.;. ___ _

PURAN SINGH & ORS.

STATE OF PUNJAB

April 25, 1975.

[N. L. UNTWALIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]

Penal Code-S. 99 to 102-Private defence when can be' exercised-" Settled possession" 1neaning of.

All the appellants \\'ere convicted by the Sessions Jndge under s. 302 read with s. 149 l.P.C. and s. 326 read with 149 I.P.C. and sentenced to life C in1prisonment. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In a dispute over land 'between the party of the appellants and the con1 plainant, the appellants alleged that they had redeemed the mortgage . in respect of the ]and and thereafter the mortgagee had himself delivered possession of the land and that they had grown \Vheat crop in it. The complainant, to whom the mortgagee sold bis mortgage rights, tried to take its possession D forcibly. It was alleged that on the day of the occurrence the complainant and his party, arn1ed with deadly \veapons, entered the disputed land and tried to destroy the \Vheat crop. In the scuffle that ensued. two pe; rsons of the complainant's party died and ome persons on both sides were injured. On the question of possession of the 1and the High Court gave a finding in favour of the appellants but on its own interpretation of the decision of thiS Court in

M1tnshi Rani and Others v. Delhi Adn1inistration held that the appellants vtho \Vere not in settled possession of the land, \Vere rank trespassers and E secondly that, instead of indulging in a free fight with the opposit~ party, the appellants could have taken recourse to the public authorities. Since the appeJJants had eXceeded the limitations provided iri s. 99 to 102 I.P.C. they could not claim any right of private defence.

Allowing the appeal,

F HELD : ( 1) It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast nlle as to when the po'SSeissjon of a trespasser can mattffe into settled possession. But \Vhat 'this Court really meant was that the ,.-possession of a trespasser must be effective, undisturbed and to the kno\vledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment. There is no special charm or magic in the \VOrds "settled possession" nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait jacket but it has been used to mean such clear and effective posSes~ sion of a person, even if he is a trespasser, \Vho gets the right under the criminal la\V .to defend his property ngainst _nttack even by the true o\vner.

G The nature of possession in such cases which may entitle a. trespasser to exercise the right of private defencB of property and person should contajn the following attributes : (I) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; (ii) that the possession must be within the knowledge either express or implied~ of the owner orwithout any attempt at concealment and Vihich contains an elcn1ent of anifnus possendie.

The nature of possession of the trespasser \Vould ho\vever be a matter to be decided on facts and circum5tances of each case (iii) the H process of dispossession of the tn1e owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and mnst be acquiesced in by the tn1c owner; (iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the ca1e of culturable Jand, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken

possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true o\vner bas no right to destroy the crop gro\vn by the trespasser and take forcible possession. In such a case the trespasser will have

A a right of private defen.::e and the tn1e owner will have no right of private defence. [307E-H, 308A-D]

It is manifest that th1~ finding of the High Court on the facts of the present case that the appellants were not in settled possession of the land is legally erroneous and_ cannot be allowed to stand. The ratio of the judgment of this Court in Munshi Rain's case has not been correctly applied by the High B Court. [310-C-D]

M1111slii Rani and 01'/iers v. Delhi Adn1inistrario11, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 455 explained and followed.

Honun and others v. Rex, A.LR. 1949 All. 564, .'i67 Sangappa and others

v. State, I.L.H .. [1955] Hyd. 406, /11 re : Mookti l\'adar, and others AJ.H .. [1943j !\Iad. 590, Hazara Singh and others v. The State, A.LR. 1959 Punjab

570. Bhartu v. State. A.l.R. 1954 All. 35=(1954) Cr. L.l. 54 !'hula SiaRh

v. Emperor, A.l.R. 1927 Lah. 705=28 Cr!. L.J. 848, referred to.

(2) The appe11ants \Vere protected by the right of private defence ot their property and person and the prosecution case against the appellants, \vhich has not-been proved beyond rea5onable doubt must fail. It is not the law that a person when called upon to face in assault must run away to the police station and not protect himself or when his property has been the subject matter of trespass and mischief he should allow the aggressor to take pos5ession of the property while he should run to the public authorities. Where there is an attribute of invasion or aggression on the property by a person who has no right to possession then there is o)Jviously no room to have recourse to the public authorities and the accused has an undoubted right to resist the attack and use even force if necessary.

The right of private defence of property or person, ivhcre there is real apprehension that the

agressor might cause death or grievous hurt to the victim, could extend to the causing of death also and it is not necessary that death or grievious hurt should; actualfy be caused before the right could be exercised. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough lo put the right of private defence into operation. [311-B-Dl

Jai Dev v. Tlic State of Pr.:11iab (1963] 3 S.C.R. 489 an<l A111jad Kha1i v.

J!ie State, [1952] S.C.R. 567, followed.

Jn the present case it could not be said that the appellants had exceeded the right of private defence. The appellants were undoubtedly in possession of the land and hac; l grown wheat crop and the prosecution part}' had tried to doslroy the wheat crop. The appellants were entitled to resist the invasion of their right by the prosecution party.

Again it cannot be. said that the appellant<; had in any eYent exceeded their right of private defence. As the rrosecnti.on had deliberately suppressed the very matedal part of the origin of the occurrence it is not known how the occurrence started. Secondy \Vhen t\VO persons on the side of the accused \vere injured by gun fire it \Vas not p6ssible for them to \veigh their blo\vs in golden scales in order to assault the prosecntiori party. }Jter two mcmbyrs of their party had received gun sot injuries the appellants would have undoubtedly a reasonable apprehension that eithr death or grievous hurt could be caused to the members of their party or one of them.

This being the position they were fully justified in causing the death of the decea-sed persons in exercise of their right of p1ivate defence of person. Such an a_1:prehension could not be said to be hypersensitive or based on no ground and it will be idle to content that the appellants could have waited until one of their party members would have died or received serious injuries before acting on the spur of moment. nor could one expect a person who is attacked by an agressor to modulate his blows in accordance \Vith the injuries he received. [312E-ll, 313G-H, 314ABC]

State of Gujarat 11. Sai Fatin1a & Anr. [19751 3 S.C.R. 993, followed.

PURAN SiNGlI v. PUN°JAB (Faiar Ali, J.) 301

CRIMINAL ,\PPELATE JURISDICTION :. Criminal Appeal .No. 266 of 1971.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 10th February, 197_1 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court iu Criminal Appeal No. 1034 of 1969.

R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala and V. J. Francis, for the appellants. h

0. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon, for respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAZAL Au, J.-The appellants Puran Singh, Piara Singh,

Bkshish Singh, Boliar Singh aud Balkar Singh have been convicted under S. 302/149 I.P.C, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a C fine of Rs. 200 each and in default six months. rigorous imprisonment and under ss. 326/149 I.P.C. to one year rigorous imprisonment and l!nder s. 148 J.P.C. to one year simple imprisonment.

The learned , Sessions Judge who tried the present cas~ has also convicted one Pargat ' Singh the brother of Bakshish Singh and son of Charan Singh but this accused has been acquitted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana-

. D hereinafter refrred to as 'the High Court'. The High Court, has, however, affirmed tqc conviction and sentences of the five appellants and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants before it-hence this appeal to this Court by special leave.

It is not necessary for us to detail the facts of this case, because the decision of the matter lies within a very narrow compass: Mr. R. K.

Ge.rg appearing for the appellants has raised a few questions of laiv and according to his submissions the appeal should succeed on the question of law on the basis of the findings given by the High Court.

The unfortunate incident in the present case which led to the loss of two valuable lives appears to be the result of chronic land dispute between the parties and a competitive race for taking possession of the land by the prosecution or the accused.

The story opens with a usdructuary mortgage which was executed by H ari Singh the original owner in respect of 29 Kanals 14 Murlas of land in favour of the appellants Puran Singh and Piara Singh and one Nishan Singh for a sum of Rs. 3000/-. Soon thereafter the mortgagees sold their mortgage rights to Makhan Singh father of Dilbagh Singh of the prosecution party.

On July 28, 1966 the appellants Purim Singh and Piara Singh and one Smt. Chandra daughter of the appellant Bakshish Singh purchased the equity of redemption in the said land from Hari Singh

for a sum of Rs. 20,000 and undertook to liquidate the mortgage debt. According to the defence the mortgage debt was actually discharged on May 30, 1967 and a few months later mutation was sancticmed in favour of the accused on July 13, 1967. Having, however, failed to take possession of the mortgage property after having redeemed the mortgage, the purchasers of the equity of redemption, namely, the party of the appellants filed a suit for possession against Dilbagh Singh in tlie Cou~ of the Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur on

October 4, 1967. One of the dates fixed in this suit was October 27, 1968 when, according to the prosecution, Puran Singh, Piara Singh,

A Ilakshish Singh, Pargat Singh and Chandra Singh entered the land in dispute and demolished the kothas of the complainant. A complaint was filed by Dilbagh Singh on October 30, 1968 against the accused and Ajmer Singh Sub-Inspector of Police alleging that the accused had entered the land and demolished the kothas belonging to the complainant with the active aid of the police.

