GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR:

v. t.'

HINDUSTAN MACHINE TOOLS LTI).

May I, 1975 ·

H. R. KHANNA, M. H. BEG ANDY. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.)

Article 246(3) and entry 49 in LJst II of 1th Schedule to Constitution-- Nature of fees-Quid pro quo-Legislature amending definition retrospectively whether encroaches upon judicial functions-Andhra Pradt:sh Gian1 Panchayat Act, 1964.

The And.bra Pradesh Legislature passea' the Andhra Pradesh Gran1 Panclutyat Act, 1964.

The Kuthbullapur Gram Panchayat was established under the Act.

The respondent constructed a factory and other buildings without the permission of the Gram Panchayat.

Later on, the respondent asked for expost-facto permission.

The Panchayat agreed to grant the permission on the respondent paying permission fee at 1-1/2 per cent on the capital value of the factory building ano' at 1 per cent on the capital value of other buildings.

The Panchayat also called upon the respondent-; to pay the house tax.

The respondents filed a Writ Petition in the High Court challenging the levy of house tax and permission fee.

The High Court allowed the Writ Petition holding that the buildings constructed by the respondents did not fa11 within the definition of a house and further ruled that since no services were rendered, the levy of permission fee was illegal. Section 69 of the Act authorises the Gram Panchayat to levy a house tax.

The definition of house as it stood when the High Court delivered its judgment was a building or hut fit for human occupation whether as a residence or otherwise, having a separate principal entrance from the common way and included any shop, workshop or warehouse or any building used for garaging or parking of buses or as a busstand.

The High Court held that the buildings other than factory premises were not a house because their separate principal entrance was situated on the road belonging to the respondents.

Ali regards the factory buildings, the High Court held that the Legislature included shops, workshops, and warehouses, but clid not include factory within tho definition of the house. The demand of house tax was held to be illegal.

After the judgment of the High Court was delivered, !he Legislature amended the definition of the house retrospectively to incluCie the buildings constructed by the respondents.

The appellant contended that the new definition of the house clearly includes the buildiµgs constructed by the respondent and that the Pancbayat was entitleQ to impose house tax on the respondent Secondly, the Gram Panchayat lays roads, provides for drainage and lights, scrutinises the plans submitted for intended construction, and, therefore, is entitled to charge the permission fee. In the alternative, it was contended that the permis5lion fee though called a fee is. really in the nature of a tax on buildings and may be upheld &8 such.

Respondent contended :-

1. By redefining the term 'house' with retrospective effect, the Legislatur_e encroached upon a judicial function.

2. Without a proper budget, the Gram Panchayat cannot impose taxes.

A. P. GOVT. v. H. M. T. (Chandachud, /.)

3: There is no provision in_ the Act enipowei:ing tb.e Gram Pancba-. -. yat to levy permission fees. ·

4. No services are rendered for which perinission fees . can be charged.

Partly allowing the appeal,

HELD : The Legislature has power to pass alaw JlTOspectiveIY as well ls B retrmpectively.

The Legislature can remove the baslS of the decision ren~ dereo' by a court.

The Amending Act does not ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decision given by the High Court, but merely removes the basjs of that decision.

Under Article 246(3) read with Entry 49 in Llst II of the 7th Schedule, the State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to taxes on lands and buildings .. Section 69 of the Act authorises the Gram Panchayats to levy house _tax in the villages under their respective juris6.'iction. The house tax was rightly imposed by the C Gram Panchayat. [398 B.F., 399 DEF]

HEW FURTHER-The argument about absence of budget was not made in the High Court and as it involves an investigation into facts, this Court cannot go into it for the first time. [40G-DE]

HELD FURTHER-There is no provision in the Act empowering the GTani Panchayat to levy fees on the permission to construct a building.

In fact, there is no .provision in the Act to obtain the permission of the Gram Panchayat for construction of building. Fees are a sort of return or consideration for services rendered which makes it necessary that there should be an clement Of quid pro quo in the imposition of a fee. There has to be correlationship between the fee levie6.' by an a\Jthority and the services rendered by it to the person who is required to pay the fee.

In this case, there is no such correlationship.

Fees cannot be imposed for discharging statutory functions of public authorities.

The services have to be rendered individually to the particular J?.t:rsOn on whom the fee is imposed. The very fact that the pennission fee :is. Jevied at a certain percentage of the capital value of the buildings shows that the Gram Panchayat itself never intended to correlate the fee with the service's rendered or intended to be rendered by it. [400-H, 401-DE, 402 c]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICT!ON : Civil Appeal No. 1189 of 1972.

From the Judgment and order dated 6th August, 1971 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W. P. No. 4223 of 1969.

P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao, for the appellants.

B. Sen and Naunit Lal, for tha respondent.

K. Srinivasamurthy, Naunit Lal and La/ita Kohli, for the interveners.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CIIANDRACHUD, J. This is a tax dispute concerning the power

of the second appel, lant, Kuthbullapur Gram Panchayat, to levy house- H tax and Permission Fee on the respondent. The Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., which is a Government of India Undertaking. The first appellant is th<; Government of Andra Pradesh. e, ·- ' . .

The Kuthbullapur Gram Panchayat was established in 1959, Jn 1964 the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature passed the Andhra Pradesh

396 SUPREMll COUll.T IUlPORTS (1975] SUPP s.c.k.

A Gram Panchayats Act, 2 of 1964, which with the exception of Chapter VII of the Act, came into force on January 18, 1964. The Act applies to the Kuthbullapnr Graru Panchayat within whose geographical limits

the respondent has established a factory for the manufactnre of special apparatus machines, presses etc. The construction of the factory began in 1964 and was completed in December, 1965. The factory was con- B structed without the permission of the Gram Panchayat. Considering the skeleton staff which mans the Panchayat and its skeleton activities, the respondent's plea that it did not obtain the Panchayat's permission because it was not aware of its existence is not implausible. But such awareness has no relevance on the respondent's liability to pay taxes and fees. In any event, on coming to know of the construction of the factory and the other buildings the Panchayat asked the respondent C to obtain the requisite permission. The respondent asked for ex-postfacto permission in January, 1967.

In its meeting of May 8, 1967 the Panchayat passed a resolution for collecting Permission Fee from the respondent at 1/2% on the capital value of the factory buildings and at 1 % on the capital value of other D buildings. By a letter dated August 20, 1968 the Panchayat called upon the respondent to pay house-tax for the years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69 amounting to Rs. 1,83,750 at the rate of Rs. 61,250 per annum. On March 3, 1969 the Panchayat demanded from the respondent a sum of Rs. 1,65,000 by way of Permission Fee, Rs. 80,0()() beillg for factory buildings and Rs. 85,000 in respect of the other E buildings.

On November 25, 1969 the respondent filed a writ petition ia the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the levy of house tax and the Permission Fee. By its judgment dated August 6, 1971 the High Court allowed the writ petition. It held that the buildings cons- F tructed by the respondent did not fall within the definition of a 'house' as contained in the Act and therefore no house-tax could be li!tied on the buildings. Regarding the Permission Fee the High Court repelled the appellant's contention that the fee was in the nature of tax and held that since no services were rendered by the Pancl111yat to the respondent the levy of Permission Fee was illegal. The High Court has granted to the appellants a Certificate of Fitness under Article G 133(1) (a) of the Constitution to appeal to this Court.

Section 69 (l )(a) of the Act provides that a Gram Panchayat shall levy in the village a house-tax. By section 2( 15), as , it stood when the High Court delivered its judgment, 'house' meant a building or hut fit for human occupation, whether as a residence or otherwise, "having a separate principal entrance from the common way,!' and H included "any shop, workshop or warehouse or any building used for garaging or parking buses or as a bus-stand". The High Court heW that buildings other than factory premises were not a 'house' within the meaning of the Act because their separate principal entrance8 were situated on the roads belonging to the respondent and not on the common way as required by section 2(15). As regards the factory buildings, the High Court held that the Legislatnre had included shops,

A. P. GOVT. v. H. M. T. (ehwuirachud, J.) 397

worop& and warehouses but not factories within the definition of A i a 'house' and therefore factory buildings were also not a 'house' within the meaning of the Act. The demand of house-tax was accordingly held illegal.

By the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 16 of 1974. the State Legislature has amended the definition of 'house' B with retrospective effect so as to eliminate the impediments on which the High Court rested its judgment. If the amendment is lawful and valid, it will be unnecessary to consider whether the High Court was right in reading the way it did the definition of 'house' as contained in the unamended section 2(15).

