UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

SETH R. DALMIA

Febrµary 27, 1975.

7 35

[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ .J

Income Tax Act 1961-Sec. 148.

C'ntral Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Tra11saction of Busi11ess) R111.ts 1964-Rule 4-Whctlrer approra/ by Ccnt; a/ Go\'ernme11t cf distrilmtion

of the busi11ess of board by Chairman m11.1t be expressed in tire sl1ape of an oriu.

6 notices were issued to the respondent under s. 148 of the Income Tax Act for reopening the assessments for 3 assessment years.

The notices recited that they were issued after obtaining the necessary satisfaction of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The respondent filed a writ petition in t!ie High Court challenging the said notices inter a/ia 011 the ground that sanctio11' of the Central Board of Direct Taxes was not taken before the notices were issued as required 9y sec. 151 of the Ah:t.

The High Court accepted the •said contention and did not decide the other grounds raised in the petition. The High Court held that on a reading of the affidavit made by J. P. Singh, Chairman of Central Board of Direct Taxes it wou.ld appear that the work which had been done by the Chairman of the Central Board was transferred to the Member of. the Board and the approval of th~ Secretary to the Government of India was obt.aincd for this transfer or allocation of work.

The High Court, however, found that the averments in the affidavit were not in line with the ofliec notes in the relevant file.

The High Court also held that as no formal order was paS'>ed changing the allocation with the previous appmval of the Central Government, the sanction issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes was without jurisdiction and authority.

On appeal by Special Leave it was contended before this Cot•rt that r. 4 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of Business) Rules, 1954 provides that the Chairman of the Central Board may with the previous approval of the Central Government distribu'e the business of the. Board between himself Mid the other members and may specif) the cases o; class of cases which shall be considered jointly by the Board. lt was contended that J. P. Singh in his affidavit cka.ly stated that on 30-3-1964 he suggested to ]'firayan Rao a member of the Cen'.ra\ Board of Di; ect Taxes that he should take up the work of ac.:ording sanction of the Board unde: s. 151 ot the Act which was being done by the Chairman. It was further stated in that affidavit that on June 18, 1964 be personally discussed the proposal wi!h the Secretaiy to the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance and that the secretary approved the said proposl and that a note was made by him on 18th June,

1%4 to the effect that the mattr was discussed with the Secretary and that it is just a minor internal arrangement and no formal order was necessary.

Allowing ihe appeal,

HELD. (1) The High Court erred in not taking not~ of the affidavit of P. G. Gandhi Under Secretary Central Board of Direct Taxes, in which it is stated that all assessment work of income tax was assigned to Narayan Rao with the approval of the Centrnl Government.

In view of the statements in the spedfic affidavit of J. P. Singh and P. G. Gandhi it cannot be said that the offire notes were not in line with tbe averments in the affidavits.

[739H;

740C]

(2) It wa~ not necessary to P-xpress the approval of the Central Government formally in the shape of an order. [741HJ

Fonseca Private Limited and Others v. L. C. Gupta & Others, (1973) I S.C.C. 4 18, distinguished.

In that. case what was challenged was the order passed by an officer who A was not entitled to J>aSs it under the rules of business and the decision has no relevance on the question whether on the circumst:mces of the present case, approval of the Cenral Government should have been recorded in a formal order. [741C]

(3) The distribut!on •of the business of the Board by the Chairman is not a sub-delegated leg1slat1on and need not be expressed in a formal document; that the allo=ation of the business and approval are matters of internal arrangement B not affecting any one's rights at that stage. Since the appeals succeed on other grounds the Court diJ not go into the question whether the provisions of tile Central Board of Direct Taxes (Validation of Proceedings) Act 1971 afforded protection to the action taken. [741E-F; 742E] '

C1v1L APPF.LLATE JuRJsDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1107- 1112 (NI) of 1970.

1 From the judgment and order dated the 24th March, 1970 of the Delhi High Court In Civil Writ .Petition Nos. 663D and 6680 of 1965.

S •. T. Desai, T. A. Ramchandran & S. P. Nayar, for the appellants.

L. M. Singhvi and Bishambar Lal, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D

GUPTA, J.-These six appeals by certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi arise out of six writ petitions filed by the respondent before us challenging the validity of six ootices dated September 7, 1965 issued under sec. 148 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The notices relate to . the assessment years E 1949'-50 1950-51 and 1951-52, the corresponding accounting years

ending bn the 30th September of 1948, 1949 and 1950 respectively.

Three of the notices were issued to the petitioner in his individual capacity and the other three were served on him as a member of an association of persons. The petitioner had been assessed as an individual for the aforesaid assessment years in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922. Thereafter a Comm.is- F sion known as Vivian Bose Commission was appointed to enquire into the affairs of various companies with which the appellant was alleged to have been associated._ On the facts disclosed in the report of enquiry, the Jncome1-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle A, New Delhi, issued the aforesaid two sets of notices to the petitioner under sec. 148 of the Act. The notices informed the petitioner that these were issued "after obtaining the necessary satisfaction of the G Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi". This claim was questioned by the petitioner in the High Court and one of the grounds on which . the validity of the notices was challenged was that sanction of the Central Board of Direct Taxes had not been taken before the notices were isued as req:iired by sec. 151 of the Act. The High Court accea:ing this contention queshed all the six notices served OR the petitioner and by issuing a writ of prohibition restrained the aooel- H !ants, the Uniot1i of India, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, and the Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle A, New

Delhi from taking any action upon these notices. As the writ petitions' succeeded on this ground, the High Court did not consider the othe, r objections to the notices raised in the petitions. The pro-- priety of that decision is in question in these appeals.