In this corn- B plaint although the complainant did not admit in so many words that the accused had taken forcible possession of the land and demolished the kothas, yet from the facts and circumstances proved in this case there was no doubt that it was a fact that the complainant in spite of his best attempts was dispo.scsscd by the party ol' the accused.

While the complaint was being enquired into, the suit filed by Puran Singh and others was dismissed C on November 21, 1968 on the ground that the suit was not maintain-

3hlc and the plaint was returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to the proper authorities, namely, Revenue Courts. Emboldened by this success in a civil suit, it appears that the complainant Dilbagh Singh along with Sohan Singh. Bachan Singh, Sulakhan Singh, Baj Singh and others went to the field in question and started ploughing it and D sowing Sarson.

We might mention here tl1at the definite case of the accused has been that after taking possession of the land in question from the complainant the appellants had grown wheat in the land and on the date of occurrence the complainant party tried to destroy the crop which led to mutual fight between the accused and the complainant patty resulting E in the death of the two deceased persons of the prosecution party and according to the defence injuries on Mohan Singh and Bohar Singh who were on the side of the accused.

According to the prosecution while the prosecution party was busy ploughing the land and sowing Sarson crop in the field all the appellants F variously armed with gun, barchhas, kirpans, gandasis and axes cntcrcri upon the land and Pargat Singh fired his gun as a result of which Dilbagh Singh and Bachan Singh fled away leaving the two deceased persons and Schan Singh behind.

Thereafter the accused Puran Singh and Piara Singh surrounded Sulakhan Singh -and inflicted various injuries on his body with kirpans, while Bakshish Singh gave spear blows in the thigh and abdomen of Sulakhan G Singh. The appellants Balkar Singh, Puran Singh and Piara Singh inflicted with their respective weapons blows on Baj Singh, Sohan Singh P. W. 9 who tried to rescue his brother was also assaulted by Balkar Singh, Bohar Singh and Bakshish Singh.

Puran Singh and Piara Singh arc also alleged to have assaulted Sohan Singh with their weapons.. The victims then fell down on the ground and then the accused made good their escape. The three injured persons were. re- H moved to the civil hospital at Hoshiarpur but Sulakhan Singh succumbed to his injuries on the way while Baj Singh and Sohan Singh were admitted in the. hospital.

The F.I.R. was lodged on November 27, 1968 by Baj Singh one of the injured persons on the basis of which the present case started and after usual investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused which resulted in their ultimate conv'.ction and sentences as mentioned above.

...,,._

PURAN SINGH v, PUNJAB (Fazal Ali, J.)

The defence of .the appellants was that they had redeemed the A mortgage debt and thereafter the mortgagee had himself delivered possession of the land to the appellants some time in 1968, and since then the appellants were in peaceful possession. of the land and had grown wheat crop therein.

Dilbagh Singh being c!issatisfied with his having to part with the posscsion of the property filed a false complaint against the appellants and thereafter tried to take forcible B possession of the land from the appellants with the show of force.

According to the defence, the prosecution party was also armed with gun, axe, kirpans and other deadly weapons and the accused tried to resist their being dispossessed and assaulted the prosecution party p11rely in the exercise of their right of private defence of person and property.

According to the c!efcnce two persons on their side were injured one of them Mohan Singh had received gun-shot injury, C whereas Ilohar Singh bad also received gun-shot injuries.

The High Court after discussing the evidence appear to have given a finding in favour of the accusec! so far as the question of possession of the land is coneen; cd, but in view of the decision of this Court in Munshi Ram and Others v. Delhi Administration,(!) on its own interpretation, held that as the appellants were not in settled possession of the D land and were rank trespassers they could not have any right of private defence.

Appearing for the appellants Mr. Garg submitted that the High Court hac! taken an erroneous view of the law and had misinterpreted the judgment of this Court in Munshi Ram's case (supra). Before, however, coming to the judgment we would like to extract the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court on the question of possession which forms the basis of the right of private defence claimed by the acc11scd.

In this connection the High Court found as follows:

"Certain admissions wrong out from the prosecution witness in cross-examination, however, do show that about ' one month or so prior to the occurrence, the vendce-appcllants. had somehow entered upon the disputed land and taken its physical possession, and had possibly sown wheat crop in it. .................... .

After some prevarication, witness admitted that on the dav of occurrence Dilbagh Singh had told him that they should go and plough the field and take its possession. Witness thereupon took the kulhari from the house of Dilbagh Singh and proceeded to the place of occmrence with the deceased persons.

Sohan Singh does not say a wore! that they had sowed or were sowing wheat crop at the time of occurrence in this field. He stated that at about 5 P .M. they were busy sowing sarson in the field ............. ..

Dilbagh Singh, P.W. 12, in examination-in-chief stated that about one month before the occurrence, all the accused, excepting Bohar Singh and Balar Singh, had cemolishe.d his kothas in the dispmcd fielc! with the help of the Police ...

(l) [1968] 2 SCR 45S .

Though in this complaint it is not specifically alleged that P_uran Singh, Piara Singh etc., had taken forcible possession ()f the land, yet the same read with the admission made by P. W. Sohan Singh already referred to above, shows that Dilbagh Singh had been ousted from possession of the land on the 27th October, 1968, and thereafter the appellants continued in its actual possession till the occurrence took place .................. In Rabi J 968, as has been deposed to by Patwari Bchari Lal, P.W. 14, wheat crop was standing in the disputed khasra 17 /9 when he inspected the harvest at the spot in April 7, 1969.

In the visual site-plan, Exhibit PZ, which, accoreing to AS.I. Kartar Singh, was prepared by him on November 27, 1968, it is mentioned that the field was under wheat cultivation. It is unfortunate that no question was put to the AS.I. in cross-examination to show as to what was the size of the wheat crop.

If at the time of occurrence, sprouted wheat crop was in the field and if, as has been deposed to by P.W. Sohan Singh, the complainant party had gone there armed to take back the possession from the accused party, this wheat crop might have been sown by the vendee-appellants some eays prior to the occurrence.

Though the facts elicited in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or otherwise brought on record fall short of positive proof of this wheat crop having been sown by Piara Singh and Puran Singh appellants, yet the possibility of that being a fact cannot be ruled out.

Thus, even if the view most favourable to the accused, of the evidence on record is taken, then also the possession of the appellants, which commenced about one month prior to the occurrence, was little better than that of a trespasser.

It is now settled law that even a person nghtfully entitled to immediate actual possession has no right to oust a trespasser by force if that trespasser is in settled possession of the lane.

Such a trespasser in established possession is entitled-unless he is rejected in due course of law-to defend his possession even against the rightful tenure-holder or owner.

This is what was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration

A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 702."

From these findings of the High Court, which arc basee on the admissions of some of the prosecution witnesses and are corroborated by the circumstances proved by the prosecution, it is quite clear that the party of the appellants had undoubtedly tak<; n possssion of_ th~ land in dispute to the knowledge of the complamant D1lbagh Singh at least a month before the occurrence and had sown wheat crop on the land in question.

Jn fact this finding is based on very cogent

PURAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Fazal Ali; J.) 305

material because it woulc! appear that P.W .. Sohan Singh one of the A eye witp.ess clearly state\! in his evidence that about a mol)th before ,,. the occurrence Puran Singh and Piara Singb took possession of the land with the help of the police.

This witness further admitted as follows :

i J

' '

> -I

"Dilbagh Singh did tell me that we shonld •go and B plough the field and take its possession .. I hac! taken the Kulhari from the house of Dilbagh Singh in .the field." . . .

He further admitted in his evidence that after the kotlzas ere demolished, Dilbagh Singh used to live in the village.

This also corroborates the fact that the complainant's party was dispossessed on October 27, 1968, when the accused hac! taken forcible posses- . sion of the land and since then the complainant Dilbagh Singh had started living with Sohan Singh in the village.

Similarly another eye witness P. W. 10 Jagtar Singh admitted that he did state to the police that the appellant Puran Singh had taken forcible possession of the land about one month earlier.

P .W. 12 Dilbagh Singh, the complainant himself depose<! that he had stated before the police that they had sown Sarson as well as

wheat in the field and when he was confronted with his previous statement before the police where he had mentioned the fact that

he and his companions had ploughed the field and were preparing the furrows or sowing Sarson. The witness further admitted in his evi- E tlence that most of the crop was, however, wheat.

P.W. 14 Bchari Lal, Patwari, has stated that he effected the Girdawri on April 7, 1969 and found wheat crop standing in Khasra No. 16/2 anc! 16/9 which was shown to be in possession of Puran Singh.

The evidence of this witness fully corroborates the evidence F of the prosecution witnesses that the accused party had dispossessed the complainant from the land in dispute as far back as October 27, 1968 which led to the filing of the complairlt by Dilbagh Singh and thereafter it was the accused party and not the prosecution party which hacl sown wheat crop on the land. ·

Finally, even in the F.1.R. it appears that the informaat had G admitted in categorical terms that the accused Piara Singh and Puran Singh had taken forcible possession of the land.

This statement runs thus :

"Dilbagh Singh had been in possession of this land, bl1t some days after the Dewali, Piara Singh anc! Puran Singh took forcible possession of this land. Now, some days ago, H both the above mentioned cases were decided in favonr of Dilbagh Singh.

