessary to embark upon the labyrinthine details or prolix analyses which have\n\negaged the learned Judges of the High Court. Nor do we think that extensive or intensive consideration of the decision in Naraindas's case\n\n(supra) is called for since its ratio is clear and does not come in for H serious application in the present dispute. In this view, we proceed to specificate the precise issues pertaining to the decision as to whether\n\nthe production and distribution of text-books by the State Government, on its own, is liable to be voided on the score of any fatal statutory infirmity.\n\nThe laying down of the syllabus is a condition precedent to the prescription of text-books, because the courses of instruction follow upon and should be in conformity with the syllabus and text-books are in implementation of the courses of instruction.\n\nThe first question that falls for consideration, therefore, is as to whether there has been a legally sustainable laying down of the syllabus for \"Rapid Reading\". If there has been, the second crucial issue of importance is as to whether the State Government has given consideration to the availability of text-books in terms of the 'syllabi' with the publishers.\n\nIf such publishers have offered their text-books, Government may consider them from many angles and reach a conclusion that it is. necessary for the Government itself to undertake the preparation, printing and distribution of text-books in this regard or entrust these operations to a choosen agency.\n\nThe question is whether such a consideration had been bestowed by the Government as required by s. 5 before it produced and distributed the text-books compiled by itself among the students of the secondary schools.\n\nAssuming there is any breach, the next question is whether such non-compliance spells invalidation of the text-books altogether.\n\nFinally, assuming all the points against the State Government, should the Court make a realistic appraisal of the situation as it exists currently and mould the relief appropriately so that the student community, which has to take the examinations in a couple of months or so, may not be obliged to switch text-books belatedly in taking their examinations.\n\nThe ultimate concern of the judicial process is not to guarantee the profit of the private producers or to condone every executive sin but, within statutory parameters, to promote the educational welfare of the student community.\n\nThe core of the controversy turns on whether there is statutorily solemnised syllabus at all under s. 3(2) of the 1973 Act and, whether the State has the facultative power to compile and distribute its own text books under s. 5, even if there are. private publishers in the field with ready-made text-books.\n\nThis duplex challenge once disposed of, the other disputes do not merit mui; J:i discussion.\n\nNaraindas (supra), heavily relied on by the respondent, is impeccable law but inapplicable here.\n\nB True many points arise, according to counsel.\n\nBut abbreviation, without amputation, does justice to the /is and avoids forensic prolixity, and so we turn the focus on these two points and, in the light of\n\n.- ,\n\n' •\n\nour answers, structure the. relief to promote the interests of the invisible and inarticulate student secto.r for whose sake the law was made. The real party, in many litigative battles under Art. 226, is the community whose processual participation is alien to the adversary system inherited from an individualistic legal culture. The judges are the guardians of that silent sector until our system of procedure is re-structured.\n\nThis observation assumes prominence as we shape the remedy finally.\n\nSection 3 as well as s. 5 must now come under the legal microscope.\n\nBefore that, we must bestow attention on a preliminary plea which respondent's . counsel, encouraged by his success at the High Court level, has urged before us.\n\nHe argues that the mere mention of topics in bare outline, such as has been done here by the Board of Secondary Education, does not constitute 'syllabi' as defined ins. 2(d).\n\nTo fulfil the statutory requisites, a syllabus for a subject must concretise and constellate courses of instruction, short of which it is no syllabus in the eye of law. If this be valid, no syllabus, no text-book; and no text-book, the status quo ante; and the book of the respondent being admittedly' extant immediately before, it gains legal re-incarnation and all the students shall have to do 'rapid reading' of his book for which they must first buy them.\n\nThe Board is the legislative instrument for laying down the syllabi and must be presumed to possess academic expertise sufficient to understand what is a syllabus.\n\nWords of technical import whose signification is familiar for specialists in the field should not be petrified by courts based on verbalism. 'A little learning is a dangerous thing' and courts should not 'rush in', tempted by definitional attraction, where experts 'fear to tread'. Section 2(d) tells us that a syllabus is a document containing courses of instruction. A broad outline, a brief indication, a demarcation of the topic may well meet with lexical approval.\n\nMoreover, s. 2(d) speaks of a 'course of instruction' .\n\nThis can be a bare. outline, a bald mention of the matter and does. not compel particularisation of details, even if it be desirable.\n\nThat part is taken care of by the next step of prescription of text-books. A syllabus may helpfully give general features but may not cease to be so solely because only an outline is silhouetted. For instance, 'music' without more, is not syllabus, because it may range wildly from weird noises which make music among African tribes but to an Indian ear may offensively amount to 'sound and fury signifying nothing' to a concord of sweet sounds or continuous flow of micro-notes which thrills the West and the East. But if 'sitar' or 'violin' is mentioned it illumines, although it still leaves much for imagination to fill in a\n\nhurnlred details for instruction to be actually imparted in the class.\n\n'Courses of Instruction' ins. 2(d) simply means the rubric for teaching, not more, although treacherous vagueness which disables textbook producers from responding to the Government by offering their books may be bad. It must be a syllabus of courses and so the courses must be spelt out with relevancy, even though with brevity.\n\nTo exemplify again, 'Justice' is not enough, Indian Justice System may fill the bill. Brief may be, but not blank.\n\nWhile courts, will uot surrender their decisional power to the vagarious experts non-interference by courts in fields of specialists, save in gross cases, is a wise rule of guidance.\n\nFrom this angle, we are not satisfied that for so elusive a subject as 'Rapid Reading', 'particularise or perish' should be the test.\n\nThe absence of syllabus cannot defeat the case of the State.\n\nWe stress, however, that, functionally speaking, the syllabus must tell the publishers and pundits in the concerned field sufficient to enable them to help Government under s. 4 to choose text-books.\n\nIf this minimum is not complied with the court will use the lancet and issue an appropriate writ.\n\nLanguage permitting, the appropriate interprctational canon must be purpose-oriented.\n\nTherefore, the expression \"syllabi\" must be so interpreted as to fulfil the purpose of ss. 3 and 4 which means there must be sufficient information for those concerned to know generally what courses of instruction are broadly covered under the heading mentioned, so that they may offer text-books for such courses. If there is total failure here the elements of syllabi may well be held to be non-existent even though experts might claim otherwise. The law is what the Judges interpret the statute to be, not what the experts in their monopoly of wisdom assert it to be.\n\nNow we move on to s. 3 to verify what flaws vitiate the laying down of syllabi.\n\nIn this case if we predicate the existence of syllabus the next ingredient is its publication ''in such a manner as may be prescribed.\" Publication of the sylllbus is thus essential under s. 3 and when confronted by this requirement, Shri A. K. Sen, counsel for the State, sought to construe that expression to mean communication by the Board to the Government or other concerned authorities.\n\nTo publish, according to him, is to make known to those concerned. On the contrary, Shri Upadhyaya, counsel for the respondent, argued that\n\n\"to publish\" was more than to communicate to the Government Departments and really meant making known to the community or the concerned section of the community.\n\nContextually speaking, we are satisfied that 'publication' means more than mere communication to concerned officials or Departments.\n\nTo publish a news item is to\n\n~-·\n\n• -\n\nmake known to people in general; \"an advising of !he public or making known of something to the public for a purpose\" (Black's Legal Dictionary, p. 1386). In our view, the purpose of s. 3 animates the meaning of the expression 'publish'. 'Publication' is \"the act of publishing anything; offering it to public notice, or rendering it accessible to public scrutiny ...... an advising of the public; a making known of something to them for a purpose.\" Logomachic exercises need not detain us because the obvious legislative object is to ensure that when the Board lays down the 'syllabi' it must publish 'the same' so that when the stage of prescribing text-books according to such syllabi arrives, both the publishers and the State Government and even the educationists among the public may have some precise conception about the relevant syllabi to enable Government to decide upon suitable text-books from the private market or compiled under s. 5 by the State Government itself.\n\nIn our view, therefore, \"publication\" to the educational world is the connotation of the expression.\n\nEven the student and the teaching community may have to know what the relevant syllabus for a subject is, which means wider publicity than minimal communication to the departmental officialdom.\n\nIf this view be sound, the State Government has failed to comply with the requisite of publication of the syllabus before prescribing the text-books.\n\nOn that ground alone the order of the Government prescribing text-books must fail because the condition preceding such pres- E cription, namely, publishing of the syllabi has not been complied with.\n\nWe confine our observations only to the item relating to \"Rapid Reading'\" so that there is no need for reopening other subjects and syllabi and to create chaos or uncertainty.\n\nWhat should be the follow-up action that the Court should adopt in issuing the necessary direction on this finding that, for want of publication of the syllabus, the prescription of text-books even under s. 5 must fail?\n\nNeoossarily publication is important and we should insist that the State Government should not dismiss it as a ritual of little moment.\n\nAs we have earlier indicated, but may repeat for emphasis that there is an object in publishing the syllabi and this public purpose will be stultified to the prejudice of the school-going community if the syllabi are not made known to the public generally.\n\nOnly when they come to know about the syllabi prescribed, representatives in the educational field or in the public sector may be able to tell the State Government what type of text-books are available, what kinds of books will make for excellence in teaching and what manner of material will promote\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR!S [1979] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthe interests of the students in the subjects of study. If there are exisin¥ textb?oks, Govern_ment may give consideration for them or may mv1te op1mon of experts on their worh. Government may pay attention to the cost of the books so made available, their readability, their design and arrangement, the impression that they may produce on the plastic minds and a host of other factors.\n\nAll these possibilities may be frustrated if the syllabi are not published.\n\nWliat has been done in the present case by the State Government is to exercise its power under s. 5 to prepare, print and distribute textbooks of its own compilation. Certainly, this is well within the power of Gove.rnment under s. 5.\n\nTo dispel misapprehension we emphasise that no private publisher has a right under s. 4 that his text-book shall be prescribed or necessarily considered by Government.\n\nNo such right as is claimed by the respondent-publisher has, therefore, been violated by the State Government.\n\nWe upset Government's text-books, not because the respondent-publisher has a right to have his books necessarily considered by the Government, but because the syllabi have not been published prior to the prescription of text-books.\n\nWe must erase another possible confusion.\n\nGovernment has plenary power under s. 5 to produce its own text-books in tune with the syllabi prescribed under s. 3.\n\nNo private published can quarrel with it on the ground that his profit is affected or that the State sector acquires monopoly in text-book production.\n\nThe legislature, in its wisdom, has empowered the State to do so and there is no vice of unconstitutionality whatever.\n\nBut there is a caveat built into s. 5 by the legislature. Before the State Government undertakes the preparation, printing or distribution of text-books or causes them to be so done by any other agency, it must bestow appropriate attention on the wisdom of the policy in the given circumstances.\n\nSection 5 authorises Government to enter the text-book field as a monopolist \"if it considers it necessary so to do.\" These are weighty words and cannot be slurred over.\n\nNationalisation of the activity of preparation, printing or distribution of text-books is a serious step and resort to that measure calls for a policy judgment.\n\nGovernment must consider it necessary so to do an\"d this consideration must imply advertence to relevant factors.\n\nMyriad matters, material to a right decision, may be thought of since books are more than collection of information but mental companionship for good or evil.\n\nSchool children require uplifting books, not such as pollute their minds or inject prurience.\n\nTheir creativity must be kindled and not stifled.\n\nThe presentation of subjects must be appetising, not inhibiting. The cost must be within the means of the\n\nt •, t t\n\n~· .,\n\n~ ' '-\n\n' •\n\npoor Indian parent.\n\nAvailability of sufficient number of books within easy reach so as to avoid a. scarcity situation may be yet another criterion.\n\nIndeed, it is beyond exhaustive enumeration to catalogue the considerations. We do not think that the Court should sit in judgment over Government decisions in these matters save in exceptional cases.\n\nThe law is complied with if Government bas, before undertaking action under s. 5, bestowed consideration on matters of relevance which may vary from time to time and from subject to subject. ,_ We need hardly say that Government may like to avoid expenditure\n\nf from the public exchequer if books, inexpensive and qualitatively )._acceptable'. are easily available: The decision is that of foe Govern- . ment and 1t bas a wide d1scret10n.\n\nPublishers have no tight to com-\n\n~ plain, and if the mind of the Government has been relevantly applied to the subject, courts must keep their hands off.\n\n.'r- ---..\n\n' • • -...\n\n-'\\\n\nThe construction we have put upon s. 5 gives Government power which is also a responsible power.\n\nIndeed, all public power is a public trust and in that spirit ss. 4 and 5 must be executed.\n\nOn this basis, the direction that we give is that the State Government will publish, .under s. 3, the syllabus for 'Rapid Reading' as a first step.\n\nThereupon, representations from any relevant quarters, if received, will be considered under s. 4 so as to reach a decision on the prescription of the ext-books according to the syllabus.\n\nThis decision may be either !Al choose some text-books available in the field or to compile text-books on its own.\n\nIf the decision is the latter, Government is perfectly free to undertake preparation, printing and distribution.\n\nIt mny be right to caution the State while choosing text-books from ihe private sector or preparing such books on their own to remember the vital constitutional values of our nation.\n\nSocial justice is the corner stone of our Constitution. Freedom of expression is basic to our democratic progress.\n\nThe right to know, awareness of the implications of a sovereign, secular, socialist republic and its membership and the broad national goals incorporated in the Constitution are fundamental.\n\nWhen education is a State obligation, when prescription of syllabi and text-books falls within the governmental function, when the constellation of values mandated by the Constitution is basic to our citizenship, the play of ss. 3, 4 and 5 must respond tg this script.\n\nInstruction at the secondary school level must be promotional of these paramount principles.\n\nUltimately, it is Yonth Power that makes for a Human Tomorrow.· The felt necessities of our cultural integration and constitutional creed are fostered essentially at the school level. \"Books are not merely the best companions but make or mar the rising generation.\n\nWe have reached the final.\n\nWhat remains is to crystallise the conclusions and to formulate the directions.\n\nThe syllabus for 'rapid reading' is not bad as falling short of definitional needs, although it jg desirable for the Board to be more expressive when laying it down.\n\nWilful vagueness in syllabi will invite an adverse verdict. 'Rapid Reading', as a rubric, in itself, somewhat slippery as a substantive topic and so the syllabus for it also may share that trait. The new plea urged specifically for the first time at the argument stage in this Court (and controverted by the State) that no syllabus has been laid down, as a fact, for 'Rapid Reading' is too late to be permitted.\n\nThe syllabus for 'Rapid Reading' suffers invalidation under s. 3 because it has not been published.\n\nThe publication must precede the prescription of text-books under s. 4 or their preparation under s. 5.\n\nHere the case of the State show that the syllabus was published only on June 30, 1978, while the text-books were prescribed in October 1977.\n\nSo ss. 3 and 4 have been breached and a fresh decision by Government prescribing text-books for 'Rapid Reading' must be taken.\n\nWe are not disposed, even as in the case of the plea of no syllabus for 'Rapid Reading', to consider the nascent discovery of Sri Upadhyaya, counsel for the respondent, that the two text-books prescribed for 'Rapid Reading' were not even in printed existence when they were prescribed.\n\nJudicial proceedings, especially at the earlier stages, should not ordinarily be allowed to become the scene of newly discovered points of contention. There is no substitute for proper briefs and good home-work.\n\nNever can controverted facts he raised de novo here.\n\nWe disallow the contention of non-existence of text-books in print or otherwise, when they were prescribed.\n\nReverting to the project of providing for the future course of action and to obviate the untowardness of a void in the syllabus and textbonks, we hold that the State Government shall take a fresh decision\n\nJtder ss. 4 and 5 read together. If publishers of text-books or probono publico representationists communicate relevant matters bearing on the selection of text-books and the wisdom of the State itself undertaking the task, Government will give thought to them. There is no need to wait idefinitely for such representations. If within one month from\n\n•w they are received, their merits will be examined departmentally.\n\nIf, thereafter, Government considers it proper to take over the textbook business under s. 5 it is free to do so.\n\nWe make it clear that the private sector has no \"right\" and Government's jurisdiction is wide although the State need not be allergic to private publishers if books of excellence, inexpensive and well-designed, are readily available.\n\n• ...,\n\n... -\"\\\n\nThese directions take care of the future.\n\nBut what about the A current academic year?\n\nTo change horses mid-stream may be disastrous.\n\nThroughout the better part of the year, except for around a month, Government text-books have been in use.\n\nThe examinations are impending. To harass the young alumni by putting them through fresh books of the respondent (though in circulation last year) is an avoidable infliction.\n\nTherefore, for the nonce, Government books for 'Rapid Reading' will continue in this year's classes.\n\nWe direct so.\n\nBefore the next academic year begins, Government will decide, under ss. 4 and 5, on preparing text-books itself or selecting from the private sector.\n\nThis will be done on or before March 31, 1979.\n\nJf the decision taken is either way, the books shall be well-stocked by th' end of May.\n\nWe allow the appeal in part and dismiss in part and as a corollary, ing dates and months but governmental processes are often 'paperlogged'.\n\nThe fear that •the State Government may not be sufficiently conscious of the due priority to be given to the tasks now set before it has persuaded us to issue these time-bound directions.\n\nWe allow the appea'I in part and dismiss in part and as a corollary, order the parties to bear their costs throughout.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\n5-196SCil79", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "f\n\nSTATE OF M.P. & ANR. 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Cardozo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{J) The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardozo."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11868, "end_char": 11891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".,-·\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh, alive to its obligation to promote education in widest co=onalty, with accent on quality and cost, among the impressionable generation, undertook the task Of statutory regulation of teaching material for 'primary education', 'middle school education', and 'secondary education'."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12632, "end_char": 12640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A painstakingly accurate and comprehensively detailed 1 , statement of the project, with an integrated analysis of the statutory J-- provisions and erudite enunciation of the law,, is found in the judgment ,: of Bhagwati, J. in Naraindas('), if we may say so with respect, that !"}}, {"text": "Naraindas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12648, "end_char": 12657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A painstakingly accurate and comprehensively detailed 1 , statement of the project, with an integrated analysis of the statutory J-- provisions and erudite enunciation of the law,, is found in the judgment ,: of Bhagwati, J. in Naraindas('), if we may say so with respect, that !", "canonical_name": "Naraindas"}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12943, "end_char": 12957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 S.C.R. 624", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14684, "end_char": 14703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15115, "end_char": 15123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15378, "end_char": 15392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I There is a trichotomy of school education in Madhya Pradesh as J in many other States-Primary, Middle and Secondary."}}, {"text": "Board of Secondary Education", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15549, "end_char": 15577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Secondary Education, Appellant No."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16868, "end_char": 16877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16938, "end_char": 16942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17244, "end_char": 17251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17253, "end_char": 17262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17418, "end_char": 17425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2(d), 3 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17847, "end_char": 17864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31012, "end_char": 31016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31313, "end_char": 31324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31816, "end_char": 31820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32067, "end_char": 32071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32118, "end_char": 32127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Publication of the sylllbus is thus essential under s. 3 and when confronted by this requirement, Shri A. K. Sen, counsel for the State, sought to construe that expression to mean communication by the Board to the Government or other concerned authorities.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Upadhyaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32362, "end_char": 32371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, Shri Upadhyaya, counsel for the respondent, argued that\n\n\"to publish\" was more than to communicate to the Government Departments and really meant making known to the community or the concerned section of the community.", "canonical_name": "Upadhyaya"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32934, "end_char": 32938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33695, "end_char": 33699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34762, "end_char": 34766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOR!S [1979] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35476, "end_char": 35511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only when they come to know about the syllabi prescribed, representatives in the educational field or in the public sector may be able to tell the State Government what type of text-books are available, what kinds of books will make for excellence in teaching and what manner of material will promote\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR!S [1979] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36075, "end_char": 36079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36209, "end_char": 36213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36299, "end_char": 36303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36808, "end_char": 36812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36885, "end_char": 36889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37197, "end_char": 37201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37461, "end_char": 37470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38780, "end_char": 38784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39363, "end_char": 39367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39489, "end_char": 39500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39612, "end_char": 39616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39762, "end_char": 39766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40805, "end_char": 40819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41959, "end_char": 41963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42066, "end_char": 42070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42098, "end_char": 42102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42250, "end_char": 42261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Upadhyaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42505, "end_char": 42514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not disposed, even as in the case of the plea of no syllabus for 'Rapid Reading', to consider the nascent discovery of Sri Upadhyaya, counsel for the respondent, that the two text-books prescribed for 'Rapid Reading' were not even in printed existence when they were prescribed.", "canonical_name": "Upadhyaya"}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43250, "end_char": 43261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43752, "end_char": 43756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44636, "end_char": 44647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_428_430_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "JAGDISH v.\n\nSTATE OF RA~STHAN\n\nFebruary 28, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nPenal Code-Sec. 302-Mutual assault-Injuries 011 the body of deceased very severe-Injuries on the person of accused superficial--ConJitions requisite to prove mutual assault-What are. )~\n\nC The a.ppellant and four other accused who were -.:harged with an offence\n\nunder s. 302 IPC were acquitted of the charge but the appellant alone vras convicted and sentenced under s. 304 read with s. 34 IPC. Rejecting the vie\\v of the trial court that since some of the accused had injuries on their bodles it was a case of mutual assault and that there was no intention to cause muni1!r, the High Court convicted the appellant under s. 302 IPC and sentenced hirr1 to life imprisonment.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The High Court was right in pointing out that th~ findings of the Sessions Judge were not based on a proper appreciation of evidenc'e, The injuri1:s on the persons of the accused v.--ere extremely superficial and could be easily explained. The accused had not established that the injuries on their bodies were sustained in the course of altercation which resulted in the death of the decea:•- ed, so as to lay the burden on the prosecution to explain the :presence of the injuries. Before this obligation is placed on the prosecution two conditions must be satisfied viz., (i) that the injuries on the person of the accused were very serious and severe and not superficial and (ii) that the injuries had been caused at the time of the occurrence in question.\n\n[429 A-H]\n\nJn 1he present case neith'er condition is satisfied. The i~1juries were extremely superficial and there was nothing to show that they were caused during altercation which resulted in the death of the deceasd. [430 A-Bl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1972.\n\n(From the Judgment and Order dated 3-3-1972 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Criminal Appeal No. 354/69 and S. B. Criminal Appeal No. 121/69).\n\nL. N. Gupta, (A.C.) for the Appellant.\n\nSobhagmal lain for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n-II -- '\n\nJAGDISH v. RAJASTHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 429\n\nFAzAL ALI, J.-In this appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargennent of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), Act, the appellant was convicted along wilh other accused by the Sessions Judge under s. 304 .Pt. 1 read with s. 34 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to five years R.I.\n\nThe State filed an appeal to the High Court against the acquittal of the appellant under s. 302 I.P.C. and other accused. The High Court while allowing the appeal of other accused also allowed the appeal of the State against the appellant Jagdish and set aside his acquittal under s. 302 I.P .C. and convicted him under s. 302 I.P .C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment.\n\nWe have gone through the judgment of the High Court which has given cogent reasons for holding that the Trial Court Judge was absolutely wrong in acquitting the appellant of the •charge under s. 302 I.P.C. The injuries found on the deceased were very severe which resulted in fracture of the scalp on the left perietal bone and also a fracture of the temporal bone. These were the two injuries which according to the prosecution were the cause of the -death of the deceased Jairam.\n\nThe Sessions Judge was of the opinion that as some of the accused persons had also injuries it was a case of mutual assault and therefore, there was no intention to cause murder.\n\nThe High Court has rightly pointed out that the findings of the Ses- sions Judge arc 'not based on a proper appreciation of the evidence.\n\nIt is true that the accused had some injuries on their persons.\n\nThe injuries on their persons were extremely superficial and could be easily explained.\n\nAs regards Nanda, it is true that he had five injuries out of which two are contused wounds. It was the evidence of D.W. 1 that he examined the injuries on 25-6-67.i.e. two to four days after the occurence. It has not been proved that all the injuries sustained by him were sustained in the course of altercation which resulted in the death of the deceased, so as to lay the burden on the prosecution to explain the presence of these injuries.\n\nEven the contusions are not of serious nature. It is true that where serious injuries are found on the person of the accused, as a principle of appreciation of evidence, it becomes obligatory on the prosecution to explain the injuries, so as to satisfy the Court as to the circumstances under which the occurrence originated.\n\nBut before this obligation is placed on the prosecution, two conditions must be satisfied ;\n\n1. that the injuries on the person of the accused must be very serious and severe and not superficial;\n\n2. that it must be shown that these injuries must have been caused at the time of the occurrence in question,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nA In the instant case, none of these conditions are satisfied. The injuries. are extremely superficial and there is nothing to show that they were caused during the altercation which resulted in the death of the deceased. Having regard, therefore, to the ircumstances of the case, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court in convicting the appellant under s. 302 I.P.C. We find.\n\nB no force in this appeal. It is dismissed.\n\nN. K. A.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' )", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "JAGDISH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 7, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDISH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v.\n\nSTATE OF RA~STHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 28, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAGDISH v.\n\nSTATE OF RA~STHAN\n\nFebruary 28, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND 0."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 112, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371, "end_char": 377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 378, "end_char": 381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 487, "end_char": 492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724, "end_char": 730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 731, "end_char": 734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(From the Judgment and Order dated 3-3-1972 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L. N. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2017, "end_char": 2028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Gupta, (A.C.) for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sobhagmal lain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2057, "end_char": 2071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhagmal lain for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAzAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\nII -- '\n\nJAGDISH v. RAJASTHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 429\n\nFAzAL ALI, J.-In this appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargennent of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), Act, the appellant was convicted along wilh other accused by the Sessions Judge under s. 304 .Pt."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court (Enlargennent of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), Act", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\nII -- '\n\nJAGDISH v. RAJASTHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 429\n\nFAzAL ALI, J.-In this appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargennent of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), Act, the appellant was convicted along wilh other accused by the Sessions Judge under s. 304 .Pt."}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2403, "end_char": 2408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2416, "end_char": 2421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2546, "end_char": 2552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2553, "end_char": 2558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jagdish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court while allowing the appeal of other accused also allowed the appeal of the State against the appellant Jagdish and set aside his acquittal under s. 302 I.P .C. and convicted him under s. 302 I.P .C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2738, "end_char": 2744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2777, "end_char": 2783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3025, "end_char": 3031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3032, "end_char": 3037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jairam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These were the two injuries which according to the prosecution were the cause of the -death of the deceased Jairam."}}, {"text": "Nanda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3800, "end_char": 3805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Nanda, it is true that he had five injuries out of which two are contused wounds."}}, {"text": "25-6-67.i.e", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the evidence of D.W. 1 that he examined the injuries on 25-6-67.i.e."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5285, "end_char": 5291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N. K. A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5354, "end_char": 5362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. K. A.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_431_447_EN", "year": 1979, "text": ".. •\n\nPROFULLA CHORONE REQUI'ITE & ORS.\n\nSATYA CHORONE REQUITTE\n\nMarch 2, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]\n\nInterpretation of Wills-Common ancestor of plaintiffs and defendant! created absolute debutter of his house in favour of family deity-By two wills devised and bequeathed the house to the trustees for service and lvorship of the deity-Shebaiti rights-Whether vested in trustees or descendants of the testator.\n\nThe common ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendant owned a big residential house (the suit property) In which he had his fumily deity. By hvo wills-one dated June 4, 1898 in respect of his properties in British lndia and another, dated June 6, 1898 in respect of the house property in Chandrangore-he appointed his wife, two sons and nephews as hustees of the estate.\n\nBy these wills he provided that in the event of vacancy occurring in the office of trustees the continuing trustees might appoint any other person or persons to be a trustee or trustees. By his will of June 6, 1898 th'e tes-ta.tor created an absolute debutter in favour of the family deity.\n\nThis will also stated that he \"devised and bequeathed\" the Chandranagore house to the tn1stees named\n\ntherein as a dwelling house \"upon trust to stand possessed of\" and \"to hold, retain and use the premises ns an endowed or debutter property for the service and worship of\" the family deity.\n\nIn 1934 rival claims of the sons and grandsons of the testator to their E residence in the debutter property were referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator allotted rooms nos. 72 and 82 which had been in his use and occupation from before to the defendant (respondent) and allotted certain other rooms to the other sons and grandsons of the testator.\n\nThe then trustees (plaintiffs) filed a suit in 1959 claiming that the dwelling house at Cbandranagore being absolute debutter property belonging to the deity none other than the trustees had any legal right in it, and since the award of the arbitrator was not binding on the deity the defendant should be ejected from the rooms forcibly occupied by him .\n\nThe defendant on the other hand claimed that he was in occupation of the rooms in dispute in his own right as a shebait and that the plaintiffs had no right to represent the deity and so had no locus standi to maintain the suit as trustees.\n\nDismissing the suit the trial court held that on the death of the testator it was not the trustees but the descendants of the testator who became shebO.its and who had the shebaiti rights in the endowed property and that the defendant being the descendant (grandson) of the testator, had a right, as a co-.hebait, to occupy the rooms in the suit property.\n\nIJ'he District Judge, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 8-253 scr /79\n\nA On second appeal the High court decreed possession of certain rooms to the plaintiffs but not in respect of the rooms under the occupation of the defendant.\n\n0n further appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that from the language used in the 'vill dated June 6, 1898 the intention of the testator was clearly to constitute the tn1stees as shebaits of the property with B exclusive right to manage the dehutter.\n\nOn the other hand on behalf of the defendant it was contended that the two wills should be read as complementary to each other, and so read, they made it clear that the testator did not wish W part with his shebaiti ri; ghts,\n\nwhich were heritable property, in favour of the trustees to the exclusion of his natural heirs under the Hindu Law.\n\nC .Allowing the defendant's appeal and dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal.\n\nHELD : 1. A conspectus of the various provisions of the two wills makes it clear tha.t the testator left th'e shebaitsliip undisposed of with the presumed intention that it devolved on bis natural heirs who would have the ri, g, ht to use the suit house as their family dwelling house. The rights conferred o:o the trustees may amount to curtailment of the right to manage the endowed property which a shebait would otherwise have; but such curtailment by itself would not make the ordinary rules of Hindu Law of succession inapplicable in regard eo the devolution of shebaitship. Therefor'e, the defendant and other descenda11ts of the testator became ctrshebaits of the deity by the operation of the ordinary rules of Hindu Law. [445 A-Bl\n\n2(a) It is well established that property dedicated to an idol vests in it in an ideal sense only. The shebait is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its teinporaJ affairs and to manage its property. Under Hindu Law, property absolutely dedicated to an idol, vests in the idol and not in the shebait. Yet almost in every case a shebait has a right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of its enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct, depending on usage nnd custom, if not devised by the founder. [ 439 F-G]\n\n(b) In the conception of shebaitship both office and property are blended.\n\nA shebait has, to some extent, the rights of a limited owner. Shebaitship being property, it devolves like any other species of heritable property. Where the founder does not dispose of shebaiti rights in the endowment created by him, the shebaitship devolves on the heirs of the founder according to Hindu Law, if no usage or custom of a different nature is shown to exist.\n\n[ 440 D-E]\n\nGossamee Shree Greedhareejee v.\n\nRumanlalje~, 19 I.A. 137; Doorganath Roy v. Ra1n Chander Sen L.R. 4 I.A. 52; Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna\n\nKumar Mullick, 52 I.A. 245; referred to.\n\n3(a) The words \"to hold, retain and use the premises endowed or debutter property for the service and worship of my family thakur or idol\" usei in the wilJ, merely create a trust or endowment and indicate the nature and purpose fl of the endowment. They do not touch or deal with shebaiti rights. [442 GJ\n\n,. 'r\n\n,..\n\n(b) The two wills are complementary to each other. The will of' June 4, ..o, • refers \"~\" the family house as having been endowed to the family deity and\n\n---~ - ,.\n\nP. c. REQUITTE v. s. c. REQU!TTE (Sarkaria, !.) 433\n\nv..ould be used by the testator's heirs for their residence. By using the words A \"''wife and sons and sons' \\Vives and other relatives of mine\" who shall reside\n\nin my residential house in Chandranagore the testator n1eant that all the des~ cendants and heirs of his should reside in the house.\n\nIn other words although 'the entire family house ¥.'as formally endowed to the family idol, his intcutit>n\n\nwas that his heirs and descendants \"'ould also be entitled to use this house\n\nas their family dwelling house, apart from the room where the idol was en~ shrined. [443 A; ll 444 Al B\n\n(c) The will also provided that although the trustees were provided with funds for the Sewa-puja of the family deity and for other festivals out of tho -estate of the testator, they were not expressly constituted as shebaits of the deity. The intention af the testator apparently was that these funds would te expended for the purpose indicated by him through the sheb<llts. [444 El\n\n(d) Even assuming that originally the trustees \"'ere regarded as having been -constituted as shebaits, then, too, those among them who were not fan1ily members or descendants of the founder had renounced and relinquished their •hebaiti right, if any, in favour of the descendants of the founder. Such a relinquishment in favour of the co-shebaits will be valid. (446 E]\n\n(e) The shebaitship of the family deity remained solely with the descenc\n\ndants of the founder and the defendant being the grandson of the founder, D had been regarded as one of the sl1ebnits and therefore was entitled to reside in the disputed rooms. [446 F-G]\n\n(f) Moreover in this case the trustees accepted the a\\vard of the arbitrator .allotting the disputed rooms to the defendant and the plaintiffs described the defendant as a shebait of the deity. (446 D]\n\n(g) The trustees by themselves have no right to maintain the suit in respect Of the debutter property.