The relevant part of sec. 151 of the Act reads as follows:-

"151.

Sanction' for issue of notice.-(l) No notice shall be issued under section 148 after the expiry of eight years from the end. of the relevant assessment year, unless the Board is satisfied on the reasons recorded by the Incometax Officer that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice.

(2) x x x x"

Section 4(1) of the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 provides:

"The Central Government may make rules for the purposes of regulating the 1 transaction of business by each Board and every order made or act done in accordance with such rules shall be deemed to be the order or act, a5 the case may be, of the Board." "Board" as defined inl sec. 2 of this Act means the Central Board of Direct Taxes or the Central Board of Excise and Customs. Rule 4 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulations of Transaction of Business) Ru!es, 1964 is in these terms :

"The Chairman may, by an order made with the previous approval of the Central Government, distribute the busilliess of the Board among himself and the other Members allld specify the cases or class of cases which shall be considered jointly by the Board."

What happened in this case was that the Income-tax Officer put up the case of the respondent to the Central .Board of Direct Taxes by a comprehensive note prepared by him and Shri S. 4.. L. Narayana Row, the only Member of the Board besides the Ch irman, on being satisfied on the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer that for each of the assessment years in both capacities of the respondent a fit case had been made out for the issue of a notice under sec. 148 of the Act, the impugned notices were issued to the respondent. In support of his case that sanction of the Board had not been obtained, the respondent relied on the Office Order dated January 1, 1964 annexed to the affidavit of Shri P. G. Gandhi, Under Secretary Central Board of Direct. Taxes, led in er to the writ petitions, which sets out the distribution of r between the Chairman and the Member of the Central Boar of Direct Taxe~: . I.n this document, entry No. 7 in the lisB0f ; woK allotted to the Chairman reads : "all assessment work ofincome-tix''. It was cori•ended that Shri: Narayana Row had therefore no .auP.liority to deal with cases for reopeninirof-.....,..

asse.ssments a!ld a~ sucJ.ilthe impugned notices. issued upon his satis- ........_ faction. w_er~ mval!d !, l'I paragraph 5 of the affidavit of Shri P. .G.

Gandhi, 1t 1s adm1ttef! that "all assessment work of Income-tax" had been assie~ to t.J;\e Chairman under office order dated January 1, 1964 which mclur!fed matters relating to the reopening of assessments / { I \

under sec. 34 of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 or under sec. 147 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, but the paragraph adds that "later wit'.1 the approval of the Central Government this item of work was as:'1gne.d to the Member of the Board Shri S. A. L. Narayana Row who m thts case accorded the sanction".

An affidavit atirmed by Shri J. P. Singh who at the relevant time was the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes and ex-oflicio Additional S1:cretary to the Govcrnmont of India in the Ministry of Finance, was aiso filed on behalf of the appellants. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of Shri Singh's affidavit state how Shri Narayana Row came to d1:al with the cases relating to the reopening of assessme.nts.

These paragraphs read as follows :

''3. That on 30-3 64 I suggested to Shri

S. A. L.

Narayana Row, the then Member of the Central Board of Direct Taxes that he should take up the work of according sanction of the Board under Section 151 ( 1) for reopening of assessments under Section 14 7 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 to which he consented.

4. Rule 4 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of Business) Rules, 1964 envisaged

that Chairman may by an order made with the previous approval of the Central Government distribute the business of the Board among himself and the other members.

The approval regarding the transfer of work relating to sanction un:der section 151(1) of Income-Tax Act from the Chairman to the Member Central Board of Direct Taxes was accordingly referred to by me to the Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue & Expenditure) on 9-6-1964.

5. Tiat on 18-61964. I personally discussed the proposal rega ding transfer of work from myself to the Member, Central Board of Direct Taxes with Shri V. T. Dehejia, the then Secretary of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue & Expediture).

6. That Shri V. T. Dehejia, the then Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue & Expcmgture) approved the said proposal to which effect a note wa~ by me on 18-6-1964.

7. That pursuant to the ci~ assigned to him under Section- 147 of the Income-Tax )\ct, 1961 in the aforesaid Rule 4 of the Central Board of Dirt Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of BusiIJess) Rules 1-..964, Shri

S. A. L.

Narayana Row, Member, Central Boa:..d of Direct Taxes gave sanction for the reopening of the 'j!Ssessments under

Section 147 of the Income-Tax Act, 196t in the aforesaid case on 11-8-1965 ." \

\ ' \

The High Court observed that on a reading of the affidavit. afli.rmed bv Shri J. P. Singh "it would appear that the work which had tiil then been done by the Chairman was to be transferred to the Member and approval of the 'secretary to the Government of India was obtained for this transfer or allocation of work." Th('.

High Court however found that the averments in the affidavit \\'ere "net in line" with the office notes in the relevant file which aprears to have been made available to the learned Judges of the High Court who heard these writ petitions.

We have also looked into the copies of these oJlice-notes which are on record. lt appears that on March 13, 1964 Shri .I. P. Singh, Chairman of the Board, recmded the following note : ·

"M(I&ED) may also consider whether he coufd take up th.:

cases for sanction of reopening of assessments (old section 34)."

This was obviously a note for consideration of the other Ml:mbcr of the Board who, on the next day, recorded his consent to this prorosal in the following words : ·

"I will take up cases of reopening of assessment als0.''

Below the sentence conveying Shri Row's assent to the proposal, the Chairman wrote "ThankS:".

The matter however did not rest there.

On May 14, 1964 the following note was put up by Shri B. B.

Ghosh, Under Secretary :

"Rule 4 of the Central Hoard of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of Business) Rules, 1964 envisage that Chairman may by an order made with the previous approval of the Central Government distribute the business of the Board among himself and the other Members.