So, yesterday the 26th November, 1968 at about 4 P.M., Dilbagh Singh along with his brother Gurbachan Singh, having taken myself (Baj Singh) and both of my brothers Sulakhan Singh and Sohan Singh with him, ploughed this land."

A On a consic!cration of the admissions of the prosecution witnesses a_nd the findings arrived at by the High Court, the following propositions of fact emerge:

( 1) That although the accused had purchased the equity of redemption, yet there is no reliable evidcJ1.ce to show that they had paid off the mortgage debt and taken possession from the mortgagee in spite of the fact that mutation was sanctionccl in favour of the appellants in 1967.

The High Court has rightly pointed out that if the appellants party had taken possession as far back as in 1967 there would be no occasion for them to file a civil suit for possession on October 4, 1967 against the mortgagee, Dilbagh Singh and others;

(2) That on October 27, 1968 the appellants undoubtedly entered the field and took forcible possession of the land from the complainants who were unable to resist the entry of the accused as a result of which Dilbagh Singh filed a complaint on Oct.ober 30, 1968. It is not necessary for us to say anything regan.!ing the allegation about demolishing of the Kothas;

( 3) The complainant knew fully well that he had been dispossessed by the appellants at least a month before the occurrence and that the appellants hacl sown wheat crop and in spite of his knowledge he deliberately went there with the avowed object of taking forcible possession from the appdlants;

( 4) That on the date of ocel!rrence the prosecution party undoubtedly went to the field armed with the gun and axe. It would appear from the injuries on Bahar Slngh F ancl Mohan Singh on the side of the accused that the present occurrence took place as a result of mutual fight over the land; and

( 5) that although the defence has proved beyond reasonable doubt that both Mohan Singh and Bahar Singh had re<; eived injuries on their person, the prosecution has given no explanation for the same.

The question that arises for consideration is whether in view of these findings of fact it can be said that the accused had no right of private defence or that the prosecution party in entering upon the land was protected by the right of private. defence of property.

This brings us to the consideration of the decision of this Court-Munshi Ram and Others v.

Delhi Administration(') on H which great reliance has been placed by the High Court,· where this Court obscrvod as follows:

"It is true that no one including the true owner ha~ a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser ----·------------ (I) [1968! 2 s:c.R. 455.

PURAN.SINGll v. PUNJAB (Fazil Ali, .T.)

is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unlesi he is evicted in due co11rse of law, he is entitlecl to defend his possession even against the rightful owner.

But strai: or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give uch a nght against the true owner.

The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner.

A casual act of possession woulcl not have .the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful ownr. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he docs not use more force than necessary.

Such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which has never been lost.

The persons in possession by a stray act. of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time, to remove the obstruction even by using nece>sary force."

In this case there was a concurrent finding of fact that Jamuna was in effective possession of the field on the date of occurrence and the prosecution hac! alleged that P.Ws 17 and 19 had taken possession of the property but the finding of the Court was that P.Ws 17 and 19 had not been put in possession by virtue of the delivery of possession given by the Court. lt was against this context that the observations referred to above were made.

This Court clearly pointed out that where a trespasser was in settled possession of the land he is not entitled to be evicted except in due course of law anc! be is further entitled to resist or defend his possession even against the rightful owner who tries to dispossess him.

The only condition laid down by this Court was that the possession of the trespasser must be settled possession. The Court explained that the settled possession must be extended over a sufficiently Jong period anc! acquiesced in by the true owner.

This particular expression has persuacled the High . Court to hold that since the possession of the appellants party in this case was only a month old, it cannot be deemed to be a settled possession.

We, however, think that this is not what this Court meant in defining the nature of the settled possession. -It is indeed difficult to Jay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into a settled possession.

Bllt what this Court really meant was that the possession of a trespasser must be effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment.

For instance a stray or a casual act of possession would not amount to settled possession.

There is no special charm or magic in the word 'settled possession' nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be con fined in a strait jacket but it has been used to mean such clear and effective possession of a person, even if he is a trespasser, who gets the right under the criminal law to cle!end his property against attack even by the true owner. Similarly an occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.

Thus in our. opinion the nature of possession in such cases which ma~ entitle a trespasser

A to exercise the right of private defence of property and person

should contain the following attributes: ,

(i) . that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of property over a sufficiently long period; .

(ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge either express or implied of the owner or without any attempt at concealment and which contains an clement of animus prossendie. The nature of possession of the trespasser would however be a matter to be decic!ed on facts and circumstances of each case ;

(iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final ancl must be acquiesced iu by the true owner; and

(iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken p0ssession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown .by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession, in which case the trespasser will have a right of private defence ancl the true owner will have nci right of .private defence ..

These principles logically flow from a long catena of cases decided by this Court as well as other High Courts some of which have been referred to in the judgment of this Court in Munshi Ram's case (supra).

In the case of Horam and others v. Rex(') which was relied upon by this Court in Munshi Ram's case (supra) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows:

"Where a trespasser enters upon the land of another, the person in whom the right of posse; sion is vestecl,. while the trespasser is in the process of acquiring possession, may turn the trespasser out of the land by force and if in doing so he inflicts such injuries on the trespasser as are warranted. by the situation, he commits no offence.

His action would be covered by the principle of self-defence embodied in Ss. 96 to 105, Penal Code.

If, on the other hand, the trespasser hacl already accomplished or completed his possession and the person with the right of possession has acquiesced in this accomplishment, it is not open to the latter to avail himself of the doctrine of self-defence and by inflicting injuries on the trespasser to re-acquire possession of his land." It may be noted that in this case the accused hacl remained in possession for ten days and had sown the field and this was held to be sufficient possession to enable the trespasser to resist the entry of the true owner.

In fact this case appears to be on all fours .with

(')_A.l.R. 1949 All. 564,567.

0 PURAN SINGH v. PUl<JAB (Fazal Ali, J.) 309

the factFot the present case where also the appellants party after A having taken possession of the land in dispute a montli before the occurrence had grown wheat crop on it ano the complainant party tried to re-enter the land 'and destroy the crop grown by the accused. '

Anoth'e~ decision to which reference. has been made by this Court B in Munshi Ram's case (supra) is Sangappa and others v. State('),

where a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court observeo as follows:

 "If somebody enters on his land d4ring his absence 'and. he does not acquiesce in the trespass, he would still retain possession of the land and as the possessor of the land, he c is entitleo to that pssession ..... , .............................. .

If a person aquie~¢es in his dispossession and $ubsequcnt!y under caim of title comes agaill to dispossess h_is opponents then he aitd his friends would be members of un!aiV:ful assembly:" · ·

.This case also fully covers th~ facts of the present case which falls' under the seconp category laid down by the ourt. . _.,• ' ) . · A similar view was taken in In .re. Mooka Nadar and others (2), where H6rwill, J., observed as follows :

"It seems to be true that the party of P.W.2 were on E the field first on the morning on which this offence happened; but that does not n'Ccessarily mean that they were then in possesion of the field.

A person doe~ not lose possession of the field by going home to have a meal; or to sleep. If somebody enters on his land <luting his absence and he c!oes 'not acquiesce in the trespass, he would F still retaih possession of the land; and as the possessor of the !and he is entitled to defend that possession ............. ..

If a person acquiesces in his dispossession and subsequently under claim of title comes again to dispossess his opponents, then he and his frienos would. be members of an unlawful assembly and guilty of rioting."

These were the cases referred to in the judgment of this Court in Munshi Ram's case (supra) and it would appear frpm all these cases that the case of the appellants is fully covered by these decisions.

Apart from that in the case of Hazara Singh and other~ v. The Sta(e(') it was held that the accused was protected by the nght of 11.nvate

<!fence having cultivated and sown Bajra in the field.

In this connection, Chopra, J., observed as follows: .

"When once Resbam Singh had taken possession . of, cultivated and sown bajra in the field and bad remamed

(1) I.L.R. (1955) Hyd. 406.

(2) A.LR. (1943) Mad. 590.

(3) AJ.R. (1959) Funja b 570.

in possession of it for a couple of months, Hazara Singh even though hi: was the owner was not entitled to take the law into his own hands and use force in ousting the trespasser. He had ample time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities.

He was himself liable" for committing criminal trespass and mischief by taking forcible possession of the land and uprooting the crop and would not therefore be entitled to the right of private defence of property."

The learned Judge relied on two judgments one of the AllahabaC: High Court in Bhariu v. State(') and the other of Lahore High Court in Phu la Singh v. Emperor(').

In view of these decisions it is, therefore, manifest that the finding of the High Court on the facts of the present case that the appellants were not in settled possession of the land is legally erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand.

The ratio of the juc!gment of this Court in Munshi Ram's case (supra) has not been correctly D applied by the High Court.

The second point that falls for determination is as to what is the extent of right of private defence which the accused can claim in this case? In this connection, the High Court has given a finding that since the prosecution party had entered the land" in possession of the aceuseo and were trying to plough it, the appellants should "E have taken recourse to the public authorities instead of indulging in free fight with the prosecution~ In other words, the High Court fotmd that the right of private defence available to the accused was under .the limitations provided for in Ss. 99 to 102 of the Indian Penal Code and these limitations apply to the facts of the present case, ano the accused cannot claim any right of private defence.