Sedion 2 of the Amending Act provides :

"2. For clause ( 15) of section 2 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), the following clause shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted, namely :-

"(15) 'house' means a building or hut fit for human occupation, whether as a residence or otherwise, and includes any shop, factory, workshop or warehoue or any building used for garaging or parking buses or as a busstand, cattle shed (other than a cattle shed in an agricultural land), poultry shed or dairy shed" ;

Section 4(a) of the Amending Act provides:

"4. Notwithstanding anything in any judgment, or order of any court or other authority,- decree

( a) anything done or any action taken, including any tax levied and collected, in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the principal Act shall be deemed, to be and to have always been, done or taken or leived and collected in the exercise of the powers conferred by tor under the principal Act as amended by section 2 of this Act, as if the principal Act as amended by this Act were in force on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken, or tax was levied and collected; and all arrears of tax and other amounts due under the printipal

Act as amended by this Act at the commencement of this Act, may be recovered as if they had accrued under the principal Act as amended by this Act";

The new definition of 'house' which is to be read retrospectively

in to the Act meets effectively both the objections by reason of which H the High Court held that the buildings constructed by the respondent were not a 'house'. By the Amendment the old clause "having a separate principal entrance from the. common ay" is , dropped and the efiniti?n of 'house' is re-framed to mclnde a factory. It 1s clear and 1s undisputed that the. buildings constructed by the respondent-the colony buildings as well as the factory buildingsanswer fully the description

A of a house and are squarely within the new definition contained in section 2(15).

We see no substance in the respondent's contention that by redefining the term 'house' with retrospective effect and by validating the levies imposed under the unamended Act as if, notwithstan, ding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of any court, .that Act as amended was in force on the date when the tax was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon a judicial function. The power of the Legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as weII as retrospectively, the one no less than the other.

Within the scope of its legislative competence and subject to other constitutional limitations, the power of the Legislature to enact laws C is plenary. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum ( 1 ) Gwyer, C.J. while repelling the argument that Indian Legislatures had no power to alter the existing laws retrospectively, observed that within the limits ot their powers the Indian Legislatures were as supreme and sovereign as the British Parliament itself an~ that those powers were not subject to the "strange and unusual prohibition against retrospective legis- D lation". The power to validate a I law retrospectively is, subject. to the limitations aforesaid, an ancillary power to legislate on the particular subject. .

The State legislature, it is sJgnificant, has not overruled or set aside the judgment of the High four!. It has amended the definition E of 'house' by the substitution o a new section 2(15) for the old section and it has provided that. the new definition shall have retrospective effect, notwithstanding apything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority. In other words, it

has removed the basis of the del'ision rendered by the High Court so that the decision could not have Ileen given in the altered circumstances.

If the old section 2(15) were to define "house' in the manner that the

amened section 2(15) does, fhere is .doubt that t.he decision .of

th~ High Court would have been otherwise. Jn fact, 1t was not d!Sputed before us that the buildipgs constructed by the respondent meet fully the requirements of sction 2(15) as amended by the Act of 1974.

G In Tirath Ram Rajindra Natb v. State of U. P. ( 2), the Legislature amended the law retrospectively and thereby removed the basis of the decision rendered by the f!igh Court of Allahabad. It was held by this Court that this was with.in the permissible limits and validation of the old Act by amending it retrospectively did not constitute an encroachment on the functions of the judiciary.

The decisions on which th~ respondent relies are clearly distin- H guishable. In the Municipal Cdrporation of the City of Allilhabad

v. The New Shrock Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. ( 3) the impugned provision commanded the Corporation tol refuse to refund the amount illegally ·---·--·

(') (194-0) F. C.R. !JO.

(') A.LR. 1973 S.C. '4-05. (') Al.R 1970 S.C. 1292.·

. '

collectd by it despite the orders of the Supreme Court and the High Court As the basis of these decisions remained unchanged even after the amendment, it was held by this Court that the legislature had made a dircet inroad into the Judicial powers. In Janp11da Sabha Chindwara etc., v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd.,('} the Madhya Priidesh Legislature passed a Validation Act in order to rectify the defect pointed out by this Court in the imposition of a css.. But e Act did not set out the nature of )he amendm€fut nor did 1t provide that the notifications issued without the sanction of the State Government would be deemed to have been issued validly. It was held by this Court that this was tantamount to saying that the judgment of a coµrt rendered in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction was to

be deemed to be ineffective.

The position in, State of Tamil Nadu v, M. Rayappa Gounder ( 2 ) was similar. In that case the re-assessment made under an Act which did not provide ror reassessments were attempted to be validated without changing the law retrospectively.

This was considered to be an encroachments on the judicial functions .

.In the instant case the Amending Act of 197 4, cures the old definition contained in section 2(15) of the vice from which it suffered. The amendment has been given retrospective effect and as stated earlier the legislature has the power to make the law passed by it retro-active. As the Amending Act does not ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decision given by the High Court but removes the basis of its decision, the challenge made by the respondent to the Amending Act must fail.

The levy of the house-tax must therefore be upheld.

Under Article 246(3) read with Entry 49 in List II, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the State legislatures have exclusive power t9 make laws with respect to ''Taxes on lands and buildings" Section 69~1)(a) of the Act authorises Gram Panchayats to levy house .. tax m the villages under their respective jurisdiction.

The F Gram Panch.ayat of Kuthbullapur has accordingly levied house-tax on the bmldmgs constructed by the respondent including the factory buildings. It needs to be clarified that by Rule 6 of the "Rules relatmg to levy of House-Tax", machinery and furniture are to be excluded .from consideration for the purpose of assessment to house-tax.

Thus, the tax is on buildings only and does not transgress the scope of Entry 49.

This clarification became necessary in view of the respondent's C?ntention that the State legislature has no power under Entrv 49, List II, to levy tax on the lands and buildings owned or occupied by

~ factory., Entry 36 in List III relates to "Factories" and Entry 47 m. that List reates t? "Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not mcludmg fees taken in any court". It is urged on H

behlf of the !espondent that these specific Entries in regard to the

partrclar sub1t matter exhaust the power to impose levies on factones .and smce the power is limited to the imposition of fees on

 (') A.I.it 1971 s.c. 57.

(') A.I.R.

1971 S.C. 231.

400 SUPIUi'.MB _COURT REPORTS [1975] SUPP• S.C.ll.

A factories, the legislature has no competence to impose a tax on the lands or buildings of a factory. It is true that the various Entrie8 in the legislature Lists must receive a broad and liberal construe:. tion nd Entry 36 in List III may therefore cover every aspect of the subject matter of "Factories". But the State legislature has not authorised the levy of house-tax on factories in the COIJlpendious B sense. The new definition of 'house' includes a 'factory' but the housetax is levied only on the buildings occupied by the factory and not on the machinery and furniture.

The State legislature bas the legislative competence to do so under Entry 49 in List II.

It was urged by Mr. Naunit Lal on behalf of one of the interveners that 'Factory' is a compendious expression and sijlce a factory C consists of the building, the machinery and the furniture, the legislature cannot split up the personality of the factory and tax one part of it only.' There is no substance in this contention because the power to tax a building can be exercised without reference to the use to which the building as put and it irrelevant that the building is occupied by a factory which cannot conduct its activities without the machi- D nery and furniture. What falls legitimately within the scope of a legislative Entry can lawfully. form the subject matter of legislation'.

We cannot entertain the respondent's argument that without a proper budget, the Gram Panchayat cannot impose a tax. Such an argument was not made in the High Court and it involves an in- \'estigation into the fact whether the Gram Panchayat had or had not prepared a budget. Nor can we entertain the respondents submission that section 4(b) and (c) of the Act of 1974 .are invalid.

Under clause (b), no suit or other proceeding is maintainable or can be continued in any court or before any authority for the refund of any tax.

Under clause (c), no court shall enforce any decree or order directing the refund of any such tax. No suit has been filed by the respondent for the refund of tax and no decree or order has been passed by any court or any authority for the refund of any tax.

This Court does not answer academic questions.

. .

The position in regard to the so called 'Permission Fee' is entire- ly dilierent. In the first place, the Act of 1964 itself makes a distinction between the power to impose a tax and the power to impose a r: fee. Section 69(1) and section 69(3)(i), (ii), (iii) empower the Gram Panchayats to levy taxes while section 69(3) (v) and (vi) provide for the levv of fees.

Sections 92, 109(2), 111, 121(5), 122 and section 131 of the Act also provide for the imposition of specific fees.

There is no provision in the Act empowering the Gram Panchayats to -levy fees on the permission to construct a building, which is what H the second appellant has purported to do in the instant case.