Accordingly, the Office Order already issued in the matter will require amendment.

Draft D.O. -is submitted for consideratio1i.

We imiy

alo inform the Heads 'Jf Departments under the Board about the decision. Draft letter is submitted for approval."

The last relevant note on this subject reads :

"Discussed with Secy. (R&E). It is just a minor il'lernal arrangement.

No formal order is necessary."

This is signed by Shri J. P. Singh and bears the date 18-6-64.

The High Court held that a~: no formal order was pas; cd "chanrring the allocation with the previous approval of the Central Government, the sanction as granted by Shri 'S. A. L. Narayana Row is without jurisdiction and authorify".

It is not quite clear whether the High Court was not satisfied that Shri J. P. Singh's proposal for a change in the allocation of work was at all approved by the G, wernment or that in the absence of a formal order to that effect the approval was of no consequence.

The High Court does not appear to have taken any rrote of the affidavit of Shri P. G. Gandhi in paragraph 5 0( which it is stated that all assessment work of Inome-tax was assigned to Shri Narayana Row with the approval of the Central

...

Goverwnent.

From the affidavit of Shri J. P. Singh, the then Chairman of the. Central Board of Direct Taxes, part of which we have

extracted above, it appears that Shri Singh had referred to the Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Expenditure) the proposal for transfer of work relating. to sanction under sec. 151(1) of the Act from the Chairman to the Member of the Board, that Shri Singh personally discussed the matter with Shri V.

Dehejia who was then the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, and that Shri Dehejia approved the proposal. Shri J. P. Singh'.s affidavit adds that the note he made in the office file on June 18, 1964-"Discussed with Secy. (R&E). It is just a minor internal arrangement. No formal order is necessary."-refers to these facts. In the face of the statements appearing in the affidavits of Shri J. P. Singh and Shri P. G. Gandhi that the work relating to the reopening of assessments W:\S assigned to Shri Row with the previous approval of the Central Government, it is difficult to see how it can be said that the office notes were not in line with the averments in the affidavits.

The High Court did not disbelieve the statement of Shri J. P. Singh that h~ had di•- cussed the proposal with Shri V. T. Dehejia, who approved the proposal. Possibly, the absence of a formal order expressing the approval led to the observation that Shri Singh's affidavit was not in line with the office notes and also the ultimate finding that the notices issued upon the satisfaction of the member of the Board was "without jurisdiction and authority".

Dr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the respondent, contendd (1) that the material on record did not prove beyond doubt that the Central Government had approved the proposal of the Chairman to alter the original distribution of work and (2) that in any event the law required the. approval to be expressed in the 'hape of a formal order. Referring fo the office note of the Chairman dated June 18, 1964, Dr .. Singhvi submitted that it was not clear from thi~

note what exactly was considered unnecessary-a formal order expressing the approval, or getting the proposed alteration approved by the Central Government ? It was argued that as the suggested alteration was considered "just a n1inor internal arrangement," it \Vas likely that the Chairman thought that no prior approval of th" Central Government was necessary before the altered arrangement was put into operation, in which case the notices would be -.invalid in view of Rule 4 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of.Business) Rules, 1964.

However, it seems to us, when :he note said "no formal order is necessary." it could not possibly mean that approval of the Central Government was unnecessary, and we have no doubt that it meant that no fonnal order conveying the approval was necessary.

Regarding the statements in the affidavits of Shri J. P. Singh and Shri P. G. Gandhi that all work relating to the reopening of assessments was assigned to Shri Narayana Row with the approval of the Central Government, Dr. Singhvi pointed out that these statements had been verified by Shri J. P. Singh as true to his. hrowledge "derived from records in the possession of the Central Board of Direct Taxes" and by Shri P. G. Gandhi as "based on the. information derived from record in possession of the Board".

It was argued that as the records did not disclose any order of appro- val by the Central Government, the said statements were of no value.

-'G

It seems .to us that the verifica.tion of the statements in Shri J. P.

Singh's affidavit clearly suggests that the facts stated therein were true to his knowledge which the records also bear out.

As stated already, the High Court did not question the truth of the facts stated in Shri Singh's affidavit, nor do we find any reason to do so.

We have no doubt that the office note made by Shri J. P. Singh on June 18, 1964 supports the statements made in his affidavit.

The next question is whethe{ the approval should have been formally expressed in the shape of an order.

On this question Dr.

Singhvi referred to the decision of this Court in Fonseca (P) Ltd., & Ors. v. L. C. Gupta & Ors. (1) In that case an order made by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, who was not empowered to make such an order under the Rules of Business, was held to be illegal, ineffective and void.

We do not think this decision has any relevance. Thr authority of Mr. V. T. Dehejia, Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Department of Reveuue and Expenditure) to approve the proposal for the Central Government was never questioned, nor the power of the Chairman to distribute the business of the Board between himself and the other D . Member with the previous approval of the Central Government. We

have already held that upon the material on record such approval appears to have been given Fonseca's case (supra) is hardly of any assistance on the question whether in this case the approval of the Cl?ntral Government should have been recorded in a formal order. Dr.

Singhvi characterised the distribution of the business of the Board by

the Chairman as suh delegated legislation and referred to a number of authorities to show that the law required publication of such subdelegated legislation which implied that it must be expressed in a formal document. It was submitted that this was necessary to enable the persons affected by such sub delegated legislation to ascertain what the legislation was. We do not think that the distribution of work by the Chairman of the Board can be equated with legislation.