F" With respect we find ourselves unable to agree with this somewhat broad statement of the Jaw. It is true that the right of private defence of person or property is to be exercised under the following limitations:

0) that if there is sufficient time for recourse to the public authorities the right is not available;

(ii) that more harm than necessary should not be caused;

(iii) that there must be a reasonable apprehension of death or of grievous hurt to the person or damage to the property concerned. ·

The fast limitation obviously does not apply to this ca5e.

In the first place the accused after having dispossessed the complainant to his knowledoc were in conscious and peaceful possession of the land and had grown wheat crop therein.

The complainant had already filed a complaint and thereafter it was not" open ' to the

(!) A.I.R 1954 All. 35= 1954 Cr. L.J" 54"

(2) kLR. 1927 Lah. 705=28 Cl'" L.J. 848"

!'URAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Fazal Ali, J.)

complainant to take the Jaw in his own hands and to try to disposses the accused by show of force. That the complainant had entered the land in question along with other persons variously armed with gandasis and a gun cannot be disputed, because this is the finding of the Court which is supported by the injuries on the person ot Mohan Singh and Bohar Singh for . which the prosecution has given no explanation whatsoever.

It is not the Jaw that a person when callee! upon to face an assault must run away to the police station and not protect himself or when his property has been the subject-matter of trespass and mischief he shou(d allow the aggressor to take possession of the property while he should run to the public authorities.

Where there is an attrib1c1te of invasion or aggression on the property by a person who has no right to possession, then there is obviously no room to have recourse to the public authorities and the accused has the undoubted right to resist the attack and use even force if necessary.

The right of private defence of property or person, where there is real apprehension that the aggressor might cause death or grievous huh to the victim, coulcl extend to the causing of death also, and it is not necessary that death or grievous hurt should actually be caused before the right could be exercised.

A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of private defence into operation. We are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court in Jai Dev v. The State of Punjab (1) where this Court observed as follows:

"This, however, does not mean that a person sudi'enly called upon to face an assault must run away and thus protect himself.

He is entitled to resist the attack and defend himself.

The same is the position if he has to meet an attack Ofl his property.

In other words, where an individual citizen or his property is faced with a i'anger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, the individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his properly ................. .

There can be no doubt that in. judging the conduct of a person who proves that he hacl a right of private defence, allowance has necessarily to be made for his feelings at the relevant time.

He is faced with an assault which causes a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt and that inevitably creates in his mind some excitement and confu- G sion. At such a moment, the uppermost feeling in his mind would be to ward off the danger and to save himself or his property, and so, he would naturally be anxious to strike a decisive blow in exercise of his right."

In this very case, while adverting to the question as to whether the force used should not be more than what is necessary, the Court H observed:

"But in dealing with the question as to whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the

(1) [19631 3 $.C.R. 489,

10 SC/75-21

A prevailing circumstances, it would be inappropriate to adopt tests of detached objectivity which would be so natural m a court room, for instance, Jong after the incident has taken place.

That is why in some judicial decisions it has been observed that the means which a threatened person adopts of the force which he uses should not be weighed in golden B scales."

To the same effect is the decision of this Court in A /l/jad Khan

v. The State(') where it was observed :

"It was impossible for him to know whether his shop would or would not suffer the same fate if he waited, and on the findings it was reasonable for him to apprehend death or grievous hurt to himself and his family once they broke in, for he would then have had the right to protest and indeed would have been bound to do what he could to protect his family.

The threat to break in was implicit in the conduct of the mob and with it the threat to kill or cause grievous hurt to the inmates; .................. The circumstances in which he was placed were amply sufficient to give him a right of private defence of the body even to the extent of causing death.

These things cannot be weighed in too fine a set of scales or, as some learned Judges have expressed it, in golden scales."

Thus the question whether the appellants used more force than was necessary would determine on the facts and circumstances of this case.

We are satisfied that in the present case it cannot be said that the appellants, although two persons have lost their lives, had exceeded the right of their private defence.

To begin with the appellants were undoubtedly in possession of the land and had grown wheat crop and that the prosecution party had tried to destroy the wheat crop.

The appelJants were, therefore, entitled to resist the invasion to their right by the prosecution party.

The High Court has also found that the probabilities are that the prosecution party were also armed with gun and Gandasis.

Mohan Singh one of the persons on the side of the accused had received a gun-shot injury which has been proved by the Injury Report (Ext. D.D.) which shows that Mohan Singh received as many as four injuries one of them under the right eye.

Similarly the accused Bohar Singh who was examined by P.W. 5 Dr. Pritpal Singh, had two injuries which according to the Doctor were gun-shot injuries having been caused by a gun.

This Doctor also says that after examining the injuries of Mohan Singh he was of the opinion that they were also gun-shot injuries.

The Sub-Inspector of Police also found pellets at the place of occurrence which confirms the fact that the complainant must have fired from his gun.

The High Court has also pointed out that the complainant Dilbagh Singh was prosecuted for having been in possession of an unlicensed gun and has since been absconding.

These facts, therefore, clearly establish that the prosecution party was undoubtedly armed with lethal weapons and that a gun was also

(i) [1952] S.C.R. 567.

PURAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Fazal Ali, J.) 313

iired.

The High Court has also found that the prosecution party A was the aggressor in the sense that they were bent upon destroying the crop of the appellants ancl taking back possession of the land forcibly.

This is also supported by the fact that the injuries on the person of the accused have not been explained by the prosecution and in fact Mohan Singh was deliberately kept back from being made an accused so that the prosecution may be absolved from the B <luty !O explain the injuries on him.

In State of Gujarat v. Sai Fatima & Anr.( 1) one of us (Untwalia, J.,) speaking for the Court, observed as follows:

"In a situation like this when the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the person of an. accused, depending on the facts of each case, any of the three results may follows:

(I) That the accused had inflicted the injuries on the

members of tl, le prosecution party in exercise of the D right of self defence.

(2) It makes the prosecution version of the occurrence doubtful and the charge against the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable c!oubt.

(3) It does not affect the prosecution case at all."

The facts of the present case clearly fall within the four corners of either of the first two principles laid down by this judgment.

In the instant case, either the accused were fully justified in causing the death of the deceased and were protected by the right of private F <lefence or that if the prosecution c!oes not explain the injuries on the person of the deceased the entire prosecution case is doubtful and the genesis of the occurrence is shrouded in deep mystery, which is sufficient to demolish the entire prosecution case.

It was, however, contended by counsel appearing for the State that on the allegations made by the prosecution the accusecl had mercilessly assaulted the prosecution party including the Sulakhan

Singh and Baj Singh and, therefore, even if they had the right of private defence they had exceeded the same.

We are, however, unable to accept this contention.

In the first place as the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the very material part of the origin of occurrence, we co not know as to how the occurrence started.

Secondly when two persons on the side of the accused were injured by gun-fire it was not possible for the appellants to _weigh their blows in golden scales in order to assault the proserntion party._ As

- held by us this was a case where the appellants were fully entitled to the exercise of the right of self defence of their property and

; .-'

(I)

[19751 3 S.C.R. 993.""' ,·

A person both because their persons had been attacked ancl their property had been trespassed upon and damaged. It is manifest that after the two persons on the side of the accused received gun-shot injuries as found by the High Court ancl by us, the accused party would have undoubtedly a reasonable apprehension that either death or grievous hurt could be caused to the appellants or one of them.

B. This being the position they were fully justified in causing the death of the deceased persons in the exercise of their right of private defence of person.

Such an apprehension coulcl not be said to be hypersensitive or based on no ground and it will be idle to contend that the accused should have waited until one of their party members would have died or received serious injuries before acting on the spurt of moment, nor can one expect a person who is attackecl by C an aggressor to modulate his blows in accordance with the injuries he receives. In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the accused had in any event exceeded their right of private defence. If the prosecution did not come ont with the true version of the nature and . origin of the occurrence, they cannot blame the Court if the critire version presented by them is rejectecl, as held D in the recent judgment of this Conrt in State of Gujarat v. Sai Fatima & Anr.( 1) For these reasons, therefore, we arc clearly of the opinion that the accnsed are protected by the right of pcivatc defence of their property and person and the prosecution case against the appellants must fail.

In any event, the prosecution case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

E The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the conviction of and the sentences passecl on the appellants are set aside and the appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith.

P.B.R.

Appeal allowed ..

• •

.. ..

PURAN SINGH & ORS

STATE OF PUNJAB

N. L. UNTWALIA

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.

Penal Code

S. 99 to 102

s. 302

s. 149

s. 326 read with 149

I.P.C

s. 99 to 102

I.P.C

[1968] 2 S.C.R. 455

(1963] 3 S.C.R. 489

S. 302

I.P.C

ss. 326

I.P.C

s. 148

[1968] 2 SCR 45

Ss. 96 to 105

Penal Code

Ss. 99 to 102

Indian Penal Code


BHAGWAN DASS JAGDISH CHANDER

DELHI.ADYIJNISTRATION

March 25, 1975

[M. H. BEG, A. ALAGIRISWAMI AN.D N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.J

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Ss. 7, 16 and 19(2)-Joint trial of 1_e.11dor a11d distributor of food article-If legal-S. 20A-Scope of.