\n\nThe legal title to the debutter property vests in the jdol a.nd not in the trustees. The right to sue on behalf of the deity vests in the shebaits. All the shebaits having not been made parties, the suit was not properly constituted and was liable to be dismissed. (446 G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1873-1874 of 1970. a.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 21-7-1969 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 30/67.\n\nLal Narain Sinha and Sukumar Ghosh for the Appellant in C.A. 1873/70 and Respondent in C.A. 1874/70.\n\nA. K. Sen (In C.A. 1874/70) and D. N. Mukherjee for the Res- G ponderit in C.A. 1873/70 and Appellant in C.A. 1874/70.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. These two appeals on certificate arise out of the appellate judgment and decree, dated July 21, 1969, of the High Colll1 at Calcutta.\n\nThe facts of the case are as follows :-\n\n H Late Babu Durga Charan Requitte was the grandfather of Satya Charan Requitte, defendant, and plaintiffs l and 2.\n\nHe owned consi-\n\n' 1\n\nderable immoveable property. He was an inhabitant of Chandernagore (then a French territory). The suit property is situated in Chandernagore.\n\nAmong others, it included a big residential house containing about 84 or 85 rooms with extensive grounds, gardens and tanks. In this house, which he was occupying for his residence, he had his family Deity Sree Sree Iswar Sridhar Jiew.\n\nDurga Charan made and published two Wills, one dated June 4, 1898 with regard to his properties in the then British India, and the other dated June 6, 1898 with regard to his properties situated in the French territory of Chandernagore. By these two Wills, Durga Charan appointed his wife, Saraswati Dassi, his two sons, Shyama Chorone Requitte and Tarini Chorone Requitte and his nephews, Ashutosh Das and Bhola Nath Das, executrix and executors and trustees of the (:State left by him.\n\nThe Wills provided that the trustees would hold the bequeathed properties left by the testator according to the terms of the Wills for the legatees and the beneficiaries mentioned therein. The Wills also provided that in case of death or retirement or refusal or incapacity to act of any of the trustees, the continuing trustees of trustee for the time being, or the executors or administrators of the last acting trustee might appoint any other person or persons to be a trustee or trustees in place of the trustee or trustees so dying or desiring to retire from or refuse etc.\n\nBut, in no case, the number of the trustees should be less than two.\n\nBy his Will, dated June 6, 1898, Durga Chorone created un absolute Debutter in favour of the said family Deity and devised and bequeathed to his executors and trustees named therein, his dwelling house with gardens and tanks appertaining thereto sitµated in Chi, ndernagore, \"upon T111st to smnd possessed of and to hold, retain and use the premises and endowed or Debutter property for the service and worship of\" his said family Deity.\n\nBy that Will, he further directed that this family idol \"shall be located in my said house in Chandernagore which said house and premises shall be appropriated and devoted solely and exclusively to the Thakur or Idol.\"\n\nTh~ testator died on Angust 27, 1898. Thereafter, the Will, dated June 6, 1898, was duly probated and the trustees came into possession of the Debutter properties and carried on the administration of the estate and the Sewa and Puja, as directed in the Will.\n\nH Smt. Saraswati, widow Gf Babu Durga Chorone, who was one of the trustees nan1ed in the Will, died on October 30, 1913, while her son, Shyama Chorone, another trustee, died on December 21, 1925.\n\nI .;... ,,\n\n... '\n\n-<, '\n\nThereupon, Tulsi Chorone son of Shyama Chorone was appointed a new trustee in place of his father, Bhola, the other co-trustee, refused to act as such. Therefore, his son, Devindra wa's appointed as trustee by the continuing trustees.\n\nTurani Chorone died on or about May 29, 1939 and the continuing trustees appointed his son, Profulla Chorone as a trustee. Tulsi Chorone died on August 17, 1952 and the continuing trustees similarly appointed Bhagwati, son of late Shyama Chorone as a new trustee.\n\nDebendranath Das died on or about March 7, 1956, and the continuing trustees appointed Salish Chandra Das, a son-in-law of late Shyama Chorone as a new trustee in his place.\n\nIn or about the year 1934, the descendants of the settlor, Durga\n\nChorne, some of whom were the then trustees, referred certain disputes with regard to the endowed property to the arbitration of one Bhringeswar Sreemany.\n\nThe disputes referred to the arbitrator included rival claims by the sons and grandsons of Durga Chorone, to their residence in the Debuttor property belonging to the family Deity. The Arbitrator made an Award on September 6, 1934, whereby he allotted rooms Nos. 72 and 82 to Satya Chorone, respondent, who had been in use and occupation from before. The Arbitrator made similar allotments of other rooms in the said house in favour of the other sons and grandsons of the settlor.\n\nOn April 20, 1959, Profulla Chorone Requitte, Bhagwati Chorone Requitte and Salish Chorone Das, the then trustees instituted Title Suit No. 28 of 1959 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly. The plaintiffs prayed for two reliefs in the plaint : (i) Possession by ejectment of the defendant, Satya Chorone Requitte, primarily from all the six rooms, alleging that the defendant had been occupying the same as licensee under the plaintiffs and the said licence had been revoked : (ii) in the alternative, for possession of the four rooms mentioned in Item No. 1 of Schedule 'B' of the Plaint, which had not been allotted to !Jim under the award.\n\nThe plaintiffs' ca'se, as laid in the plaint, was that since the dwelling house belonging to the Deity, had a large number of roonis the trustees allowed temporarily the sons and grandsons of Durga Chorone to occupy and use for their families some of the rooms in the said dwelling house as licensees. It was further alleged that in the year 1966, the defendant illegally and forcibly occupied Room Nos. 63, 35, 46 and 57 in the aforesaid house without the knowledge and consent of the trustees causing serious inconvenience in the due perfor• mance of the religious ceremonies of the Deity according to the terms\n\n.. •\n\nof the Will. It was further contended somewhat inconsistently that the dwelling house at Chandemagore being absolute Debutter belonging to the Deity, no person, except the trnstees, has any legal right in the said house which can only be used for the Sewa Puja of the family Deity located in the house; that the arbitration award of 1934 is not binding on the Deity and/or the trnstees who were not parties to the arbitration; that the award was beyond the scope of the reference and was adverse to the Trust, itself.\n\nIn his written statement, the defendant traversed the material allegatious in the plaint and asserted that he was in use and occupation of the rooms in dispute in his own right as a Shebait. He further pleaded that the plaintiffs had no right to represent the Deity and had no locus standi to maintain the suit as trnstees; that since all the Shebaits had not been joined as parties the suit was incompetent.\n\nThe subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding, inter alia, that :\n\n(i) By his Will, Babu Durga Chorone had absolutely dedicated the property in dispute to the family Deity, Sree Sree Iswar Sridhar Jiew, but he had not under that Will made any testamentary disposition of his Shebaiti rights in respect of this Debutter property which, on the death of the testator, devolved under Hindu Law upon his descendants, who in consequence, were entitled to reside in the house as Shebaits.\n\n(ii) The Trustees were not Shebaits.\n\nOnly the descer, dants of Babu Durga Chorone had become Shebaits and had Shebaiti right in the endowed property.\n\n(iii) The award made by the arbitrator, Bhringeswar Sreemany, was valid and binding upon the plaintiffs.\n\n(iv) The plaintiffs could not recover possession from the defendant as trustees.\n\n(v) The plaintiffs were not entitled to represent the Deity and had no locus standi as trustees to maintain the suit on behalf of the Deity.\n\n(vi) The defendant had a right to occupy the rooms in suit as c<>-shebaits .\n\n(vii) The plaintiffs having not claimed any relief in terms of the arbitration award, were not entitled to any relief in respect of Room Nos. 35, 46, 57 and 63.\n\nAggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Judge, who dismissed the same and 'affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.\n\nH Against the appellate decree of the District Judge, the plaintiffs --< carried a Second Appeal to the High Conrt at Calcutta. The DivisiQn Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated July 21, 1969~\n\n.... ,\n\nallowed the appeal, in part, and granted the plaintiffs' a decree for A Khas possession of Room Nos. 35, 46, 57 and 63 in the said dwelling house; but not in respect of Room Nos. 72 and 82 mentioned as Item No. 1 of Schedule 'B' to the Plaint.\n\nAfter obtaining the certificate under Article 133(1) (b) of the Constitution, as it then stood, the plaintiffs have filed Civil Appeal 1873 of 1970 against the partial dismissal of their claim in respect of Room Nos. 72 and 82; while the defendant has filed Civil Appeal 1874 of 1970, praying that the plaintiffs' suit ought to have ben dismissed in respect of Room Nos. 35, 46, 57 and 63 also. Both the appeals will be disposed of by this common judgment.\n\nJne following pedigree table which has been compiled from the material on record by the learned counsel for the appellant, will be helpful in understanding the relationship of the parties and other connected facts :-\n\nDurga Chorone\n\nkraswati (Widow).\n\nExecutrix died on 30-10-1913.\n\nI ' Hart\n\n, 111re<\n\nsons & their families.\n\nTulsi Wife Two sons & their families & one unmarried daughter.\n\ndied on 27-8-1898\n\nShyama qorone\n\n(Son) Executor, died on 21-12-25\n\nI I Satya Chorone (Defdt.)\n\nI !\n\nWife, six sons and families and five daughters (one unmarried).\n\nhi .\n\nB agwatt Chorone (Plff. 2)\n\n-~--- Tarani Corone\n\n(Son).\n\nExecutor died on 29-5-39_\n\nj 1' wife, five sons & two \\ daughters (one un- 1 married). \\\n\nProfulla Chorone (Plff. l). lmulya (not a party)\n\nlife 4 daughters .\n\nlife,2sons\n\n& 6daughters (3 unmarried.)\n\nThe principal question that falls to be determined in these appeals\n\n_ is, whether the settlor had constituted the same set of persons as H Shebait as well us Trustees. This question turns on a construction of the- V,'ill.\n\nMr. Lal Narain Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1873 of 1970 submits that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative because the Settlor, Durga Chorone Requitte had by express words in the Will, (Ex. 6/6A), dated June 6, 1898, imposed an obligation on the trustees to hold, manage and use the suit property which he bad thereby absolutely dedicated to the family idol, for the service and worship of the idol. It is maintained that although the word 'Shebait' is not used in the Will, yet the said obligation cast on the Trustees by inevitable implication clothed them with the character of Shebaits, also.\n\nAs against this, Mr. Ashok Sen contends that the answer to the question posed must be in the negative. It is urged that the words \"to hold, retain and use the pTemises . . . for the service and worship of my family deity\", on which Mr. Sinha's argument rests, do not necessarily mean that the Testator had disposed of his Shebaitship rights, also, and vested them in the Trustees.\n\nTt is stressed that there are no words in the Will which, expressly or necessary implication, constituted the Trustees as Shehaits; that the testator has not used the word 'Shebait' anywhere in the Will; nor did he employ the word 'manage' or 'manager' anywhere in the Will while charging the Trustees to hold and use the premises as Debutter property of the idol.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, if the Will is construed as a whole in the light of the surrounding circumstances, it would be clear that the trust created was not a continuing trust but one which would terminate as soon as the Executor-Trustees handed over the bequeathed properties to the beneficiaries.\n\nIt is pointed out that the two Wills, one dated June 4, 1898, and the other dated June 6, 1898, should be read as complementary to each other. The necessity of executing two separate Wills arose, because the properties bequeathed by the Will (Ex. 6) were situated in the then French territoriei., while those covered by the Will dated June 4, 1898, were situated in the British India.\n\nThere were several beneficiaries under these Wills, and the family idol was one of them.\n\nThe recitals in these Willsaccording to the counsel-particularly in the Will dated June 4, 1898, show that the testator had kept, in tact, the right of residence of his widow and daughters-in-law and other heirs in the property dedicated to the idol. This, says Mr. Ashok Sen, is a sure indication of the fact that the founder did not want to part with his Shebaiti rights, which were heritable property, in favour of the Trustees, to the exclusion of his natural heirs under Hindu Law.\n\nMr. D. B. Mukherjee, appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1874 of 1970, further submitted that the words \"to hold!, retain\n\n, )·\n\n• .. -\n\n~ '\n\nllnd use the premises as endowed or debutter property for the service and worship of my family deity\", if properly construed in the context of the Will as a whole and surrounding circumstances, mean that the Executors and Trustees would hold the property in trust for the benefit of the deity and the shebaits. In the alternative, counsel submitted that even if it is assumed arguendo that they were so appointed, the line of succession set out in the Will would be hit by the principles laid down in Tagore v.\n\nTagore('), Ganesh Chandra v. Lalit Behary('); Jagadindra v. Rani Hemanta Kumari(•) and by the Rule against perpetuities (Manohar v. Bhupendra)('). It is further contended that since the founder did not dispose of the Shebaitship but only founded the worship of the Thakur, Shebaitship would vest in the heirs of the founder.\n\nFor this proposition, reliance has been placed on Gossamee Shree Greedhareejee v. Rumanlaljee(•).\n\nIn reply to this, Mr. Sinha submits that trusteeship with power to nominate successor is an estate recognised by law, and in such a case the founder does not create an estate of inheritance contrary to Hindu Law of Succession, nor does the question nf the rule of perpetuity arise\n\nbecause the founder does not determine the choice of the succeeding Trustees. Reference has been made in this behalf to\n\nLL.R. 24 Madras 219, and Underhill's treatise on \"Trusts\", 12th Ed. pp. 534- 35 at 23-31. It is maintained that the Trust in question is a continuing trust; it did not come to, an end when the Trustees had fully performed their duties and obligations as executors of the Will, that the general principle underlying Section 77 of the Trust Act is applicable to the case in hand. lt is further submitted that of the two Wills, the later must prevail and rderence to the earlier Will, for the purpose of\n\ndete.rmining whether the heirs of the Settlor had been given a right of residence in the suit property, is irrelevant.\n\nBefore dealing with these contentions, it will be appropriate to have a clear idea of the concept, the legal cha, racter and incidents of Shebaitship.\n\nProperty dedicated to an idol ve.sts in it in an ideal sense only; ex-necessitas.. the possession and management has to be entrusted to some human agent.\n\nSuch an agent of the idol is known as Shebait in Northern India. The legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal\n\n------~-- (!) I.A. Supp. l, Vol. 47.\n\n(2) 63 I.A. 448.\n\n(3) 31 I.A. 203.\n\n(4) 60 Cal. 452.\n\n(5) 19 I.A. l37.\n\nA •\n\n• A\n\naffairs and to manage its property.\n\nAs regards the administration of the debutter, his position is analogous to that of a Trustee, yet, he i:>\n\nnot precisely in the position of a Trustee in the English sense, becaus•~ under Hindu L'aw, property absolutely dedicated to an idol, vests in the idol, and not in the Shebait.\n\nAlthough the debutter never vest> in the Shebait, yet, peculiarly enough, almost in every case, the Shebait has a right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment, amf the amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom, if not devised by the founder.\n\nAs regards the service of the temple and the duties th•at appertain to it, h.e is rather in the position of the holder of an office; but even so, it will not be quite correct to describe Shebaitship as a mere office,. \"Office and property are both blended in the conception of Shebait ship\". Apart from the obligations and duties resting on him in connection with the endowment, the Shebait has a personal interest in the endowed property.\n\nHe has, to some extent, the rights of a limited' D owner.\n\nShelYaitship being property, it devolves like any other species of hec '.able property. It follows that, where the founder does not dispose of the shebaiti rights in the endowment created by him, the Shebaitship devolves on the heirs of the founder according to Hindu E Law, if no usage or custom of a different nature is shown to exist [Gossamee Shree Greedharejee v. Rumanlaljee, (ibid.) ]\n\nThen, there is a distinction between a public and private debutter.\n\nIn a public debutter or endowment, the dedication is for the use or benefit of the public. But in a private endowment, when property is set apart for the worship of a family idol, the public are not interested.\n\nThe present ca'se is one of a private debutter. The distinction is important, because the results logically following therefrom have been given effect to _l:iy Courts, differently.\n\nAooording to English Law, the beneficiaries in a private Trust,. if sui juris 11nd of one. mind, have the power or authority to put arr end to the trust or use the trust fund for any purpose and divest it from its original object.\n\nWhether this principle applies to a private endowment or debutter created under Hindu Law, is a question on which authorities are not agreed.\n\nIn Doorganath Roy v. Ram Chunder Sen('), it was observed that while the dedication is to it public temple, the family of the founder could not put an end to it, but \"in the case of a familv idol, the consensus of the. whole family\n\n(I) L.R. 4 I.A. 52.\n\n• '\n\n'>-\n\n- r\n\nmight give the (Debutter) estate another direction\" and tum it into a secular estate.\n\nSubsequently, in Pramatha Nath Mullick v.\n\nPradyunma KumQI' Mullick('), the Judicial Committee clarified that the property cannot be taken away from the idol and diverted to other purposes without the consent of the idol through its earthly agents who, as guardians of the deity, cannot in law consent to anything which may amount to an extinction of the deity itself.\n\nAlthough, Shebaitship is heritable property, yet, it C'annot be freely tnu1sferred by the Shebait.\n\nBut there are exceptions to this general rule.\n\nSome of such exceptions recognised in several decisions, are : alienation in favour of next shebait, or one in favour of the heir of the transferor, or in his line of succession, or in favour of a coshebait, particularly when it is not against the presumed intention of the founder. (See Nirod Mohini v. Shibdas(') and Mancharan v.\n\nPranslwnkar(').\n\nThe Bombay High Court has also pointed out in Radhu Nath v.\n\nPurnanand ('), that if any one of the Shebaits intends to get rid of his duties. the proper thing for him to do would be to surrender his office in favour of the remaining Shebaits. In the case of such a transfer in favour of co-shebait, no policy of Hindu L'aw is likely to be affected, much less the presumed intentions of the founder.\n\nNow, let us deal with the problem in hand in the light of the principles cited above.\n\nThe first question that falls for detennination is : Whether the founder's intention as to confer rights of Shebaitship on the persons designated by him as 'trustees' in his Will? In other words, did he by the Will, dated June 6, 1898 (Ex. 6/6A), dispose of the Shebaitship of the deity, also? 'If the answer to this question is fonnd in the negative, shebaiti rights in this endowed property will devolve, according to Hindu Law, on all the heirs of the founder, including the defendant. In that situation, the defendant with his family, like the other co-Shebaits, will be taken as residing in the debutter property, in his own right.\n\nIf, however, the answer to the said question is fonnd in the affirmative, the further question to be considered would be with regard to the effect of the Award dated June 29, 1934 (Ex. C) on the respective claims of the parties.\n\n(l) 52 I.A. 245.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 36 Cal. 975.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 6 Born. 298.\n\n(4) I.L.R. 47 Born. 529.\n\nWe will now take up the first question.\n\nMr. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that since by his Will, dated June 6, 1898, the founder had \"devised and bequeathed\" the Chandernagore house to the pl'aintiffs-trustees \"upon Trust to stand possessed of' and \"to hold, retain and use the premises as endowed or debutter property for the worship of the family Thakur'', his intention was to constitute the trustees as Shebaits of the property having the exclusive right to manage the debutter, to serve the idol and to preserve its property. It is submitted that the founder had by these express words, invested the trustees both with the legal title and Shebaitship, although the beneficial title (in an ideal sense) was vested in the idol.\n\nThe passage in the Will on which Mr. Sinha relies for the construction propounded by him, runs as under :\n\n\"I desire, devise and bequeath to my Executors and Executrix and Trustees hereinafter named . . . my dwelling house with garden and tanks appertaining thereto situate in Lal Bagan in Chandernagore. Upon trust to stand possessed of and to hold, retain and use the premises an endowed or Debutter property for the service and worship of my family Thakur or idol Sreedhar Jew, which I hereby direct shall be located in my said house in Chandernagore which said house and premises shall be appropriated and devoted solely and exclusively to the Thakur or Idol.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThe crucial words are those that have been underlined.\n\nIt may be observed that this Will, in English, appeoars to have been drafted in pursuance of legal advice by an expert draftsman.\n\nThe omission of the words \"management\", \"1nanager' 1 , \"custodian of the idol\" or \"ministrant of the idol\" from the Will, therefore, cannot but be intentional.\n\nIt seems clear to us tlrat the underlined words in the above extract, by themselves, merely create a trust/ or endowment and indicate the nature and purpose of the endowment.\n\nThese words do not touch or deal with Shebaiti rights. This inference receives support from the surrounding circumstances.\n\nFurther, in arriving at the true import of the words \"to hold, retain and use the premises an endowed or Debutter property for the service and worship of my family Thakur', it will not be improper to look to the conduct of the Trustees and the members of the family of the founder.\n\n• '\n\nThere is no antagonism between the two Wills, one dated June 4, 1898 and the other dated June 6, 1898, of the founder.\n\nIndeed, in a sense they are complementary to each other.\n\nThere is a reference in the Will, dated June 4, 1898, to the Testator's dwelling house at Chandernagore, which under the Will (Ex. 6) was endowed to the family deity.\n\nFrom the following provisions in the Will, dated June, 4, 1898, .it is clear thoat the testator intended that the dwelling house at Chandernagore would be used by his heirs for their residence :\n\n\"(a). I further direct my said Executors and Trustees out of the said rents and profits of the said premises number 39, Chowringhee Road to pay monthly a sum of Rupees Fifty for the maintenance to each of my daughterin law Smt. Gopeswari Dassee wife of my eldest son Shyama Chorone Requitte and Nagendra Mani Dassee wife of youngest son Tarine Choron-e Requitte during their lives respectively and provided they reside with their respective husbands at my dwelling house in Chandernagore.\n\n(b). The Trustees shall pay monthly a sum not exceedin Rupees Two hundred in addition to the interest of Government securities of the nominal wlue of Rupees Twenty thousand hereinafter mentioned and directed to be applied for the purpose of household and other monthly expenses of my family, namely wife and sqns and sons' wives and other relatives of mine who shall reside in my dwelling house at Chandernagore.\n\n( c). To pay and apply the net interest of Government securities on the nominal wlue of Rupees Twenty thousand for the house-hold and other monthly expenses of my family, namely, wife and sons and also sons' wives and other and other relatives of mine who shall reside in my dwelling house at Chandernagore and also to pay and apply the net interest of Government securities of the nominal value of Rupees six thousand for the costs and expenses of keeping and maintaining my said family dwelling house at Chandernagore in proper repair and in payment of all taxes and assessments in respect thereof.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nLooking to the general tenor of the document, it will not be inappropriate to interpret the words \"wife, and sons, and sons' wives, H\n\n4 r and other relatives of mine\" in the above-quoted portions of the Will, as including all the descendants and heirs of the testator.\n\nA Thus construed conjointly, tl)e two Wills make it clear that although the entire family )muse, comprising 84 or 85 rooms, at Chandernagore was formally endowed to the faniily idol, yet the testator's intention was that his heirs and descendants would also be entitled to use this house s their family dwelling house, apart from the room wherein the idol was enshrined.\n\nIt may be further noted that in the Will, dated June 4, 1898, the testator made the following provisions for the Sewa puja of the idol at Chandernagore and for other religious festivals :\n\n(i) The trustees shall set ap•art interests of Government secur.ities C for the daily expenses of worship of the idol.\n\n(ii) The Trustees shall pay and apply the net interest of Government securities of the nominal value of Rs. 25,000/- for the yearly expenses of the Durga Puja festival at Chandernagore.\n\n(iii) The Trustees shall pay and 11pply the net interest of Government securities of the nominal value of Rs. 15,0001for the yearly expenses of the Dolejatra of the faniily idol, Thakur Sreedhar Jew at Chandernagore.\n\nThe aforesaid provisions further show that although the trustees were provided with the funds for the Sewa-puja of the family deity and for other festivals out of the estate left by the testator, but they were not expressly constituted as Shebaits of the deity. It will, therefore, be not unreasonable to infer that the intention of the testator W\\lS that these funds would be expended for the purposes indicated by him, through the Shebaits.\n\nAnother telling circumstance appearing in evidence is that after the death of the widow and the two sons of the testator, their heirs, also, continued to live in this family dwelling house at Chandernagore.\n\nIt may be further noted that by the Will, dated June 6, 1898, no legal title in the endowed property was vested in the trustees.\n\nThe title was expressly vested in the family idol to whom the property was absolutely dedicated.\n\nThe testator did not create a trust estate in the sense in which it is understood in English Law.\n\nThe above-quoted provisions from the Wills further show that no rights to act as ministrant of the idol were conferred upon the Trus- H tees.\n\nOn the other hand, a mere obligation to hold 11nd use the property for the endowment indicated was imposed upon the per>ons designated as 'trustees'.\n\n~ '\n\n.. .,, \\\n\n~\"ii~ • ~\n\n• )' I •\n\nReading the two Wills together, with particular focus on the pro- <visions extracted iu this judgment, it is clear that the testator, Durga Chand Requitte, did leave Shebaitship uhdisposed of; his presumed intention being that Shetaitship should devolve on his natural heirs who would have a right to use the suit house as their family dwelling house.\n\nThe rights conferred on the Trustees under the Will may, at the most, amount to a curtailment of the right to manage the endowed property which a Shcbait would otherwise have.\n\nBut, such curtailment by itself would not make the ordinary rules of succession in Hindu Law inapplicable in regard to the devolution of Shebaitship, which is heritable property.\n\nThe upshot of the above discussion is that in spite of the interposition of the Trust for management of the endowed property, the Shebaitship remained undisposed of and, as such, the defendant and other descendants of Durga Chand Requitte became co-shebaits of the deity by the operation of the ordinary rules of Hindu Law.\n\nIn arriving at the conclusion that in spite of the interposition of the Trust, the founder by his Will left the Shebaitship undisposed of, and as such, the defendant also, under Hindu Law, became one of the Shebaits, we are fortified by the inference arising out of the facts admitted by no less a witness than Plaintiff No. 3, Satish Chandra Dass, himself, who alone deposed for the plaintiffs.\n\nThough he claimed that there were no Shebaits of the deities and the trustees\n\nwere managing the Shebaiis, he categoricallY admitted the following facts :\n\n(a) \"The disputed house is a big house\", having 84-85 rooms. \"It is the only family dwelling house\" of the sons and grandsons ol Durga Chorone Requittc, who live in it, while \"the deity is installed in room No. 66 in the first floor\".\n\n(b) \"The inmates of the disputed house, as far as practicable, look after the bath of the deity as also the preparation of Naibedya (tray containing the offerings) and Bhog (food) of the deity\".\n\nThus even according to the plaintiffs-appellants, only the descen dants and heirs of the founder, who live in the endowed house, have throughout been acting as ministrants of the fumily idol, which, as already noticed, is one _of the vital characteristics of a Shebait.\n\nIn other words, the sons and the descendants of Durga Chorone Requitte, alone, have throughout been acting as co-shebaits of the family deity, to the exclusion of the 'trust'ees' who were not his descendants.\n\nThe first two courts were, therefore, right in holding that the\n\nShebai~I rights remained with the heirs of the founder.\n\nAssuming for the sake of argument, that the 'trustees' were also vested with the rights and obligations of a Shebait, then also, the evidence on the record shows that !hose trustees who were not descendants of the founder, Durga Charon Requitte, never acted as such.\n\nThey went out ot the picture long ago and must be presumed to have renounced their Shebaiti rights in favour of their co-shebaits who were descendants of the founder. It is in evidence that in 1934, a dispute arose among the descendants of the founder with regard to the accommodation in their residential occupation.\n\nThereupon, the trustees agreed with the descendants of the founder by means of the Agreement (Ex. E) to refer the dispute to the sole arbitration of Shri Shringerwar Shrimani.\n\nThe arbitrator, inter alia, held that the heirs of late Durga Charon Requitte and his descendants alone had the rights to act as Shebaits. There is documentary evidence on the record to show that this award (Ex. G) given by the arbitrator was accepted by the 'trustees'.\n\nThe present plaintiffs-appellants, by their letter dated June 18, 1950 (Ex. A/7), asserted their rights on the basis of this award and described the defendant-respondent as a shebait of the deity.\n\nThe letters (Ex. A-8 and A-10) also point to the same conclusion.\n\nThus, even if it is assumed that originally, the trustees were regarded as having been constituted as Shebaits, then also, those among them who were not family members or descendants of the founder, renounced and relinquished their shebaiti rights, if any, in favO\"Jr of the descendants of the founder.\n\nSuch a relinquishment made in favour or the co-shebaits, will be valid.\n\nFrom whatever angle the matter may be looked at, the conclusion is inescapable that Shebaitship of the family deity remained solely with the descendants of the founder; and the defendant-respondent, who is admittedly a grandson of the founder, had been regarded as one of the Shebaits, and as such, entitled to reside in the disputed rooms. All the Shebaits were therefore, necessary parties; but all of them have not been impleaded.\n\nThe Trustees by themselves, have no right to maintain the suit in respect of the debutter property, the legal title to which vests in the idol, and not in the Trustees.\n\nThe right to sue on behalf of the deity wsts in the Shebaits.\n\nAll the Shebaits of the deity not having been made parties, the suit was not properly constituted, and was liable to be dismissed on this :score alone.\n\nIn the view we take, it is not necessary to decide, whether the 'trust' created by the Will of Durga Chorone Requitte was a continuing trus~ or not, or whether the mode of devolution of the office of\n\n< •\n\n' )\n\n•I I\n\nTrustees indicated by the founder in his Will was or was not hit by A the rule in Tagore v. Tagore (supra).\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we allow the defendant's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 1874 of 1970), set aside the judgment of the High Court, and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 1873 of 1970 filed by the Plaintiffs, ipso facto fails, and is dismissed. In B the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nC.A. 1873/70 dismissed.\n\nP.B.R .\n\nC.A. 1874/70 allowed.\n\n9-253SCI/79", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "PROFULLA CHORONE REQUI'ITE & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PROFULLA CHORONE REQUI'ITE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SATYA CHORONE REQUITTE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 2, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 78, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SATYA CHORONE REQUITTE\n\nMarch 2, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "June 6, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By hvo wills-one dated June 4, 1898 in respect of his properties in British lndia and another, dated June 6, 1898 in respect of the house property in Chandrangore-he appointed his wife, two sons and nephews as hustees of the estate."}}, {"text": "Chandrangore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 725, "end_char": 737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By hvo wills-one dated June 4, 1898 in respect of his properties in British lndia and another, dated June 6, 1898 in respect of the house property in Chandrangore-he appointed his wife, two sons and nephews as hustees of the estate."}}, {"text": "Cbandranagore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1834, "end_char": 1847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The then trustees (plaintiffs) filed a suit in 1959 claiming that the dwelling house at Cbandranagore being absolute debutter property belonging to the deity none other than the trustees had any legal right in it, and since the award of the arbitrator was not binding on the deity the defendant should be ejected from the rooms forcibly occupied by him ."}}, {"text": "L.R. 4 I.A. 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5527, "end_char": 5541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandranagore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6348, "end_char": 6361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By using the words A \"''wife and sons and sons' \\Vives and other relatives of mine\" who shall reside\n\nin my residential house in Chandranagore the testator n1eant that all the des~ cendants and heirs of his should reside in the house."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "446 G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8468, "end_char": 8487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 21-7-1969 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8532, "end_char": 8548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha and Sukumar Ghosh for the Appellant in C.A. 1873/70 and Respondent in C.A. 1874/70.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha and Sukumar Ghosh for the Appellant in C.A. 1873/70 and Respondent in C.A. 1874/70."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen (In C.A. 1874/70) and D. N. Mukherjee for the Res- G ponderit in C.A. 1873/70 and Appellant in C.A. 1874/70."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen (In C.A. 1874/70) and D. N. Mukherjee for the Res- G ponderit in C.A. 1873/70 and Appellant in C.A. 1874/70.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8798, "end_char": 8806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. These two appeals on certificate arise out of the appellate judgment and decree, dated July 21, 1969, of the High Colll1 at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Satya Charan Requitte", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9045, "end_char": 9066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case are as follows :-\n\n H Late Babu Durga Charan Requitte was the grandfather of Satya Charan Requitte, defendant, and plaintiffs l and 2.", "canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Chandernagore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9179, "end_char": 9192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was an inhabitant of Chandernagore (then a French territory)."}}, {"text": "Sree Sree Iswar Sridhar Jiew", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9475, "end_char": 9503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this house, which he was occupying for his residence, he had his family Deity Sree Sree Iswar Sridhar Jiew."}}, {"text": "Durga Charan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9506, "end_char": 9518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Durga Charan made and published two Wills, one dated June 4, 1898 with regard to his properties in the then British India, and the other dated June 6, 1898 with regard to his properties situated in the French territory of Chandernagore.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "June 4, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9559, "end_char": 9571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Durga Charan made and published two Wills, one dated June 4, 1898 with regard to his properties in the then British India, and the other dated June 6, 1898 with regard to his properties situated in the French territory of Chandernagore."}}, {"text": "Saraswati Dassi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9796, "end_char": 9811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By these two Wills, Durga Charan appointed his wife, Saraswati Dassi, his two sons, Shyama Chorone Requitte and Tarini Chorone Requitte and his nephews, Ashutosh Das and Bhola Nath Das, executrix and executors and trustees of the (:State left by him.", "canonical_name": "Saraswati Dassi"}}, {"text": "Shyama Chorone Requitte", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9827, "end_char": 9850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By these two Wills, Durga Charan appointed his wife, Saraswati Dassi, his two sons, Shyama Chorone Requitte and Tarini Chorone Requitte and his nephews, Ashutosh Das and Bhola Nath Das, executrix and executors and trustees of the (:State left by him.", "canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Tarini Chorone Requitte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9855, "end_char": 9878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By these two Wills, Durga Charan appointed his wife, Saraswati Dassi, his two sons, Shyama Chorone Requitte and Tarini Chorone Requitte and his nephews, Ashutosh Das and Bhola Nath Das, executrix and executors and trustees of the (:State left by him.", "canonical_name": "Tarine Choron-e Requitte"}}, {"text": "Ashutosh Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9896, "end_char": 9908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By these two Wills, Durga Charan appointed his wife, Saraswati Dassi, his two sons, Shyama Chorone Requitte and Tarini Chorone Requitte and his nephews, Ashutosh Das and Bhola Nath Das, executrix and executors and trustees of the (:State left by him."}}, {"text": "Bhola Nath Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9913, "end_char": 9927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By these two Wills, Durga Charan appointed his wife, Saraswati Dassi, his two sons, Shyama Chorone Requitte and Tarini Chorone Requitte and his nephews, Ashutosh Das and Bhola Nath Das, executrix and executors and trustees of the (:State left by him."}}, {"text": "Durga Chorone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10678, "end_char": 10691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his Will, dated June 6, 1898, Durga Chorone created un absolute Debutter in favour of the said family Deity and devised and bequeathed to his executors and trustees named therein, his dwelling house with gardens and tanks appertaining thereto sitµated in Chi, ndernagore, \"upon T111st to smnd possessed of and to hold, retain and use the premises and endowed or Debutter property for the service and worship of\" his said family Deity.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Angust 27, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11325, "end_char": 11340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ testator died on Angust 27, 1898."}}, {"text": "Saraswati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saraswati, widow Gf Babu Durga Chorone, who was one of the trustees nan1ed in the Will, died on October 30, 1913, while her son, Shyama Chorone, another trustee, died on December 21, 1925.", "canonical_name": "Saraswati Dassi"}}, {"text": "Babu Durga Chorone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11591, "end_char": 11609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saraswati, widow Gf Babu Durga Chorone, who was one of the trustees nan1ed in the Will, died on October 30, 1913, while her son, Shyama Chorone, another trustee, died on December 21, 1925."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11667, "end_char": 11683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saraswati, widow Gf Babu Durga Chorone, who was one of the trustees nan1ed in the Will, died on October 30, 1913, while her son, Shyama Chorone, another trustee, died on December 21, 1925."}}, {"text": "Shyama Chorone", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saraswati, widow Gf Babu Durga Chorone, who was one of the trustees nan1ed in the Will, died on October 30, 1913, while her son, Shyama Chorone, another trustee, died on December 21, 1925.", "canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "December 21, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11741, "end_char": 11758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saraswati, widow Gf Babu Durga Chorone, who was one of the trustees nan1ed in the Will, died on October 30, 1913, while her son, Shyama Chorone, another trustee, died on December 21, 1925."}}, {"text": "Tulsi Chorone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11798, "end_char": 11811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "... '\n<, '\n\nThereupon, Tulsi Chorone son of Shyama Chorone was appointed a new trustee in place of his father, Bhola, the other co-trustee, refused to act as such.", "canonical_name": "Turani Chorone"}}, {"text": "Bhola", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11886, "end_char": 11891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "... '\n<, '\n\nThereupon, Tulsi Chorone son of Shyama Chorone was appointed a new trustee in place of his father, Bhola, the other co-trustee, refused to act as such."}}, {"text": "Devindra wa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11959, "end_char": 11970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, his son, Devindra wa's appointed as trustee by the continuing trustees."}}, {"text": "Turani Chorone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12023, "end_char": 12037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turani Chorone died on or about May 29, 1939 and the continuing trustees appointed his son, Profulla Chorone as a trustee.", "canonical_name": "Turani Chorone"}}, {"text": "Profulla Chorone", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12115, "end_char": 12131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turani Chorone died on or about May 29, 1939 and the continuing trustees appointed his son, Profulla Chorone as a trustee.", "canonical_name": "PROFULLA CHORONE REQUI'ITE & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12232, "end_char": 12240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tulsi Chorone died on August 17, 1952 and the continuing trustees similarly appointed Bhagwati, son of late Shyama Chorone as a new trustee."