The allocation of business and the approval are matters of internal arrangement not affecting anyone's rights. llliitially the Board consisting of the Chairman and the member had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter in question. Thereafter, in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of Business) Rules. 1964 the Chairman with the approval of the Central Government distributed the business of the Board between himself and the member keeping all assessment work of income-tax to himself. Then, again with the approval of the Central Government, he assi!med this work to the member. Rule 4 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of Business) Rules, 1964 does not prescribe any sriecial or particuhr manner in which the, aporoval is to be recorded. The approval given at that stage does not touch the rights of the assessc:es. The fact that approval was given must of course be oroved nd. in our view. that

hs been done in this case; no question of publication of the order --- ----- en [l973J 1 sec 418.

' ' '

of allocation and the approval accorded to it by the Centrl Government can therefore arise. The office file does not also disclose any formal order approving the original distribution of work as b.::twee11 'the Chairman and the member of the Board. It appears from the office note of January 1. 1964 that a draft showing the allocation of work was signed by Shri J. P. Singh and Shri V. T. Dehejia, Secretary of the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue a'1d Expenditure) appended his signature below Shri Singh's. This shows clearly that a formal expression of the approval was not considered necessary. If there is no reason to doubt the truth of the statements made in Shri J. P. Singh's affidavit,. and we think there is nom:, then the legality of the impugned notices under sec. 148 ofthe Ac:t cannot be challenged on the ground that they were issued upon the satisfaction of Shri Narayana Row.

On behalf of the appellants our attention was also drawn to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Validation of Proceedings) Act, 1971 (No. 37 of 1971) which provides, inter alia, that no action taken by the Chairman and other members of the Board, either singly or jointly, without having been validly entrusted with the powers or duties in that behalf in accordane with the provisions of the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 or the rules made thereunder shall be 'deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid on that ground.

As in our opinion the impugned notices were issued in due compliance with the requirements of Rule 4 of Central Board of Direct Taxes (Regulation of Transaction of Business) Rules, 1964. we do not find it newssary to consider the provisions of this Act for the purpose of these appeals.

The appeals are accordingly allowed and the Judgment and orders appealed from are set aside. The High Court will now proceed to di~

poe of the :Nrit oetitions in accordance with Jaw on the other )l; l'ounds

raised therem. The appellants will entitled to their costs in this Courtone hearing fee.

P.H.P.

Appeals allowed.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS

SETH R. DALMIA

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD

R. S. SARKARIA

A. C. GUPTA, JJ

Income Tax Act 1961

Sec. 148

s. 148

Central Board of Direct Taxes

sec. 151

J. P. Singh

Government of India

Central Government

firayan Rao

s. 151

June 18, 1964

P. G. Gandhi

Narayan Rao

Cenral Government

T. Desai

T. A. Ramchandran

S. P. Nayar

L. M. Singhvi

Bishambar Lal

D

GUPTA

sec. 148

Income-Tax Act, 1961

Income-Tax Act

Vivian Bose Commission

New Delhi

sec. 148

sec. 151

sec. 151

section 148

Section 4(1)

Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963

sec. 2

Central Board of Direct Taxes or

Central Board of Excise and Customs.

Central .Board of Direct Taxes

S. 4

L. Narayana Row

sec. 148

January 1, 1964

P. .G.

Gandhi

sec. 34

Income-Tax Act, 1922

sec. 147

Income-Tax Act, 1961

S. A. L. Narayana Row

Singh

30-3 64

S. A. L.

Narayana Row

Section 151

Section 14

Income-Tax Act, 1961

section 151(1)

Income-Tax Act

Tiat

V. T. Dehejia

V. T. Dehejia

Section 147

Income-Tax Act

March 13, 1964

.I. P. Singh

section 34

Row

May 14, 1964

B. B.

Ghosh

S. A. L. Narayana Row

J. P. Singh

sec. 151(1)

V.

Dehejia

J. P. Singh'.s

June 18, 1964-"Discussed

Singhvi

Narayana Row

J. P.

Singh

Fonseca

sec 418

sec. 148

Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963


THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH,

LUCKNOW

PARSON TOOLS AND PLANTS, KANPUR

February 27, 1975. [Y. v. CH.'1NDRACHUD, R. s. SARKARIA AND A. c. GUPTA, JJ.]

Interpretation of Statutes-Legislature wilfully omitting to i11corporate a11 analogou.t law in subsequent stature-Language plain a11J unambiguous-Courts if competent to supply the omissio11 by analogy or implicatio11.

lliterpretation of Statutes-Lmv of . limitatio11-Speciil/ stalll!e. prescribing certain period of limitation-Provi.iion for extension upto specified time-limit 011 sufficient caue being shown-Time-limit, if could be extended on anology of s. 14(2) of Limitation Act.

U.P. Sales Tax A.ct, 1948 and U.P. Sa/es-tilx Rules, Rule 68-Appe/late Authority and Judge (Revisions) under the Act, if Courts within the meaning of s. 14(2) of Limitation Act.

U.P. Sales Tax A.ct, 1948, s. 10(3) (i) and s. 10(3B)-Revisio11 applhatio11 -Revising Authority not conferred with discretion to extend period of limitation heyo11d six months even on sufficient cause shown-Principle of s. 14(2) of Limitation Act, if could be imported into :r. 10(38) by analogy.

The SaleJ-Tax Officer a'lse"d tax for the assessment years 1958-1959 and 1959-60, on the respondent assessee by two separate orders. The assessee filed appwls against those orders before the Appellate Authority.

On May 10, 1963, when the appeals came up for hearing, the assessec was absent.

The aprcals were, therefore, dismissed in default by virtue of Rule 68(5) of tl:e U.P. Sales-tax Rules..