The appellant, a firm of ghee merchants, through its partner as A2 w; is charged with having sold ghee to Al (the vendor of ghee). A san1ple of that gheC: purchscd_ by the Food Inspector was found (on analysis) to be adulterated. The two accused were prosecuted jointly under ss. 7 and 16 of the Prevention or Food Adulteration Act, 1954. .

At the trial, the vendor prayed for the discharge or acquittal of the warrantor so that he might examine the v.rarrantor as his defence \vitness 'to prove his own purchase of the article under a warranty. The trying magistrate acquitted the partner of the appellant.

The vendor was also acquitted on the ground that he was protected by a warranty covered bys. 19(2) of the Act. -

On appeal, the High Court, while maintaining acquittal of A-1, set aside the acquittal of the appellant (A-2).

On the! question \Vhethcr the charge should be quashed because two accused were set up for trial jointly.

HELD : The High Court was right in holding that the joint trial of the ·<.!ppellant with the vendor was not illegal.

[42A]

(l)(a) Jn a suitable case, a vendor, a distributor, and a manufacturer could be tried together provided the allegations made before the Court show that there \Vere connecting links between their .activities so as to constitute the same transaction.

The connecting links, in a case could be provided by (i) the fact that a sale at an anterior stage could be viewed as the cause of the subsequent sale; (ii) the allegation that each of the accused parted with the article of food when it was in an . adulterated state and (iii) the common object of the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor was that the article

st.ould reach the consumer to be used as food. The third and last link is decisive and must tilt the balance in favour of legality of a joint trial of the parties concerned.

.[41~C-DJ

(b) A rnens rea as a particular state of mind which could be described as guilty or wrongful 'vas not needed, and, therefore, could not provide the connecting link between the co-accused in a trial for such an offence in order to constitute the same transaction.

[39D]

Sarjoo 'Prasad v. The State of Uttnr Pradesh, A.LR. 1961 S.C. 631, referred to.

(c) Where jOinder of several accused persons concerned dealing in different \Vays with the same adulterated article of food at different stages is likely to jeopardise -a fair trial, a separate trial ought to be ordered. It is not proper to acquire or discharge an accused person on this ground alone.

The order of separate trial in a case where preJudice to an accused from a joint trial is apprehended is enough.

A joint trial of such accused persons is not nb' initio illegal. [40A]

Jt. N. Knn1dar & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [19741 lS.C.R. 157 Ill' 161 and Kadiri Kunhammad v. The State of Madras.

A.I.R. 1960, S.C. 661 @663, followed.

(2) Neither S. 7 nor S. 14 of the Act bars trial of several offences by .A the same accused person, be he a manufacturer, a distributor or a last seller referred to as "the vendor" in S. 14 of the Act. . The definition• <.)f "sale" in sub-s. (xiii) of the Act. is wide enough to include every kind of .sefler. Every seller can be prosecuted for an offence created by s. 7 of the Act.

The mere fact that, for purposes of S .. 14, the .perron who could be the last seller is described as "the vendor'', could not affect a liabili_ty. fo~ an offence under s. :; _of the Act_ by a sale of an.ar.ticle oT food ...;· 'vhich is found to be adulterated.

A sale of an rticle of .food by a D umanufacturer, distri!tOr, or dealer" is , a distinct and separable offence.

Section 14 was not ant to carve out an exemption in favour of a <listri butor o:r a manufact r who sells articles of food; found to be adulterated, irrespective of the qqesiion whether any warranty was given for them. [36CF1

(3)(a) The special provisions contained in Ss. 19(2) and 20A do not take away or derogae from the effect of the otdinary provisions of the Ja\V \Vhich enable separate as well as joint trials of accused persons in accordance

. C with the provisions of the old Ss. 233 to 239, Cr. P. C.

On the other hand, there is no logically sound rCason why, if a distributor or a manufacturer can be subsequently in1pleaded i.1nder s. 20A of the Act, he cannot be joined as a CO:accused initially in a joint trial if the allegations made iustify s.uch .a course. [37B] ·· "

(b) The special provisions of S. 20A are only enabling and do-_ not give rise to a mandatory duty. They do not bar either a separate or a joint trial of an accused person if other conditions are satisfied.

Similarly S. 239(d), Cr. P.C. is only an enabling section. f41B]

In the instant case although the charge stated that the ghee sold by the vendor was found to be adulterated, it is not stated that it was in that very state when the appellant sold it to the vendor. It is left to be inferred from the charge that the appellant also sold the ghee in an adulterated state. It is true that defects in the charge V.-'ou]d not invalidate a trial.

Even so, continuation of such an old prosecution is likely to handicap the appellant in his defence. Assuining that the charge. implied an allegation that ghee was adulterated v.-hen the appellant sold it to the vendor an enquiry _in 1975 into the actual state of the ghee sold by the distributor in 1967 would be obviously difficult.

It would impose undue hardship on the distributor to prove at this distance of time, the actual state of the small quantity of ghee analysed.

[41G~HJ

Alagiri.(wami, J. (concurring in the final result)

The High Court was not correct in saying that the action of both the accused formed part of the same transaction and there was unity of purpose of the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor furnished by the purpose of all of them to sell, and, therefore, it was the same transaction and all of them could be tried together.

[43E]

(1) If the common purpose of all. of them was to sell ghee, joint trial G 0f all of them would not be valid; but, if it was to sell adulterated ghce it would be valid.

If it is aileged that at every one of the sta_ges $lice was

d.ulterate? then it Wollld be the same transaction and they could all be 101ntly tned. In the absence of an aJlegation that the ghee di_stributed by the appe1lant to the vendor was adulterated both of them could not be tried together.

[43G]

. (2) At he stag~ of considering the validity of the charge, ifis the alle .•H

at1on that is. matenal ; at the stage of considering the grult Of the parties it is proof that ts material. [ 43H] '

.i In the instant case, although the charge :::tates that_ the ght:; e_ purchased tfrom the vendor was found tp be adulterated, there was _no_ alleg'ation thiit

Ube .ghee. SC!ld by the . appellant t? the vendor was adulterated. While the common obJect \Vas o sen the article of food sold, it is not said that it was to sell adulterated article of food.-

[42E] ·

(3) It is now well settled that for establishing an offence under the Act it is not necessary to establish mens rea i.e., criminal intention either on the part of the manufacturer or distributor or vendor.

Even knowledge on th'e

part of all of them that the food was adulterated is not necessary. Ignorance f. on the part of any one of them that the food was adulterated wouldl not absolve them of liability.

[42HJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 59 and 60 of 1971. •

From the judgment and order dated the 28th 0Gtober, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 8 and 9 of 1969.

E. C. Agarwala, for the appellant (in both the appeals)

B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent no. 2.

The Judgment of M. H. Beg and N. L. Untwalia, JJ. was delivered by Beg, J. A. Alagiriswami, J. gave a separate Opinion.

BEG, J .-These two criminal appeals, after certification of the cases as fit for decision by this Court, under Article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution, arise out of the prosecution of M/s. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander, Ghee Merchants and Commission Agents at Delhi, under Sections 7 /16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appellant was prosecuted jointly with Laxmi Narain, the vendor of 450 gms. of ghee to a Food Inspector, on 22-8-1967. On analysis, the sample was found to be adulterated.

Laxmi Narain, a partner of M/s. Laxmi Sweets, Delhi, in defence, successfully relied upon Section 19(2) of the Act and was acquitted.

Section 19, which reads as follows, may be set out here in tozo :

"19(1) It shall be no defence in a prosecution for an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food to allege merely that the vendor was ignorant of the nature, 'substance or quality of the food sold by him or that the purchaser having purchased any article for analysis was not prejudiced by the sale.

(2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offer.cc pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves-

( a) that be purchased the article of foo, d-

(i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a nuly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer;

(ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer,

(b)

with a written warranty in the prescribed torm; and

that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it ..

. , l.

(3) Any, person by whom a warranty as is referred to m A Section 14 is alleged to have been given shall be entitled to appear at the hearing and give evidence"·.

Section 14 of the Act, to which reference was made in Secl!on 19(3), says:

"S. 14. No manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article B of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed !or.m about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor.

Explanation.-In this section, in sub-section (2) of Section 19 and in Section 20A, the expression "distributor" shall include C a comn1ission agent''.

In the course of the trial, Laxmi Narain filed an appl!cat10n praying that the warrantor may be discharged or acquitted so that Laxm1 Narain may examme the warrantor as his defence witness to prove his own purchase ot the offending article under a warranty. It may be D mentioned that, as the complaint describes the warrantor accused as "M/s. Bhagwan Das J agdish Chander through an authorised person",

appearance was put in by Jagdish Chander, a partner, as the accused person responsible on behalf of the tirm.

The trying Magistrate allowed the application of Laxmi N aram and acquitted Jagdish Chander on the ground that Laxmi Narain E would be deprived of a valuable defence unless this was done and relied upon V. N. Chokra v. The State(') in support of this action.

Of course, an accused person has a right to appear in defence under Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and, Laxmi Narain, taking advantage of this provision, did depose in his own defence.

But, it seems that it was urged on behalf of Laxmi Narain that Jagdish F Chander could not be compelled to appear as a defence witness until he had been discharged or acquitted.