}}, {"text": "Debendranath Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debendranath Das died on or about March 7, 1956, and the continuing trustees appointed Salish Chandra Das, a son-in-law of late Shyama Chorone as a new trustee in his place."}}, {"text": "Salish Chandra Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12375, "end_char": 12393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debendranath Das died on or about March 7, 1956, and the continuing trustees appointed Salish Chandra Das, a son-in-law of late Shyama Chorone as a new trustee in his place.", "canonical_name": "Salish Chandra Das"}}, {"text": "Durga\n\nChorne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12522, "end_char": 12535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In or about the year 1934, the descendants of the settlor, Durga\n\nChorne, some of whom were the then trustees, referred certain disputes with regard to the endowed property to the arbitration of one Bhringeswar Sreemany.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Bhringeswar Sreemany", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12662, "end_char": 12682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In or about the year 1934, the descendants of the settlor, Durga\n\nChorne, some of whom were the then trustees, referred certain disputes with regard to the endowed property to the arbitration of one Bhringeswar Sreemany.", "canonical_name": "Bhringeswar Sreemany"}}, {"text": "September 6, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12898, "end_char": 12915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Arbitrator made an Award on September 6, 1934, whereby he allotted rooms Nos."}}, {"text": "Satya Chorone", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12961, "end_char": 12974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "72 and 82 to Satya Chorone, respondent, who had been in use and occupation from before.", "canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "April 20, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13170, "end_char": 13184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 20, 1959, Profulla Chorone Requitte, Bhagwati Chorone Requitte and Salish Chorone Das, the then trustees instituted Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Profulla Chorone Requitte", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13186, "end_char": 13211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 20, 1959, Profulla Chorone Requitte, Bhagwati Chorone Requitte and Salish Chorone Das, the then trustees instituted Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "PROFULLA CHORONE REQUI'ITE & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati Chorone Requitte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13213, "end_char": 13238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 20, 1959, Profulla Chorone Requitte, Bhagwati Chorone Requitte and Salish Chorone Das, the then trustees instituted Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Salish Chorone Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13243, "end_char": 13261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 20, 1959, Profulla Chorone Requitte, Bhagwati Chorone Requitte and Salish Chorone Das, the then trustees instituted Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Salish Chandra Das"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13338, "end_char": 13375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 of 1959 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly."}}, {"text": "Satya Chorone Requitte", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13477, "end_char": 13499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs prayed for two reliefs in the plaint : (i) Possession by ejectment of the defendant, Satya Chorone Requitte, primarily from all the six rooms, alleging that the defendant had been occupying the same as licensee under the plaintiffs and the said licence had been revoked : (ii) in the alternative, for possession of the four rooms mentioned in Item No.", "canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Jim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13809, "end_char": 13812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jim under the award."}}, {"text": "Chandemagore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14541, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended somewhat inconsistently that the dwelling house at Chandemagore being absolute Debutter belonging to the Deity, no person, except the trnstees, has any legal right in the said house which can only be used for the Sewa Puja of the family Deity located in the house; that the arbitration award of 1934 is not binding on the Deity and/or the trnstees who were not parties to the arbitration; that the award was beyond the scope of the reference and was adverse to the Trust, itself."}}, {"text": "Bhringeswar Sreemany", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16059, "end_char": 16079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) The award made by the arbitrator, Bhringeswar Sreemany, was valid and binding upon the plaintiffs.", "canonical_name": "Bhringeswar Sreemany"}}, {"text": "High Conrt at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16833, "end_char": 16855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Against the appellate decree of the District Judge, the plaintiffs --< carried a Second Appeal to the High Conrt at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1969~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16917, "end_char": 16931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The DivisiQn Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated July 21, 1969~\n\n.... ,\n\nallowed the appeal, in part, and granted the plaintiffs' a decree for A Khas possession of Room Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17224, "end_char": 17238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Durga Chorone\n\nkraswati (Widow)", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17862, "end_char": 17893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jne following pedigree table which has been compiled from the material on record by the learned counsel for the appellant, will be helpful in understanding the relationship of the parties and other connected facts :-\n\nDurga Chorone\n\nkraswati (Widow)."}}, {"text": "Shyama qorone", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18054, "end_char": 18067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "died on 27-8-1898\n\nShyama qorone\n\n(Son) Executor, died on 21-12-25\n\nI I Satya Chorone (Defdt.)", "canonical_name": "Shyama Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18693, "end_char": 18709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha"}}, {"text": "Durga Chorone Requitte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18867, "end_char": 18889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1873 of 1970 submits that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative because the Settlor, Durga Chorone Requitte had by express words in the Will, (Ex.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Ashok Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19358, "end_char": 19367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against this, Mr. Ashok Sen contends that the answer to the question posed must be in the negative."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19573, "end_char": 19578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the service and worship of my family deity\", on which Mr. Sinha's argument rests, do not necessarily mean that the Testator had disposed of his Shebaitship rights, also, and vested them in the Trustees."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20772, "end_char": 20777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while those covered by the Will dated June 4, 1898, were situated in the British India."}}, {"text": "D. B. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21362, "end_char": 21377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. D. B. Mukherjee, appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Underhill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has been made in this behalf to\n\nLL.R. 24 Madras 219, and Underhill's treatise on \"Trusts\", 12th Ed."}}, {"text": "Section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23168, "end_char": 23178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Northern India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23831, "end_char": 23845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an agent of the idol is known as Shebait in Northern India."}}, {"text": "L.R. 4 I.A. 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26775, "end_char": 26789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27766, "end_char": 27783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay High Court has also pointed out in Radhu Nath v.\n\nPurnanand ('), that if any one of the Shebaits intends to get rid of his duties."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29053, "end_char": 29066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, the answer to the said question is fonnd in the affirmative, the further question to be considered would be with regard to the effect of the Award dated June 29, 1934 (Ex."}}, {"text": "June, 4, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31984, "end_char": 31997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the following provisions in the Will, dated June, 4, 1898, .it is clear thoat the testator intended that the dwelling house at Chandernagore would be used by his heirs for their residence :\n\n\"(a)."}}, {"text": "Gopeswari Dassee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32359, "end_char": 32375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopeswari Dassee wife of my eldest son Shyama Chorone Requitte and Nagendra Mani Dassee wife of youngest son Tarine Choron-e Requitte during their lives respectively and provided they reside with their respective husbands at my dwelling house in Chandernagore."}}, {"text": "Nagendra Mani Dassee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32426, "end_char": 32446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopeswari Dassee wife of my eldest son Shyama Chorone Requitte and Nagendra Mani Dassee wife of youngest son Tarine Choron-e Requitte during their lives respectively and provided they reside with their respective husbands at my dwelling house in Chandernagore."}}, {"text": "Tarine Choron-e Requitte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32468, "end_char": 32492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopeswari Dassee wife of my eldest son Shyama Chorone Requitte and Nagendra Mani Dassee wife of youngest son Tarine Choron-e Requitte during their lives respectively and provided they reside with their respective husbands at my dwelling house in Chandernagore.", "canonical_name": "Tarine Choron-e Requitte"}}, {"text": "Durga Chand Requitte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36459, "end_char": 36479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\"ii~ • ~\n\n• )' I •\n\nReading the two Wills together, with particular focus on the pro- <visions extracted iu this judgment, it is clear that the testator, Durga Chand Requitte, did leave Shebaitship uhdisposed of; his presumed intention being that Shetaitship should devolve on his natural heirs who would have a right to use the suit house as their family dwelling house.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Satish Chandra Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 37688, "end_char": 37707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Satish Chandra Dass, himself, who alone deposed for the plaintiffs."}}, {"text": "Durga Chorone Requittc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38042, "end_char": 38064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the only family dwelling house\" of the sons and grandsons ol Durga Chorone Requittc, who live in it, while \"the deity is installed in room No.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Durga Charon Requitte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39171, "end_char": 39192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hose trustees who were not descendants of the founder, Durga Charon Requitte, never acted as such.", "canonical_name": "Durga Chorone Requitte"}}, {"text": "Shringerwar Shrimani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39689, "end_char": 39709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E) to refer the dispute to the sole arbitration of Shri Shringerwar Shrimani."}}, {"text": "June 18, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40041, "end_char": 40054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present plaintiffs-appellants, by their letter dated June 18, 1950 (Ex."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_448_452_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "RAM LAL\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 5, 1979 • B (S. l\\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nS. 499(1) Cr.P.C.-No personal bond taken front accused-Nor was the signature of the accupsed taken on the reserve of surety bond-Accused jumptd bail-Sureties if liable-Bond executed by surety if independent of the bond ex~ cuted by accused.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: Section 499(1) of the Cr. P.C., \\Vhich contemplated the e.xecution of a bond by the accused and by the sureties, did not imply that a single bond was to be executed by both the accused and the sureties, signed by the accused and counter-signed by the sureties. An undertaking of the surety in Form 42, Schedule V to secure the attendance of the accused \\Vas quite independent of the undertaking given by the accused to appear before the court whenever called upon, even if both the undertakings of the surety and the accused happened ·o be executed in the same document for the sake of convenience. Each undertaking being distinct can be separately enforced. [ 450 C, 451 BDJ\n\nThe fact that an accused 'vould not be released on bail without his executing a personal bond does not mean that if a person is released by n1h .. takc without his executing a personal bond, the sureties are absolved from securing the attendance of the accused and his appearance before the court. The sureties' responsibility arises from the execution of the surety bond and is not contingent upon execution of a personal bond by the accused. Nor is the liability to forfeiture of the bond executed by the surety contingent upon the execution and the Iio1bility to forfeiture of the personal bond executed by the accused. The forfeiture of the personal bond of the accused is not a condition precedet:it to the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the sureties.\n\n[451 E-F]\n\nAbdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1946 All. 116; Mewa Ram & Anr. v.\n\nState, AIR 1953 All. 481; approved.\n\nBakaru Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 430; distinguished.\n\nBrahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, AIR 1939 All. 682; Sailesh Clumdra 'f Chakraborty v. The State, AIR 1963 Cal. 309; over-ruled. •\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 154 -G of 1972. • From the Judgment and Order dated 12-11-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 865 of 1970.\n\nShiv Pujan Singh for the Appellant.\n\nD .P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent. lff The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CmNNAPPA REDDY J.-Jorma who was convicted by the learned -< Sessions Judge, Dehradun under Section ~02 Indian Penal Code and\n\n• '\n\n' -\\ •\n\nRAM LAL v. u. P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 449\n\nentenced to suffer• imprisonment for life, was directed by the High Court of Allahabad to be released on bail on furnishing bail to the 'Satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Dehradun. The District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun ordered Jorma to execute a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 5,000/- and to furnish two sureties in a sum of Rs .\n\n10,000/- each.\n\nRam Lal the present appellant was one of the persons who executed a surety bond. Another, Abdul Jabbar, also executed a surety bond. By some oversight no personal bond was taken from Jorma nor was his signature taken on the reverse of the bonds executed by the two sureties as appeared to have been usually done.\n\nJorma jumped bail and the sureties were unable to produce him when required to do so.\n\nThe Distrjct Magistrate, Dehradun, therefore, forfeited the surety bonds and issued' a warrant of attachment against the sureties under Section 514 of the Olde of Criminal Procedure, 1898.\n\nThe \"llppellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad against the order of forfeiture. Before the High Court it was submitted that the surety bond executed by the appellant could not be forfeited when no personal bond had been taken from the accused who had been released on bail.\n\nThe High Court over-ruled the submission of the appellant and confirmed the order af forfeiture.\n\nThe appellant has ' 'filed this appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court under Artide 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.\n\nShri Shiv Pujan Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the question of forfeiting the surety bond for the failure of the accused to appear would arise only if the accused himself had executed a personal boud for his appearance. He submitted that someone must be primarily bound before the surety could be bound and his bond forfeited.\n\nHe invited our attention to Section 499 of the Code of 'Criminal Procedure, 1898, and form No. 42 of the forms in Schedule V. He relied on the decisions in Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor,('), and Sailash Chandra Chakraborty v. The State('). A reference was also to BIJJ.'llru Singh v. State of U.P. (3) On the other hand the learned Counsel for the State urged that the bond to be executed by the surety was independent of the bond to be executed by the accused and there was no impediment in the way of the forfeiture of the surety bond even in the absence of a personal bond executed by the accused.\n\nHe relied upon the decisions iu Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor('), oand Mewa Ram &: Anr. v. State(•),\n\n(1) AIR 1939 All. 682 (2) AIR 1963 Cal. 309\n\n(3) AIR 1963 SC 430 '(4) AIR 1946 All. 116 '(5) AIR 1953 All. 481\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979) 3 s.r R.\n\nA Section 499(1) of the Code of Criminal'Procedure Code 1898 wa;-. in the following terms :\n\n\"Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be execu- B ted by such person, and, when he is relea'sed on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such persons shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend nntil otherwise directed by the policeoflicer or Court, as the case may b.e\".\n\nC Now, this provision contemplated the execution of a bond by t)le accused, and by the sureties. The provision did not imply that a singfo bond was to be executed by the accused and the sureties, as it were, to be signed by the accused and counter signed by the sureties. Form No. 42 of Schedule V, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was asfollows : D\n\n\"XLII-bond and bail-bond on a preliminary Inquiry before a Magistrate.\n\n(See Sections 496 and 499)\n\nI, (name), of (place), being brought before the Magistrate of (as the case may be charged with the offence of and required to give security for my attendance, in his Court and at the Court of Session, if required, do bind myself to attend at the Court of the said Magistrate on every day of the preliminary inquiry into the said charge, and, should the case be sent for trial by the Court of Session, to be, and appear, before the said Court when called upon to answer the charge against me; and, in case of my making default, herein, I bind myself to forfeit to Government the sum of rupees\n\nDated this day of 19 c (Signature}\n\nI hereby declare myself (or we jointly and severally declare ourselves and each of us) surety (or sureties) for the said (name) that he shall attend at the Court of on every day of the preliminary inquiry into the offence charged against him, and, should the case be sent for trial by the Court of Session, that he shall be, and appear, before the said Court to answer the char~ against him, and,. in case of his\n\n. }\n\nRAM LAL v. u. P. STATE (Chin1111ppa Reddy, !.) 451\n\nmaking default therein, I bind myself (or we bind ourselves) to forfeit to Government the sum of rnpees Dated this day of 19 (Signature)\"\n\nThe undertaking to be given by the accused as may be seen from form No. 42 of Schedule V was to attend the Court on every day of hearing and to appear before the Court whenever called upon. The undertaking to be given by the surety was to secure the attendance of the accused on every day of hearing and his appearance before the Court whenever called upon. The undertaking to be given by the surety was not that he would secure the attendance and appearance of the accused in accordance with the terms of the bond executed by the accused. The undertaking of the surety to secure the attendance and presence of the accused was quite independent of the undertaking given by the accused to appear before the Court whenever called upon, even if both the undertakings happened to be executed in the same document for the sake of convenience.\n\nEach undertaking being distinct could be separately enforced. It is true that before a person is released on bail he must execute a personal bond and, where necessary; sureties must also execute bonds. There can be no question of an accused being released on bail without his executing a personal bond. But it does not follow therefrom that if a person is released by mistake without his executing a personal bond the sureties are absolved from securing his attendance and appearance before the Court. The responsibility of the surety arises from the execution of the surety bond by him and is not contin• gent upon execution of a personal bond by the accused. Nor is the liability to forfeiture of the bond executed by th!) surety contingent upon the execution and the liability to forfeiture of the personal bond executed by the accused. The forfeiture of the personal bond of the accused is not a condition precedent to the forfeiture of (he bonds executed by the sureties. The Calcutta High Court in Sailash Chandra Chakraborty\n\nv. The State (supra) and single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, (supra) proceeded on the assumption that the bond executed by the accused and the sureties was single and indivisible and if the accused did not join in the execution of the bond, the bonds executed by the sureties alone were invalid. We do not find any warrant for this assumption in Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. We are afraid that there has been some <:onfusion of thought by the importation of the ideas of 'debt' and 'surety' from the civil law. As pointed out in Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor\n\n(supra) under Section 499 Criminal Procedure Code, the surety did not guarantee the payment of any sum of money by the person accusedl\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nwho was released on bail but guaranteed the attendance of that person and so the fact that the person released on bail himself did not sign the bond for his attendance did not make the bond executed by the surety an invalid one. In Mewa Ram & Anr. v. State (supra) the differene<' between a surety under the Code of Criminal Procedure and a surety under the Civil Law. was pointed out and the view taken in Abdul Azi:: &. Anr. v. Emperor (supra) was reiterated.\n\nWe agree with the view expressed in Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor, and Mewa Ram & Anr.\n\nv. State (supra).\n\nIn Bakaru Singh v. State of U.P., (supra) the question presently under consideration did not arise. The question which was considered in that case was whether it was necessary that the .Personal bond of the accused should be executed on the other side of the bond executed by the surety on the same paper. It was held that it was not necessary. And, it was pointed out that the mere fact that form No. 42, Schedule V Criminal Pr_ocedure Code, printed the contents of the tw<>\n\nbonds, one to be executed by the accused and the other by the surety together, did not mean that both the bonds should be ou the same sheet of paper. To the extent that it goes the decision helps the State and not the appellant. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "LAL\n\nSTATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1979 • B (S. l\\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 499(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 499(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368, "end_char": 382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 670, "end_char": 680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "AIR 1963 SC 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1956, "end_char": 1971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Brahma Nand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1989, "end_char": 2000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, AIR 1939 All."}}, {"text": "Shiv Pujan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2301, "end_char": 2317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Pujan Singh for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Shiv Pujan Singh"}}, {"text": "D .P. Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D .P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D .P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CmNNAPPA REDDY J.-Jorma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lff The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CmNNAPPA REDDY J.-Jorma who was convicted by the learned -< Sessions Judge, Dehradun under Section ~02 Indian Penal Code and\n\n• '\n\n' -\\ •\n\nRAM LAL v. u. P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2539, "end_char": 2556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2817, "end_char": 2856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun ordered Jorma to execute a personal bond in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Jorma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun ordered Jorma to execute a personal bond in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 2991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal the present appellant was one of the persons who executed a surety bond.", "canonical_name": "RAM LAL"}}, {"text": "Abdul Jabbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3074, "end_char": 3086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another, Abdul Jabbar, also executed a surety bond."}}, {"text": "Distrjct Magistrate, Dehradun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3389, "end_char": 3418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Distrjct Magistrate, Dehradun, therefore, forfeited the surety bonds and issued' a warrant of attachment against the sureties under Section 514 of the Olde of Criminal Procedure, 1898."}}, {"text": "Section 514", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3521, "end_char": 3532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The \"llppellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad against the order of forfeiture."}}, {"text": "Shiv Pujan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4101, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the question of forfeiting the surety bond for the failure of the accused to appear would arise only if the accused himself had executed a personal boud for his appearance.", "canonical_name": "Shiv Pujan Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4477, "end_char": 4488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1963 SC 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 499(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedure Code 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5343, "end_char": 5362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Procedure Code 1898", "statute": "Procedure Code 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 496 and 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6298, "end_char": 6318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9380, "end_char": 9399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court in Sailash Chandra Chakraborty\n\nv. The State (supra) and single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, (supra) proceeded on the assumption that the bond executed by the accused and the sureties was single and indivisible and if the accused did not join in the execution of the bond, the bonds executed by the sureties alone were invalid."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9477, "end_char": 9497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court in Sailash Chandra Chakraborty\n\nv. The State (supra) and single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, (supra) proceeded on the assumption that the bond executed by the accused and the sureties was single and indivisible and if the accused did not join in the execution of the bond, the bonds executed by the sureties alone were invalid."}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10066, "end_char": 10077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10078, "end_char": 10101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.tt.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10188, "end_char": 10226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Emperor\n\n(supra) under Section 499 Criminal Procedure Code, the surety did not guarantee the payment of any sum of money by the person accusedl\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 3 s.c.tt."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10536, "end_char": 10562, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11203, "end_char": 11213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11559, "end_char": 11565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_453_462_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "--4 •\n\n' ' ··~\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ANR. v.\n\nK. G. KHOSLA & CO. (P) LTD. & OTHERS\n\nMarch 6, 1979 ..\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., D. A. DESAI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nCentral Sales Tax Act, 1956 S. 3(a)-Scope of-Goods manufacturf!d in the State of Haryana in accordance with production progrannne advised by head office-Goods despatched from-Delhi-Whether inter-state or intra-state sale.\n\nThe respondent company who was a manufacturer of afr compressors and garage equipment had itsfactory at Farid21bad (in the State of Haryana) and C its head office in Delhi (Union Territory of Delhi). The head office drew the production programme and advised the factory to manufacture the goods in accordance therewith. After the goods were so manufactured in the factory they \\Vere collected by the head office and brought to Delhi and despatched to various customers Whether outside Delhi or in Delhi. The price of goods was received at the head office. In other words excepting the manufacture of goods at the factory all other activities, were catTied out from the head office in Delhi.\n\nIn respect of sale of goods manufactured at Faridabad the respondent company filed sales tax returns with the sales tax authorities at Delhi on the ground that the sales were effected from Delhi by the head office -and that they were intra-state sales within the territory of Delhi and accordingly paid sales tax at Delhi.\n\nIn November, 1965, however, the sales tax authorities of Haryana demanded payment of sales tax under the East Punjab General Sales Tax, Act, 1948 for the period commencing from April 1, 1961 and ending \\Vith the year 1964-65 pointing out that the sales effected were inter-state sales liable to be assessed by them under the Central Sa\\'es Tax Act, 1956.\n\nIn its writ petition the respondent-company alleged that since all its activities were being carried on by or through the head office in Delhi and no sales were effected by. or from the factory at Farida.bad sales tax was paid by it in Delhi and since the sales tax authorities in Haiyana were demanding payment of Central Sales Tax in respect of the same transaction the High Court might resolve the controversy .\n\nThe High Court held that the sales fell under s. 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Ac~ 19 56 and were liable to be assessed to inter-state sales tax by the Sales Tax Authorities at Faridabad and accordingly ordered that the sales tax paid by the respondent in Delhi be transferred to the Sales Tax Authorities at Faridabad.\n\nOn appeal the Union of India contended that since the situs of sale was Delhi Sales Tax was payable in De1hi.\n\nDismissing tht appeal, ,.\n\nHELD l(a) The High Court was right in holding that the sales were inter state sales and that the turnover on sales was assessable to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and that the amounts of sales tax wrongly paid in Delhi be transferred to the Sales Tax Authorities at Faridabad. [462 A-BJ\n\n(b) In order that a sale may be regarded as an inter-state sale it is immaterial whether the pro.Jfrty in the goods passes in one State or another. The question as regards the nature of the sale, that is, whether it is an inter State sale or an intra-State saJe does ot depend upon the circum11tance as to n which State the property in the goods passes. It may pass in either and yet the sale can he ao inter-State sale. [461 G-H, 462 A]\n\nIn the instant case the contract! of sales were made at Delhi and in pursu ance of those contracts, goods were manufactured at Faridabad according to specifications mentioned in the contract:-i. This, therefore, is not that type of case in which goods are manufactured in the general course of business for being sold as and when offers are received by the manufacturer for their pur~ chase. Contracts of sales were finalised in the instant case at Delhi and specific goods were manufactured at Fa.ridabad in pursuance of those contracts. These were \"future goods\" within the meaning of s. 2(6) of the Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930. After the goods were manufactured to agreed specifications, they were despatched to the head office at Delhi for being forwarded to the respective customers at who9e instance and pursuant to the contracts with whom the goods were manufactured. The despatch of goods of Delhi was but a convenient made of securing the pe1formance of contracts made at Delhi. Thus the move~ ment of goods was occasioned from Faridabad to Delhi as a result or incident of the contracts of sale made in Delhi. [45& H, 459 A-D\n\n(c) For the purpose of s. 3(a) it is not necessary that the contract of sale must itself provide for and cause the movement of goods or that the movement of goods must be occasioned specifica.lly in accordance with the terms of contract of sale. [459 E]\n\nTata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Bombay v. S. S. Sark'ar & Ors., [1961] I SCR 379; Centrnl Marketing Co. of lndiu v. State of Mysore, [1963] 3 SCR '177; State Trading Corporatiolj of India v. State of Mysore, [1963] 3 SCR 792; Singareni Collieries Co. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, llyderabad, [1966] 2 SCR 190; K. G. Khasla & Co. v. Dy. Commr. of Comm., cial Taxes, [1966] 3 SCR 352; Oil India Ltd. v. The Superintendent of Taxes & Ors., [1975] 3 SCR 797; followed.\n\nTata Eng. & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. The Asstt. Com1nr. of Commercial Taxes & Anr., [1970] 3 SCR &62; distinguished.\n\nState af Bihar & Anr. v. Tata Eng. &: Locomotive Co. Ltd., [1971] 2 SCR 849; referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2077 of 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 2-8-1971 of the Delhi High Conrt in Civil Writ No. 162-D of 1966.\n\nE. C. Agarwala and R. N. Sachthey for the Appellants.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, K. K. Jain, S. K. Gupta, Pramod Dayal and Bishamber Lal for the Respondent No. 1\n\n(• ..\n\n' .\n\nUNION OF INDIA v. KHOSLA & co. (Chandrarhud, C.J.) 455\n\nRameshwar Dial, Adarsh Fial, and A. D. Mathur for Respondents A 2-3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.-This appeal by certificate raises an interesting controversy between the Sales Tax Authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi and those in Haryana, the question being as to which of the two authorities can assess respondent 1 io sales tax. One\n\nof the reliefs sought by respondent 1 is that until the Sales Tax authorities of the two territories settle their differences, no sales tax should be levied or recovered from it since, it does not know to whom to pay the tax. This controversy arises on the following facts.\n\nRespondent 1 is a private limited company called K. G. Khosla & Co. (P) Ltd., having its head office in the Union Territory of Delhi at 1, Deshbandhu Gupta Road, New Delhi. The company carries on business in Air Compressors and garage equipment which it manufactures in its factory at Faridabad, which was formerly in the State D\n\n-Of Punjab and is now a part of the State of Haryana.\n\nFor the purposes of sales tax, respondent 1 is registered as a dealer both in the Union Territory of Delhi and in the State of Haryana. It filed returns of sales tax with the sales Tax authorities in Delhi since, according to it, the sale of goods manufactured in the factory at Faridabad was being effected from Delhi by its head office.\n\nThe sales tax was being paid by the company under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to Delhi, on the basis that the sales effected by the company were intra-State sales within the territory of Delhi.\n\nOn November 24, 1965,\" however, the Sales Tax Assessing Authority at Gurgaon, which was then in the State of Punjab but which subsequently became a part of the State of Haryana, sent a notice to the company under sections 11 and 14 of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 and rule 33 made thereunder that, in respect of the period commencing on April 1, 1961 and ending with the year 1964-65, the sales made by the company were liable to assessment in Haryana.\n\nOn March 13, 1968 an assessment was made by the Assessing Authority at Faridabad on the basis that the sales effected by the company were inter-State sales liable to be assessed to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 74 of 1956.\n\nAn appeal against the order of assessment is said to be pending.\n\nIn the meanwhile, on February 14, 1966, the company filed a writ petition before the Punjab High Court Circnit Bench at Delhi which,\n\nafter the reorganisation of States, was dealt with by the Delhi High\n\nA Court.\n\nThe Chief Commissioner of the Union Territory of Delhi and the Assessing Authority of the territory were impleaded as respondents 1 and 2 to the writ petition. Respondent 3 was the State of Pnn)ab and respondent 4 the Assessing Authority at Gurgaon. Rcspon. dent 3 was later substituted by the State of Haryana.\n\nThe company contended by its writ petition that except the manufacturing of goods at the Faridabad factory, all of its activities, including those of booking of orders, sales, despatching of goods, billing and receiving of sale price were being done by and through the head office in Delhi and that no sales were effected by or from the factory.\n\nSince, however, both the Sales Tax authorities, namely, at Delhi and Haryana, were demanding payment of sales tax on the same sale transactions, the company prayed by its writ petition that the High Court do resolve the controversy between the Sales Tax authorities of the two States and decide the question of their respective jurisdiction• to assess its turnover.\n\nThe State of Haryana contended by its counter affidavit to the writ petition that the goods were manufactured by the company at Faridabad in pursuance of contracts of sale with outside purchasers, that those goods were appropriated to the various contracts of sale in the State of Haryana and that the movement of the goods from Faridabad' to Delhi and onwards was caused as a necessary incident of the contracts of sale made by the company. The sales, according to the State of Haryaoa had taken place at Faridabad during the course of inter-State trade.\n\nThe Union of India, on the other hand, contended that the goods F were brought from Faridabad to Delhi and were thereafter sold by the company to the various purchasers outside Delhi.\n\nThese sdes according to the Union of India, were governed by the Bengal Finance\n\n(Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to Delhi, their situs being the Union Territory of Delhi.\n\nG The Delhi High Court by its judgment dated August 2, 197f allowed the writ petition and granted a declaration that the salei; effected by respondent 1 which fell under section 3 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 were liable to be assessed to inter.State sales tax by the Sales Tax authorities at Faridabad since, those sales caused the movement of goods from Faridabad to Delhi. The High Court added H that the writ petition was confined to the goods manufactured at Faridabad in pursuance of pre-existing contracts of sales and therefore, its judgment would have no application to the local sales;\n\n• ,\n\n' .\n\neffected by respondent 1 at Delhi.\n\nIn the resnlt, the High Court passed an order directing that the amount of tax which respondent 1 had wrongly paid to the sales tax authorities at Delhi on the inter- State sales between 1.4.1961 to 30•9-1965 be transferred by the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi to the Sales Tax authorities at Faridabad. The High Court has granted a certificate of fitness to the Union of India to file an appeal to this Court under Article 13 3 ( 1) (b) of the Constitution.\n\nThe question which arises for decision is whether the sales made by respondent 1 were made at Faridabad in the course of inter-State trade as contended by the State of Haryana or whether they are intrastate sales effected within the Union Territory of Delhi as contended by th~ appellant, the Union of India.\n\nThe answer to this question would depend upon the course and nature of transactions in relation to which the movement of goods was caused from Faridabad to Delhi and the terms of the contracts of sales which caused that movement.\n\nBut before adverting to those aspects of the matter, it wonld be necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act 7 4 of 1956 (\"The Act\").\n\nSection 3 of the Act provides as follows :\n\n\"3. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take\n\nplace in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :- E\n\nA sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase :-\n\n(a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or\n\n(b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.\" ·\n\nThere are two Explanations to the section but they have no bearing on\n\nthe appeal.\n\nSection 9(1) of the Act provides as follows :-\n\n9. \"Levy and collection of tax and penalties (1) the tax payable by any dealer under this Act on sales of goods effected by him in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, whether snch sales fall within clause .(a) or clause\n\n(b) of section 3, shall be levied by the Government of India and the tax so levied shall be collected by that Government\n\nin accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2), in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced.\"\n\nThere is a proviso to section 9 (I) to which it is unnecessary to refer since it has no application.\n\nIn the light of these provisions, what has to be considered is whether the sales effected by respondent 1 occasioned the movement of goods from one State to another State, which oh the facts of the instant case would mean, from the State of Haryana to the Union Territory of Delhi.\n\nIt is only if a sale occasions the movement of goods from one State to another that it can be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce within the meaning of 1; ection 3 (a) of the Act.\n\nClause (b) of section 3 is not relevant for our purpose.\n\nThe course and manner of its business have been set out by respondent 1 in paragraphs 3 and 27 of the writ petition in the following terms :\n\n\"3. Orders for the supply of goods from various parti, es are received by the petitioner's company at its head office in Delhi. The head office draws out a production programme and advises the factory to manufacture the goods in accordance therewith.\n\nAfter the goods are so manufactured in the factory, the goods are collected by the head office and brought to its head office in Delhi. From its head office the goods are despatched to various customers whether outside Delhi or in Delhi. The price of goods is also received at the he-dd office. In short, the position is that excepting the manufacture of goods at the factory, all other activities including that of booking of orders, sales, despatching and billing and receiving of sale price are being carried out from the head office in Delhi.\"\n\n\"27. The goods manufactured in the factory are future goods within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act and 11ie G dispute does not relate to any ready goods.\"\n\nIt is clear from these averments that goods were manufactured by respondent 1 in its factory at Faridabad, Haryana, in pursuance of specific orders received by its head office at Delhi. The contracts of sales were made at Delhi and in pursuance of those contracts, goods JI were. manufactured at Faridabad according to specifications mentioned in the contracts. This, therefore, is not that type of case in which goods are manufactured in the general course of business for being\n\n\\ '\n\nsold as and when offers are received by the manufacturer for their purchase. Contracts of sales were finalised in the instant case at Delhi and specific goods were manufactured at Faridabad in pursuance of those contracts.