Snb-.rule ( 6) of Rule 68 provided for setting aside wch dismissal and for re-admission of the appeal.

On the s; cme day (May 10, 1963), the as; essee made two applications in accordance with Sub-rule (6) for settin.~ aside the

dimissal. Du.oing the pendency of those applkations. Subrnle (5) of Rule 68 was declared ultra vires the rule-making authority hy Manchanda J. of the High Court who further held that the Appellate-Authority could not dismi5' an appeal in default bu; was bound to decide it on merits even though the .1ppeliant be absent.

When these applications under r. 68(6) cirme up for hearing .. on 20-10-64, the AppelJate-Authority dismissed them outright in view of the ruling of Manchanda .T.

Against the order of dismissal of his appeals, the assessee on 16-12-1964 filed two revision petitions under s. 10 of the Sales-tax Act, before the [Judge (Revisions) Sale5-taX].

These revisions petitions having been filed more than 18 months after the dismissirl of the appeals,-which was the.maximum period of limitation pres,:ribed by sub-s. (3) of s. 10-were prima facie timebarred. They were however, accompanied by two applications in which the assessee prayed for exclusion of the time spent by him in prosecuting the abortive )Jfocecdings under r. 68(6) for setting aside the dismissal of bis appeals.

The Revi5ional Authority found that the asessee had been pursuing his remedy under r, 68(6) with due diligence and in good faith.

It therefore excluded the time spent in those proceedings from computation of limitation by applying s. 14, Limita'ion Act and in consequence. held that the revision petitions were within time.

On the motion of the Commissioner of Sales-tax. the Judge (Revisions) Sales-!ax made two references under s. J 1( 1) of the Sale'l-ta~ Act to the High

Court for answering the following question of law :

"Whether under the drcumstooces of the case, s. 14 of the Limitation Al extended the period for filing of the revisions by the time during which t)le restoration applications remained pending as being prosecuted bona fide."

The referencee were heard by a Full Bench of three learned Judges. each of whom wrote a separate Judgment.

Dwivedi t with whom Singh J. a11.reed atter ccframing the question held "that the time spent in prosecutinc tne application for setling aside the order of dismissal of appeals in default can be

excluded from computing the period of limitation for filing the revision by the application of the principle underlying s. 14(2). Limitation Act."

Hari Swarup J. was of the opinion: "The Judge (Revisions) Sales-tax while hearing the revisions under s. 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act does not act as. a Court hut only as a revenue tribunal and hence the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings before him. If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither s. 29(2) nor '3. 14(2) of the Limitation Act will apply to proceedings before him." The learned Judge was further of the vi•~W that the principle of s. 14(2) also, could not be invoked to extend the time beyond the maximllm fixed by the Legi, lature in sub-section (3-B) of s. 10 of the Saks-lax Act.

These appeals ha\'e been preferred on the basis of the special leave granted by this court.

Allowing th~ a.ppeals,

HELD: (i) If the legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not comr.".!tent to scpply the omission by engrafting on it or introducting in it, under the guise of interpretation, by a:nalogy or implication, something wh'.lt it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. To do so "would be entrenching upon the preserves of Legislatu.re", the primary function of a cc1urt of law bei11g jus dicere and not jus dare.

[7490-E]

(ii) If the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particul11r application thereunder aild provides in dear terms that such period on suflkient cause being shown, tflay be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the tribunal concerne<' has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond 1; uch maximum time-limit spedfied in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of s. 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

[7510-E} Ramdutt Ramfdssen Dass v. E. D. Sesso11 & Co. A.1.R. 1929, P.C. 103 and Pursliottam Dass Hassaram v. lmpex (India) Ltd. A.l.R. 1954 Born. 309, referred to.

(iii i In view of the pronouncements of this Court in Shrimflti Ujjam nlzai

1. Stat(' of U.P., [1963] 2 S.C.R. 778 and Jagannath Prasad v. State of U.P. [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850. there is no room for argument that the Appellate-Authority and the Judge (Revisions) exerdsin~ jurisdiction under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 194.8, are 'Courts'. They are. merely admi!!'istrative Tribunals and "not courts".

Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore. does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such Tribunals.- [747E]

(iv) Time features of the scheme of pr:ovisions of s. 10(3)(i) and sedion 10(3B) are note-worthy. The first is that no limitation has been prescribed for the suo niotu exercise of its jurisdiction by the Revising Authority.

The second is that the period of one year prescribed as limitation for .filing an application for revision by the .aggrieved party is unusually long.

The third is that the Revising Authority has no discretion to extend this period beyond a further period of six months, even on suffi:ient cause shown.

The three s•ark features of the scheme and language of these provisions, unmistakably show that the legislatu.re has deliberately excluded the application_of the principl.:s of Ss. 5 and 14 of the Limit a lion Act. except to the extent and in t.he truncated form embodied in sub-s. (3-B) of s. 10 of the A:t. (7480-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1458-1459 of 1970.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 1st January, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in S.T.R. No. 344 and S.T.R. No. 347 of 1967.

c.s.r. v. PARSON roo1s (Sarkaria, /.) 745

N. D. Karkhanis and 0. P. R{J.na, for the appellant.

No. aparance, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.-The common question of law for determinati?n. in these appeals by special Jcaye .is : Whether:s 14(2) of the imita tion Act, in terms, or, in prmc1ple,, ca~ be invoked for excludmg the time spent in prosecuting an apphca!Jon under Rle .68(6) ot the U.P. Sales Tax Rules for setting aside the order of d1snussal of appeal in default under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for short, the Salestax Act) 'from computation of the period of !imitation for filing a revision under that Act '?

It arises out of these circumstitnccs.