In fact, there is no provision in the Act under which it is necessary to cbtain the permission of the Gram Panchayat for constructing a building. Section 131(2) of the Act which authorises the levy of fees for every licence or permission is therefore notattracted. Section '125(1) requires that the permission of the- Gram Panchayat must

.., be obtained for constructing or establishing a factory, workshop or A work-place in which it is proposed to employ steam po.wer, ati:r power .or other mechanical power or electrical power or m which 1t is proposed to instal any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by steam water or other power as aforesaid. The provision may possibly spport a le~ of . Permission Fee on the tactory build\nll; S• but there is no provmon m the Act at all requmng the per011ss10n of.

B the Gram Panchayat for the construction of other buildi_ngs. _<?ounsel

for the appellants wanted to derive sustenance to the 1mpos1t1on of

Premission Fee from the provision contained in section 217(2) (xvi) but that clause only empowers the Goverrunent to make rules "as to the regulation or restriction of building and the use of sites for building".

~ In the absence of any provision in the parent Statute requiring the c

~ ' permission of the Gram Panchayat for the construction of non-factory

buildings, the rule-making power of the Government cannot be ' exercised so as to impose the requirement of a permission in respect cf sucb buildings.

But there is a broader ground on which the levy of Permission Fee must be struck down. Fees are a sort of return or consideration for services rendered which makes it necessary that there should be an element of quid pro quo in the imposition of a fee. There has to be a correlationship between the fee levied by an authority and the services rendered by it to the. person who is required to pay the fee('). There is, in this case, not a word showing such a correlationship. In the counter-affidavit which the appellants fild in the High Court in reply to the respondent's writ petition, nothing at all was stated as to the expenses incurred or likely to be incurred by the Gram Panchayat in rendering any actual or intended service to

the respondent. There may be something in the grievance of the Gram Panchayat that the mighty respondent and others following the respondent's lead have been persistently refusing to pay taxes which h'.'8 made it impossible for the Gram Panchayat to render any ser- 'F vices. But the -true legal position as stated by Mukherjea, J. in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Shri Lakshmindar Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mut1(2) is that 'it is absolutely > nrcessary that the levy of fees should on the face of the legislative

prov1S1on, be correlated to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services". In the total absence of any data showing such a corrclationship, the levy of Permission Fee has to fail.

One cannot take into account the sum total of the activities of a public body like a Gram Panehayat to seek justification for the fees imposed by it.

The expenses incurred by a Gram Panchayat or a MuniciJ?ality_ .i~ dischargin, g its obligatory functions are usually met by the 1mpos1t1n of a variety of taxes. For justifying the imposition of fees the public authonty has to show what services are rendered or H intended to be rendered individually to the particular person on whom the fee i~ imposed.

The Gram Panchayat here has not even prepared an estimate of what the intended services would cost it.

I') [1954] S.C.R. 1005: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 846 . ...\

(') 119541 S.C.R. 1005, 1042.

A Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Gram r Panchayat lays roads for providing access to new . buildings, that it provides for drainage and lights and that it scrutinises the plans submitted for intended constructions . and, if necessary, it advises the applicants in order that the proposed construction may conform to the regulations.

We are unable to accept that these services . are B rendered individually to the respondent.

The laying of roads and drainage or the supply of street-lights are a statu1ory function of public authorities and it is difficult to hold, in the absence of any material, that any of such services as have been mentioned to us have in fact . been rendered to the respondent.

The very circumstance that the Permission Fee is levied at a certain percentage of the "" c capital value of the buildings shows that the Gram Panchayat itself , never intended to correlate the fee with the services rendered or in- • tended to be rendered by it. There is therefore no warrant for the { levy of Permission Fee, not even on factory buildings, assuming for the sake; of argurnent that the i)ermission of Gram Panchayat is necesse.1y for the construction of factory buildings.

D It was alternatively contended on behalf of the appellants that the Permission Fee though called a fee is really in the nature of a tax on buildings and may be upheld as such. It is impossible to accept this contention. That the Permission Fee is not a tax on buildings is clear from the fact that the fee may be required to be paid even if a building does not eventually come into existence.

The scheme E under which. the Permission Fee is attempted to be levied is that it becomes payable at the time when thte permission, to . construct a building is applied for.

The levy does not depend upon whether a building has. been in fact constructed with the result that whether a building is constructed or not, the fee has to be paid. In other words, the Permission Fee is in the nature of a levy on a proposed activity F and is not a tax on buildings. . . ,,,

Thus, the levy of house-tax is lawful but the levy of Perruission Fee has to be struck down as being illegal. Accordingly the appeal is allowed partly but since the success is divided,· there will be no , order as to costs.

~P. H. P.

Appeal partly allowed.

GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR

t.'

HINDUSTAN MACHINE TOOLS LTI

H. R. KHANNA

M. H. BEG ANDY. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.

Article 246(3)

Panchayat Act, 1964

Panclutyat Act, 1964

Section 69

Article 246(3)

Section 69

Gram Panchayats Act

Chapter VII of the Act

Section 69

section 2( 15)

section 2(15)

section 2(15)

section 2

Section 4(a)

section 2

section 2(15)

section 2(15)

section 2(15)

section 2(15)

section 2(15)

Article 246(3)

Seventh Schedule

Section 69

section 4(b)

Section 69(1)

section 69(3)(i)

section 69(3)

Sections 92, 109(2), 111, 121(5), 122

section 131

Section 131(2)

section 217(2)


DOLLAR COMPANY, MADRAS

COLLECTOR OF MADRAS

May 1, 1975

[V. R. KRISHNA !YER, R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ]

Land ~4.cquisition Act-Section 23-Market Value-Prirtciple on which Appellate Court interferes.

The suit land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Land

Acquisition Officer awaided Rs. MO per ground as compensation. The City C

~ Civil Court awarded at the rate of Rs. 1000 /- per ground. The High Court on

appeal awarded Rs .. 1800 per ground. The appellant himself purchased the ,.. ....- suit land about 10 months before the notification under s. 4 was made at a price of ks. 410 per ground. The appellant spent a little money on filling up the r pond. ·

HEID : Dismissing the appeal,

This Court interferes with the judgment of the High Court only if the High Court applies a principle wrongly or because some important point affecting valuation has been overlooked or misapplied. A court of appeal interferes not when the judgment under attack is not right, but only when it is.shown to be wrong. [404 E-FG]

HELD FURTHER-Market value is ""hat a willing purchaser will pay a E willing vendor. The best evidence of the value of property is the sale of the very property to which the claimant is a party. If the sale was long ago, the Court \VOuld examine more recent sales of comparab1e lands as throwing better Jigbt on current land value. In the present case, the appellant himself purch.ued the

land at the rate of Rs. 410 per ground. [404 H. 405 A.BJ

HELD-There is no error in principle in the High Court Judgment nDr hae F any of the limited grounds on which these Court's jurisdiction can be legiti- ' mately exercised been made out. [408-CD]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 667 of 1968.

From the judgment and order dated 31st January, 1967 of the 'Madras High Court in Appeal No. 412 of 1962.

N. Natesan, K. Jayaram and R. ChandraseRher, for the appellant

Govind Swaminathan, N. S. Sivam, A. V. Rangam and A. Subha shini, for the respondent.

• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.-This is a pedestrian appeal by a land-owner H whose property, having been acquired compulsorily by the State, asks

for more compensation, probably appetised by increases over the Collector's award granted by the City Civil Court and the High Court.

The grounds urged are conventional, based on comparison of pries shown in land sales in the neighbourhood and the general escalation of urban land values in the country.

tr-

A 127 odd 'grounds' (a ground is aronnd 5-112 cents; .actually- 2,400 sq. ft) were acquired in 1959 for the i:onstruction of a Housr ing Colony for the Madras Port Trust employees by the then :Madras State. They comprise R. S. No. 4032/1 and other items with which we are not concemec~, since the owners of those items have not come up in appeal to this Court .. The relevant notification under s. 4( 1) B was made on August 12, 1959 and so the compensation has to be pegged to the market value as on that date. Of course, 16 years have rolled by since, thanks to delay which bas come to stay in the administrative and forensic processes of our land. That is by the way. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 800/- per ground. The City •

Civil Court, approaching the problem of valuation plot; wise, as for, a housing colony, made the necessary deductions involved in that C process and awarded at the rate. of Rs. 1,000/- per ground.

The .,- High Court, on appeal, made an upward revision, c!iscarding the trial • court's approach and awarded Rs. 1,800/- per ground.

The State • has not come up in appeal, but the unquenched claimant asks ; for more in appeal, demanding at least Rs. 2,200/- per ground.

Generally speaking, a cardinal component in the escalation of prices of urban realty which does not find sufficient expression in the ancient Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the developmental operations inevitable in a rapidly industrialising society for which the individual owner ' makes no social contribution. Be that as it may, courts have to apply the legislation as extant, it being left to the law-makers to harmonize social justice which individual rights by appropriate reforms.