\n\nThose were \"future goods\" within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.\n\nAfter the goods were manufactured to agreed specifications, they were despatched to the head office at Delhi fat being forwarded to the respective customers at whose instance and pursuant to the contracts with whom the goods were manufactured.\n\nThe goods could as well have been despatched to the respective customers directly from the factory but they were sent in the first instance to Delhi as a matter of convenience, since there are better godown and rail facilities at Delhi as compared with Faridabad. The despatch of the goods to Delhi was but a convenient mode of securing the performance of contracts made at Delhi.\n\nGoods conforming to agreed specifications having been manufactured at Faridabad, the contracts of sale could be performed by respondent 1 only by the movemel\\t of the goods from Faridabad with the i.ntention of delivering them to the purchasers. Thus, the movement of goods was occasioned from Faridabad to Delhi as a result or incident of the contracts of sale made in Delhi. '\n\nIt is true that in the instant case the contracts of sales did not require or provide that goods should be moved from Faridabad to Delhi.\n\nBut it is not true to say that for the purposes of section 3(a) of the Act it is necessary that the contract of sale must itself provide for and cause the movement of !\\oods or that the movement of goods must he occasioned specifically in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale. The true position in law is as stated in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Bombay v. S. R. Sarkar and others(•) wherein Shah, J. speaking for the majority observed that clauses,(a) and (b) of section 3 of the Act are mutually exclusive and that section 3(a) covers sales in which the movement of goods from one State to another\n\n\"is the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and property in the goods passes in either State\" (page 391). Sarkar, .J . speaking for himself and on behalf of Das Gupta, J. agreed with the majority that clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 are mutually exclusive but differed from it and held that \"a sale can occasion the movement of the goods sold only when the terms of the sale provide that the goods wonld. be moved; in other words, a sale occasions a movement of goods when the contract of sale so provides\" (page 407). The view of the majority was, approved by this Court in the Central\n\n(1) [1961! I SCR 379 .\n\nMarketing Co. of India v. State of Mysore,(') State Trading Corporation of India v. State of Mysore( 2 ) and Singareni Collieries Co. v.\n\nCommissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hyderabad.(•) In K. G. Khosfa & Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,(4 ) counsel for the Reveque invited the Court to reconsider the question but the Court declined to do so.\n\nIn a recent decision of this Court in Oil India Ltd.\n\nv. The Superintendent of Taxes & others(\") it was observed by Mathew, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (1) a sale which occasions movement of goods from one State to another is a sale in the course of inter-State trade, no matter in which State the property ia the goods passes; (2) it is not necessary that the sale must precede the inter-State movement in order that the sale may be deemed to have occasioned such movement; and (3) it is also not necessary for a sale to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, that the covenant regarding inter-State Movement must be specified in the contract itself. It would be enough ;:c the movement was in pursuance of and incidental .to the contract of sale (page 801). The learned Judge added that it was held in a number of cases by the Supreme Court that if the movement of goods from one State to another is the result of a covenant or an incident of the contract of sale, then the sale iB an inter-State sale.\n\nThe decision in Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co.\n\nLimited v.\n\nThe Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another(\") on which the Union of India relies, proceeds on a different consideration and is distinguishable.\n\nThe appellant therein carried on the business of manufacturing trucks in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar.\n\nThe sales office of the appellant in Bombay used to instruct the Jamshedpur factory to transfer stocks of vehicles to the stockyards in various States after taking into account the production schedule and requirements ol customers in different States.\n\nThe stocks available in the stockyards were distributed from time to time to dealers.\n\nThe transfer of the vehicles from the factory to the various stockyards was a continuous process and was not -related to the requirement of any particular custo- G mer.· It was the stockyard incharge who appropriated the required number of vehicles to the contract of sale out of the stocks available with him. Until such appropriation of vehicles was made, it was open\n\n(I) [1963] 3 SCR 777\n\n(2) [1963] 3 SCR 792\n\n(3) [1966] 2 SCR 190\n\n(4) [1966] 3 SCR 352\n\n(5) [1975] 3 SCR 797\n\n(6) [1970] 3 SCR 862\n\n• I\n\n~·-·\n\nto the company to allot any vehicle to any purchaser or to transfer A the vehicles from the stockyard in one State to a stockyard in another\n\nState.\n\nAt page 870 of the report, a statement occurs in the judgment -0f Grover, J., that it was not possible to comprehend how in the above situatJOn it could be held that \"the movement of the vehicles from the works to the stockyards was occasioned by any covenant or incident -0f the contract of sale.\" This statement is relied upon by the Union of India iµ support of its contention that the contract of sale must itself provide for the movement of goods from one State to another.\n\nWe are unable to read any such implication in the observation cited above.\n\nAt page 866 of the report, after referring to certain decisions, the Court observed that the principle admits of no doubt, according to the decisions of this Court, that the movement of goods \"must be the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale.\"\n\nThis decision may be usefully contrasted with another decision between the same parties, which is reported in State of Bihar & Anr.\n\nv. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.('). In that case the turn- -0ver in dispute related to the sales made by the company to its dealers -0f trucks for being sold in the territories assigned to them under the dealership agreements.\n\nEach dealer was assigned an exclusive territory and under the agreement between the dealers and the company, they had to place their indents, pay the price of the goods to be purchased and obtain delivery orders from the Bombay office of the company.\n\nIn pursuance of such delivery orders trucks used to be delivered in the State of Bihar to be taken over to the territories assigned to the dealers. Since under the terms of the contracts of sale the purchasers were required to remove the goods from the State of Bihar to other States, no question arose in the case whether it was or was not ne.:essary\n\nfor a, sale to be regarded as an inter-State sale that the contract must itself provide for the movement of goods from one State to another.\n\nIf a contract of sale contains a stipulation for such movement, the sale\n\nwould, of course, be an inter-State sale.\n\nBut it an also be an inter- State sale, even if the contract of sale does not itself provide for the movement oI goods from one State to another but such movement is the result of a covenant in the contract of sale or is an incident of that contract.\n\nThe decisions to which we have referred above show that in order that a sale may be regarded as an inter-State sale, it is immaterial whether the property in the goods passes in one State or another.\n\nThe question as regards the nature of the sale, that is, whether it is an inter-\n\n(1) [1971] 2 SCR 849.\n\nA State sale or an intra-State sale, does not depend upon the circums-\n\n,..\n\ntances as to iu which State the property in the goods passes. It may passin either State and yet the sale can be an inter-State sale ..\n\nThe High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the sales in question are inter-State sales and that the turnover of sales is assessable • ,,.\n\nB to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 at the instance of ji the Sales Tax authorities at Faridabad. The amount of tax which .. respondent has wrongly paid to the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi on • such inter-State sales from 1-4-1961 to 30-9-1965 shall have to be\n\n~ II transferr<:d by the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi to the Sales Tax authot\n\n'\" ritiei; at Faridabad, as directed by the High Court. c The appeal is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nI Appeal dismissed. \"\"\n\nN.K.A\n\nJI .. ' •\n\nI I", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. G. KHOSLA & CO. (P) LTD. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. G. KHOSLA & CO. (P) LTD. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company who was a manufacturer of afr compressors and garage equipment had itsfactory at Farid21bad (in the State of Haryana) and C its head office in Delhi (Union Territory of Delhi)."}}, {"text": "Faridabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of sale of goods manufactured at Faridabad the respondent company filed sales tax returns with the sales tax authorities at Delhi on the ground that the sales were effected from Delhi by the head office -and that they were intra-state sales within the territory of Delhi and accordingly paid sales tax at Delhi."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1456, "end_char": 1463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1965, however, the sales tax authorities of Haryana demanded payment of sales tax under the East Punjab General Sales Tax, Act, 1948 for the period commencing from April 1, 1961 and ending \\Vith the year 1964-65 pointing out that the sales effected were inter-state sales liable to be assessed by them under the Central Sa\\'es Tax Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1582, "end_char": 1589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1965, however, the sales tax authorities of Haryana demanded payment of sales tax under the East Punjab General Sales Tax, Act, 1948 for the period commencing from April 1, 1961 and ending \\Vith the year 1964-65 pointing out that the sales effected were inter-state sales liable to be assessed by them under the Central Sa\\'es Tax Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1739, "end_char": 1752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haiyana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or from the factory at Farida.bad sales tax was paid by it in Delhi and since the sales tax authorities in Haiyana were demanding payment of Central Sales Tax in respect of the same transaction the High Court might resolve the controversy ."}}, {"text": "s. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2217, "end_char": 2224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2506, "end_char": 2520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the Union of India contended that since the situs of sale was Delhi Sales Tax was payable in De1hi."}}, {"text": "De1hi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2595, "end_char": 2600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the Union of India contended that since the situs of sale was Delhi Sales Tax was payable in De1hi."}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2783, "end_char": 2810, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fa.ridabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Contracts of sales were finalised in the instant case at Delhi and specific goods were manufactured at Fa.ridabad in pursuance of those contracts."}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 3994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930"}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 SCR 792", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4970, "end_char": 4986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 SCR 190", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5062, "end_char": 5078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 352", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 797", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 SCR 849", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5411, "end_char": 5427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. C. Agarwala and R. N. Sachthey for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5626, "end_char": 5640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. C. Agarwala and R. N. Sachthey for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, K. K. Jain, S. K. Gupta, Pramod Dayal and Bishamber Lal for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, K. K. Jain, S. K. Gupta, Pramod Dayal and Bishamber Lal for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5692, "end_char": 5703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, K. K. Jain, S. K. Gupta, Pramod Dayal and Bishamber Lal for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Pramod Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5705, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, K. K. Jain, S. K. Gupta, Pramod Dayal and Bishamber Lal for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, K. K. Jain, S. K. Gupta, Pramod Dayal and Bishamber Lal for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Dial", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5830, "end_char": 5844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA v. KHOSLA & co. (Chandrarhud, C.J.) 455\n\nRameshwar Dial, Adarsh Fial, and A. D. Mathur for Respondents A 2-3."}}, {"text": "Adarsh Fial", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5846, "end_char": 5857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA v. KHOSLA & co. (Chandrarhud, C.J.) 455\n\nRameshwar Dial, Adarsh Fial, and A. D. Mathur for Respondents A 2-3."}}, {"text": "A. D. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5863, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA v. KHOSLA & co. (Chandrarhud, C.J.) 455\n\nRameshwar Dial, Adarsh Fial, and A. D. Mathur for Respondents A 2-3."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5944, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.-This appeal by certificate raises an interesting controversy between the Sales Tax Authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi and those in Haryana, the question being as to which of the two authorities can assess respondent 1 io sales tax."}}, {"text": "K. G. Khosla & Co. (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 1 is a private limited company called K. G. Khosla & Co. (P) Ltd., having its head office in the Union Territory of Delhi at 1, Deshbandhu Gupta Road, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6646, "end_char": 6655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 1 is a private limited company called K. G. Khosla & Co. (P) Ltd., having its head office in the Union Territory of Delhi at 1, Deshbandhu Gupta Road, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6819, "end_char": 6825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company carries on business in Air Compressors and garage equipment which it manufactures in its factory at Faridabad, which was formerly in the State D\nOf Punjab and is now a part of the State of Haryana."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7433, "end_char": 7450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1965,\" however, the Sales Tax Assessing Authority at Gurgaon, which was then in the State of Punjab but which subsequently became a part of the State of Haryana, sent a notice to the company under sections 11 and 14 of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 and rule 33 made thereunder that, in respect of the period commencing on April 1, 1961 and ending with the year 1964-65, the sales made by the company were liable to assessment in Haryana."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Assessing Authority at", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7466, "end_char": 7498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1965,\" however, the Sales Tax Assessing Authority at Gurgaon, which was then in the State of Punjab but which subsequently became a part of the State of Haryana, sent a notice to the company under sections 11 and 14 of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 and rule 33 made thereunder that, in respect of the period commencing on April 1, 1961 and ending with the year 1964-65, the sales made by the company were liable to assessment in Haryana."}}, {"text": "Gurgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1965,\" however, the Sales Tax Assessing Authority at Gurgaon, which was then in the State of Punjab but which subsequently became a part of the State of Haryana, sent a notice to the company under sections 11 and 14 of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 and rule 33 made thereunder that, in respect of the period commencing on April 1, 1961 and ending with the year 1964-65, the sales made by the company were liable to assessment in Haryana."}}, {"text": "State of", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7530, "end_char": 7538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1965,\" however, the Sales Tax Assessing Authority at Gurgaon, which was then in the State of Punjab but which subsequently became a part of the State of Haryana, sent a notice to the company under sections 11 and 14 of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 and rule 33 made thereunder that, in respect of the period commencing on April 1, 1961 and ending with the year 1964-65, the sales made by the company were liable to assessment in Haryana."}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7643, "end_char": 7661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7669, "end_char": 7708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7782, "end_char": 7795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1965,\" however, the Sales Tax Assessing Authority at Gurgaon, which was then in the State of Punjab but which subsequently became a part of the State of Haryana, sent a notice to the company under sections 11 and 14 of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 and rule 33 made thereunder that, in respect of the period commencing on April 1, 1961 and ending with the year 1964-65, the sales made by the company were liable to assessment in Haryana."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7902, "end_char": 7916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 13, 1968 an assessment was made by the Assessing Authority at Faridabad on the basis that the sales effected by the company were inter-State sales liable to be assessed to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 74 of 1956."}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8121, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 14, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on February 14, 1966, the company filed a writ petition before the Punjab High Court Circnit Bench at Delhi which,\n\nafter the reorganisation of States, was dealt with by the Delhi High\n\nA Court."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court Circnit Bench at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8287, "end_char": 8327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on February 14, 1966, the company filed a writ petition before the Punjab High Court Circnit Bench at Delhi which,\n\nafter the reorganisation of States, was dealt with by the Delhi High\n\nA Court."}}, {"text": "Delhi High\n\nA Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8394, "end_char": 8413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on February 14, 1966, the company filed a writ petition before the Punjab High Court Circnit Bench at Delhi which,\n\nafter the reorganisation of States, was dealt with by the Delhi High\n\nA Court."}}, {"text": "State of Pnn)ab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8597, "end_char": 8612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 3 was the State of Pnn)ab and respondent 4 the Assessing Authority at Gurgaon."}}, {"text": "Assessing Authority at Gurgaon. Rcspon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 3 was the State of Pnn)ab and respondent 4 the Assessing Authority at Gurgaon."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8710, "end_char": 8726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dent 3 was later substituted by the State of Haryana."}}, {"text": "State of Haryaoa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9913, "end_char": 9929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sales, according to the State of Haryaoa had taken place at Faridabad during the course of inter-State trade."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The Delhi High Court by its judgment dated August 2, 197f allowed the writ petition and granted a declaration that the salei; effected by respondent 1 which fell under section 3 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 were liable to be assessed to inter."}}, {"text": "August 2, 197f", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10404, "end_char": 10418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The Delhi High Court by its judgment dated August 2, 197f allowed the writ petition and granted a declaration that the salei; effected by respondent 1 which fell under section 3 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 were liable to be assessed to inter."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10529, "end_char": 10538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10550, "end_char": 10577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1.4.1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11199, "end_char": 11207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the resnlt, the High Court passed an order directing that the amount of tax which respondent 1 had wrongly paid to the sales tax authorities at Delhi on the inter- State sales between 1.4.1961 to 30•9-1965 be transferred by the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi to the Sales Tax authorities at Faridabad."}}, {"text": "30•9-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11211, "end_char": 11220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the resnlt, the High Court passed an order directing that the amount of tax which respondent 1 had wrongly paid to the sales tax authorities at Delhi on the inter- State sales between 1.4.1961 to 30•9-1965 be transferred by the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi to the Sales Tax authorities at Faridabad."}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11429, "end_char": 11439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11766, "end_char": 11780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which arises for decision is whether the sales made by respondent 1 were made at Faridabad in the course of inter-State trade as contended by the State of Haryana or whether they are intrastate sales effected within the Union Territory of Delhi as contended by th~ appellant, the Union of India.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12130, "end_char": 12151, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12178, "end_char": 12187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12737, "end_char": 12749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13022, "end_char": 13031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13056, "end_char": 13075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Levy and collection of tax and penalties (1) the tax payable by any dealer under this Act on sales of goods effected by him in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, whether snch sales fall within clause .(a) or clause\n\n(b) of section 3, shall be levied by the Government of India and the tax so levied shall be collected by that Government\n\nin accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2), in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced.\""}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13276, "end_char": 13285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13872, "end_char": 13881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14945, "end_char": 14962, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15778, "end_char": 15790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15798, "end_char": 15821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17021, "end_char": 17033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17376, "end_char": 17380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The true position in law is as stated in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Bombay v. S. R. Sarkar and others(•) wherein Shah, J. speaking for the majority observed that clauses,(a) and (b) of section 3 of the Act are mutually exclusive and that section 3(a) covers sales in which the movement of goods from one State to another\n\n\"is the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and property in the goods passes in either State\" (page 391)."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17448, "end_char": 17457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17501, "end_char": 17513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17713, "end_char": 17719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, .J ."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17764, "end_char": 17773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for himself and on behalf of Das Gupta, J. agreed with the majority that clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 are mutually exclusive but differed from it and held that \"a sale can occasion the movement of the goods sold only when the terms of the sale provide that the goods wonld."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17831, "end_char": 17840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a recent decision of this Court in Oil India Ltd.\n\nv. The Superintendent of Taxes & others(\") it was observed by Mathew, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (1) a sale which occasions movement of goods from one State to another is a sale in the course of inter-State trade, no matter in which State the property ia the goods passes; (2) it is not necessary that the sale must precede the inter-State movement in order that the sale may be deemed to have occasioned such movement; and (3) it is also not necessary for a sale to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, that the covenant regarding inter-State Movement must be specified in the contract itself."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19455, "end_char": 19468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge added that it was held in a number of cases by the Supreme Court that if the movement of goods from one State to another is the result of a covenant or an incident of the contract of sale, then the sale iB an inter-State sale."}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19929, "end_char": 19939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant therein carried on the business of manufacturing trucks in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19956, "end_char": 19961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant therein carried on the business of manufacturing trucks in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sales office of the appellant in Bombay used to instruct the Jamshedpur factory to transfer stocks of vehicles to the stockyards in various States after taking into account the production schedule and requirements ol customers in different States."}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 SCR 777", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20679, "end_char": 20695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 SCR 792", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20701, "end_char": 20717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 SCR 190", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20723, "end_char": 20739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 352", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20745, "end_char": 20761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 797", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20767, "end_char": 20783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 862", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20789, "end_char": 20805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 SCR 849", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23563, "end_char": 23579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23970, "end_char": 23997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1-4-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24186, "end_char": 24194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount of tax which .. respondent has wrongly paid to the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi on • such inter-State sales from 1-4-1961 to 30-9-1965 shall have to be\n\n~ II transferr<:d by the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi to the Sales Tax authot\n\n'\" ritiei; at Faridabad, as directed by the High Court."}}, {"text": "30-9-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24198, "end_char": 24207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount of tax which .. respondent has wrongly paid to the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi on • such inter-State sales from 1-4-1961 to 30-9-1965 shall have to be\n\n~ II transferr<:d by the Sales Tax authorities at Delhi to the Sales Tax authot\n\n'\" ritiei; at Faridabad, as directed by the High Court."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_463_471_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "..,._\n\n' • • -,.,\n\n~ • ---i\n\n~-~\n\nMUNSHI RAM AND ORS.\n\nMUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, CHHEHARTA\n\nMarch 6, 1979\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.j\n\nPunjab Municipal Act. 1911, Sections 84,86- Jurisdiction of the Civil Court, of levy of profession tax on the firm and also its partners-Punjab General Clauses Act Sec. 2(40) and Cqnstitution Art. 276(2) .\n\nPunjab, Municipal Acf, 1911, Sections 84-86-Juri.sdictiori of the Civil Court, whether a bar to hear and deternzine suit relating to levy of profession tax under the Act.\n\nUnder section 61(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 the responde<>t by its Notification dated May 15, 1946 levied a profession tax ot Rs. 15/- per annum on each of th'e partners of a firm.\n\nBharat Industries Chheharta i.e. the appellants in the appeal.\n\nBy the Notification dated July 4, 1958 the tax was rai5ed to Rs. 200/- per annum. The validity of the demand made by the respondent at the rate of Rs. 200 /- from each of the partners of the firm was\n\nchallenged, pleading that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the D individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under section 61 ( 1) (b) of the Municipal Act in as much as the term 'person' occurring in section 61 (I) (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, const111ed in the light of the definition given in sectioo 2(40) of the Punjab General Oauses Act included a 'firm' and since the trade carried on by the firm is one, the tax could be levied only on the firm, and not on the partners individually. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. First appellate court reversed the decree llnd the High E Court in Second Appeal confirmed it. A Letters Patent Appeal, preferred by the respondent was allowed and the Trial Court's decision dismissing the suit was restored.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD: 1. It is clear, from 2' plain reading of Section 61(1)(b) that a tax leviable under clause (b) is in terms, a tax on 'persons', which expression F includes natural persons. Its incidence falls on individuals, who belong to a class practising any profession or art, or carrying on 10.• trade or calling in the municipality. To hold that persons who are collectively carrying on a trade in the municipality cannot be taxed .individually, would be to read into the statute words which are not there.\n\nThere are no words in c1ause (b) or else\\\\'here in the stntute which expressly• or by necessary implication, exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from G being taxed as individuals.\n\nTo attract liability to a tax under this clause it is sufficient th6'1 the person concerned is carrying on a trade in the municipality, irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnernhip with others.\n\n[467G, 468H, 469A-B]\n\n2 'Partnership' as defined in Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of alt. A firm or partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from the partners. Firm\n\n11}-253SC1/79 463\n\nA is only a compendious description of the individuals \\Yho 1; ompose the firm.\n\nThe business being carried on by all or any of the partners, all of them are jointly and severally responsible for the liabilities incurred in the course of the business as each one is considered as an agent of the other. Such partner5 can be taxed as persons, in their individual. [468 D-H]\n\n3. In order to be authorised a tax under clause (b) of Section 61(1) must B satisfy two conditions : First. it must be a tax on persons.\n\nSecond, such persons must b'e practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade; or calling in the municipality.\n\nBoth the conditions necessary for levying a tax under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case. The appellants are\n\n1persons 1 and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata Municipality.\n\n[467H, 468A-CJ , C 4(i) Where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that imnner, and an other forumSo and modes of seeking it are excluded.\n\n[470D-E]\n\n(ii) From a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86, it is plain that the Municipal Act, gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by D an assessment of tax under this Act, irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment. The Act further provides a paticular forum and a specific mode of bQving this remedy, which is analogous to that provided in Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved. by an assessment from seeking his r'emedy in any other forum or in a.ny other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act. Therefore, Sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal E Act bar by inevitable implication_, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessrncnt under the Act.\n\n[470B-D, E-F]\n\n(iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear\n\n(a) that in assessing the appellants individually, and not collectively to the tax in question, the Municipal Committee did not abuse its powers under the Act, (b) in levyinJl, the profession tax it did not travcI beyond or act contrary to the provisions of section 61(l)(b) of the Act, and (c) that the Committee acted under the Act.\n\nThe Civil Courts jurisdiction, therefor, to entertain and decide the suit was barred. [471E-GJ\n\nvf }--\n\nFirnz Seth Radhakishan v. Administrutor, Municipal Comniittee, Ludldaru.t .-\n\nAIR 1973 SC 1547; followed. ' \"\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1998 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 3-10-1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in LP.A. No. 348/64.\n\nV. C. Mahajan, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants.\n\nH ardev SLgh for the Respondent. ... ....\n\n\" •\n\n111e Judgment of the. Court was cielivered by A\n\nSARKARJA, J .-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated October 3, 1968, of the High Comt of Punjab and Har• yana.\n\nThe facts leading to this appeal are that the appellants are partners\n\nf a firm, Bharat Industries, Chheharta.\n\nBy a Notification, dated May 15, 1946, the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax under Section 6l(l)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act,, 1911.\n\nInitially, the tax was Rs. 15/- per annum and was levied on all the partners of the said firm.\n\nBy a Notification, dated July 4, 1958, the annual tax for trade, pro- C fession or calling for the owner of a factory registered under the Indian Factories Act, was raised to Rs. 200/- per annum and each of the six partners of the said firm were assessed to annual tax of Rs. 200/- by the Municipal Committee.\n\nOn October 30, 1960, the appellants filed a suit for permanent in- D junction restraining the defendant-Committee from realising the profession tax demanded by it per letters Nos. 15 to 20, dated May 31, 1960, amounting to Rs. 1,200/-.\n\nThe appellants challenged the validity of the assessment contending that construed in the light of the definition given in section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act, the term \"person\" occurring in E section 6(1) (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, includes a 'firm' and since the trade carried on by the 'firm' is one, the tax could be levied only on the firm, and not on the partners individually. On these premises, it was pleaded that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under Section 6l(l)(b) of the Municipal Act.\n\nF The trial court dismissed the suit.\n\nOn appeal by the plaintiffs, the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit.\n\nThe Municipal Committee carried a further appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe learned Single Judge, who heard the appeal, affirmed the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, on the reasoning which may be summed up as under :\n\nThe term \"person\" iu Section 61 (1 )(b) of the Municipal Act, interpreted in the light of the definition given in Section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act, includes a 'partnership'. Under clause (b j of Section 61 (1) of the Municipal Act, the basis on which the liability to pay tax arises, is the trade, profession or business; and if the\n\ntrade and business is one carried on by several persons collectively in partnership, then the partnership alone, and not the individual partners, are liable to pay the tax; that the liability on the partners will fall twice which is not contemplated by the scheme and language of the Municipal Act, even though all the partners are jointly and severally liable to any tax for the partnership business.\n\nIn support of his conclusion that the tax was on trade and not on persons, the learned Judge by way of analogy, referred to clauses (a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of sub-Section (1).\n\nHe also referred to two Madras decisions in The Municipal Commissioners of Nagapatam v.\n\nSadaya Pillay(1) and Davies v. President of the Madras Municipal Commission(2) : and found himself in entire agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges in those cases.\n\nAggrieved, the Municipal Committee preferred a Letters Patent Appeal.\n\nThe Appellate Bench of the High Court held that to import the definition of the term \"person\" occuring in Section 2( 40) of the Punjab General Oauses Act into Section 61 ( l) (b) of the Municipal Act, will be repugnant to the subject.\n\nIn the opinion of the Bench, under the scheme of the statute in question, the tax cannot be levied on\n\na firm or factory as such, but only on the individual owners of the factory or of the firm.\n\nOn this reasoning, the Bench reached the conclusion \"that under Section 61 (l )(b) of the Act, it is the individual who is to be assessed and is liable to pay the tax mentioned therein and so the assessment as well as the demand of the tax from each of the plaintiffs does not suffer from any legal infirmity.\" The Bench further held that since the Committee in imposing the tax on the appellants herein, has not acted outside the provisions of the statute, \"it would, on the basfo of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) represented by Hari Kishan & Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana,(3 ) which also dealt with the provisions of the Municipal Act, follow that the impugned assessment could only be questioned under the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act, and die jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of tax levied or the assessment made is excluded\". In the result, the appeal was allowed and the trial court's decision dismissing the suit was restored.\n\nBefore us, Mr. V. K. Mahajan, learned counsel for the plaintiffs .. appeJlants, has adopted the reasons given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.\n\nIn support of his contentions, he has relied upon the\n\n(1) !LR 7 Madras 74\n\n(2) !LR 14 Madras 140\n\n(3) AIR 19'3 S.C. 1547\n\n, •\n\n' . , .... ~~\n\naforesaid Madras decisions.\n\nHis argument is that if the interpretation placed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court is allowed to stand, it will lead to anamolous and unconstitutional results.\n\nMr. Mahajan concedes that the individual partners are also 'persons' within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 61(1).\n\nHe, however, maintains that the firm, also, is a 'person' within the contemplation of this provision and as such, liable to be taxed; that if in respect of the one trade, which is being carried on by the firm, apart from each of the individual partners, the firm, also is separately assessed to Rs. 200(- per annum, not only the incidence of the tax will fall twice, the total liability therefor will far exceed the ceiling of Rs. 250/- per annum fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIn these premises, it is contended that an interpretation of Sec• tion 61 (1) (b), which may lead to unconstitutional on irrational results should be eschewed.\n\nWith regard to the question of jurisdiction it is contended that since the Municipal Committee had in the exercise of its powers clearly acted\n\nbeyond its jurisdiction, the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court.\n\nSection 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act, so far as material for this case, reads as under :\n\n\"Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf, and the rules, any committee may, from time to time for the purposes of this Act, and in the manner directed by this Act, impose in the whole or any part of the municipality any of the following !axe's, namely :-\n\n(1) (a) ..................... .\n\n(i) to (iii) ................. .\n\n(b) a tax on persons practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality.\n\nExplanation.-A person in the service or person holding an office under the State Government or the Central Government or a local or other public authority shall be deemed to be G practising a profession within the meaning of this sub-section.\"\n\nFrom a plain reading of the extracted provision, it is clear that a tax leviable under clause (b) Is, in terms, a tax on \"persons\".\n\nThe expression \"persons\" undoubtedly includes natural persons.\n\nThe class of such taxable persons has been indicated by the Legislature with re.; H ference to their occupational activity.\n\nThus, in order to be authorised, a tax under clause (b) of Section 61 ( 1) must satisfy two conditions :\n\nr A First, it must be a tax on \"persons\". Second such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality.\n\nI - G\n\nThere can be no dispute that the appellants are \"persons\" and, as such, satisfy the first condition. Even the learned counsel for the appellants has candidly conceded that the individual partners are also \"pt:rsons\" within the meaning of the said clause (b).\n\nControversy thus becomes narrowed down into the issue; Whether persons collectively doing business in partnership, in the municipality, fulfil the second condition ? That is to say, do such persons \"carry of any trade or calling in the municipality\" within the contemplation of clause (b) ?\n\nIn our opinion, for reasons that follow, the answer to this question must be in the affimative.\n\n'Partnership' as defined in Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of all.\n\nThe Section further makes it clear that a firm or partnership is not a legal entity sieparate and distinct from the partners.\n\nFirm is only a compendious description of the individuals who compose the firm.\n\nThe crucial words in the definition of 'partnership' are tho'se that have be<m underlined.\n\nThey hold the key to the question posed above.\n\nTh•oY show that the business Is carried on by all or any of the partners. In the instant case, admittedly, all the plaintiff-appellants are carrying on the business in partnership.\n\nAll the 'six partners are sharing the profits and losses.\n\nAll the partners are jointly and severally responsil:le for the liabilities incorrect or obligations incurred in the course of the business.\n\nEach partner is considered an agent of the other.\n\nThis being the position, it is not possible to hold that each of the six partners is not carrying on a trade or calling within the purview of clause (b) .of\n\nSection 61 ( 1) of the Municipal Act.\n\nAt the most, it can be said that each of these six persons is severally as well as collective.ly carrying on a trade in the Municipality.