The Magistrate accepted this ground as good enough for the acquittal of Jagdish Chander. After the evidence of Jagdish Chander and Laxmi Narain, as defence witnesses, the trying Magistrate acquitted Laxmi Narain also on the ground that Laxmi Narain was protected by a warranty covered by Secti?n 1,9(2) of the Act.

Thus, both the accused persons were acqmtted.

After their acquittal, the Magistrate impleaded the manutacturers M/s .. Gann Shanker Prem Narain, under section 20A of the Act. Thi; prov!Slon reads as follows :

"20A.

Where at any time during the trial ot any offence H under this Act alleged to have been committed by any perso not bemg the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any articf~ of food, the Court 1s satisfied, on the evidence adduced b f it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also conc:r~:~

(1) AIR 1966 Punja]{ 421..

SUPREME GOuRT REP, ORTS

["1975] SUPP. S.C; R.

with that offen.ce, then, the Cort may, notwithsianding anythipg

contained in subcsection (1) of Section 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 1B98, or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20". ·

Although, we .are not concerned in the appeals before us with the prosecution of the manufacturer, M/s. Gauri Shanker Prem Narain, yet, we find that one of the questions framed for consideration and decided by the Delhi High Court relates to the meaning and scope of Section 20A of the Act. We may mention that a statement has been made at the Bar that the manufacturer has also been acquitted.

We do not know whether this acquittal was on the grourid that the manufacturer cannot be impleaded under section 20A of the Act after the trial is concluded by the acquittal of the two accused.

It is clear that Section 20A contemplates action which can only be taken during the course of the trial. A separate trial would require a "written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or of a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the .Central Government or the State Government or a local authority", unless it is a complaint by a purchaser, other than a Food Inspector, who could rely upon Section 12 of the Act.

But, an addition of an accused under section 20A of the Act constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction under section 20 (!) of the Act.

 In. the case before us, the prosecutor, the Munkipal Corporation of Delhi, appealed against the acquittals of Laxmi Na rain and Jagdlsh Chander.

In the Delhi High Court, two questions,· arising in the case before us and in other similar cases, were framed and referred for decision by a Full Bench as follows :

"(i) Whether a joint trial of the vendor, the distributor and the manufacturerer for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is illegal? and

(ii). What is. the scope of.Section 20A of th~ said Act?"

G On the !st question, the Full Bench held : that, the. general pro' cedure for joint trials, found in Sections 234 to 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, applies to prosecutions under the Act which contains no other or special procedure for joinder of charges or of accused persons in the same trial; that, the joint trial of the vendor Laxmi Narain with the warrantor Jagdish Chander was. permissible as the actions of both these accused form parts M the same transaction, as H e 1 xplainGed by this, CRourt&inAthc (f)tatethoft Athn_dhra Pradesh v._ Cf heembaapati aneswara ao nr. ; a , 1s view was rem orce y the consideration that mens. rea. was not an essential element for offences under the Act, and the High Court relied on the pronouncement of this Court iri Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seeds Merchants Assoc.iation v. Union of India(') for this proposition; that, proof

(I) [1964] 3 SCR 297.

12) [19701 (2) S.O.C: 71.

of a guilty mind is not necessary in statutes creating absolute liability for offences against public health and public welfare; that, there was a "unity of purpose" between the manufacturer and distributor and vendor of the adulterated article of food sold furnished by the purpose of all of them to sell; that, au indication of a "unity of puqi_qse", which is less stringent than either a "corr1mon object" or a Hco1nmon intentionn,

was sufficient to establish the sameness of a transaction for the pnr- B poses of Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code; that, although the joinder of the vendor or manufacturer in a single trial was legally .valid under section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it did not appear to be incumbent upou the Court to hold such a joint trial where such joinder may jeopardise the interests of justice; that, Section 19 of the Act, as it stands, does not require that the warrantor should be separately prosecuted only after the vendor had Successfully estab- C lisbed that he could rely upon a warranty covered by Section 19(2) of the Act; that, as both the vendor and his warrantor could. get an adequate opportunity to prove their cases in a trial for sale or an adulterated article under the Act, no. right of ari accused person, either in law or justice, was jeopardised by such a joint trial; that, in any event, a person accused of such an offence under the Act "can D always insist that a co-accused should be discharged or acquitte-d on the ground that be wants to examine him as a witness"; that, Section 19 ( 3) of the Act confers a right upon the vendor and not upon the warrantor; that, no interests of an accused person were prejudicially affected in the case before us by a joint trial of the vendor and the distributor. E . , As regards Section.20A ot the Act., the FuH Bench held: that, tb, is prbVlsion, which is an 'Exceptiort to Section 351"(1) of the Criminal

Procedure Code, "can be invoked after the trial of the vendor has commenced and before it has concluded and not after that"; and that, Section 20A of the Act is not controlled by Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code but is a self contained provision so that F "the person concerned in the offence",_ mentioned therein, is not to be equated with "a person who has committed the same offence" mentioned in Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. '

The High Court, whil~ maintaining the aquittal of Laxmi Narain" set aside the. acquittal of the appellant M/s. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander. It is not clear to us why two appeals to this Court became G necessary as the appellant does not question the correctness of the acqmttal of Laxm1 N aram. Separate Counsel have, however, appeared aqd 11rgued the case for the appellant firm and its partner Jagdish Chander. We propo~ to deal with t.he case as one only and assume that bot~ the firm and its. partner Jag<\1sh Chander question the validity of the tnal on. a complamt where the only .allegation against the appellant firm, arraigued as an accused through 1ts partner, was that it was a H ct1stnbutor. of the .. apulterated ghee sold., The charg" framed, against the appellant was :' ·

"That, on or about the 22nd day of Aug. 1967 at 12 'rioo~; sample of ghee was P1;1r'chase.d by Sh: V. P. Aiiand F:I. frnm accused No. I Lakshmi Naram and the said ghee was sold by .

you to accused No. I Laxmi Narain on 21-8-67 and the said sample of ghee on analysis was foun!d to be adulterated and hereby committed an offence punishable under sections 7 /16 of the Prevention of Food A_dulteration Act of 1954 and within my cognizance".

The material question before us, shorn of subtlety and bereft ot verbiage, could be said to be: Should this charge be quashed, after holding that the prosecution of the appellant, which was duly sanctioned by the competent authority, was invalid merely because, initially, the appellant was sent up for trial jointly with Laxmi Narain, or, alternatively, should we quash it on any other ground?

We are not impressed by the argument that a distributor could only be prosecuted for selling without giving a warranty to a vendor which is a separate offence under section 14 of the Act. It is clear from Section 14 itself that a manufacturer as well as a distributor can sell. The definition of "Sale", given in sub s. (xiii) of the Act, is wide• enough to include every kind of se!Jer. Every se!Jer can be prosecuted of an offence created by Section 7 of the Act which prohibits a sale as well as distribution of an adulterated article of food.

The mere fact that, for the purposes of Section 14, the person who could be the last se!Jer, in the sense that he sells to the actual consumer, is described as

"the vendor", could not affect a liability for an offence under section 7 of the Act by a sale of an article of food which is found to be adulterated. A sale of an article of food by a "manufacturer, distributor, or dealer" is a distinct and separable offence. Section 14 was not meant to carve out an exemption in favour of a distributor or a manufacturer who sells articles of food, found to be adulterated, irrespective of the question whether any warranty was given for them.

It is true that the manufacture of an adulterated arti- .clc of food for sale is also an offence under section 7 of the Act. But, neither Section 7 nor Section 14 of the Act bars trial of several offences by the same accused person, be he a manufacturer, a distributor, or a last seller, referred to as "the vendor" in Section 14 of the Act.

We are also unable to accept as correct a line of reasoning found in V. N. Chokra v. The State (supra) and Food Inspector, l'alghal

Municipality v. Setharam Rice & Oil Mills('), and in J'. B. Kurup

v. Food Inspector, Malappuram l'anchayat('), that, in every case G under the Act, there has to be initially a prosecution of a particular seller only, but those who may have passed on or sold the adulterated article of food to the vendor, who is being prosecuted, could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up under section 19(2) has been pleaded and shown to be substantiated. Support was sought for such a view by referring to the special provisions of Section 20A and Section 19(2) and Section 20 of the Act. A reason for Sec. 20A seems H to be that the prosecution of a person implcaded as an accused under Section 20A in the course of a trial does not require a separate sanction Section 20A itself lays down that, where the Court trying the offence is itself satisfied that a "manufacturer, distributor, or dealer is also

(1) 1974 F. A.C. p. 534(Crl. Appeal Nos. 222, 223, 225 to 227173 etc. etc. decided on 3-7-74).

(2) 1969 Kerala Law Times p. 845.

A concerned with an offence", for which an accused is being tried, the necessary sanction to prosecute will be deemed to have been given.

Another reason seems to be that such a power enables speedy trial of the really guilty parties. We are in agreement with the view , of the Delhi High Court that these special provisions do not take away or derogate cram the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law which enable separate as well as joint trials of accused persons in accor- B dance with the provisions of the old Sections 233 to 239 of Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, there seems no logically sound reason why, if a distributor or a manufacturer can be subsequently impleaded, under Section 20A of the Act, he cannot be joined as a co-accused initially in z joint trial if the allegations made justify such a course ..