C The respondent, M/s. Parson Tools and Plants (hereinafter refer . red to us the usscsscc) carries on business at Kanpur. The SaleSitax

Officer assessed tux for the assessment years, 1958-1959 and 1959·60, on the nsscssce by two scpnrntc order~. The nssessee filed appeals

against those orders bcforn the Appellate Authority. On May 10, 1 Y63, when tho up peals cnmo up for hcnring, the nsscssee was abserlt.

The appeals were, therefore, dismissed in del'llult by virtue of Rule D 68 (5) of the U.P. Sulcs-tux Rules, Sub-rule (6) of Rules 68 pro· vided for setting aside such dismissnl and re-admission of the appeal.

On the same duy (May lO, 1963), the asscssec made two applications in accorduncc willl Sub rule ( 6) for setting aside the dismissal.

During the pcndcni.:y of those upplic:1tions, Sub-rule (5) of Rule 68 was declared 11/tra. rirt'.\' the ruli.:-muking authority by Manchanda J, of the High Court who further held that t)1c Appellate-Authority E could n!ot dismiss. an appeal in default but was bound to decide it on merits even though the appellant be absent. When these applications under Rule 68(6) came up for hearing, on 20-10·1964, the Appellate-Authority dismissed them outright in view of the ruling of Manchanda J. Against the order of dismissal of his appeals, the assessee on J 6-12-1964 filed two revision petitions under s. 10 of the Sales, tax Act, before the Rcvisional Authority (Judge (Revisions) F Sales-tax). These revision petitions having been filed more than 18 months after the dismissal of the appeals, which was the maximum period of limitation prescribed by sub-. 73) of s 10-were prima facie time-barred. They were however, accompanied by two applications in which the assessee prayed for exclusion of the time spent by him in prosecuting the abortive proceedings under Rule 68 ( 6) for setting aside the dismissal of his appeals. The Revisional Authority G found that the asscssee had been pursuing his remedy under Rule 68 ( 6) with due diligence and in good faith. lt therefore excluded the time spent in those proceedings from computation of limitation by applying s. 14, Limitation Act and in consequence, held that the revision petitions were withjn time. On the motion of the Cominis.- sioner of Sales-tax, the Revisional Authority made two reference& under s. 11 (1) of the S:1Jcs-tax Act to the High Court for answering H the following question of law :

"Whether under the circumstances of the case section 14 of the Limitation Act extended the period rdr filing

SUl'REM~ COURT UPORTS [197 5] 3 s.c.it.

of the revmons by the time during w.hich the restoration applications remained pending as being prosecuted bona fide."

The references were heard by a Full Bench of three learned Judges, each of whom wrote a separate Judgment. Dwivedi J. with whom Singh J. agreed after rcraing the qustion .held "that the tiin~ snt

in prosecuting the application for settmg aside the order of dismissal of appeals in default can be excluded from computing the period of

limtation for filing the revision by the application of the principle unde11ying s. 14(2). Limitation Act."

Hari Sl/Varup J. was of the opinion : "The Judge (Revisions) Sales-tax while hearing the revisions under s. 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act does not act as a Court but only as a revenue tribunal and hence the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings before him. If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither s. 29(2) nor s. 14(2) of the Limitation Act will a, pply to proceedings before him." The learned Judge was further of the view that the principle of s. 14(2) also, could not be invoked to extend the time beyond the maximum fixed by the Legislature in sub-section (3-B) of s. lO of the Sales-tax Act.

Sub-section (2) of s. 14, Limitation Act, runs thus:

"In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceedings, whether in a Cour1 of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where

such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Ctmrt which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it." (emphasis added).

If will be seen that this sub-section will apply only if-

( 1) both the prior and subsequent .procedings are civil

proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

(2) the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

(3) the failure of the prior proceedings was due to a G defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature;

( 4) both the proceedings are proceedings in a Court.

r. Karkhani~, learned Counsel. appearing for the appellant does not dispute the view taken by the High Court that the proceedings in 9uestion under the Sales-tax Act could be deemed as civil proceed- H mgs. Learned Counsel, however, contends that the authoritir.s irrespective of whether they exercise, original, appellate or revisional

C.S.T. v. PARSON TOOLS (Sarkaria, J.) 747

jurisdiction under the Sales-tax Act are not 'Courts' within the contemplation of s. 14(2) of th~ Limitation Act. It is pointed out that this question stands concluded by this Court's decision in Jagannath Prasad v. State of "l/.P.(')

Mr .. Karkhanis is right that this matter is no longer res integra.

In Shrimati Ujjam Bhai v. State of U.P.(2) Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, observed :

"The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State.

They are not a part of the legislature, nor are they a part of the judiciary. Their functions are the assessment and collection of taxes and in the process of assessing taxes, they follow a pattern of action which is considered Judicial. They are not thereby converted into Courts of Civil judicature.

They will remain the instrumentalities of the State and are within the definition or "State'' in Article 12."

The above observations were quoted with approval by this Court in Jagannath Prasad's case (supra), and it was held that a Sales-tax Officer under U.P. Sales-tax Act, 1948 was not a Court within the meaning of s. 195 ot the Code of Criminal Procedure although he is required to perform certain quasi-juicial functions. The decision in

Jagannath Prascufs case, it seems, was not brought to the notice of the High Court. In view of these prononcements of this Court, there is no room for argument that the Appellate-Au¢ority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales-tax exercising jurisdiction under the Salestax Act, are courts." They are merely administrative Tribunals and

"not courts." Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore,. does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such Tribunals. ·

Further question that remains is : Is the general principle underlying s.14 (2) applicable on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience for excluding the time spent in prosecuting the a1'ortive applications under Rule 68(6) before the Appellate Authority, for computing limitation for the purpose of revision applications.