We have to proceed to determine the compensation according to the canons crystallized in s. 23 of the Act .

. At ihe outset, we must. warn ourselves of the broad guideline that in an appeal from an award granting compensation this Court F will not interiere unless there is something to show not merely that on the balance of evidence it is possible to reach a different conclusion but that the judgment cannot be supported by reason of a wrong . • application or principle or because some important point affecting valuation has been overlooked or misapplied.

Moreover. there is a prudent condition to which the appellate power, generally speaking, is subject. A court of appeal interferes not when the judgment under < _ G . attack is not right but only when it is shown to be wrong. These twin . principles serve as backdrop to our approach to the rival_ contentions in the case. · · ·

It is true that compem.atio'u for c~pulsry . acqulsition, as gcr vemed by s. 23, gives high priority to the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification imder s. 4, sub-s. (1).

H But what is market value ? It is a common place of this branch of jurisprudence that the main criterion is what a willing purchaser would • pay a willing vendor.' Ordinarily a party will be entitled to get the amount that he actually and willingly paid for a particular property; provided the transaction be bona fide and entered into with due regard to the prevalent market conditions. and is proximate in time to the relevant date under s. 23.

We may even say that the best evidence of. ·. the value of property is the sale of tlu!very property to which ,._

...

the claimant is a party. If the sale is of recent date, then all that need normally be proved is that the sale was between a willing purchaser and a willing seller, that there has not been any appreciable rise or fall since and that nothing has been done on the land during the short interval to raise its value (See Parks 'Principles & Practice of Valuations' p. 29-Eastern Law House--Calcutta,-IV Edition 1970). But if the sale was Jong ago, may be the Court would examine more recent sales of comparable lands as throwing better light on current land value.

We emphasize this facet because the appellant himself purchased the land in question just ten months before the notification under s. 4(1), at a price of Rs. 410 per ground. There was a pond in the pot, the filling up of which is alleged to have cost some extra money according to the appellant, but he gave no evidence before the court on this matter with the result that we arc left with the estimate made by the Public Works Department for the filling up of the pond wliich works out at a much lesser figure.

In short, less than a year before the date of commencement of acquisition proceedings, the appellant himself had purchased this land at a price around Rs. 450 (making allowance for the pond which he had filled up) and he has been awarded Rs. 1,800 per ground by the High Court Instead of wandering around neighbouring lands or guessing as to what the_ price of the disputed land might have been, we have before us the actual purchase of the suit property by the appellant himself and he has not set up any case of special features or circumstances depressing the land value or affecting the particular transaction so that one could ignore that sale as the product of artificial circumstances.

We have thus a situation where the law should express a judgment from the experience of the appellant himself as against a judgment from speculation based on other transactions.

Clinching evidence to correct uncertain prophesy is furnished here by the claimant's conduct.

An actual transaction with respect to the specific land of recent date is a guide-book that courts may r not neglect when called upon to fix the precise compensation.

Viewed fri>m a slightly different aspect, it is but fair that compulsory landacquisition while assuring a just equivalent should not be converted into an avaricious windfall. Can an owner who brought the land at Rs. 400 per ground and laid out a little more money on it, grouse on the score of inadequate or unjust recompense, if within a year after his own purchase he is paid by the State 400 per cent of what he G spent for the identical land ? Neither morality nor legality is violated in such a ca.se; for even a black marketeer's bosom may not be uneasy at the prospect of such a fortune which he could not have bargained for when he became the owner of the land some months before. 'It is the duty of the state or federal government, in the conduct of the inquest by which compensation is ascertained, to see that it is just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public H which is to pay for it' (See 27 Am Jur 2nd paragraph 266, p. 53 of Vol. 27). All things considered, the appellant stands self-condemned by his own deed of purchase. .

Property valuation as a practfaed art is greatly influenced by legal and economic constraints. But, in this case, we do not have any

"A complex considerations since helpful indicators are. available. Pr!ce

paid by the owner recently represents an expression of market . value, as bona fide evidence of value, subject, to such matters as (a) the relationship of the parties; (b) the market conditions and the. terms of sale and (c} the date of sale .. It may not end the enquiry but goes a long way to solve the problem.

In this concction it may be useful B to refer to the . decision of this Court in S. L. A. Officer v.

T .A. Setty(1 ) where it was observed :

"It is not disputed that the function of the court in award- · ing compensation under the Act is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of the notification• . under ·· S. 4(1) and the methods of valuation may be (1) opiniol) of experts, (2) the price paid within a reasonable time in bone fide transactions of purchase of the lands acquired or the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing sirni-, Jar advantages and (3) a number of years purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquir- . ed"~.

(p. 432, para 9-emphasis; ours)

 Appreciating this lethal consequence, Sri Natesan, learned counsel, suggested rather obscurely that there might have . been pecuc

liar possibilities why this land was sold to his client at a low price.

But the reasoning breaks down because the claimant has not even hinted in his pleading or cared to testify what special circumstances played upon the transaction by which he got this identical land at the price he paid. We cannot be swayed by surmises floating in midair, particularly where the party who urges these feathery likelihoods stood mute at the trial stage.

He failed to speak only to become a martyr for silence. ·

Sri Natesan switched on to the prices of other lands in the locality to overcome the self-created obstacle of his client's purchase. 'J'.his is specious logic- When decisive evidence of the market value. of the land compulsorily acquired is unavailable you seek light from com~ parable neighbourhood. Such is not the case here. Even so, we travelled with counsel on to other lands, to gather whether any grave G error had crept into the High Court's assessment. The discovery made was that lands in the near neighbourhood were sold sometime earlier at prices ranging from Rs. 300 . to Rs. 400 and in one case Rs. 900 (Ex. R2 to R7) while distant neighbours like that covered by Ex. Cll were valued by court at around Rs. 2,200 or Rs. 2,400

per ground. This wide disparity may be a trifle mystifying. Even so, we go by lands close by and not by one a mile-and-half. away as Ex-Cll H plot. In an industrial area, land prices are sensitive to an intricate variety of factors.· ·

Propinquity to highway or ports and. many. industriai. and social: imponderables enter the verdict of evaluation. So much so we cannot antomatically assert, witlt reference to a piece _of l_::nd a mile-and-half

. (I) AJ.R. 1959 S.C. 429 ,

...

/ / ·- ...

away, tha1 it serve5 as a guide for fixing the price of the suit plot.

What the High Court has done is to have at the back of its mind the various sales, Exhibits R2 to R7, which fall far below the value demanded by the claimant and the high prices awarded by the same High Court in regard to ot11er lands distances away, have regard to the then growing industrial potential and make an intelligent guess.

May be as the learned Advocate General has pointed out, in theilight of evidence regarding the precise land and the particular owner, there was no justification for awarding such a high price as has been dune but the State has not bothered to come up in appeal and we cannot hold that the High <s:ourt was in error in making out of the totality of materials available, a best judgment assessment of the market value.

No serious flaw in principle, no omission to consider important material or like infirmity has been pointed out to fault the judges on

tl1e appraisal.

Nevertheless, Shri Natesan contended strenuously that the sales showing low prices were not reliable for two reasons. They were 'distress' sales and prices had gone up from the dates of those deeds which were of 1949-50. Neither argument is conclusive. True, a few of the sales D suggest some press11re inducing the vendors to dispose of their land. But there are other deeds which are unbjemished by any such depressant.

Having gone through the documents in question we are satisfied that none of the sales bear marks of throwaway prices.

The other argument that prices must have inexorably risen from 1949 to 1959 is no axiomatic proposition. True, generally speaking, there has been an inflationary spiral in India which has not spared realty. But there is evidence in the present case to show that between 1949 and 1952 lands in this very area stood stationary in their prices.

Various geo-economic factors have affected land prices, some to boost them, others to slump them. Therefore we cannot be persuaded to hold tl)at a relentless rise in land prices has come to stay. Take but one example : If a land adjoins a factory which needs to be expanded further, a higher price may be offered by that factory owner.

Likewise, if a heavy tax on construction of buildings or ceiling on vacant urban land is in the offing, prices of building sites may come down. It may even be said that such a factor as the application of the MISA to smugglers may depress prices of many items, including land and foreign cars, in certain places. Another exotic example. In some

American cities the influx of certain coloured races into the downtown area brings down the market value of real estate, under current social conditions.

While it is true that the area we are concerned with is an industrial belt, we carmot forget that there are housing colonies also as adjuncts so that some lands may be less suitable for industrial buildings but may still be useful for workers' houses. It is in evidence that the plots acquired here had ponds, the appellant himself having filled up the pond in his plot.