\n\nThere is nothing in the language of Section 61 or the scheme of the Municipal Act which warrants the construction that persons who are carrying on a trade in association or partnership with each other cannot be individually taxed under clau:; e\n\n(b) of Section 61 ( 1). On the contrary, definite indication is available in the language and the scheme of this statute that such partners can be taxed as persons in their individual capacity. As noticed already, clause\n\n(b) makes it clear i'n no uncertain terms that this is a tax on 'persons.' Its incidence falls on individuals, who belong to a class practising any profession or art; or carrying on a trade or calling in the municipality.\n\nTo hold that persons who arc collectively carrying on a trade in the A municipality cannot be taxed individually, would be to read into the statute words which are not there. There are no words in clause (b) or elsewhere in the statute which, expressly or by necessary implication, exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from being taxed as individuals. To attract liability to a tax under this clause, it is sufficient that the person concerned is carrying B on a trade in the municipality, irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnership with others. Thus, both the conditions necessary for levying a tax under clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case. The appellants arc \"persons\" and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata \\ c Municipality.\n\nIn the view we take, we do not think it necessary to go further into the question, whether the definition of 'person' given in Sxtion 2(40) of the Pnnjab General Clauses Act, can be imported into the statute under consideration, so as to include a contractual firm, also, within the purview of the expression 'persons' used in clause (b) of Section 61 ( 1).\n\nIndeed, the entire effort to import the definition of 'person' given in the General Clauses Act, into Section 61 (1) (b) of the Municipal Act, is directed to find a foundation for the argument, that the constructiou adopted by the High Court could lead to double taxation and even unconstitutional results.\n\nBut in the instant case, nothing of this kind bas happe.ned.\n\nThe firm has not been assessed.\n\nNo question of double taxation or exceeding the Constitutional ceiling of Rs. 250/- fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution, arises on the facts of the present case.\n\nThe arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants on this aspect of the matter are merely hypothetical, and speculative.\n\nThis takes us to the second question, whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.\n\nSection 84( 1) of the Punjab Municipal Act provides that \"an appeal against the assessment or levy of any. . . . tax under tllis Act, shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf'. Then, there is a proviso to this sub-section which says that when the Deputy Commissioner or such other officw, as aforesaid, is or was, when the tax wa:s imposed, a member of the Committee, the appeal shall lie to the Commissioner of the Division.\n\nSub-section (12) is important.\n\nIt provides :\n\n\"84(2). If,, on the hearing of an appeal under the section, any question as to the liability to, or the principle of assessment of, a tax arises, on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable dobut, he may, either of his own\n\nmotion or on .the application of any person interested, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained, and refer the statement with his own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court.\" Section 86 mandates that \"no objection shall be taken to any valua· tion or assessment, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.\"\n\nFrom a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86, it Is plain that tlm Municipal Act, gives a special and particular remedy for the pe; rson aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act, irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle olt\n\nassessment.\n\nThe Act further provides a particular forum and a 'specific mode of having this remedy which analogous to that provided in Section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nSection 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking hfo remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act.\n\nIt is well recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a per .. son aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be\n\nsought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seek ing it are excluded.\n\nConstrued in the light of this principle, it is clear that sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar, by inevitable implica·\n\ntion,, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act.\n\nIn the view we take, we are fortified by the decision of this Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Admi11istrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, (supra) wherein sections 84 and 86 of this very Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 came up for consideration. Therein, the Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, imposed a terminal tax on Sambhar salt and assessed the appellant, therein, to a sum of Rs. 5,893 /- towards that tax at the rate of Rs. 10/- per maund under item 69 of the Government Notification by which the terminal tax was imposed.\n\nThe assessee filed a suit against the Municipal Committee in the Civil Court, con-· tending that Sambhar salt ought to have been assessed at the rate of 3 pies per maund under item 68, that he had been illegally assessed. under item 69 at the higher rate, and claimed refund of the amount i; iaid by him, with interest. The Committee, inter alia, contended that Sambhar salt was not common salt, and the Civil Court had no juriS· diction to entertain the suit.\n\nThe trial court held tha, t .Sambhar salt was common salt within the meaning of item 68 of the Schedule, that\n\nthe imposition of tax on it under item 69 of the Schedule was illegal, and, therefore, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit by virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, and dismissed the suit.\n\nThe assessee came in appeal to this Court by certificate granted by the High Court, and contended that since the impugneJ levy was not made under the Municipal Act but in derogation thereof, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit.\n\nDelivering the judgment of the Court, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) repelled this contention, observing that the rate of the tax to be levied depended upon the character of the salt, and it was not possible to say that in •ascertaining this fact the authoritib concerned travelled outside the provisions of tl1e Municipal Act, even if they wrongly applied item 69 of the schedule; that the mistake in applying the wrong item of the Schedule to the tax could be correclcd only in the manner prescribed by the Act, and the aggrieved person cannot file a suit in the Civil Court in that regard, the Civil Court's jurisdiction having been excluded by the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of -Of the Act.\n\nThe Court distinguished that class of rnses where the Municipal Committee in levying a tax or committing an Act, clearly acts outside or in abuse of its powers under the Municipal Act, and explained that it is only in such cases, the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not apply.\n\nCan the case before us be said to belong to that chtss of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a Tax acts beyond or in abuse of its powers under the Act ? The answer to this question must be in the negative.\n\nBy no stretch of imagination, can it be said in the facts and circumstances of the case, that in assessing the appellants, indivi\\lually, and not collectively, to the tax in question, the Municipal Committee abused its powers under the Act.\n\nWe have already discussed and held that in levying this tax, the Municipal Committee did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions -0f Section 61 (I) (b) of the Act.\n\nIn short, the present case is one where the Municipal Committee acted \"under the Act\".\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit was barred, even if the dispute raised therein related to the principle of assessment to be followed.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "MUNSHI RAM AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNSHI RAM AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, CHHEHARTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, CHHEHARTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. 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CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Municipal Act", "statute": "Punjab Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(40)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab General Clauses Act", "statute": "Punjab General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab General Clauses Act", "statute": "Punjab General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab General Clauses Act", "statute": "Punjab General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "section 61(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab General Clauses Act", "statute": "Punjab General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 573, "end_char": 599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1141, "end_char": 1151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1227, "end_char": 1237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1253, "end_char": 1279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 61(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 61(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3590, "end_char": 3603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3882, "end_char": 3892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Chheharata Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are\n\n1persons 1 and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata Municipality."}}, {"text": "sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4763, "end_char": 4776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4784, "end_char": 4811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4812, "end_char": 4822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5005, "end_char": 5023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 61(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "AIR 1973 SC 1547", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6041, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "V. C. Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6084, "end_char": 6098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "H ardev SLgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H ardev SLgh for the Respondent. ... ...."}}, {"text": "A\n\nSARKARJA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6214, "end_char": 6225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was cielivered by A\n\nSARKARJA, J .-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated October 3, 1968, of the High Comt of Punjab and Har• yana."}}, {"text": "Chheharta Municipal Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6513, "end_char": 6542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification, dated May 15, 1946, the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax under Section 6l(l)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act,, 1911."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6573, "end_char": 6582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6869, "end_char": 6882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 30, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7037, "end_char": 7053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 30, 1960, the appellants filed a suit for permanent in- D junction restraining the defendant-Committee from realising the profession tax demanded by it per letters Nos."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 to 20, dated May 31, 1960, amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "section 2(40)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7394, "end_char": 7407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7422, "end_char": 7441, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7476, "end_char": 7488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7500, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7940, "end_char": 7975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit."}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8294, "end_char": 8304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Section 2(40)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8387, "end_char": 8400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8415, "end_char": 8434, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8483, "end_char": 8493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also referred to two Madras decisions in The Municipal Commissioners of Nagapatam v.\n\nSadaya Pillay(1) and Davies v. President of the Madras Municipal Commission(2) : and found himself in entire agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges in those cases."}}, {"text": "Section 2( 40)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9701, "end_char": 9711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10038, "end_char": 10048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench further held that since the Committee in imposing the tax on the appellants herein, has not acted outside the provisions of the statute, \"it would, on the basfo of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) represented by Hari Kishan & Ors."}}, {"text": "Seth Radha Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10501, "end_char": 10518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench further held that since the Committee in imposing the tax on the appellants herein, has not acted outside the provisions of the statute, \"it would, on the basfo of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) represented by Hari Kishan & Ors."}}, {"text": "Sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. K. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us, Mr. V. K. Mahajan, learned counsel for the plaintiffs .. appeJlants, has adopted the reasons given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.", "canonical_name": "V. C. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chheharata \\ c Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17429, "end_char": 17456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants arc \"persons\" and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata \\ c Municipality."}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17613, "end_char": 17632, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17800, "end_char": 17810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17894, "end_char": 17913, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17920, "end_char": 17930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18314, "end_char": 18328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18627, "end_char": 18641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19664, "end_char": 19674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19934, "end_char": 19952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Is plain that tlm Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19957, "end_char": 19988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20329, "end_char": 20339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Is plain that tlm Municipal Act", "statute": "Is plain that tlm Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20351, "end_char": 20378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20381, "end_char": 20391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20927, "end_char": 20945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21305, "end_char": 21323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21337, "end_char": 21363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee, Ludhiana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21404, "end_char": 21433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein, the Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, imposed a terminal tax on Sambhar salt and assessed the appellant, therein, to a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22409, "end_char": 22418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22422, "end_char": 22449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22850, "end_char": 22859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delivering the judgment of the Court, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) repelled this contention, observing that the rate of the tax to be levied depended upon the character of the salt, and it was not possible to say that in •ascertaining this fact the authoritib concerned travelled outside the provisions of tl1e Municipal Act, even if they wrongly applied item 69 of the schedule; that the mistake in applying the wrong item of the Schedule to the tax could be correclcd only in the manner prescribed by the Act, and the aggrieved person cannot file a suit in the Civil Court in that regard, the Civil Court's jurisdiction having been excluded by the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of -Of the Act."}}, {"text": "Sections 84 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23478, "end_char": 23496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24415, "end_char": 24425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_472_481_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "SUPERINTENDENT AND LEGAL REMEMBRANCER OF\n\nLEGAL AFFAIRS TO THE GOVT. OF WEST BENGAL\n\nABANI MAITY\n\nMarch 6, 1979\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, P. S. KA!LASAM AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J Bengal Excise Act, 1909-Ss. 63 and 64-Seope of.\n\nInterpretation of Statutres-\"Shall be liable to confiscation\" and \"may ordtr confiscation\"-Whether have a con1pulsive force-\"Liable\"-Meaning of.\n\nSection 63(1) of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 provides that whenever on offence punishable under the Act had been committed, the intoxicant material and the means Gy which such offence had been committed \"shall be //able to coff.\n\nfiscation'.\n\nSection 64( 1) provides that when the Magistrate decides that an.rthing is liable to confiscation under s. 63 he may either order confiscation or give the owner an option to pay in lieu of confiscation such fine as he thinks fit.\n\nThe respondent was found carrying contraband ganja in a car of which be was the owner.\n\nThe Magistrate passing the order of conviction and sentence against him, did not pass orders for the disposal of the contraband goods a-d confiscation of the car which was seized.\n\nOn the question whether the words \"liable to\" used in the context of \"'oonfiscation\" in s. 63(1) convey an absolute imperative or merely loove it to the discretion of the Magistrate to confiscate or not to confiscate the vehicle by means of which such offence had been committed.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. It is imperative for the Magistrate to pass, at the conclusion of the trial, in addition to the conviction and sentence, an order of confiscation of the car by means of which the offence was committed. [481 A]\n\n2. The expressions \"shall be Iirtble to confiscation\" and \"1nay\" in the sections were intended to have a con1pulsive force.\n\nAs soon as the conditions of s. 63, namely, that the conveyance had been used for carrying the contrabi:1nd intoxicant and that the owner of that conveyance was i1nplicated in the commissioa of the offences arc established the word \"may\" in s. 64(1) acquires. th~\n\nforce of \"must\".\n\nThe discretion of the ~Iagistrate is restricted to a choice between the two alternatives mentioned in s. 64(1) namely, confiscation of the conveyance. or imposition of fine in Heu thereof. [478 F; 480 G-H]\n\n3. Ordinarily the word liable\" has been held as conveying not an absolute obligation or penalty but as merely importing a possibility of attracting such obligation or penalty even where it is used with the words \"shaII be.\" But a statute is not to be interpreted merely from the lexicographer's angle.\n\nExposi~ tion ex visceribus actus is a long recognised n1le of construction. Words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute a5 a whole; they are not to be construed in isolation. The purpose of the Excise Act is not merely to raise revenue but also to stop free use of intoxicants and illegal\n\n• J -'y\n\n' . ··\\'\n\ntrade in them which has a deleterious effect on public health and morals. Thllfl A considered both the expressions are intended to have a compulsive force. [477\n\nB-HJ\n\nlndo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. lasiit Singh, Addi. Collector of Customs & Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 594; held in applicable.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimind Appeal No, 57 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 5-3-1971 of the, Calcutta High Court in Cr!. Revision No. 35/71.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for the Appellant.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee for the Respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR!A, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated March 5, 1971, of the High Court of Calcutta. The facts are as follows : Abani Maity, respondent herein, and three other persons were tried by the Magistmte, First Class, Alipore, District 24-Parganas, in respect of a charge under Section 46(a) of the Bengal Excise Act,\n\n1909 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nOn the night of July 29, 1963, at about 7.30 p.m., the Excise\n\nstaff intercepted Motor Car No. WBD 8169 at village Rajpur, Police Station Sonarpur. The car was searched and thereupon 199 kgs. 700 E grams contraband Ganja was recovered from inside the car. The respondent, Abani Maity, who was the registered owner of the car, and held a driving licence was himself on the steering wheel. Abani Maity and the three other occupants of the car were arrested.\n\nAfter completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against Abani Maity and his companions in respect of an offence under Sec- F tion 46(a) of the Act.\n\nDuring the trial, out of the accused, Robin, died Ka!ipada absconded; and the case proceeded only against Abani Maity and his coaccused, Mihir Bose .\n\nThe Magistrate, ultimately, by his order dated August 21, 1970, convicted both the accused persons under Section 46(a) of the Act and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 800/-, and, in default, to snffer six months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe Magistrate, however, failed to pass orders for the disposal of the contraband Ganja, and the confiscation of the seized car.\n\nIn the course of the trial, it was established by evidence that the respondent, Abani Maity, was the registered owner of the car and he was driving the vehicle at the time of its interception.\n\nIt was further\n\nestablished that some packets of contraband Ganja were seized from underneath the driver's seat and some from the luggage boot which was opened with a key produced by the respondent. Thus, the evidence on record indubitably established that the cm (Registered No.\n\nWBD 8169) was used for the transport of this contraband Ganja by its owner, Abani Maity, respondent.\n\nAfter his conviction, on November 16, 1970, Abani Maity made an application to the Magistrate, praying for return of the car and the other articles seized by the Excise Staff.\n\nOn the same day, the Magistrate, without issuing any notice to the prosecution, passed an ex-parte order directing return of the seized car and other articles to the accused-respondent.\n\nAgainst that order, dated November 16, 1970, of the Magistrate, the State preferred a Revision in the High Court, which was finally heard by a Division Bench, who, by an order dated March 5, 1971, affirmed the Magistrate's order relating to the return of the car to the accused-respondent, but directed confiscation of the Ganja.\n\nMr. Chatterjee, -appearing for the appellant-State, does not now request the Court to pass an order of confiscation of the aforesaid car, obviously because the passing of such an order after a lap!; e of E about 16 years from the date of its seizure, will be an exercise in futility.\n\nThe learned counsel, however, submits that this Court should for the guidance of the courts below, clarify the law on the point so that the efficacy of the provisions contained in Sections 63 and 64 of the Act as an instrument for combating and prventing such anti-social crime is not undermined due to misinterpretation or mis- F understanding in regard to their import, nature and application.\n\nIt is contended that as soon oas Abani Maity, the owner-driver ot this car was found guilty of using this car for transport of contraband Ganja, the Magistrate was bound in addition to the conviction of Abani Maity for that offence, to pass an order for confisC'ation of G the car, or to give its owner, Abani Maity, an option to pay in lieu of confiscation a fine, as the Magistrate thought fit.\n\nThe point sought to be made out is that the words \"shall be liable to confiscoation\" occurring in Section 63 ( 1) read with sub-section (I) of Section 64, make it obligatory on the Magistrate in the event of the conditions laid down in these provisions being satisfied, to adopt either of the H two alternatives, namely, to confiscate the car, or, in lieu of conpscation, to impose a fine oat the option of its owner.\n\nIn support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon certain observations of\n\n• J\n\n\\ .\n\n• •\n\nthis Court in Inda-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh,\n\nAdditional Collector of Customs & Ors(').\n\nAs against this, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the words \"liable to\" used in the context of \"confiscation\", in Section 63 ( 1) of this Act or in some other penal statutes, do not convey an absolute imperative; they are merely directory and leave it to the discretion of the Magistrate to confiscate or not to confiscate the vehicle by means of which such offence has been committed.\n\nSection 63 of the Act defines the things liable to confiscation, while Section 64 indicates when the order of confiscation is to be passed by the Magistrate or Collector.\n\nSection 63 and 64 read as follows :\n\n\"63 (1). Whenever an offence has been committed which is punishable under this Act, the (intoxicant) materials, steel, utensils, implement and apparatus in respect of or by means of which such offenoo has been committed shall\n\nbe liable to confiscation.\n\n(2) Any (intoxirnnt) lawfully imported, transported, manufactured; had in possession or sold along with, or in addition to, any (intoxicant) which is liable to confiscation under sub-section (1) and the receptacles, packages and coverings in which any such (intoxicant) as first aforesaid, E or oimy such materials, steel, utensils, implement or apparatus as aforesaid, is found, and the other contents, if any, of such receptacles or packages, and the animals, carts, vessels, rafts or other conveyances used in carrying the same shall likewise be liable to confiscation :\n\nProvided tlrat no animal, cart, vessel, raft or other conveyance as aforesaid shall be liable to confiscation unless the owner thereof is proved to have been implicated in the commission of the offence .\n\nExplanation.-For purpose of this Section \"owner\" includes, in relation to any animal car, vessel, raft or other conveyance.\n\n(a) which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession thereof under that agreement.\"\n\n\"64(1). When in any case tried by him, the Magistrate decides that anything is liable to confiscation under Section\n\n(!) [1964] 6 SCR 594.\n\n63, he may either order confiscation or give the owner oJ such an option to pay, in lieu of confiscation, such fine as the Magistrate thinks fit :\n\nProvided that the Magistrate shall in cases order confiscation of the intoxicants decided by him to be liable to confiscation under Section 63.\n\n(2) Whenever anything is liable to confiscation under Section 63, and the offender or the person entitled to possession is not known or cannot be found, the case shal\\ be inquired into and determined by the Collector, who may order confiscation :\n\nProvided that no such order shall be made until the ex· piration of two months from the date of seizing the thing intended to be confiscated, or, withont giving such person as may, before such expiration, claim any right thereto, an opportunity of being heard and of producing such evidence as he may like to produce in support of his claim :\n\nProvided further that if the thing in question is liable to speedy and natural decay, or if the Collector is of opinion that its sale would be for the benefit of its owner, the Col- E lector may at any time direct it to be sold, and the provisions of this sub-section shall, as early as may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of the sale.\"\n\nIt will be seen that the liability to confisrntion of a conveyance, such as, a car or cart or vessel under Section 63 is incurred only if two conditions are established, namely:\n\n(a) that the conveyance was used in carrying the contraband intoxicant, (b) the owner of tb '. conveyance is implicated in the commission of the offence.\n\nIn the instant case, both these conditions were established.\n\nIt has been found by all the courts below that the car in question (WBD 8169) was used in carrying and transporting contraband Ganja and it was being driven by its owner, Abani Maity, who was convicted of the offence of possessing and transporting the contraband Ganja in this car. The liability to confiscation of the car had, therefore, been incurred.\n\nIt may be further marked that in sub-section (2) of s. 63 the R Legislature has used the words \"shall be\" in the context of '1iable to confiscation\".\n\nEven, in the proviso to sub-section (2) the expression \"shall be liable to confiscation\" has been reiterated. Once\n\n' •\n\n• J\n\n' .\n\nthe facts essential for incurring the liability to confiscation are established, the Magistrate has no option but to adopt any of the two alternative courses indicated in sub-section ( 1) of Section 64, that is to say, he may either order confiscation of that conveyance; or give its owner an option to pay in lieu of confiscation, such fine as the Magistrate thinks fit.\n\nThe Magistrate cannot just ignore to adopt any of these alternatives.\n\nSince sub-section ( 1) of Section 64 talks of the imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation, it appears that such an order of confiscation or fine in lieu of confiscation, is to be passed at the conclusion of the trial, when after conviction, a sentence for the commission of the offence is awarded.\n\nIt is true that ordinarily, the word \"liable\" denotes : ( 1) \"legally subject or amenable to\", (2) \"Exposed or subject to or likely to -suffer from (something prejudicial)\", (3) \"Subject to the possibility of (doing or undergoing something undesirable)\" (See Shorter Oxford\n\nDictionary).\n\nAccording to Webster's New World Dictionary, also, the word \"liable\" denotes \"something external which may befall us\".\n\nAccordingly, the word \"liable\" occurring in many statutes, has been held as not conveying the sense of an absolute obligation or penalty but merely importing a possibility of attracting such obligation, or penalty, even where this word is used along with the words\n\n\"shall be\".\n\nThus, where an American Revenue Statute declared that for the commission of a certain act, a vessel \"shall be liable to forfeiture\", it was held that these words do not effect a present absolute foi:feiture but only give a right to have the vessel forfeited under dne process of law. (See Kate Haran, 14 Fed. Cas. 139, 141 6 Sawy.\n\n106) quoted in Words and Phrases, Vol. 25 p11ge 109.\n\nPerman :nt Edition, West Publishing Co.) Similarly, it has been held that in Section 302, Indian Penal Code, the phrase \"shall also be liable to fine\" does not convey a mandate but leave it to the discretion of the Court convicting an accused of the offence of murder to impose m not lo impose fine in addition to the sentence of death or transportation for life.\n\nBut a statute is not to be interpreted merely from the lexicographer's angle. The court must give effect to the will and inbuilt policy of the Legislature as discernible from the object and scheme of the enactment and the language employed therein.\n\nExposition ex visceribus actus is a long recognised rule of construction.\n\nWords in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole.\n\nThey are therefore, not to be construed in isolation.\n\nFor instance, the use of the word \"may\" would normally indicate that the provision was not mandatory.\n\nBut in the context of a particular statute, this word may connote a legislative imperative, particularly when its construction in a permissive sense would relegate it to the unenviable position, as it were, \"of an' ineffectual angel beating its wi'ngs in a luminons void in vain\".\n\nIf the choice is betmen two interpretations\", said Viscount Simon L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd.(') \"the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility aild should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result\".\n\nThe provisions of Sections 63 and 64 of the Act are to be interpreted in the light of this principle.\n\nThe language and scheme of the Excise Act, taken as a whole, show that the purpose of this legislation is not only to raise revenue but also to control and restrict the import, export, transport, manufacture and sale of intoxirnnts.\n\nFree and unrestricted use of intoxicants and illicit trade in contraband intoxicants not only means a loss of revenue to the public ex:hcqucr but also has a harmful effect on public health and morals. Moreover,\n\nillicit trade and smuggling of intoxicants is often committed in an organised and clandestine manner, and is difficult to detect.\n\nWe have, therefore, to adopt that construction of the expressions \"shall be liable to confiscation\" used in Section 3 (2) and \"may\" in sub-section ( 1) of Section 64, which will preserve the efficacy of the provisions as an instrument for combating these anti-soda! activities, and reject the other which will render them ineffective.\n\nThus considered, it seems clear that the expressions ''shall be liable to confiscation\" and \"may\" in the aforesaid provisions were intended to have a compulsive force.\n\nWe need not dilate on the topic further.\n\nWe will close the discussion by noticing one decision of this Court which has been cited by the counsel for the appellant.\n\nThat case is : lndo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs & Ors. (ibid), wherein this Court was considering the interpretation of certain provisions of the Sea Customs Act.\n\nJn dealing with an offence under Section 167(12A) o[ the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Customs Officer has also to exercise his jurisdiction under Section 183 of that Act, which expressly requires\n\n(I) [1940! A.C. 1014 at p. 1022.\n\n• .\n\n• I\n\nthe adjudicating Officer to give an option to the owner of the offending vessel to pay fine in lieu of confiscation.\n\nQuestion arose as to what was the nature of the responsibility prescribed by Section 167 (12A). Gajendragadkar, C.J., spe-aking for the Court elucidated the position, thus :\n\n\"We have already seen that Section 167(12A) provides that if a vessel contravenes Section 52A, it shll be liable to confiscation and the master of such vessel shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding Rs. 1,000/-. Can it be said that the penalty prescribed by Section 167(12A) may in any given case not be imposed against the ship on the ground that the contravention proved against it is of a very trivial character, or has been the result of an act on the part of a criminal who acted on his own contrary to the instructions of the master of the ship ? The words used in the third column of Cl. ( 12A) are that \"such vessel shall be liable to confiscation\".\n\nThe context seems to require that it is not open to the Customs Authority to refnse to confiscate the vessel on the ground that there are any extenuating circumstances surrounding the contravention of s. 52A in a given case and that it would be unfair to impose the penalty of confiscation.\n\nTwo penalities are prescribed, one is the confiscation of the ship, and the other is a fine against the master.\n\nIn regard to the later penalty, it is within the discretion of the Customs Authority to decide what amount of penalty should be imposed; just as in the case of the first penalty it is not open to it to say that it would not impose the penalty of confiscation against the offending ship, so in the case of the second penalty it is not open to it to say that it will not levy any penalty against the master. In its discretion, it may impose a very small fine against the master if it is satisfied that the master was innocent and despite his best efforts, he could not prevent the contravention of s. 52A. If the two penalties prescribed by cl. (12A) had been alternative, the position . may have been different, but they are independent penalties, one is against the ship and the other is against the master; and so, there is no scope for contending that the Customs Authority may refuse to impose one penalty and impose the other, or may refuse to impose either of the two penalties. It must be regarded as an elementary requirement of clause l 2A that as soon as the offence referred to in column 1 of the said clause is\n\n11-253SCT /79\n\nproved, some penalty has to be imposed and cl.\n\n(12A) indicates that two penalties have to be imposed and not one, there being discretion in regard to the penalty impos. able against the master as regards the amount of the said penalty.\n\nTherefore, we do not think it would be possible to take the view that if there are extenuating circumstances att'ending the contravention of s. 52A in a given case the CustQllls Authority can refrain from confiscating the vessel.\n\nConfiscation of the vessel is the immediate statutory consequence of the finding that an offence under cl. 12A is established, just as the imposition of some penalty against the master is another statutory consequence of the same contravention.\" .\n\nThe language of Section 167(12A) and 183 of the Sea Customs Act, is not in pari materia with those of Sections 63 and 64 of the Bengal Excise Act. It was on the language of these provisiom;, as they then stood, it was held that the penalties prescribed under Sections. 167(12A) and 183 are independent and not alternative. The observations, extracted above therefore, are not applicable in their entirety. Nevertheless, they are a useful guide inasmuch as the: expression \"shall be liable to confiscation\" nsed in Section 167(12A) in the context of a vessel found in the Customs waters in cir1:nmstances that amounted to a contravention of Section 52A, was held to cast on the Customs Authority an imperative dnty to confi:; cate such vessel.\n\nFor all that has been said above and keeping in view the purpose, the scheme and the language of the provisions in question, we are of opinion that as soon as on proof of the conditions nece:>sary under Section 63, a conveyance incurs the liability to confiscation, the word \"may\" used in Section 64 (1) acquires the force of \"must\", G and the Magistrate is bound to abide by either of the two altema1ives viz., confiscation of the conveyance or imposition of the fine in lieu thereof in accordance with that Section. Thus, the discretion of the Magistrate is restricted to choice between these two alterna1tives.\n\nThis limited discretion, also, is not to be exercised whimsically. but judicially, in a manner which will not emasculate these provisions or H debilitate their potency as an instrument for suppressing the mischief which the Legislature had in view. In the circumstances of this case therefore, it was imperative for the Magistrate, to pass, at the\n\n~ ~\n\n•~ 1!i I\n\n~ .\n\n' j~\n\n-,::. '\n\nF \"\n\nI- ' ; I r k.':\n\n~ ..\n\ni!i\n\n~ 11!1 1;;;.; 1'\"'',- \" • I\n\n~;' - jc-\n\n,, .. ..~\n\nI\"\"\n\n!iiii\n\nconclusion of the trial, in addition to the conviction of the accused- A respondent, an order of confiscation of the car by means of which the offence was committed.\n\n, With this clarification of the law on the point, the appeal stands disposed of.\n\nP.B.R .\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "SUPERINTENDENT AND LEGAL REMEMBRANCER OF\n\nLEGAL AFFAIRS TO THE GOVT. OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT AND LEGAL REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS TO THE GOVT. 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K. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3381, "end_char": 3397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3402, "end_char": 3418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3439, "end_char": 3454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee for the Respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR!A, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated March 5, 1971, of the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "SARKAR!A", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3518, "end_char": 3526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee for the Respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR!A, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated March 5, 1971, of the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee for the Respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR!A, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated March 5, 1971, of the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Abani Maity", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3671, "end_char": 3682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are as follows : Abani Maity, respondent herein, and three other persons were tried by the Magistmte, First Class, Alipore, District 24-Parganas, in respect of a charge under Section 46(a) of the Bengal Excise Act,\n\n1909 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).", "canonical_name": "ABANI MAITY"}}, {"text": "Section 46(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3829, "end_char": 3842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Excise Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 29, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of July 29, 1963, at about 7.30 p.m., the Excise\n\nstaff intercepted Motor Car No."}}, {"text": "Rajpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4029, "end_char": 4035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WBD 8169 at village Rajpur, Police Station Sonarpur."}}, {"text": "Abani Maity", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4302, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abani Maity and the three other occupants of the car were arrested.", "canonical_name": "ABANI MAITY"}}, {"text": "Robin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4575, "end_char": 4580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the trial, out of the accused, Robin, died Ka!ipada absconded; and the case proceeded only against Abani Maity and his coaccused, Mihir Bose ."}}, {"text": "Ka!ipada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the trial, out of the accused, Robin, died Ka!ipada absconded; and the case proceeded only against Abani Maity and his coaccused, Mihir Bose ."}}, {"text": "Mihir Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the trial, out of the accused, Robin, died Ka!ipada absconded; and the case proceeded only against Abani Maity and his coaccused, Mihir Bose ."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4735, "end_char": 4750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Magistrate, ultimately, by his order dated August 21, 1970, convicted both the accused persons under Section 46(a) of the Act and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 46(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4793, "end_char": 4806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Excise Act,\n\n1909", "statute": "the Bengal Excise Act,\n\n1909"}}, {"text": "November 16, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his conviction, on November 16, 1970, Abani Maity made an application to the Magistrate, praying for return of the car and the other articles seized by the Excise Staff."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that order, dated November 16, 1970, of the Magistrate, the State preferred a Revision in the High Court, which was finally heard by a Division Bench, who, by an order dated March 5, 1971, affirmed the Magistrate's order relating to the return of the car to the accused-respondent, but directed confiscation of the Ganja."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6342, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee, -appearing for the appellant-State, does not now request the Court to pass an order of confiscation of the aforesaid car, obviously because the passing of such an order after a lap!;"}}, {"text": "Sections 63 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6803, "end_char": 6821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7561, "end_char": 7571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8524, "end_char": 8534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8625, "end_char": 8642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 SCR 594", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10055, "end_char": 10071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10421, "end_char": 10431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11414, "end_char": 11424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12110, "end_char": 12115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12531, "end_char": 12541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12810, "end_char": 12820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kate Haran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Kate Haran, 14 Fed."