Mr.

Karkhanis m1intains that the answer to this question; also, must be in the negative because definite indications are available in the scheme and language of the Sales-tax Act, which exclude the application of s. 14(2), Limitation Act even in principle or by analogy. LearnM Counsel further submits that the ratio of the Privy Council decision in

Ranuk!.tt Ramkissen Dass v. E. D. Sesson & Co.(8) relied upon by the majority judgment of the High Court is not applicable for computing limitation prescribed under the Sales-tax Act. Reference in this connection has been made to Purshottam Dass Hassaram v. lmpex (India) Ltd.(4 ) wherein a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court explained the rule of decision in Ramdutt's case (supra) and found it to be in.apPiicable for the purpose of computing limitation for applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940. ·

(1) ·. [196~) 2, S.C.R. 856.

(2) [1963) 1, S.C.R. 771.

(3) AIR 1n9 P. c, 103, (-4) A.I.R. 195-4 Bom. 309,

The material part of s. l 0 runs thus :

"(3) (i). The Revision Authority ....... may, f_or the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propnety of any order made by any appellate or asscssin~ auth.ority und.er this Act in its discretion call for and examine, either on its

own mtion or on the application o!' the Commissioner of Sales-tax or the person aggrieved, the record of such order and pass such order as it may think fit.

* * * *'

(3A)

(3B) The application under sub-section (3) shall be made within one yen1 from the date of crvice of the order complained of, but the Revising Authority mny on proof of

ufficient cnusc entertain nn upplicntinn within a furth11r period oe six months."

Three features of the scheme ot' the nbove provision a.re noteworthy. The first is that no limitntion has been .p!'escribcd for the suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction by the Rcvisin~ Authority. The second is that the period of one year prescribed as limitation for filing an application for revision by th1~ uggrk:vcd pmty is unusually long.

The third is that the Revising Authoritv hns no discretio11 ti> extend this period beyond a further period of six months, even on 11ufficient cause shown.

As rightly pointed out i11 the minority judgment of the High Cou; t, pe.ndcncy of proceedings of the nature contemplated by s. 14(2) of the Limitation Act, may amount to a sufficient cause for condoning the delay and extending the limitation for filing a revision application, but s. JO (3-B) of the Sales-tax Act, gives no , iurisdiction to the Revisinli Authority to extend the limitation, even in such a case, for a further period of more than six months.

The three stark features of the scheme and langua!!e of the above provision, urmistakably show that the legislature has 'deliberately .excluded the application of the principles und1?rlving ss. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in sub-s. (3-B) of s. 10 of the Sales-tax Act.

Delay in disposal of revenue matters adversely affects the steady inflow of revenues and the financial stability of the State. Section 10 is therefore designed to ensure speedy and final. determination of fiscal matters within a reasonably certain time-schedule.

It cannot be said that by excluding the unrestricted application of the principles of ss. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the Le1islature has made the provisions of s. JO, unduly oppressive.

In most cases, the discretion to extend limitation, on sufficient cause bein~: shown for a further period of six months only, given by sub-s. (3-B) would be enough to afford relief. Cases are no doubt conceivabfo where an aggrieved party, despite sufficient cause, is unable to make an

C.S.T. v. PARSON TOOLS (Sarkaria, !.)

application for revision within this maximum period uf 18 months.

Such harsh cases would be rare.

Even in such exceptional cases of extreme hardship, the Revising Authoritly may, on its own motion, entertain revision and grant relief.

Be that as it may, from the scheme and laneuage of S. 10, the intention of the Legislature to exclude the unrstricted application of the principles of ss. 5 and I 0 of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear.

Thee provisions of the Limitation Act which the Legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Sales-tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy.

An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it''. "The will of the lcgislati1re is.

the supreme law of the lnl)d, and demands perfect obdience". (1) "Judicial power is never exercised" said Mnrshall C. J, of the United States, "for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or in other words, to the will of the lnw''.

If the legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something t1f an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or evc11 if there is n cC1s11.1 omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plnin nnd unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the , Quisc of interpretation, by analogy or im:plication, somethine; what it thinks to be a general principle of justice a11d equity. To do so would be cntrenchit1g upon the preserves of Leiislatures, 'The primary function of a court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare.'

, In the light of what has been said above, we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in importing whole hog the principle of s. 14(2) of the Limitation Act into s. 10 (3-B) of the Sales-tax Act.

The ratio of the Privy Council decision in Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E. D. Sasson & Co. (Supra) relied upon bv the High Court is not on speaking terms with the clear language of s. 10 (3-B) of the Sales-tax Act. That decision was rendered Jong bfore the passage of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. It Jost its efficacy after the enactment of the Arbitration Act which contained a specific provision in regard to exclusion of time from computation of limitation.

The case in point is Purshottam Dass Hussaram v. Index (India) Ltd. (supra). In this Bombay case, the question was, whether the suit was b~_rred by limitation. It was not disputed that Article 115 Of the Limitation Act governed the limitation and if. no other factor was to be taken into consideration, the suit was filed beyond time.

But what was relied upon by the plaintiff for the purpose of saving

(1) see Maxwell 0n Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn .. pp. 1, 2 and 251.

SUPUM~ _COUJ. T .REPOUS [1975) 3 s.c.1.

limitation was the fact that there were certain infructuous arbitration proceedings and if the time taken in prosecuting those proceedings was excluded under s. 14, the suit would be within limitation. It was held that if s. 14 were to be construed strictly, the plaintiff would not be entitled to exclude the period in question.