This shows incidentally that highrising construc, tions may require pile-driving at high cost. We need , not guess at the various chancy factors except to state that having

IOSC/75-27

A due regard to the conspectus of circumstances, including the appelt !ant's own cost price, the Court has made a sound judgment. In this view; we do not think there is need for further discussion of the facts pressed before us by the appellant. We agree with him that the purpose for which the land is acquired has no bearing on the value to be determined by the Court but our couclusion remains unaltered.

B We see no reason, no law nor justice, to interfere with the judgment under appeal. Maybe, the appellant :i'3 aggrieved that slightly inferior lands acquired simultaneously and adjoining his plot have been given the same value as has been awarded to him. It may also be that each court he has approached has improved upon the price awarded by the earlier one and therefore he might have obtained certificate hopefully.

C And looking at his lost land now, years later, when real estate has risen in price much more, he may sigh at what is fixed and strive to get more.

But a closer examination has disclosed no error in principle in the High Court's judgment nor has any of the limited ground on which this Court's jurisdiction can be legitimately exercised been made out.

D The appeal is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.

P.H.P.

Appeal dismiseed

DOLLAR COMPANY, MADRAS

COLLECTOR OF MADRAS

R. S. SARKARIA

A. C. GUPTA, JJ

Section 23

s. 4

s. 4( 1)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

s. 23

s. 23

s. 4

s. 23

s. 4(1)

S. 4(1)


...

MALOON LAWRENCE CECIL D' SOUZA A

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

May lst, 1975 B

[A. N. RAY, C. J., H. R. KHANNA, M. H. BEG, ANDY. V.

CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950, Article 16-Seniority List, validity of- Promotion of petitioner as Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax prior to

respondrus 4 to 26-Petitioner, if could claim seniority over respondents in C .subsequent ser.iority list.

On July 1, 1947 the petitioner was appointed Income-Tax Offir Class IT.

On August 12, 1949 the petitioner was appointed Income-Tax Officer Class I Grade II in post-1945 vacancy reserved for candidates with war service.

On January 24, 1950 a seniority list of Income-Tax Officers Class I Grade JI as on January 1, 1950 was issued on the basis of 1947 Seniority Rules. The petitioner was shown in that list senior to respondents 4 to 26. The same position was reflected in a seniority list issued in 1958. The petitioner was prompted as Income Tax Officer Class I Gtade I with effect from January 1, 1951 and confirmed in that post from the said date. The Rules of 1974 were revised and in supersession of them 1952 Seniority Rules were issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Income-Tax department took -some time to revise the seniority list of Income-tax Officers Class I in accordance with 1952 Seniority Rules and finally on November 26, 1956 revised seniority list of Income-tax Officers Class I Grade I as on October, 1 1956, was issued.

In this list respondents 4 to 26 were shown senior to the petitioner and were entitled to be promoted to higher posts earlier than the petitioner. Another "Seniority list of Assistant Commissioners was issued as on January l, 1958 in conformity with the earlier list of 1956 showing the petitioner to be junior to respondents 4 to 26.

By this time the petitioner and respondents 4 to 26 had all been promoted Assistant Com.missioners.

This Court in Karnik's case 78 I.T.R. 243 held that the following princi- \ples emerge from 1952 Rules for determining the_ seniority. (i) Between Jncometax officers promoted at the same meeting, their seniority inter se will be reflected in the list of Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax; (ii) Between an officer promoted earlier and another officer senior to him but who was not considered in the meeting when the former was promoted, seniority in the list of Income-tax Officers will be reflected in the higher cadre; (iii) Where the senior officer was considered and not promoted, and the junior officer \Vas promoted at that meeting. the order of promotion will govern seniority in the higher grade and (iv) Where senior officer is promoted and confirmed and at a later meeting a junior officer is promoted, the latter cannot claim to be placed above the senio1 officer in the higher cad.re relying upon the circumstance that he could not be considered for promotion at the earlier meeting, because he had not to his credit the qualifying minimum service.

In pursuance of the above judgment of this Court, seniority of. Income-tax

Assistant Commissioners promoted before Avril 1. 1964 was recast and new seniority list was issued on February 1, 1971. The petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the seniority list of Additional Commissioners of Incometax as on February 1, 1971 circulated by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance. '

It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that as he was promoted Assistant Commissioner on August 19, 1955 while respondents 4 to 26 were promoted to that post subsequent to that date, the petitioner should be shown senior to those respondents.

Rejecting the contention and dismissing the \Vrit petition.

HELD : (i) The fact that the petitioner was promoted a'i Assistant Con1missioner prior to respondents 4 to 26 \Vould not make him senior to respondents 4 to 26 because according to the seniority list issued on the basis of 1952 Seniority Rules the above mentioned respondents were senior to the petitioner. The seniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondents 4 to 26 has. to be delermined in the light of proposition No. 2 laid do\\n by this Court in Karniks case, according to which bet ween an officer promoted earlier and another officer senior to him. but who \Vas not considered in the meeting \\hen the former \Vas promoted, seniority in the list of Income-tax Officers. will be reflected in the higher cadre.

As respondents 4 to 26 were admittedly sho\vn senior to the petitioner in the list as on October 1, 1956 prepared in accordance with 1952 Rules, their seniority qua the petitioner would be reflected in the higher cadre of Assistant Commissioner. [ 412 GH]

(ii) It has not been sho\vn that the names of respondents 4 to 26 were also considered in the meeting wherein a decision was taken to promote the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner. Assuming that a decision to promote f'espondents 4 to 26 to the posts of Assistant Commissioners was taken at the same meeting in which it \Vas decided to promote the petitioner, in that event proposition No. 1 in Karnik's case would be attracted. Even in such a contingency the seniority of respondents 4 to 26 qua the petitioner \Vould be reflected in the list of Asslstant Commissioners. In the seniority list of Assistant Commissioners issued in 1958, the petitioner was shovm junior to respcndeats 4 to 26 in conformity with the seniority list of 1956.

In the matter of confirmation to the post of Assistant Commissioner, six out of respondents 4 to 26 confirmed earlier then the petitioner. v.hil~ the rest of them were confirmed at the same time as the petitione-r.

The impugned list of seniority circulated in 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitionet'" qua respondents 4 to 26 as determined in 1956. [412 H, 413 AC]

S. K. Gliosh & Anr. v. nion of India & Ors., [1968] 3 SCR 631 referred to.

HELD FURTIIER-(iii) The seniority of the petitioner qua respondents 4 to 26 was determined as long ago as 1956 in accordance with 1952 Rules. The said seniority was reiterated i.n the seniority list issued in 1958. The present writ petition was filed in 1971. No satisfactory expJnnation has been furnished by the petitioner for the inordinate delay in approaching the court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but the representation was rejected in 1961.

No cogent ground has been shown as to why the petitioner becarn~ quiescent and took no dilige.nt steps to obtain redress. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years. [413EFGHJ

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 296 of 1971.

G Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Ram Panjawani and B. R. Agarwala, for the petitioner.

S. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3.

Memo for the respondents Nos. 4 to 26.

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KTIANNA, J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India by Malcom Lawrence Cecil D'Souza, Additional Commissioner of Income-tax for an appropriate writ to quash the seniority list of the Additional Commissioners of Income-tax as on February L 1971 circulated by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance. The petitioner claims that he is senior to respondents 4

to 26, but in tlie impuged list he is shown junior to those respon- A dents.

Prayer has also been made by the petitioner for other consequential reliefs.

Apart from respondents 4 to 26, the petitioner has impleaded the Union of India, the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and the Chairman. Central Board of Direct Taxes as respondents 1 to 3.

The petitioner served in the Royal Navy as a Sub-lieutenant from March 1945 till November 1946 when he was released from the naval service because of the end of war.

On July 1, 1947 the petitioner was appointed Income-tax Office Class II. On August 12,

1949 the petitioner was appointed Income-tax Officer Class I Grade II in post-1945 vacancy reserved for candidates with war service.

On January 24, 1950 a seniority list of Income-tax Officers Class I Grade II as on January l, 1950 was issued on the basis of 1947 Seniority Rules.

The petitioner was shown in that list senior to respondents 4 to 26.

The same position was reflected in a seniority list issued in 1953. The petitioner was promoted as Income-tax Officer Class I Grade I with effect from January 1, 1951 and confirmed in that post from the said date.

According to 1947 , Rules, the seniority of candidates inter se appointed to post-1945 vacancies was to be determined by age irrespective of the category from which they were recruited.

The Rules of 1947 were revised and in supersession of them 1952 Seniority Rules were issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Accord- E ing, inter alia, to 1952 Seniority Rules, the break in service was not to be taken into account for determining the seniority of persons confirmed against post 1945 was reserved vacancies. The Income-tax Department took some time to revise the seniority list of Income-tax Officers Gass I in accordance with 1952 Seniority Rules and finally

on November 26, 1956 the revised seniority list of Income-tax Officers Class I Grade I as on October 1, 1956 was issued.