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14237, "end_char": 14248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14250, "end_char": 14267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon L.C.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15430, "end_char": 15449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the choice is betmen two interpretations\", said Viscount Simon L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd.(') \"the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility aild should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result\"."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15740, "end_char": 15750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the choice is betmen two interpretations\", said Viscount Simon L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd.(') \"the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility aild should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result\"."}}, {"text": "Sections 63 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15847, "end_char": 15865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16617, "end_char": 16626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16664, "end_char": 16674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court was considering the interpretation of certain provisions of the Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17309, "end_char": 17394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17430, "end_char": 17446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court was considering the interpretation of certain provisions of the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Court was considering the interpretation of certain provisions of the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17454, "end_char": 17475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17541, "end_char": 17552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17831, "end_char": 17842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17850, "end_char": 17864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, C.J., spe-aking for the Court elucidated the position, thus :\n\n\"We have already seen that Section 167(12A) provides that if a vessel contravenes Section 52A, it shll be liable to confiscation and the master of such vessel shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17956, "end_char": 17972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18011, "end_char": 18022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18190, "end_char": 18206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18792, "end_char": 18798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19592, "end_char": 19598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20513, "end_char": 20519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A) and 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20868, "end_char": 20892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20904, "end_char": 20915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 63 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20954, "end_char": 20972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21366, "end_char": 21382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21492, "end_char": 21503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21799, "end_char": 21809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21885, "end_char": 21895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_482_493_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "ARUNACHALAM v.\n\nP. S. R. SADHANANTHAM\n\nMarch 6, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND Q. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, 1950-Art. 136-Scope of jurisdiction.\n\nCrimfnal appeal not preferred by Government-Prlvate Party if could invok~ jurisdiction under Art. 136.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that there was enmity between the deceased and hi• brother, P.W. 2 (Appellant) and P.W. 3 on tho one side and A 1 (respondent), A 2, their father, A 4 and A 5 their nephews on the other on account of disputes arising out of elections to the Gram Pancbayat and Co-- operative Stores of the village. A fe_w days before the occurrence, the first accused demanded that the dance performance being arranged in connection with a religious festival in the village should be held under his PresidentShip, but this was rejected by PW 3. The prosecution further alleged that on the night of the occurrence when the stage was being decorated by PW 3 all tbe accused came in a group, got up on the stage and A 1 questioned PW 3 with regard to the conduct of the dance performance without his presiding over it. Accused 1, 2 and 4 started beating P.W. 3. Frightened by the fracas the men gathered near the stage started running away. In the meantime, the deceased and hia\n\nmen intervened, whereupon the first accused took out a knife from his waist and. stabbed the deceased on the left flank, as a result of which he fell down.\n\nThe deceased was first taken to the police station where his staternent Ex. Pl w3\\'S recorded.\n\nHe was then taken to the local hospital but the stab injury being serious he was removed to the headquarters hospital where a Magistrate recorded his dying declaration Ex. P6. The next afternoon tho deceased succumbd to his injuries.\n\nIn their defence, the accused claimed that they were falsely implicated on F account of factions and suggested that some of the prosecution witnesses prevailed upon the deceased to name the accused as assailants.\n\nIn the course of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the defence suggested that a certain R was also injured at thCj sMne time and place.\n\nAccepting the prosecution case the Sessions Judge convicted A-1 under s. 148 and s. 302 and the rest under Sections 147, 323 and 149 read with 323.\n\nOn appeal the High Court acquitted the accused primarily on the ground that neither the direc't witnesses nor the dying declarations explained the serious injury caused to Ramalingam who it appeared from the evidence cf the Doctor, PW 4, had received a stab injury 5 ems. x 2 ems. x 2 ems. near the left side of the abdomen on the back. The High Court thought that though Ext. P-1 was purported to have been recorded earlier than Ext. P-6 in point of time, it was in fact recorded later. The High Court . took the view that the first accused must have been implicated by the decea6ed as the assailant in Ext. P-6 at the in$tance of PW3 who met him in the hospital at about 1 a.m. The evidence of the direct witnesses PWs. 1, 2, 3 and 5 was rected\n\n, )\n\n' t\n\nARUNACHALAM V. P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM 483\n\non the ground that they were interested and had not explained how P.amalingam A tiUstained the injury found on him. The conduct of P.\\.V. 3 was also severely commented upon.\n\nThe State did not prefer any appeal against the acquittal of the accused by the High Court; but the appeal was preferred by the brothor of the deceased.\n\nOn the question whether a private party could invoke the jurisdiction of B ibis Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution against an acquittal by the High Court .\n\nHELD : 1. This Cou1i could entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal 'by the High Court at the1 instance of a private party also. The fact that the 'Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal by a. subordinate court at the instance of a C private party has no relevance to the question of the power of this Court undelr Art. 136 of the Constitution. [488 DJ\n\n2. The appellate power vested in this Court under Art. 136 is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and appellate tribunals under specific statutes.\n\nThe pow~ under Art. 136 is plenary, 'exercisable outside the purview of the ordinary law' to D meet the pressing demands of justice. Art. 136, neither confers on any one the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits any enc from invoking !its juri!diction.\n\nThe power is vested in this Court. The exercise of the power is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court has led to a serious miscarriage of justice this Court caonnot refrain from doing its duty and abstain from interfering with it on the ground that a private party, and not the State, E ha• invoked the court', jurisdiction. [487 H-488 CJ\n\nMohan Lal v. Ajit Singh, [1978] 3 SCC 279; referred to.\n\n3. There need be no apprehension that if appeals againt judgmen1\" of acquittal at the instance of a private party are permitted there may be a! flood of iluch appeals, because appeals under Art. 136, are entertained by special leave granted by this Court. Special leave is not granted as a matter of course, It is granted only for good and sufficient re: .. ons, as well established by the practice of this Court. [488 F]\n\n4. The power under Art. 136 is plenary in the sense that 1here nre no words in Art. 136 itself qualifying that power. The very nature of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within which to exercise such power.\n\nWithin the restrictions imposed by itself, this Court has the undoubted pO\\\\'et to interfere even with findings of fact, making no distinction between judgments\n\nof acquittal and conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted 4'perversely or otherwise improperly\". [481 C-D]\n\nState of Madras v. Vaidyanatha Iyer, [1958] SCR 580; Himachal Pradesh\n\nAdministration v. Om Prakash, [1972] 1 SCC 249, referred to.\n\n5. In dealing with an appeal ag<>inst acquittal, this Court will, naturally, Keep in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, reinforced, ns may br, by the judgment of acquittal. But, this will not abjure the court\n\nof its duty to prevent violent miscarriage of justice by hesitating to interfere where interference is imperative. Where the acquittal is based on irrelevant ground, or where the High Court allows itself to be deflected by red herrina•\n\ndrawn across the track, or where the evidence accepted by the trial court is re~ jected by the High Court after a perfunctory consideration, or where the baneful approach of the High Court has resulted in vital and crucial evidence being ignored, or for any such adequate; reason, this Court may feel obliged to step in to secure the interests of justice, to appease the judicial conscience as it were.\n\n[487 E-F]\n\n6. The High Court was wrong and unjustified in rejecting the testimony of the direct witnesses and the dying declarations on the ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the pclrSons (R) alleged to have been present at the scene of occurrence. There is nothing to suggest that R and the deceased received their injuries in the course of the same transaction.\n\nAccording to the doctor who examined R, the injured person did not know who bis assailant was.\n\nHe was not shown to be connected with either party but was surreptitiously and dexterously introduced into the case by the defence in the course of cross-examin&tion of the prosecution witnesses. A conspectus. of the evidence clearly points to the conclusion that there was nothing to connect the injuries or R with the stabbing of the deceased. [488 G--489 A,\n\n490 D1\n\n7. Both the dying declarations could be safely relied upon without any reservation.\n\nThough the second dying declaration gives fewer details than the first it clearly states that thei deceased and others first went to the 1 police station.\n\nThis clearly lends support to the prosecution story that it was there that tho first dying declaration was recorded. There is, therefore, no ground to hold as the High Court did that the second dying declaration was in point of time, recorded earlier than the first.\n\nThe difference between the two was tha-t 'vhile the :first was recorded almost immediately after the, incident, the second waa recorded a few hours later by which time the condition of the deceased had deteriorated and he was not in a position to give as many details as beforCI.\n\nThere was, therefore, no reason to doubt the genuineness of either of tho two dying declarations. [493 E, 491 F-492 A, 490 Fl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELUTE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1971 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 217 of 1971.\n\nR. K. Garg, V. !. Francis and D. K. Garg for the Appellant.\n\nK. Jayaram and R. Ramkumar for Respondent No. 1.\n\nA. V. Rangam for Respondent No. 6.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-P. s. R: Sadhanantham and four others H were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, on various counts.\n\nSadhanantham (Al) was convicted under Sections 148 a\"nd 302 Indian Penal Code while the four others were convicted under Sections 147,\n\n' j\n\n\\ ·\"' •\n\n' •\n\n323 and 149 read with 323. The first accused was sentenced to imprisonment for life on the charge of murder and to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years on the charge under Section 148. The others were sentenced td suffer imprisonment for a period of one year on each of the counts on which they were convicted, the sentences to run concurrently. All tl]e five accused preferred an appeal to the High Court of Madras. The High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted all the accused of all the charges. Arunachalam the brother of the deceased has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Madras High Court after obtaining special leave from this Co'urt on 26-7-1973. The special leave was granted against the first accused Sadhanantham only.\n\nThe case of the prosecution, briefly, was that there was enmity between the deceased Soundarapandian and his brother Arunachalam\n\n(P.W. 2) and Natesan (P.W. 3) on one side and Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar, his sons Al and A2 and his nephews A4 and AS on the other.\n\nThere were the usual disputes arising out of elections to the Gram Panhayat and to the local cooperative stores. In connection with the village Amman festival, P.W. 3 was arranging to have a dance performance on the night of 20th August, 1970, in the Gandhi Maidan. About a week earlier, Sadhanantham, the first accused demanded that the dance should be performed under his presidentship but P .W.3 did not agree.\n\nOn the night of 20th August, 1970, P.W; J alongwith one Gopalakrishnan (P.W. 6) was decorating the stage. Tube lights were burning and several persons had gathered in front of the stage. At about 8.45 p.m. accused 1 to 5 came there and got up on the stage.\n\nAl questioned P.W.3 how he dared to conduct the show without his presiding over it.\n\nP.W.3 replied that the dance performance would be conducted without the presidentship of Al. Al then slapped P.W.3 on the cheek. A2 to A4 also started beating P.W.3 with their hands.\n\nP.W.6 and several others who were there ran away apparently not wanting to get involved in the fracas. P.W.3 jumped down from the stage and attempted to run away when A3 caught him and began to throttle his neck. Al, A2 and A4 joined in beating him with their hands. The deceased P.W. I, P.W. 2 and P.W. 5 came running towards P.W.3. The deceased asked the first accused why they were beating his younger brother. A.3 and A.5 who were holding P.W.3 by the neck Jet him free.\n\nA. I asked the deceased who he was to question him and saying so he took out a knife from his waist and stabbed the deceased on the left flank.\n\nThe deceased fell down shouting \"stabbed, stabbed\". Accused 1 to 5 then ran towards the north.\n\nP.W.3 chased .them over a distance of about one and half furlongs. They ran inside the forest.\n\nP.W.3 stopped chasing them further.\n\nIn the meanwhile the injured Soundarapandian was taken by P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 to the\n\nfl ;\n\n- - c\n\nPoliee Station and then to the hospital at Kayalpattinam. At the Police Station, the writer P.W.14 recorded a statement Exhibit P-1 from Sonndarapandian at 9.15 p.m. Soundarapandian when asked to sign the statement insisted on signing the statement after dipping the pen in the blood that was coming out of the wound. He was taken to_ the ho'spital in a jeep requisitioned by the police.\n\nP.W.4 the Mediical Officer in charge of the Hospital examined the injured and found that the injury was of a serious nature.\n\nHe sent tl!e injured to the Government Headquarters Hospital at Tuticorin for further treatment.\n\n.the District Medical Officer, P.W. 8 examined him and finding his condition very serious, sent a requisition Exhibit P-5 to the Sub Magistrate, Tuticorin to record the dying declaration of Soundarapandian. Exhibit P-6, the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate P.W.7 at 1.30 a.m. At 7.45 a.m. next morning, P.W.8 performed an operation but Soundarapandian could not be saved. He died at about 1.30 p.m.\n\nThe autopsy was conducted by P.W.9 who, on dissection lound that the diaphragm and the upper lobe of the left lung had been pierced. The police after completing the investigation laid a charge-sheet against Sadhanantham, Nithiyanantham, Thamilan, Kumaresan and Kairthikeyan.\n\nIn support of its case, the prosecution examined P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 as direct witneses to the occurrence and relied upon Exhibits P 1 and P6, the two dying declarations made by Soundarapandian. The prosecution also examined P. W. 6 to speak to the earlier part of the incident.\n\nAll the accused denied the offence and stated that they were falsely implicated on account of enmity. In the cross-examination of the witnesses it was suggested that one Ramalingam was also injured at the same time and place. It was suggested that P. Ws. 2 and 3 had prevailed upon the deceased to name A-1 as the person who stabbed him. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the dying declarations as true. He also accepted the evidence of the eye witnesses. He convicted and sentenced the five accused as mentioned earlier. The High Court acquitted the accused primarily on the ground that neither the direct witnesses nor the dying\n\ndeclarations explained the serious injury caused to Ramalingam, who it appeared from the evidence of the Doctor P.W. 4, had received a stab injury 5 ems x 2 ems near the left side of the abdomen on the back.\n\nThe High Court thought that though Exhibit P-1 was purported to have been recorded earlier than Exbibit P-6-in point of time, it was in fact recorded later. The High Court took the view that the first accused must have been implicated by the deceased as the assailant in E:thibit P-6 at the instance of P.W.3 who met him in the hospital at about 1 a.m.\n\nThe evidence of the direct witnesses P. W.s. 1, 2, 3, and 5 was rejected on the ground that they were interested and had not explained\n\n• •\n\n' '\n\n• •\n\n\\ '\n\nhow Ramalingam sustained the injury found on him.\n\nThe conduct of A P.W. 3 was also severely commented upon. The High Court acquitted all the five accused.\n\nBefore proceeding to discuss the evidence and the findings of the High Court we remind <JUrselves of the confines of our jurisdiction to deal with appeals by special leave against judgments of acquittal by the High Court.\n\nArticle 136 of the Constitution of India invests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within which to exercise such power. It is now the well established practice of this Court to permit the invocation of the power und~ Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances, as when a question of law of general public importance arises o'r a decision shocks the conscience of the Court. But, within the restrictions imposed by itself, this Court has the undoubted power to interfere even with findings of fact making no distinction between judgment of acquittal and conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted \"perversely or otherwise improperly\". (See State of Madras v. Vaidyanath Iyer,(') and Himachal Pradesh Administration v.\n\nOm Prakash. (2) In dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the Court will, naturally, keep in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, reinforced; as may be, by the judgment of acquittal.\n\nBut, also, the Court will not abjure its duty to prevent violent miscarriage of justice by hesitating to interfere where interference is imperative.\n\nWhere the acquittal is based on irrelevant ground, or where the High Court allows itself to be deflected by red herrings drawn across the track, or where the evidence accepted by the trial court is rejected by the High Court after a perfunctory consideration, or where the baneful approach of the High Court has resulted in vital and crucial evidence being .ignored, or for any such adequate reason, this Court may feel obliged to step in to secure the interests of justice, to appease the judicial conscience, as it were.\n\nA doubt has been raised about the competence of a private pRrty, .as distinguished from the State, to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against a judgment of acquital by the High Court.\n\nWe do not see any substance in the doubt.\n\nAppellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordin3ry appellate\n\n(!) 11958] S.C.R. 580.\n\n(2) 11972] I S.C.C. 249.\n\n488 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n[1979] 3 S.C.R\n\npower exercised by Appellate Courts and Appellate Tribunals wider specific statutes.\n\nAs we said earlier, it is a plenery power, 'exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law' to meet the pressing demands of justice (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Ors.(') Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers\n\non anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court's jurisdiction.\n\nThe power is vested in the Supreme Court but the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one.\n\nThe exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court has led to a serious miscarriage of justice the Supreme Court\n\nannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain from inerfering on the grom1d that a private party and not the State has invoked the Court's jurisdiction.\n\nWe do not have the slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of.private parties also.\n\nThe circumstance that the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal by a Subordinate Court, at the instance of a private party, has no relevance to the question of the power of this Court under Article 136.\n\nWe may mention that recently in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh,( 2) this Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of a private party. An apprehension was expressed that if appeals against judgments of acquittal at the instance of private parties are permitted there may be a flood of such appeals.\n\nWe do not share the apprehension.\n\nAppeals under Article 136 of the Constitution are entertained by special leave granted by this Court.\n\nWhether it is lhe State or a private party that invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, special leave is not granted as a matter of course but only for good and sufficient reasons, as well established by the practice of this Court. .\n\nAs earlier mentioned, the primary reason given by the High Court for rejecting the testimony of the direct witnesses and the dying dclarations was the supposed failure of the prosecution to explain the serious injury found on the person of one Ramalingam alleged to have been injured at the same time and place as the deceased.\n\nWe may at once say thatJ1othing is known about this Rama!ingam.\n\nHe is not shown to be connected, even remotely, either with the prosecution party or with the faction of the accused. He was very surreptitiously and dexterously introduced mto the case in the ------\n\n(!) [19551 1 S.C.R. 267.\n\n(2) [1978] 3 S.C.C. 279.\n\nI j\n\n. )\n\n< •\n\ncourse of the cross-examination of the prosecution witness and thereafter made to loom large.\n\nHe was, as we shall presen.tly point out nothing more than a \"red herring\" across the track.\n\nWe will refer to the whole of the evidence where Ramalingam was made to appear in the case to examine whether the High Court was right in rejecting the entire case of the prosecution on the ground that the injury on Ramalingam was not explained.\n\nP.W. 1 was put but one question whether he was aware that injuries were caused to oue Rama!ingam Nadar at the place of the occurrence on the night of occurrence. He stated that he was not aware of that fact. No further question was put to P. W. 1 pursuing the matter.\n\nSimilarly P.W. 2. was also asked in cross-examination whether he was aware of the stabbing of one Ramalingam Nadar at the time of occurrence. He stated that he was not and that was the end of the matter and it was not pursued further.\n\nP. W. 3 was also asked the same question. He too denied knowledge of injuries sustained by Ramalingam Nadar on the night of occurrence.\n\nP.W. 5 was also asked a similar question and he too gave a similar answer.\n\nP.W. 4 the Medical Officer, Kayalpattinam, deposed in his evidence that he examined one Rama1ingam at about 11.30 p.m. on 20th August, 1970. and found an incised wound 5 ems x 2 ems x 2 ems near the left •ide of the abdomen on the back and one •mall irregular edged wound on the inner side of the first injury.\n\nThe Doctor also stated that Ramalingam told him that he was assaulted by some unknown person when he was witnessing the dance show.\n\nP.W. 10 who had gone to witness the dance performance but who ran away when trouble r, tarted stated that when he was running away he saw one Ramalingam Nadar running along with him and that the said Ramalingam Nadar was keeping his hand near his waist and that the hand was blood stained. P.W. 15 the Head Constable attached to the Arumuganeri Police Station stated that 4 or 5 days after the occurrence he came w know that a case was reisterd in Arumuganeri Police Station on the strength of a complamt given by one Ramlingam. P.W. 16, the Invesiigating Officer also stated that the First Information Report registered on the strength of Ramalingam's complaint had also been sent to the Magistrate and that a final report had also been sent.\n\nHe denied the sugge3tion. made, to him that the First Information Report in respect of Ramalmgam s complaint was suppressed as it was not in favour of the prosecution. These are all the appearances which Ramalingam made, o~ the sta_ge of this case, in the mouth of the witnesses, though Ramahngam did himself not enter upon the 3cene.\n\nNone of \" H the accused 11_1ade any reference to Ramalingam in his statement. It would be noticed that it was not suggested to any of the pfosccution\n\nwitnesses that Ramalingam was connected. with either the prosecution party or the party of the accused. It was not suggested that the injury to Ramalingam was caused by a member of either group. It was not suggested that Ramalingam i)1tervened in the fight and received an m1ury.\n\nIn fact there was nothing to suggest that Ramalin, gam and the deceased received their respective injuries in the course of the same transaction.\n\nThe only suggestion was that Ramalingam received an injury that night at the place of occurrence. It is in evidence that as soon as trouble started, the people who had gather, ed there started running helter skelter.\n\nWhile so running Ramalin gam apparently received a stab injury accidentally or deliberately from someone. In fact according to the evidence of the Doctor, Ramalingam told him that he did not know who his assailant was.\n\nThere was, therefore, absolutely nothing to connct the stabbing of Ramalingam with the stabbing of the deceased Soandarapandian. The evidence of P.W. 10 also was to the effect that Ramalingam himself was one cf those who ran away from the scene alongwith him and that was before the deceased was stabbed.\n\nThere was thus nothing to indicate that the deceased or any of the direct witnesses were aware or could possibly be _aware of the injury caused to Ramalin gam.\n\nIn our opinion the High Court was entirely wrong and wholly unjustified hi rejecting the testimony of the direct witnesses and the dying declarations on the irrelevant consideration that they did not explain the injury found on the person of Ramalingam.\n\nIn regard to the dying declarations the reason given by the High Court to conclude that Exhibit P. 1 must have been recorded later than Exhibit P-6 was that Exhibit p, 1 contained several statements not to be found in Exhibit P-6.\n\nWe are afraid that the High Court was merely indulging in speculation and approaching the question from the wrong end.\n\nExhibit P-1 which was recorded by P.W. '14 was as follows :\n\n\"Arumuganeri is my native place.\n\nI am doing shop business.\n\nRecord dance was arranged to take place in Gandhi Maidan at Arumuganeri. I went to see the record dance along with Arunachala Nadar my elder brother, Gunesekaran younger sister's husband, and Somasundaram son of Adinarayana Perumal.\n\nWe were talking, standing in front of Ramaswami temple.\n\nSadanandam, Nithianan, dam, sons of P. S. Raja Nadar, Tamilam alias Subramaniam, Knmarsan son of Thangapla Nadar, Karthikyan son of Raja Pandia Nadar were beating my younger brother Nate, san, on the north of the dancing stage.\n\nMyself, and the\n\n.. •\n\n, ;\n\npersons with me ran to that place.\n\nI questioned as to why you beat my younger brother.\n\nSadanandam son of P. S.\n\nRaja Nadar forcibly stabbed me with the greece knife in the hand, on my left flank, below the rib I cried to the effect\n\n\"Ayyoh : stabbed.\" I covered the stab injury with my hand.\n\nMy elder brother and Somasundaram, took me to Police station.\n\nThere is prior enmity between myself and P. S.\n\nRaja Vagaria in connection with the elections., I read the statement. It has been recorded as narrated by me.\n\nSd/- Soundarapandian\"\n\nExhbiit P-6 which was recorded by the Sub Magistrate, was as follows:\n\n\"There is one Gandhi Maidan in Arumganeri, Record dance was to be performed there.\n\nI went to see it. The dance was not begun: Myself, Arunachalam, my elder brother, Gunasekaran, my sister's husband were all talking.\n\nThere was quarrel at the place of performance of the record D dance.\n\nAt that time, the record dance was not begun.\n\nMyself and others ran to the place where the quarrel took place.\n\nA boy called Sadanandem son of P. S. Raja Nadar stabbed me with a knife.\n\nI cried to effect \"Ayyoh Stabbed, stabbed?\" The police station is very near.\n\nWe all went there.\n\nMy hand was stained with blood.\n\nThere is no E reason for stabbing me.\n\nL.I.T. of Thiru Soundrapandian\".\n\nIt is true that Exhibit P-1 gives more details than Exhibit P-6. Ex- \\, ' hibit P-1 mentions the names of A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5 also in cn- -< nectim with the beating of P.W. 3. It also mentions that the dcceas-\n\n' ed was stabbed oh the left flank below the rib.\n\nIt further mentions\n\n~ the prior enmity between the deceased and P. S. Raja Vageria. On the contrary Exhibit P-6 gives fewer details, and does not mention the names of the participants in the fight which preceded the stabbing of the deceased.\n\nThe stabbing of the deceased by A-1 alone is particularly mentioned.\n\nWhat is important to be noted in Exhibit P-6 is that it refers to the circumstance that the deceased first went to the Polite Station. That statement lends support to the prosecution case that the deceased and others went to the Police Station and a Statement was recorded at the Police Station from the deceased. What is more imrortant is the circumstance that while Exhibit P-1 was recorded within a very short time after the occurrence, Exhibit P-6 was recorded a few hours after the occurence by which time the condition of the\n\nA deceased had apparently deteriorated and he was not in a position to make as detailed a statement as\n\nP-1.\n\nThe evidence of the District Medical Officer, P.W. 8, shows that when he saw l\\im at 1 a.m. the condition of the deceased was very bad.\n\nP-6 was recorded, it may be noted at 1.25 a.m.\n\nIt would also be seen that the condition of Soundarapandian at that time was such that his thumb impression and not his signature rnuld . . . be taken on Ex.P.6.\n\nThe reason for Jess particulars in P-6 was quite obvious qut yet the High Court completely missed it because of its wrong approach.\n\nThere was no reason whatsoever to doubt the genuineness of Exihibit P-1 or P-6. The High Court thought that P.W.3 might have met the deceased in the Tuticorin hospital at 1 a.m. and induced him to implicate the first accused.\n\nThis was nothing but speculation. AB we mentioned the condition of the deceased was very bad at 1 a.m. and it is too much to think that anybody would have been allowed to go near the deceased in the critical condition in which he was in the hospital and to tutor him to implicate someone falsely.\n\nThe evidence of three of the eye witnesses namely P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 was dealt with by the High Court in a most summary and perfunctory way. It was said:\n\n\"The name of this witness (P.W.l) was not mentioned by the deceased in Exh.P-6. It has been licited from this witness that there was bitter enmity between him and the family of the accused. This witness was appointed by t!Je deceased as a clerk in Arumuganeri Cooperii.tive Stores and in the Panchayat election, P.W.l proposed the name of the person who stood against the father of Accused 1 and 2. He was a prosecution witness in a criminal case instituted against the father of accused 1 and 2.\n\nThis witness is not only interested in the deceased as he was employed under the deceased as a clerk but also inimically disposed towards the family of the accused. It will, therefore, be unsafe to rely upon his evidence.\n\nP.W.2 is the brother of the deceas .. ed and P.W.5 is the brother-in-law of the deceased.\n\nThey are very much interested in the deceased and they were also inimically disposed towards the accused.\n\nThey are not telling the truth.\n\nThey have not explained as to how Ramalingam sustained the injury.\n\nThey have fallen in line with the statements made in the dying declaration.\n\nWe do not accept their eviderice\".\n\n• •\n\nThe reasons given were that the witnesses were interested and that A they had not explained the injury found on the person of Ramalingam.\n\nIn the case of P .W.1 it was also stated that his name was not mentioned in Exhibit P-6.\n\nWe do not think that the criticism of the High Court bears any scrutiny. We have perused the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 and we are unable to discard their testimony for the sole reason that they are interested witnesses.\n\nWith regard to P .W .3 however, there is scope for much criticism having regard to his conduct subsequent to the incident.\n\nAccording to his evidence after he chased the accused he stopped for about an hour near the forest and returned to tlie village thereafter. While he was on his way back he saw his uncle's jeep on the road and learnt from his uncle that Soundarapandian had been taken to the hospital at Tuticorin. Therefore, he went to Tuticorin and saw his brother in the hospital at about J a.m. Thereafter he went to a hotel where he slept for the night.\n\nNext morning without going to the hospital to find out the condition of his brother he returned to the viJlage nd made himself available to the police for questioning at about 1 p.m. Though there cannot be any doubt that he witnessed the occurrence his subsequent conduct does not inspire such confidence as to place implicit reliance on his evidence.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the High Court th.llt P.W.3 was not a reliable witness.\n\nIn our view the two dying declarations Exhibits P-1 and P-6 may be relied upon without any reservation and the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 may also be safely accepted. We have considered the reasons given by the High Court for acquitting the first accused and we find them wholly unsatisfactory'.\n\nIn the light of the principled set out by us earlier we think that the interests of justice deinand that we should interfere with the order of acquittal in the present case.\n\nAccordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Tirunelveli against the respondent (first accused) on the charge under Section 302 Indian Penal Code.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "ARUNACHALAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Arunachala Nadar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ARUNACHALAM v.\n\nP. S. R. SADHANANTHAM\n\nMarch 6, 1979\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND Q. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, 1950-Art."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Q. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260, "end_char": 268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2185, "end_char": 2191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 147, 323 and 149 read with 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2211, "end_char": 2250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramalingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2425, "end_char": 2435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the High Court acquitted the accused primarily on the ground that neither the direc't witnesses nor the dying declarations explained the serious injury caused to Ramalingam who it appeared from the evidence cf the Doctor, PW 4, had received a stab injury 5 ems.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "ARUNACHALAM V. P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM 483", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3011, "end_char": 3051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 2, 3 and 5 was rected\n\n, )\n\n' t\n\nARUNACHALAM V. P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM 483\n\non the ground that they were interested and had not explained how P.amalingam A tiUstained the injury found on him."}}, {"text": "P.amalingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3119, "end_char": 3130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 2, 3 and 5 was rected\n\n, )\n\n' t\n\nARUNACHALAM V. P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM 483\n\non the ground that they were interested and had not explained how P.amalingam A tiUstained the injury found on him.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3474, "end_char": 3482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3701, "end_char": 3724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4177, "end_char": 4185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5096, "end_char": 5104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5408, "end_char": 5416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8837, "end_char": 8847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, V. !.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "V. !. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, V. !."}}, {"text": "D. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8867, "end_char": 8877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Francis and D. K. Garg for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram and R. Ramkumar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Ramkumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8913, "end_char": 8924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram and R. Ramkumar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8948, "end_char": 8960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9028, "end_char": 9043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-P. s. R: Sadhanantham and four others H were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, on various counts."}}, {"text": "Sadhanantham", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9057, "end_char": 9069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-P. s. R: Sadhanantham and four others H were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, on various counts.", "canonical_name": "Sadhanantham"}}, {"text": "Sadhanantham", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9163, "end_char": 9175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadhanantham (Al) was convicted under Sections 148 a\"nd 302 Indian Penal Code while the four others were convicted under Sections 147,\n\n' j\n\n\\ ·\"' •\n\n' •\n\n323 and 149 read with 323.", "canonical_name": "Sadhanantham"}}, {"text": "Sections 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9223, "end_char": 9240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9284, "end_char": 9296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All tl]e five accused preferred an appeal to the High Court of Madras."}}, {"text": "Arunachalam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam the brother of the deceased has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Madras High Court after obtaining special leave from this Co'urt on 26-7-1973.", "canonical_name": "Arunachala Nadar"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9924, "end_char": 9941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam the brother of the deceased has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Madras High Court after obtaining special leave from this Co'urt on 26-7-1973."}}, {"text": "26-7-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9992, "end_char": 10001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam the brother of the deceased has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Madras High Court after obtaining special leave from this Co'urt on 26-7-1973."}}, {"text": "Sadhanantham", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10059, "end_char": 10071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special leave was granted against the first accused Sadhanantham only.", "canonical_name": "Sadhanantham"}}, {"text": "Soundarapandian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10164, "end_char": 10179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, briefly, was that there was enmity between the deceased Soundarapandian and his brother Arunachalam\n\n(P.W. 2) and Natesan (P.W. 3) on one side and Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar, his sons Al and A2 and his nephews A4 and AS on the other.", "canonical_name": "Soundarapandian"}}, {"text": "Arunachalam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10196, "end_char": 10207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, briefly, was that there was enmity between the deceased Soundarapandian and his brother Arunachalam\n\n(P.W. 2) and Natesan (P.W. 3) on one side and Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar, his sons Al and A2 and his nephews A4 and AS on the other."}}, {"text": "Natesan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10222, "end_char": 10229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, briefly, was that there was enmity between the deceased Soundarapandian and his brother Arunachalam\n\n(P.W. 2) and Natesan (P.W. 3) on one side and Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar, his sons Al and A2 and his nephews A4 and AS on the other."}}, {"text": "Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10255, "end_char": 10277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, briefly, was that there was enmity between the deceased Soundarapandian and his brother Arunachalam\n\n(P.W. 2) and Natesan (P.W. 3) on one side and Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar, his sons Al and A2 and his nephews A4 and AS on the other."}}, {"text": "Al", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10288, "end_char": 10290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, briefly, was that there was enmity between the deceased Soundarapandian and his brother Arunachalam\n\n(P.W. 2) and Natesan (P.W. 3) on one side and Rajapalavesmuthu Nadar, his sons Al and A2 and his nephews A4 and AS on the other."}}, {"text": "Amman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10483, "end_char": 10488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with the village Amman festival, P.W. 3 was arranging to have a dance performance on the night of 20th August, 1970, in the Gandhi Maidan."}}, {"text": "Sadhanantham", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10627, "end_char": 10639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About a week earlier, Sadhanantham, the first accused demanded that the dance should be performed under his presidentship but P .W.3 did not agree."}}, {"text": "20th August, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10770, "end_char": 10787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of 20th August, 1970, P.W; J alongwith one Gopalakrishnan (P.W. 6) was decorating the stage."}}, {"text": "Gopalakrishnan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of 20th August, 1970, P.W; J alongwith one Gopalakrishnan (P.W. 6) was decorating the stage."}}, {"text": "Al", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11494, "end_char": 11496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Al, A2 and A4 joined in beating him with their hands."}}, {"text": "Kayalpattinam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12270, "end_char": 12283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 2 and 5 to the\n\nfl ;\n- c\n\nPoliee Station and then to the hospital at Kayalpattinam."