This brings US to the most debated point in the case: Was the sale of ghee on 22-8-67 by the last seller or vendor, Laxmi Narain, so connected with the sale by the accused appellant J agdish Chander to Laxmi Narain on 21-8-67 that, if the ghce was found ad.ulterated in

the bands of Laxmi Na rain, the appellant Jagdish Chander could be prosecuted jointly with Laxmi Narain as the two sales were part of the D "same transaction" within th.e meaning of Section 239(d) of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 corresponding to Section 223 of the Code of 1973?·

We do not propose to attempt, in this case, the task of defining exhaustively what constitutes the same transaction within the meaning of Section 239 of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 corresponding to Section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It is practically impossible as well as undesirable to attempt such a definition of a concept which has to be necessarily elastic. Moreover, this Court has, in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalpati Ganeshwara Rao and Anr. (supra), already expressed its views (at page 321), which we respectfully quote and follow, on this question :

"What is meant by 'same transaction' is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task

to undertake a definition of that which the Lecrislature "has delib_erately left undefined .. We have not come acr:"iss a single deci- G .s10n of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of dening te .epresion. But, it is generally thought that where there IS yr?x1m1ty o~ tme or pl.ace or unity of purpose and design or c?ntmmty of act10n m respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to mfer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if seve- H ral acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction".

. Learned <; Counsel for the appellant, however. relies on the imme- , chately followmg observations (at page 322) : .

A "The connection between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction and, therefore, the mere absence of the . words 'so connected together as to form' in cl. (a), (c) and (d) of S. 239 would make little difference.

Now, a transaction may consist of an isolated act or may consist of a series of acts. The series of acts which constitute a transaction must of necessity be connected with one another and if some of them stand out independently, they would not form part of the same transaction bnt would constitute a different transaction or transactions.

Therefore, even if the expression 'same transaction' alone had been used ins. 235(1) it would have meant a transaction consisting either of a single act or of a sries of connected acts.

The expression 'same transaction' occurring in els. (a), (c) and

(d) of s. 239 as well as that occurring ins. 235(1) ought.to be given the meaning aecordirtg to the normal rule of construction of statutes".

. It .is contended that it would be dangerous to leave the "umty D of purpose and design", which may constitute a transaction, so ' vague as to bring in the manufacturer and every conceivable distributor as accused persons whenever any adulterated food, manufactured and sealed by one party and distributed by another, is finally sold by a vendor in the market. The learned Counsel for the appel- !ant contnded that we must, therefore, restrict the concept of a "transaction", in a prosecution for sale of an adulterated article 6f E. food, to an alleged criminal participat, ion in the adulteration of the actual article of food sold. It was l!T!led that some vague and general connection or concern of all the co-accused as manufacturers or distributors of the article sold will not do. It had, according to •the contention on behalf of the appellant, to be specifically alleged that the accused was concerned with the adulteration or sale of the parti- F cular article of food sold. Tk argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant seems to us to go so far as to suggest that an allegation was indispensable of a participation in some kind of conspiracy to sell the actual adulterated article of food which was sold in order to enable a trial in which the seller, the distributor, and the manufacturcf could be jointly tried for o!Iences which could be looked npon as parts of a single transaction.

To accept such an argument G. would be to import into such a case the need to establish a conspiracy between the accused manufacturer or distributor, as the case may be, and the actual vendor or .the last seller to the consumer.

We think that such a result would be ob.viously incorrect..

It was pointed out. by this Court, in .Sarjoo Prasad v. The. State of Uttar Pradesh( 1), that mens rea, in the sense of a guilty .knowledge of adulteration of the. food sold, is . not necessary to . prove for an H offence. under sction 7 of the Act. . Indeed, Section 19 ( 1) specifically rules ant such a defence although S. 19(2) makes it available in the particular case of. the accused who has .. taken .the pn; caut10n of protecting himself from what seems otherwise .to be an absolute liability without proof of gmlty knowledge. Even 1.f we were to widen

(') A.TR 1974 SC 2154.

BHAGWAN DASS' v. P}lLHl APMN. (Beg,/,) 3!1

the concept of "mens rea" here to embrace carelessness or indiffer• ence as the required states of mind in the manufacture or distribu~ tiol\ or sale of an adulterated article of food, as an ingredient of a legally punishable offence, the law obviously and expressly does_ not require parties to an offence under the Act. to have a particular guilty knowledge about the particular item of food found to be adulterated. We cannot introduce such a requirement into a case simply .B because several accused , persons are being jointly tried.

The law does require proof, for a successful defence, of a degree of care and caution revealed by the actions of the seller, distributor, or manufacturer, which will be enQj, igh to procure an exemption froni criminal liability for a sale of adulterated article of food without knowledge of its actu'al adulteration.

But, we cannot, for this reason, equate such an offence with one in which the co-accused must necessarily have a common knowledge or design to sell an article actually known to them to be adulterated. In other words, a particular state of mind, which could be described as guilty or wrongful, could not, even if it could 1Joe there individually and separately in a particular case, proviqe the connecting link between the coaccused in a trial for such an offence in order to consfaute the same D transaction.

The link, if any, has to be found elsewhere.

In our opinion, considering the character of the offence and the nature of the activities of manufacturers and distributors, who generally deal in bulk, and of the ordinary vendor, who sells particular items to the consumer, the common link, which could provide the E unity of purpose or design so as to weave their separate acts or omissions into one transaction, has to be their common intention that a particular article, found adulterated, should reach the consumer as food.

Ignorance of the fact of adulteration is immaterial. In order to justify a joint trial of accused their common object or intention to sell the article as food is enough. In such a case of a strict !ia- F bility created by statute, for safeguarding public health, the mental connection between the acts and omissions of the manufactu'rer, the distributor, and the last vendor would be provided simply by the common design or intention that an article of food, found to be adulterated, should reach and be used as food by the consumer.

Each person dealing with such an article has to prove that he has shewn du.e .care' .and .caution by. tak.ing prescribed. steps in order to G escape cnmmal !rnbahty. Otherwise, if one may so put it, a mens rea shared_by tem 1s presumed from.a common carelessness exhibited by them. Agam, a sale at an antenor stage by a manufacturer or distributor to a vendor and 1he sale by the vendor to the actual consumer could be viewed as linked with each other as cause and effect.

th We t?ink that the activi!ies of the manufacturer, the distributor and H e retail seller are sufficiently connected, in such a case of sale of an arl!cl.e of food found to be adulterated, . by a unity of purpose

~!!d de~1~, an~, th.erefore,. of a transaction, so as to make their

JOnt trial possible Ill a swtable case.

But at the same time we th_mk that, where . a joinder of several acnsed persons concrned with dealmg in different_ ways with the same adulterated article of

10 SC/75-4

A food at different stages is likely to jeopardise a fair trial, a separate trial ought to be ordered. It is not proper to acquit or discharge an accused person on this ground alone.

The ordering of a separate trial, in a case where prejudice to an accused from a joint trial is , apprehended, is enough. Indeed, we can go even further and say that, ordinarily, they ought to be separately tried. But, a joint trial of such B accused persons is not ab-initio illegal. It can take place in suitable cases.

We may point out that, in V. N. Kamdar & Anr., v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi( 1), this Court held (at p. 161) :

"The normal rule uuder the Criminal Procedure Code is to try each accused separately when the offence committed by him is distinct and separate. The.provisions of ss. 233 to 239 would indicate that joint trial is the exception. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao & Anr., [1964) (3) SCR 297, 324) this Court said that separate trial is the normal rule, and joint trial is an exception when

D the accused have committed separate offences. Section 5 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that the provisions of that Code will apply to trial of an offence under any law

other than the Indian Penal Code subject to any enactment. for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherWise dealing with such offence."

In Kadiri Kunhahammad v. The State of Madras( 2 ) , this Court said (at p. 663) :

"Section 239(d) authorises a joint trial of persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; and there can be n_o doubt that in deciding the question whether or not more persons than one can be tried together uuder the said section, the criminal Court has to consider the nature of the accusation made by the prosecution. It would be unreasonable to suggest that though the accusation made by the prosecution would justify a joint trial of more persons than one, the validity of such a trial could JJ., effectively challenged if the said accusation is not established according to law. It is true that, in framing the charge against more persons than one and directing their joint trial, Courts should carefully examine the nature of the accusation; but if they are satisfied that prima facie the accusauon made shows that several persons are charged of different offences and that the said offences prima facie appear to have been committed in the course of the same transaction, their joint trial can and should be ordered."

We dq not interpret Kadiri Kunhahammad's case (supra) to mean that a joint trial of accused persons is obligatory in every case where : a catenation of facts, said to constitute separate but related or cognate

(l) [19741 (1) S.C.R. 157@ 161.

(2) A.I.R. 1960 SC 661 @663.