In this list F respondents 4 to 26 were shown senior tO the petitioner and were entitled to be promoted to higher posts earlier than the petitioner.

Another seniority list of Assistant Commissioners was' issued as on January 1, 1958.

This list was in accordance with the earlier list of Income-tax Officers as on October I, 1956 showing the petitioner to be junior to respondents 4 to 26.

It may be stated that by this time the petitioner and respondents 4 to 26 had all been promoted G Assistant Commissioners.

The seniority list of Income-tax Assistant Commissioners as on August I, 1965 was challenged by Assistant Commissioner Vasant J ayaram Karnik in Gujarat High Court by means of a writ petition filed in 1967.

The High Court allowed that petition and issued a writ quashing the seniority list as on August L 1965 in so far as H that list showed several officers senior to Karnik and another officer B. S. Nadkarni.

The High Cour{ gave its own interpretation of the 1952 Seniority Rules.

An appeal was filed in this Court on behalf of the Union of India against the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court in 1969.

This Court as per judgment dated September 7, 1970, reported in 78 ITR 243 dismissed that appeal.

This Court

A held that the following principles emerge from 1952 Rules for determining the seniority :

"(i) Between Income-tax Officers promoted at the sam~

meeting, their seniority inter se will be reflected in the list of Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax;

(ii) Between an officer promoted earlier and another officer senior to him, but who was .not considered in the meeting when the former was promoted, seniority in the list of Income-tax Officers will be reflected in the higher cadre;

(iii) Where the senior officer was considered and not promoted, and the junior officer was promoted at that meeting, the order of promotion will govern seniority in the higher grade ;

(iv) Where a senior officer is promoted and confirmed and at a later meeting a junior officer is promoted. the latter cannot claim to be placed above the senior officer in the higher cadre relying upon the circums tance that he could not be considered for promotion at the earlier meeting, because he had not to his credit the qualifying minimum service."

In pursuance of the above judgment of this Court, seniority of Income-tax Assistant Commissioners promoted before April 1, 1964 was recast and the impugn.ed seniority list was accordingly issued.

The petition has been resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of P. S. Mehra, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and Insurance has been

fil~ in opposition to the petition.

It has been argued by Mr. Ram Panjwani on behalf of the petitioner that as he was promoted Assistant Collllllissioner on August 19, 1955 while respondents 4 to 26 were promoted to that post subsequent to that date, the petitioner should be shown senior to those respondents.

We find it difficult to accede to this contention.

The fact that the petitioner was promoted as Assistant Commissioner prior to respondents 4 to 26 would not make him senior to respondents 4 to 26 because according to the seniority list issued on the basis of 1952 Seniority Rules the above-mentioned respondents were senior to the peiitioner.

The seniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondents 4 to 26 has to be determined in the light of proposition No- 2 laid down by this Court in Karnik's case (supra), according to which between an officer promoted earlier and another officer senior to him. but who was not considered in the meeting when the former was promoted, seniority in the list of Income-tax Officers will be reflected in the higher cadre.

As respondents 4 to 26 were admittedly shown senior to the petitioner in the list as on October L 1956 prepared in accordance with 1952 Rules, their seniority qua the petitioner would be reflected in the higher cadre of Asistant Commissioners. It ,!:tas

not been shown to us that the names of respondents 4 to 26 were

also considered in the meeting wherein a decision was taken to pro- A mote the petitioner as' Assistant Commissioner.

Assuming that a decision to promote respondents 4 to 26 to the posts of Assistant Commissioners was taken at the same meeting in which it was decided to promote the petitioner, in that event proposition No. 1 in Karnik's case (supra) would be attracted.

Even in such a contingency the . seniority of respondents 4 to 26 qua the petitioner would be reflected B in the list of Assistant Commissioners. In the seniority list of ASsistant Commissioners issued in 1958, the petitioner was shown junior to respondents 4 to 26 in conformity with the seniority list of 1956.

In the matter of confirmation to the post of Assistant Commissioner, six out of respondents 4 to 26 were confirmed earlier than the petitioner, while the rest of them were confirmed at the same time as the petitioner. The impugned list of seniority circulated in 1971 merely C reflected the seniority of the petitioner qua respondents 4 to 26 as determined in 1956.

The case of S. K. Ghosh & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors(') to which reference has been made on behalf of the petitioners can be of no assistance to him as that case related to rules for recruitment to the grade of Directors of Postal Services in Indian Postal Service.

So far as the seniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondents 4 to 26 is concerned, the matter is governed by 1952 Seniority Rules and those rules as already mentioned have been the subject of the decision of this Court in Karnik's case (supra). In view of the direct decision of this Court relating to the precise question with which we concerned, it is not necessary, in our opinion, to refer to other rules.

The matter can also be looked at from another angle.

The seniority of the petitioner qua respondents 4 to 26 was determined as long ago as 1956 iu accordance with 1952 Rules.

The said seniority was reiterated in the seniority list issued in 1958.

The present writ petition was filed in 1971.

The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years.

The fact that a seniority list was issued in 1971 in pursnance of the decision of this Court in Karnik's case (supra) would not clothe the petitioner with a fresh right to challenge the fixation of his seniority qua respondents 4 to 26 as the seniority list of 1971 merely reflected the seniority of tb petitioner qua those respondents as already determined in 1956.

Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst public servants because of stale claims made after lapse of 14 or 15 years.

It is essential that any one who feels aggiieved with an administrative decision affecting one's seniority should act with due diligence and promptitude and not sleep over the niatter.

No satisfactory explanation bas been furnished by the petitioner before us for the inordinate delay in approaching the court.

It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but that representation was rejected in 1961. No cogent ground has been shown as to why 'the petitioner became quiescent and took no diligent steps to obtain redress.

Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one

(lf(1968] 3 SCR 631.

A of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in puplic

services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet.

Raking up old matters like.

B seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complication, s and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matter. should be , given a quietus after lapse of some time.

The writ petition fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances C Without costs.

V.M.K.

Petition dismissed.

MALOON LAWRENCE CECIL D' SOUZA

A

UNION OF INDIA & ORS

A. N. RAY

H. R. KHANNA

M. H. BEG

CHANDRACHUD, JJ.

Constitution of India

Article 16

[1968] 3 SCR 631

Article 32

Constitution of India

article 32

Constitution of India

(1968] 3 SCR 631


1 '

CHEMICALS & FIBRES OF INDIA LTD.

D. G. BHOIR & ORS.

May 2, 1975

[A. ALAGIRISWAMI, P. N. BHAGWATI AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sections ZA and 23 (b)-"During the pendency of proceedings'', 111ea11il1g of-Reference pening before Labour Cout in respect of n1atter falling under S. 2A-Stnke by other ivorkn1e1:·, if barred.

On 14th August, 1972 the Government of ]\.faharashtra made a reference to the Labour Court under s. !O{l)(c) of the Industrial Displ1tes Act of an industrial dispute in respect of the dis.missal by the appellant of one of its employees N. S. Bobhate.

On 25th August 1972 the appellant dismissed three other workers, Dastoor, Shome and Soman after an i::; nq uiry and this led to a strike in the appel1ant's factory. Towards the end of October 1972 the Company discharged about -312 of its employees and filed 12 applications be- D fore the Industrial Tribunal for approval of such discharge as a reference was pending before it. . The appellant pleaded before the Tribunal that the strike was illegal as a reference was pending in respect of Bobhate and therefore the discharge of its workers by the appellant \Vas in order and approval should be granted.

On August 30, 1973 the Tribunal rejected all the applications for approval and these appeals. have been filed in pursuance of a Special Leave granted by this Court

It was contended on behalf of the appellants __ that the whole of the machinery under the Act is available in the case of a reference relating to an individual workman and one~ something which is not an industrial dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute all the necessary implications of such a deeming provision should be given effect to.

On the other hand, contention on behalf of the \Vorkmcn \vas that, if the intention was to make the v.'hole of the machinery of the Act available even in the case of pendcncy of the case of an individual \vorkman before a Labour Court or Tribunal what would have been done is to add the words "and includes any dispute or difference between a workman and his employer connected with or arising out of the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of the services of that \Vorkman notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute" to clause (k) of sec. 2.

It was further contended that the dispute or diITerence between the individual workman and '

his employer is only deemed to be an industrial dispute and that it is not in fact an industrial dispute. In the case of a deeming provision no greater effect should be given to it than is necessary for the purpose for which it is enacted.