}}, {"text": "Sonndarapandian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12364, "end_char": 12379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the Police Station, the writer P.W.14 recorded a statement Exhibit P-1 from Sonndarapandian at 9.15 p.m. Soundarapandian when asked to sign the statement insisted on signing the statement after dipping the pen in the blood that was coming out of the wound.", "canonical_name": "Soundarapandian"}}, {"text": "Government Headquarters Hospital at Tuticorin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12770, "end_char": 12815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He sent tl!e injured to the Government Headquarters Hospital at Tuticorin for further treatment."}}, {"text": "Sub Magistrate, Tuticorin", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12969, "end_char": 12994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".the District Medical Officer, P.W. 8 examined him and finding his condition very serious, sent a requisition Exhibit P-5 to the Sub Magistrate, Tuticorin to record the dying declaration of Soundarapandian."}}, {"text": "Nithiyanantham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13477, "end_char": 13491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police after completing the investigation laid a charge-sheet against Sadhanantham, Nithiyanantham, Thamilan, Kumaresan and Kairthikeyan."}}, {"text": "Thamilan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13493, "end_char": 13501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police after completing the investigation laid a charge-sheet against Sadhanantham, Nithiyanantham, Thamilan, Kumaresan and Kairthikeyan."}}, {"text": "Kumaresan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police after completing the investigation laid a charge-sheet against Sadhanantham, Nithiyanantham, Thamilan, Kumaresan and Kairthikeyan."}}, {"text": "Kairthikeyan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police after completing the investigation laid a charge-sheet against Sadhanantham, Nithiyanantham, Thamilan, Kumaresan and Kairthikeyan."}}, {"text": "s. 1, 2, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15052, "end_char": 15062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15546, "end_char": 15557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15565, "end_char": 15586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15599, "end_char": 15612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and Tribunals in India."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16012, "end_char": 16023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17580, "end_char": 17591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17756, "end_char": 17767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18209, "end_char": 18220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19286, "end_char": 19297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19680, "end_char": 19691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rama!ingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20385, "end_char": 20395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may at once say thatJ1othing is known about this Rama!ingam.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Ramalingam Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21469, "end_char": 21485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was also asked in cross-examination whether he was aware of the stabbing of one Ramalingam Nadar at the time of occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Kayalpattinam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21848, "end_char": 21861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4 the Medical Officer, Kayalpattinam, deposed in his evidence that he examined one Rama1ingam at about 11.30 p.m. on 20th August, 1970."}}, {"text": "Rama1ingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21908, "end_char": 21918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4 the Medical Officer, Kayalpattinam, deposed in his evidence that he examined one Rama1ingam at about 11.30 p.m. on 20th August, 1970.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Arumuganeri Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22598, "end_char": 22624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 15 the Head Constable attached to the Arumuganeri Police Station stated that 4 or 5 days after the occurrence he came w know that a case was reisterd in Arumuganeri Police Station on the strength of a complamt given by one Ramlingam."}}, {"text": "Ramlingam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22783, "end_char": 22792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 15 the Head Constable attached to the Arumuganeri Police Station stated that 4 or 5 days after the occurrence he came w know that a case was reisterd in Arumuganeri Police Station on the strength of a complamt given by one Ramlingam."}}, {"text": "Ramalmgam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23097, "end_char": 23106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "made, to him that the First Information Report in respect of Ramalmgam s complaint was suppressed as it was not in favour of the prosecution.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Ramahngam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23297, "end_char": 23306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are all the appearances which Ramalingam made, o~ the sta_ge of this case, in the mouth of the witnesses, though Ramahngam did himself not enter upon the 3cene.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Ramalin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23820, "end_char": 23827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact there was nothing to suggest that Ramalin, gam and the deceased received their respective injuries in the course of the same transaction.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "gam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23829, "end_char": 23832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact there was nothing to suggest that Ramalin, gam and the deceased received their respective injuries in the course of the same transaction."}}, {"text": "Soandarapandian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24475, "end_char": 24490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was, therefore, absolutely nothing to connct the stabbing of Ramalingam with the stabbing of the deceased Soandarapandian."}}, {"text": "Ramalin gam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24816, "end_char": 24827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was thus nothing to indicate that the deceased or any of the direct witnesses were aware or could possibly be _aware of the injury caused to Ramalin gam.", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Arumuganeri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25499, "end_char": 25510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit P-1 which was recorded by P.W. '14 was as follows :\n\n\"Arumuganeri is my native place."}}, {"text": "Arunachala Nadar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25674, "end_char": 25690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I went to see the record dance along with Arunachala Nadar my elder brother, Gunesekaran younger sister's husband, and Somasundaram son of Adinarayana Perumal.", "canonical_name": "Arunachala Nadar"}}, {"text": "Gunesekaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25709, "end_char": 25720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I went to see the record dance along with Arunachala Nadar my elder brother, Gunesekaran younger sister's husband, and Somasundaram son of Adinarayana Perumal."}}, {"text": "Somasundaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25751, "end_char": 25763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I went to see the record dance along with Arunachala Nadar my elder brother, Gunesekaran younger sister's husband, and Somasundaram son of Adinarayana Perumal."}}, {"text": "Sadanandam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25850, "end_char": 25860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadanandam, Nithianan, dam, sons of P. S. Raja Nadar, Tamilam alias Subramaniam, Knmarsan son of Thangapla Nadar, Karthikyan son of Raja Pandia Nadar were beating my younger brother Nate, san, on the north of the dancing stage.", "canonical_name": "Sadhanantham"}}, {"text": "Sadanandam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26196, "end_char": 26206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadanandam son of P. S.\n\nRaja Nadar forcibly stabbed me with the greece knife in the hand, on my left flank, below the rib I cried to the effect\n\n\"Ayyoh : stabbed.\"", "canonical_name": "Sadhanantham"}}, {"text": "P. S.\n\nRaja Vagaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26506, "end_char": 26525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is prior enmity between myself and P. S.\n\nRaja Vagaria in connection with the elections.,"}}, {"text": "Gandhi Maidan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26732, "end_char": 26745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- Soundarapandian\"\n\nExhbiit P-6 which was recorded by the Sub Magistrate, was as follows:\n\n\"There is one Gandhi Maidan in Arumganeri, Record dance was to be performed there."}}, {"text": "Arumganeri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26749, "end_char": 26759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- Soundarapandian\"\n\nExhbiit P-6 which was recorded by the Sub Magistrate, was as follows:\n\n\"There is one Gandhi Maidan in Arumganeri, Record dance was to be performed there."}}, {"text": "Gunasekaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26884, "end_char": 26895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dance was not begun: Myself, Arunachalam, my elder brother, Gunasekaran, my sister's husband were all talking."}}, {"text": "Sadanandem", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27132, "end_char": 27142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A boy called Sadanandem son of P. S. Raja Nadar stabbed me with a knife.", "canonical_name": "Sadhanantham"}}, {"text": "P. S. Raja Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27150, "end_char": 27166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A boy called Sadanandem son of P. S. Raja Nadar stabbed me with a knife.", "canonical_name": "P. S. Raja Vageria"}}, {"text": "P. S. Raja Vageria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27726, "end_char": 27744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further mentions\n\n~ the prior enmity between the deceased and P. S. Raja Vageria.", "canonical_name": "P. S. Raja Vageria"}}, {"text": "Tuticorin hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29248, "end_char": 29266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court thought that P.W.3 might have met the deceased in the Tuticorin hospital at 1 a.m. and induced him to implicate the first accused."}}, {"text": "Arumuganeri Cooperii.tive Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30025, "end_char": 30057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This witness was appointed by t!Je deceased as a clerk in Arumuganeri Cooperii.tive Stores and in the Panchayat election, P.W.l proposed the name of the person who stood against the father of Accused 1 and 2."}}, {"text": "Tuticorin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31778, "end_char": 31787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While he was on his way back he saw his uncle's jeep on the road and learnt from his uncle that Soundarapandian had been taken to the hospital at Tuticorin."}}, {"text": "Tirunelveli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33011, "end_char": 33022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Tirunelveli against the respondent (first accused) on the charge under Section 302 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33082, "end_char": 33093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33094, "end_char": 33111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33114, "end_char": 33120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1979_3_494_503_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "JUSTINIANO AUGUSTO DE PIEDADA BARRETO\n\nANTONIO VICENTE DE FONSECA AND ORS.\n\nMarch 6, 1979\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND 0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nLimitation-Provisions of the Portugue!Je Civil Code relating to limitation, whether stand repealed by Limtation Act 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) by necessa.\"Y implication, or whether they are saved by section 29(2) of that Act-Limitation Act, 1963 section 29(2), Portuguese. Civil Code Art. 535.\n\nThe Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 sub section (I) and (2) of sections Sand 6.\n\nThe Goa Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulations promulgc1tcd under Art. 240 of the Constitution, scope of-\"Local Law\" and \"Special Law\" difference in-- Whether the Portuguese Civil Code a local law~Whether there is any repugnancy .:111d therefore void under Art. 254(1) of the Co11.Jtitutio11.\n\nOn Goa, .Daman and Diu becoming a part of India as a: Union Territory, Parliament enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 to provide for its administration and for matters connected therewith. Section 5 (I) of the Act declared that all laws in force immediately before 20th December, 1961 in Goa, Daman and Diu or any part thereof shall continu~\n\nto be in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.\n\nPursuant to the powers conferred by Article 240 of the Constitution, the President promulgated certain Regulations styled as 'The Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulations' from time to time. These Regulations extended certain enactments to Goa, Daman and Diu with specified modifications. To the extent that any law in forco in Goa, Dam.an and Diu corresponded to any Act which was so extended to those Territories such law was declared to stand repealed.\n\nBefore Goa, Daman and Diu becamei part of India, Portuguese Civil Codo and the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code were in force in those territories.\n\nThe Portuguese Civil Code contained various provisions dealing with limitation for suits, applications and appeals. These provisions were never re.pealed either by express legislative enactment or by an order made by the Central Govemmi!nt in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under section 5 (2) of the 1962 Act by any Regulation made by the President. Neither any notification by the Central Government under section 6 of the 1962 Act was issued nor 'vas a regulation made by the President extending the Limitation Act, 1908 to Goa, Daman and Diu with or without modification. Nor did any Regulation repeal a.ny of the provision of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation. Even\n\nthe Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and Arbitration Act), 1965, neither expressly nor by implication repealed the provi .. sions relating to limitation contained in the Portuguese Code.\n\nThe Goa, Daman and Diu (extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and Arbitration Act), 1965 also did not either expressly or by implication repeal the provisions relating to limitation in the Portuguese Civil Code.\n\nIn the circumstances, the question that arose for consideration in the appeals by the appellants-defendants was ' 1wbether the provisions of the Portuguese\n\n• •\n\n\\I .,\n\n,;~\n\n~ • • i v ..\n\n';.cf\n\nJUSTINIANO V. ANTONIO 495\n\nCivil Code relating to Limitation stood repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, i\\ by necessary implication, or whether they were saved by Section 29(2) ibid?\"\n\nDismissing the appeals by special leave the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The provisions in the Portuguese Civil Code dealing with the subject of Limitation of suits etc. and in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only is \"local law\" within the meaning of Se<:tion 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. These provisions have to be read into the 1963 Act, as if the schedule to the said Act is amended. muratis mutandfs. [503 B]\n\n2. If section 32 and section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 are read together it is clear that the -only law of Limitation that was repealed was the Limitation Act, 1908 and all other laws dealing with 1itation, special or local were saved and are to be read into the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore{, no question of repugnancy or voidness of the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to limitation on that ground arises. They continue to be i~ force, in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. [503 A-B, C]\n\nDeep Chand v. The State of U.P., [1959] 2 SCR 843; Municipal Council, Pa/ai v. T. !. Joseph, [1964] 2 SCR 87; Stahe of Jammu and Kashmir v. H. S.\n\nFarooqui. AIR 1972 S.C. 1738; referred to.\n\n3. The word \"special\" has reference to subject and the \\Vorel \"local\" has reference to a particular area or territory. A special law is a law relating to a particular subject while a local Jaw is a law confined to a particular area or territory. Used in an Act made by Parliament the word local may refer to a. part or the whole of the many States constituting the Union. Though a law deaHng with a particular subject may be a general law in the sense that it is\n\na law of general applicability, laying down general rules, yet, it may cotitain E special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation. Such a law would be a special la\\v for the purpose of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.\n\nSimilarly, a law \\Vhich may be a law of general applicability is yet a local law, if its applicability is confined to a particular area instead of 'generally' the whole country. [501 A-D]\n\nKaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, [1964] 4 SCR 982 @ 987 and 988; applied.\n\nQueen v. Land County Council, [1863] 2 Q.B. 454 @ 462 quoted with approval.\n\nCJVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Apal No. 1818 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 17-3-1969 of the Judicial G Commissioner's Court in Appeal No. 243/66.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2038 of 1969\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated the 12th March 1969 of the Court of Judicial Commissioner Goa, Daman and Diu in Second H Appeal No. 5 of 1968.\n\n12-253SCI/79\n\nA V. M. Tarkunde, Naunit Lal and Dr. Bernardo Das Rais for the Appellant (In C.A. 1818/69).\n\nEduardo Falero, 0. C. Mathur, D. N. Misra aoJ I. B. D. & Co. for the Respondent (In C.A. 1818/69).\n\nB Naunit Lal and Dr. Bernardo Das Rais for the Appellant (In C.A. 2038/69).\n\nS. V. Tambwekar for the Respondent (In C.A. 2038/69).\n\nThe Judgment o! the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-It is 'now a matter of history that the er:; twhile Portuguese Colonial P05sessions of Goa, Daman and Din he came part o! the Territory o! India from 20th December, 1961. The territories of Goa, Daman and Din were incorporated as a Union Territory by the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962, with effect from 20th December,\n\n1961. The Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962, repealing and re-enacting the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Din Administration Ordinance 1962, was enacted by Parliament to provide for the administration of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Din and for matters connected the1ewith.\n\nSection 5 (1) of the Act declared that all laws in force immediately before the appointed day (20th December,\n\n1961) in Goa, Daman and Din or any part thereof shall continue to bot in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.\n\nSection 5 (2) enabled the Central Governmeht, within two years from the appointed day, to make such adaptations and modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, ; is may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of facilitating application of any such law in relation to the administration of Goa, Daman and Din as a Union Territory and for the purpose of bringing tl:e provisions of any such law into accord with the provisions of the Constitution. Section 6 of the Act empowered the Central Gove; nmont, by notification in the official Gazette, to extend with such restrictions or modifications, as it thinks fit, to Goa, Daman and Din, any enactmmf which is in force in a State at the date of the notification.\n\nBefcre Goa, Daman and Din became part of India, certain laws web as (ne Portuguese Civil Code, the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code etc. were in force in those Territories. Apart from dealing with multiple other matters, the Portu!Ilese Civil Code contained, various H pro, isions dealing with limitation !or suits, applications and ppeals.\n\nIt is undisputed that the provisions o! the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation were never repealed either by express Legislative\n\n• ..\n\n\\ .\n\nenactment or by any order made by the Central Governmrnt in exercise of the powers conferred upon it u'ader Section 5 (2) of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 It is also not in dispute that the Central Government did not ism~ any notification under Section G of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act extending the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, to Goa, Daman and Diu with or\n\nw)thout modification.\n\nThe Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act suitably amended Article 240 of the Constituiion to enable the President to make Regulations for the peace, progress and i:ood Government of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu until a body was created by Parliamentary enactment to function as a Legislature for the Union Territory.\n\nPursuant to the powers conferred by Article 240 of the Constitution, the President promulgated certain Regulations styled as 'The Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Re&11lations' from time to time. These Regulations extended certain enactments to Goa, Daman and Diu with specified modifications. To the extent that any law in force in Goa, Daman and Diu corresponded to any Act which was so xtended to those Territories, such law was declared to stand repealed. The Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was not one of the Acts extended to Goa, Daman and Diu under any of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulations.\n\nNor was any Regulation made by the President repealing any of the provisions of th•3 Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation.\n\nWhile so, the Limitation Act 1963, was enacted by Parliament on 5th October, 1963, to take effect from the date to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette. 1st January, 1964, was later specified as the date from which the Limitation Act was to come into force. Section 1 (2) extends the Limitation Act 1963, to the whole of India exopt the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 32 of the Act containing hnt one sentence repeals the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.\n\nNo other enactment is expressly repealed.\n\nSection 31 makes special provision for suits etc. for which the prescribed period of limitation is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Section 29 contains 'savings' clauses and Section 29(2) which particularly savc5 ·pecial and local laws' is in these terms :\n\n\"29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of rection 3 shall !tpply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of\n\nH !\n\nA determining any period of limitation prescribed for any uit, appeal or application by any speeial or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply iu so far as, aud to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law\".\n\nThe question which has arisen for consideration in these two appeals is whether the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation stand repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, by necessary implication, or whether th.3y are saved by Section 29(2) of that Act.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1818 of 1969 arises out of a suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff against the appellant-defendant on 25th November, 1965, claiming damages for malicious prosecution. The prosecution which was alleged to have been maliciously launched against the plaintiff ended in an acquittal by the decision of the Supreme Court, Lisbon, on 6th April, 1960. The plaintiff claimed that the suit was within time uuder Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code which provides a period of limitation of 20 years.\n\nOn the other hand the defendant claimed that the suit was governed by Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a period of limitation of one year only. The Trial Court decided the point of limitation, as a preliminary issue, in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nAn 'Agravo' appeal to the District Judge and a further appeal to the Judicial Commissioner not having borne fruit the defendant has preferred this appeal aiter obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2038 of 1969 arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent to recover a sum of Rs. 5,000 /- said to be due on a promissory note dated 24th November, 1962, executed by the defundant-appellant.\n\nIn this suit th;, plaintiff claimed that the period of !i, nitation was as provided by Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code while the defendant claimed that the period of limitation was as provided by Article 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.\n\nThe question of Limitation was decided as a preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff by the Subordinte Courts and by the Judicial Commissioner of Goa.\n\nThe defendant has preferred this appeal a{ter obtainmg special leave from this Court.\n\nThe principal submission of Shri V. M.\n\nTarkunde and Shri Naunit Lal, learnd Counsel for the appellants in the two appeals was\n\nthat the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limit.'ltion JI for the filing of suits etc. must be considered to have been pro-tantorepea\\ed by the Limitation Act, 1963, ilb view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. It was their submission that too provisions\n\n' ..\n\nI •\n\nJUSTINIANO v. ANTONIO (Chinnappa ReJdy, !.) 4 99\n\nrelating to limitation contained in the Portuguese Civil Code, a law made by the Legislature of a State, were repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, a law made by Parliament and, therefore, the former provisions were void to the extent of the repugnancy. It was submitted that the question of a local or special law being saved by\n\nthe provisions of Section 29 would arise only if the provisions of the local or special Jaw were not repugnant to the Jaw made by Parliament namely the Limitation Act. It was further argued that the Portuguese Civil Code was a general law and not a local law and, therefore, the provisions contained in it relating to limitation were not saved\n\nundr Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. It was also contended that the words \"where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application\" occurring in Section 29(2) indicated that Section 29(2) was confined in its application to odd Legislation dealing with particnlar types of suits and did not extend to a general law of Limitation like the Portuguese Civil Code.\n\nShri Eduardo Falero and Shri Tambwekar, learned Counsel for the resrondents urged that the Portuguese Civil Code which was applicable lo the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only and not the whole of rndia was a local law, and, therefore, the provisions contained in it relating to limitation were saved by Section 29(2) of the Limitalion Act, 1963. The relevant provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code having been expressly sawd, no questi.on of any repug\n\nnancy between those provisions and those of the Limitation Act arose.\n\nIt was also urged that Parliament which made express provision in Section 30 for suits for which the Limitation Act 1963, pl', scribed shorter periods of limitation than the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, would surely not have allowed the drastic inroads into the law of Limitation of suits prevailing in Goa, Daman and Din without introducing a provision similar to Section 30. It was further urged that the Limitation Act, 1963, was not retrospective so as to curtail periods of limitation in respect of causes of action which had already arisen.\n\nBefore considering the rival contentions of the parties, we may, at\n\nthis jnncture, mention that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the G Arbitration Act, 1940, were extended to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu by Section 3 of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration Act) Act,\n\n1965. Section 4 of the Act repeals so much of the law in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu as corresponds to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Arbitration Act, 1940.\n\nThis H Act also neither expressly nor by implication repeals the provisions relating to limitation contained in the Portuguese Civil Code .\n\n' B\n\n. - G\n\nArticle 254 ( 1) of the Constitution prescribes that if any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law, made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with resp;:ct to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Llst, then subject to the provisions of clause 2, the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or as the cae may be, the existing law shall prevail and the law madt> by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnancy be void.\n\nWe are not here concerned with the provisions of clanse 2. For the\n\npurpoe of the present appeals, we will assume that the Portuguese Civil Code which was continued by Parliament to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu was a law made by the Legislature of a State, though there may be several objections to so doing. The principles applicable to ascertain whether there is repugnancy or not have been ennnciated by this Court in Deep Chand v.\n\nThe State of Uttftr Pradesh('), Municipal Council, Palai\n\nv. T .. I.\n\nJoseph('), State of !ammu and Kashmir v. H. S. Farooqi( 8), :and other cases.\n\nWe do not consider it necessary to restate the well known principles. Wrthout doubt the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code, unless they are saved by Section 29(2) of the limitation Act, are repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. If, however, the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code are saved by Section 29 (2) the'n there can be no question of any repugnancy, Sic tion 29 (2) declares that the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law shall apply as if such period was prescribed by the Schdule to the Limitation Act. In other words it is as if the special or local law is incorporated into the Limitation Act and the Schedule to the Limitation Act is amended, mutatis mutandis, by the special or local law. Therefore, to say that the provisions of a special or local law which by the Il'cessary implication of Section 29(2) are read into the Limitation Act are co'ntrary to the provisions of the Limitation Act, is merely to argue in a vicious circle, to end where one begins. So the question whether the provisions of the Portuguese- Civil Code are void on the gronnd that they are repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act depends on the question whether the Portuguese Civil Code is saved by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. That depends on whether the Portuguese Civil Code is a special or local law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.\n\n(l) [1959] 2 S.C.R. 843.\n\n(2) (1964! 2 S.C.R. 87.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1738.\n\n• ...\n\n\" ;\n\nI '\n\nA We do not see how we can escape from the conclusion that . the Portugu\"'\"e Civil Code is a local law within the meaning of Section 29(2). Obvionsly the word 'special' has reference to subject and the word 'local' has reference to area or territory. A special law is a Jaw relati'ng to a particular subject while a local law is a law confined to a particular area or territory. Used in an Act made by Parliament the word local may refer to a part or the whole of one of the many States B constituting the Union. Though a law dealing with a particular subject may be a general law in the sense that it is a law of gmral applicability, laying down general rules, yet, it may contain special provisio'os relating to bar of time, in specified cases, different from too general law of limitation. Such a Jaw would be a special law for the purpose of Section 29(2). The rule of limitation contained in Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 was accordingly held to be a 'special Jaw' in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh(').\n\nSimilarly, a Jaw which may be a law of general applicability is yet a local law if, its applicability is confined to a particular area instead of generally the whole country. In The Queen v.\n\nLondon County Council(') Bowen L.J. observed :\n\n\"Now, a general Act, prima fade, is that which applies lo the whole community. In the natural meaning of the term it means an Act of Parliament which is unlimited both in its area and, as reEards the individual, in its effects; a'nd as opposed to that you get statute~ which may well be public becaui; c of the importance of the subjects with which they deal and their general interest to the community, but which are limited in respect of area a limitation which makes them local-or limited in respect of individuals or persons-a limitation which makes them personal.\n\nHere, we may also extract the following useful observations from Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (supra) to which we have already referred :\n\n\"It has been observed in some of the cases decided by the High Courts that the Code is not a special or a local law within the meaning of s. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, that is to say, so far as the entire Code is concerned, because it is a general Jaw laying down procedure, generally, for the trial of criminal cases. But the specific question with which we are here concerned is whether the provisio'n contained in s. 417 ( '4) of the Code is a special Jaw. The whole Code is\n\n\n(2) [t 893] 2. Q .. B. 454 462.\n\nindeed a general law regulating the procedure in crintinal trials generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for particular class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a Land. Revenue Code may be a general law regulating the relationship between the revennepayer ahd the revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rentreceiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it may contain special provision relating to bar of time, in specified cases, different from the general law of limitation.\n\nSuch a law will be a 'special law' with reference to the law generally governihg the subject-matter of that kind of relationship.\n\nA 'special law', therefore, means a law enac_ted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays dow'n any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated bys. 417(3) & (4), read together, it will be a special law contained within the general law.\n\nAs the Limitation Act bas not defined 'special law', it is neither necessary nor expedient to attempt a definition.\n\nThus, the Limitatioh Act is a general law laying down the general rules of limitation applicable to all cases dealt with by th~ Act; but there may be instances of a special law of limitation laid down in other statutes, though not dealing generally with the law of limitation.\n\nFor example, rules framed under Defence of India Act, vide S. M. Thakur v.\n\nThe State of Bihar (I.L.R. 30 Pat. 126); Canara Bank Ltd.\n\nv. The Warden Insurance Co. (I.I.R (1952) Bom. 1083) dealihg with the special rule of limitation laid down in the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bom.\n\nXXXIII of 1948).\n\nTheso are mere instances of special laws within the meaning of s. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act\".\n\nIf in the above extracted passage dealing with the scope of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act one reads the words \"local Jaw\" for tl1c\n\nwords \"special Jaw\" and the word \"area\" for the words \"Bpecial • cases\", the meaning of the expression \"local law\" becomes clear.\n\nH Now, there is only one ge'neral law of Limitation for the entire country and it is the Limitation Act, 1963. All other laws prescrib ing periods of limitation are either special or local laws.\n\nThey are\n\n, •\n\n. \" y\n\n\\ •\n\n:sp<cial luws if they prescribe periods of limitation for specified cases.\n\nThey are local laws if their applicability is confined to specified areas.\n\nIf Section 32 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 are read\n\ntogether, it becomes clear that the only law of Limitation that is re- Jl\"'aled is the Limitation Act, 1908, and all other laws dealing with limitatio'n, special or local are saved and are to be read into the Limi- .tation Act, 1963.\n\nWe, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that the body of provisions in the Portuguese Civil Code dealing with the subject of Limitation .of suits etc. and in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only is \"local law\" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.\n\nAs stated earlier these provisions have to be read into the Limitatio11 Act, 1963, as if the Schedule to the Limitation Act is amended mutatis mutandis. No question of repugnancy arises.\n\nWe agree with the Judicial Commissioner that the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation continue to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman a'nd Diu.\n\nWe do not think that it is nee1.>ssary to consider the other submis- . sions of the learned Counsel for the respondents. In the result both the appeals are dismissed with costs.\n\n:~.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed .", "total_entities": 173, "entities": [{"text": "JUSTINIANO AUGUSTO DE PIEDADA BARRETO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JUSTINIANO AUGUSTO DE PIEDADA BARRETO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANTONIO VICENTE DE FONSECA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANTONIO VICENTE DE FONSECA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 89, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 6, 1979\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND 0."}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. 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{"document_id": "1979_3_504_517_EN", "year": 1979, "text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nJ. AHMED\n\nMarch 7, 1979\n\n(D. A. DESAI AND 0. OIINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nAll lndia S.rvices (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules 1958-r. 16-Scope 0/1\n\nWords and Phrase'S: Misconduct-What conStitutes to attract punishment in disciplinary proccedings-Mene acts of om1Ssion and commission or negligence in perforn1ance of duty-If nzisconduct.\n\nThe respondent, an officer belon&in: to the Indian Administrative Service, was due to retire on February 1, 1962.\n\nSince a departmental enquiry in respect of some charges levelled aiainst him wa! pending, he was retained in service, in the first in!tance, for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement or till tho termination of departmenta-1 proceedings whichever\n\nv.as earlier, This date was, however, extended from time to time and evcn 4 tually on August 28, 1963 an order under r. 16(2) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958 was pas1oed.\n\nThat Rule provides that \"a member ef the service under suspension on a chare of misconduct shrill not be required or pef'mitted to retire from service but sha.U be retained in service until the enquiry into th11 charges against him is concluded and a final order is passed,\" ..\n\nThe charges levelled against the respondent were (1) that he completely failed to take any effective preventive measures aainst widespread disturbances which broke out in the district, (2) th•t he •bowed complete lack of leadership and failed to give proper directions to his subordinate officers, (3) that he did not personally visit the scene of disturbances; ( 4) that he did not keep the Government informed of the extent of disturbances; and (5) that he showed complete inaptitude, lack of foresight, capacity to take firm and quick decision and, that therefore, he proved himself completely unlit to bold any responsible position.\n\nOn the report of the enquiry officer that all the charges {except one) were substantially proved, he was removed from 1ervice.\n\nStriking down the order of his removal from service, the Jligh Court held that (i) nog1igence and efficiency in the performance of one's duty would not constitute misconduct so as to attract punishment of removal from service and\n\n(ii) under r. 16(2) an officer could be retained in service only for the purpose of holding or completing disciplinary proceedings for misconduct and since in this cftSe there was no enquiry into what could be cad.led misconduct, his retention in service beyond his date of retirement was void.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: l(a) No case, stricto srnsu, for a dis.ciplinary proceeding for misconduct had been made out agaimt the respondont. Any ~.eficiency in the discharge of one's duties would not [Constitute misconduct.\n\nThe enquiry held\n\nl •\n\n, •\n\nI ' y-\n\nUNION v. J, AHMBD sos\n\nwas to establish that the respondent Wa6 not fit to hold a rcaponsible post; A it did not establish any misconduct on his part to deserve the punishment. [516 HJ\n\n(b) Conduct which is blameworthy on the prt of a government servan' in the context of the Conduct Rules would be misconduct, that is if a government servant conducts himself in a way which is not consistent 'vith due and faithful discharge. of his duties it is misconduct. Similarly, disrOp.ird of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute mh; conduct. So B too an error or omission resulting in serious or atrocious consequences may amount to misconduct.\n\nBut competence for the post, capability to hold and dischllrge the functions attached to it with requisite efficiency are different from some act or omission on the part of its holder so as to be1 called misconduct.\n\nA single act or omission: or error of judgment while holding a post of responsibility unoccompanied by serious or atrocious conduct would not constitute misconduct. [511 G-Hl C\n\nPierce v. Fosttr, 17 QB 536 at 542; Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers), [1959] 1 WLR 698; S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India, [1967] 2 SCR 566; P. H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta, [1964] 2 SCR 104; referred -\n\n(c) The All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954 prescribe a codo of conduct for members of the service, such for example1 as, that e\"Very member shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and th&t an act or omission contrary to or in breach of the prescribed norms of conduct would constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings. But the Rules are not exhaustive. In the absence of an exhaustive or self-contained code, thereforo\n\nit would not be correct to sa.y that only that act or omission would constitute E misconduct for the purposes of Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the provisions of the Conduct Rules. [511 C-E]\n\nIn the instant case all that the charges framed against the respondent show is 1'hat he was not a very efficient officer. They did not specify any act or. omission in derogation of or contrary to, Conduct Rules, except the general rule (r. 3) prescribing devotion to duty. La-ck of leadership, inaptitude, lack of foresight, lack of firmness and indecisiveness which are dediciencies in the personal character or ability of a Government servant would not by themselves constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings.\n\nThey may be relevant while considering an officer's promoti9n to higher post or for his retention in a higher post but they cannot be elevated to the level of acts of omission or con1mission contemplated by Discipline find Appeal Rules for imposing punishment. When the respondent was sought to be removed from service as a disciplinary measure by \\vay of penalty, a clear case of misconduct should ha.ve been established.\n\n(d) In the context of disciplinary proceedings, misconduct doet not mean misbehaviour involving some form of guilty mind or 1nr11s rea.