BHAGWAN DASS v. DELHI Af>MN.- (Beg,!.) . 41

offences, can be viewed as one transaction. The q, uestion whether there + should be a joint or separate trial in a case should be deterrnilled on .the facts of that case and the requirements of justice there. As pointed

out by this Court in V. N. Kamdar & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) the special provisions of Section 20A are only enabling and do not give rise to a mandatory duty. They do not bar either a separate or a joint trial of an accused person if other condi- B tions are satisfied. Similarly, Section. 239(d) of the Criminal Procer

dure Code of 1898, which is reproduced as Section 223 ( d) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, is only an enabling section. No doubt it has to be shewn that the requirements of Section 239(d} have been fulfilled whenever this provision is sought to be utilised.

The result is that we think that, in a suitable case, a vendor, a C distributor, and _a manufacturer could be tried together provided the allegations made before the Court show that there are conuecting links between their activities so as to constitute the same transaction. The connecting links, in a case such as the one before us, could be provided by: firstly, the fact that a sale at an anterior stage could be viewed as the cause of the subsequent sale; secondly, the allegation that each D of the accused parted with the article of food when it was in an adulterated state ; and, thirdly, by the common object of the manufacturer the distributor, and the vendor, that the article should reach the consumer to be used as food. The third and last mentioned link seems decisive and must tilt the balance in favour of legality of a joint trial of the parties concerned. But, we are also conscious of the fact that E Courts canuot ignore broader requirements of justice.

In the case before us, hll that the complaint states is that the appellant firm had sold the offending ghee to the vendor Laxmi Narain a day earlier. The assertion that it was in an adulterated state at that time was wanting in the complaint. Although, the charge framed, set out above, states that the sample of ghee sold by Laxmi F

Narain, to whom it was sold by the appellant, was found in an adulterated state, yet, it is not stated there that it was in that very state when the appellant had sold it to Laxmi Narain. It is true that Laxmi Narain successfully pleaded a . warranty under which he ootained the ghee from the appellant firm. It is left to be inferred from these facts that . the appellant also sold the ghee while it was in an adulterated state. It could be urged that this would follow from the successful de- G fence of Laxmi Narain. The defects in the charge would not invalidate the trial. But, we think that a continuation of such an old prosecution is likely to handicap the accused Jagdish Chander in his defence. Even if we were to assume that the charge, as framed, implies the allegation .that the ghee was adulterated also when the distributor sold it to the vendor, an enquiry in 1975 into the actual state of the ghee sold by the distributor to the vendor in 1967 would be obviously difficult. The U

appellant, content with the initial acquittal, had probably rested on his oars and not taken the trouble to challenge the correctness of the analyst's report. And, even if that report was quite correct it may not establish the state in which the small quantity of ghee analysed was when it. was sold by the distributor. It would impose undue hardship on the distributor to prove, at this distance of time, the actual state

SUPJ.l!!r.i; I! (; OUltT RBl'ORTS . [l9751' suPP. S.C.R.

A of the small quantity of ghee analysed which must have been a part of the consignment supplied by the distributor who is perhaps also relying on the manufacturer's warranty. Although we hold, in agreement with the Pdhi High Court, that tbe joint trial of the appellant with Laxmi Narain was not illegal, we think that, on the special facts of this case, the interests of justice will be better served by quashing B such a stale charge because the appellant's defence will suffer if he JS called upon. to answer it now.

Consequently, we allow these appeals to the extent that we quash the charge against the appellant and rder that he be discharged.

ALAGIRISWAMI, J .-I agree with my learned brothers as regards c the final conclusions arrived at and the order propesed., But I think it is necessary to say a few words on the first question which was decided by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court.

The question is as follows : ·

"(i) Whether a joint trial of the vendor, the distributor and the manufacturer for offences under the Prevention of D Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is illegal ?

It is unnecessary to set 9ut the facts which are found in the judgment of my learned brothers. The Full Bench found that the joint trial of the vendo~ Laxmi Narain with the warrantor J agdish Chander (the appellant before us) was permissible as the actions of ooth these accused form parts of the same transaction, that there w~ a unity o{ purpose between the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor of .the adulterated articles of food sold furnished by the purpose of all of them to sell, that an indication oJ' a unity of purpose was sufficient .to establish the sameness of a transaction as conlemplated by s. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The charge framed against the appellant is as follows :

"That you, on or about the 22nd day of August 1967 at 12 noon a sample of ghee was purchased by Shri V. P.

Anand F.I. from accused No. I Lakshmi Narain and the said ghee was sold by you to accused No. 1 Lakshmi Narain on 21-8-1967 and the said sample of ghee in analysis was found to be adulterated and hereby committed an offence punishable under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954 and within my cognizance."

1t would be noticed that while the charge states tht the sample of ghee purchased from Lakshmi Narain was found to be adulterated, there is no allegation that the ghee sold by the appellant to Lakshmi Narain was adulterated. While it may be readily conceded that the H common object or common intention or unity of purpose between the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor was to sell the article of food sold, it is not said that it was to sell the adulterated article of food. It is true that it is now well established that for establishing an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act it is not necessary to establish mens rea i.e. criminal intention either on the

BHAGWAN DASS v. DELHI ADMN. (Alagiriswami, J.)

pan of the manufacturer or distributor or vendor. Even knowledge on the part of all of them that the food was adulterated is not necessary. Ignorance on the part of any one of them that the food was adulterated would not absolve them of liability. But before the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor could be tried jointly it must

43.

be alleged that the manufactured food was adulterated when the manufacturer passed it on to the distributor and; it was also adulterated when B the distributor passed it on to the vendor arid that it was adulterated when the vendor sold it to the consumer. It is not necessary to prove that the article of food was adulterated !lt all the three stages for the

purpore of deciding the validity of the charge being framed against all the three of them provided the necessary allegation is there. At that stage the queruon of proof does not come in.

The validity of the charge hastobe decided on the facts put forward asthe prosecution c case. If it is no~ established against any one of them that the article of food manufactured, distributed or sold by him was adulterated that person Will be acquitted, not because the charge was not valid or was defective but because there was no proof to substantiate the charge.

But without that allegation there cannot be said to be a unity of purpose or common object or common intention on the part Q of all of. them to manufacture, distribute or sell the adulterated food.

The manufacture, distribution and sale of adulterated ghee would be

tbe same transaction if it was found to be adulterated at all the three stages. Otherwis.e it only means that they were all sanie transaction only in the sense that the common object of all of them is the sslling of the ghee.

Selling ghee by itself is not an ofience; only selling E 'adulterated ghee is an offence. The Delhi High Court is not therefote correct in saying that the action of both the accused forn:t part of the same transaction and there was unity of purpose of the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor furnished by the purpose of an of them to sell and therefore it was the same transaction and all of them could be tried together. It would not be the same transaction in so far as selling adulterated ghee was concerned unless the ghee was F in fact adulterated at every one of these stages.

If the common purpose all of them was to sell ghee joint trial of all of them would not be valid but if it was t.o sell. adulterated ghee it would be valid.

t~ it _is eged .that at every one Of the stages, that is of manufacture, distribution and sale the ghee was adulterated then .it would be the same transaction and they could all be jointly tried. In the absence G of .an allegation that the ghee distributed by. the appellant to the ve11dor Lakshmi Narain was adulerated both of them canno.t be tried together. The manufacturer could also have been tried along with them only if it is alleged that the ghee he manufactured was adulterated fo the absence of this allegation there cannot be a joint trial.

At tJie 8\fige of nsidering the Validity of the charge it is the allegation t 1s material;, at 'the .stage of considering the guilt of \he parties H 1t is prOOf that 1s matenaL In the present case it may be that the appet could be prosecuted for giving a false warranty because he

ad issued a warranty and the fOOd sold by the vendor to whom he issued the warranty was found to be adulterated.

f'.~'El.Jt ,, ' . : ' ', h , A'p(Je'als 'Ill/owed.

, I ::., .• ; .!_'./ . -

BHAGWAN DASS JAGDISH CHANDER

DELHI.ADYIJNISTRATION

M. H. BEG

A. ALAGIRISWAMI AN.D N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ

Ss. 7, 16 and 19(2)

S. 20A

ss. 7 and 16

S. 7

S. 14

S. 14

s. 7

Section 14

Ss. 19(2) and 20A

Ss. 233 to 239

s. 20A

S. 20A

S. 239(d)

Article 134(l)(c)

Sections 7

Section 19(2)

Section 19

Section 14

Section 14

S. 14

Section 19

Section 20A

Section 342A

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 20A

Section 351

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 20

section 20

Section 20A

section 20A

Section 20A

Section 12

section 20A

section 20

Section 20A

Sections 234 to 239

[1964] 3 SCR 297

Section 239

section 239

Section 19

Section 19(2)

Section 19

Section 351

Section 20A

Section 239

Section 239

sections 7

section 14

Section 14

Section 7

Section 14

section 7

Section 14

section 7

Section 7

Section 14

Section 14

section 19(2)

Section 20A

Section 19(2)

Section 20

Sec. 20A

Section 20A

Section 20A

Sections 233 to 239

Criminal Procedure Code

Section 20A

Section 239(d)

Criminal Procedure Code

Section 223

Section 239

Criminal Procedure Code

Section 223

S. 239

s. 239

article 6

Section 19

S. 19(2)

ss. 233 to 239

Section 5

Indian Penal Code

Section 239(d)

Section 20A

Section 223

s. 239

section 7