Disrnissing the appeals,

HELD : (i) The important words in S. 23(b) of the Act are "during the pendency of proceedings." Eve, n though the dispute between the employer and the employees might relate to a case of a single workman the provisions of s. 23 (b) would apply if the single workman's cause has been espoused by H a labour union \Vhich need nut necessarily comprise of all the employees <tf the concerned employer. [418 A-BJ

(ii) Even lhough the proceedings pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National 'fribunal might telate to certain matters only. there cannot be a strike or lock-out even in relation to matters other than those which are pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. [418 B-C]

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1975] supp. S.C.R.

Proiat Kuntar v. W. T. C. Parker, AIR 1950 Cal. fliJu1r v. Deodar iha, AIR 1958 Patna 51, approved.

116 and State of

(ii.i) Jn enacting S. 2A the intention of the legislature was that an individual \Vorkman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated should be given relief without it being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the v, rhole body of employees being attracted to that dispute and the dispute becoming a generalised one between labour on the one hand and the employer on the other. [418H, 419A}

tiV) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act clearly bring out the elaborate nature of the proceedings relating to conciliation, arbitration, settlement, inquiry and ward.

The intention behind all these provisions is to avoid strikes and lock-outs as far as possibic not only by bringing the parties together but also by referring point!> of dispute between them, either voluntarily or otherwise, for decision by Labour Courts.

Tribunals and National 'fribunals.

Strikes arc not banned even in the caw of public utility services.

The ban on strikes is subject to certain lin1itations.

There is no doubt that the Act recognises strikes as a legitimate \Veapon in the matter of industrial relations.

The prohibition of strikes during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Coi.irt, Tribunal or National Tribunal under sec. 23 \Vas, in the /\ct as originally cnacteU, confined only to disputes. between the employer and the general body of employees and not to individua] workmen. It is in that context that section 23 should be interpreted.

In the case of an industrial dispute between an individual worknan and the employer the whole claboraie machinery of the Industrial Disputes 1-\ct may not be necessary lest it would be like using sledge-hammer to kill a flea.

While there is justification for pre\1enting a strike \Vhen a dispute btween th~ employcT and the general body of 'vorkmen is pending adjudication or resolution, it \VOuld be too much lo hold that the legislature intendeJ that a lid should be put on all strikes just because the case of a ~\ngle workman was pending. That the general body of Jabour should be prevented from resorting to strike where they had chosen to espouse trtc cause of a single \1, rorkman Jtc understandable and reasonable.

Even if the employer and workmen are parties to a reference the decision therein binds them even though they may have said they \Vere not interested in it.

But if strikes are to be prohibited merely because the case of an individual workman was pending,, y,.hose case had not been espoused by the general body of the workmen, there can never be any even for justicb.ble grounds [421 E-422AJ

Bellapur Collieries v. Presiding Officer, fl972J 3 S.C.R. 805 relied on Comrnissioncr of !11come-1ax v. Teja Si'ngh, rl9591 Supp. (1) S.C.R. 394 and East End D-u, ellings Co. -Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council. rI952l AC 109 at p. 132, referred to.

(v) It is not correct to say that clause (b) of S. 23 provide:; a blanket ban o~ tries if proceedings are pe!Jdi~~· Even in espect of clause (b) some Itrn1tatron should be read confining it to the parties to the proceedings either actually or constructively as in the case of a Union espousing the cause of an individual uorkn1an. (f.422-H].

Tea The

Work1nen of Di1nakuchi Tea EState v. The Managernent of Dinwkuchi Estate, r1958l S.C.R. 1156, and The Bon1bay Union of Journalists v. 'Hindu' Bombay, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 893, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : 1644 of 1973 Civil Appeals Nos. 1633-

Appeals by special leave from the order dated the 30th August, 1973 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra in Application No. (IT) 316 of 1972.

Y. S. Chitale, A. K. Sen, P. D. Damania and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the appellant.

' -

CliBM!CALS & FIBRES OF INDIA v. D. G. BHOIR (A/agiriswami, !.) 417

V. S. Desai, S. T. Desai, Naunit Lal, D. H. Buch and Lalita A Kohli, for the respondents (In appeal No. 1634, respondent no. I in appeals Nos. 1633, 1635-38 & 1640-43 and respondent no. 1 and 2 in Appeal No. 1639 and respondents no. 1-3 in Civil Appeal No. 1644.

The Juc!gment of the Court was delivered by B

ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The question that arises in the appeals is the implication of section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

On 14th August, 1972 the Government of Maharashtra made a reference to the Labour Court under section 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of the dismissal by the appellant of one of its cmp- C ioyces M. S. Bobhate. On 25th August, 1972 the appellants dismissed

three other workers, Dastoor, Shame and Soman after an enquiry and this led to a strike in the appellant's factory.

Towards the end of October 1972 the Company discharged about 312 of its employees and filed 12 applications before the Industrial Tribunal for approval of such discharge on the groU'lld that a reference was pending before

it.

The appellant pleaded before the Tribunal that the strike was D illegal as a reference was pending in respect of Bobhate and therefore the discharge of its workers by the appellant was in orc!er and approval should be granted.

On August 30, 1973 the Tribunal rejected all the applications for approval and these appeals have been filed in pursuance of a Special Leave granted by this Court.

Though reference was made to the repeated calls on behalf of the employer to the strikers to return to work and the refusal of the workmen to return to work, the sole point for determination is whether when a reference is pending before the Labour Comt in respect of a matter falling unc!er section 2A any strike by the other workers would be illegal.

That is the only ground on which Special Leave has been granted.

Under section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in so far as it is relevant for the purposes of this case, a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of section 22 or section 23.

We arc not concerned with section 22 in !his case though at one stage that seems to have been one of the grounds for contending that the strike was illegal.

Section 23, insofar as it is relevant for the purposes of this case, reads as follows:

"23. No workman who is employee! in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-out.

(a)

(b) during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court. Tribunal or National Tribunal and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings;

(bb) ...................................................... .

(c) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award."

~UPREME COURT REPORTS

[1975] SUPP S.G.R.

The important worc!s are "during the pendency of proceedings".

Undoubtedly a proceeding was pending before the Labour Court and that was in respect of the dismissal of Bobhatc. Did this make the strike by the workmen of the appellant illegal though at least in its origin the strike had nothing to do with Bobhate's case "? it was common ground that even though the dispt!lc between the employer and the employees might relate to a case of a single workman the provisions of section 23Cb) would apply if the single workman's cause has been espoused by a labour union which need not necessarily comprise of all the employees of the concerned employer. The decisions of some High Courts establish that even though the proceedings pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal might relate to certain matters only, there cannot be a strike or lock-out even in relation to matters other than those which are pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal (see Provat Kumar v. W.T.C. Parkar, AIR, 1950 Cal. 116, and State of Bihar v. Deodar Iha, AIR 1958 Patna 51). We express our agreement with this view.

But the question is: does the fact that a proceeding is pending before a Labour Court in respect of an individual workman bar the other workers from resorting to a strike? Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, which came into effect on l-l2-1965 reads as follows:

"2A. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman ancl his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shaU be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding tint no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party tv the dispute."

An industrial dispute is defined in section 2(k) as follows:

"(K) 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of Jabour, of any person." ·

It is in interpreting this clause that it has been held that even where the dispute relates to a single workman it is an industrial dispute if that dispute is espoused by the general body of the employees.

Before the introduction of section 2A an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated and whose case was not cspousecl by any H labour union or by a substantial number of workmen had no remedy.

It was to deal with that contingency that section 2A was enacted.

We would therefore be justified in concluding that in enacting section 2A the intention of the legislature was tlm't an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated should be given relief without it being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole

CHEMICALS & FIBRES OF INDIA v. D. G. BHOIR (Alagiriswami, J.)

body of employees being attracted to that disp.ute and the dispute becoming a generalised one between labom on the one hand and the employer on the other. If this point of view is kept clear in mine the solution of the problem before us becomes simple.

In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which resulted in the enactment of section 2A it is stated :

. :'In construing the scope of industrial dispute, Courts have taken the view that a dispute between an employer and an individual workman cainnot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by a union or a number of workmen making a common cause with the aggrieved incividual workman. In view of this, cases of individual dismissals and discharges cannot be taken up for conciliation or arbitration or referred to adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, unless they are sponsored by a union or a number of workmen. It is now proposed to make the machinery under the Act available in such cases."

This is reliec upon by the employer to contend that the who(e of the machinery under the Industrial Disputes Act is available even in the case of a reference relating to an individual workman. On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the workmen that if the intention was to make the whole of the machinery of the Industrial Disputes Act available even in the case of pendency of the case of an inilividual worf'..man before a Labour Court or a Tribunal what wonld have been done is to add the words "and includes any dispute or difference between a workman and his employer connected with or arising out of the discharge, cismissal, retrenchment or termination of the services of that workman notwithstanding that no other workman nor any nnion of workmen is a party to the dispute" to clause (k) of s.ection 2. lt is further contended that the dispute or difference between the individual workman and his employer is only deemed to be an incustrial dispute and that it is not in fact an industrial dispute.