\n\nGross or habituad. negligence in the performance Of one's duty may not involve 1nens rea but yet it may constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings. [513 DJ\n\n2(a) The respondent was no longer in service on the date on which the order removing him from service was made and to retain him in service\n\nbeyond the period of his normal retirement with a view to punishing him was wholly unjustified. [517 C-D]\n\n(b) Since the State Government had no power to retain him in service under r. 16(1)(a) of the Retirement Rules beyond August I, 1962 it could not continue the enquiry thereafter. Although under r. 16 (I )(b) the Central Government had power to retain him in service beyond six months of the date of his retirement, no ord, er had been p2ssed by it. [515 H]\n\n(c) Before r. 16(2) (which provides that a member of the service under suspensioa on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitl'ed to retire from service until the enquiry into the charges. against him is concluded and a final order passed) would be at.tracted it must .be sho\\vn that a member of the service was under suspension on a charge of migconduct and an enquiry was being conducted against him. No misconduct having l'een tlleged against the respondent, it cannot be said that r. 16(2) was attracted and that he was deemed to have been retained in service until the enquiry was concluded.\n\n[516 F-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2152 of 1969.\n\n D Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n1-8-1967 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No. 256 of 1966.\n\nNaunit Lal for the Appellant.\n\nS. K. Dutta, S. K. Nandy and A. Sen for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-Respondent J. Ahmed joined service in Assam State in 1945 and some time in 1959 came to be promoted to the Indian Administrative Service Cadre. In that very year he was posted as Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Nowgollg District.\n\nWhile he was holding the aforementioned post, some time in the beginning of June 1960 there were large scale disturbances in Nowgong city and District area described in official parlance as 'language disturbances'.\n\nThere was considerable damage to property.\n\nOne Shri A N. Kidwai, the then Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, undertook an inquiry into the causes of disturbances at Nowgong with a view to ascertaining the responsibility of District o:fflcials.\n\nAfter Shri Kidwai submitted his Report, the Government took the first step of suspending the respolldent from service by an order dated 14th September. 1960. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam by his commnnication dated 13'th Seprember 1960 conveyed to the. respondent various charges framed against him and called upon him to submit his explanation.\n\nA statement of allegations was annexed to the communicatioll.\n\nRespondent submitted his explanation and thereafter the Government appointed respondent\n\nl •\n\n\" I\n\nJ •\n\n\\ .\n\n.. '-('\n\nNo. 4, K. Balachandran as the Enquiry Officer. After the rnquiry was concluded, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. It may be noticed that respondent was born on 1st February 1907 and according to Rule 16 of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirelll\".Jlt Benefits) Rules, 1958 ('Retirement Rules' for short), then in force, the age of retirement being 55 years, the respondent would have retired from servio~ on 1st February 1962. First, the Governor of Assam by his order dated 31st January 1962 purporting to exercise power under Rule 16(1) of the Retirement Rules, directed that the respondent then under suspension be retained in service for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement which fell on Ist February 1962 or till the termination of departmental proceedings drawn up against him whichever is earlier.\n\nBy subsequent orders dated 21st June 1962, Ist September 1962, 23rd February 1963 and 28th August 1963 respondent was retained in service, till the inquiry pending against him concluded and final orders were passed in the proceedings. [t may be mentioned that the order dated 28th August 1963 was made by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by subrule (2) of rule 16 of the Retirement Rules.\n\nThe Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding charges 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 proved and in respect of charge No. 4 the finding recorded was that though the charge. was proved, the Enquiry Officer took note of certain extenuating circumstances mentioned in the report.\n\nA Memorandum dated 22nd February 1963 was served by the Government of India on the respondent forwarding the report of the Enquiry Officer and the respondent was called upon to show cause why the provisional penalty determined by the Government of removal from service be not imposed upon him.\n\nUltimately, by order dated 11th October 1963 the President, after consultation with the Union Public Seryice Commission, imposed the penalty of removal from service on the respondent.\n\nA memorial submitted by the respondent to the President under Rule 20 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955, ('Discipline and Appeal Rules' for short), 'against the imposition of the penalty was rejected.\n\nThe respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Assam and Nagaland.\n\nTwo contentions were raised before the High Court: (1) Whether rule 16(2) of the Retirement Rules is attracted so as to retain the respondent in service beyond the period of his normal retirement for the purpose of completing disciplinary proceedings against the respondent; and (2) if rule 16(2) was not attracted, whether the retention of respondent beyond the normal period of his retirement was valid and if it was not valid, whether he\n\ncould be removed from service after he had actually and effectively retired from service 7 While examining these two contentions, the High Court was of the opinion that disciplinary proceedings can be held and punishment can be imposed for misconduct and the charges ex facie did not disclose any misconduct because negligence in performance of duty or inefficiency in discharge of duty would not constitute misconduct.\n\nOn the second point it was held that if the Enquiry was not for any misconduct, sub-rule (2) of rule 16 would not be attracted and the Government had no power to retain the respondent in service for the purpose of holding or completing disciplinary proceeding which can only be tor misconduct, and as there was no inquiry into what can be styled as misconduct, the retention in service of the respondent beyond the period of retirement was not legal and valid, and, therefore, the respondent could not be removed from service from which he had retired. In accordance with these findings, the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed declaring that the respondent was deemed to have retired from service from 1st February 1962 and that the punitive or disciplinary action taken against him after that date is completely without jurisdiction and wholly unjustified, and the same was quashed.\n\nThe Union of India and the State of Assam have preferred this appeal by special leave.\n\nRule 3 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules provides that the penalties therein set out may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed on a member of service.\n\nOne such penalty prescribed therein is 'removal from service which shall not disqualify for future employment'. Rule 4 prescribes the authority competent to institute disciplinary proceedings.\n\nWhere a member of a service has committed any act or omission which renders him liable to any penalty specified in rule 3, an inquiry shall be held according to procedure prescribed in rule 5.\n\nTherefore penalty prescribed in rule 3 can be imposed upon a member of the service for any act or omission committed by him which, according to rule 3, must provide good and sufficient reason to impose one or the other of the penalties mentioned therein.\n\nRule 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules enables the Government to put under suspension a member of the Service during disciplinary proceeding if having regard to the nature of charges and circumstances the Government thinks it proper to do so.\n\nSub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Retirement Rules as it stood at the relevant time reads as under :\n\n\"16(2). A member of the service under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to retire from the service but shall be retained in service until the\n\n• •\n\n.~·\n\n-< \\\n\ninquiry into the charges against him is concluded and a final A order is passed\".\n\nA survey of these rules would show that disciplinary proceedings can be held against a member of the service for any act or omission which renders him liable to a penalty and such penalty can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons.\n\nAll India Services (Conduct) Rules, i954, prescribe a code of conduct for members of service. Discipline and Appeal Rules provide for disciplinary action and imposition of penalties.\n\nSub-rule (2) of rule 16 of the Retirement Rules contemplates a situation where a member of service against whom disciplinary proceeding is pending is likely to retire and the proceedingl! may be thwarted and provides for his retention in service beyond the date of his\n\nretirement till the completion of the inquiry, provided the delinquent officer is under suspension on a charge of misconduct.\n\nThe respondent contended and the contention has found favour with the High Court that the charges framed against the respondent, even if they are held proved, would not constitute misconduct, and, therefore, it could not be said that he was under suspension on a charge of misconduct and accordingly &ub-rule (2) of rule 16 would not be attracted and he could not be retained in service beyond the date of his\n\nretirement. It was said that retention in service being invalid, imposition of penalty after his retirement is illegal.\n\nTherefore, what constitutes misconduct for a member of a service liable to be removed from service on proof ofsuch misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding, looms large in this case.\n\nTo appreciate the contention it is better to have a look at the charges framed against the respondent.\n\nThey are as under :\n\n\"(i) Completely failed to take any effective preventive measures against widespread disturbances breaking out in Nowgong District in spite of adequate warning being conveyed.\n\n(ii) Showed complete lacl: of leadership when the disturbances actually did break out and failed to give proper direction to your subordinate Magistrates and co-ordinate co-operations with the police to restore Law and Order;\n\n(iii) Did not personally visit the scenes of disturbances within the town or in the Rural areas, in time to take personal control of the situation and to exercise necessary supervision;\n\n(iv) Did not keep Government informed of the actual picture and extent of the disturbances;\n\n(v) Showed complete inaptitude, lack of foresight, Jack of firmness and capacity to take quick and firm decision and were, thus largely responsible for complete break down of B Law and Order in Nowgong town as well as the rural areas of N owgong District.\n\nThus you proved yourself completely unfit to hold any responsible position\".\n\nC The Inquiry Officer has treated the statement in the Jetter conveying\n\nthe charges that the respondent proved himself completely unfit to hold a responsible position as a separate and independent charge which on the face of it is merely a surmise or a conclusion drawn from the five charges set out above.\n\nThis surmise or conclusion has to be ignored and cannot be treated as a specific charge.\n\nThe five charges listed above at a glance would convey the impression that the respondent was not a very efficient officer.\n\nSome negligence is being attributed to him and some Jack of qualities expected of an officer of the rank of Deputy Commissioner are listed as charges. to wit, charge No. 2 refers to the quality of Jack of leadership and charge No. 5 enumerates inaptitude, lack of foresight, lack of firmness and indecisiveness.\n\nThese are qualities undoubtedly expected of a superior officer and they may be very relevant while considering whether a person should be promoted to the higher post or not or having been promoted, whether he should be retained in the higher post or not, or they may be relevant for deciding the competence of the person to hold the post, but they cannot be elevated to the level of acts of omission or commission as contemplated by Rule 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules so as to incur penalty under rule 3.\n\nCompetence for the post, capability to hold the same, efficiency requisite for a post, ability to discharge function attached to the post, are things different from some act or omission of the holder of the post which may be styled as misconduct so as to incur the penalty under the rules.\n\nThe words 'acts and omission' contemplated by rule 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules have to be understood in the context of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954 ('Conduct Rules' for short). The Government has prescribed by Conduct Rules a code of conduct for the members of All India Services.\n\nRule 3 is of a general nature which provides that every member of the service shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. Lack of integrity, if proved, would undoubtedly en-\n\n• '\n\ntail penalty.\n\nFailure to come u_p to the highest expectations of an officer holding a responsible post or lack of aptitude or qualities of leadership would not constitute failure to maintain devotion to duty.\n\nThe expression 'devotion to duty' appears to have been used as something opposed to indifference to duty or easy-going or light-hearted approach to duty. If rule 3 were the only rule iu the Conduct Rules it would have been rather difficult to ascertain what constitutes misconduct in a given situation.\n\nBut rules 4 to 18 of the Conduct Rules prescribe code of conduct for members of service and it can be safely\n\nstated that an act or omission contrary to or in breach of prcscr:bcd rules of conduct would constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings.\n\nThis code of conduct being not exhaustive it would not be prudent to say that only that act or omission would constitute misconduct for the purpose of Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the various provisions in the Conduct Rules.\n\nThe inhibitions in the Conduct Rules clearly provide that an act or omission contrary thereto so as to run counter to the expected code of conduct would certainly constitute misconduct.\n\nSome other act or omission may as well const:tute misconduct.\n\nAllegations in the various charges do not specify any act or omission in derogation of or contrary to Conduct Rules save the general rule 3 prescribing devotion to duty.\n\nIt is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of admin.istrative ability while holding a high post would themselves constitute misconduct. If it is so, every officer rated average would be guilty of misconduct.\n\nCharges in this case as stated earJ:cr clearly indicate lack of efficiency, lack of foresight and indecisiveness as serious lapses on the part of the respondent.\n\nThese deficiencies in personal character of personal ability would not constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings.\n\nF \\ It would be appropriate at this stage to ascertain what generally • constitutes misconduct, especially in the context of disciplinary proceedings entailing penalty.\n\nCode of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly ind'catcs the conduct expected of a member of the service.\n\nIt would follow that G that conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct [see Pierce v. Foster(')]. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle ·(lndicator Newspapers)(')].\n\nTh; s H\n\n(1) 17 QB 536 at 542.\n\n(2) [1959] I WLR 698.\n\n13-253SCI/79\n\nA view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur('), and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza(2 ). The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under :\n\nB \"Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive;\n\nacts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct\".\n\nIn industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct but in Management, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v.\n\nWorkmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik (') , in the absence of standing orders governing the employee's undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive, In S. Govinda Menon v. Unio nof India(•), the mamnner in which a member of the service discharged his quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings.\n\nA single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P. H. Kalyani v.\n\nAir France, Calcutta(\"), wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct.\n\nThere may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating '.he developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high.\n\nAn error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence.\n\nCarelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence.\n\nLeaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post\n\n(1) 61 Born. L.R. 1596.\n\n(2) 10 Guj. L.R. 23.\n\n(3) [1966] 2 SCR 434.\n\n(4) [1967] 2 SCR 566,\n\n(5) [1964] 2 SCR 104.\n\n• j\n\n\" . ,- .'-(\n\nand allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar instances of which a railway cabinman signals in a train on the same track where there is a stationary train causing headlong collision; a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument\n\nhowing snag in engine and the aircraft crashes causing heavy loss of life.\n\nMisplaced sympathy can be a great evil [see Navincl1'mdra Shakerchand Shah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Co-op. Departme/1/ Stores Ltd.(')]. But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty.\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that misconduct in the context\n\nDf disciplinary proceeding means misbehaviour involving some form of guilty mind or mens rea.\n\nWe find it difficult to subscribe to this view because gross or habitual negligence in performance of duty may not involve mens rea but may still constitute misconduct for disciplinary D proceedings.\n\nHaving cleared the ground of what would constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceeding, a look at the charges framed against the respondent would affirmatively show that the charge inter\n\nalic alleged failure to take any effective preventive measures meaning thereby error in judgment in evaluating developing situation.\n\nSimilarly, failure to visit the scenes of disturbance is another failure to perform the duty in a certain manner. Charges Nos. 2 and 5 clearly indicate the shortcomings in the personal capacity or degree of efficiency of the respondent.\n\nIt is alleged that respondent showed complete lack of leadership when disturbances broke out and he disclosed complete inaptitude, lack of foresight, lack of firmness and capacity to take firm decision. T)lese are personal qualities which a man holding a post of Deputy Commissioner would be expected to possess.\n\nThey may be relevant considerations on the question of retaining him in the post or for promotion, but such lack of personal quality cannot constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. In fact, charges 2, 5 and 6 are clear surmises on account of the failure Df the respondent to take effective preventive measures to arrest or to nip in the bud the ensuing disturbances.\n\nWe do not take any notice of charge No. 4 because even the Enquiry Officer has noted that there are number of extenuating circumstances which may exonerate the resp()lldent in respect of that charge.\n\nWhat was styled as charge No. 6 is the conclu-\n\n(1) (1978) 19 G.L.R. 108 at 120.\n\nsion, viz., because of what transpired in the inquiry, the Enquiry Officer was of the view that the respondent was unfit to hold any respomible position.\n\nSomehow or other, the Enquiry Officer completely failed to take note of what was alleged in charges 2, 5 and 6 which was neither misconduct nor even negligence but conclusions about the absence or lack of personal qualities in the respondent. It would thus transpire that the allegations made against the respondent may indicate that he is not fit to hold the post of Deputy Commissioner and that if it was possible he may be reverted or he may be compulsorily retired, not: by way of punishment.\n\nBut when the respondent is sought to be removed as a disciplinary measure and by way of penalty, there should have been clear case of misconduct, viz., such acts and omissions -which would render him liable for any of the punishments set out in rule 3 of the Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1955.\n\nNo such case has been made out.\n\nMr. Naunit Lal for the appellant contended that the word 'misconduct' is nowhere used either in the Conduct Rules or in the Discipline and Appeal Rules and the Court should not import any concept of misconduct in this inquiry.\n\nThe word 'misconduct' has relevance here because the respondent in due course would have retired from sen-ice on 1st February 1962 on attaining the age of 55 years.\n\nThe inquiry could not be completed before the relevant date and it became necessary for the Government to retain the respondent in service beyond the normal period of retirement on superannuation for continuing the inquiry.\n\nRule 16(1) of the Retirement Rules 1955 as it stood at the relevant time provided for retirement on superannuation on attaining . the age of 55 years.\n\nThere is a proviso to rule 11}(1) which enables the Stile Government to postpone the period of retirement and retain the Government servant in service for an aggregate period not exceeding six months and if the retention in service beyond that period is required, the same will have to be with the sanctioll\" of the Central Government.\n\nRespondent would have retired from service on attaining the age of 55 years on 1st February 1962. He was served with a charge-sheet dated 13th September 1960. The inquiry could not be completed before the date of retirement of the respondent.\n\nThe Government of Assam by order dated 31st January 1962 retained the respondent in service for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement which fell on 1st February 1962 or till the termination of the departmental proceedings drawn up against him whichever is earlier. In view of the language of rule 16(1), the Assam Government had no power to extend the period of service of a member of the service beyond a period of six months in the aggregate.\n\nTherefore, retention for a period of three months would be legal and valid with the result that the\n\n\\ '\n\ndate of retirement of the respondent would be postponed to 1st May\n\n1962. Admittedly no order was made by the Assam Government before 1st May 1962.\n\nThe order postponing the date of retirement and retention of the respondent in service beyond 1st May 1962 was\n\nmade on 21st June 1962. No order was made by the Assam Govern- B ment for postponing the period of retirement of the respondent and his retention in service before 1st May 1962.\n\nThe State Government had power under rule 16(1) (a) of the Retirement Rules to retain the respondent in service for a period of six months in aggregate and therefore, even though specific period was mentioned in the order, simultaneously providing for retention in service till the date of termination C of the proceedings, the extension would be valid for a periocl of six months in the aggregate if the inquiry was continuing till the expiration of six months but not exceeding six months.\n\nIn that event the respondent would retire from service by 1st August 1962.\n\nPutting the construction on rule 16(1) (a) and the order of extension, most favourable to the State Government, it may be stated at once that retention in D service upto 1st August. 1962 would be valid but unfortunately the inquiry was not over by 1st August 1962. No order was made before 1st August 1962 for retention of the respondent in service beyond 1st August 1962.\n\nThe order next in succession is of 1st September 1962.\n\nThis order is again made by the State of Assam.\n\nThe State Government had no power to retain a member of tl1e service for. a period E exceeding six months in the aggregate after the date of his normal retirement. The maximum period for which retention could be ordered by the State Government being thus six months, the respondent would !iave retired from service on 1st August 1962. Even if aii.-.. order had been made by the State Government to retain the respondent F in service it would he without jurisdiction and the order in fact was made on 1st September 1962.\n\nNow, undoubtedly under rule 16(1) (b) the Central Government has power to retain a member of the service in service after the date of retirement for any period beyond six months.\n\nBut in this connection it may be pointed out that no such order appears to have been made by the Central Government.\n\nAll the subsequent G orders were made by the Government of Assam.\n\nSuch orders made by the Government of Assam would not have th~ effect of retaining the respondent in service beyond a period of six months from the date of his normal retirement.\n\nThat being the maximum period, the State Government had no power to retain the respondent in service. If the State Government could not retain him in service beyond 1st August, H 1962, it could not continue the inquiry thereafter. This position seems to he clearly established by the decision of this Court in State of Assam\n\nv. Padma Ram Borah('). In that case the State Government had made an order to retain the Government servant in service up to the end of March 31, 1961. Subsequent order extending the period was made on 9th May 1961. This Court held that according to the earlier order of the State Government itself the service of the Government >ervant had come to an end on March 31, 1961 and the State Government could not by unilateral action create a fresh contract of service to take effect from April 1, 1961. If the State Government wished to continue the service of the respondent for a further period, the State Government should have issued a notification before March 31, 1961.\n\nIt is thus clear that the retention of the respondent in service by order of the State Government not made before the retirement taking place on !st August 1962 and the State Government not having the power to retain the res-· pendent, a member of the Indian Administrative Service, beyond a period of six months, the respondent could not be said to have continued in service so that an inquiry could be continued against him.\n\nMr. Naunit Lal, however, contended that sub-rule ,(2) of rule 16 D clearly provides that a member of the service under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to retire from the service until the enquiry into the charges against him is concluded and a final order is passed. It is in the context of snb-rule (2) of rule 16 that the question of the nature of the proceedings held against the E respondent assumed importance. If the inquiry was on a charge of misconduct, the respondent could be retained in service until the inquiry into the charges against him was concluded and a final order was made.\n\nBut before sub-rule (2) of rule 16 would be attracted it must be shown\n\n#111' lllat the member of the service was under suspension on a charge of misconduct and an inquiry was being conducted against him.\n\nAs F pointed out earlier, no misconduct as one would understand that word in the context of disciplinary proceeding was alleged against the respondent.\n\nThere was an inquiry but before sub-rule (2) of rule 16 is attracted, it had to be an inquiry on a charge of misconduct.\n\nWhat is alleged is not misconduct as the word is understood in service jurisprudence in the context of disciplinary proceedings.\n\nTherefore, it G could not be said that an inquiry on a charge of misconduct was being held against the respondent and sub-rule (2) of rule 16 would thus be attracted and he would be deemed to have been retained in service till the inquiry was concluded.\n\nIt thus appears crystal clear that there was no case stricto sensu for H a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent.\n\nIn fact the inquiry was held to establish that the respondent was not fit to hold a respon-\n\n(1) AIR 1965 S.C. 473.\n\n. )\n\n' .\n\nsible post.\n\nThe respondent was actually retiring from service and there A was no question of his any more holding a responsible position.\n\nYet not only the inquiry was initiated but he was retained in service beyond the date of his normal retirement till the final order was made on 11th\n\nOctober, 1963 when he was removed from the Indian Administrative Service. It appears that there were large scale disturbances in the State. There followed the usual search for a scapegoat and the respondent came handy.\n\nSome charges were framed none of which could constitute misconduct in law. Some charges were mere surmises. Substance of the allegations was that he was not a very efficient officer and lacked the quality of leadership and was deficient in the faculty o[ decision making. These deficiencies in capacity would not constitute misconduct. If the respondent were a young man and was io continue in the post for a long period, such an inquiry may be made whether he should be retained in the responsible post. He may or may not be retained but to retain him in s, rvice beyond the period of his norm~! retirement with a view to p_unishing him was wholly unjustified. The High Court was, therefore, right in coming to the conclnsion that the respondent was no longer in service on the date on which an order removing him from service was made and, therefore, the order was illegal and void.\n\nAccordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "J. AHMED", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. AHMED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. AHMED\n\nMarch 7, 1979\n\n(D. A. DESAI AND 0."}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. OIINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "August 28, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pending, he was retained in service, in the first in!tance, for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement or till tho termination of departmenta-1 proceedings whichever\n\nv.as earlier, This date was, however, extended from time to time and evcn 4 tually on August 28, 1963 an order under r. 16(2) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958 was pas1oed."}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 566", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 SCR 104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the provisions of the Conduct Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4634, "end_char": 4718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Discipline find Appeal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5475, "end_char": 5503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although under r. 16 (I )(b) the Central Government had power to retain him in service beyond six months of the date of his retirement, no ord, er had been p2ssed by it. ["}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7456, "end_char": 7467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dutta, S. K. Nandy and A. Sen for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Nandy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7469, "end_char": 7480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dutta, S. K. Nandy and A. Sen for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dutta, S. K. Nandy and A. Sen for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-Respondent J. Ahmed joined service in Assam State in 1945 and some time in 1959 came to be promoted to the Indian Administrative Service Cadre."}}, {"text": "Nowgong city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7936, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While he was holding the aforementioned post, some time in the beginning of June 1960 there were large scale disturbances in Nowgong city and District area described in official parlance as 'language disturbances'."}}, {"text": "A N. Kidwai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8080, "end_char": 8091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shri A N. Kidwai, the then Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, undertook an inquiry into the causes of disturbances at Nowgong with a view to ascertaining the responsibility of District o:fflcials."}}, {"text": "Government of Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shri A N. Kidwai, the then Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, undertook an inquiry into the causes of disturbances at Nowgong with a view to ascertaining the responsibility of District o:fflcials."}}, {"text": "Nowgong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shri A N. Kidwai, the then Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, undertook an inquiry into the causes of disturbances at Nowgong with a view to ascertaining the responsibility of District o:fflcials."}}, {"text": "Kidwai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8304, "end_char": 8310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Shri Kidwai submitted his Report, the Government took the first step of suspending the respolldent from service by an order dated 14th September."}}, {"text": "K. Balachandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8845, "end_char": 8860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, K. Balachandran as the Enquiry Officer."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9300, "end_char": 9305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, the Governor of Assam by his order dated 31st January 1962 purporting to exercise power under Rule 16(1) of the Retirement Rules, directed that the respondent then under suspension be retained in service for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement which fell on Ist February 1962 or till the termination of departmental proceedings drawn up against him whichever is earlier."}}, {"text": "21st June 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9706, "end_char": 9720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By subsequent orders dated 21st June 1962, Ist September 1962, 23rd February 1963 and 28th August 1963 respondent was retained in service, till the inquiry pending against him concluded and final orders were passed in the proceedings. ["}}, {"text": "Ist September 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9722, "end_char": 9740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By subsequent orders dated 21st June 1962, Ist September 1962, 23rd February 1963 and 28th August 1963 respondent was retained in service, till the inquiry pending against him concluded and final orders were passed in the proceedings. ["}}, {"text": "23rd February 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9742, "end_char": 9760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By subsequent orders dated 21st June 1962, Ist September 1962, 23rd February 1963 and 28th August 1963 respondent was retained in service, till the inquiry pending against him concluded and final orders were passed in the proceedings. ["}}, {"text": "28th August 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9765, "end_char": 9781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By subsequent orders dated 21st June 1962, Ist September 1962, 23rd February 1963 and 28th August 1963 respondent was retained in service, till the inquiry pending against him concluded and final orders were passed in the proceedings. ["}}, {"text": "22nd February 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10370, "end_char": 10388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Memorandum dated 22nd February 1963 was served by the Government of India on the respondent forwarding the report of the Enquiry Officer and the respondent was called upon to show cause why the provisional penalty determined by the Government of removal from service be not imposed upon him."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Memorandum dated 22nd February 1963 was served by the Government of India on the respondent forwarding the report of the Enquiry Officer and the respondent was called upon to show cause why the provisional penalty determined by the Government of removal from service be not imposed upon him."}}, {"text": "Union Public Seryice Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10734, "end_char": 10765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, by order dated 11th October 1963 the President, after consultation with the Union Public Seryice Commission, imposed the penalty of removal from service on the respondent."}}, {"text": "Discipline and Appeal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10964, "end_char": 10991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11097, "end_char": 11108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Discipline and Appeal Rules", "statute": "Discipline and Appeal Rules"}}, {"text": "High Court of Assam and Nagaland", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11136, "end_char": 11168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Assam and Nagaland."}}, {"text": "1st February 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12751, "end_char": 12768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with these findings, the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed declaring that the respondent was deemed to have retired from service from 1st February 1962 and that the punitive or disciplinary action taken against him after that date is completely without jurisdiction and wholly unjustified, and the same was quashed."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India and the State of Assam have preferred this appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "State of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12961, "end_char": 12975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India and the State of Assam have preferred this appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "Discipline and Appeal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14783, "end_char": 14810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nowgong District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16223, "end_char": 16239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are as under :\n\n\"(i) Completely failed to take any effective preventive measures against widespread disturbances breaking out in Nowgong District in spite of adequate warning being conveyed."}}, {"text": "Nowgong town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16987, "end_char": 16999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Showed complete lacl: of leadership when the disturbances actually did break out and failed to give proper direction to your subordinate Magistrates and co-ordinate co-operations with the police to restore Law and Order;\n\n(iii) Did not personally visit the scenes of disturbances within the town or in the Rural areas, in time to take personal control of the situation and to exercise necessary supervision;\n\n(iv) Did not keep Government informed of the actual picture and extent of the disturbances;\n\n(v) Showed complete inaptitude, lack of foresight, Jack of firmness and capacity to take quick and firm decision and were, thus largely responsible for complete break down of B Law and Order in Nowgong town as well as the rural areas of N owgong District."}}, {"text": "N owgong District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17030, "end_char": 17047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Showed complete lacl: of leadership when the disturbances actually did break out and failed to give proper direction to your subordinate Magistrates and co-ordinate co-operations with the police to restore Law and Order;\n\n(iii) Did not personally visit the scenes of disturbances within the town or in the Rural areas, in time to take personal control of the situation and to exercise necessary supervision;\n\n(iv) Did not keep Government informed of the actual picture and extent of the disturbances;\n\n(v) Showed complete inaptitude, lack of foresight, Jack of firmness and capacity to take quick and firm decision and were, thus largely responsible for complete break down of B Law and Order in Nowgong town as well as the rural areas of N owgong District."}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22311, "end_char": 22317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under :\n\nB \"Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive;\n\nacts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct\"."}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 SCR 434", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24603, "end_char": 24619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 566", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24626, "end_char": 24642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 SCR 104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24649, "end_char": 24665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Appeal Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28354, "end_char": 28372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28412, "end_char": 28422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Naunit Lal for the appellant contended that the word 'misconduct' is nowhere used either in the Conduct Rules or in the Discipline and Appeal Rules and the Court should not import any concept of misconduct in this inquiry.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "Retirement Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29045, "end_char": 29066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13th September 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29654, "end_char": 29673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was served with a charge-sheet dated 13th September 1960."}}, {"text": "Government of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29764, "end_char": 29783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Assam by order dated 31st January 1962 retained the respondent in service for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement which fell on 1st February 1962 or till the termination of the departmental proceedings drawn up against him whichever is earlier."}}, {"text": "31st January 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29799, "end_char": 29816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Assam by order dated 31st January 1962 retained the respondent in service for a period of three months beyond the date of his retirement which fell on 1st February 1962 or till the termination of the departmental proceedings drawn up against him whichever is earlier."}}, {"text": "Assam Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30089, "end_char": 30105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the language of rule 16(1), the Assam Government had no power to extend the period of service of a member of the service beyond a period of six months in the aggregate."}}, {"text": "Assam Govern- B", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30643, "end_char": 30658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No order was made by the Assam Govern- B ment for postponing the period of retirement of the respondent and his retention in service before 1st May 1962."}}, {"text": "1st August 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31324, "end_char": 31339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that event the respondent would retire from service by 1st August 1962."}}, {"text": "1st August. 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31512, "end_char": 31528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Putting the construction on rule 16(1) (a) and the order of extension, most favourable to the State Government, it may be stated at once that retention in D service upto 1st August."}}, {"text": "1st September 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31751, "end_char": 31769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order next in succession is of 1st September 1962."}}, {"text": "1st August, H 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33052, "end_char": 33070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the State Government could not retain him in service beyond 1st August, H 1962, it could not continue the inquiry thereafter."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33349, "end_char": 33363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the State Government had made an order to retain the Government servant in service up to the end of March 31, 1961."}}, {"text": "9th May 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33415, "end_char": 33427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent order extending the period was made on 9th May 1961."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33698, "end_char": 33711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court held that according to the earlier order of the State Government itself the service of the Government >ervant had come to an end on March 31, 1961 and the State Government could not by unilateral action create a fresh contract of service to take effect from April 1, 1961."}}, {"text": "st August 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34033, "end_char": 34047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st August 1962 and the State Government not having the power to retain the res-· pendent, a member of the Indian Administrative Service, beyond a period of six months, the respondent could not be said to have continued in service so that an inquiry could be continued against him."}}, {"text": "11th\n\nOctober, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36352, "end_char": 36371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yet not only the inquiry was initiated but he was retained in service beyond the date of his normal retirement till the final order was made on 11th\n\nOctober, 1963 when he was removed from the Indian Administrative Service."}}]}