On the authority ot Ramdutt Ramkissen's case (supra), it. was then contended that. the time taken in arbitration proceedings should be excluded on the analogy of s. 14. This contention was also negatived on the ground that since the decision ot the Privy Council, the legislature ha1:l in s. 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, provided as to what er.tent the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable to th¢ proceedings before the arbitrator. Section 37 ( ~:) wa.s as follows :

"Where the court orders that an award be set aside or orders, after the commencement of an arbitration, that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with res pect to the difference referred, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order ot the Court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the difference referred."

The reasons advanced, the observations made and the rule enunciated by Chagla CJ., who spoke for the Bench in that case, a!'e opposite and may be extracted with advantage :

" ...... we hve now a statutory provision for exclusion of time taken up in arbitration proceedings when a suit is filed, and the question arises of computing the period of

limitation with regard to that suit, and the time that has got to be excluded is only that time which is taken up as provided in s. 3 7 ( 5). There must be an order of the Court

setting aside• an award or there must be an order of the Court declaring that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect, and the period between the commencement ot

he arbitration and the date of this order is the period that has got to be excluded.

It is therefore no longer open to the Court to rely on s. 14 Limitation Act as applying by analogy to arbitration proceedings. If the Legislature intended that s. 14 should apply and that all the time taken up in arbitration proceedings should be excluded, then there was no reason to enact s. 37(5). The very fact that s. 37(5) has been enacted clearly hows that the whole period referred to in s. 14, .

Limitation Act is not to be excluded but the limited periodindicated ins. 37(5).

• • • •·

c. s. T. v. Parson Tools (Sarkaria, J.) ,. 51

''It may seem rather curious-and it may' also in certain cases result in hardshias to wpy the legislature should not have excluded all time taken up in good faith before an arbitrator just as the time taken up in prosecuting a suit or an appeal in good faith is excluded.

But obviously the B Legislature did not intend that parties should . waste time infructuous proceedings before arbitrators.

The Legislature has clearly indicated that limitation having once begun to run, no time could be excluded merely because parties chose to go before an arbitrator without getting an award or without coming to Court to get the necessary order indi- C cated in s. 37(5)."

What the learned Chief Justice said about the inapplicability of s. 14, Limitation Act, in the context of s. 3 7 ( 5) of the Arbitration Act, holds good with added force with reference to s. 10 (3-B) of the Sales-tax Act.

Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, _ in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, than the tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in , prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of s. 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

We have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same with out scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or

I implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the Jaw-giver; more so .if the statute is a taxing statute. We will close the discussion by recalling what L-Ord Hailsham (') has said recently, in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute which is a c!ear and complete Code, by itself :

"It is true of course that the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair.

But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view

(!) rl.t p, 11 in Pearl Ber~ v. Varty [1972] 2 All E. R. 6,

of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger degree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him.

Still less is it the functioning of the courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment."

For all the rasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the ob jcct, the scheme and language of s.10 of the Sales-tax Act do not permit the invocation of s.14(2) of the Limitation Act, either, in terms, or, in principle, for excluding the time spent in. prosecuting proc:ee dings for setting aside the dismissal of appeals in default, from com putRtion of the period of limitation prescribed for filing 11 revillion under the Snlcs.tax.

Accordingly, we answer the question referred,

i11 !he ncgntive,

1 n the result, we set aside the judgment c •he High Court and ac ccpt these oppcnls.

Since the appeals hnvc 1*'1 heard exparte, there will be no ordc:r as to costa.

V.M.K.

470Sup. CI/75-2500-27-11-75-GIPF.

PARSON TOOLS AND PLANTS, KANPUR

February 27, 1975

R. s. SARKARIA

A. c. GUPTA, JJ.

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

s. 10(3)

s. 10(3B)

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

May 10, 1963

Manchanda

s. 10

s. 10

s. 14

s. 14

Dwivedi

Singh

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

Hari Swarup

s. 10

Sales Tax Act

Limitation Act

s. 29(2)

Limitation Act

s. 14(2)

s. 10

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

Shrimflti Ujjam nlzai

[1963] 2 S.C.R. 778

[1963] 2 S.C.R. 850

Sales Tax Act

Section 14

Limitation Act

s. 10(3)(i)

Ss. 5 and 14

s. 10

N. D. Karkhanis

. P. R{J.na

SARKARIA

s 14(2)

Sales Tax Rules

Sales Tax Act, 1948

s. 10

s 10

s. 14

Limitation Act

s. 11

section 14

Limitation Act

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

Hari

Varup

s. 10

Limitation Act

Limitation Act

s. 29(2)

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

s. 14(2)

s. 14

Limitation Act

Karkhani~

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

Karkhanis

Hidayatullah

Article 12

Jagannath Prasad

Sales-tax Act, 1948

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

Jagannath Prascufs

Section 14

Limitation Act

Karkhanis

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

Bombay High Court

Ramdutt

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

ss. 5 and 14

Limitation Act

s. 10

Section 10

ss. 5 and 14

Limitation Act

S. 10

ss. 5

Limitation Act

Thee provisions of the Limitation Act

Mnrshall

United States

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

s. 10

s. 10

Bombay

Article 115

Limitation Act

s. 14

s. 14

Ramdutt Ramkissen

s. 14

s. 37(5)

Arbitration Act, 1940

Limitation Act

Section 37

Chagla

s. 3

s. 14

Limitation Act

s. 14

s. 37(5)

s. 37(5)

s. 14

Limitation Act

Sarkaria

s. 37(5)

s. 14

Limitation Act

s. 3

s. 10

s. 14(2)

Limitation Act

L-Ord Hailsham

Parliament

Limitation Act