It is contended on behalf of the employer that once something which is not an industrial dispU'te is deemed to be an industrial dispute all the necessary implications of such a deeming proviion should be given effect to and the mind should not be allowed to boggle in working out such implications (See East end DwelUngs Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 at p.132 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Teja Singh, 1959 Supp.

U). SCR 394).

On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the workmen that in the case of a deeming provision no greater effect should be given to it than is necessary for the pU'rpose for which it is enacted.

Both these contentions are amply supported by authority and the duty of this Court is to see what exactly are the necessary implications of the deeming provision.

We should say, however, that it does not make any difference to the decision of this question whether the deeming provision is in the form of a separate section like section 2A as in the present case or is part of the definition of the industrial dispute itself as is suggested it should be on behalf of the workmen.

A We should first of all have a broad idea of the scheme of the Act.

The Act as framed originally was not enacted to deal with the case of individual displlte.

It was intended to deal with the problems arising between the employers on the one hand and the general body of workmen on the other though not necessarily the majority of the workmen.

Section 3 of the Act provides for the B constitution of Works Committee to .promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen. Section 4 provides for appointment of conciliation officers charged with the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes (the definition of 'industrial dispute' in section 2(k) may be here kept in mine!).

Section 5 provides for the constitution of Boards of Conciliation for promoting the settlement of C industrial disputes.

Section 6 provides for constitution of Courts of Inquiry for inquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.

Section 7 proviees for constitution of Labour Courts for the adjudication of il)dustrial disputes.

Section 7 A provides for constitution of Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industdal disputes relating to any matter spe- D cified in the Second and Third Schedules to the Act.

Section 7B provides for constitution of National Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes involving questions of national importance or in which industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in or affected by.

Section I 0 provides for reference of industrial disputes whether they exist or are apprehended to Boards of Conciliation for promoting a settle- E men!, or to a Labour Court or to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication or even to a National Tribunal.

It also provides for parti1~ to an industrial dispute applying whether jointly or separately for a reference of the dispute to a Conciliation Board, Court of Inquiry, Labonr Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal.

Where a dispute has been so referred the appropriate Government is enabled to pro- F hibit the continuance of any strike or lock out.

Section JOA provides for employers and wrokmen agreeing to refer their disputes to arbitration before a dispute has been referred under section I 0 to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal.

Section 12 pmvides for the duties of Conciliation Officers.

Section 13 provides for the duties of Boards of Conciliation, section 14 for the duties of the Court of Inquiry and section 15 for the duties of Labour G Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals. Section 12 (!) says that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.

Section 18(3) says that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on:

(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

(b) all other parties sllmmoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so s!lmmoned without proper cause;

' )

~·-

CHEMICAU & FIBRES OF INDIA v. D. G. BHO!R (Alagiriswanii, J.) 421

(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) A is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates.

(ct) Where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause

(b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were B employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employee! in that establishment or part."

Section 22 provides that there shall be n0. strike or lock-out in C a public utility service.

Section 23 bars a strike or lock-out during the pendency oI conciliation proceedings before a Board, pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator as also during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation.

Section 24 provides that a strike or lock-ont shall D be illegal if it is commenced in contravention of section 22 or 23 or in contravention of an order made under sub-section (3) of section 10 or sub-section ( 4A) of section 1 OA.

These provisions bring out the elaborate nature of the proceedings relating to conciliation, arbitration, settlement, inquiry and . award.

E The intention behind all these provisions is to avoid strikes and lock-outs as far as possible not only by bringing the parties together but also by referring points of dispute between them, either voluntarily or otherwise, for decision by Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals.

Strikes are not banned even in the case of public utility services.

The ban on strikes is subject to certain limitations. There is no doubt that the Act recognises strikes as a F legitimate weapon in the matter of industrial relations.

We need not concern ourselves about aberration like gheraos, or go-slow. The prohibition of strikes during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under section 23 was, in t11e Act as originally enacted, confined only to disputes between the employer and the general body of employees and not to individual workmen. It is in that context that section 23 should be in- G terpreted. In the case of an industrial dispute between an individual workman and the employer the whole elaborate machinery earlier set forth of the Industrial Disputes Act may not be necessary lest it would be like using a sledge-hammer to kill a flea.

While there is justification for preventing a strike when a dispute between the employer and the general body of workmen is pending ac!judication or resolution, it would be too much to expect that the legislature H intended that a lid should be put on all strikes just because the case of a single workman was pending. That the general body of labour should be prevented from resorting to strike where they hacl chosen to espouse the cause of a single workman is understandable and reasonable. It has even been held that if the employer and workmen are parties to a reference the decision therein binds them

A even though they may have said they were not interested in it (Baltarpur Collieries v. Presiding Officer, 1972 (3)

SCR 805).

But if strikes arc to be prohibitee merely because the case of an individual workman was pending, whose case had not been espoused by the general body of the workmen, there can never be any strike even for justifiable grounds.

A strike is a necessary safety valve in indus- B trial relations when properly resorted to.

To accede to the contention of the employer in this case would be in effect acceding to a contention that there should never be a strike.

While we realise the importance of the maintenance of industrial peace, it cannot be secure<> by putting a lid on the legitimate grievances of the general body of labour because the dispute relating to an individual workman under s.2A is pending.

That might mean that the boiling caul- C dron might burst.

In that case the general body of workmen would be legitimately aggrieved that they are prevented from striking because an indivieual's case was pending with which they were not concerned.

It is not enoogh in this situation to say that it is always open to the Government to make a reference under section 10. It may or may not happen. Furthermore, the matters that could be pending before D a Labour Court under section 23 under the Second Schedule are:

1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders;

2. The application and interpretation of standing orders;

:i. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed;

4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege;

5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock-out; and

6. All matters other than those specified in the Third

Schedule.

The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders very often might refer to an individual workman and that sboule not be made the reason for preventing labour from giving vent to its legitimate grievances in a legitimate way.

Our attention is drawn to the contrast between clause ( c) and

(d) of section 23 and it is argued that while under cfause (c) there is a limitation in respect of matters in relation to which there can!lot be a strike, there is no such limitation under clause (b) and therefore clause (b) provides a blanket ban on strikes if proceedings are pending.

It is not possible to give such an exteneed meaning to A that provision.

As we have pointed out, even in respect of clause

(b) some limitation should be read confining it to the parties to the proceedings either actually or constructively, as in the case of a union espousing the cause 'of an individual workman.

Nobody, for instance, can argue that because proceedings are pending in relation to one industrial establishment owned by an employer, there can be no strike in another ineustrial establishment owned by that

CHEMICALS & FIBRES OF INDIA V, D. G, BHO!R (Alagiriswami, J,) 423

employer because there are uo words of limitation in clall6e (b), A See Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. -The Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCR 1156, where it was held that the word 'any person' cannot be given its ordinary meaning.

Sec also The Bombay Union of Journalists v. The 'Hindu' Bombay, 1962

(3) SCR 893.

We are therefore of opinion that the proper point of view fro!ll which to look at the problem is to give limited application to the fact of the introduction of section 2A in the Industrial Disputes Act and to hold that the pendency of a dispute between an inc!ividual workman as such and the employer does not attract the provisions of section 23.

The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs.

V.M.K.

Appeals dismissed.

IOSC/75-28

CHEMICALS & FIBRES OF INDIA LTD

D. G. BHOIR & ORS

A. ALAGIRISWAMI

P. N. BHAGWATI

P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

S. 2A

sec. 2

S. 23(b)

s. 23

S. 2A

Industrial Disputes Act

sec. 23

section 23

S. 23

[1962] 3 S.C.R. 893

section 2A

Industrial Disputes Act

section 10(1)

Industrial Disputes Act

section 2A

section 24

Industrial Disputes Act

section 22

section 23

section 22

Section 23

section 23C

Section 2A

Industrial Disputes Act

section 2(k)

section 2A

section 2A

section 2A

section 2A

Industrial Disputes Act

Industrial Disputes Act

Industrial Disputes Act

section 2A

Section 3

Section 4

section 2(k)

Section 5

Section 6

Section 7

Section 7

Section 7B

Section 12

Section 13

section 14

section 15

Section 12

Section 18(3)

Section 22

Section 23

Section 24

section 22

section 10

section 1

section 23

section 23

Industrial Disputes Act

section 10

section 23

Second Schedule

Third

Schedule

section 23

section 2A

Industrial Disputes Act

section 23